Italy 1945 - Government & Politics

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A New Risorgimento (Reprinted from "The Economist" of London of June 5, 1945)

The unconditional surrender of the German South West Command has given the Allies com­plete control in N orthem Italy and in large areas of Austria. The surrender crowns a long and arduous campaign, and it is appropriate that Field Marshal Alexander and the men fighting under him should end so sensationally a struggle which has not always commanded its share of public at­tention. It would, however, be unfortunate if the speed of the final collapse were to mask the ha1·d fighting that preceded it. In particular, it should not be forgotten that the prime factor in the free­ing of Northem Italy was not the German sur­render but the successful using of the partisans. Long before the Gern:ans ceased fighting a~d_long before the Allied a1·m1es reached the great cities-­Milan, Turin, Genoa, Piacenza-the partisan armies and their political leaders were in full con­trol.

ln spite of the crowds who hissed and booed round the exposed bodies of Mussolini, his mis­tress and his pal'ty bosses, discipline, not anarchy and violence, is the most striking feature of the movement of liberation. Field-Marshal Alexander and General Clark have both praised the partisans for the skill and efficiency with which they fol­lowed the instructions of the General Staff and worked out their own tactical plans. In almost every town in the North they managed to prevent the destruction of powel' stations, l'eservoirs, public utilities and 1·ailways. In the factories, they knew exactly when to strike and did so in the most effective way of occupying, not deserting, the fac­tories. In each community, a Committee of Libera­tion was alreay in being, ready to take over the civil administration until the arrival of the Allied armies.

The Central National Committee of Liberation for North Italy is based on a coalition of the prin­cipal political parties. It appears at present to in­clude two Communists, two members of the Action Party, two Christian Democrats, two members of the Italian Liberation Party and two Socialists. It is impossible to say what is the balance of power between the different groups. The three strongest are undoubtedly the Communists, whose numbers have grown very considerably in recent months, the Socialists and the Christian Democrats. They are all of them committed to radical reforms in Italian society-a large measure of socialisation and the establishment of a Republic. Their pres­tige as the liberators and rulers of the richest, most populous and most highly developed areas in Italy will enormously reinforce the power of their parties throughout the country. The Bonomi Government has already agreed that the National Liberation Committees of Rome and of the North shall meet and there is talk of summoning a con­ference of all the provincial committees. The Com-

mittees will undoubtedly demand a reshuffle of the Government with an active resister as Prime Minister.

The question mark over Italy's future is whe­ther this new government, representing a strong coalition of the Left, can guide the Italian people towards the free and progressive society which a great mass of them undoubtedly desire. As a result of liberation, there have been "spring-times of the people" in other countries, particularly in France. But in each case the ensuing months have seen the weakening and disillusionm('nt of the popular forces and the resurg·ence of old, com­promised groups and interests. In Italy, there is perhaps a greater chance of successful political evolution. The resistance movement is not a hete­rogeneous medley of groups united by loyalty to one man. The parties which compo e it have proved themselves capable of mass action on a scale achieved nowhere else--only in Northern Italy have strikes been used effectively as a weapon of resistance. They appear to be united on the major issues of national reconstruction. On the vexed question of public ownership, the fact that Mussolini's Fascist Republic nationalized the whole industrial system in North Italy may make the achievement of public control elsewhere and its maintenance in the North less difficult. Above all, the Liberation Movement, thanks to its g1·eat part in the actual fighting, must now enjoy that supremely important political asset-self-confid­ence.

It would, however, be very misleading to under­estimate the potential opposition. The Fascists are defeated but not wiped out. It is not so long ago that the escape of General Roalta deeply disturbed the people of Rome by the evidence it gave of a quite widespread Fascist underground movement. The Monarchists are far more active and vocal in Southern and Central Italy than they were a year ago. Industry is predominantly in private hands and there are reports in the Swiss press of the close contact maintained by such industrial leaders as Count Volpi with British circles in Switzerland. The basis for the usual coalition of frightened and compromised people exists in Italy as in any other liberated country. Accusations and disputes among the progressive parties may yet undo the first enthusiasm of freedom and sap the political initiative and drive necessary to carry through a really radical programme.

It is too early to forecast the strength of the opposing groups. But it is not too soon to see clearly how influential must be the policy of the Allies in Italy. It is entirely in their interests that a radical and democratic Italy should emerge from this war. The voice of the people in North Italy is raised today in favour of peaceful relations with their neighbours, and of union between the states

of Europe; in short, the new Italy denounces everything that made Fascist Italy an endless disturber of the peace. An Italy based on a coali~ tion of the anti-progressive parties might be tempted to return in foreign policy to the frac~ tious, grabbing, war-mongering mood of Mus­solini's regime. There is at the moment a very good chance that a peace-loving and progressive Italy will be the result of liberation; but it is also true that a wrongly conceived Allied policy could frustrate the Italians' proper development.

First of all it is surely time to recognize the Italians' part in their own liberation by bringing democratic Italy back into the comity of nations. It is surely ludicrous that Argentina should sit at

an Francisco while the men who liberated North­ern Italy are unrepresented. If, when the new gov­ernment is formed, it were to receive a formal in­vitation to attend the Conference, its prestige would be enormously enhanced and that fact alone would strengthen it against an opposition in which extremist nationalists are bound to play an active part.

It is equal1y important that Allied supervision and control should be reduced to a minimum. It has already been stated that the period of AMG in the North will be short. At the first moment possible, the relative freedom of action restored to central and southern Italy should be extended to the politically far more mature north. It is very likely that the use the new government will make of its powers will not be altogether acceptable to conservative circles either in Italy or this country. The question of the monarchy's future is an ob­vious example. The British Government has ac­quired in Europe-not without some justification -the reputation of intervening only in f&vour of the Right. It would be disastrous if the new poli­tical situation in Italy were, during the next crucial months, to be influenced or manipulated by the occupying Powers.

Some of the gravest problems awaiting the united Italian government lie in the economic field. There is a hope that most of this year's harvest will be gathered in, but there are some hungry months ahead. Coal was one of Italy's chief imp01·ts. Very little will be available from abroad for some time to come. Anything that the Control Commission can do to relieve the despe­rate economic situation will contribute directly to political stability. Even if the straitened supply position and a heavy list of priorities make large­scale deliveries impossible, the Allies could take a load off the minds of the people by lightening the economic clauses of the armistice. The par­ti ans, by saving thousands of Jives and millions of dollars worth of equipment, have at least earn­ed this.

Finally, the Allies can probably make or mar the democratic future of Italy by the policies they permit on the part of Italy's neighbours. Nothing so weakens the prestige of a government as to sit by helplessly while undisputed national territory is unjustly given away. Nothing could give a bet-

ter entry point for ·nationalist and fascist propa­ganda. Not'hing would so confuse and divide the progressive parties themselves. Marshal Tito has demanded the Italian town of Trieste. His troops are in its outskirts. No Italian government could consent to the transfer of an Italian town to Croat control. Most Italians are ready for a very drastic redrawing of the Italo-Jugoslav frontier in order to transfer as many Slavs as possible to Slav rule. They would also admit that the hinterland of Trie­ste is largely Slav. The compromise which prob­ably offers most hope of a solution is the creation of a Free City of Trieste, under Italian adminis­tration, but acting as a port and depot for Jugo­slav, Italian and Austrian trade. The Slav areas behind the city could then be transferred wit'hout endangering the rights of the Italian community and without condemning Trieste to share the eco­nomic decline of Fiume.

This question already threatens to divide the unity of the Italian liberation movement. Mos­cow has given its blessing to Marshal Tito's plan of annexation. Thus the Italian Communists can­not openly oppose it. The Christian Democrats and Socialists have already spoken firmly against the proposal. If the Communists are forced to take an unpopular line, it is of course the right wing, na­tionalist opposition that would stand to gain from their discomfiture.

There is a possibility of conflict on Italy's west­ern frontier as well. French forces have crossed the Italian frontier and appear to be marching on Turin. It seems that they have already advanced beyond the line of occupation fixed for them by the Supreme Command. The purpose of this ad­vance is difficult to understand. The Italian par­tisans certainly regard it with alarm and suspicion, and if the French were to enter Turin, an armed clash might be the result. One of the most en­couraging features in the last nine months has been General de Gaulle's 1·eadiness to see in liberated Italy a regime as different from that of Mussolini as is his own from that of Petain. It would be disastrous if now, for no reason at all, Franco-Italian relations were to drift back into the bickering animosity of the twenties and thirties.

The Allies' Italian policy presents them with a very grave responsibility. There are in Italy today fairer hopes of a genuine revival of freedom and social progress than anywhere else in Central Eu­rope. The movement of liberation faces difficult months. It has enough economic and political problems to daunt the most self-confident leader­ship. Its task will become impossible if, over and above the difficulties inherent in the situation, the Allies by indifference, clumsiness, stupidity or self-interest, weaken in any way the new regime. On the other hand, a successful experiment in co­operation might lead not only to a new creatiTe relationship between Italy and the Allies but to a genuine renewal of freedom and responsibility throughout the Latin world.

Distributed by FREE ITALY AMERICAN LABOR COUNCIL and COMMITTEE FOR THE RECOGNITION OF ITALY AS AN ALLY, 144 Bleecker Street, New York 12, N. Y. GRamercy 7-4938.

~m

A New Risorgimento (RP.printed from ccThe Economist" of London of june 5, 1945)

The unconditional surrender of the German South West Command has given the Allies com­plete control in Northern Italy and in large areas of Austria. The surrender crowns a long and arduous campaign, and it is appropriate that Field :\Iarshal Alexander and the men fighting under him should end so sensationally a struggle which has not always commanded its share of public at­tention. It would, however, be unfortunate if the speed of the final collapse were to mask the hard fighting that preceded it. In particula1·, it should not be forgotten that the prime factor in the free­ing of Northern Italy was ~ot the Germa~ sm·­render but the successful usmg of the partisans. Long before the Germans ceased fighting and long bef01·e the Allied armies reached the great cities­Milan, Turin, Genoa, Piacenza-the partisan armies and their political leaders were in full con­trol.

In spite of the crowds who hissed and booed round the exposed bodies of Mussolini, his mis­tress and his party bosses, discipline, not anarchy and violence, is the most striking feature of the movement of liberation. Field-Marshal Alexander and General Clark have both praised the partisans for the skill and efficiency with which they fol­lowed the instructions of the Gene1·al Staff and worked out their own tactical plans. In almost every town in the North they managed to prevent the destruction of powe1· stations, reservoirs, public utilities and railways. In the fact01·ies, they knew exactly when to strike and did so in the most effective way of occupying, not deserting, the fac­tories. In each community, a Committee of Libera­tion was alreay in being, ready to take over the civil administration until the arrival of the Allied a1·mies.

The Central National Committee of Liberation for North Italy is based on a coalition of the prin­cipal political parties. It appears at present to in­clude two Communists, two members of the Action Party, two Christian Democrats, two members of the Italian Liberation Party and two Socialists. It is impossible to say what is the balance of power between the different groups. The three strongest are undoubtedly the Communists, Whose numbers have grown very considerably in recent months, the Socialists and the Christian Democrats. They are all of them committed to radical reforms in Italian society-a large measure of socialisation and the establishment of a Republic. Their pres­tige as the liberators and rulers of the richest, most populous and most highly developed areas in Italy will enormously reinforce the power of their parties throughout the country. The Bonomi Government has already agreed that the National Libe1·ation Committees of Rome and of the North shall meet and there is talk of summoning a con­ference of all the provincial committees. The Com-

mittees will undoubtedly demand a reshuffle of the Government with an active resister as Prime Minister.

The question mark over Italy's future is whe­ther this new government, representing a strong coalition of the Left, can guide the Italian people towards the free and p1·ogressive society which a great mass of them undoubtedly desire. As a result of liberation, there have been "spring-times of the people" in other countries, particularly in France. But in each case the ensuing months have seen the weakening and disillusionm('nt of the popular forces and the resurgence of old, com­promised groups and interests. In Italy, there is perhaps a greater chance of successful political evolution. The resistance movement is not a hete­rogeneous medley of groups united by loyalty to one man. The parties which compose it have p1·oved themselves capable of mass action on a scale achieved nowhere else--only in Northern Italy have strikes been used effectively as a weapon of resistance. They appear to be united on the major issues of national reconstruction. On the vexed question of public ownership, the fact that Mussolini's Fascist Republic nationalized the whole industrial system in North Italy may make the achievement of public control elsewhere and its maintenance in the North less difficult. Above all, the Liberation Movement, thanks to its great part in the actual fighting, must now enjoy that supremely important political asset-self-confid­ence.

It would, however, be ve1·y misleading to under­estimate the potential opposition. The Fascists are defeated but not wiped out. It is not so long ago that the escape of General Roalta deeply disturbed the people of Rome by the evidence it gave of a quite widespread Fascist underground movement. The Monarchists are far more active and vocal in Southern and Central Italy than they were a year ago. Industry is predominantly in private hands and there are reports in the Swiss press of the close contact maintained by such industrial leaders as Count Volpi with British circles in Switzerland. The basis for the usual coalition of frightened and compromised people exists in Italy as in any other liberated country. Accusations and disputes among the progressive parties may yet undo the first enthusiasm of freedom and sap the political initiative and drive necessary to carry through a really radical programme.

It is too early to forecast the strength of the opposing groups. But it is not too soon to see clearly how influential must be the policy of the Allies in Italy. It is entirely in their interests that a radical and democratic Italy should emerge from this war. The voice of the people in North Italy is raised today in favour of peaceful relations with their neighbours, and of union between the states

of Europe; in short, the new Italy denounces everything that made Fascist Italy an endless disturber of the peace. An Italy based on a coali­tion of the anti-progressive parties might be tempted to return in foreign policy to the frac­tious, grabbing, war-mongering mood of Mus­soHni's regime. There is at the moment a very good chance that a peace-loving and progressive Italy will be the result of liberation; but it is also true that a wrongly conceived Allied policy could frustrate the Italians' proper development.

First of all it is surely time to recognize the Italians' part in their own liberation by bringing democratic Italy back into the comity of nations. It is surely ludicrous that Argentina should sit at San Francisco while the men who liberated North­ern Italy are unrepresented. If, when the new gov­ernment is formed, it were to receive a formal in­vitation to attend the Conference, its prestige would be enormously enhanced and that fact alone would strengthen it against an opposition in which extremist nationalists are bound to play an active part.

It is equally important that Allied supervision and control should be reduced to a minimum. It has already been stated that the period of AMG in the North will be short. At the first moment possible, the relative freedom of action restored to central and southern Italy should be extended to the politically far more mature north. It is very likely that the use the new government will make of its powers will not be altogether acceptable to conservative circles either in Italy or this country. The question of the monarchy's future is an ob­vious example. The British Government has ac­quired in Europe-not without some justification -the reputation of intervening only in favour of the Right. It would be disastrous if the new poli­tical situation in Italy were, during the next crucial months, to be influenced or manipulated by the occupying Powers.

Some of the gravest problems awaiting the united Italian government lie in the economic field. There is a hope that most of this year's harvest will be gathered in, but there are some hungry months ahead. Coal was one of Italy's chief imports. Very little will be available from abroad for some time to come. Anything that the Control Commission can do to relieve the despe­rate economic situation will contribute directly to political stability. Even if the straitened supply position and a heavy list of priorities make large­scale deliveries impossible, the Allies could take a load off the minds of the people by lightening the economic clauses of the armistice. The par­tisans, by saving thousands of lives and millions of dollars worth of equipment, have at least earn­ed this.

Finally, the Allies can probably make or mar the democratic future of Italy by the policies they permit on the part of Italy's neighbours. Nothing so weakens the prestige of a government as to sit by helplessly while undisputed national territory is unjustly given away. Nothing could give a bet-

ter entry point for nationalist and fascist propa­ganda. Nothing would so confuse and divide the progressive parties themselves. Marshal Tito has demanded the Italian town of Trieste. His troops are in its outskirts. No Italian government could consent to the transfer of an Italian town to Croat control. Most Italians are ready for a very drastic redrawing of the Italo-Jugoslav frontier in order to transfer as many Slavs as possible to Slav rule. They would also admit that the hinterland of Trie­ste is largely Slav. The compromise which prob­ably offers most hope of a solution is the creation of a Free City of Trieste, under Italian adminis­tration, but acting as a port and depot for Jugo­slav, Italian and Austrian trade. The Slav areas behind the city could then be transferred without endangering the rights of the Italian community and without condemning Trieste to share the eco­nomic decline of Fiume.

This question already threatens to divide the unity of the Italian liberation movement. Mos­cow has given its blessing to Marshal Tito's plan of annexation. Thus the Italian Communists can­not openly oppose it. The Christian Democrats and Socialists have already spoken firmly against the proposal. If the Communists are forced to take an unpopular line, it is of course the right wing, na­tionalist opposition that would stand to gain from their discomfiture.

There is a possibility of conflict on Italy's west­ern frontier as well. French forces have crossed the Italian frontier and appear to be marching on Turin. It seems that they have already advanced beyond the line of occupation fixed for them by the Supreme Command. The purpose of this ad­vance is difficult to understand. The Italian par­tisans certainly 1·egard it with alarm and suspicion, and if the French were to enter Turin, an armed clash might be the result. One of the most en­com·aging features in the last nine months has been General de Gaulle's readiness to see in liberated Italy a regime as different from that of Mussolini as is his own from that of Petain. It would be disastrous if now, for no reason at all, Franco-Italian relations were to drift back into the bickering animosity of the twenties and thirties.

The Allies' Italian policy presents them with a very grave responsibility. There are in Italy today fairer hopes of a genuine revival of freedom and ocial progress than anywhere else in Central Eu­

rope. The movement of liberation faces difficult months. It has enough economic and political problems to daunt the most self-confident leader­ship. Its task will become impossible if, over and above the difficulties inherent in the situation, the Allies by indifference, clumsiness, stupidity or self-interest, weaken in any way the new regime. On the other hand, a successful experiment in co­operation might lead not only to a new creatin relationship between Italy and the Allies but to a genuine renewal of freedom and responsibility throughout the Latin world.

Distributed by FREE ITALY AMERICAN LABOR COUNCIL and COMMITTEE FOR THE RECOGNITION OF ITALY AS AN ALLY, 144 Bleecker Street, New York 12, N. Y. GRamercy 7-4938.

~m

Distributed by The Free Italy American Labor Council 144 Bleecker Street, New York, N. Y.

ITALIA RESURRECTA

It is fitting that it should be the Partisans who disposed of Mussolini. For the spiritual heirs of the murdered Matteotti had the right to deal swift justice to this sawdust Caesar, this strutting egotist, this small-scale dic­tator who destroyed a nation to build his tinsel empire. The carrion rema~ns in the market place of Milan, where twenty-six years ago Mussolini founded the Fascist movement, are an ignominious symbol of the completion of a cycle.

Now a new spirit is stirring in northern Italy. For eighteen months the Italian Partisans have made a magnificent contribution to the Allied effort in Italy. They have fought alone, engaging the enemy in battles of such scale that the Germans and the Fascists were forced to make ample use of tanks, big guns, and air support. Aneurin Bevan, before the House of Commons, revealed that "it is on record from Field Marshal Alexander that the resistance movement in Italy has been more effective in fighting the Germans than any other resis­tance movement in Europe. More than 250,000 Italians have lost their lives in that movement." THE NATION has already mentioned the statement by a high Cana­dian officer that "without the efforts, big and small, of the Patriots, our task would have been doubly difficult and three times as costly." And even Mr. Churchill was forced to admit that "very desperate battles" were being waged by "brave men who have been fighting and maintaining guerrilla warfare in the Alps."

No one can therefore deny the tremendous contribution of the Italian PaLti­sans to the Allied cause. But this great contribution has been hidden as much as possible from the peoples of the Allied nations -- the above mentioned declarations, with the exception of Churchill's, did not appear in the American press. The reason lies in the fact that the Partisans speak with the voice of democracy, which is quite out of tone with that of the Fascism now represented by the House of Savoy and its supporters in and out of Italy. The Partisans are organizing the first local governments in regions they have liberated, and the Committees of Liberation are military as well as political bodies. Behind these committees stand n0t only the Partisans but the great majority of tho Italian people. Without such help the Partisans could not have carried on their fight for eighteen months. The workers especially, with their strikes and sabotage, have supported the activities of the Partisans.

As our forces sweep northward they are confroLted with a popular movement which the international reaction concentrated in Rome tries to suffocate. The Partisans are disarmed when they are found within the Allied lines, unless they enter the army of the King. The Partisans distrust the old military bureau­cracy of a state in disintegration and claim that they represent the strongest and most faithful army of the new Italian popular state. But the Allied admin­istration when it arrives immediately tries to build up sympathies for the Italian monarchy. The same day that we read about the liberation of Milan, Turin, and Genoa, and of the probaale capture of Mussolini, the Ne~ York Times carried a dispatch from Bologna telling of the ''acclaim" that greeted a visit of Prince Humbert. It seems strange that during the fifteen minutes of his appearance in public the Prince found "500 assorted Bolognese'' ready to mill around him, when, a few days before, the same paper in a dispatch from Bologna carried the following: "Queries throughout central Bologna today evoked the response that the Socialists and Communists were the strongest parties, with the Actionists third. Moreover--and vitally indicative--all who replied said they were strongly anti-monarchist and did not expP-ct the House of Savoy to survive the Constituent Assembly." A powerful state machine is being built for the monarchy, and the tragic result may be a civil war. In view of the importance of the events in Italy today, and of their bearing on the future not only of the Peninsula but of Europe, we feel that this plot should be made known. Future issues of THE NATION will carry a series of articles on the sub­ject, explaining the Allied policy in Italy since the fall of Mussolini.

Reprinted from THE NATION, May 5, 1945.

ALBERT SP1'>.L'DinG - { "HLJOR SHERIDL.N ")

Excerpts from NE~~\~EK, bpril 16, 1945.

"Few of the Italian Partisans had known who he was - this "~ajor Sheridan" who spoke over the air in such resonant, flawless Italian. He gave them their orders for resistanc9, offered hope, and compared their ovm struggle against Nazi overlords to what !.me rica.· had gone through in 1776.

"Though illness and exhaustion (he had been working 80 hours a week) forced "Major Sheridan" to come back home to the United States last November, his identi­ty and war record Tiere not ~1ovm outside of the Office of war Information until NE";iS\iSEK persuaded this modest man to give his first press interview. For Albert Spalding, the .American concert violinist, v1as never one to brag - and it was Spalding who had been Italy's "~ajor Sheridan."•••

"Though Spalding was 55 and a world-famous violinist when his country needed him again, he unhesitatingly put a\7-aY his fiddle and v~s appointed to the Psycho­logical Warfare Division of the Army by the Orii. Arriving in Italy in April of last year, he took over his broadcasting duties on Italia Combatto in Naples ••••

"Though ho is nov1 making rocords for broadcast to Italy, h!3 is reluctant to talk about v:hat he accomplishedo 'It v1as what the patriots did, not r:hat I did.' Ro was farvont in his praise of tho Partisan movom<mt. 'In it lies tho symbol of regeneration and unity in Italy,' ho said. 'Th0 vitality and recovery power of tho Italian pooplo springs from tho soil and not tho privilogod.'.~.,v

• • • • • •

Toxt of an address dolivorod by Albort Spalding during tho "V-E Day" coJo.bration in Central Park Mall, Now York City, on ~fay a. ·and~cQr!'iGdi..'Ol'llr Statir.m f.laEh

This is a d~y of doep rejoicing. It is not a day for jubilation. The Nazi nightmare has ondod; tho hideous carnage which has hold Europa in its grip for fivo and a half yoars is over. One phaso of tho groat struggle is finished; but V-E Day is not tho same as J.rrnistico Day of November, 1918, nor can it bo celebrated ln the sarno way. It v:ould bo a hideous mockery to those ".7ho must carry on the strugglo against a still d1.ngorous and defiant Japan, But VIE> can rojoico in a solemn way over V~E Day. Tho best 1.·my of showing rejoicing is in a :nodadica­tion of all of our efforts to moot tho rosponsibili ty v;hich v:o must shoulder un­less r:o aro going to fail those who havo gi von their lives in ordor that this ~orld might again bocomo a docont place, a fit placo for froo mon to livo in.

Tho comploto victory in tho Italian thoatro of r1ar brought to a suddon clcso a long and arduous campaign about Tihich from time to timo doubts and mis­glvmgs have boon oxpressod. Primo Uinistor Churchill, \lhon announcing it to Parliam0nt, and v;h'}IJ payJ.ng tribute to tho Allied Armios' Commanders, romindod the chooring Houso: "that. d.ur .1n~ bho timo tho Allied troopo y;oro laborioudly climbing up tho mountainous :ron~n~1·la of ltflly it had boon found nococsa:ry to \7Hhdraw eroc.t numbors of thoil' o:;:'fJvtivc s to other fronts". C~urchill point od out that bocauso of this tho Allied troops found thomsolvos facing "an onomy far stro'1.gor than thomsolvos".,

Churchill's tribute did not nogloct to singlo out tho ~morican born J11.panoso and tho /morican NC"8roos fighting with tho United Stat s 5th Lrmy, tho JO\'lish Brigado !lnd (I quoto ): ''ti'J.O Froa It3.l·ians nho havo played their p3.-::-t in cl0aring their co,mtry frcm tho GJr,:'JPr, }'')8Ciet ::okn" - (1:.f:Jquoto ). This citation is timely. llnd it is ,..·oL doso;vod. ~htu g:'•Jo:c vJctory in Italy shottorod a trn.diti on th~t hRd •JXi<.:to.: fur r:1oro th~n t1.·:o thousand yoD-rs.

Lll dur;11g t!'lo Itetlin.n ca:rm"'ign tho1·o wore not J:: ckin voices ,-;ho argued that ."..n t:1o t · s 00r;r of +;to •· 0 .. l: .10 s·~.-c00s J. u1 ir.ill hj•y cam "li n h d ovar toon carr::.r;d ou nroco;Ci1.Jr-" r0: .b ''lt&J ') ... t,.,, l'-''L}~U.i." 1.0 vPl .J'"'~r"Ch. Lrm1d

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wit!-:'. un·iorinblo hisJcoricnl da;';;n "'.;ho~r pT'od:.cto'i thA.t this C."-ITTf~ gn y;ould not aJ d cou::.d r.ot succood and t:1at at best it .. ouJd ond :.n a s·~-a.lcm1to.

But tho records of history hnvo b08'1 rovo:,·sor:'. . Tho'>c prophets wero wrong. Pe r haps thoy \-:o r o \'lr ong bcc.:.uso th)V .lni~.od. to t3.lrJ i. to full c:..ccou11t a force that has 'JJon oporatbg in th'J No:·:~h of It'l:.y l•r: our sid.o - those "froe It::;.:Lians" who in Churchill's \'lOrds 'havo p:~~j.·or "'.;ho:.r :v1rt 1n clcerwg thoi r c.om,trv from tho Go:.."man Fascist YokG ." It H: of them ~hnt I v:ent to talk to you. f.uring tho mnr.y mo!!t:1o I spent in I·ca.J y my pa:::-ticular \·:ork was in con­noc-=vion with ?<:.:rtisi:n i'.~ovcr,1')nt o·l' Rosist.s::·H.•.> '...•h~-:1ri tho onomy linos . I y;as tho connJcting lu:.k b·;i;\·;Jon the A:!.llod ?.igh Co1.1m, nd nnC. tho various groups of Italian ,ar"::isa.nsc By m12am:: of rr.d10 E1nd. by tho C.rop:;nr.g of loaflotn a daily comm:nicn:\;ion vas mai:1taino:'!. bctv:c..'Jn tho Al:!.iorl Commb.nd and tho pr..r~ isans opor a­t:.ng in tho va:cio<;s zonos of o::om~·-oc3upiod It-::.ly . It v:n.s m:· C..ut~· to transmit to thoso patnot 1::"1:.1d1 t:1o oxp2ic.:.t :inilt~uct1o··s of tho commanC::.ing gomral, dr:ta.i.ling j·:st v;nr..t t:1o ,'>.lliod Con,~arli v:ishod thorn to do and \ihat not '~o cio . Tho r·o~o,~d of tho:.r c.chiovo:r.on'~s Las :;:oocontly boon c~ im[.J.Jd in no uncJrtain way . It is pln.in th;::t t.hoy hav0 bee~ ar. a1.:..:nl ia.ry a~·m of '0ho :ng:J.'J8t ii,ipO:'t:'..r.~o to ~ho Allio'i a·rrdcs i:1 Ital;, n constant th:r.o~t to tho on(;t:~''b .!'o.::.:::-, an<l cl:::> tJ t:10i:.· sr;ift, du.r:i:;Jg uct~on ·.vhon aC:.cq'tA.atoly suyiJliod ''it:J :.~1..ns they s'.;ru~.,lc E:t t.1o c.;nGl!:Y

in all-ou.t ·,-;-artal·o~ Thoy dGSOl'VO well o: uo; tho~' d.C30r~ro ovon mvro frc,,J t.JC\1.::' ovm country, bocn.uso in ctr:iki~.g so o.ffocti 1'o:'.;;~ t~:ls f5n,ll Glc·;; fur t:1o ljtJl·~­tion of i.ho north of rt.~ .. :y choy have 'boon i·'_.'"';~u:u.r.t.' .. l i:l s:..Yhlf' lh'bY o: tho in­s te1.1 lat i o:ns of o loct:r~ cal pov1or '.7hich thu d.ufrH•t ~ o 2.1d 0.oq:L r::1ro 1~&.~ is wonlQ. otl"..ol''.'5Gu havo dost:-oyodo Vlho A,l'IJ th1fL; p::,:uritlts, ',liJ"O rc.rt·sqn~? ·;1!::l1i do thoy :rop:;:osont? V:11a.t ·,~i~.l thoir fntu.:.• ~Y'? I y;i:,.l toll ~reo;. 'bJcnuso I havo lived vrith th m d"ly in and clay out <'lli·J kJGVI '."l1<1t mn.:-;'1J1• r)f mc::1 t.JDy aro . I kn0'7 9 .s.lso, that thoro h.:t7o 'boon many co·, ·:rastin~ a~Jc... con'fu.,irlg reports circula­ted ab'Jut tho:n f:-om ono sourciJ o:: another. I know tha+. ir. so•. 3 quarters rreat concorn 1s fc:.t tr.a"; 'bocuus) tho:ir act.iv1tios fbd ['U.12n~1~o l.'1.r oly from ~oli­ti.cal bfluonr~os to tho lof'G of cantor it is tho'lght t'·at he>:.: -:ould p:-ovo to ba mora of a pro'blorJ tl::.,n an rJSsot in the 7'0b'lilJ.l::l~ c.·:d tho rocovu···~- of I1:.:1.ly. I hoard 1t c .~oJ:::ssJy sta~od that tho partisans \'X)r<J all violent leftists ::.nd bocauso of this they vmuld produce chaos .

Just in tho so ls.st days tho sudden and violent ond of Hussolin i has boon cHocl. :1g~.in.;1. t·hnm ir: eo,:Jo .J1l'l·:tc::.·s r .. s ovidonco of tho lawlessness th::1t y;o na.y J:>::-:=Jct frcm 7his bcdy of :rJOno \"Jell) Vio:!.onco is an ugly thing nhonovor fend v.hcrovor it 1-.-''.:~::r,ons . I do not dofond. it. I do not like it. But it might '!Jo \7iso to rorr.ind ot:.rsolvos that undor t~rrnnny r osp3ct for tho lm'7 ah:ays breaks clovm 3.r:d dish1t05ratos -- And tho rosult [;.ro nh-;'tys tho samo !

Aeqinst this I c'1n , of my ovm knoY:loclgo., cito to you casos \7he r o tho justi0o m0\;cd out by ::ho :r;a.rtisans has shown bctlt !DOd'Jl' ;';ion ar.0. P'J)r ~~~ On.J cnso iwmadin.·coly C0!110S to my mi..:aC . Tl1is caso v.'as vor1fiod ~uy :.lJ.io tcst~~on~ e 1. Fascist v:as can~i1t ~:ni b:"cagh"t; to trial. HC> h~d. ns hiH Cl .. ofonding d.irocato a pa:rt~s.'ln, a grsluatr. of thJ School of Lnw of c::.o lT;"\lVC!t.'S~tv o.L· P·t--· •• Ho pas a good lr:rr:yoro T:1o oxt":nULt Jng circ".l!ns·~.an:.-os ot tbo ,~,~.;c.s.d., hi[\ y ·n.h, n: s igno-1'~'::1(;0, -l;ho abs::mC3 01' a-.:tu~ .. l I•l'UC~ ();'" g'.'llt.; Of i"j 1"1f"···["::.7'1.0~.0 c~j .), TlOVC•d

th'J i!;rprnv) cod. cou;··L '.:o gi.ro h:.'TI c. c;';".!:Cr: r.-:. i.'OdrJ(•::l r·: 30.Lf Fis llfJ v;-J.s S.'l.r"Oll• Ho ,iri•l')O. 1ih) 1?'-i'\;·.~··.!:S. ~"'jj: ... -:· m:sr; bu ro:• :n'h-ro'. L2'G th~ j 1.:..·y chat r ... , .. ::~rn t~l'•t r::'ln-·~ .. 1\.:lY": f:;.ll ;·,;ll v·:l'•t fn:~') \7r38 ir, ,+;('" r ';.;lJm if t!wy ·...-;oro C'1.J.gn~ 'tly tl.3 o:.1on;,r - w··.\h, or .:o:- co th-,n 0.0 ~"<' •• h ~ to:.·tu::'o .

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FROM THE P~OPLE OF ITf..LY !.liD FOR THE PEOPLE OF IT:.LY, AND V1E \70ULD ~.U.KE ,'N IR­RETRIEVABLE UISTl,ID; NOT TO R:SCGGNIZE THIS 1 S SUCH. I HI. VE F.AITH IN THESE HEN •• NlJ I AM CONVINC~D THAT TH!1.T FLITH IS JUST I !!'IED. It is to thorn that v.:o must look as being th0 onos b0st fitted to moot tho gigantic task of recovery and rehabilitation v;hich faces Italy. ! think that those Y'ho doubt thorn and fGar thorn belong to that doubting and timid class Who foar changJ moro than thoy ~ant progress$ Thoso young mon havo provon thomsolvas in battle. They have sho'lm groat physical and sr3at moral cour~.ga. Thoy havo earned thoir right to tho role of responsibility. It must not bo doniod to thorn.

This is a day of d~op rejoicing. On this day it is significant that our oyas aro turned to San Francisco as a symbol of hope. Thoro tho roprosonta­tivos of forty-six nations arc mo~ting with a groat purpose. They aro tho architects of a world organization '."lhich has as its high aim no loss a thing than tho preservation of m~nkind. Civilization itself has boon balancing on tho brink of an abyss. It has survived annihilation - this timo by a narrow margin - but tho cost of this survival in doad and in suffering is beyond cal­culation. Tho forty-six nations who aro mooting in San Francisco ar~ united in their dotGrmination that it must not, it shall not occur again.

1hoy arG

mot to find a moans of sottling difforoncos by other ways than war. But be~•· ag!'l.in wo hoar tho voicos of tho doubting Thomasos. Thoro arc those v1ho appear surprised and dismayed because thora arc differences, and because thoro arc differences , it follows that tho oonferonco will bo a failure. This is , in­deed, a misconception - tragic misconception. 4 nd it misses the point com­pletely. The fact is - that fact that must be faced is - that thoro aro dif­ferences to be settled. Tho hope is that there Pill be agroemont to settle tho so differences by a code of la>r - and not. a recourse to arms. In the gono ral aim thoro is Unity. Lnd tho goneraT}~f all forty-six nations is an Idoal. It is not pretended - and it c.n.nnot bo pretended that tho machinery that , .. ill put thiB Idoal into action will moet tho particul::tr blue print that each individual or oach group had in mind. It must bo admitted at once that tho mach::.m1·y that is put into motion will be a compromise. Thoro will be many thi~ps that oach of us, individually, may not liko, that, in the sacred n1.rc: of Justico thoro _.,ill bo many things that do not add up to Justice. But it door oot TJlf'J~:tn ~.h . .,,t Justice h[ls faJbd, boc.<tuso tho humRn machinery that triOS to jnt,crp•0(; it r.t.tS S\;l".:nDlGd • W:1&n WO StW:.(1ble it iS Up to US to pick pureelves up, repair that mach1nery and go on. .lior the end is Progress. It is the hope of mankind. It must not fail •

uopwa #l-92

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Distributed b;v FREF. IT' LV .' HERICfN Ll.BOB. COUNClL-144 .3l.oocker :-;~C"'1·c. Noyr ':fr;:rk 12, N. Y.

C::tamorc;:r 7 49!::8 ·

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Jree Jtafy _American cfabor Council 144 B!.sc£er St., r;.w 'ljo,£ 12, n 1j.

u.N.n.n . .A. Washington, D. c.

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Ernesto Pellegrino

Cesare Gabriele

T USTRY 3 CO "RL~ 1 l.OV3!'1I11 Gronchi

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P c~J..dem. Oi.' ~= ~..: Council

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.1. anoe Bon nn. Enrico .Mol Ren~to inre G1 en Mon~r 1 b no Franco Libonati

I ,JU:)TICI; r(-~-A-8~1 berto Tuo~i I I Dante Veron·

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Court en Carlo Bassano

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1GH'r-ST PJ\fUll 1) Christi Demo r<.4ts Ll.b

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!J. rio Cevl£..otto ~a 1o l'ano

Vi.ucenzo Arangio-RUl.z ~ Bernardo Mattar lla ~

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l..E!'""TTST P il.RTIES Communists L

SECRET

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