Jakubowicz PTKS Conference Paper

7/31/2019 Jakubowicz PTKS Conference Paper

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Karol Jakubowicz

Democracy and New Media: Do the Two Go Together?

(Work in progress)

Prepared for delivery at an International Conference

on

Political Communication in the Era of New Technologies

organized by the Polish Communication Association and the University of Warsaw

Warsaw, September 22-23, 2011

Foreword

First, a salutary warning from James Curran:

The literature on media and democracy is in need of a removal van to carry away lumberaccumulated over two centuries. What should be discarded, what should be kept and

how the intellectual furniture should be rearranged is something that needs to be thoughtabout in a NEW WAY (Curran, 2002: 217; emphasis added).

The reasons for this radical view can easily be understood. Democracy has long been incrisis that is now threatening to leave it as an empty shell. There are those who claim that welive in a post-democracy era. In any case, democracy is undergoing what some scholars callits third transformation, so old concepts and theories are increasingly in need of reformulation.That in itself requires a re-examination of the role of the media in democracy all the more sothat the media themselves are in a period of socially-, culturally- and technologically drivenupheaval. These processes are all ongoing, so this paper cannot but be a work in progress,given that it concerns processes that are themselves works in progress.

We will first seek to understand some of the main reasons for the crisis of democracyand some concepts regarding its future shape. Then we will review briefly the roles of themedia in the operation of the democratic system. Then, we will take a look at what the termnew media means in practice and how in reality it stands for three generations of newmedia. Only then will it be possible to deal with the matter at hand, i.e. the new medias role indemocracy now and in the future. First, we will present the promise of the crucial role thatenthusiasts believe the new digital media can play in reviving and rejuvenating democracy.Then we will read out the indictment of the destructive role of the new media in democracy thatsome scholars have formulated. And to see which of the schools of thought is closer to themark, we will look on the basis of available evidence at what the impact of the Internet is likelyto have, on two crucial elements of democracy: the civil society and the public sphere.


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Crisis and Future of Democracy

In 1975, the Trilateral Commission published a report on the state democracy (Crozier,Huntington, Watanuki, 1975), noting that while democracy had performed well in Trilateralcountries during the first 25 years after World War II, later it suffered from a crisis. That turnedit into an anomic democracy, where there is consensus on the rules of the democratic game,

but no longer a sense of purpose as to what the game is for.Colin Crouch (cited after Blhdorn, 2006: 71) maintains that in general democracy can

at best be a momentary experience, and that after a democratic moment which, he says, didindeed last some quarter of a century in Western countries we have to expect an inevitableentropy of democracy. The result, according to Crouch, has been a post-democraticrevolution. As a result, virtually all the formal components of democracy survive, but citizenshave, in his opinion, been reduced to the role of manipulated, passive, rare participants. Politics

and government are increasingly slipping back into the control of privileged elites in the mannercharacteristic of pre-democratic times. Post-democratic politics, according to Crouch, has littleinterest in widespread citizen involvement or the role of organizations outside the businesssector. Citizens remain indispensable as the source of political legitimacy, but this can beobtained by means of minimal participation (ritualized elections, consultation processes andtightly managed exercises of public involvement), while policy is really shaped in private byinteraction between elected governments and elites that overwhelmingly represent businessinterests.

This view of the malaise to be found in established democracies is quite widely sharedby other authors, as we will see below. To try and understand the process which has led to theseresults, let us recall that Crozier, Huntington and Watanuki (1975) identified three challenges todemocracy and ascribed its crisis to the fact that it had been hit by all three of themsimultaneously:

contextual challengesthesearise autonomously from the external environments in whichdemocracies operate and are not directly a product of the functioning of democraticgovernment itself. Changes in the international distribution of economic, political, andmilitary power and in the relations both among the Trilateral societies and between themand the Second and Third Worlds now confront the democratic societies with a set ofinterrelated contextual challenges inflation, commodity shortages, international monetarystability, the management of economic interdependence, and collective military security

affect all the Trilateral societies; changes in social structure and social trends: at one time or another, threats to the viability

of democratic government have come from the aristocracy, the military, the middle classes,and the working class. Presumably, as social evolution occurs, additional threats may wellarise from other points in the social structure;

I ntrinsic challenges to the viability of democratic government which grow directly out ofthe functioning of democracy. Democratic government, the authors explain, does notnecessarily function in a self-sustaining or self-correcting equilibrium fashion. It mayinstead function so as to give rise to forces and tendencies which, if unchecked by someoutside agency, will eventually lead to the undermining of democracy. The more democratica system is, indeed, the more likely it is to be endangered by intrinsic threats. Intrinsic

challenges are, in this sense, more serious than extrinsic ones. In recent years, they continue,the operations of the democratic process do indeed appear to have generated a breakdown of

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traditional means of social control, a delegitimation of political and other forms of authority,and an overload of demands on government, exceeding its capacity to respond.

This framework is still useful today and can assist us in understanding also the currentsituation. In addition to the loss of a sense of purpose as to what the democratic game is for, we

could also mention two more manifestations of the crisis of democracy, interlinked with thechallenges listed by Crozier, Huntington and Watanuki (1975):

Doubt as to the rules of the democratic game and whether they would be effective, ifobserved;

And what we could call the disappearance of the players of that game, a profoundstructural crisis which cannot easily be remedied within the traditional model of democracy

As for contextual challenges, the above list should be complemented with a few moreitems, including globalisation, the weakening of the nation state, European integration and thedemocratic deficit of the European Union, inter-cultural migration, demographic trends,

economic performance, technological change, state capacity, individuation, mediatisation and aprevailing sense of insecurity (Schmitter, Trechsel, 2004: 3).

Regarding social trends, leading to the growing loss of faith in democracy, we couldmention a 2007 report by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. It notes theincreasing feeling of political discontent and disaffection among citizens, which is wellillustrated by a declining turnout at elections and a growing disappointment or indifferencetowards politics, especially among the young generation. This phenomenon is seen as beinginterrelated with the dysfunctioning of some political institutions in many countries: political

parties have partly lost their capacity to be a link between citizens and state; representativenessof parliaments is all too often questionable; basic principles of democracy such as separation of

powers, political freedoms, transparency and accountability are widely perceived, andsometimes rightly so, as being insufficiently implemented or not implemented at all (Gross,2007).

Changes in social structure and other social trends have also contributed to what wehave called disappearance of the players of the democratic game, a process mentioned bymany authors, including those of the Trilateral Commissions report itself. They stated thatreligion, nationalism, and ideology used to be the sources of the sense of purpose in using therules of democracy to attain the objectives resulting from those inspirations. However, neitherchurch, nor state, nor class now commands people's loyalties We have witnessed thedissipation of religion, the withering away of nationalism, the declineif not the endof class-

based ideology (Crozier, Huntingon, Wanatuki, 1975: 159-160). This, let us remember, is a

diagnosis of the situation strictly in the Trilateral countries and not others in 1975, butunfortunately later developments showed that the authors were too optimistic about nationalismand, to a lesser extent, about religion as a source of a sense of purposes for large segments ofthe population.

The process has picked up momentum since then. Ulrich Beck refers to the fact thataccording to Zygmunt Bauman in the 21st century the developed world entered the second,liquid phase of modernity. In very dramatic terms and perhaps with some exaggeration, hesays that in these circumstances all existing modern social, economic, and political institutions

the church (or mosque, temple), the family, journalism, the nation-state, party-baseddemocracy have become zombie institutions: living dead categories, which blind thesocial sciences to the rapidly changing realities inside the nation-state containers, and outside as

well (cited after Deuze, 2008: 857)

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Finally, let us cite Ivan Krastev who maintains that democracy requires the existence ofstrong players: strong government, strong opposition, strong left and right-wing parties. Wheneveryone is weak and wishy-washy, the system does not work. There is no reason to turn out forelections or to vote. Everybody wants to be in a grey centre (akowski, 2011). The result, asSwanson and Mancini (1996) describe this, is the secularization of politics, leading ultimately

to the emergence of virtual politics, whereby the virtual reality of propaganda replaces reality.Krastev argues that because of all this the entire social infrastructure of democracy hasbeen eroded, and democracy now amounts mainly to the rotation of elites. He explains:

Where are the workers? In China. Where are trade unions? They are declining in theWest and count for practically nothing in the East. Where are newspaper readers thecore of the enlightened electorate in classical democracies? They are disappearingtogether with the newspapers themselves. Where are the tax payers? They havemostly become VAT payers. Ministers of finance no longer serve taxpayers, butinvestors. And what about journalists and independent media? They [have transformedinto tabloids]. (akowski, 2011).

As forintrinsic challenges to the viability of democratic government, growing directlyout of the functioning of democracy, we can mention four especially important ones:neoliberalism, populism, nationalism and illiberalism. Closer examination of these processeswould extend beyond the scope of this paper, but it is clear that together with the erosion of theframework for the democratic process and of the social infrastructure of democracy, they addup to a major structural crisis that does not admit of an easy fix and most probably not withinthe old model of democracy.

There is, of course, no easy answer to the question regarding the future of democracy, orindeed the role of the media in the democratic system. What is known as the currently unfoldingthird transformation of democracy (Blhdorn, 2006) may take it in a variety of directions.

Robert Dahl (1995) considers this process to be associated with the era of globalizationand the need, as previously (transformation of city-state democracy into nation-statedemocracy), to adjust democracy to the new circumstances and scale of its transnational or evenglobal operation. He warns that the danger is that the third transformation will not lead to anextension of the democratic idea beyond the national state but to the victory in that domain ofde facto guardianship. In the course of its historical evolution, democracy seems to Dahl to beincrementally moving away from the theoretical ideal of rule of the people, and an increasingdemocratic deficit emerges.

Andrs Krsnyi (2007; 2011; Blhdorn, 2006) takes as the starting point for hisanalysis the decline of political parties and parliaments in the last decades and the crisis of

representation. Reviving the Weberian-Schumpeterian model of competitive elitism, he pointstowards the delegation and concentration of power, and to the striking rehabilitation ofleadership as the most striking political innovations of the past fifteen years. He argues that inlate-modern democracies there is a marked shift from input responsiveness and input legitimacytowards output responsiveness and output legitimacy. For contemporary electorates, he

believes, what matters is what works. Political elites are therefore expected to take a lead andget on with the job, and electorates make use of the democratic elections in order to pass theirverdict on their leaders performance. The objective of leader democracy is not to provideresponsive government but, if anything, to provide responsible government. The historicalevolution of democracy can be described as moving from direct democracy via representativedemocracy towards leader democracy, or as the transformation of participatory government into

representative government and further into responsible government.

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Mark Warren (2004; 2006; Blhdorn, 2006) shares the view that in the face ofglobalization, the decentering of the nation-state, complexity, and functional differentiation,representative democracy faces, if not obsolescence, at least diminished importance. He notesthe the following processes impacting on democracy: the pluralization of political arenas andconflict lines; the unprecedented opportunities for political articulation and participation; the

ever increasing skepticism of democratic publics towards their elected representatives; the highlevel of public information about political issues, and the rapid spread of experiments withelements of direct and deliberative democracy. All this leads Warren to suggest that the currenttransformation of democracy is a move towards citizen empowerment and democratic self-ruleand it was initiated by the emancipatory social movements of the 1960s and 1970s. The job nowis to continue that process.

Warren is joined in his approach by a great many authors. One is Jeremy Gilbert (2009)who believes we have now entered an era when none of the modern institutions of governmentseem capable of really exercising any control over the material, social and cultural changeswhich capitalism brings about. The crisis of democracy we are experiencing today, he says, isonly a symptom of this deeper shift: it is symptomatic of the inability of institutions which were

born in the industrial revolution and came to maturity in the era of cinema, railways and massdemocracy to get to grips with the mercurial fluidity and speed of postmodern cyberneticcapitalism.

The postmodern context could be seen, according to Gilbert, as a moment of fantasticopportunity, a moment when the force of democracy might finally break free from theconstraints placed upon it by industrial society, as the antagonisms which continue to persistwithin and across the field of contemporary social relations become evident and activated. So,he says, we need to seek out and experiment with processes of democratic consultation anddeliberation which are far more participative and processual than what we have now. Gilbertinvokes deliberative democracyas a possible model.

Even this limited sample of different views on the future of democracy shows howdifficult it is to determine what it will look like. It is doubly difficult to predict what mediasystem and model of journalism would be required. In fact, each of the three possible models offuture democracy discussed above would require a different set of solutions.

Dahls global democracy, i.e. nation-state democracy writ large, would require a globalmedia system, capable of serving a global civil society and forming part of a global publicsphere, and performing a monitorial and watchdog function vis--vis a global government.

Krsnyis leader democracy would require an elite public sphere grouped aroundthe leader and practicing what Christians et al. (2009) call collaborative journalism (see below).

Radical, participatory and direct democracy proposed by Warren would require apolycentric media system oriented to giving everyone an opportunity to speak, with the media

performing a facilitative and radical function.We need, therefore, to review different models of the functions of the media andjournalism in democracy before we can turn to the role of the new media in it.

Media and Democracy

James Carey (2000) has no doubt that No journalism, no democracy; but, equally, nodemocracy, no journalism. Journalism and democracy are names for the same thing. That is anoptimistic, but also a simplistic view on the subject.

An overview of many approaches in this field is provided by Christians et. al (2009) inthe bookJournalism In Democratic Societies.Normative Theories of the Media. As shown in

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table 1, the authors separate three levels of analysisphilosophical traditions, political systems,and media systemsbut also show how these different levels are related.

Table 1. Framework of analysis of media in democratic societies

PHILOSOPHICAL POLITICAL MEDIANormative traditions Models of democracy Roles of media

Corporatist Administrative CollaborativeLibertarian Pluralist MonitorialSocial responsibility Civic FacilitativeCitizen participation Direct Radical

Concentrating on the roles of the media, and without going into details, let us note thatthe authors explain that the most basic meaning of the term monitorial is that of an organizedscanning of the real world of people, conditions and events, and of potentially relevant sourcesof information. A subsidiary meaning is of evaluation and interpretation, guided by criteria ofrelevance, significance and reigning normative frameworks for the public arena. This elementdifferentiates monitoring from the now familiar model of the omnivorous electronic searchengine that assembles information more or less blindly. A third element of meaning that stilllurks somewhat in the background is one of vigilance and control, even if short of their mostnegative implications.

As for the medias facilitativerole, they promote dialogue among their readers andviewers through communication that engages them and in which they actively participate. Infacilitative terms, the news media support and strengthen participation in civil society outsidethe state and the market. They do not merely report on civil societys associations and activities

but seek to enrich and improve them. Citizens are taken seriously in clarifying and resolvingpublic problems. The aim of this interactive mode is democratic pluralism. The media in theirfacilitative role promote a mosaic of diverse cultures and worldviews. The facilitative role ofthe news media is both rooted in and promotes deliberative democracy.

The radicalrole of the media and journalism serves above all those in society who areopposed to the establishment and who typically do not have a fair share of the national publicsphere. This role seeks to change deep-seated concentrations of social power that inhibit citizen

participation in democratic communication. The media and journalists are called upon toencourage not merely superficial changes such as voting procedures but also changes at the verycore of the existing social structure. Minorities, for example, the voiceless and disenfranchised,must be enabled to participate fully in the electoral process. The role of the radical media and

journalists is to challenge the injustices perpetrated by hegemonic alliances, and propose insteada new order and support movements opposing these injustices.

The collaborative role deals as much with the needs and expectations of the state as theneeds and expectations of the press. Defined in relation to the state, a collaborative role for the

press implicates government(s) locally, regionally, nationally and at times eventransnationally in the mission of the press. Collaboration represents an acknowledgment of thestates interest to which the press accedes either passively or unwittingly, reluctantly or

wholeheartedly in participating in the choices journalists make and the coverage they provide.

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Another possible way of approaching the issue of the interdependence of media anddemocracy is offered by Gillmor (2010: 4) who looks at the democratic potential of the meansof communication themselves squarely in terms of the way they facilitate, if at all, individualcontrol over the act and contents of communication. On this basis, he identifies severalgenerations of media:

Media 1.0: the printing press which liberated the word of God from the control of the priestsand was humanitys first profound democratization of media;

Media 1.5: the telegraph which enabled information to move from point to point but notdirectly to the people;

Media 2.0: radio, i.e. mass media content travelling long distances instantaneously anddirectly to individuals, but still through the intermediary of an institution;

Media 2.5: television ditto; Media 3.0: the Internet, combining all that has come before and extending it across the web

of connections that includes everyone and everything from email to the World Wide Web. It

is radically democratized media. Possibilities emerge, literally without limit.This typology is in line with the view that democratic systems represent a range of

different combinations of representation and participation. Along with a great many others,Gillmor believes that the stronger the participatory dimension, the more democratic the system.That is open to heated debate, as we will see below, but on the same principle we can usefullyclassify social communication systems as situated in different places along a continuum

between representative and direct communicative democracy (see Figure 1).

Figure 1.From least to most participatory systems of communicative democracy.

As in the framework developed by Christians et al. (2009), each of these systemsimplies a different view of citizenship and the operation of democracy. We will discuss each ofthem briefly.

To begin with the wake-up functionof the media, Zaller (2003) has called for areplacement of the normative Full News standard now considered as binding on the media. It

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Citizen

media

Watchdog

Direct

communicative

democracy

Representative

comm

unicative

democracy

Representative/

participatory

Conflictand

consensus

media

Wake-up

Peer-to-peer

social

conversation


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requires that the media should provide the citizens with the basic information necessary to formand update opinions on all of the major issues of the day, including the performance of top

public officials. However, according to Zaller (2003: 110), this standard places unrealisticallyheavy demands on many citizens. The growing complexity of contemporary systems ofgovernance and issues to be resolved by the political system may indeed be beyond the ability

of most citizens to follow them closely with full comprehension. Therefore, Zaller proposes adifferent standard, Burglar Alarm news. As he puts it, the idea is that news should provideinformation in the manner of attention-catching burglar alarms about acute problems, ratherthan police patrols over vast areas that pose no immediate problems (Zaller, 2003: 110,emphases added).

This ties in with a proposal for a different concept of citizenship. According toSchudson, (1998), most thinking about citizenship is still confined to the model of theindividual informed citizen, and employs a rather rigid version of that model. It is thereforeoutdated, and has to be reconsidered. Two reasons account for this. First: the complexity ofgovernance and the great amount of information available. And second, the fact thatcontemporary democracy requires expertise and has created institutions that mediate between

private individuals and public governing bodies. The obligation of citizens to know enough toparticipate intelligently in governmental affairs should therefore be understood as a "monitorial"one: scanning (rather than reading) the informational environment in a way so that he or shemay be alerted and mobilized around issues of special importance:

Monitorial citizens tend to be defensive rather than pro-active ... The monitorial citizenis not an absentee citizen but watchful, even while he or she is doing something else ...Citizenship now is a year-round and day-long activity as it was only rarely in the past. Inthis world, monitoring is a plausible model of citizenship (Schudson, 1998: passim;emphasis added).

The familiar watchdog function is still based on the concept of the informed citizen, inthe belief that democracy requires, and citizens deserve, a healthy flow of useful informationand a news and information system that holds powerful institutions accountable (Waldman,2011: 30). Therefore, the U.S. Federal Communications Commission, in arguing for thedevelopment of local media, has said:

A shortage of reporting manifests itself in invisible ways: stories not written, scandalsnot exposed, government waste not discovered, health dangers not identified in time,local elections involving candidates about whom we know little (Waldman, 2011: 30).

For his part, James Curran (2007: 34) considers the watchdog function to be anoutdated, fossilized theory that presents citizens as protected; briefed; reconstituted as a publicbody in the form of public opinion; and represented to authority. It thus places the media centre-stage, bathed in a heroic light, as the central intermediary institution of liberal democracy. Thereason it is outdated, according to Curran, is that it downplays the role of social groups, political

parties, civil society, ideology and globalisation. It seems disconnected from an understandingof how contemporary democracy works. Curran is also unconvinced by the claim that the mediashould be impartial at all times.

His proposed media and democracy model seeks to bring together two media functionsand two types of media, conflict media and consensus media:

The first function is one of representation of different segments of society and their views.This is best achieved by means of partisan journalism taking place in advocacy, conflict-

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oriented, politically and socially engaged media. These, let us add, could also be describedas monologue media;

The second function is one of conciliation through balanced journalism, pursued in the coremedia sector. Mass television channels and, in many countries, local monopoly dailies arethe central meeting places of society where different social groups are brought into

communion with one another. We could describe these core media as dialogue media: theyshould enable divergent viewpoints and interests to be aired in reciprocal debate, and alertmainstream society to the concerns and solutions of minority groups. The norm of

journalism practiced by this core sector should be that of balanced journalism, typified bythe reporting of different viewpoints expressed by the spokespersons of opposed groups. Itsfeatures pages and studio discussions should also provide a forum of debate open todifferent opinions.

The trouble with this model is that it may itself be increasingly outdated. We seem to bedeep into what has been called a post-objectivity era. This trend was thrown into sharp reliefin August 2011 by fact that the U.S. Federal Communications Commission stripped 83 rules,

including the Fairness Doctrine, from its books. The doctrine had not been enforced for morethan two decades, but formally remained in force. Now, as FCC Chairman Julius Genachowskisaid in a statement, striking this from our books ensures there can be no mistake that what haslong been a dead letter remains dead" (Melvin, 2011).

Consensus (i.e. non-partisan, impartial) media are finding it difficult to hold their own.This is the case with CNN, a consensus medium that could be said to represent what Jay Rosen(2010) has called View from Nowhere journalism which seeks to gain trust, based on theviewlessness of the journalist and news producer. In a process known as the Foxification ofnews (The Economist, 2011), the U.S., a long-time advocate of journalistic impartiality, is inthe midst of shift in the system by which trust is sustained in professional journalism (Rosen,2010). Ideological journalism is becoming more and more prevalent and neutral journalismis said to be losing ground, as shown by the popularity of openly right-wing Fox News and therelative decline of CNN.

Transparency is the new objectivity (Weinberger, 2009): the onus on journalists is notto be objective, but transparent, i.e. candid and open about their views, giving the public a clearinterpretative framework for assessing the opinions they are expressing and the stance they aretaking:

Transparency puts within the report itself a way for us to see what assumptions andvalues may have shaped it, and lets us see the arguments that the report resolved oneway and not another. Transparency the embedded ability to see through the published

draft often gives us more reason to believe a report than the claim of objectivity did(Weinberger, 2009).

In addition to any polarization and radicalization of the general public, we may perhapsascribe this tendency to the impact of the Internet

A study conducted in 2010 of 46 American news websites (7 commercial ones and 39non-profit ones) found that the majority of them (56%) were ideological in nature (Holcomb, etal., 2011). Overall, across the 46 sites, a lack of diverse viewpoints emerged. A large majority nearly two-thirds of stories involving some controversy contained only a single point of view.

This would seem to suggest that exposure on the Internet to highly partisan and one-sided portrayals of reality creates expectations and user habits that carry over to traditional

media and create a situation in which media users seem to crave partisan political [content]

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(Stelter, 2010). If so, then this would suggest a concept of citizenship that is radically differentfrom either the monitorial or the informed citizen.

Currans (2007) model, as outlined above, may be outdated also because it still separatesthe media from the public, even though there is bound to be a closer relationship between asocial group and the conflict/advocacy medium that speaks for it. Dan Hind (2011) proposes

a blueprint for a democratic media system that opposes the monopolization of the power toinvestigate and to publicise what is discovered by a tiny number of professional editors andowners who are unrepresentative, unaccountable to the public, and vulnerable to all mannerof private pressure and inducement. Therefore, he argues, each of us must be given somecontrol over what is investigated and researched and over the prominence given to the results.In this representative/participatory model, with the BBC as its vehicle:

We need to set aside a sum of public money sufficient to support a large and livelyculture of investigative reporting and analysis. Journalists and researchers can makeopen pitches for the money they need to conduct particular investigations or to pursuelong-term projects. Those that receive sufficient support from the public will receive the

money. Those that produce material that seems important to a fair number of people willbe given more resources with which to broadcast their findings to a wider public (Hind,2011).

Another example of this trend is the practice of the daily newspaper of LitchfieldCounty Connecticut, The Register Citizen, to invite reader to participate in a daily online storymeeting, allowing them to submit story ideas. This open-door process yields new story ideas,feedback on current issues, corrections on published stories and comments on the papers

publication methods. The newspapers website also launched a fact check box at the bottom ofevery story, so any errors readers spot can be reported immediately (Silver, Martinelli, 2011).

While in this model a part of the public might play a role in determining some of thecontents of communication, it would have no control over the media institution itself.

This form of participation has, however, long been represented by autonomous,"alternative," "free" or community stations. If the groups or movements they speak for arestructured and organized in a truly democratic way, all or most of their members are able toinfluence the operation of their media and participate in the determination of their goals; inshort, they can, with some exaggeration, be called media co-managers. Few of them need beactive mass communicators in their own right. Still, in such a situation, the given group's views,ideas, culture and world outlook would enter social circulation at a level appropriate to thegroup's size and scale of operation (i.e. through the intermediary of national, regional, local orcommunity media), could be known to the public at large and could potentially influence its

views, policies or outlook. This would make group members indirect communicators.Moreover, a fairly large number of group members can be involved in the running andoperation of those media, contributing time, effort and money to ensure their functioning andsurvival; in short they would become communication facilitators, without necessarily becomingcommunicators themselves. In this instance, a communication system can be bothrepresentative and participatory at the same time. Of course, devising such a system for bigmass media, rather than for small community media, would be quite a challenge.

A much higher degree of direct communicative democracy is represented by citizenmedia which represent different degrees of institutional editorial moderation and control overcontents provided by citizen journalists. The level of direct participation by individuals willingto contribute is very high, but many of the serious citizen journalism sites (OhmyNews in South

Korea,AgoraVox in France, Skoeps in the Netherlands,NowPublic in Canada),AllVoices andThe Huffington Postin the US, finally The-Latest.com andBlottrin the UK) do perform

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editorial functions and may reject content. For example, AgoraVox publishes around 75% of allsubmitted articles.

Finally, Web 2.0-supported peer-to-peer social conversation represents a true paradigmshift: full disintermediation and deinstitutionalization of mediated social communication in thedigital commons, also known for example as "information commons (Kranich, 2004). In

theory, at least, this is genuine direct communicative democracy (at least for those that have theequipment and the communication competence to be part of it). Supporters of this model ofdemocracy have high hopes that peer-to-peer social conversation will be the ultimate form ofcommunicative democracy and thus a means of bringing democracy into the 21st century in theform of e-democracy or digital democracy. As we will see below, however, that is not theonly view on the matter.

New Media and Democracy

The generic term new media has been defined and used in a wide variety of ways (forsome authors everything that happened after Gutenberg is new). Let us therefore explain thatwe refer here to what we consider to be three generations of new media in the second half of the20th century and later, comprising

New Media 1.0: cable, satellite, VCR, teletext, etc. extensions of traditional analogue TV(1960-1970s);

New Media 2.0: the effect of media digitization and convergence of media and the Internet,facilitating different modes of communication: allocution, conversation, consultation andregistration, as well as linear or non-linear one-to-one, one-to-many, one-to-few, few-to-

few, many-to-many communication (1980-1990s); New Media 3.0: Connected TV, smartphone, tablet all in one (2000s).

Below, by new media we effectively mean the last two generations, i.e. digitalelectronic media, primarily Internet-facilitated modes of media and comunication.

As already mentioned, notions of digital democracy or e-democracy areunderpinned by a number of expectations regarding the beneficial impact of digital technologieson democratic processes. It is hoped that the Internet will strengthen democracy because:

1. It lowers the entry barriers to political participation.2. It strengthens political dialogue.

3. It creates community.4. It cannot be controlled by government.5. It increases voting participation.6. It permits closer communication with officials.7. It spreads democracy world-wide.

However, lest a mistaken impression is created that the Internet will cure all the ills ofdemocracy, the Council of Europe made a point in its Recommendation CM/Rec(2009)1onelectronic democracy (e-democracy) of pointing to what it considers its subsidiary role. Thedocument reiterates the need to develop and maintain effective, transparent and accountabledemocratic institutions that are responsive to the needs and aspirations of all and emphasizes

the importance of maintaining and improving democratic institutions and processes in thecontext of the new opportunities and challenges arising from the information society.

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Others have gone much further in debunking the supposed beneficial consequences ofInternet use in political processes and procedures. Eli Noam (2010) considers each of thestatements in the above list of Internet contributions to a strengthened democracy as a utopian

populist view, and continues:

I argue, in contrast, that the Internet, far from helping democracy, is a threat to it precisely because the Internet is powerful and revolutionary, it also affects, and evendestroys, all traditional institutions--including--democracy.

A somewhat more nuanced view is offered by Benjamin Barber (2002):

How quickly the remarkable new technology has become one more element reinforcingan old, commercial, consumerist society. This only increases the pressure of money andcommerce and monopoly and the forces of democracy, and increases the pressures ofhomogeneity and uniformity of democracys necessary pluralism. Politics as the art of

public selling may flourish, but democracy in its representative and strong forms can

only expire Technological change is both driving globalization unambiguously andimpacting democratization in deeply ambiguous ways. It has the potential to strengthenas well as to weaken democracy in certain of its chief characteristics, thoughdifferentially for representative and strong democracy. If it is to serve democracy, thetechnology will have to be effectively programmed to do so.

These authors views on the effect of the Internet and digital technologies ondemocracy, or prospects for its revival, add up to what might be called a charge sheet orindictment of these new technologies, as in Table 2.

Table 2. Noam (2001) and Barber (2002) on the effect of the Internet and digital

technologies on democracy

Noam Barber

1. The Internet will make politicsmore expensive and raise entry

barriers

2. The Internet will make reasonedand informed political dialog moredifficult.

Is speed appropriate to democratic deliberation? Withrespect to deliberative democracy, the injunction isslow down!Digital media relevant to democracy are prone toreductive simplicity -- to binary dualism. Strong

democracy demands multiple choices and thecomplexities multi-choice options bring consensusor at least nuance rather than a clear division

4. The Internet disconnects as muchas it connects

New technologies divide, isolate and atomize people.Too many chat rooms on the Net criminalize differencerather than exploring it. They embrace a hooliganismwhere participants refuse to learn, refuse to listen andrefuse to grow.

5. Information does not necessarilyweaken the state

6. Electronic voting does not

strengthen democracy

In a participatory democracy, where COMMON

deliberation is the object the privatization introduced bycomputer voting will appear as a vice

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7. Direct access to public officialswill be phony

8. The internet facilitates theinternational manipulation ofdomestic politics.

9. Politics, the law and democracy start quite necessarilyas a contest of words against force and feeling.Democracy will rely on words rather than pictures andstreaming video will not be a welcome development.

We could discuss each of these eight items at length but instead let us concentrate on thereally important contentions made by Noam and Barber, and these are set out in items 2 and 3.They go to the heart of the issue namely whether or not the Internet makes possible the kindof discourse and debate that is needed for democracy to operate in practice. In considering thefuture of democracy in the Internet age, these comments raise to two crucial questions:

1. How, and to what extent, can the new media and new technologies contribute to

transforming their users into a community, giving its members a group identity and a senseof co-responsibility for the common good, so they can reconcile individual and publicinterest;

2. How can they facilitate the emergence of the common will of the demos as a foundation forthe development of the political will of society and its ability to take decisions within its

political system in a way that guarantees their legitimacy?

These are huge issues, of course. To find a way at least partly to deal with thesequestions, we will approach the first set of dilemmas in terms of the prospects for the operationof civil society in the context of new media and technologies. We will also interpret the secondset of issues in terms of prospects for the reconstitution of the public sphere in the newcircumstances. We will draw on available research to see, as far as the data allow, whether itconfirms or disproves the pessimistic predictions of Noam and Barber.

Civil society and new media

Putnam (1995) and other scholars have identified social capital as capable of powerfullyinfluencing the way representative systems of government operate. Social capital is rooted indifferent forms of civic engagement, civic attitudes and forms of involvement in the life of the

community, social trust and strong social relationships which contribute to the development ofdemocratic norms and behaviour patterns. Participation in civic associations and other groups ofthe civil society also helps acquire the social and organizational skills needed for participationin forms of direct democracy. However, according to Putnam, social capital and civicconnectedness are declining. Over time, this cannot but negatively influence social cohesionand democratic processes.

Social and cultural change in developed societies is promoting the individualization andalienation of individuals and groups from the political process. The new media and newtechnologies may accelerate this trend, damaging civil society in the process. Completeindividualization would be an extreme form of social fragmentation and if it were to occurr ona mass scale would hamper, or could actually prevent, the development of the common will of

the demos and the emergence of a community capable of mobilizing for the pursuit of commongoals. Some authors (e.g. Ulrich Beck and Zygmunt Bauman) maintain that individuals in

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Western societies refuse to accept that their lives are influenced by external factors (such asclass, or cultural capital obtained with education) or social structure, or are unaware of theirimpact. They ascribe their own actions and situation solely to their individual motivations ordecisions.

As noted by Mikuowski-Pomorski (2006: 92), what is fragmented in social life may

never come together again. That may powerfully influence social and democratic processes.In the media field, fragmentation and individualization may be encouraged by aprocess known as ego-casting (Rosen, 2004-2005), whereby individuals select media contentfor reception in line with their personal preferences, potentially creating individual virtualenvironments that have little in common with those of other individuals. And indeed, if allaudiencje behaviour patterns and content chioices were fully individualized, that would meanthe end of the audience as a signivficant social collectivity. Media users [would] come to haveno more in common that each other than owners of any other consumer article [followed by] nadecline in the strength of ties that bind people to their chosen media source and a loss of anysense of identity as an audience (McQuail, 2005: 447).

Views differ as to what forms of social relations favour the development of social

capital. Putnam (1995) himself considered the impact of electronic networks on social capitaland expressed this view: My hunch is that meeting in an electronic forum is not the equivalentof meeting in a bowling alley or even in a saloon. In line with this, some authors argue thatface-to-face interaction within traditional social group activity is most conducive to generatingsocial capital, because it is through direct contact, social interaction, and sustained involvementthat social capital develops. Others claim that the importance of face-to-face communicationmay be exaggerated.

Another thing to consider in this respect is the composition of the group or associationone belongs to. This is known as the difference between bridging and bonding forms of socialcapital. Homogeneous, inward-looking groups tend to produce dense networks that promote

bonding, whereas bridging occurs in more diffuse settings in which groups encompasssocial diversity.

Social interactions that bridge together people from different backgrounds andinterests may connect people to others beyond their normal social network and develop moregeneralized social trust and collective orientations. In contrast, groups that tend to bondtogether mostly like-minded individuals may be less likely to develop trust and tolerance thatextends beyond the individuals own network. Associations with more diverse and moreengaged members presumably generate generalized trust.

Participation in civil society groups can produce social and organizational skills that arevital for a participatory democracy. The jury is still out, however, on whether directinterpersonal contacts are a necessary requirement from this point of view and precisely what

types of associations are most conducive to the attainment of these ends (Kittilson, Dalton,2008).In this context, Atkinson (2010) notes that the individualisation thesis is based on the

view that the residents of contemporary Western nations are no longer willing or able toperceive the motors of their life paths as external, social forces such as class or materialresources and instead talk of internal, personal facets and motivations. They allegedly perceivetheir actions and their fates as the consequences of their own, free, individual choices ratherthan social structural forces. Ulrich Beck ascribes this to the demands of an ambiguous blend ofwelfare state policies and employment insecurity, whereas for Bauman individualisation is aninsidious corollary of the hegemonic grip of neo-liberalism, individualism and consumerism on

political and media discourse. Widespread acceptance of such views would be harmful to

prospects of the existence of a strong civil society.

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Atkinsons research shows, however, that Britons, at least, have still not lost a sense ofthe impact of societal factors and determinants on their lives and perceive and express theirlives in terms of external, class-based constraints and enablements, chiefly those of economicand cultural capital, whilst any individualism or individualisation of class that do occur,

particularly amongst the dominated, is both old news and fully explicable in terms of class.

Accordingly, they are likely to see value in forms of social organization, such as civil societyassociations, and democratic processes enabling them to exert influence on their political andsocial environment.

Research shows that the Internet does not lead to full atomization of society. While thetraditional sources of social capital may be declining, the mechanisms through which citizensconnect to others evolve with the new technology of the Internet (and other new technologies):Indeed, more people are sitting in front of their computer monitors, but they use thisexperience to connect to others in their social groups, others who share their cultural, social or

political interests, and to garner information about the world and their fellow citizens throughthis new medium. Virtual civil society appears to have many of the same benefits for citizennorms and political involvement as traditional civil society (Kittilson, Dalton, 2008). The

authors find that the shift toward virtual civil society is linked with bridging trust in peopleoutside ones immediate personal network. Virtual activity is also related to participatorycitizen norms. Overall, interpersonal social group and virtual activity are each similarly and

positively associated with higher levels of political participation. Both forms of involvementcontribute to heightened electoral and Internet activity. While interpersonal social group activityis more strongly linked with protest participation, virtual interactions share a tighter connectionwith political discussion. Interpersonal social group activity appears more conducive to socialtrust and tolerance.

On the central question of how social capital is generated, the authors say that this likelyhappens in multiple ways, and those mechanisms are changing with social, economic andtechnological transformations. Specifically, their findings thus suggest that face-to-faceinteractions may not be the crux of social capital formation in the contemporary age.

This appears to find confirmation in a study of personal networks of ICT users in the US(Petrovi, 2008). As it turned out, active involvement in online communities means havinglarger personal networks of emotional support with a smaller percentage of close family ties anda larger proportion of friends. Active participants in online communities also report moregeographically distant networks and having known the members of their personal networks fora shorter period of time.

In this network sociality, Petrovi found, there are no real "strangers", only potentialmembers of people's ever-expanding networks. Moreover, because of mobility, networksociality is based less upon a shared common history and narrative: instead, information is key,

the immediacy of what each person can offer in the quick exchange and the active production oftrust. Finally, this sociality is also a "sociality with objects" since it is deeply embedded in newcommunication technologies, including Internet-based communication services such as email,chat rooms, discussion forums, mailing lists and web sites and especially mobilecommunication technologies like notebooks and mobile phones.

Geographic proximity and local ties are still important resources of emotional support.The importance of local ties is suggested by the structural composition of personal networks oflandline and mobile phone users. The former have fewer friends in their network, but moreolder and locally-knit ties than non-users of telephones, whereas mobile phone users havemore work- or schoolmates in their networks than mobile phone non-users. Mobile phone use is

positively associated with visits to relatives. The same holds for active participation in online

communities that also highly significantly correlates with the frequency of involvement involuntary organizations, whereas landline telephone use is positively correlated with both active

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participation in religious community and voluntary organizations.Respondents combine a variety of communication technologies to stay connected to

their personal networks. On one hand, active participants in online communities use morefrequently mobile phones, texting and the Internet to communicate with members of theiremotional support networks than non-active participants, whilst passive participation in online

communities is significantly correlated only with the use of texting. On the other hand, theuse of texting issignificantly associated with the frequency of mobile phone, SMS, landline telephone andInternet use. Landline use is associated with sms and landline use. As for PC email use, a highlysignificant association was found with Internet use. Finally, mobile phone users draw on mobile

phones more frequently and on texting less frequently to stay in touch with their personalnetworks than non-users of mobile phones.

Rather than viewing online and offline interactions as social processes that take place onseparate social planes, study results suggest, says Petrovi, that new forms of sociality aredriven by a human need to fine-tune social contact, manage time and (micro)coordinateactivities in a increasingly interlaced manner, which combines electronically mediated and in-

person communication. In this respect, the intense social use of ICTs does not preclude readyadopters such as active participants in online communities from offline social activities andsocializing; on the contrary, it appeared that it may have an important role in augmenting theirsocial circles and in intensifying the offline socialization with their relatives.

The findings contradict the idea that communication technology detracts from personalrelationships and leads to social isolation. Instead, the results indicate a synergy between onlineand offline participation that relates to the ways people experience the cohesiveness of theirsocial environments, which may be used to advantage to leverage the community - increasingthe relevance and significance of community in individuals' lives.

The author argues that the individual focus of communication technology use embodiedin the changing experience of network and mobile sociality in late modernity does notnecessarily carry with it the dissolution of integrative forms overlying communal life but,instead, can foster greater involvement in the coordination of activities that lay at the foundationof contemporary communal life.

An interesting set of data on these subjects is provided by a study of American socialnetwork sites (SNS) (Hampton, et al., 2011). 79% of American adults said they used theinternet and nearly half of adults (47%), or 59% of internet users, say they use at least one ofSNS. Facebook dominated the SNS space in this survey: 92% of SNS users are on Facebook;29% use MySpace, 18% used LinkedIn and 13% use Twitter.

The study found that the average user of a social networking site has more close ties andis half as likely to be socially isolated as the average American. The average internet user is less

likely to report having no discussion confidants (7%), and they tend to have more close ties(average of 2.27) than non-internet users (15% of non-internet users have no close ties, and theyaverage 1.75 discussion partners). SNS users are even less likely to be socially isolated; only5% report having no discussion confidants, with an average 2.45 close ties.

The use of some technologies is associated with having more close ties. Here are theexamples:

Internet users average 14% more discussion confidants than non-users. Those who use instant message average 12% more core confidants than other internet users,

or 25% more than non-internet users. The use of SNS in general was not found to have a negative relationship with the number of

overall close ties. However, frequent users of Facebook have larger core networks. For

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example, someone who uses Facebook a few times per day tends to have about 9% morestrong ties. Facebook use seems to support intimacy, rather than undermine it.

Social networking sites are increasingly used to keep up with close social ties. Looking only at those people that SNS users report as their core discussion confidants, 40%

of users have friended all of their closest confidants.

Internet users in general score 3 points higher than average Americans in total support, 6points higher in companionship, and 4 points higher in instrumental support. A Facebook userwho uses the site multiple times per day tends to score an additional 5 points higher in totalsupport, 5 points higher in emotional support, and 5 points higher in companionship, thaninternet users of similar demographic characteristics. For Facebook users, the additional boost isequivalent to about half the total support that the average American receives as a result of beingmarried or cohabitating with a partner.

Facebook is said to revive dormant relationships. The average Facebook user had 229Facebook friends. They reported that their friends list contains:

22% people from high school 12% extended family 10% coworkers 9% college friends 8% immediate family 7% people from voluntary groups 2% neighbors

Over 31% of Facebook friends cannot be classified into these categories. However, only7% of Facebook friends are people users have never met in person, and only 3% are people who

have met only one time. The remainder is friends-of-friends and social ties that are not currentlyactive relationships, but dormant ties that may, at some point in time, become an importantsource of information.

Interestingly also, Facebook users are much more politically engaged than most people.Internet users in general were over twice as likely as average Americans to attend a politicalmeeting, 78% more likely to try and influence someones vote, and 53% more likely to havevoted or intended to vote. Compared with other internet users, and users of other SNS

platforms, a Facebook user who uses the site multiple times per day was an additional two andhalf times more likely to attend a political rally or meeting, 57% more likely to persuadesomeone on their vote, and an additional 43% more likely to have said they would vote.

There is thus no evidence that SNS users, including those who use Facebook, are anymore likely than others to cocoon themselves in social networks of like-minded and similar

people, as some have feared.Somewhat different conclusions emerge from a study by Gaines and Mondak (2009) on

the clustering of ideological types on social networks, in this case on Facebook. Their analysisof profiles of American college students detected some signs that students cluster ideologicallyon Facebook, although the extent of this sorting is not dramatic.

Nevertheless, such phenomena do manifest themselves. During the AmericanPresidential campaign of 2008, 23% of online political users (i.e. those who went online fornews about politics or the campaign; communicated with others about politics using theinternet; or shared or received campaign information using specific tools, such as email, instant

messaging, text messages or Twitter) customized their political news, i.e. took advantage of

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tools such as RSS feeds and email alerts to get customized political news tailored to theirspecific interests.(they represented 17% of all internet users) (Smith, 2009).

Younger voters (particularly those under the age of 30) took great advantage of theability to customize their news and get the latest updates on the campaign. Among

online political users age 18-29, 21% signed up online to receive updates about thecampaign, 12% customized a web page to display political information tailored to theirinterests, and 8% set up a politics-related RSS feed.

Users of various social media applications were also interested in obtaining timelycustomized informationperhaps so they could be the first to share them with theirfriendswith Twitter users leading the way. Compared with other online political users,Twitter users were much more likely to sign up online for updates about the election(26% did this, vs. 14% of non-users) and to subscribe to political RSS feeds (14% vs. 4%).

Another feature of Internet use during the election campaign was sharing andforwarding political information. Fully 44% of online political users (representing 33% ofinternet users and 24% of all adults) did one or more of the following activities related to

political content sharing in 2008:

37% of online political users forwarded political commentary or writing to others 25% forwarded political audio or video recordings to others 22% shared photos, videos or audio files online related to the campaign or the elections

Assuming that they were probably most likely to do this in relation to users of similarpolitical views or affinities, then such individual and group communication may indeed servethe fragmentation of society and development of alternative, politically-driven public spheres.

This would appear to be indicated also by research on the 2006 general election in Italy

(Molinari, 2011). A survey of electoral flows showed that the citizens embedded inhomogeneous partisan networks were comparatively more influenced than those who discussedpolitics within heterogeneous networks that do not uniformly support a single political position.In both cases, the effects of interpersonal networks on voting behavior turned out to be strongerthan those of TV news programs and generalist talk shows.

The research results cited in this section cannot be generalized or lead to the formulationof any final conclusions. We can, however, say that while the Internet may indeed have theeffect of fragmenting society and creating an echo chamber for individual or group views, it isnot true to say that the new technologies are always destructive of social capital or the operationof civil society. While the forms this may take may be different than so far, the social effectmay be the same. The challenge is not to insist on the continuation of old patters of civil society

operation but to understand new ones and to learn how to promote them.

The public spheres of the new technology era

Noam and Barber place heavy emphasis on the need for full democratic discourse anddebate in the new technological situation in line with the classical model of society anddemocracy. This naturally prompts consideration of the public sphere (see e.g. Hudzik,Woniak, 2006) and how it may serve its purposes in the new circumstances.

Following Dahlgren (2005) we may describe the public sphere as a constellation of

communicative spaces in society that permit the circulation of information, ideas, debatesideally in an unfettered mannerand also the formation of political will (i.e., public opinion).

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These spaces, in which the mass media and now, more recently, the newer interactive mediafigure prominently, also serve to facilitate communicative links between citizens and the powerholders of society.

As Dahlgren (2010) points out, the public sphere is best conceptualized as consisting ofthree constitutive dimensions:structural(the formal institutions of the public sphere,

prominently including the media); representational(the output of the media); and interaction(interaction between the citizens and the media, and between the citizens themselves). The firsttwo are particularly important in terms of the role of the media in democracy. Benkler (2008)

points out, as do other authors, that the new technologies are conducive to the emergence of anetworked public sphere, making it possible to circumvent the bottleneck of the traditional massmedia.

However, as shown by the views of Noam and Barber, some observers anticipate thatthe fragmentation of the public discourse will lead to the disappearance of the public sphere, asindividuals will perceive reality through symbolic windows, providing no need or opportunityfor common discourse or political action. These will be possible only within groups observingthe same things through their windows (Benkler, 2008).

This is an extreme and very pessimistic view, but it is true that though we usually speakof the public sphere only in the singular, this does not reflect reality. Habermas himselfdifferentiated between a political and a cultural sphere. It is also accepted that different socialclasses or segments of society may create their own public spheres (see Negt, Kluge, 1993; cf.also Bentivegna, 2006; Jakubowicz, 1991). New media and new technologies help theemergence of different public spheres (and new imagined communities, see Slevin, 2002) and

by the same token help destabilize the old model of social and especially political communication. According to Holt and Karlsson (2011), the new technologies return the publicsphere after a period when the public discourse was dominated by the mass media to theoriginal Habermasian (1996) vision of a polycentric public debate, taking place in a widevariety of forums and public spheres, with the participation of active citizens, and not only

passive recipients of allocutory communication.The moot question is whether this process will recreate in cyberspace the forms of

public discourse typical of the Habermasian public sphere (some call this process return to thecoffee house). That will depend on how social communication evolves: whether towards a

paradigm shift, leading to the prevalence of peer to peer conversation, or conversely towards concentration and domination of communication networks by large domestic andinternational corporations.

To support what has been said about the possible multiplication of public spheres, let usnote that Downey and Fenton (2003) speak of counter-public spheres representing differentsegments of public opinion and made possible by the new media and new technologies. There

are, they say, multiple and competing counter-publics, each marked by specific terms ofexclusion (for example, those of class, race, gender) in relation to dominant communications,yet each understanding itself as a nucleus for an alternative organization of society.

Somewhat along the same lines, Peter Dahlgren (1996) argues that convergence fostersthe emergence of many mini-public spheres. Similarly to James Currans conflict andconsensus media, Dahlgren identifies a common domain of the public sphere (mainstreammedia, reaching the whole public) and an advocacy domain, media representing the views ofdifferent social groups and organizations.

New media and new technologies enrich and expand the public sphere, multiplyingcontent services and media types. In addition, many internet-based public spheres appear. Whatfollows is one list of such spheres:

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1. Versions of e-government, usually with a top-down character, where governmentrepresentatives interact with citizens and where information about governmentaladministration and services is made available. While interaction may be relativelyconstricted, it can still at times serve as a sector of the public sphere. This sector issometimes distinguished from e-governance, which emphasizes horizontal civic

communication and input for government policy;2. The advocacy/activist domain, where discussion is framed by organizations with generallyshared perceptions, values, and goalsand geared for forms of political intervention. Theseinclude traditional parliamentarian politics, established corporate and other organizedinterest group politics (e.g., unions), and the new politics of social movements and otheractivists;

3. The vast array of diverse civic forums where views are exchanged among citizens anddeliberation can take place. This is generally understood as the paradigmatic version of the

public sphere on the Net, but it would be quite erroneous to neglect the others;4. The prepolitical or parapolitical domain, which airs social and cultural topics having to do

with common interests and/or collective identities. Here politics is not explicit but always

remains a potential. Clearly, there is no absolute way in which the boundary between thenonpolitical and the parapolitical can be drawn, since it is always in part discursivelynegotiated and changeable;

5. The journalism domain, which includes everything from major news organizations that havegone online (e.g., newspapers and CNN) to Net-based news or-ganizations (usually withoutmuch or any original reporting) such as Yahoo! News, alternative news organizations suchas Indymedia and Mediachannel, as well as one-person weblog sites (also known asbloggers). Interestingly, the research literature has tended to focus mainly on deliberativeinteraction in terms of online public spheres and/or mass media journalism. The online

journalism sector is a core element of the public sphere on the Internet (Dahlgren, 2005).

If these public spheres constituted closed digital ghettoes, conducive to nichification,including the development of enclave or niche mentality (Dahlgren, 2010), then a newsocial and political situation could well emerge, potentially exploding the nation-state and thedemocratic system from within. This could produce a clear polarization and radicalization of

public opinion (see Eriksen, 2011, on hatred vitriol and aggression vented in onlinediscussions across a broad range of media after the massacre of 22 July 2011, and especiallyon forums regarded as the sewers of the public sphere) and help conflict media win an evengreater advantage over consensus media than they already have. This course of events cannot

be discounted, but it seems that the internet would play a secondary role in this process,mirroring rather than moulding social tendencies, such as exacerbation of social divisions

(driven by political or other mechanisms), intensification of conflicts, politicization orradicalization of different groups or segments of society.For now, both positive and negative consequences of this destabilization of social

communication can be identified. First of all, we are seeing a clear growth in the number ofpolitical communicators, new forms of political engagement, and an evolution of the concept ofpolitics. The growing cultural diversity of social communication can also be a positivedevelopment in terms of democracy promotion.

On the other hand, communication is growing more chaotic and unpredictable.Participation of large numbers of communicators and extreme differentiation of voices undercut

political effectiveness and make governance more difficult.This second point of view is shared by Downey and Fenton (2003). In their view, the

proliferation of counter publics may create a force to reckon with, but only if powerful effortsare made to unite or coordinate (bridge) them. Such efforts have been made successfully, they

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point out, especially in the area of the environment, globalization and ecology. The structuralproblem that arises with the proliferation of counter-publics is one of translation, ofcommunicating across a wider arena of discursive contestation. If this does not happen thecounter-public spheres will further splinter and fragment civil society and hinder, rather thanassist the operation of a possible deliberative democracy. The key issue, then, as Downey and

Fenton correctly point out, is the relationship between the new media, counter-public spheresand the common domain, especially of the ability of alternative public spheres to break throughto the common domain and reach the entire public. This also holds for all other public spheres,as without such a process public opinion may be unable to come together on issues of realsocietal importance and develop the political will needed to chart a course of action or takeother decisions valid and legitimate for all or most of society.

To sum up these initial considerations, we may agree with Dahlberg (2005), it is far tooearly for either fatalistic thinking or premature celebration regarding the democratic potential ofthe new media and new technologies. The Internet, he says, is moving towards a closed,commercial, discriminatory system. Yet, there are also very positive developments that mustnot be overlooked. Despite marginalization of critical communication and threats facing the

democratic form of online participation, the Internet supports many progressive civiccommunication networks. Out of these networks critical publics are forming

What is needed, therefore, is an ongoing evaluation of the evolving social, political, andcultural conditions and practices that would make it possible to understand and use thedemocratic potential of the new technologies.New media and new democracy?

Schmitter and Trechsel (2004: 7) quote Robert Dahl: Whatever form it takes, thedemocracy of our successors will not and cannot be the democracy of our predecessors. Onecan also agree with their view that the future of democracy in Europe lies less in fortifying and

perpetuating existing formal institutions and informal practices than in changing them democracy as we know it will have to change and to change significantly. It is therefore quitedisappointing when they say that those reforms that promise to increase voter turnout,stimulate membership in political parties, associations and movements and improve citizenconfidence in the role of politicians as representatives and legislators deserve priorconsideration (Schmitter, Trechsel, 2004: 96). Indeed, many authors are critical of, or notconvinced by, the democratic potential of the Internet and argue that the democratic malaiseshould be dealt with by breathing new life into traditional methods of political participation andcommunication.

Based on the foregoing, we have to say that this would not be significant change, but an

effort to boost democratic procedures and processes that, in Ulrich Becks terms, may alreadybe living zombies.Other authors point out that we are entering a new era, when democracy has to be seen

in a new light. It needs to be redefined; what is politics and what is democracy must bereconsidered. One reason is globalization (see e.g. Held, 1997; 2000). On the other hand, theneed for such reconsideration stems from processes unfolding at the national level. Traditionalinstitutions and structures of parliamentary democracy do retain their validity, but we are alsoentering an era of informal, extra-parliamentary politics, with the participation of socialmovements and grassroots organizations. New players appear alongside traditional political

parties, such as single-issue advocacy movements. One could argue, notes Jensen (2011: 1), thatjoining debates, uploading videos, and sharing food recipes represent important acts of

citizenry at a time when more formal acts of citizenship like voting and party membership seemto be on the decline.

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So, if citizens display little interest in parliamentary life and traditional politicalprocesses, this need not mean that they have lost interest in politics as such. Rather, they mayhave shifted their attention to new forms of political activity, oriented not only to the pursuit of

particular definable goals, but also to self-expression, demonstration of ones identity, andaffirming a sense of worth and a feeling of belonging.

If so, then the Internet and other new technologies (e.g. mobile phones) are becomingnot just an important but in reality a key area for political activity, especially because theyfacilitate new forms of horizontal civic communication.

In this context, it is significant that when commenting in 2000 r. on the future ofdemocracy, Robert Putnam wrote:

Let us find ways to ensure that by 2010 Americans will spend less leisure time sittingpassively alone in front of glowing screens and more time in active connectionwith our fellow citizens. Let us foster new forms of electronic entertainment andcommunication that reinforce community engagement rather than forestalling it.(cited after Gaines and Mondak, 2009; emphasis added)

At first sight, Putnam appears guilty of the same generational fallacy (bringing toinnovative technologies all the judgments, values and prejudices acquired in using the oldertechnologies; making assumptions about the new technology rooted in the experience of theold). as seems to emerge from the above-quoted views of Noam and Barber on the lack of fit

between new media and democracy. In reality, however, he does not suggest Americans shouldforsake the glowing screens and indicates that all the camaraderie of the saloonnotwithstanding, forms of electronic entertainment communication may reinforce communityengagement. And indeed, one of the main uses of computers is precisely to connect withothers, actively, not passively. Could it be that online socializing is already fosteringengagement in ways that might easily be missed in traditional research designs? (Gaines,Mondak, 2009: 217). It is significant in this context that analyses have identified a segment ofnew media users who prefer to interact online rather than offline. This group will doubtlessexpand in the future as the digital natives grow up, creating challenges for establishedinstitutions and policy makers who still mainly rely on traditional media (Jensen, 2011: 19).

It would appear that Noam and (to a lesser extent) Barber are not willing to recognizethis: if the new technologies do not facilitate the democratic process and procedures conductedin the traditional way, then this means to the two authors, it would appear, that thosetechnologies impact on democracy is wholly negative. Though Noam does not say so in somany words, the implication might be that in his view the best solution would to reinstate thesocietal conditions that render the traditional democratic process and debate effective. Barber is

more flexible, but he, too, expects that information technologies should be programmed in away that serve those traditional methods.This suggests that the current transformation of democracy (whatever the reasons for it)

must lead to the development of a new democratic process and perhaps even new systemicfeatures of democracy and ways of legitimizing it.

Above, we discussed three selected relatively specific visions of the future shape ofdemocracy. Two of them (those formulated by Dahl and Warren) are not mutually exclusive:democratic systems must adjust both to globalization and international integration on the onehand, and, on the other, to socio-cultural change, as well as to technological developments thatintroduce new technologies into the democratic process and development of e-democracy. Thethird vision, that of leader democracy is less easy to conceive of in these circumstances.

The globalization of democracy and e-democracy may complement and support eachother, as new technologies may provide the infrastructure for the creation of a global civil

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society and public sphere, cosmopolitan citizenship, society and democracy(Beck, 2002;Held, 1997; 2000), and thus a system of political communication suited to conditions of globalgovernance.

The future shape of e-democracy is equally unclear. If that vision were to be put intoeffect, however, there would be need of not only the requisite technologies, but also, and

primarily, of appropriate democratic procedures for deliberation and decision-making. Just asan example, there would need to be solutions making possible online democratic deliberation,with the possible participation of all Internet users (see Davies, Gangadharan, 2009). Thenormative model of participatory communication requires more than interaction orcommunication among individuals: what is needed is deliberative interaction, leading to anenlightened understanding of the issues involved and the transformation of individual viewsinto consensus and a common approach.

If we assume that this path is chosen for the future, then there loom on the horizon agreat number of difficulties inherent in conducting a well-managed process of deliberation,

producing in the end conclusions acceptable to all. Some proposed solutions concern differentmodes of representation thanks to which these difficulties can be overcome (Castiglione,

Warren, 2006). One example is Warrens (2006) concept of citizen representatives citizens(and not officials or parliamentarians) representing other citizens. The oldest form of citizenrepresentative Warren explains is the legal jury, which represents the considered judgmentof peers within courtroom proceedings. Today, we can add to this experiments with citizen

juries and panels, advisory councils, stakeholder meetings, lay members of professional reviewboards, representations at public hearings, public submissions, citizen surveys, deliberativepolling, deliberative forums, focus groups, and advocacy group representations. Citizenrepresentatives typically function not as alternatives but rather as supplements to electedrepresentative bodies or administrative bodies in areas of weakness, usually having to do withlimitations of communication, deliberation, legitimacy, governability, or attentiveness to publicnorms and common goods.

Another proposal comes from John Dryzek (1999) who recalls the classic formulation ofthe theory of deliberative democracy (i.e. that outcomes of the process are legitimate to theextent they receive reflective assent through participation in authentic deliberation by all thosesubject to the decision in question) and points out in tandem with other authors that thelarge scale of modern societies and the number of citizens that would have to be involved insuch deliberative processes make this impracticable . He therefore argues in favour of changingthe unit of account from individuals to discourses within the public sphere. A discourse,according to Dryzek, is a shared way of comprehending the world embedded in language, andalways features particular assumptions, judgments, contentions, dispositions and capabilities.Adherents of a particular discourse (meaning members of a group united by experience,

common interests and purpose and sharing opinions about facts and values) are able torecognize it and share it in an intersubjectively meaningful fashion. Accordingly, Dryzekconceptualizes deliberation as a multifaceted interchange or contestation across discourseswithin the public sphere and argues that in this approach discursive legitimacy is secured tothe extent that collective outcomes are responsive to the balance of competing discourses in the

public sphere, to the extent that the balance is itself subject to dispersed and competent control(Dryzek, 1999: 3).

For his part, Dahl (1995: 468-469) echoes the view already cited above that neither inpolyarchy II, nor even less in polyarchy III is there need (or possibility) for every citizen to

be fully informed and active on each significant issue. What is needed is a critical mass of well-informed citizens, enabling the operation of democracy. Organizational forms of this mini-

populus would complement the activities of legislative bodies.

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A totally different view on the need for citizens to be well informed is presented by theCenter for Deliberative Democracy at Stanford University which has come up with the idea ofdeliberative polling (Fishkin, n.d.). In this procedure, a random, representative sample is first

polled on the targeted issues. After this baseline poll, members of the sample are invited togather at a single place for a weekend in order to discuss the issues. Carefully balanced briefing

materials are sent to the participants and are also made publicly available. The participantsengage in dialogue with competing experts and political leaders based on questions theydevelop in small group discussions with trained moderators. Parts of the weekend events are

broadcast on television, either live or in taped and edited form. After the deliberations, thesample is again asked the original questions. The resulting changes in opinion represent theconclusions the public would reach, if people had opportunity to become more informed andmore engaged by the issues.

As for the development of the common will of the demos, decision-making processesare an even greater problem that e-democracy has to find a solution to. As we saw, Noam andBarber are quite scathing about e-voting or online plebiscites or referendums.

It is true that, whatever their enthusiasts might say, the ICTs fail to provide easy

solutions to this difficulty. And so, they fail to remove problems with societal complexity andthe associated fact that the political system has to perform a broad range of services for society,and therefore the quantity of generally binding decisions required to make the system work hasreached enormous proportions. This would call for a great number of online referendums to beheld very frequently, certainly a difficult prospect to imagine.

The ICTs can do little to solve another problem: the difficulty and interrelatedness of theproblems with which politics has to deal. This calls for expert knowledge, the building ofcompromises between differing positions, and the development of policy packages.Referendums, however, are concerned with single issues and, in voting, citizens almost alwayshave to rely on inadequate information, all the more so as the number of referenda increases.

A third aspect is motivation for participation in referendums. The normative postulate ofself-government can be approached only if the institutional possibilities are available and if theyare also used by citizens. The argument that every citizen can participate may be true, but

participation would force the citizen to obtain costly information, for without it they have noway of identifying their own interest in the given issue, and their vote would then b

Documents

Jakubowicz PTKS Conference Paper