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International Journal of Greenhouse Gas Control 9 (2012) 41–51
Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect
International Journal of Greenhouse Gas Control
j ourna l ho mepage: www.elsev ier .com/ locate / i jggc
t’s not only about safety: Beliefs and attitudes of 811 local residents regarding CCS project in Barendrecht
art W. Terwel ∗, Emma ter Mors, Dancker D.L. Daameneiden University, Department of Social and Organizational Psychology, Wassenaarseweg 52, PO box 9555, 2300 RB, Leiden, The Netherlands
r t i c l e i n f o
rticle history:eceived 21 November 2011eceived in revised form 17 February 2012ccepted 26 February 2012vailable online 29 March 2012
eywords:arbon capture and storage (CCS)
a b s t r a c t
This paper reports on a public opinion survey designed to examine how the local public thought about aproposed CCS demonstration project in Barendrecht, the Netherlands. The survey was administered to alarge sample of the Barendrecht population (N = 811) shortly before it was decided to cancel the project.The results indicate that most residents were rather negative about the CCS project and found it an impor-tant issue. Furthermore, most residents thought it was unsafe to transport and store CO2 in the regionand thought it was very likely that the project would cause a fall in local property value. These beliefsonly partially explained the mostly negative public attitudes. Socio-political factors also contributed sig-
ublic perceptionttitudesrustocal oppositionurvey
nificantly to negative attitudes among the local public: Most residents perceived the decision-makingprocess as unfair and mistrusted those who would decide about whether or not to proceed with theproject. They further felt that project developer Shell and the national government — parties that weretrusted less than the Barendrecht town council and the local activist group “CO2isNee” — had too muchinfluence in the decision-making process and that the people of Barendrecht had too little influence.Implications and challenges for future CCS projects are discussed.
© 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
. Introduction
In May 2007, the Dutch government announced a tenderrocedure for two CO2 storage demonstration projects in theetherlands. Shell submitted a proposal for such a project.he project proposed by Shell included the transport (throughipelines) of CO2 produced at its refinery in Pernis and the sub-equent storage of the CO2 in two depleted natural gas fieldsituated in Barendrecht — a town of approximately 46,000 inhab-tants located at about 17 km from Pernis. A sum of D30 millionf government funding was allocated to the project. In November010, however, the new government decided to cancel the project.n a letter to notify the parliament, the Minister of Economic Affairs,griculture, and Innovation stated that this decision was partlyotivated by a lack of support for the project among the local public
Minister of Economic Affairs, Agriculture, and Innovation, 2010).1
Shortly before the Barendrecht CCS project was cancelled, weurveyed a large sample of the local public to determine how
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +31 715276686; fax: +31 715273619.E-mail addresses: [email protected] (B.W. Terwel),
[email protected] (E. ter Mors), [email protected] (D.D.L. Daamen).1 We refer to the project as a CCS project, but it should be noted that CO2 captureas not part of the government tender.
750-5836/$ – see front matter © 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.oi:10.1016/j.ijggc.2012.02.017
widespread the local resistance against the project actually wasor if in fact there was wider support for the project within thelocal community than was commonly assumed. For instance, itcould have been the case that the media coverage of protest activ-ities by local activists had merely created the suggestion that thevast majority of the local public was opposed to the project, whilelocal opposition was in fact less widespread. In relation to thispoint, another aim of the survey was to determine to what extentthe proposed CCS project was an issue for the people of Baren-drecht. The final aim of the survey was to identify factors thatinfluenced the local public’s attitudes toward the project. To thisend, the survey assessed residents’ beliefs about the safety of CO2transport and storage, their trust in parties involved in the project,their perceptions of the decision-making process, and their satis-faction with the possibilities of obtaining information about theproject.
In this article, we first provide a summary of events that tookplace in the course of the Barendrecht CCS project. This summaryis largely based on the case chronology offered by Brunsting et al.(2011) and provides relevant background information on the differ-ent parties involved in the project, elements of the decision-makingprocess, and communication activities. Then, we present the designand the results of the survey. In the final section, we relate the cur-
rent findings to previous research and discuss the implications forfuture CCS projects.
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2.1. Sample description
The sample consisted of 811 respondents. Just over half of the
2 B.W. Terwel et al. / International Journa
.1. Summary of events2
In May 2007, the Dutch government announced a tenderrocedure for two CO2 storage demonstration projects in theetherlands. In response to this tender, Shell submitted a proposal
or a project in the Barendrecht region and provided a notificationf intent to perform an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). AnIA is a statutory requirement for projects that are expected to haveignificant environmental implications. In an EIA, the environmen-al impact of a proposed project is determined and compared withhe status quo and alternative options. The procedure and outcomesf an EIA are reported in an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS),hich is submitted to the competent authority and made available
or public consultation. In the case of the proposed CCS project inarendrecht, the competent authorities were the Minister of Eco-omic Affairs and the Province of South-Holland.
In February 2008, soon after it had provided the notification ofntent to perform an EIA, Shell hosted a public information meet-ng where the EIA procedure was explained, project details wereisclosed, and the project website was announced. Furthermore,
government representative explained the position of the Dutchovernment with respect to national climate targets, CO2 emissioneduction policies, and the necessity of CCS. This information meet-ng was attended by 60 people. Some two months later, Shell hosted
second public information meeting, which was attended by 180eople.
In November 2008, the government allocated D30 million ofovernment funding to the project whereupon Shell submitted thenvironmental Impact Statement (EIS). As legally required, the EISas made available for public consultation in February 2009. Dur-
ng the public consultation period, the Barendrecht town councilrganized a public information meeting about the project. Resi-ents of the area were personally invited to attend this meetingnd more than 1100 people did so. There were speakers fromhell, the Barendrecht town council, the national government, andnvironmental Protection Agency (EPA) Rijnmond (i.e., DCMR; theocal research, consulting, and permitting authority regarding envi-onmental issues in the region). The Barendrecht town councilxpressed its view on the EIS by means of a “question checklist”,hich included questions about a range of issues (e.g., local safety
isks, the distribution of costs and benefits, the decision-makingrocess, legal requirements). The town council stated that all ques-ions on the checklist would have to be answered before it couldecide about accepting or rejecting the proposed CCS project. Athe same time, a local political party incited the public to sign aetition against the project and organized a protest walk, whichas covered by several media.
In March 2009, the National Coordination Regulation (NCR)ame into effect. For the Barendrecht CCS project, this new reg-lation implied that permitting procedures from then on woulde coordinated by the national government. In addition, the NCRave the national government the power to overrule decisionsade by local authorities (including those with respect to granting
nvironmental permits). The NCR was introduced to make proce-ures shorter and more effective, but the town council perceived
t as a means to impose the CCS project (Brunsting et al., 2011). local information center, aimed at informing the public about allspects relevant to the proposed project, opened its doors later that
onth.In April 2009, the EIA committee concluded that the EIS wasomplete and stated that it provided a proper assessment of the
2 This section is largely based on the Barendrecht case chronology provided inrunsting et al. (2011). More details can also be found in Brunsting and Mikunda2010) and Feenstra et al. (2010).
reenhouse Gas Control 9 (2012) 41–51
impacts and risks of the proposed CCS project. Yet, the Baren-drecht town council claimed that a number of the questions inthe checklist had not been addressed satisfactorily in the EIS andofficially declared itself against the project. In June 2009, the Min-ister of Housing, Spatial Planning, and the Environment as wellas the Minister of Economic Affairs visited Barendrecht to talkwith local politicians and local residents. The Ministers promisedthat they would discuss decisions concerning the project with thetown council. Moreover, they promised additional reports thatwould address the concerns that, in the opinion of the town coun-cil, had been insufficiently dealt with before. Before these reportswere published, some local residents formed the activist group“CO2isNee” (literally translated “CO2isNo”).3
Despite the local opposition to the CCS project, in November2009, the national government officially decided to approve theproject all the same. Shortly hereafter, the two Ministers visitedBarendrecht to explain this decision at a public meeting (attendedby roughly 600 people), but they were constantly interrupted byangry residents who expressed their disapproval of the project andthe whole process.
In February 2010, the government fell and elections wereannounced. This had the implication that decisions concerning con-troversial issues had to be postponed and raised the question ofwhether the CCS project in Barendrecht should be regarded assuch. This was not the case. In March 2010, the Crisis and Recov-ery Act (CRA) came into effect. The CRA aims to stimulate theDutch economy by shortening (permitting) procedures for largeinfrastructure projects. The town council was not amused when itbecame clear that the Barendrecht CCS project also fell under theCRA, because this prohibited the town council to take legal actionagainst the project. Importantly, at this stage some scientists openlycontested (the extensiveness of) the risk analyses performed inthe EIA process. This was adopted by television programs andadded fuel to the already heated debate about the Barendrecht CCSproject.
1.2. Aims of the current survey
We conducted a survey among Barendrecht residents in May2010, less than half a year before the government decided to cancelthe proposed CCS project in Barendrecht (this decision was madein November 2010). The aim of the survey was threefold. First, weaimed to determine how widespread the local resistance againstthe proposed CCS project actually was at this point of time. Sec-ond, we aimed to determine to what extent the CCS project was animportant issue for the people of Barendrecht. Third, we aimed toexplain the local public’s attitudes toward the CCS project. To thisend, we assessed Barendrecht residents’ beliefs and perceptionsconcerning several issues, including the safety of CO2 transport andstorage, the decision-making process, trust in the parties involved,and the possibilities of obtaining information about the project.
2. Method
respondents (52%) were male. Respondents were between 18 and
3 CO2isNee was formed by rather well-educated local residents who were con-cerned about the safety of the proposed project and who believed that the denselypopulated Barendrecht region was not the best place for siting the first onshore CCSdemonstration project in the Netherlands. Through its website and messages in localnewspapers, CO2isNee informed the public about its position and any developmentsrelated to the proposed project
l of Greenhouse Gas Control 9 (2012) 41–51 43
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Table 1Evaluation of the CCS plan as a whole.
Question Answer Percentage
How good or bad do you find theplan to capture, transport, andstore CO2 in the Barendrechtregion?
1. Very bad 69.4%2. Quite bad 16.4%3. Neither bad nor good 9.9%4. Quite good 3.4%5. Very good 0.9%
All in all, do you find the CCS planacceptable or unacceptable?
1. Acceptable 13.7%2. Unacceptable 86.3%
Would you be prepared to sign apetition against the CCS plan if you
1. No, certainly not 9.2%2. Perhaps 11.6%
B.W. Terwel et al. / International Journa
1 years old. With respect to education levels, 6% of the respondentsad not completed any education or had only completed primarychool, 23% of the respondents had completed lower vocational orower general secondary education, 27% of the respondents hadompleted intermediate (vocational) education, 11% of the respon-ents had completed higher general secondary education, 27% ofhe respondents had completed higher vocational education, and% of the respondents had an academic degree. Furthermore, 72% ofhe respondents lived in an owner-occupied house (the remainingere tenants) and 44% of the respondents lived in a household with
ne or more children. Except for age, the sample was representativef the adult population of Barendrecht.4
.2. Procedure
The survey was conducted by telephone over a five-day periodn May 2010 and was executed by professional interviewers fromNS-NIPO. In order to get an accurate picture of how Barendrechtesidents thought of the local CCS project, the interviewers did nottate at the beginning of the phone call that the interview wasoing to be about this topic. If people had been told that the inter-iew would be about the proposed CCS project, then those who felttrongly involved in the topic may have been more likely to par-icipate than those who felt less involved. In that case, the sampleould have produced a distorted picture. We excluded this pos-
ibility by introducing the survey as a study into neighborhoodatisfaction: People were told that the interview was going to bebout “satisfaction with your neighborhood and a plan that is cur-ently being discussed in the region that might add to or detractrom your satisfaction with your neighborhood”. This way of intro-ucing the survey prevented the overrepresentation of residentsith a strong opinion about the project.
After three questions about neighborhood satisfaction, thenterviewer made clear to respondents that further questions wereoing to be about “the plan to capture, transport, and store CO2 (orarbon dioxide) in the Barendrecht region”,5 here simply referredo as “the CCS plan”. Topics covered in the interview were aware-ess of the plan, knowledge of some basic aspects of the plan,ttitudes toward the plan, the extent to which the CCS plan was anssue for the people of Barendrecht, beliefs and expectations aboutconsequences of) the plan, perceptions of the decision-makingrocess with respect to the plan, trust in the parties involved
n the plan, and matters related to information provision. In theesults section below, we detail how we have assessed respon-
ents’ attitudes, perceptions, and beliefs concerning each of theseopics.4 People older than 50 were slightly overrepresented in the sample and peopleetween 20 and 40 years old were slightly underrepresented. As age and the mainutcome variable (i.e., attitudes toward the proposed local CCS project) were hardlyorrelated (r = −.13), this does not jeopardize the validity of the results and con-lusions. Moreover, actual and weighted percentages (i.e., percentages adjusted forifferences in age between the population and the sample) with respect to publicttitudes toward the project were virtually identical.5 The reason why the plan was described this way was that the CO2 produced
t the Shell refinery in Pernis had to be transported through the region (not onlyithin the boundaries of the Barendrecht municipality) to the storage location inarendrecht. For this reason, we included a subsample of 58 respondents who lived
n the adjacent residential area of Portland in Rhoon (7% of the sample), an areaocated along the proposed CO2 transport line. Residents of Portland had also beennvolved in communications about the CCS plan (including the information eveningeld in February 2009). However, in this article we do not differentiate betweenarendrecht residents and Portland residents as there were no significant differ-nces between the two groups with regard to key measures (e.g., attitudes towardhe CCS plan).
were asked to do so? 3. Yes, certainly 52.0%4. I have already done so 27.3%
3. Results
3.1. Descriptive statistics
3.1.1. Awareness of and knowledge about the CCS planPublic awareness of the CCS plan was assessed by asking respon-
dents whether they knew about the plan to capture, transport, andstore CO2 (or carbon dioxide) in the Barendrecht region. Only fewanswered that they had “never heard” about the plan (3% of therespondents). The vast majority stated to know “a little” (48% ofthe respondents) or “quite a lot” (49% of the respondents) aboutthe plan.6
In addition, we assessed respondents’ knowledge about threebasic aspects of the CCS plan by means of three multiple-choicequestions (each question included an “I don’t know” option). Weasked questions about the origin of the CO2 that would be storedshould the plan continue, about the type of storage reservoir, andabout the depth of the storage reservoir. These and all further ques-tions in the interview were asked only to respondents who hadpreviously indicated to know of the plan.
Most of the respondents (80%) correctly indicated that the CO2originated from a refinery in Pernis. A similar percentage (83% ofthe respondents) knew that the storage of CO2 would take place inan empty natural gas field. However, fewer people were aware ofthe depth at which the CO2 would be stored should the plan con-tinue: Only 41% of the respondents correctly answered that the CO2would be stored at a depth of more than 1500 meters, while 39% ofthe respondents admitted not to know the answer and another 20%of the respondents thought the CO2 would be stored at depths of500 meters or (much) less. No further knowledge questions wereincluded in the survey because we mainly intended to assess (fac-tors that influenced) the local public’s attitudes toward the CCSplan.
3.1.2. Attitude toward the CCS planWhen asked how good or bad they thought the CCS plan was,
over two-thirds of the respondents (69%) indicated to find the plan“very bad” and 16% of the respondents found it “quite bad”. A verysmall minority (4% of the respondents) regarded it as “quite good”or “very good”. Furthermore, a large majority (86% of the respon-
dents) indicated to find the plan “unacceptable”. Just over half ofthe respondents (52%) stated that they would “definitely” sign apetition against the CCS plan if asked to do so, and another 27% of6 Percentages in the text are rounded to whole numbers. Aside from the predeter-mined response categories, which the interviewer read out loud to the respondentsand are described in this section, respondents could refrain from answering a ques-tion. This occurred for 0% to 12% of the total number of responses per question (themedian percentage of non-response was 2%). Percentages reported in this paperpertain to valid responses only.
44 B.W. Terwel et al. / International Journal of Greenhouse Gas Control 9 (2012) 41–51
Table 2Indicators of issue involvement.
Question Answer Percentage
The CCS plan is a subject that somepeople regard as more importantthan others. How important is theCCS plan for you personally?
1. Completely unimportant 5.0%2. Quite unimportant 15.3%3. Quite important 43.4%4. Very important 36.4%
How often do you talk to othersabout the CCS plan?
1. Never 12.4%2. Occasionally 65.4%3. Often 22.2%
Do you ever worry about the CCS 1. Never 27.3%
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Box 1: Information Box. Zembla documentary titled‘‘CO2 bomb under Barendrecht’’As described in the Introduction section, there werevarious ways for the public to obtain information aboutthe CCS plan, including public information meetings,the project information center, and the websites ofthe parties involved in the project, but also throughprograms about the proposed CCS project on nationaltelevision. Among these was an episode of Zemblawith the provocative and insinuative title ‘‘CO2 bombunder Barendrecht’’. Among other things, in this docu-mentary a professor of chemistry stated being againstthe Barendrecht CCS plan because, in his view, riskanalyses performed for the EIA were incomplete. Bymeans of a laboratory experiment, this professor fur-ther showed how CO2 extinguishes the flame of aburning candle by displacing oxygen. Shortly hereafter,a computer animation illustrated how a cloud of CO2may spread out over a Barendrecht residential district,suggesting that in the event of CO2 leakage manypeople would suffocate. The Zembla documentary wasbroadcasted less than two months before our surveywas conducted. In the survey, we asked respondentsto indicate which information sources they had con-sulted (i.e., public information meetings organized bythe town council, the project information center, thewebsite of Shell, the episode of Zembla, and an episodeof a national television program named Netwerk). Next,we asked them which of the information sources thatthey had consulted had been most helpful to themin forming their opinion about the CCS plan. Manyof the respondents (47%) indicated to have seen theepisode of Zembla and it was chosen most frequentlyas the most helpful source of information. This is con-sistent with the idea that vividly presented information(e.g., an experiment illustrating how CO2 extinguishesthe flame of a burning candle; the computer anima-tion about a CO2 cloud spreading out over an entiredistrict) is weighted more heavily and thus has moreimpact on people’s judgments than has valid but pal-lid information (e.g., statistics about the probabilityand consequences of CO2 leakage; see Nisbett & Ross,1980). In a similar vein, the episode of Zembla mayhave contributed to the fact that so many people(84% of the respondents) thought scientists who areexperts in the field of CCS disagreed about the safetyof the Barendrecht CCS project. The professor inter-viewed in Zembla contested the completeness of therisk analyses performed for the EIA, while at the publicinformation meetings safety claims were made based
plan? 2. Occasionally 48.3%3. Often 24.4%
he respondents reported having done so already. All percentagesre provided in Table 1. Thus, most of the Barendrecht residentsere rather negative about the CCS plan.
.1.3. Was the CCS plan an issue for the people of Barendrecht?Even though people were generally rather negative about the
CS plan, it remains important to see whether the plan actually wasn issue for the people of Barendrecht. To this end, we asked respon-ents questions about neighborhood satisfaction (which was thelleged topic at the start of the interview). That is, we asked themow they thought their neighborhood would develop in the nextve years (improve, deteriorate, or stay the same) and why. Wesed this procedure because whether or not people spontaneouslyi.e., not cued) mention the CCS plan as a reason for how they expectheir residential area to develop in the next five years is particularlynformative as to whether the CCS plan is an important issue inhe community. Direct questions to assess issue involvement werencluded later in the interview.
The results revealed that respondents who thought that theiresidential area would deteriorate in the next five years rela-ively often mentioned the CCS plan as a reason for this [33% of50 respondents, which is markedly more often than those whoxpected it to improve (none of 105 respondents) or to stay theame (6% of 423 respondents)]. Overall, 14% of the respondentspontaneously mentioned the CCS plan. In response to the directuestions about issue involvement, 80% of all respondents indi-ated that they regarded the plan as either “quite important” orvery important” for them personally. Furthermore, about two-hirds (65% of the respondents) indicated to “occasionally” talk tothers about the CCS plan and about one-fifth (22% of the respon-ents) indicated to do so “often”. Finally, just over one quarter27% of the respondents) indicated that they “never” worried abouthe plan, but most people worried about it at least every now andhen. All percentages are provided in Table 2. All in all, it seems theCS plan was an important issue for a majority of the Barendrechtesidents.
.1.4. Beliefs about aspects and consequences of the CCS planWe assessed respondents’ beliefs concerning the CCS plan in
elation to climate change mitigation, issues of safety, and the like-ihood that the plan would cause a fall in property value. Two-thirdf three respondents (67%) regarded measures that help to combatlobal warming as “very desirable”, but many reckoned that thehance of the Barendrecht CCS plan helping in this regard was notery high (41% of the respondents believed that this was “a littleikely” and another 40% of the respondents considered this “not atll likely”).
With regard to beliefs about safety, eight out of ten peoplenterviewed (80% of the respondents) believed that storing theO2 under Barendrecht was going to be “very unsafe” or “quitensafe”, and six out of ten (62% of the respondents) believed that
upon these risk analyses.
the transport of the CO2 was going to be “very unsafe” or “quiteunsafe”. Furthermore, 84% of the respondents believed that scien-tists who are experts in the field of CCS disagreed about the safetyof the CCS plan (a television broadcast may have contributed to thisrather high percentage, see the Information Box 1 ). Also, 72% of therespondents thought it was “very likely” that the CCS plan wouldlead to a fall in local property value. All percentages are providedin Table 3.
3.1.5. The perceived influence of the parties involvedThe perceived influence of each of the parties involved in the
decision-making process was assessed after a brief introduction:
“As you may know, there are several parties involved in the CCSplan, including the Barendrecht town council, the national govern-ment, Shell, the people of Barendrecht, and EPA Rijnmond”. Weasked respondents (in a systematically varied order) how they felt
B.W. Terwel et al. / International Journal of Greenhouse Gas Control 9 (2012) 41–51 45
Table 3Beliefs about aspects and consequences of the CCS plan.
Question Answer Percentage
How desirable do you think it isto have measures that help tocombat global warming?
1. Not at all desirable 8.4%2. A little desirable 24.8%3. Very desirable 66.8%
How likely do you think it thatthe CCS plan will help to combatglobal warming?
1. Not at all likely 39.6%2. A little likely 41.0%3. Very likely 19.4%
How likely does it seem to youthat the CCS plan will lead to afall in the value of houses inBarendrecht?
1. Not at all likely 4.8%2. A little likely 23.1%3. Very likely 72.1%
How safe do you think it is totransport CO2 by pipeline in theBarendrecht region?
1. Completely safe 8.3%2. Quite safe 29.5%3. Quite unsafe 31.8%4. Very unsafe 30.4%
How safe do you think it is tostore CO2 under Barendrecht?
1. Completely safe 4.3%2. Quite safe 15.7%3. Quite unsafe 28.3%4. Very unsafe 51.7%
Scientists who are experts in thefield of CO2 capture, transportand storage.
1. Agree that theBarendrecht CCS plan issafe
7.3%
2. Agree that this CCS planis unsafe
9.2%
3. Have differences in 83.5%
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Table 4Perceived fairness of the decision-making process, trust in decision makers, anddecision acceptance.
Question Answer Percentage
How fair or unfair is the decisionmaking about the CCS planaccording to you?
1. Very fair 0.9%2. Quite fair 12.7%3. Quite unfair 41.5%4. Very unfair 44.9%
Do you trust those who willultimately decide whether to goahead with the CO2 capture,transport, and storage plan inthe Barendrecht region?
1. Not at all 55.4%2. A little 34.5%3. Quite a lot 8.3%4. Very much 1.8%
If a decision is made soon onwhether or not to implement theCCS plan, are you willing toaccept this decision regardless ofwhat the decision might be?
1. Certainly not 22.3%2. Probably not 15.8%3. Maybe, maybe not 23.2%4. Probably 25.1%5. Certainly 13.6%
What do you expect the finaldecision to be about CO2 storageunder Barendrecht?
1. CO2 will be stored underBarendrecht
73.2%
2. CO2 will not be stored 26.8%
and the national government (see Table 5).
0% 20 % 40% 60% 80% 100 %
The peopl e of
Baren drech t
Baren drec ht
town co unc il
EPA
Rijnmond*
Natio nal
govern ment
Shell
1 = Too much
inf luence
2 = Right
amoun t of
inf luence3 = Too little
inf luence
* Res pon dents cou ld als o in dicate that they di d not know that EPA Ri jnmon d was inv olved in the CCS
plan . The 240 respondents wh o gav e this answer w ere exclu ded from ca lcul ations conc erning this party .
opinion about the safety ofthe CCS plan
bout the influence of each of these five parties when it comes toeciding on whether or not to go ahead with the CCS plan (recallhat at the time of the survey the decision to cancel the project wasot made yet). Many of them felt that Shell (88% of the respon-ents) and the national government (74% of the respondents) hadoo much influence in the decision-making process. On the otheride, most of them also felt that Barendrecht residents (85% of theespondents) and the Barendrecht town council (82% of the respon-ents) had too little influence, see Fig. 1.
.1.6. Procedural fairness, trust in decision makers, and decisioncceptance
In addition to the perceived influence of the different partiesnvolved in the CCS plan, we asked respondents to evaluate the fair-ess of the decision-making process about the plan, to indicate howuch they trusted those who would ultimately decide on whether
o go ahead with the plan, and to indicate their willingness to accepthe final decision about the implementation of the plan regard-ess of what this decision would be. The vast majority (86% of theespondents) perceived the decision-making process about the CCSlan as “very unfair” or “quite unfair”. Concerning trust, more thanalf of the respondents (55%) stated that they did no trust thoseho would ultimately decide about the CCS plan and only 10% of the
espondents had “quite a lot” or “very much” trust. In terms of deci-ion acceptance, 22% of the respondents indicated that they wouldcertainly not” accept the final decision about the continuation ofhe plan (16% of the respondents would “probably not” accept thisecision). On the other side, 14% of the respondents said they werecertainly” prepared to accept the final decision regardless of whathe decision would be and another 25% of the respondents wouldrobably accept it. In this regard, it is further important to note that3% of the respondents expected that the final decision would be toroceed with the CCS plan. All percentages are provided in Table 4.
.1.7. Trust in specific partiesIn the interview, we further asked respondents about their trust
n specific parties involved in the CCS plan. However, to keep the
under Barendrecht
time that it would take to complete the interview within acceptablelimits, we did not ask respondents how much they trusted each ofthe six parties. Instead, we randomly assigned respondents to oneof six versions of the survey questionnaire, which only differed withrespect to the trust object. For instance, in one version respondentswere asked “Do you trust Shell when it comes to the CCS plan?”(1 = not at all; 2 = a little; 3 = quite a lot; 4 = completely). In other ver-sions, respondents answered an identical question about their trustin the Barendrecht town council, the national government, EPARijnmond, scientists who are experts in the field of CCS, or environ-mental organizations. In addition, near the end of the interview allrespondents were asked whether or not they had heard of CO2isNeeand, if so, whether they trusted this party. With average scores justover 3 on the 4-point scale, the Barendrecht town council (M = 3.06)and CO2isNee (M = 3.10) were the most trusted parties. On the otherside, people placed little trust in Shell (M = 1.60) and the nationalgovernment (M = 1.57). Rated somewhere in between were envi-ronmental organizations (M = 2.34), EPA Rijnmond (M = 2.30), andscientists (M = 2.23), which all were trusted significantly less thanthe town council and CO2isNee, but significantly more than Shell
Fig. 1. The perceived influence of the involved parties when it comes to decidingon whether or not to go ahead with the CCS plan. *Respondents could also indicatethat they did not know that EPA Rijnmond was involved in the CCS plan. The 240respondents who gave this answer were excluded from calculations concerning thisparty.
46 B.W. Terwel et al. / International Journal of Greenhouse Gas Control 9 (2012) 41–51
Table 5Trust in parties.
Party Means (and SD) Number ofrespondents
Shell 1.60a (0.82) 128National government 1.57a (0.76) 107Barendrecht town council 3.06b (0.95) 139EPA Rijnmond (DCMR) 2.30c (0.92) 103Scientists with expertise in the
field of CCS2.23c (0.87) 123
Environmental organizations 2.34c (0.86) 155CO2isNee 3.10b (0.81) 578
Note. Trust ratings were expressed on scales with response categories ranging from1s
3
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Table 6Satisfaction with information provision and need for information.
Question Answer Percentage
To what extent are you satisfiedwith the possibilities ofobtaining information about theCCS plan?
1. Dissatisfied 9.6%2. Neither dissatisfied norsatisfied
24.4%
3. Satisfied 66.0%
Do you have a need for 1. Yes 24.1%
= no trust at all to 4 = complete trust. Different superscripts indicate statisticallyignificant differences at p < .001.
.1.8. Information about the CCS planWe asked respondents to indicate how satisfied they were with
he opportunities of obtaining information about the CCS plan andhether they had a need for additional information about thelan. Two-thirds of the respondents (66%) were “satisfied” withhe opportunities to obtain information about the CCS plan, andbout a quarter of the respondents (24%) were “neither dissatisfiedor satisfied” (the remaining 10% of the respondents were “dissat-
sfied”). Concerning their need for additional information about theCS plan, more than three-fifths of the respondents (62%) indicatedo have no such need (see Table 6 for all percentages). Interest-ngly, respondents who claimed to have considerable knowledgebout the CCS plan slightly more often expressed a need for addi-ional information about the plan than those who admitted to knownly a little about the plan, �2(2) = 5.61, p = .06. That is, 41% of theormer group and 34% of the latter group expressed having a needor additional information.7
.2. Correlation analyses
Zero-order correlations between all variables that allow for cor-elation analysis (i.e., items with at least ordinal level rating scales)re listed in Table 7. Of course, it is neither feasible nor very infor-ative to discuss every single correlation reported in this table.
nstead, we primarily focus on relationships between respondents’ttitude toward the CCS plan and perceptions and beliefs concern-ng aspects of the CCS plan that may have influenced their attitude.
It turned out that attitudes toward the CCS plan were stronglyorrelated with a range of issues. As might be expected, the moreegative respondents were about the plan, the more they worried
bout the plan and the more they considered it personally rele-ant. Respondents were more negative about the CCS plan as theyelieved that CO2 transport and storage would be unsafe, and as7 We further asked people to indicate whether they had been at a public infor-ation meeting, had visited the project information center, had seen two recent
elevision broadcasts about the CCS plan (i.e., Zembla and Netwerk), and had lookedt the website of Shell in order to obtain information about the CCS plan. As oftenappens in investigations of news exposure through self-reports (Prior, 2009), theseuestions undoubtedly provided an overestimation of the actual numbers in theopulation. For instance, 25% of the respondents claimed having visited the project
nformation center, but objective visitor numbers indicated that relatively few peo-le had actually paid it a visit. Importantly, the procedure that we used to inviteeople to participate in the survey (see Method section) ruled out the possibilityhat this over-reporting was due to selection biases toward certain groups of indi-iduals (which would have produced a distorted cross section of the population).e are, however, unable to determine the cause of this over-reporting. It could be
hat over-reporting occurred because people believed that their responses woulde taken more seriously if they would look well-informed and/or it may be due toocial desirability bias (cf. Hadaway et al., 1998). Whatever the cause may be, were certain that the data do not give a valid impression regarding the use of theseources of information, which is why we have not included the results in this article.
additional information about theCCS plan?
2. A little 13.5%3. No 62.4%
they considered it likely that the CCS plan would cause a drop inproperty value in the region. Also, the more they perceived thedecision-making process as unfair and the more they felt that thepeople of Barendrecht had too little (and Shell had too much) influ-ence on the decision to continue with or to cancel the plan, themore negative respondents were about the plan. Finally, attitudeswere correlated with trust in specific parties: Trust in Shell and thenational government (both proponents of the project) was associ-ated with a more positive attitude toward the CCS plan, and trustin CO2isNee with a more negative attitude.8
We further conducted a multiple regression analysis to exam-ine how much of the variance in public attitudes is explained bythese variables and to see which variables are most predictive ofattitudes toward the CCS plan. The indicators of issue involvement(e.g., worry, personal relevance) were excluded from the analysisas these are not logical to include as predictors of people’s attitudetoward the plan. Also not included were the items about trust inspecific parties because respondents were asked about only oneof these parties (and indicated their trust in CO2isNee only if theyhad heard of this party’s existence). Still, the remaining variablestogether explain 53% of the variance in attitudes toward the plan(multiple R = .74, R2
adj = .53), which is quite substantial. The leftpart of Fig. 2 lists the predictors of public attitudes that are sta-tistically significant at p < .01; the right part lists the statisticallynon-significant factors.
The variable that explained most unique variance in people’sattitudes toward the CCS project was perceived safety of CO2storage ( ̌ = .37). It is important to emphasize that although thenon-significant ˇ-weight of perceived safety of CO2 transportseems to suggest otherwise, people were not lighthearted in thisrespect. After all, perceived safety of CO2 transport and perceivedsafety of CO2 storage were highly correlated (r = .65; see Table 7),which is why perceived safety of CO2 transport explained littlevariance in public attitudes over and above the variance alreadyexplained by the perceived safety of CO2 storage. To a lesser degree,the same holds for the variance in public attitudes that is explainedby the perceived influence of the different parties involved (e.g.,perceived influence of the people of Barendrecht and perceived
influence of the Barendrecht town council were correlated r = .49;only the former was a statistically significant predictor of peo-ple’s attitudes). The list of factors that added significantly to the8 We further looked at relationships between several background variables andpublic attitudes toward the CCS plan. We observed a modest but statistically sig-nificant relationship between age and attitude (r = −.13, p < .001), indicating thatolder people were more negative about the plan. We did not observe statisticallysignificant relationships between attitude and other background variables—gender,education, specific area of residence (i.e., four different districts in Barendrecht andthe Portland district in Rhoon, based on zip code), whether one lived in an owner-occupied or rented house, and the presence of children in the household (i.e., allp-values >.01). As with the correlations reported in Table 7, we used this probabilitylevel instead of p < .05 because it is more conservative and thus avoids a large num-ber of statistically significant correlations (due to the large sample size) that haveno practical relevance. As the background characteristics had virtually no influenceon attitude toward the CCS plan, these will not be discussed any further.
B.W.
Terwel
et al.
/ International
Journal of
Greenhouse
Gas
Control 9
(2012) 41–51
47
Table 7Zero-order correlations.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1. Attitude toward the Barendrecht CCS plan –2. Desirability of measures to combat global warming .02 –3. Likelihood CCS plan helps to combat global warming .13 .25 –4. Likelihood CCS plan leads to a fall in property value −.44 −.10 −.03 –5. Safety of CO2 transport (RC) .48 .11 .11 −.37 –6. Safety of CO2 storage (RC) .65 .08 .13 −.45 .65 –7. Personal relevance −.41 .08 −.05 .35 −.36 −.46 –8. Topic of conversation −.22 .05 −.05 .18 −.17 −.22 .38 –9. Worry −.43 .01 −.06 .39 −.44 −.49 .51 .51 –
10. Influence of the Barendrecht town council −.26 .04 −.12 .11 −.16 −.22 .18 .09 .10 –11. Influence of the national government .14 −.10 .05 −.10 .13 .16 −.08 −.12 −.14 −.22 –12. Influence of Shell .32 −.12 .04 −.16 .17 .22 −.24 −.12 −.13 −.20 .12 –13. Influence of the people of Barendrecht −.37 .07 −.06 .19 −.17 −.28 .13 .06 .11 .49 −.26 −.3114. Influence of EPA Rijnmond −.02 .01 −.02 −.01 −.06 −.04 −.03 −.10 −.02 .03 −.04 −.0215. Perceived fairness of decision-making process (RC) .49 .15 .18 −.30 .35 .43 −.29 −.17 −.32 −.26 .15 .2516. Trust in decision-makers .53 .11 .13 −.35 .35 .48 −.27 −.18 −.33 −.21 .17 .2617. Acceptance of final decision about the CCS plan .45 .08 .09 −.40 .41 .47 −.37 −.26 −.48 −.11 .12 .2018. Trust in Shell .53 .17 .25 −.22 .41 .51 −.25 −.11 −.30 −.19 .11 .3719. Trust in the national government .53 .07 .25 −.49 .37 .58 −.30 −.14 −.38 −.31 .25 .3520. Trust in the Barendrecht town council −.11 .02 .04 .19 .07 −.01 −.01 .26 .08 .11 −.04 .0421. Trust in scientists .41 .20 .11 −.31 .26 .41 −.19 −.16 −.37 −.06 −.05 .0922. Trust in environmental organizations .09 .17 .01 −.22 .14 .21 .05 −.06 −.17 .03 .08 .0623. Trust in EPA Rijnmond .25 .09 .16 −.24 .41 .45 −.21 −.16 −.30 −.12 −.07 .1824. Trust in CO2isNee −.41 .09 −.11 .29 −.31 −.42 .32 .22 .32 .16 −.12 −.2325. Satisfaction with possibilities to obtain information .12 .13 .08 −.11 .13 .16 −.09 .00 −.06 −.06 −.03 .00
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
1. Attitude toward the Barendrecht CCS plan2. Desirability of measures to combat global warming3. Likelihood CCS plan helps to combat global warming4. Likelihood CCS plan leads to a fall in property value5. Safety of CO2 transport (RC)6. Safety of CO2 storage (RC)7. Personal relevance8. Topic of conversation9. Worry
10. Influence of the Barendrecht town council11. Influence of the national government12. Influence of Shell13. Influence of the people of Barendrecht –14. Influence of EPA Rijnmond .05 –15. Perceived fairness of decision-making process (RC) −.30 −.02 –16. Trust in decision-makers −.30 −.03 .63 –17. Acceptance of final decision about the CCS plan −.17 .02 .39 .41 –18. Trust in Shell −.42 −.08 .52 .62 .37 –19. Trust in the national government −.56 −.06 .52 .77 .44 N/A –20. Trust in the Barendrecht town council .12 −.19 −.04 −.15 .07 N/A N/A –21. Trust in scientists −.02 .01 .32 .43 .30 N/A N/A N/A –22. Trust in environmental organizations .05 .03 .12 .19 .24 N/A N/A N/A N/A –23. Trust in EPA Rijnmond −.03 .30 .39 .52 .36 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A –24. Trust in CO2isNee .21 −.05 −.31 −.33 −.36 −.20 −.38 .31 −.20 −.04 −.17 –25. Satisfaction with possibilities to obtain information −.08 −.04 .11 .09 .17 .11 .10 .15 .26 .23 .24 .01 –
Note. Bold faces indicate correlations significant at p < .01. RC = reversed coded.
48 B.W. Terwel et al. / International Journal of Greenhouse Gas Control 9 (2012) 41–51
Overall attitude
R = .74
R2
adj. = .53
Safety of CO2 stor age(RC)
Trust in decision makers
Likelihood CCS plan leads
to a fall in property val ue
Influence of the people
of Barendrecht
Influence of Shell
Perceived fairness of
decision-making process(RC)
β = .16**
β = .37**
β = -.13**
β = -.11**
β = .09*
β = .11*
Desirability of measures to
combat g lobal w arming
Safety of CO2 transport(RC )
Influence of the national
government
Likelihood CCS plan helps
to combat g lobal w arming
Influence of the
Barendrecht town council
Influence of EPA Rijnmond
Satisfaction with
infor mation possibilities
β = -.06
β = .07
β = -.04
β = .03
β = -.02
β = .01
β = .01
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4
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ig. 2. Significant (left) and non-significant (right) predictors of overall attitude towC = reversed coded.
xplained variance in attitudes toward the CCS plan is comple-ented by the level of trust in the decision-making authorities,
xpectations about the likelihood that the plan causes a fall inroperty value in the region, and perceptions of the (un)fairness ofhe decision-making process. On the other side, factors that wereot significant predictors of public attitudes (at least if consideredlongside the other factors) included the perceived desirability ofeasures that help to combat global warming, the expected like-
ihood that the Barendrecht CCS plan would help to combat globalarming, and satisfaction with the possibilities of obtaining infor-ation about the plan.In sum, many of the factors considered in the current sur-
ey have contributed to Barendrecht residents’ attitudes towardhe local CCS plan. The generally rather negative attitudesere partially explained by public concerns with respect to the
onsequences of the CCS plan (in terms of local safety and thealue of local property). Socio-political factors like trust and per-eived procedural (un)fairness played an important role as well.ogether, these factors accounted for more than half of the vari-nce in the local public’s attitudes toward the Barendrecht CCSroject.
. Discussion
Virtually all Barendrecht residents were aware of the plan topply CCS in their residential area. To compare, a recent Euro-arometer survey suggests that, overall, only 10% of the Europeaneneral public have heard of CCS and claim to know what its (European Commission, 2011). Although this percentage is
arkedly higher for the Dutch general public (52%), it is stillowhere near the level of local awareness of the proposed CCS
roject in Barendrecht. However, this high level of local aware-ess is hardly surprising considering that the project had becomeore and more controversial over the years (as suggested by theact that it was a recurrent subject of local political debate, by
he Barendrecht CCS plan in a multiple regression analysis. Note. *p < .01; **p < .001;
the protests of local activists, and by the growing media atten-tion).
By contrast, it was less clear what the local public thought aboutthe CCS project. True, it was beyond doubt that at least some mem-bers of the local public firmly rejected the project (as evidencedby the formation of the local activist group CO2isNee), but therewere no survey data available to determine whether negative opin-ions were as widespread within the community as was commonlyassumed. Project developers and political authorities are in need ofthis kind of information, at least if they truly consider how membersof the public think about hosting a CCS project in their residentialarea as an important factor in siting decisions.
The results of the current survey demonstrate that the people ofBarendrecht were indeed quite negative about the proposed localCCS project. In fact, many of them found the project “unaccept-able” and had already signed a petition against it or were willing todo so when asked. Furthermore, our survey shows that the projectwas an important issue for most residents. One-third of those whoexpected their neighborhood to deteriorate in the next few yearsspontaneously mentioned the proposed CCS project as a reason forthis, and many people indicated to worry about the CCS plan everynow and then. In terms of beliefs about the consequences of theproposed project, the results showed that most people thoughtthat CO2 transport and storage in the Barendrecht region wouldbe unsafe, and further anticipated a fall in local property value ifCCS would be applied. Yet, these beliefs only partly explain themostly negative attitudes toward the proposed CCS project amongthe local public.
4.1. The role of socio-political factors
Socio-political factors like public trust and perceptions of the
decision-making process have played an important role as well.Our survey shows that most residents perceived the decision-making process as unfair and found the distribution of influenceamong the parties involved suboptimal. In their view, the people of
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arendrecht and the Barendrecht town council should have hadore influence in the process, whereas the national government
nd Shell should have had less influence. Also, people placed trustn the town council and CO2isNee (both confirmed opponents ofhe project), but not in the national government and Shell. Theseesults compare well to the observations of Bradbury et al. (2009)ho conducted focus groups in different communities in the US,
ncluding communities that were under active consideration toost a CCS project. In their study, people not only expressed safetyoncerns, but also frequently mentioned procedural fairness andssues of trust as being among the main concerns when it comes toiting a project. Moreover, our findings are consistent with exper-mental research that shows that the public is more trusting (and
ore willing to accept decisions) of political authorities that use fairather than unfair procedures to arrive at their CCS policy decisionsTerwel et al., 2010).
The above implies that whereas ‘not-in-my-backyard’ (NIMBY)entiments may have played a role, the existence of such senti-ents in the local public by no means fully explains why peopleere generally very negative about the local CCS project. As noted
y Wolsink (2000), the NIMBY concept specifically refers to localpposition motivated by self-interest and, indeed, concerns aboutocal safety and property value partly explain why so many res-dents were opposed to the local CCS project. However, in theirverall evaluations of the Barendrecht CCS project, residents fur-her attached significant weight to socio-political factors (e.g.,erceived procedural unfairness). This illustrates that anti-processentiments and a lack of trust in project developers and politicaluthorities clearly contribute to a more complete explanation forocal opposition to CCS projects. As such, the current findings reem-hasize that local opposition should not be instantly dismissed asIMBY-ism (for a similar argument and discussions of other factors
hat are relevant to consider when interpreting local opposition toiting decisions, see Devine-Wright, 2005, 2009; Terwel & Daamen,012; Wolsink, 2000, 2007).
We should note that while we observed significant correlationsetween trust in parties involved in the project and public attitudesoward the proposed CCS project in Barendrecht, the correlationalature of the data makes it difficult, if not impossible, to drawrm conclusions about causality. For instance, the lack of trust inhell may have fostered the growth of negative attitudes towardhe CCS project in the local public (cf. Siegrist, 2000; Terwel et al.,009a). Alternatively, residents might have been negative abouthe local CCS project already and, hence, placed trust in those par-ies that shared their opinion (i.e., the Barendrecht town councilnd CO2isNee) rather than in parties that did not (i.e., Shell and theational government). This touches on the debate about whetherublic trust should be seen as a cause or as a consequence of publicttitudes toward new and complex technologies (Eiser et al., 2002;oortinga & Pidgeon, 2005). It seems likely that the relationship isircular, but that trust (or a lack thereof) is the starting point inhe case of relatively unknown and complex technologies like CCSTerwel et al., 2011).
As this was the first CCS public opinion survey conducted among cross section of the Barendrecht population, we can only speculatebout how public trust and attitudes have developed in the coursef the project. There is no denying that both Shell and the nationalovernment have not managed to create trust in the local publichough. From the beginning of the project, Shell tried to reassureocal politicians and members of the public that the technology toe applied in Barendrecht was already in use and proven safe, butever managed to convince them. If a party is perceived to have a
ommercial interest in a project, it has a hard job convincing theublic that it is trustworthy when it comes to information aboutafety and the social benefits of the project. For instance, at a pub-ic information meeting a speaker from Shell once declared that thereenhouse Gas Control 9 (2012) 41–51 49
Barendrecht CCS project was motivated by environmental concernand would not be profitable for Shell, but such messages are incon-gruent with the motive that an industrial organization like Shellis expected to act upon and, hence, are not easily believed by thepublic (Terwel et al., 2009b). Also, Shell wisely sought to collaboratewith environmental NGOs and other stakeholders to increase theperceived quality and credibility of project information to be pro-vided to the public (cf. Ter Mors et al., 2010), but in the end such acomplete multi-party coalition did not get off the ground. Finally, itdid not help that the activist group CO2isNee became well-knownand managed to engender trust in the local public (this might beeasier for them than for Shell). Backed up by some scientists whoquestioned whether the Barendrecht CCS project was proven safe,CO2isNee stressed that the scientific community was divided aboutthe safety of the project, which caused doubts among the public asto whether risk analyses were as valid and complete as these wereclaimed to be.
The lack of trust in the national government likely had to dowith characteristics of the decision-making process. For one, mem-bers of the public had the opportunity to voice their concerns andopinions about the local CCS project at different stages in the pro-cess, including at the public information meetings and through theopportunity for public participation provided for in the EIA proce-dure. Yet, despite the promises of the national government to takepublic concerns into account, people may have suspected that ithad already been decided to continue with the project no matterwhat. So, they may have perceived consultations with the publicas a form of ‘pseudo voice’ (i.e., authorities that offer the opportu-nity to voice opinions and concerns, but never intend to actuallyconsider the input; cf. De Vries et al., 2012). Furthermore, the lackof trust in the national government may have been caused by theintroduction of the national coordination regulation (NCR) and thecrisis and recovery act (CRA), which increased the formal decision-making power of the national government relative to the power ofthe local government and made it impossible for the Barendrechttown council to take legal action against the proposed CCS project.These interpretations are consistent with the current findings that,at the time of the survey, most Barendrecht residents expectedthe final decision to be to proceed with the project, perceived thedecision-making process as unfair, and felt that the people of Baren-drecht had too little influence on the final decision. Unfortunately,the correlational nature of the current data and the absence of priorCCS public opinion surveys in Barendrecht make it impossible totest whether or not the events described above indeed account forthe fact that Shell and the national government were not trustedby the local public.
4.2. The role of information
Proper information provision is a precondition for the successof any CCS project (e.g., this may reduce initial concerns about theconsequences of a project and could help to avoid that people cometo suspect that parties intentionally withhold information from thepublic). While poor information provision to the public can cer-tainly reduce the local acceptance of a CCS project, the current studysuggests that proper information provision is no guarantee for localacceptance. That is, Barendrecht residents were mostly satisfiedwith the possibilities of obtaining information about the proposedCCS project, but these satisfaction ratings were unrelated to publicattitudes toward the project.
Furthermore, most residents did not have a need for addi-tional information about the local CCS project. However, residents
who claimed to have considerable knowledge about the projectalready, slightly more often indicated a need for additional infor-mation than those who knew only little about the project. This mayseem counterintuitive, but it is in line with previous work on the
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nowledge gap hypothesis (Tichenor et al., 1970), which posits that,nce established, differences in knowledge between certain groupsf individuals typically increase rather than decrease as a result ofnformation campaigns. Continued attempts to inform membersf the public about a proposed local CCS project thus tend to reachhose who are already knowledgeable, but often fail to reach peopleho have less knowledge about the issue. The latter are proba-
ly not so much concerned with getting thoroughly informed, butay consider it most relevant to know the positions of the parties
hat they trust most. Indeed, this reasoning aligns with researchy Siegrist and Cvetkovich (2000), who established that trust isore predictive of attitudes toward hazards and technologies when
eople’s knowledge about the attitude object is limited.
.3. Implications and challenges for future CCS projects
Consistent with principles formulated in the facility siting credoe.g., Kunreuther et al., 1993), the Barendrecht case illustrates hownfair decision-making procedures (at least as perceived as suchy the public) and a lack of public trust in project developers andolitical authorities make it difficult to establish local acceptance ofroposed CCS projects. A process that allows for early and extensiveublic participation may increase perceived procedural fairnessnd mutual trust. But the Barendrecht CCS project also suggests
number of other challenges and relevant considerations.First, a challenge for project developers and political author-
ties is how to deal with activist groups in an effective manner.learly, CCS projects will not necessarily encounter local oppositiony activist groups. For instance, there are no signs of local publicpposition to the CCS project at Ketzin, Germany (Dutschke, 2011).owever, in other cases, the Barendrecht case included, activistroups have fostered the growth of negative attitudes in the localublic (e.g., in Greenville, Ohio, the activists of “Citizens against CO2equestration” have successfully protested against the CCS plansf Battelle, and in Jutland, Denmark, landowners have set up theNo to CO2 storage association” to jointly oppose Vattenfall’s CCSlans in the region). Activist groups may not in all cases manageo generate widespread support for their position among the localublic, but an important reason why they often do succeed is that,bove all, they seem to pursue local interests and, hence, are trustedy the local public (in this regard, the current survey shows thathe activist group CO2isNee was trusted by the local public). More-ver, it is probably easier for activist groups to make communitiesoubt the safety of a proposed CCS project than it is for projectevelopers to convince members of the local public that a project
s safe. If these dynamics are adequately dealt with, the impactf local activist groups on local public opinion may be reduceduccessfully.
Another issue to consider is how a CCS project fits within theocial and cultural history of a specific location. We have not con-idered this factor in our survey, but it may account for someariance in public attitudes on top of the variance explained by fac-ors that we did consider (which together already explained morehan half of the variance in public attitudes). That is, the “socialt” (Hammond & Shackley, 2010) may have been suboptimal asarendrecht residents already had to put up with several infras-ructure projects in the past (e.g., the broadening of a highway thatasses the municipality) and may have felt ‘enough is enough’. Aoor social fit could end up being a major drawback for any CCSroject, even where public communication and outreach strategiesre adequately implemented and the expected negative sides of aroject are mitigated (e.g., by establishing a compensation fundo deal with concerns about local property value). On the other
ide, Dütschke (2011) suggests that a good social fit is one of theeasons why the project at Ketzin, Germany — an area with a his-ory connected to gas and experience with the storage of naturalreenhouse Gas Control 9 (2012) 41–51
gas — has been accepted or at least quietly tolerated by the localpublic. If possible, in addition to technical considerations, the socialfit is a relevant factor to consider in CCS siting decisions.
Public communications should certainly focus on educating thelocal public on climate change as well as on the role of CCS andother technological solutions to CO2 reduction (which parallelsone of the useful recommendations for public communication andoutreach formulated by Ashworth et al., 2010), but should alsoexplain the relevance of small-scale demonstration projects in thebroader context. Our survey shows that most of the Barendrechtresidents considered it desirable to have measures that help tocombat global warming, but many also believed that the localCCS project was not really helpful in this regard. Indeed, this iscorrect by objective standards as the two depleted gas fields sit-uated in Barendrecht have only very limited storage capacity. Onthe other hand, the CCS project in Barendrecht would have beena relevant step towards the deployment of CCS on a larger scaleand, as such, would have contributed to climate change mitiga-tion in an important way. People who are confronted with plansfor a small-scale demonstration project in their residential area areunlikely to become favorably disposed towards such a project ifthey do not realize that the project is a necessary first step on theroad to the large-scale deployment of CCS. On the basis of the cur-rent data we cannot determine whether this has been the case inBarendrecht, but in any case the cancellation of the BarendrechtCCS project has made it more difficult for future demonstrationprojects in the Netherlands to be accepted by the local public. Afterall, even if members of the local public at other proposed sites learnthat a future CCS demonstration project is relevant in the broadercontext, they may not see why such a project should take placein their residential area but not in Barendrecht. In that sense, alack of public understanding of the relevance of a first small-scaleCCS demonstration project in the broader context could eventu-ally be another hurdle on the road to the large-scale deployment ofCCS.
Finally, we believe that it is important to monitor public aware-ness, knowledge, perceptions, beliefs, and opinions with regardto local CCS projects at various stages of a project. A few yearsago, the general public was largely unaware of the existence ofCCS and traditional public opinion surveys on this topic thusprimarily collected “pseudo opinions” or “non-attitudes” (see DeBest-Waldhober et al., 2009; Malone et al., 2010). Public aware-ness has increased over the years (although not in all countries;European Commission, 2011; Pietzner et al., 2011) and thereuponthe value of CCS public opinion surveys has increased. In fact,as the present research indicates, the public awareness of CCS isprobably quite high in areas where CCS is actually considered. Forseveral reasons it is important to conduct repeated surveys amongpeople living in the vicinity of a (proposed) CCS project. First, tomonitor local awareness, to assess local perceptions and opinions,and to detect shifts in opinions. Second, to link any shifts in opin-ions to specific events that have occurred in the course of a project.And third, to monitor how general and project-specific knowledgeabout CCS develops, which would help to evaluate the effec-tiveness of public outreach activities and to identify knowledgegaps and misconceptions to resolve in future communications (forinstance, in Barendrecht special attention could have been giventhe depth of the CO2 storage location as many people appearedto lack knowledge about this aspect of the proposed project).In this regard, it is unfortunate that the current survey is thefirst survey conducted among a large sample of the Barendrechtpopulation (in fact, there is a complete lack of other large-scalelocal CCS public opinion surveys). Nevertheless, the current surveyresults offer valuable insights and, as discussed before, suggest a
number of challenges and issues for consideration in future CCSprojects.
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Wolsink, M., 2000. Wind power and the NIMBY-myth: Institutional capacity and the
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cknowledgement
This research has been carried out in the context of the CATO--program. CATO-2 is the Dutch national research program on CO2apture and storage technology (CCS). The program is financiallyupported by the Dutch government (Ministry of Economic Affairs)nd the CATO-2 consortium parties. We thank Barend van Engelen-urg for valuable comments on an earlier version of the manuscript.
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