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Rahel Jaeggi

Critique of Forms of Life

Forms of Life as Instances of Problemsolving

Porto Alegre Sept. 2013

Is a critique of forms of life possible? Does it make sense to say that they are

good, successful or even rational? Since Kant it is considered common sense that

happiness or the good life, other than that which is morally right, cannot be

determined philosophically. And since Rawls the ethical content of forms of life is

often considered indisputable in virtue of the irreducible ethical pluralism of modern

societies. Thus, philosophy retreats from the socratic question on "how we ought to

live“ and instead restrains itself to the question on how a just way of living together,

understood as the coexistence of different forms of life, can be secured once we

acknowledge the sheer diversity of mutually incompatible "comprehensive

doctrines". The political order of the liberal constitutional state presents itself as a

way of organising this coexistence that is itself ethically neutral towards different

forms of life. Once we are no longer concerned with what a good shared form of life

should consist in, with but the frictionless coexistence of different forms of life,

matters concerning the way we ought to lead our lives become „privatised”. The are

removed into the realm of mere preferences that cannot be questioned any further or

of matters of identity resistant to further analysis. A in matters of taste forms of life

then cannot be a matter of dispute.

In my paper I argue that “burden of proof” should be reversed: Questions

concerning the forms of life we live in cannot simply be extracted from our

individual as well as from our collective deliberation processes. Every social

formation has always already given a specific answer to them. And this is also true

for that social form that has made the pluralism of forms of life its primary matter of

concern. But this means that, in a certain way, the question about the possibility of a

critique of forms of life has not been put correctly. Not in spite but because of the

situation of modern societies the issue of the possibility of such a critique cannot

simply be abandoned into the reservation of particularistic preferences and

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commitments resistant to further analysis. It concerns a practice that in several

respects we cannot avoid participating in. This becomes especially clear in situations

of social conflict and transformation. Such situations might occur when so far

unquestioned ethical principles are suddenly challenged by new technologies or

when established social practices become problematic. Or they might occur when

the ("internal" or "external") confrontation with other forms of life leads to crises of

our self-understanding. In such cases, political liberalism's "ethical abstinence"

reaches its limits. The project of a critique of forms of life is thus at the same time a

kind of critique of ideology with regard to the liberal neutrality thesis, that is, of the

basic "liberal" idea that social institutions should or can only be neutral towards

particularistic forms of life and each individuals' ethical points of reference.

The claim I want to discuss in this paper is the following: Forms of life can very

well be disputed. More specifically, they can be disputed justifiably. The issue I am

concerned with here in dealing with the possibility of their critique regards the

specific rationality of forms of life.

In this talk I can’t develop all the philosophical arguments and tools that one would

need to make this claim. What I will nevertheless be doing is the following:

1. I will spell out the very question I’m concerned with What then are forms of

life – and what does it mean to criticize a form of life as a form of life?

2. I will then give a short account of some of my underlying assumptions and give

some hints about the „way to go“. The issue of criticizing forms of life can only be

adressed in a fruitful way, so I think, if one goes beyond the constraints of the

„ethics“ vs. „morality“ or the „good life vs. morality“ or the „right vs. the good“

framework and deals with the social ontological question of what forms of life are

and how they work. (Simply put: to conceive of them as bundles of social practices

with a certain character and a certain function and a certain kind of normativity

involved makes the Rawlsian and Habermasian picture of a pluralistic variety of

„comprehensive doctrines“ less persuasive than it seems to be on first sight.)

3. I will then „zoom in“ and develop to some extent my main thesis: Forms of life

are instances of problem solving. But then: In order to make sense of this theses

one has to take into account the specific character of „problems“ involved. Here the

terminology might be misleading: I am not concerned with technical problems who

might find a technical solution but with what I would like to call problems of a

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second order; problems that share some important characteristics with what in a

Hegelian spirit might be called practical contradictions.

1. Was does it mean to criticize a form of life as a form of life?

- One would laugh at a person who is seriously outraged over someone eating

bananas or wearing red cowboy boots. Even if one felt disgust at the thought of

bananas or bewildered in the face of red cowboy boots, it is hard to imagine a

meaningful debate concerning whether it is right or wrong to eat bananas or to wear

red cowboy boots. Such matters are, as they say, each person's own business and –

literally – a matter of taste.4

- Matters appear differently if we see someone beating his child. Here we are

outraged – so we might think – with good reason. We don't think this person is

justified in acting in such a way. This is, we might be convinced, neither a matter of

taste nor a merely “his own business.” Indeed, we may consider it our duty to

intervene.

- But what if one is thinking about whether one prefers to live in a shared flat or

within a nuclear family, in a monogamous or an open relationship? Is intimacy

appropriate for "chat rooms,” and should relationships be fostered in Tantra

workshops? How do we consider the custom of living under the roof of a spouse's

parents with a newly founded family? What attitude should we take towards the fact

that the modern bourgeois nuclear family is typically constituted by the spatial and

economic separation from the family of origin (a fact already highlighted in Hegel's

discussion of the bourgeois family)? And what should we think when not dealing

with child abuse but with the common practice of using the TV as a babysitter? On

what basis can we object to the expansion of shopping malls in public spaces? And

why do we prefer spending our leisure time in the theatre, cinema or in a pub to

spending it with computer games or with watching TV; or prefer living in the city to

living in the countryside (or the other way round)?

We often have strong views on such issues. We criticize the TV viewer’s passivity

and unsociability. We are disgusted with the conventionality of traditional marriage

or the lack of commitment of those with open relationships. We either consider

living in a nuclear family too isolated or living among extended family insufferably

restrictive. We may be enthusiastic or skeptical about the expansion of commercial

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centers. We may love urban life or prefer the comfort of country living. And if

capitalism as a form of life becomes all too intrusive – if, for instance, so-called

"cultural values" are sacrificed to commerce – we might fear the trivialization or

impoverishment of our lives. We may even feel that our lives are becoming

“unreal.”

These questions concern what I call “critique of forms of life.” While such

positions are often firmly held and debate surrounding them can be acrimonious, the

argumentative status of such positions remains unclear. Do we make a fool of

ourselves if we, as in the case of the red cowboy boots, search for reasons for our

views and attempt to convince others? Must not each person decide for herself how

to act? In such cases, is there even such a thing as better or worse options that can be

intersubjectively justified or that can claim universal validity?

Criticizing forms of life as forms of life

In examining these cases, what does it mean to criticize a form of life as a form of

life? It means that we are concerned with the specific make up, the qualitative

dimension of the attitudes and practices constitutive of it, rather than dealing

with its consequences (even if these consequences might be morally or juridically

unacceptable). To use a distinction established by Charles Larmore: We are dealing

with the intrinsic content of a form of life, not its external effects. Put a different

way, we are concerned with the ethical content rather than the moral consequences

of forms of life; we are dealing with matters of value rather than disputes about

norms. While such distinctions themselves might be controversial and their utility

may be disputed, we can put the matter in the following way: these issues are not

concerned with the effects that certain forms of life might have on others (e.g., the

rights of third parties), but with the question if certain forms of life can be

considered successful or rational as such.

(Marx’s critique of capitalism is in this sense – I would argue – a critique of

capitalism as a form of life, not just a critique of distributive justice or

relations of domination.)

2. Why should one criticize forms of life?

Nevertheless: Is a critique of forms of life even a sensible idea? Or, given the “fact

of pluralism” so characteristic of our society, should we rather focus on the

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possible ways in which different and seemingly incompatible forms of life can

peacefully coexist?

The diagnosis of contemporary society considered here – that society is

characterized by an irreducible pluralism – is often accompanied by a moral-

political position of “ethical abstinence” towards questions about forms of life.

This position attempts to refrain from taking a stand on different forms of life except

insofar as they directly harm other members of society. (Whether held for reasons of

liberal pragmatism, anti-paternalism, or a fixation with a particular interpretation of

autonomy, this is a popular position nowadays.)

Often the debate simply ends here or else gets entangled in a stale back and forth

– e.g. regarding the priority of the good over the right or vice versa – or in the

attempt to draw a line between questions for which publically justifiable judgments

are possible and those we are forced to leave to what Charles Taylor calls the

“extraphilosophical darkness.” I’d like to take a different approach and examine

some considerations that motivate again taking up the process of critique.

Out of the many possible reasons for engaging in critique, I’d like to focus on two:

(1) The urgency of ethical questions within modern life

According to this diagnosis, the principle of “ethical abstinence” is of limited utility

not despite but rather because of the situation confronting modern society. While

“abstinence” may seem to have become a signature of modern society, it is also true

that modernity and scientific-technical civilization increasingly confronts actors with

topics that make assessing forms of life essential. (For example, the increased

interdependence characteristic of modern society increases the need for rules and

regulations. To take just one example, the existence of single-family homes depends

on institutional settings like construction plans or subsidies from the state; likewise

the availability of theater performances of a particular quality depends on state

subsidies for cultural activities).

The question whether it is possible to assess forms of life is thus caught up the sort

of dialectic of individualization that can be read out of Hegels Philosophy of Right.

As modern society (on the one hand) releases individuals from dependence on

collective and tradition connections, it makes them (on the other hand) increasingly

dependent on exchange and commerce, thus increasing their interdependence.

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“Thick ethical positions” concerning our way of life become increasingly difficult to

justify (under conditions of modern pluralism) while they are at the same time

becoming even more pressing - or even unavoidable - under modern social

conditions. In this sense, the German philosopher Ludwig Siep is correct in

remarking that:

“Modern forms of life have such massive technical and infrastructural requirements

that they are not possible without considerable public services.”

Then, however, “the private formation of preferences and conceptions of happiness

becomes an illusion.” When private happiness is decided publically and by law – by

tax laws, governmental technological politics and so on – then the ways of life in

which human beings find themselves must become matters of public discussion.

However one wants to understand the rules of such a debate and wherever the

ultimate decisions regarding such questions ends up taking place – the question,

what reasons -- what kind of reasons -- can be validly employed in such a debate is

one that philosophy can and should contribute to.

(2) The “ideological character” of the neutrality thesis

The next point similarly seeks to reverse the onus of argument. The ethical question

“How is one to live?” is in every social formation already implicitly or explicitly

answered -- and this holds even for those forms of social organization that

understand themselves as pluralistic. Yet if this is correct, then the question

regarding the possibility of critique has not been correctly posed.

When one takes this view, then liberal “abstinence” appears as a way to obscure (or

to make invisible) formative influences and to deny that particular institutions that

present themselves neutral – for example, the market – bear the mark of a

particular ethic. This means, to put it bluntly, that the “pluralism” and “anti-

paternalism” that motivate “remaining neutral” regarding different forms of life

actually promotes what one might call the transformation of a form of life into a

destiny. As the powers that define collective life conceal themselves, the result is not

self-determination but rather loss of autonomy.

To sum up my argument:

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Both of my arguments are less “refutations” of the liberal position of “neutrality”

than they are motivations to take up again the question of how one can criticize

forms of life.

Neither of these arguments attempts to dispute the legitimacy of the modern anti-

paternalistic desire for autonomy. Neither do they encourage some sort of moral

dictatorship. Rather, they wish to draw our attention to the conditions for the

attainment of (individual and collective) self-determination, and, more specifically,

to show that thematizing and discussing forms of life is such a condition.

The claim that my project seeks to vindicate thus consists in the thesis that one can

argue about forms of life and one can argue about them with reasons. That is, by

way of the question of criticizability, I intend to investigate the specific rationality

of forms of life.

It is no coincidence that I’m investigating the success of forms of life from the

perspective of critique. The goal is not to develop a general conception of a correct

form of life. Nor is it to trace the conditions of such a conception. Such ethical

system-building seems to me neither desirable nor promising. My focus is rather on

the failure of forms of life, the crises to which they can fall victim, and the problems

that can arise for and within them – in sum, the aspects that make them liable for

criticism.

The moment of “functional disturbance” or “crisis” in this context will show itself to

be an important movens (or driver) of what I call “critique” and should remove any

suspicion of paternalism. The critique of forms of life as I conceive it begins exactly

there where there are problems, crises, and conflicts, even when these are not overtly

manifest. For this reason, critique is not conducted from an external-authoritarian

perspective. It is rather the catalyst of a process in which critique and self-critique

are intertwined. The sort of critique we take as our goal should therefore be neither

“ethically abstinent” nor paternalistic; it should not end in relativism but neither

should it have anti-pluralistic implications.

2. What (then) are forms of life?

In the context of my account, the term “form of life“ refers to a culturally shaped

"order of human co-existence"1 that encompasses an "ensemble of practices and

orientations"2 as well as their institutional manifestations and materializations.

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Differences amongst forms of life are not only expressed by different beliefs, values

and attitudes; they are also manifested and materialized in fashion, architecture,

juridical systems and family organization. As the forms in which we live, forms that

give shape to our life, they are part of the sphere of “objective spirit.“ They belong

to the– as Hannah Arendt would say – particularly human world, that world in

which human beings make their lives. Forms of life – in the sense used throughout

this paper – are concerned with the cultural and social reproduction of human life.

The term is apt because it is plausible to speak of a form of life only in those cases in

which we can think of something as being formed such that it can be reformed. A

form of life encompasses more than actions and attitudes that are simply repeated or

given by instinct.

To put the point differently, I’m asking about forms of life in the plural. I’m

interested in the different cultural forms that human life can take rather than in the

form of human life (as contrasted, say, with that of a lion).

Forms of life as inert bundle of practices

Now, since the concept is notoriously unclear both in sociology and philosophy, I

will at least outline my understanding of the very structure of forms of life: Forms of

life, as I conceive of them, are inert bundles of social practices

- The term social practice here refers to practices concerning oneself, others, and the

material world. They are practices in which we participate and into which we are

inaugurated. These practices are “social” not in the sense that they concern

interpersonal relations or the coordination of social relationships. Rather, they are

“social” in the sense that these practices can only exist and be understood against the

background of a socially constituted realm of meaning. They are patterns in which

we act. A practice therefore is a set of actions that has a repetetive and a habitual

moment and an intrinsic idea of what it means to “fulfil” this practice (that is: to act

rightly, according to the expectations that are involved in a certain practice.)

- Forms of life are to be understood as a bundle of such practices in that they

encompass a diversity of practices that are related to one another without building an

impenetrable and closed totality.

- Finally these bundles are inert, constituting an inert context of praxis. In contrast

to more fluid practices, they maintain “sedimentary elements,” praxis components

that are not always available, explicit, or transparent. Forms of life are not always

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engaged in deliberately. They are something that human beings participate in

without planning, intending, or even knowing, exactly what they are doing. (There is

habitualisation inherent as well as implicit knowlegde.) Nevertheless, they are

something that human beings do and therefore could do otherwise. (And this is

something that shows as soon as a certain set of practices and self-understandings

comes to its limits, when things don’t run smoothly anymore; when a set of practices

is interrupted, doesn’t go without saying anymore: the moment of crisis.)

- Now forms of life are also normatively structured bundles of social practices. This

does not only mean that as parts of a social order they contain rules, regulations, and

implicit assumptions about what is right or wrong. The important point here is that

the norms that structure forms of life – or rather that are expressed in them – cannot

be understood as mere conventions. Rather, they can only be grasped in relation to

their goal(s) that set certain demands and certain limits to what can be done in a

certain form of life. The practices composing forms of life are directed by ethical-

functional norms without which the practices could not function. Moreover, these

practices are guided by what can be understood as their own immanent criteria of the

good – that is, their own ethical-functional norms.

INS it makes sense to link Hegels notion of the “concept” to this specific

kind of normativity involved:

3. How can we criticize forms of life? My thesis about forms of life as instances

of problem-solving

My thesis is: Forms of life are strategies for solving problems or better; instances of

problem-solving. As such, they can succeed or fail. They can be rational or

irrational, appropriate or inappropriate. And, going a step further: Since we now

seem to only have shifted the burden of proof – taking into account that it might

neither go without saying what (under the conditions of malleable human forms of

life) “problems” are nor what there “solution” might look like this thesis needs to be

accompagnied by a second thesis:

The success or failure of forms of life as strategies to solve problems can only be

judged procedurally – as the result of a successful or failed learning process. The

general result of my project can thus be formulated as follows: Forms of life succeed

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when they can be understood as the result of successful processes of learning and

when they enable further learning. And the task of a critique of forms of life is to ask

the meta-question regarding the criteria whereby one can recognize whether a

certain kind of dynamic - - has succeeded in becoming a process of learning. This

means: In order to judge on forms of life we should establish criteria for the very

quality of social dynaics of transformation. (Put more crudely – is there such a thing

as progress?)

4. Zoom: Forms of Life as Problem-Solving Strategies

My thesis was: A form of life is a strategy for solving problems. Forms of life

respond to problems confronting our species (or individuals trying to shape their

lives) and they are an attempt to solve these problems. According to this

understanding, forms of life claim to constitute the best possible solution to the

specific problems they both face and pose. The success of forms of life can then be

measured by the extent to which they meet this demand.

In which sense, then, are forms of life instances of problem solving? What exactly

do I mean by “problem”, and what kind of problems are solved by a specific

form of life?

What are problems?

What then are problems? And in what sense are forms of life strategies for solving

them? As we will see, the idea of forms of life as instances of problem solving relies

on a specific concept of “problems”. A) Problems are always already situated, they

evolve out of a historical and social context, b) problems are “normatively loaden”

or preconceptualized.

Let me start with some observations.

- The talk of “problems” can be elucidated by noticing that when we say someone is

‘confronted with a problem,’ we can either mean ‘He is confronted with a task’ or

‘He is confronted with a difficulty’. Accordingly, conceiving of forms of life as

strategies for solving problems can either mean that the known ways of living

together are confronted with certain tasks or that they are confronted with certain

difficulties. Both of these aspects are relevant to my understanding of the word

“problem”. As forms of life master their specific problems (in the sense of tasks),

they always also encounter problems (in the sense of difficulties). They are

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confronted with shifting dynamics of change and conflict, which they cope with in

different ways. Such coping strategies will never be complete and will always

necessitate new attempts at solving the problems at hand. Thus, the starting point for

an evaluation of forms of life is the fact that they become problematic.

Problem vs. Needs

The advantage of speaking of “problems” and “strategies for solving problems” with

regard to forms of life can be made clear by comparing the talk of problems and

their solutions with an alternative approach based on the idea of needs and their

satisfaction. Rather than claiming that forms of life solve problems, one might argue

that they satisfy human needs and are better or worse to the extent that they succeed

in satisfying such needs. In contrast to the concept of “problems” that I have chosen,

the concept of “needs” has a more static and ahistorical character. “Needs” (at least

in a very rough understanding) understood as “basic needs” are commonly thought

to be fundamental and unquestionable constants requiring no interpretation. Because

they are independent of any particular historical or cultural formation, their

satisfaction may seem the perfect candidate for an objective criterion for assessing

the desirability of different forms of life.

When speaking of ‘problems’, on the other hand, I share the well-known critique of

such references to uninterpreted and ahistorical basic needs. First, needs are not

determinable, i.e. they are dynamic in nature. Second, needs are variable. Human

forms of life display fundamental differences, which – speaking with Arnold

Gehlen– exhibit “such a conspicuous contrariness, right into the folds of the human

heart, that one is almost lead to believe that we are dealing with different species.”

The concept of ‘problems’ now takes into account the way in which human life is

always already culturally formed and that its “higher-order” character requires

interpretation: ‘One can never survive bare,” and forms of life are not directed

towards ‘bare survival’ but rather a specific life, a life that will always already have

been fashioned in a particular way.

Note: One could also begin from a different concept of “needs” that took into

account their mutability and cultural variability. Or one could try to start with a

more sophisticated account of the human form of life that took account of such

elements. However, it seems to me more productive to start directly with cultural

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formations themselves. And the concept of “problems” is a good tool to investigate

these. – somehow starting from the opposite direction.

Productivity and Characteristics of the Concept of “Problems”

The approach that takes “problems” as central has three aspects that are important

for my concerns:

(1) This approach emphasizes the perspective in which difficulties and the

possibility of crises explain a form of life’s dynamic as well as provide a basis for

its critique

(2) The approach emphasizes that problems are determined and formed in a

particular socio-cultural context. Problems as they appear in connection with forms

of life are always multiply mediated problems. They appear in the context of a form

of life that is already historically situated and socially institutionalized. Such

problems always appear against the background of an already formed and

interpreted situation. The point of departure for a form of life is never the

“aboriginal origin” of “bare needs” independent of one’s form of life.

(3) The approach therefore opens up the possibility of understanding problems and

their solutions as moments within a (potentially interminable) process of problem-

solving. Problems, I claim, are always results of attempted solutions to earlier

problems; they are in a way always “problems of the second order,” arising out of

the solutions to other problems, Conversely, attempts to solve problems develop

historically through grappling with other problem-solving strategies. Forms of life

must then be understood in relation to their position in a history of problem-solving

attempts.

In other words, the problems with which human beings are confronted are not stable,

they change. Particularly, it is not only the attempted solutions to problems that

change but the problems themselves (and their description). The “history of

problem-solving” in which a form of life is situated is therefore not a history of

solutions (or rather repeated attempts at a solution) to the same problems but rather a

history of attempts at problem-solving that under certain conditions leads to an

accumulated history of problem-solving attempts. Problems are posed to a form of

life that itself poses problems in reacting to the problems posed to it. (This leads to

the suspicion – to which I will later return – that this is an unending process.)

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It will be easier to understand these characteristics by considering particular

examples. The first example is of the interpretation of the modern nuclear family

and bourgeois institution of marriage that Hegel provides in his Philosophy of Right.

It should then become clear that “problems” regarding forms of life are always

already historically developed and normatively understood (and thereby possess a

particular structure).

Example 1: Hegel’s Theory of the Family

When Hegel introduces the family as an instance of Sittlichkeit in his Philosophy of

Right, he considers a particular, historically distinct form of the family – the

bourgeois nuclear family of Christian Europe. Hegel wants to provide both a

description and justification of this form of the family. What makes his discussion

interesting for us is that he attempts to show how the bourgeois family emerged

from a historically-specific “ethical” context (in my terminology: “historically

specific constellation of problems”) and shows to be superior to alternative ways of

organizing family life. He does this by examining the way the institution of the

family responded to tensions specific to this historical constellation. To translate this

into my (which is naturally not Hegel’s vocabulary): the family was a superior

problem-solving strategy. Furthermore: It is the normatively imbued solution to a

normative problem.

How should one describe the “constellation of problems” that Hegel’s discussion is

responding to? When one examines Hegel’s theory of the Sittlichkeit of the family,

one can identify two strands of argument used to establish the nuclear family’s

superiority over alternative family arrangements:

First he distinguishes the specifically modern ideal of the family characterized by

independency of the married couple from the “traditional family” characterized by

closer relations to blood relatives, and argues for the superiority of “exogamy” (that

is: the choice of partner outside of association of the family) and monogamy.

Second, he brings this ideal of the family “back to itself” in that he defends it against

two misleading interpretations. On the one hand, he argues against the romantic

ideal of love that threatens the ethical-institutional character of the family by

overvaluing the emotional and erotic aspects of marriage. On the other hand, he

argues that reducing the family to a contract fails to understand the emotional aspect

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of family relations as well as the way in which the ethical relations established in

family life is taken as an end in itself.

Both lines of confrontation are necessary for Hegel’s justification of the bourgeois

family as an instance of Sittlichkeit in which freedom can be realized.

What does this examples show?

First we can see what it means to begin within a pre-formed situation in which

claims and possible solutions are already established rather than starting from “bare

needs” or uninterpreted problems. The problem that the bourgeois family solves is

not simply the problem of organizing familial relations and socializing the

subsequent generation (problems common to all human communities). The

bourgeois family attempts to solve conflicts between nature and freedom and

dependence and independence only intelligible when a certain historical moment has

been reached. And the family does this in a situation in which the claims of the

individual have already “made themselves heard.” To summarize, the ethical model

of the bourgeois family can be understood as the adaequate solution to two sets of

deficient alternatives (nature vs. ethical life and freedom vs. attachment).

Second, one also sees how the problems considered here are problems that arise

from earlier solutions to problems and provide the opportunity for further solutions.

Both the “contract” and “romantic” understandings of marriage can be seen as

reactions to the traditional family structure’s neglect of the individuality and the

self-sufficiency of individuals. However, these interpretations are themselves

characterized by a one-sided emphasis on self-sufficiency, to which Hegel’s model

reacts.

Third, the dimension of conflict also receives its due: It is not coincidental or

unimportant that Hegel develops his view against the background of alternatives and

tensions that appeared to him as real tensions and conflicts. When the institution of

bourgeois marriage is more sensitive to problems it itself poses than available

alternatives, and when the ethical interpretation of marriage gets at the “truth” of this

institution (if not necessarily its lived reality) better than alternatives, this

demonstrates that the appropriateness of this ethical formation (and its

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interpretation) shows itself in the fact that it can better manage current conflicts than

the available alternatives. To put it simply, the patriarchal model encounters

problems as soon as the claim of individuals for independence is made. And once

this claim acquires legitimacy, it leads to familial conflict. (Romeo and Juliette,

Bollywood).

Fourth, now we are finally in the position to discuss the normative dimension–. If

the problem (understood as task) of the bourgeois family is not simply to secure

natural reproduction but also to make ethical freedom possible – to provide the

natural basis for ethical freedom and thereby to make possible individual autonomy -

-, then the challenges forms of life respond to are not only culturally formed but

also normatively pre-defined. When forms of life succeed or fail, they do this in

relation to the normative claims and challenges that they themselves have brought

forth.

Here one sees what one could call the “dialectical complexity” of the problems that

forms of life attempt to solve and the way such problems can provide a basis for

critique.

(a) Where forms of life encounter crises (we’ll discuss crises shortly), they fail not

only on external hindrances but on internal, self-created problems.

(b) Forms of life don’t just fail. They fail only in relation to a normatively pre-

formed problem. Such a form of normative failure cannot be separated from their

actual and functional failure (that is one of the points of the approach that sees forms

of life as problem-solving strategies). The normative and the functional are

intertwined.

Example 2: Work and the crisis of the “labor society”

Let me discuss a second example: the crisis of the labor society. This too – as far as

it is related to the ethical dimension of our form of life (as I claim it is) – can only be

understood when one considers that a historical situation has been reached in which

particular claims are being raised that cannot be taken back. The labor society too is

currently in a normative as well as functional crisis.

The situation: The crisis of a labor society– a “labor society in which there is no

longer any labor to be done” (as Hannah Arendt pointedly described the problem) –

can only be understood when one has before one’s eyes the level of complexity of

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bourgeois society and the normative demands that characterize it. In such a society

(according to Hegel’s classical description), work is not only a means to subsistence

but also the means to social integration, recognition and honor. Moreover, because

work has this function, it brings particular normative expectations with it (even if

these are only seldom fulfilled). The crisis of the labor society thus is not only a

crisis of subsistence but also a normative crisis that can only be understood as a

crisis against the background of historically-specific normative assumptions and

demands. Therefore, the task such a society faces is not only to secure a minimal

subsistence for its members but also to provide work for members of society that

can be understood as free work. (To put it concretely: no forced labor).

The Problem (Difficulty): Every solution to the crisis – be it political or economic–

must provide a functional equivalence for that which work provided. The crisis of

the labor society is therefore only describable through a particular historically

situated constellation, i.e. through the particular historical form that work has

achieved and the normative claims that make sense within it. And any credible

solution to the problem must start here as well. The crisis of the labor society

therefore does not admit of a general solution completely divorced from the

historical, social, and normative form that this problem has taken. To take as an

example an issue being currently discussed: If a basic income is to avoid

constituting a socially destabilizing “giveaway,” it cannot be interpreted as

harkening back to a pre-bourgeois work ethos or embodying a simple distain for

work. It must rather transform the bourgeois understanding of work.

Problems of the second order and dialectical contradictions

I’ll conclude this part of my paper with some remarks on a few outstanding issues.

(And a typology of the kind of problems that might be involved in forms of life)

(1) First, a few remarks on the complex (or even dialectical) form of the very idea of

a problem I am defending.

(a) Problems that arise as problems of a certain form of life should be seen as

problems of a second order. What do I mean by this?

- Lets imagine a rural society that starves from hunger because it hasn’t been raining

for months. The lack of food certainly is a problem for this society. People are

starving. But it is not necessarily a problem for it as a form of life. This means: The

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fact that people starve as such doesn’t put into question any of the established

practices and institutions the society in question consists of. Only if it turns out that

this society is for some reasons (that might have to do with their misinterpretation of

nature – maybe they accept starving as a punishment from god) is unable to react to

the problem (for example by building speicherhäuser) this problem becomes a form-

of-life problem. Second order problems thus don’t adress “pure facts” but facts

evolvong out of established practices and interpretations.

(b) But, coming back to my examples taken from Hegel the picture is even more

complicated. The normatively complex notion of “problem” I’ve sketched above is

such that problems cannot – so to speak – “come from outside” but are in a

particular way “self-made.” That is, such problems are not about normative claims

made by some outside observer but rather concern the form of life’s own claims that

it at the same time cannot meet. As should be clear from these examples, the sense

in which these claims are the form of life’s own is not that they are explicit value

claims or norms society pays lip service to. Rather, they are points of reference

already contained in social practices and shared by those participating in the practice

– even if they are not fully realized or even if in a particular situation they cannot be

realized at all. In this way, problems emerge out of the specific constellation of the

particular form of life – even out its particular way of being self-contradictory.

Exkursus: Problems as contradictions

For Hegel thus, problems take the form of contradictions. In a given social and historical

situation, they do not appear to be contingent or disturbances coming from the outside

but rather the realization or updating of tensions that were already present in the situation

itself.

Problem as Contradiction: Immanent Character

While other problem conceptions (e.g. John Dewey's pragmatic conception) present

problems as unforeseeable and contingent occasions for learning, externally produced

(material) obstacles to action, or interruptions that rupture the functioning of an inwardly

reflected praxis context, for Hegel, the contradiction that leads to crisis is not external

to the discovered constellation. By this understanding, it is not the case that what is

intrinsically (or previously) stable does become instable, what is coherent does become

incoherent, and what is certain does become uncertain. Instead, the form itself that is

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being challenged is characterized by the differences contained within it. Every historical

and social constellation that is hereby challenged is, so to speak, the prior, necessarily

instable specification of a problem or contradiction.

Let's now look more closely at what characterizes the interpretation of crises and

problems in the mode of the contradiction.

First, for Hegel, problems are due to conflict. They appear as conflicts between

irreconcilable claims. In itself, that is a very specific interpretation of the concept of

crisis or problem that stands apart from the idea that a problem has to do with a simple

form of non-knowing or non-ability. But what is even more decisive here is the fact that

these conflicts are not, for instance, conflicts between two unconnected opponents. The

conflicts that are challenged do not only come about through the simultaneous onset of

two contrary claims. These claims are linked to one another – and that is precisely what

makes up the immanent character and the systematic constitution of the conflict.

Problems in the form of (dialectical) contradictions are then problems that are found

systematically within a given social formation, are created by those formations

themselves, and cannot be resolved within them.

For example, the "deeper" meaning of the dissolution of Greek morality had an

immanent character. With reference to Socrates, it is its own principle that

opposes it and by which it is destroyed. The Greek polis simply had a principle of

individuality that, embodied by Socrates, contradicts the morality of the polis, but

at the same time was created by it

Hegel's crisis diagnoses therefore describe the ruin of certain moral formations as, tersely

put, "homemade." The historical constellations that he diagnoses as crisis-prone don't

just fail, they fail unto themselves.

Problem as Contradiction: Reflexive Character

The immanence of problem development described here, however, would be

inconceivable without another aspect: Problems are reflexively interpreted as "internal

contradictions." Immanent contradictions exist only to the extent that cultural forms of

life are (analogous to Charles Taylors "self-interpreting animals") "self-interpreting

entities." They therefore fail "unto themselves" not only because they created the

contradictory practices and institutions that contradict one another; instead they

primarily fail unto themselves because they contradict their own self-conception, their

own interpretation of the world and the claim to validity coming along with it. The fact

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that a way of life can be in "conflict" means that it has its own bases for validity; the

meaning that is set with and by it and the normative reference points that are set with and

by it are called into question. This explains the fact that ways of life can, in a way,

internally "erode" or even that such an erosion, attributable to internal inadequacies, is

the precondition for its actual failure. It is not the fact of poverty that allows bourgeois

society to "fall apart into its extremities" but the fact that that reality contradicts its

character as a society in which the individual can find "honor and substance" (only)

through participation in it as a worker.

The Constitutive-Productive Character of the Contradiction

Another characteristic arises from this internally contradictory structure: the constitutive-

productive character of the crises that Hegel describes. Contradiction and crisis do not

only indicate the decline of a particular historical or intellectual formation. Where they

develop their dynamics, they are also the moment of motion that leads out of those

dynamics, symbols of the "vibrancy" of such a formation.

"Objective" Character of Contradictions

This constitutive and systematically interpreted character of contradictions refers to

another trait: Contradictions are "objective" in the sense that the "contradiction" is (also)

on the side of the object. "Objective crises" are on the side of an institutional and

practical structure that is alienated from itself and that grows to be at odds with itself due

to the existence of conflicting principles.

Contradictions, then, are interpreted as characteristic of social reality itself. They

denote an internal relationship of corresponding moral form of the corresponding form

of life. That is exactly why the theory of (social) contradiction does not (only) grasp the

existence of an open (social) conflict: What can become the problem for us, the

relationship that we contradict, must have already become latently problematic on the

side of the object (on the side of reality).

Interim Consideration: Contradictions in Social Reality

Here I would like to introduce a few considerations regarding the question of what talk

of contradictions in social reality actually implies, i.e. what it might mean that that

reality is "composed in a contradictory way". (I do this in order to make out whether it

makes sense to analyze social reality in term of "contradiction" at all – an assumption

that doesn't seem to be settled.) How do social practices come to contradict one another?

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And how are we to explain the fact that such a social pattern might entail mutually

contradictory practices and still endure?

There are prima facie several options.

(1) A praxis or institution contains various praxis-constitutive norms that cannot be

simultaneously adhered to. This results in a contradictory relationship between the

respective norms or between the practices that are constituted through them, insofar as

they can neither be harmonized nor exist simultaneously. The imperative to "be your

own person!" does not comport with the imperative to "conform!" But insofar as modern

working relations often entail both imperatives, we might describe this as "inherently

contradictory." The simplest variant in such a constellation is the classic double bind

situation in which there is an imperative that, practically speaking, is simultaneously

circumvented, a case in which, for example, working relations might be de facto

repressive while a claim to creativity or self-fulfillment might simultaneously be

postulated.

(2) By contrast, a "stronger" version of a systematic internal (and in fact dialectical)

tendency toward contradiction appears when two sets of practices and norms within a

social context are both in effect and mutually contradictory. Such praxis does not merely

postulate something that is not fulfilled within it but rather lives, so to speak, on equal

obedience to both imperatives. This is exactly how we might describe the working

relations involved in what is known as the "creative sector": They are based on the fact

that individuals simultaneously conform and act creatively; they require a posture in

which both coincide and they are also dependent upon both postures, provided that they

live on one hand by mobilizing the resource of creativity and on the other hand want to

steer toward exploitable channels.

The question, then, is: How useful is it to call this condition a "contradiction"? If we look

at the mutually contradictory norm-praxis structure, is there a common foundation on

which we can discern a contradiction in the same respect? The plausibility of talk of the

contradiction that is internal to the relations (the "real contradiction" of these relations)

can obviously only be tested if it has been shown that the practices in question are in fact

mutually dependent and mutually determined within the praxis context and that as such

they cannot be fulfilled simultaneously, i.e. they are mutually evasive – despite the fact

that they in fact arise together (otherwise the praxis context in question would not

endure).

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(3) A third case in which we might speak of the onset of "practical contradictions" or a

contradictory reality would be one in which the praxis-constitutive norms are

systematically interpreted in such a way that they change into the opposite of what was

intended (the goal that is being pursued) as soon as they are fulfilled. As such, the

French Revolution's transition into the Jacobin Terror can be seen as the transformation-

into-the-opposite of the original intent. If we can find an opposite or a contradiction here,

it exists between the intentions that are linked with specific actions and the factual

impacts and results that they create, the unintended consequences of processes that are

planted in the world. But here as well, it is insufficient for a claim of a systematic and

immanent "contradiction" to merely establish that the intention with which a project was

initiated and the result of the process that it triggered are at odds with one another.

Because "unintended consequences" in the social are likely to occur, such an

understanding would be accompanied by an inappropriate overextension of the concept

of a contradiction. It is thus crucial for the strong thesis of an immanent contradiction

that the process in question does not take that course by coincidence but due to "deeply

rooted and unavoidable reasons." To be seen as a "real contradiction" requires more than

a "good intention" that has led to a disastrous result. The characteristics that cause that

outcome are not only factually unfulfilled but also cannot be fulfilled. They must be built

into the formulation of the outcome or, at any rate, linked with the means available for

its fulfillment. (So, according to Hegel's analysis, the "horror" of the French Revolution

is not a result of contingent side effects but built into the "absolute" model of freedom

itself.)

(4) Finally, the contradictory nature of a social way of life can be described such that

connections that belong together have been torn apart within it such that its elements

confront one another in dysfunctional one-sidedness. In this case, a social way of life is

contradictory because, in its effective practices, it has been torn from its context and,

more specifically, from unity with its opposition. Again the model for such a

contradiction in the social would be Hegel's Antigone: If a functioning non-contradictory

ethical life unites state order and familial solidarity, then both sides in the Antigone

conflict become opposites of one another; the situation is contradictory because it is

disunited.

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With his interpretation of problems as contradictions and the thesis of real contradictions

that occur throughout reality itself, Hegel, as these general considerations have already

explained, accepts various explanatory burdens and a large number of implications.

It is, however, also an attractive concept for understanding social crises and

transformation processes insofar as what emerges is what can be interpreted as the

interconnection or entanglement of the functional and normative shortcomings of a form

of life, a perspective which enables us to analyze a certain kind of social erosion, one-

sidedness, and atrophying can be seen as a precondition of failure. The fact that social

practices and institutions – forms of life – have crises does not only mean that something

"is not working" or that a praxis can no longer actually be reproduced in the way that one

is used to. It means that that practice can no longer fit into the normative self-conception

and the connection of practices with interpretations of the world that accounts for those

practices and interpretations. Put another way: It means that something is wrong with

that connection. It has become incoherent, turned out to be impractical and "inhabitable"

(as Terry Pinkard puts it). Interpreting problems and crises as contradictions means

embracing the situation such that ways of life are less confronted with problems than

confront problems. And such that the problems that they are confronted with do not

appear coincidentally but systematically for reasons that are constitutively connected

with their disposition. Such problems that arise (as contradictions) are not only obstacles

to action but simultaneously conditions of possible action; they are not only

dysfunctional but in their dysfunction they are simultaneously constitutive for the

modality in which the inherently contradictory formation functions. (Ideological

criticism attaches to precisely this constitutive moment.)

Let me get away from Hegel now – and come to the end.

Problems with the notion of problems

(2) I have suggested to conceive of forms of life as problem solving; I have also

suggested that we can judge on the relative merits (and even the rationality= of a

form of life by looking the way it adresses these problems: adauquate of inadaequete

– regressive or in a way that adresses the topics involved at the height of where the

problem comes up.

However, when one understands the concept of a “problem” and with it the concept

of a “solution” in such a fashion, there is a difficulty.

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This difficulty consists in the dependence of problems and solutions on

interpretation. Put as a question: are problems or crises just “subjective” – that is,

are they constructed by us or “made” by our interpretations? Or are they “objective,”

—that is, do they exist independently from our interpretation of the situation? My

answer, briefly put, is that they are both. Problems are simultaneously given and

made.

Problems must be first understood as problems and therefore interpreted as such.

However, that does not mean that they are “only constructed.” Problems “call out”

as ways in which the practical sphere is confronted with obstacles without already

having acquired the particular form that characterizes a “problem.” With this, we

can resolve what looks like a paradoxical description of problems. A problem is

given insofar as a situation provides indications of a crisis. It is made insofar as the

identification of something as a problem „makes“ something out of inchoate

material. Even when the problem calls out as something “objective” that cannot be

ignored, that which shows itself is still so indefinite that it can only be made into a

concrete problem through interpretation.

In other words, a problem cannot be constructed “out of nothing.” It must be based

on something “independent of us” that makes itself known through a disturbance.

For this reason, problems cannot be simply talked away or ignored.

Whether a problem is accurately interpreted and its ostensible solution successful

can be seen by whether the “pressure” created by the problem lets up. And even

when that is a question of interpretation, one can approach the “real content of a

problem” through a process of adjustment of problem and problem description.

However, this process – and here the fourth element of my approach plays a role – is

exactly that: a process. Specifically, it is a learning process mediated through

conflicts and crisis. And on this process’s success or lack thereof -- on the

evaluation of its internal constitution – is where a critique of forms of life finds the

criterion for which it has searched.

5. Conclusion: An experimental pluralism

Do the conception of forms of life as problem-solving strategies and the related

notion of an ethical learning process lead to a monism of forms of life? Do the

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“problems” sketched in my remarks have only a single correct solution such that in

the distance lies a dystopian picture of a single, complete, and unified form of life?

No. I’d like to follow a remark of Hilary Putnam’s that exhibits a different

understanding of pluralism as well as the fundamental recognition of a plurality of

forms of life. As Putnam notes, “the problem does not consist in the fact that we are

acquainted with a multitude of forms of the good life that are incompatible but rather

that we don’t know any good form of life, at least not one that does not have deficits

as well as virtues.” To put it another way: we do not know of a form of life that

solves problems without creating new ones.

When one looks at the situation like this, then one sees -- on the one hand --

different forms of life competing with one another to be the best. They compare

themselves to others, and criticize themselves and each other on the basis of their

inability to solve the problems they pose for themselves. But, on the other hand, this

same activity can be seen as a motive for recognizing (even valuing) an ineliminable

pluralism. This motive is neither purely pragmatic nor merely a romanticization of

diversity. Rather, it is a different sort of pluralism: not a community of monads cut

off from one another but rather a plurality of experiments in problem-solving whose

results cannot be confidently predicted. And there should be as many of these as

possible since experimentation is the only path to new solutions. When we in reality

have not too many but rather not a single solution to the problem of how to live,

then a plurality seems necessary because (in the pragmatist tradition) a diversity of

trials is necessary to approach anything like an acceptable solution.

And– in a “pragmatic spirit” – when the consequences of our actions cannot be

anticipated with conceptual means alone, it is necessary to evaluate them by

observing the way in which they weave back and forth in the process of confronting

the products of their actions.

My conception thus does not lead to a monism but rather to an experimental

pluralism of forms of life. This is, however, fundamentally different from the

pluralism of “ethical abstinence” that I discussed at the beginning. The sort of

pluralism that I advocate is not one that principally excludes ethical questions but

rather a pluralism of debate about the correct solution to the problem of how to lead

a life. Simply put: a liberal agnosticism bracketing out ethical questions hinders the

experiment.

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