Jama Intern Med 2014 Aug 174(8) 2 Meaning

Embed Size (px)

Citation preview

  • 8/11/2019 Jama Intern Med 2014 Aug 174(8) 2 Meaning

    1/2

    Copyright 2014 American Medical Association. All rig hts reserved.

    TheMeaning of Brain Death

    A Different View

    The recent caseof Jahi McMath, a teenager in Oak-

    land, California, was extensively publicized in the news

    media and led to prominent commentaries in medical

    journals on the meaning of brain death.1,2 McMath is a

    14-year-old adolescent who in December 2013 experi-

    enced devastating neurologicaldamage following com-

    plications froma tonsillectomy. McMathmet criteriafor

    thediagnosisof brain death.She continues,however,to

    receive mechanical ventilation,tube feedings,and sup-

    portive care at an undisclosed location, with her treat-

    ment financed by private funds,according to the most

    recent reports.

    Virtually allof thecommentaryon theMcMath case

    has focused on how unreasonable it wasfor her family

    to insist on the continued use of life support. One bio-

    ethicist was quoted in USA Todayas saying of the un-

    named medical facilitywhere McMath was placedon a

    ventilator, What could they be thinking? Their think-

    ing must bedisordered,froma medical pointof view.

    There is a word for this: crazy.3 Another bioethicist in-

    sistedthat continued mechanical ventilationwas notlife

    support and that the teenager was not a patient be-

    causeshe was dead. The bioethicistwas quotedas say-

    ing that the newphysicians aretrying to ventilateand

    otherwise treat a corpse. She is going to start to

    decompose.3

    Inourview,theseandothercommentatorshaveig-

    nored an important distinction between braindeath as

    a biological phenomenon and as a legal status.4,5 For

    morethan 200years,the essentialfeaturesof living or-ganisms have been the subject of scientific investiga-

    tion. At present, we understand life to be defined in

    termsofthecapacityoforganismstouseenergyinmain-

    taining a stable homeostatic internal environment and

    integratedfunctioning.6Whenanorganismlosesthisca-

    pacity, it hasdied. Thisdefinitionappliesacross thebio-

    logical spectrum, fromsingle-celled organisms to com-

    plex plants and animals.

    The history of brain death reveals a persistent and

    continuedfailureto connect theconceptof brain death

    withthisbiological understanding of lifeand death. The

    1968 report from the Ad Hoc Committee of the Har-

    vard Medical Schoolto Examine theDefinition of BrainDeath proposed a definition of irreversible coma but

    provided no reason to consider patients in this condi-

    tion to be actually dead.6

    In 1981, the Presidents Commission for the Study

    ofEthical Problemsin Medicineand Biomedical andBe-

    havioral Researchasserted thatbrain-deadpatients did

    in fact fulfill this biological definitionbecause they had

    lost the integrated functioning of the organism as a

    whole.7(p33)Overthe pastseveraldecades,however, in-

    controvertibleevidenceshowsthat thisassertion is false.

    Many individuals with a diagnosis of brain death can

    maintainintegrated functioning for prolongedperiods,

    evenyears.These functionsmay include circulation,di-

    gestion,excretionof waste products,temperaturecon-

    trol,woundhealing, fightinginfections,growthand de-

    velopment, and gestating a fetus.8 We now know that

    the integrated functioning of the organism as a whole

    is an emergent property of living organisms and is not

    dependenton a central organizersuch as thebrain. The

    fact that those with a diagnosis of brain death cannot

    breathe without being supported by a ventilator does

    not make them dead because this is no different from

    the situation of patients with high-level spinal cord in-

    jury whoare unableto breathespontaneouslybut surely

    are alive.

    The scientific evidence is clearin many cases,

    brain-dead patients are biologically alive. Neverthe-

    less, there is good reason to maintain the widely

    accepted policy stance that those with a diagnosis of

    brain death are legally dead. Prior to the development

    of intensive care medicine, when the mind ceased to

    function the body also ceased to function. However,

    technology such as the mechanical ventilator permits

    the body to continue vital functions even when the

    patients capacity for mental life has been irreversibly

    lost. The unfortunate individual in this condition is

    biologically alive but psychologically dead. With no

    mental life, there is no value in living. This makes it

    reasonable to treat a patient who is brain dead as

    legally dead; the patient is as good as dead. Maintain-ing life support can be of no value for a person in an

    irreversible coma; nor cansuch a personbe harmed or

    wronged by procuring their organs for transplanta-

    tion, as long as valid consent has been obtained.

    Patients whohave correctlyreceived a diagnosis of

    being in a persistent vegetative statealso have perma-

    nently lostconsciousness. At present, the clinical crite-

    ria for diagnosing the persistent vegetative state are

    much less reliable thanthose for braindeath, however.

    Thus, it is not prudent to consider a patient in a persis-

    tent vegetative state as legally dead.

    The legalstatusof braindeathhasanalogiestoother

    areas of the law, in which entities may be given a legalstatusthatdiffersfromthenatureoftheentity.Apromi-

    nent example is thelegaldoctrine that a corporationis

    a person in the eyes of the law. It may serve appropri-

    atelegalpurposesinapplyingthelawtocorporationsto

    treatthem as persons,even though theyare, of course,

    not persons.6Similarly, someindividualsare deemed le-

    gally blind despite thefactthatthey retainlimitedeye-

    sight.Althoughthosewithadiagnosisofbraindeathare

    not biologically dead, they are properly understood as

    legally dead.

    VIEWPOINT

    Robert D.Truog,MD

    Division of Critical Care

    Medicine,Boston

    Childrens Hospital,

    Boston, Massachusetts,

    andDivisionof Medical

    Ethics, Harvard Medical

    School, Boston,

    Massachusetts.

    FranklinG. Miller,PhD

    Departmentof

    Bioethics, National

    Institutesof Health,

    Bethesda, Maryland.

    Corresponding

    Author: RobertD.

    Truog, MD,Division of

    Critical Care Medicine,

    Boston Childrens

    Hospital, 300

    Longwood Ave, Bader

    621, Boston, MA02115

    (robert.truog

    @childrens.harvard

    .edu).

    Opinion

    jamainternalmedicine.com JAMA Internal Medicine August 2014 Volume 174, Number8 1215

    Copyright 2014 American Medical Association. All rig hts reserved.

    wnloaded From: http://archinte.jamanetwork.com/ by a Universita Torino User on 08/08/2014

  • 8/11/2019 Jama Intern Med 2014 Aug 174(8) 2 Meaning

    2/2

    Copyright 2014 American Medical Association. All rig hts reserved.

    Most families have no interest in continuing life support once

    theycome to understandthat their loved one is irreversibly uncon-

    scious. Buthow should we respond to families like McMaths, who

    wish to maintain life support fora family member whois in an irre-

    versible coma andlegally dead? To insistthat such families are ob-

    viously mistaken or in denial is not helpful because from a biologi-

    calperspectivetheymay wellbe correctthattheir lovedone remains

    alive.Continuing life support in the intensive care unit of a hospitalis not anappropriate useof this expensiveand scarceresourcebe-

    cause such care can offer no medical benefit. As a matter of re-

    spect, however, for thosefew families whoinsist on continued life

    support,clinicians shouldbe preparedto facilitatetransferto a long-

    term care institution that is willing to maintain such patients. In-

    deed, New Jerseylegally requires this approach.6(p55)

    Whoshould payfor this continuedtreatment? On onehand, it

    seems reasonable to say that traditional third-party payers should

    notfundthe continued careof patientsdeemed legallydead.On the

    other hand, third-party payers routinelypay for continuedlife sup-

    portforpatientsinapersistentvegetativestatepatientswho,ifcor-

    rectly diagnosed, arealso irreversibly unconsciouswith nohope for

    a meaningful life.Evenif thedifference in legal status is clear, it may

    seem ethically arbitrary to provide financial support in one situa-

    tion and notthe other. Veatch9 has thereforeargued thatall states

    should follow New Jerseysexample,which is to allow patientsand

    families to opt out of accepting brain death and to choose to have

    deathdetermined by biological criteria.

    Itmightseem that allowingpatientsand families tochoose their

    definition of death would have many practical problems, but in-

    deeditseemstohaveworkedwellinNewJersey.Familiesrarelywant

    to continue thebiological existenceof a patient whois irreversiblycomatose. Respecting defensible minority views that do not im-

    posesubstantial burdens onothersis reasonableand in accord with

    theideals of a liberal society.

    Facing the reality of brain death raises important questions

    about the role of physicians in helping to resolve complex issues

    in law, medicine, and public policy. We should provide the public

    with the best scientific data and thinking available and allow soci-

    ety through the democratic process to use those data in deter-

    mining the best policy. In our view, the medical profession, by

    insisting that brain death has a biological status even though this

    status is unfounded, has not upheld this obligation. Trust and the

    public interest would be best served by a more honest discussion

    about the meaning of brain death. We owe the public and our

    patients no less.

    ARTICLE INFORMATION

    Published Online: June9, 2014.

    doi:10.1001/jamainternmed.2014.2272.

    Conflict of Interest Disclosures: Nonereported.

    Disclaimer: Theopinionsexpressed arethe views

    of theauthorsand do notnecessarilyreflect the

    policy of theNational Institutes of Health, the

    PublicHealth Service,or theUS Departmentof

    Health and HumanServices.

    REFERENCES

    1. GostinLO. Legaland ethical responsibilities

    following braindeath: the McMath and Muozcases.JAMA. 2014;311(9):903-904.

    2. MagnusDC, Wilfond BS,Caplan AL.Accepting

    braindeath. N EnglJ Med. 2014;370(10):891-894.

    3. SzaboL. Ethicistscriticizetreatmentof teen,

    Texas patient. USA Today. January 10,2014. http:

    //www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/01

    /09/ethicists-criticize-treatment-brain

    -deadpatients/4394173/.Accessed April 24,2014.

    4. Truog RD,Miller FG. Changing theconversation

    aboutbrain death.Am J Bioeth. Inpress.

    5. TruogRD,Miller FG.Definingdeath: the

    importanceof scientific candorand transparency.

    IntensiveCare Med. Inpress.

    6. MillerFG, TruogRD. Death, Dying,and OrganTransplantation. NewYork, NY: Oxford University

    Press;2012.

    7. Presidents Commission for theStudy of Ethical

    Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and

    Behavioral Research. Defining Death:A Reporton

    theMedical,Legal, andEthical Issuesin the

    Determinationof Death. Washington, DC:

    Government Printing Office; 1981.

    8. Shewmon DA. Chronic braindeath:

    meta-analysis and conceptualconsequences.

    Neurology. 1998;51(6):1538-1545.

    9. Veatch R. Letparentsdecide if teen is dead.

    CNN.com. January 2, 2014. http://www.cnn.com

    /2014/01/02/opinion/veatch-defining-death.

    Accessed April 24,2014.

    Opinion Viewpoint

    1216 JAMAInternal Medicine August 2014 Volume 174, Number 8 jamainternalmedicine.com

    Copyright 2014 American Medical Association. All rig hts reserved.

    wnloaded From: http://archinte.jamanetwork.com/ by a Universita Torino User on 08/08/2014