a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e v i e w o f p e a c e i n i t i a t i v e s

Issue Editor Laurence Broers

Elites and societies in the Nagorny Karabakh peace process

The limits of leadership

The limits of leadership:elites and societies in the Nagorny Karabakh peace process

Since the ceasefire of 1994, the conflict between Azerbaijan andArmenia over the region of Nagorny Karabakh has remained firmlydeadlocked. An internationally-sponsored peace process based onclosed talks between Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders has yieldedseveral proposals but no significant agreement. Rather than preparingpopulations for possible compromises, leaders in the region have longsought to bolster their domestic ratings with hardline stances.Theirzero-sum approaches to the competing principles of territorial integrity and self-determination make renewed violence as likely as a peaceful resolution.

With insufficient space in either society for the articulation ofconstructive solutions or the identification of common ground,The limits of leadership: elites and societies in the Nagorny Karabakh peaceprocess highlights the obstacles to a sustainable agreement. Inparticular, it explores the central challenge of bridging the gap betweenpotential for agreement at the negotiating table and popular resistanceto the compromises this entails.

With distrust in the present process so widespread, could a moreinclusive and multi-faceted approach address the dynamics ofpolarization and provide greater chances of reaching a solutionacceptable to all?

Featuring contributors from diverse constituencies, this issue of Accord presents perspectives on the peace process and analysis of the impacts of the conflict. It explores the roles of civil society and themedia, the economics of war and peace, and the challenges for furtherdemocratization. It also contains key texts and agreements, profiles of key actors and a chronology of the peace process.

Conciliation Resources and the Accord programmeConciliation Resources (CR) is an international non-governmentalorganization which supports people working to prevent violence,promote justice and transform armed conflict. CR’s Accord programmeaims to inform and strengthen peace processes, providing a uniqueresource on conflict and peacemaking.Working collaboratively withlocally based organizations, we document peace processes, increaseunderstanding and promote learning from past and comparablepeacemaking experiences.

“[Accord materials]…serve as valuable inputs and ready referencesfor our peace officers as we come up with more creative ways inpromoting peace and development on our side of the world.”

Rene V. Sarmiento, Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, Philippines

“…the series is of utmost importance for me. It provides a very goodreference source for empirical research.”

Hans J. Giessman, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy, University of Hamburg

The full text of all issues in the Accord series can be found on theConciliation Resources website at http://www.c-r.org

Issue 17 2005

ISSN 1365-0742£17.00

Accord 17Conciliation Resources

The Nagorny Karabakh peace process

C o n c i l i a t i o n R e s o u r c e s

Conciliation Resources

London 2005

The limits of leadership

Elites and societies in the Nagorny Karabakh peace process

Issue Editor: Laurence Broers

Front cover: the remains of ateahouse in Aghdam.

Acknowledgements

Accord Series Editor Celia McKeonIssue Editor Laurence BroersAccord Editor/Researcher Aaron GriffithsAccord Outreach Coordinator Sarah WheelerAccord Distribution Coordinator Guy BurtonCaucasus Programme Co-Manager Jonathan CohenDirector Andy Carl

This publication has been developed as a collaborative initiative between Conciliation Resources'Caucasus and Accord programmes.

Conciliation Resources would like to extend grateful thanks to our authors, peer readers,photographers, translators and those who contributed to consultation and analysis in the process of putting this publication together, especially: Ali Abasov, Arzu Abdullayeva, Veli Alibekov, ZardushtAlizadeh, Oksana Antonenko, Margarita Akhvlediani, Gegham Baghdasarian, Laura Baghdasarian, Phil Champain, Rachel Clogg, Elena Cook, Sofi Cook, Bhavna Dave, Tom de Waal, Sabine Freizer, TuralGanjaliev, Andranik Gasbarian, Salpi Ghazarian, Mark Grigoryan, Vafa Guluzade, Hikmet Hajizade, AvazHasanov, David Hovannisian, Tabib Huseynov, Armine Ishkanian, Alexander Iskandarian, Famil Ismailov,Lawrence Jackson, Volker Jacoby, Jana Javakhishvili, Walter Kaufman, Kerim Kerimli, HaroutiunKhachatrian, Seymour Khalilov, Siobhan Kimmerle, Paul Lawrence, Gerard Libaridian, AlyoshaManvelian, Elmar Mammadyarov, Ruben Mangasaryan, Anna Matveeva, Masis Mayilian, Rhona Miller,Rasim Musabayov, Tofig Musayev, Eldar Namazov, Boris Navasardian, Jenny Norton, Karine Ohanian,Karen Ohanjanian, Craig Oliphant, Vartan Oskanian, David Petrosyan, Rexane Rasmussen, ShahinRzayev, Dennis Sammut, Emil Sanamyan, Ronald Suny, Hratch Tchilingirian, Gevork Ter-Gabrielian, ArpiVartanian, Zarema Velikhanova, Siegfried Wöber, Arif Yunusov, Paata Zakareishvili, Tofik Zulfuqarov.

The publication was made possible thanks to the financial support of the UK Department forInternational Development (DFID), the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, the SwedishInternational Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) and the United Kingdom Global ConflictPrevention Pool for Russia and the CIS, through a grant to the Consortium Initiative.

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Contents

Acronyms 4Map of Azerbaijan and Armenia 5Political glossary 6Introduction 8Laurence BroersThe Nagorny Karabakh conflict: origins, dynamics and misperceptions 12Thomas de Waal

Perspectives on the Nagorny Karabakh peace processTowards peace in the Nagorny Karabakh region of the Republic of Azerbaijan through reintegration and cooperation 18Elmar MammadyarovOld states and new: shifting paradigms and the complex road to peace in Nagorny Karabakh 20Vartan OskanianA Karabakh Armenian perspective 22Gegham BaghdasarianA Karabakh Azeri perspective 25Tabib Huseynov

Personal stories 28

The official peace processThe role of the OSCE: an assessment of international mediation efforts 30Volker JacobyThe elusive ‘right formula’ at the ‘right time’: a historical analysis of the official peace process 34Gerard J. LibaridianObstacles to resolution: an Azerbaijani perspective 38Tofik ZulfuqarovSelf-regulating ceasefire 42Oksana AntonenkoA last chance for peace? 43Sabine Freizer

Civil society and the peace processBridging divides: civil society peacebuilding initiatives 44Avaz Hasanov and Armine IshkanianBetween freedom and taboo: media coverage of the Karabakh conflict 48Mark Grigoryan and Shahin Rzayev

Post-war dynamics and societal transformationsWar, social change and ‘no war, no peace’ syndromes in Azerbaijani and Armenian societies 52Laura Baghdasarian and Arif Yunusov The cost of stalemate: economic aspects of the Nagorny Karabakh conflict 56Phil Champain The Karabakh conflict and democratization in Azerbaijan 60Rasim MusabayovNew structures, old foundations: state capacities for peace 64Hratch TchilingirianThe politics of non-recognition and democratization 68Laurence Broers

Key texts and agreements 72Profiles 84Chronology 92Further reading 100About Conciliation Resources 101Accord Series 102Order form 104

3Contents

4 Accord 17

Acronyms

ACG Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli (Azerbaijan’s offshoreoilfields)

ADP Azerbaijan Democratic PartyAIOC Azerbaijan International Operating CompanyANIP Azerbaijan National Independence PartyANM Armenian National MovementANS Azerbaijan News ServiceARF Armenian Revolutionary FederationASALA Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation

of ArmeniaBP British PetroleumBTC Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (oil pipeline)BSEC Black Sea Economic Cooperation

(Organization)BTE Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (gas pipeline)CIS Commonwealth of Independent StatesCRINGO Caucasian Refugee and IDP NGO networkCRS Catholic Relief ServicesCSCE Conference for Security and Cooperation

in EuropeDPA Democratic Party of ArtsakhEBRD European Bank of Reconstruction and

DevelopmentEU European UnionGONGO ‘Government-organized’ non-governmental

organizationGUUAM Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan

and MoldovaHCA Helsinki Citizens’ AssemblyHLPG High level planning groupIA International AlertIDP Internally Displaced Person

IDEE Institute for Democracy in Eastern EuropeINGO International non-governmental

organizationKGB Committee for State Security KLO Karabakh Liberation OrganizationLINKS London Information Network on Conflicts

and State-buildingLOC Line of contactMG Minsk GroupNATO North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationNGO Non-governmental organizationNK Nagorny KarabakhNKAO Nagorny Karabakh Autonomous Oblast

(region)NKR Nagorno-Karabakh RepublicOMON Special Forces Police UnitPACE Parliamentary Assembly of the Council

of EuropePFA Popular Front of AzerbaijanPKF Peacekeeping forcesPOW Prisoner of warPPA People’s Party of ArmeniaRF Russian FederationRPA Republican Party of ArmeniaSOCAR State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan RepublicSOFAZ State Oil Fund of the Azerbaijan RepublicSSR Soviet Socialist RepublicOSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation

in EuropeUN United NationsUSSR Union of Soviet Socialist RepublicsYAP Yeni Azerbaycan Party

Key disputed place names

Official Armenian sources do not use Armenian variants of locations in the occupied territories outside of formerNagorny Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. In this publication we have as far as possible used the names employed at theonset of the conflict. Thus for example we have used Stepanakert rather than Khankendi and Shusha rather than Shushi.

Azerbaijani Armenian

Khankendi Stepanakert

Shusha Shushi

Agdere Mardakert

Khojavend Martuni

Goranboy Shaumian

Khanlar Getashen

Lachin(town) Berdzor

Lachin (province) Kashatagh

Kelbajar Karvajar

Gubatly Kashunik

Zangelan Kovsakan

Jebrail Jabrail

Disclaimer: this map shows places referred to in this publication for illustrative purposes and does not imply the expression of any opinion on the part of Conciliation Resourcesconcerning the legal status of any country or territory or concerning the delimitation of frontiers or boundaries.

5Map of Azerbaijan and Armenia

Map of Azerbaijan and Armenia

Any writing on unrecognized political formationsfaces the minefield of how to refer to institutionsand political posts lacking international legitimacy.Some authors express this ambiguity through theuse of inverted commas, e.g. the ‘republic’ or the‘president’. In this publication we have opted notto use this approach for the sake of ease ofreading. We refer to such institutions and posts as unrecognized or de facto.

administrative resources Resources enjoyed by incumbent candidates in elections, deriving from their controlover public sector personnel, finances and allocations, as well as state-owned media.Many post-Soviet governments have made extensive use of these resources tomarginalize electoral challenges from opposition groups.

Azeri There is no clear distinction in meaning between this term and the cognateAzerbaijani. In this publication we have used Azeri to denote ethnically Azeripopulations, and the term Azerbaijani to refer without ethnic distinction to thecitizens and state institutions of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

de facto / de jure states A de facto state is a polity, typically emerging from a separatist conflict, with manyempirical attributes of internal sovereignty (such as control over a given territory,capacity to provide government and services for its population and popularlegitimacy), but which in legal terms forms part of the metropolitan or de jure statefrom which it has separated. A de jure state possesses external sovereignty, namelyrecognition and the right to enter into relations with other sovereign states, and iscommonly assumed to also possess attributes of internal sovereignty.

ethno-federalism See titular nation.

First Secretary The highest executive position within Communist Party structures at the nationalrepublic and all-Union levels of the Soviet Union. This position was traditionally heldby a member of the titular nation, while a Slav held the position of Second Secretary.

interim status Related to a phased approach to resolving the conflict, interim status would be theinternationally recognized status that Karabakh (while continuing to exist in itspresent form) would receive having accepted a first phase agreement, before its ‘final status’ was worked out in a second phase agreement.

international administration A concept derived from conflict resolution efforts in the former Yugoslavia advancedin some discussions as a solution to the problem of the return of displaced Azeris tothe town of Shusha. The concept suggests that Shusha would be administered by aninternational authority, providing the necessary security guarantees for the returningAzeri population. Once a sufficient level of return had been achieved, the town wouldthen serve as a base from which to implement return to more scattered surroundingsettlements. Some Armenian commentators reject this concept as compromising thesovereignty of Nagorny Karabakh.

metropolitan state A state from which a territory formerly incorporated within its administrative bordershas separated and from which this territory seeks independence. The use of the termmetropolitan does not imply, however, that such a state should necessarily be seen as‘imperial’ or ‘colonial’ in nature.

Nagorno-Karabakh A commonly used variant spelling of Nagorny Karabakh in Russian, used in the Englishlanguage insignia of the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. Technically,however, since nagornyy (‘mountainous’) is a Russian adjective, the variant used in this publication complies with Russian linguistic norms.

near abroad A term translating the Russian blizhnee zarubezhë, signifying Russia’s relationship withthe former Soviet republics, now independent states.

6 Accord 17

Political glossary

A destroyed bridge at Sadakhlo market at themeeting point of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.

Source: Ruben Mangasaryan/Patker

nomenklatura Rus. The nomenklatura formed an informal elite group within the Soviet Union from whichall important political posts were appointed and which comprised the establishment.Nomenklatura membership was associated first and foremost with loyalty to the Sovietregime, political conservatism and a number of material privileges and benefits.

oblast Rus. Region.

obshchina Rus. Literally meaning ‘community’, this term is frequently used to denote non-titular (seetitular nation) minorities in post-Soviet states. In the context of the Karabakh conflict theterm is used in Azerbaijani sources to denote the Karabakh Armenian population, and inArmenian sources to denote the Karabakh Azeri population. In both cases the implication is that the population denoted is non-titular and therefore not deserving of territorializedautonomy. Neither the Karabakh Armenians nor the Karabakh Azeris accept the term as aself-designation.

occupied territories This term may be used in a narrow sense to denote the territories surrounding NagornyKarabakh captured by Armenian forces in 1993-94. These are the Azerbaijani regions ofKelbajar, Zengelan, Jebrail, Gubatly and Lachin, occupied in full, and parts of the regions of Aghdam (77 per cent according to independent experts; 35 per cent according toKarabakh authorities) and Fizuli (33/25 per cent). In a wider sense it may be used to denote Nagorny Karabakh and the above-mentioned territories collectively.

package approach One of the methodologies of arriving at a peace agreement for Nagorny Karabakhdiscussed in the late 1990s, contrasted with the step-by-step approach. The ‘package’implies the simultaneous resolution of all outstanding issues, crucially the issue of status.

perestroika Rus. Literally meaning ‘rebuilding’, this term came to popularly denote the political reformsin the Soviet Union initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985.

Politburo The Politburo, from ‘political bureau’, was the executive organization of the CommunistParty of the Soviet Union.

step-by-step approach One of the methodologies of arriving at a peace agreement for Nagorny Karabakhdiscussed in the late 1990s, contrasted with the package approach. The step-by-stepapproach implies a phased process addressing the consequences of armed conflict (above all occupation) before the core issue of status.

Supreme Soviet The highest representative body within Soviet national republics and the Soviet Union as a whole.

titular nation The granting of privileged status to the nationality for which a territory was named was a cornerstone of Soviet nationalities policy, and a defining feature of the system oftenreferred to as ‘ethno-federalism’. Titular status served to territorialize the eponymous nation,deemed to be ‘autochthonous’ (indigenous to the territory) within its given boundaries,institutionalizing a powerful sense of ownership by these groups over those territories andlegitimating a considerable degree of self-administration (if not self-rule per se). Other (non-titular) ethnic groups tended to become marginalized over time, and seen as immigrantsregardless of their settlement history. It was exceptional for one ethnic group to be thetitular nation in more than one territory, as the Armenians were in Armenia and the NKAO.

Yerazi An informal and for some pejorative term used in Azerbaijan to denote Azerbaijanis ofArmenian origin. The term means ‘Azeris from Yerevan’. The Yerazi form a cohesive politicalclan that, together with the Nakhichevani clan, has been a dominant force in internalAzerbaijani politics since Soviet times.

7Political glossary

IntroductionLaurence Broers

The Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over the regionof Nagorny Karabakh has languished in a state of‘no war, no peace’ for over a decade since the

ceasefire of 1994. The conflict is a central obstacle tothe political development of Armenia and Azerbaijanand a key impediment to the development of theSouth Caucasus region as a whole and its integrationinto the wider world. It is one of several conflictsbetween former federal units of the Soviet Unionwidely framed in terms of a clash between theprinciples of the self-determination of peoples and the territorial integrity of states. Reference to theseprinciples, understood in absolute terms rather thanthe more relativistic approach increasingly salient ininternational practice, continues to dominate the claimsof the respective parties to the conflict. Armenia andthe Armenians of Nagorny Karabakh insist on sovereignself-determination for the latter, previously anautonomous unit within Soviet Azerbaijan; Azerbaijaninsists on territorial integrity within its Soviet-eraboundaries, offset by ill-defined autonomy for theKarabakh Armenians.

Overlaying what is fundamentally a territorial disputeare the consequences of the 1991-94 war: a decisiveArmenian military victory resulting in Armenian controlof Nagorny Karabakh and the further occupation ofseven districts surrounding it. Continued occupation or release of these territories forms a key asset to the Armenian side in its attempts to prioritize thedetermination of Nagorny Karabakh’s future status as a precondition for dialogue on other issues. It has thusproved impossible to disentangle negotiations over theconsequences of armed conflict from the substantiveissues underlying it.

A decade of stagnation has seen international attentionto the conflict wane amid exasperation at the lack ofprogress in the peace process and the more urgentdemands of flashpoints elsewhere on the planet. Thisissue of Accord seeks to refocus attention on theKarabakh peace process and to explore the logic

8 Accord 17

Laurence Broers completed doctoral

studies at the School of Oriental and

African Studies on ethnic conflict

and violence in Georgia. He has

participated in a wide variety of

NGO projects and dialogue meetings

with civil society actors in Georgia,

Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Hostage exchange talks between Armenian andAzerbaijani fighters in Nagorny Karabakh, 1992.

Source: TASS/Sovfoto

behind the current equilibrium of stalemate. In the firstpart of the issue the history of the conflict is charted,the competing visions of the parties to it are presentedin their own terms and the history of the peace processis documented. Yet beyond the battlefield and thenegotiating table, both Armenian and Azerbaijanisocieties have undergone radical transformations as a result of the conflict. These include the mutualexpulsion of Armenians from Azerbaijan and Azerisfrom Armenia (and thereby the loss of much of bothrepublics’ former ethnic diversity), the militarization of societies and political cultures, a correspondingweakening of democratic impulses, and stuntedeconomic development deriving from blockades andlost investment, exacerbating the already traumatictransition from command to market economies. Thearticles in the second half of the issue address thesebroad transformations with which any peacesettlement must engage if it is to endure.

Defining termsOne of the first problems encountered in approachingthe conflict over Nagorny Karabakh is that the parties to it and external observers construct the conflict, and therefore define its structure, in different ways. De Waal’s opening article quickly dispels the popularnotion that the conflict can be reduced to incompatibleethnic or religious identities or so-called ‘civilizational’differences. As he shows, such explanations neitherexplain Armenians’ and Azerbaijanis’ long history of peaceful cohabitation nor the intermittent nature of explosions of violence between them.

The following articles provide insight into thecompeting visions of the conflict among the parties toit, and how this is reflected in contradictory views of the

necessary structure of the peace process aimed atresolving it. Two contributions from the foreign ministersof Armenia and Azerbaijan, Elmar Mammadyarov andVartan Oskanian, lay out conflicting state perspectives.Azerbaijan’s official position defines the conflict as abilateral interstate conflict between itself and Armenia,an understanding rooted in perceptions of Armenianirredentism, ambitions for territorial expansion and amilitary invasion of Azerbaijan. In accordance with thisview Azerbaijan makes no distinction between Armeniaand the Armenians of Nagorny Karabakh; directnegotiations with the de facto authorities in Karabakhare ruled out as a priori legitimating the latter’s claim to sovereign statehood. The official Armenian positiondefines the conflict in terms of a trilateral framework,defining Nagorny Karabakh and Azerbaijan as the keyprotagonists, with Armenia playing a only a secondaryrole of interested party and security guarantor for theArmenians of Karabakh. Rejecting claims of irredentism,the Armenian position situates the conflict within the broader discourse of self-determination anddecolonization structuring understandings of thecollapse of the Soviet Union as a whole. The Armeniansof Nagorny Karabakh support this view and haveconsistently lobbied for inclusion as an explicitlyrecognized party to the peace process.

As the following chapters by Baghdasarian and Huseynovshow, conflicting conceptual terminology continues inthe definition of the respective claims of the Armenianand Azerbaijani populations of Nagorny Karabakh.Informed by hierarchical Soviet understandings oflevels of rights inhering in different categories ofcollective identity, both Karabakh Armenians andKarabakh Azerbaijanis reject the terms ‘minority’ or‘community’ (obshchina in Russian), both claimingKarabakh as their national homeland.

9Introduction

The resilience of the Soviet legacy has at least twoimplications for outside observers. The first is that thatanything less than assiduous use of terminology caninadvertently reflect the bias of one or other side. To illustrate the complexities of the lexicon of theKarabakh conflict and the potential pitfalls in using oneor another term this issue of Accord includes a politicalglossary detailing competing definitions of key terms.The second implication is the thorough discrediting ofconcepts of autonomy by the experience of dysfunctionalfederalism under Soviet rule. Secessionist minorities inthe South Caucasus regard promises of autonomy withthe same lack of seriousness as the leaders of majoritygroups who make them. Outsiders prescribingautonomy arrangements as solutions to the region’sconflicts must take this context into account if theywish their proposals to be taken any more seriously.

A crowded peace processSituated at the margins of European, Eurasian andMiddle Eastern geopolitical spheres, the Karabakhconflict bewilders the observer in terms of the numberof actors involved. The conflict has intersected with anddeeply coloured the emergence of a new geopoliticalspace in the South Caucasus, a region historically andtoday where great powers compete for influence.Indeed, the competing agendas and unilateralinitiatives of international mediators are often held tobe a key explanation of the lack of progress in thepeace process. Early mediation attempts were initiatedby Russia, Kazakhstan and Iran; from 1992 the Karabakhconflict emerged as a key test-case for the validity ofthe ‘New World Order’ that many claimed wouldsucceed Cold War geopolitics, and the capacity of theinstitutions created to administer it: the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, later theOrganization for Security and Cooperation in Europe(OSCE), under whose aegis the ‘Minsk Group’ was giventhe mandate to mediate in the Karabakh conflict.

Initially debilitated by unfolding events on thebattlefield, the resulting OSCE-sponsored process hasbeen oriented towards securing agreement betweenthe sides on both the content and methodology of asettlement. As the chapter by Jacoby shows, however,the process has not vindicated hopes and expectationsfor greater cooperation among leading powers.Subsequent chapters by Zulfuqarov and Libaridianfurther provide evidence of how the parties to theconflict continue to fear that peace will institute a newregional hegemony favouring the other side. Theircontributions also highlight a central dilemma for manypeace processes: the tension inherent in processesmanaged by states for states in conflict scenariosfeaturing non-state actors. The de facto authorities inNagorny Karabakh may constitute a particular kind of

non-state actor, one that is highly structured andorganized, yet as Libaridian argues, the statist premiseunderlying international mediation that minoritieswould relinquish aspirations for independence in returnfor assurances of stability, economic prosperity andminority rights has proved unfounded. Similarly, asZulfuqarov shows, Azerbaijan’s hopes that a bodyenshrining the principle of territorial integrity wouldmediate in its favour have not been realized.

This sense of disappointment should not, however,obscure the underlying point that the current structureof the peace process marginalizes precisely thosecommunities that have the most to gain or lose from it:the Karabakh Armenians and the displaced KarabakhAzerbaijani community. Establishing contact betweenthese two constituencies, which must ultimately live inpeace in the case of a settlement, must form an integralaspect of future peacemaking efforts, a factoracknowledged in June 2005 by the AzerbaijaniForeign Ministry.

The absence of a clear regional hegemon has alsocontributed to an idiosyncratic feature of the Karabakhconflict explored in Antonenko’s article: the self-regulating nature of the ceasefire regime. The relativestability of the ceasefire indicates that neither Armenianor Azerbaijan have hitherto been inclined to resumeviolence. However, as Freizer warns in her contribution,rising ceasefire violations, increased military expendituresand mutual demonization may reach a tipping pointwhere such an outcome becomes inevitable.

Parameters of participation: elitesand societiesThe readiness among some sectors of Armenian andAzerbaijani societies to blame external actors for thelack of progress towards resolution introduces thetheme of ownership, and the extent of societalparticipation in the peace process. As many of thechapters in this issue suggest, only the highest echelonsof the political establishments in both countries havebeen involved in direct contact with the other side:presidents, their aides and foreign ministers. Syndromesof elitism, secretiveness and centralization inheritedfrom Soviet rule have structured post-Soviet approachesto peacemaking in Armenia and Azerbaijan, as regimeshave maintained tight monopolies on the managementof the peace process and information about its contents.Autonomous civic initiatives to broaden debate on theconflict – and specifically what can legitimately be saidabout it in public – are regarded with suspicion, orworse, confronted with charges of ‘capitulation’. Elitismin the peace process has forestalled the involvement ofwider societies and maintains a huge rift between therhetoric Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders use to frame

10 Accord 17

the issues for domestic audiences and their positions atthe negotiating table. The following series of articlesaddresses the interface between elites and societies andthe impacts of the conflict on different levels of society.

The policing of monopolies on the management of thepeace process and contacts with the other side haveseverely curtailed opportunities for engagement at thecivil society level. As Ishkanian and Hasanov show intheir article, the number of civic initiatives has dwindledover time and civil society’s capacity to broaden theparameters of participation is limited. In Azerbaijan civilsociety is fragile in the face of a regime enjoyingconsiderable autonomy deriving from its control of oilrevenues. In Armenia domestic civil society prioritizesother issues over Karabakh, a reflection of the fact thatcivil society agendas do not necessarily match outsiders’expectations of it as a constituency for conciliation.

Rzayev and Grigoryan chart the role of the media incovering the conflict. Their somewhat pessimisticconclusion is that while the war provided newopportunities for greater autonomy among journalists,the post-war impasse has seen the media in bothArmenia and Azerbaijan draw closer to official stancesby reproducing militancy and honouring taboos on thesubject of potential concessions. In their contributionBaghdasarian and Yunusov chart some of the majorsocial and attitudinal transformations undergone byArmenian and Azerbaijani societies. Their conclusionstrongly suggests the paradox of parallel processes inneighbouring, yet mutually isolated societies. FinallyChampain considers some of the economic costs of the current stalemate and the prospects for economicdevelopment to positively influence the peace process.

Collectively these articles strongly suggest themovement of societies as a whole away from conciliationand towards the internalization of identities as eithervictor (Armenia) or victim (Azerbaijan). Mutually exclusiveidentities constructed since the war pose seriousobstacles to a politics of dialogue, yet mirror one anotherin the narratives they tell. Underpinning these identitiesare competing understandings of historical justice tightlyinterwoven with national ideologies. For instance, ifsome Armenian sources have sought to situate theArmenian-Azerbaijani conflict within a broader narrativeof genocide at the hands of ‘Turks’, official Azerbaijanisources project the problem of refugees anddisplacement as a solely Azerbaijani problem. There is, moreover, a reciprocal, competitive aspect to such‘symbolic monopolies’, as witness attempts in Azerbaijanto construct a narrative of the Karabakh conflict as‘genocide’ at the hands of Armenians. On each sidethere is a tendency to highlight the most extremeinstances of violence (for Azeris, the massacre atKhojaly, for Armenians the pogroms of Sumgait and

Baku), which are not representative but becomeremembered as such. Narratives of coexistence andcooperation are lost in this process: as the conflictdeveloped, both communities ‘began to remember’historical enmities towards each other, enmities nowinstitutionalized within official narratives reproduced in the media. Plotted along parallel courses, Armenianand Azerbaijani histories do not meet.

Democratization and the capacity for peaceIf nationalist conflicts defined the 1990s and structuredthe contours of the re-establishment of independentstatehood in the South Caucasus, the current decade isbeing defined by state-society struggles over the formsthat statehood should take. In recent years regimes inboth Armenia and Azerbaijan have been confrontedwith expressions of considerable discontent with thepace and reach of democratization. Lacking robustmandates, and having promoted a culture ofhomogenizing militancy in part as a result, political eliteshave left themselves little room for the compromises that any peace settlement must involve. On more thanone occasion tentative agreement reached at thenegotiating table has foundered when put beforedomestic audiences. As the articles by Musabayov andTchilingirian argue, governments in both Azerbaijan andArmenia have sought to manipulate the ‘no peace, nowar’ impasse for internal political gains, rather than toestablish preconditions for its resolution. Finally Broersconsiders the impact of non-recognition on the politicaldevelopment and democratization process in NagornyKarabakh itself. In short, throughout the region it seemsthat only democratic dividends deriving from improvedstate-society relations may ultimately furnish thenecessary resources to break the current impasse in the peace process.

It appears inevitable that any future progress towardspeace must involve a widening and deepening ofparticipation and therefore ownership of the peaceprocess. This is possible only in a context whereregimes feel more secure in their mandates and nolonger feel compelled to reify a hardline stance on the Karabakh issue as a litmus test of legitimacy.Achieving this presupposes a far greater public spacefor engagement between state and society and thecreation of a politics of dialogue within, as well asbetween, societies. Since its inception, the transformativepower of the Karabakh conflict has been demonstratedagain and again. The crucial question for the future ishow political elites and wider societies in Armenia andAzerbaijan will respond to the potentially far-reachingchallenge of transforming politics implicit in the questfor its resolution.

11Introduction

The NagornyKarabakhconflictorigins, dynamics and misperceptions

Thomas de Waal

All conflicts have a pre-history. Few have as clear a beginning as the Nagorny Karabakh conflict.The basic positions – the Karabakh Armenians’

determination to secede from Azerbaijan with thesupport of Armenia and Azerbaijanis’ resolve to stopthat happening – were adopted in February 1988 andthat month saw turmoil erupt as if out of the blue in theform of demonstrations, strikes, political quarrels, flightsof refugees and pogroms. That full-scale Armenian-Azerbaijani fighting only broke out at the end of 1991 is more a matter of weaponry than of intention.

The events of February 1988 were dramatic, sudden,and almost universally unanticipated in a Europe thathad all but forgotten the power of nationalism as apolitical force. In that sense, by being the first seriousnationalist quarrel of the late Communist era, theKarabakh conflict can be called both the mostunexpected and the most predetermined of all thesedisputes. More than any others in Yugoslavia or theSoviet Union, the conflict was all but inevitable becauseits causes lay in the ‘deep structure’ of the relationshipbetween its two parties in late Communist times. Fourelements – divergent national narratives, a disputedterritorial boundary, an unstable security arrangementand lack of dialogue between the two parties – hadmade fissures that would break Armenia and Azerbaijanapart, as soon as trouble began. Yet because theproblem was both so new and so profound, nomechanism was found – or has yet been found – torepair the damage.

Narrating Karabakh: identity andownershipContradictory national narratives pervaded bothsocieties at all levels. Before fighting began, intellectualshad formulated detailed arguments that formed anational frame of reference for what happened on thebattlefield. These positions were first staked out during

12 Accord 17

Thomas de Waal is Caucasus Editor of the

Institute for War and Peace Reporting in

London. He has written widely on South

Caucasian and Russian politics, and is the

author of Black Garden: Armenia and

Azerbaijan through Peace and War.

A demonstration in Yerevan, 1988.

Source: Ruben Mangasaryan/Patker

the 1960s post-Stalinist ‘thaw’ initiated by Soviet leaderNikita Khrushchev, which created conditions forsanctioned, or ‘orthodox’, forms of nationalism. Theseproved difficult to control, however, as diametricallyopposed versions of history were later propagated bywriters such as Zia Bunyatov and Zori Balayan.

When the dispute broke to the surface in 1988, teamsof pamphleteers and propagandists on both sides were ready to rush into the breach and they beganproducing works with titles such as ‘Karabakh: theguilty party in the tragedy is well known’.Disappointingly little has changed in this regard. These ideological battles continue to this day on theinternet among a narrow audience, yet opinion polls in both countries suggest an overwhelming majority of respondents find it impossible to countenanceKarabakh being given to the ‘other’ in any peaceagreement. It is customary on both sides to believe that to be without Nagorny Karabakh is to have anincomplete national identity, that Armenian orAzerbaijani nationhood is a stunted and wounded

thing without it. This in turn feeds into a widersensation of insecurity in the face of the threat posedby the ‘other’ and its allies, real or perceived.

We should not dismiss these fears as fantasies – after allthe modern history of both Armenians and Azerbaijaniscontains enough real instances of catastrophe and lossto provide grounds for genuine insecurity. In bothcountries, many more compatriots live outside thehome state than inside it, as a result of war, expulsionsand Great Power treaties. The Treaty of Turkmenchai of1828 divided Azerbaijan into two – Russian and Iranian– parts and the Great Power politics of 1915-21truncated Armenia. While the mass killing of Armeniansin Anatolia in 1915 dwarfs in scale anything elsecommitted in the neighbourhood in modern history,Azerbaijanis also suffered grievously from earlytwentieth century history – often at the hands ofArmenians. It has been precisely those episodes whereAzeris and Armenians suffered at each other’s hands(rather than Russians, Georgians or others) that havebeen the focus of contemporary nationalist narratives.

13The Nagorny Karabakh conflict: origins, dynamics and misperceptions

The modernity of the Karabakh conflictThe first major Armenian-Azerbaijani tensions can betraced to the end of the nineteenth century. Armeniansand Azerbaijanis were the two major national groups in the borderland between the Russian, Ottoman andPersian empires and as such were intermingled overterritory stretching hundreds of miles. Historically, theArmenians tended to be a more successful socio-economic group, with a heavier concentration in townsand cities as a prosperous merchant class. With the rise of nationalism and heightened Russian-Ottomanconflict at the end of the nineteenth century, theArmenians became both the most militant and themost vulnerable community in Ottoman Anatolia. And, while a few generations before mainly ShiiteAzerbaijanis and mainly Sunni Turks might have foundlittle in common, they increasingly found commoncause – and were identified as one and the same byArmenians. This has fed through into the Armeniangeneralization that Azerbaijanis are also ‘Turks’ – andtherefore share complicity for the 1915 genocide.

The Armenian-Azerbaijani fighting of 1917-20 can beseen as a messy attempt to draw borders and build aviable state – a bloody process that was being playedout across the rest of the Eastern Europe and theBalkans. It was also war by proxy, with Russia andTurkey continuing a long-running territorial conflictthat had lasted for most of the previous century, eachusing the Armenians and Azerbaijanis respectively astheir local allies.

The misfortune of Karabakh was that it was alwayscaught in the middle. Geographically it was situated onthe Azerbaijani side of the mountainous watershed thatruns down between the two countries. Demographicallyit was mixed, as it evidently had been for centuries: the Armenians predominated in the hills, with moreAzerbaijanis in the plains, as well as in the city of Shusha(or Shushi as it was known to its Armenian inhabitants).Culturally it had great significance for both sides. ForArmenians, the meaning of Karabakh lay in the dozensof Armenian churches dotted around the territory, itstradition of local autonomy through the “melik” princesof the Middle Ages and the martial reputation ofKarabakh Armenians. For Azerbaijanis, the associationswere primarily with the khanate based around the greateighteenth century city of Shusha and with the greatcultural flowering of composers and poets such asVagif, Natevan and Uzeir Hajibekov. Karabakh was inshort a culturally rich border-zone, like Alsace, Flandersor Kashmir and, like them, fated to be a battlefield.

In 1920-21 the only ‘solution’ of this dispute couldcome either by military victory – as basically happenedin Anatolia, Zangezur and Nakhichevan – or by theimposition from above of a new structure by animperial power. After the British failed to impose asettlement, the imperial arbiters turned out to be theBolsheviks, whose 11th Army conquered Karabakh inMay 1920. On 5 July 1921 the Bolsheviks’ Caucasiancommittee, the Kavburo, under the chairmanship ofStalin ruled that the mountainous part of Karabakhwould be part of Azerbaijan. In July 1923 the Nagorny(or Mountainous) Karabakh Autonomous Region(NKAO) was created within Azerbaijan, with bordersthat gave it an overwhelming Armenian population of 94 per cent of the total inhabitants.

This arrangement turned the NKAO into one of onlytwo instances in the Soviet system of an autonomousprovince inside one union republic that had a strongaffiliation to another union republic (the other instance,Russian-majority Crimea, though also unstable, hasproved a less fissiparous case). The contradictions ofthis arrangement were never openly discussed, but the two national narratives were still far apart: manyArmenians never accepted the 1921 decision andprotests against it were made in 1945, 1965 and 1977.On 20 February 1988 the NKAO local Soviet voted torequest the Soviet government to permit Karabakh toleave Soviet Azerbaijan and become part of SovietArmenia. It was perhaps predictable that the vote tookAzerbaijanis completely by surprise: to them thatNagorny Karabakh was part of their republic was a self-evident fact, reinforced by everyday news as well as by scholarly literature that stressed the territory’sAzerbaijani heritage.

A key point must be made here, which is that theseunderlying structural tensions in the architecture of theregion had little impact on the daily life of the residentsliving there. As most Armenians and Azerbaijanis willtell you, they traditionally had a better tradingrelationship with each other than either community did with Georgians; rates of intermarriage were alsohigh. Soviet Karabakhis from both communities tendedto be bilingual, on good terms with their neighboursand little concerned by the nationalist narratives beingadvanced by intellectuals in Yerevan or Baku.

It is an elementary mistake therefore to see the Karabakhconflict as a clash of ‘ancient hatreds’ or as a religiousdispute. Links of culture, business and marriage stillbind Armenians and Azerbaijanis together in Moscow,Georgia and Iran – anywhere in fact outside the zone of the Karabakh conflict.

14 Accord 17

Security dilemmasWhat was it then that pushed these ordinaryneighbours into conflict with one another? Theprecipitate breakdown in security and trust could beattributed to the rigidities of the Soviet state, which hadfailed to manage the political contradictions inherent inNagorny Karabakh. The heavily centralized system hadenforced security through fear but it had almost nomechanisms of resolving a dispute between twocommunities by consensus.

The Soviet Union created territorial units defined interms of nationality, but it did not allow the freeformation of horizontal civic bonds across society in the sense of participation in public life by organizationsdefined neither by nationality nor the Communist Party.By 1988 ideological socialism had vanished as a guidingprinciple, so, when crisis struck, it was all too logical thatboth Armenians and Azerbaijanis showed allegiance totheir nationality and homeland, rather than to putativeideals of ‘brotherhood’ and ‘workers’ solidarity’. Theyhad no interest in engaging in bilateral dialogue inpursuit of an acceptable compromise, even if they hadwanted to. No Karabakh Armenians thought of pressingtheir case in Baku and no Baku leaders thought ofinviting them: one Karabakh Armenian advocate ofcompromise, Valery Grigorian, part of a delegation from Stepanakert to Baku in 1991, was murdered on hisreturn. Instead both sides instinctively sent delegationsto Moscow and made telephone calls to the Kremlin to bend the ear of Communist Party officials. Bothbelieved this was a dispute which Moscow wouldarbiter and in which there would be one winner.

Ordinary people thus soon lost whatever bonds theyhad had with their neighbours and friends. Once thepolitical dispute had begun, residents in Shusha andStepanakert could only be identified as eitherArmenians or Azerbaijanis – an act of identification that when it came to mixed marriages had to bedeliberately made. They had no third option to choose,apart from voting with their feet and leaving theirhometown altogether. It is indicative that theArmenian-Azerbaijani community with the strongestcivic consciousness, the one in Baku, survived thepolitical strains the longest and fell apart only inJanuary 1990.

Some have seen this breakdown in relations as beingeconomically motivated – as being a quarrel overscarce resources – yet this analysis also does not standup to scrutiny. The tensions within Karabakh pre-datedby decades the depressed Soviet economy of the 1980sand the province was not appreciably poorer thanmany other parts of the Soviet Union, having average

economic indicators for Azerbaijan and being slightlypoorer than Armenia. A promise of a “small renaissance”by Gorbachev and a big influx of investment fromMoscow spearheaded by Arkady Volsky in 1988-89were not enough to persuade the Karabakh Armeniansit was within their interests to stay within SovietAzerbaijan.

From conflict to violenceThe breakneck speed with which events occurred inearly 1988 suggests how fragile the situation was. First a large group of Azerbaijanis fled southern Armenia,complaining of brutal harassment (a smaller group hadleft some months before). Then the Nagorny KarabakhSoviet made its unprecedented vote. This led to ralliesin Stepanakert and Baku, and then to the largestdemonstrations ever seen in the post-war Soviet Union in Yerevan. At the same time the post-war Soviet Union experienced its first major strike byworkers in Nagorny Karabakh.

What tipped the balance from confrontational politicsinto outright conflict were the pogroms in Sumgait on28-29 February 1988. These came about through acombustible mix of ingredients: a depressed andpolluted town with a mixed ethnic community; asudden influx into Sumgait of Azerbaijanis fleeingArmenia; a town leadership that was either confused orabsent; silence from the authorities in Moscow; reportsthat two Azerbaijanis had been killed in Karabakh; anda series of angry demonstrations. All of this flared into aferocious pogrom in the Armenian quarter of the town,leading to a belated armed intervention by the Sovietarmy. The official death toll (almost certainly reliablebecause it tallies with lists of named victims) was 26 Armenians and 6 Azerbaijanis. Sumgait effectivelymade the Karabakh dispute into the Karabakh conflict,with only a lack of access to weaponry preventing animmediate escalation into war.

A crisis of managementAlthough there have been many conspiracy theoriesabout Sumgait, the weight of evidence suggests that itwas a grassroots upsurge of violence, mishandled by the Soviet authorities, but not provoked and still lessinstigated by them. Moscow played a less than gloriousrole in the outbreak of the conflict, but it is wrong, asmany in the Caucasus still do, to blame the start of thedispute in 1988 on manipulation by the centre, withmost ordinary Armenians and Azerbaijanis relegated tothe role of bystanders. All the Politburo documentsavailable from the time show that the central decision-making authority of the Soviet Union was immediatelyout of its depth, unable to cope with an unwelcome and

15The Nagorny Karabakh conflict: origins, dynamics and misperceptions

unfamiliar challenge. Gorbachev was immediatelywrong-footed because the republican CommunistParties of Armenia and Azerbaijan refused to complywith his wishes. In an outburst of frustration typical ofthis period, Gorbachev lashed out at the Party leaders inboth Baku and Yerevan, complaining to a Politburomeeting convened to discuss the Sumgait events on 29 February 1988 that, “We need information and it’shard to obtain it – both sides are hiding it. Everyone is involved.”

In retrospect Gorbachev could probably have used only two tactics in 1988 to dampen down this growingconflagration. It is to his credit that he did not try thefirst, which was mass repression. Mass arrests of allpolitical activists in Armenia and Azerbaijan might havecowed the populations of both Soviet republics in theshort term, but this would have carried a big politicalcost for Gorbachev and would surely have onlypostponed trouble to a later date. The second optionwas still more fantastic even for the most liberal leaderin Soviet history. This was to begin a democratic debatedesigned to find consensus – by flying to the region,holding talks, commissioning an independent enquiryinto the problems associated with the dispute andnegotiating a compromise solution. In the SovietCaucasus of 1988, this kind of initiative was simplyunimaginable. Significantly, when both Armenians

and Azerbaijanis continue to criticize Gorbachev for hisrole in the Karabakh dispute, it is not for his failure to bea fair mediator, but for his failure to use the authority ofthe Kremlin to award Nagorny Karabakh to its justowner – them.

The evidence shows that Moscow in fact lost fullcontrol of both Armenia and Azerbaijan as early as1988. Gorbachev replaced both Communist Partyleaders in Baku and Yerevan in May 1988, only to findthat their successors took an even more robust line on the Nagorny Karabakh issue. Both Soviet republicsembarked on a process of nation-building, adoptingnew nationalist symbols, creating new institutions, and deporting en masse their respective Armenian or Azerbaijani minorities.

Another watershed came in January 1990, when theSoviet leadership lost Azerbaijan, first yielding thestreets of Baku to the nationalist opposition and thenmaking things many times worse by sending in thearmy to the city to crush the Azerbaijani Popular Frontand killing dozens of civilians. The first victims of thiscrisis were Baku’s remaining Armenians, more than 90of whom died in pogroms before they were evacuatedfrom a city that finally lost its reputation as a haven ofmultiethnic tolerance.

16 Accord 17

Escalation and open warThe end of the Soviet Union in 1991 transformed theKarabakh conflict from a civil war to an interstate one.As the 15 former Soviet republics became independentstates within their Soviet boundaries, NagornyKarabakh was formally recognized internationally asbeing part of Azerbaijan – a central issue that stillstands at the heart of the dispute. At the same time thetransfer of Soviet weaponry to each side increased thedestructive capacity of both combatants.

In purely physical terms, the geographical anddemographic realities on the ground set an Azerbaijaniside that surrounded Nagorny Karabakh withAzerbaijani towns and villages against an Armenianside that was separated from nearby Armenia but hadfar greater control of Karabakh itself. The militaryoutcome of the conflict thus hinged on the ability ofthe Azerbaijanis to blockade Nagorny Karabakh andforce their terms on it, set against the capacity of theArmenians to break out of the military cordon and linkup with nearby Armenia.

The blackest episodes of the war from the Armenianperspective are the remorseless Azerbaijani shelling of Stepanakert in 1991-92 and the sweep throughKarabakh by Azerbaijani forces in 1992. The Azerbaijanisrecall with horror the worst massacre of the war whenan estimated 485 people, the vast majority civilians,were killed in and around Khojaly by the Armenianforces in February 1992. They also suffered by far thegreatest humanitarian crisis with the occupation byArmenian forces of seven regions around Karabakh in1992-94 and the expulsion of half a million people fromthose regions. The aftermath of this expansion of thewar to a vast swathe of territory outside NagornyKarabakh (if Karabakh itself is included, then Armenianscurrently control 13.6 per cent of the internationallyrecognized territory of Azerbaijan) remains an openwound in the unsolved conflict.

These were brutal acts of war. But the blame for themshould be shared with the outside world for failing tocommit more resources to securing the warring parties’commitment to a settlement. These brutal actsarguably stemmed from a military logic in a situation ofkill-or-be-killed (although it is harder to see a strategiclogic in Khojaly, where warped motives of revenge mayhave played a big role). To prevail, the Azerbaijanisneeded to tighten the economic and military noosearound Karabakh, an aim that they bloodily failed toachieve. In turn the Armenians needed to transformKarabakh from a vulnerable enclave into a defensiblefortress – a task they bloodily achieved.

Together in isolationA recurrent theme of the Karabakh dispute since 1988has been the lack of an effective and authoritativeoutside arbiter. The conflict can be said to haveoriginated as a clash of political ambitions for atraditionally disputed territory at a moment of imperialdecline. This quickly turned into a matter of elementarysecurity, when the imperial centre was unable toprotect vulnerable communities and both sides fellback on their own resources.

The dynamics of conflict of course soon transformedwhat had already begun. After February 1988,economic factors also began to fuel the conflict and do so to this day. Profiteering arms-dealers, greedylooters, middlemen and mafiosi all came to have a stake in the growth of the conflict and in its non-resolution. Also, the awfulness of war and the hatefulpropaganda it has spawned and the desire for revengecaused by a conflict that has taken 20,000 lives haveprogressively undermined the common culture onceshared by Armenians and Azerbaijanis and created anantipathy that is now projected back into the past.

What are the implications of this brief analysis of theroots and evolution of the conflict for attempts toresolve it? First, that socio-economic conditions werenot to blame and that Armenian-Azerbaijani social andeconomic links, although damaged over the years, areentirely reparable. Second, that previous politicalarrangements for Karabakh have contained lethalstructural flaws that perpetuated mutual insecurities,and that only the latter-day Great Powers of Russia andthe West have the capacity to devise a new overarchingsecurity structure that makes all sides feel safe frompotential aggression. Finally, that the heart of theconflict lies within the narrow political narratives thatArmenia and Azerbaijan have come to employ both inimagining themselves and the other. To break out ofthe prison of the conflict, they need to begin the titaniceffort of a genuine dialogue about their commonfuture. Since 1988 Nagorny Karabakh has come torepresent an ever-widening chasm, but bothArmenians and Azerbaijanis need to re-imagine it notonly as a territory but as a bridge, on which they have a firm footing but are freely joined to the other side.

17The Nagorny Karabakh conflict: origins, dynamics and misperceptions

A ruined mosque in Shusha.

Source: Laurence Broers

Towards peacein the NagornyKarabakh regionof the Republicof Azerbaijanthroughreintegrationand cooperationElmar Mammadyarov

The ongoing armed conflict in and around theNagorny Karabakh region of the Republic ofAzerbaijan has resulted in the occupation of

almost one-fifth of the territory of Azerbaijan and madeapproximately one out of every eight persons in thecountry an internally displaced person or refugee. TheGovernment of Azerbaijan’s strategy is aimed at theliberation of all occupied territories, the return offorcibly displaced persons to their places of origin, andthe establishment of durable peace and stability in theNagorny Karabakh region as well as in the entireSouth Caucasus.

The legal and political constituent for the settlement ofthe conflict is based on the norms and principles ofinternational law, laid down in the United Nations (UN)Security Council resolutions 822, 853, 874 and 884 aswell as in the appropriate documents and decisions ofthe Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe(OSCE). The above-mentioned UN Security Councilresolutions were adopted in 1993 in response to theoccupation of the territories of Azerbaijan andreaffirmed the sovereignty, territorial integrity andinviolability of the international borders of the Republicof Azerbaijan and all other states in the region.

Although the mediation efforts conducted for over tenyears within the framework of the OSCE have not alwaysbeen consistent and, except for establishment of theceasefire, have yet to yield results, Azerbaijan continuesto be committed to the settlement of the conflict withinthe OSCE Minsk Group. However, the success of thepeace process depends on a similar commitment andconstructive approach on the part of Armenia, as well as on the active contribution of all OSCE member states,especially those represented in the Minsk Group and itsCo-Chairmen. We are ready to continue negotiationswith Armenia in order to eliminate the consequences of its military invasion and occupation of the territoriesof Azerbaijan.

We are also highly appreciative of the role of otherinternational organizations, particularly the UnitedNations and the Council of Europe, in formulating andconsolidating the general position of the internationalcommunity. This position is based on respect for theterritorial integrity of Azerbaijan and condemnation ofthe occupation and notorious ethnic cleansing of itsterritories, as well as addressing specific issues that, if leftunaddressed, may result in serious obstacles to peacenegotiations as well as unpredictable consequences.Thus, the UN General Assembly’s consideration at its59th session of the agenda item entitled ‘The situationin the occupied territories of Azerbaijan’ played a crucialrole in attracting attention to the issue of the illegal

18 Accord 17

Elmar Mammadyarov has been Minister of Foreign Affairs of the

Republic of Azerbaijan since 2004. A graduate of the Kiev State

University, the USSR Diplomatic Academy and the Centre for

Foreign Policy Development at Brown University, he has

previously served in Azerbaijan’s diplomatic missions to the

United Nations, United States and Italy.

Azerbaijani PresidentIlham Aliyev before aposter of Heydar Aliyev.

Source: Reuters/Sergei Karpukhin

transfer of Armenian settlers into the occupiedterritories of Azerbaijan, as well as in initiating urgentmeasures for putting this dangerous practice to an end.

This article is written at a time of cautiously positivesigns in the drive to find a settlement to the conflict.Azerbaijan has clearly and unequivocally demonstratedits aspiration towards a constructive resolution based onthe so-called Prague process and strives to make full useof all political and diplomatic resources available to it.

The territorial integrity of Azerbaijan cannot be a subjectof compromise. We will not surrender an inch of ourterritory to anyone. Azerbaijan does not want war andremains committed to a peaceful resolution. Yet if forcedby deliberate actions aimed at the further consolidationof the current status quo of occupation, Azerbaijan willbe ready to resort to any other available measures tolegitimately restore its territorial integrity. Territorialacquisitions and the practice of ethnic cleansing areincompatible with universal and European values andcontradict the principles and ideas of peace, democracy,stability and regional cooperation.

In order to veil its aggressive policy towards Azerbaijan,the Armenian side frequently speculates on theinternational legal principle of the right of peoples toself-determination. In reality, the practical realization ofthis right, as stipulated in the relevant internationaldocuments, does not involve unilateral secession, but represents a legitimate process carried out inaccordance with international and domestic law withinprecisely identified limits. Obviously, the critical factor inaddressing the issue of self-determination with regardto the conflict in question is that all actions aimed attearing away a part of the territory of Azerbaijan areunconstitutional and accompanied by violation of basicrules of international law, particularly those prohibitingthe use of force and the acquisition of territory.

Our approach to the right of self-determination derivesfrom its true value and envisages securing the peacefulcoexistence and cooperation of the Azerbaijani andArmenian communities of the Nagorny Karabakh regionand creating the necessary conditions for the effectiverealization of their right to participate in the conduct ofpublic affairs, including through the formation oflegitimate regional authorities at all levels.

We believe that the legal status of the NagornyKarabakh region can be worked out only with the fully-fledged and equal participation of the citizens of Azerbaijan of both Azerbaijani and Armeniancommunities within the framework of a lawful anddemocratic process. While envisaging the realization

of this perspective in the final stage of the peaceprocess, it is logical that the whole strategy would notbecome a reality without the restoration of Azerbaijan’ssovereign rights over all occupied territories and thesafe and dignified return of the expelled Azerbaijanipopulation thereto.

Once an agreement is achieved, we will need theinternational community to help guarantee itsimplementation through the deployment ofmultinational peacekeeping forces, support fordemining, restoration of communications andrehabilitation of lands, as well as the provision ofsecurity guarantees for the population in the NagornyKarabakh region, including the creation of local policeforces in the region for both Azerbaijani and Armeniancommunities. The Government of Azerbaijan is ready to assist in all possible ways with the infrastructuralrebuilding and economic development of the region,including the attraction of investments at the local level.

Special attention in the conflict settlement should begiven to the issue of communications in the region.Those who are familiar with the conflict often encounterthe notion of ‘corridors’ or ‘unimpeded access’.Azerbaijan suggests a policy of shifting from restricted,antagonistic understandings of the corridor concept to the use of all communications in the region for themutual benefit of both sides. This approach acquiresparticular significance with regard to the so-called‘Lachin corridor’, which is important for linking both theArmenian population in the Nagorny Karabakh regionwith Armenia, and Azerbaijan with its AutonomousRepublic of Nakhichevan through the territory ofArmenia. The use of the Lachin road in both directionsalong the route Aghdam-Khankendi-Shusha-Lachin-Goris-Shahbuz-Nakhichevan (with the possibility offurther extension to Turkey) can provide bothAzerbaijan and Armenia with guaranteed secureconnections. The significance of utilizing the ‘Lachincorridor’ in such a way goes beyond the practicalbenefits of direct transport communication betweentwo states. This road could become a ‘road of peace’ ofgreat political, economic and pan-regional importance.

The Armenian-Azerbaijani war caused enormousdamage and suffering to hundreds of thousands ofuprooted people deprived of normal living conditionsfor more than a decade. A long-term solution for them,deriving from their strong desire to return to theirhomes, can be found only through a lasting settlementof the conflict.

19Towards peace in the Nagorny Karabakh region of the Republic of Azerbaijan

20 Accord 17

Vartan Oskanian is a graduate of the Fletcher School of

Law and Diplomacy, as well as Harvard University. He has

served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic

of Armenia since 1998.

Old states and newshifting paradigms and thecomplex road to peace inNagorny Karabakh

Vartan Oskanian

Over the course of the last decade, the contentand focus of the negotiations on NagornyKarabakh have changed dramatically. By

breaking down the process into stages, it is possible to see how we have come to a point where – withsufficient political will – we can move more concretelytowards resolving our differences.

The conflict began in 1988, when Azerbaijan used forceto respond to peaceful demonstrations by the peopleof Nagorny Karabakh calling for this Armenian-populated region to be able to determine its ownstatus. Even as military activities continued, there werevarious incongruent, uncoordinated, random andimpulsive efforts at mediation from within the formerSoviet space. In 1992, the conflict resolution processbecame internationalized through the Conference forSecurity and Cooperation in Europe. Yet just as wethought the fighting had stopped, Azerbaijan mountedanother attack in December 1993, which was repelledby the Karabakh Armenians who took control of certainsurrounding territories in order to prevent furthermilitary aggression. By May 1994, there was a mutuallyagreed ceasefire. At a summit of the now Organizationfor Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) inBudapest in December, the OSCE harmonized thevarious negotiation tracks. Thus the end of militaryhostilities coincided with the creation of a mechanismfor serious negotiations, which continue to this day.

Over the years, international developments and self-determination processes in different parts of the worldhave led to fundamental changes in internationalthinking on the issues underlying the Karabakh conflict, as well as in the process and content of thenegotiations. Relationships between states – new andold – are evolving. We have witnessed East Timor’sindependence through a referendum and the signingof an agreement in Sudan concluding a decades-oldconflict on the basis of a referendum to be held in onepart of the country. There are serious deliberationsabout the possibility of a referendum to determineKosovo’s status. Among political, legal and academicexperts, there is a growing awareness of the possibilityand reality of recognizing the right of self-determination in certain circumstances.

Each self-determination struggle must be judged by itsown historical and legal circumstances, as well as therealities on the ground. Self-determination conflicts fallinto four types depending on the degree of control thestate exercises over its entire territory (including theterritory on which those striving for self-determinationactually live) and the degree of self-determinationachieved in practice by those struggling for it. In thefirst category, those expressing a desire for self-determination exercise that right through a vote and

Armenian PresidentRobert Kocharian.

Source: Reuters/Mike Segar

choose to remain part of the state. The only example of this is Quebec, which has voted to remain part ofCanada. The overwhelming majority of today’ssecession movements conform to a second type,struggling without any degree of self-determination as the state continues to fully control the territoryunder question. A third category is comprised ofborderline cases where the state is not able to controlthose desiring self-determination, who in turn are notstrong enough to maintain control over their territorywith any certainty of permanence.

Nagorny Karabakh falls into a completely different,fourth category. Azerbaijan has no control whatsoeverover Karabakh, which has achieved all the empiricalattributes of complete sovereignty in the last 15 years. In this context the attempt to convince its people toaccept Azerbaijani jurisdiction by enticing them withpromises of human rights and economic benefits is asenseless exercise. In addition to the duration and depthof its self-determination, Nagorny Karabakh’s situation isfurther reinforced and made complete by the followingfacts. First, it seceded legally, according to the laws ofthe day. Second, the territory in question has never beenwithin the jurisdiction of independent Azerbaijan. Third,Azerbaijan, in perpetrating violence against people thatit considered its own citizens, has lost the moral right tocustody over those people. And, finally, there is the defacto political reality of Nagorny Karabakh’s provenability to hold elections, govern its people, protect itsborders and conduct international relations.

Azerbaijan’s authorities find it difficult to come to termswith these indisputable realities. Instead, they constructtheir positions on new premises and myths. First, theyhave convinced themselves that their territories are theessence of the issue. Yet, when this conflict began,there were no territories outside Nagorny Karabakhunder Armenian control. Those territories came underArmenian control not only because there wasdisagreement about Nagorny Karabakh’s status, butalso because Azerbaijan attempted the completecleansing of all Armenians from Nagorny Karabakh.

Second, the Azerbaijani authorities want to believe thatif they do not realize their maximum demands throughnegotiations, they can always resort to military solutions.But is it not obvious that a conclusive military resolutionis not possible? A successful military solution wouldrequire more than conventional arms against thepeople of Nagorny Karabakh, who are defending theirown homes. Azerbaijan can succeed in its attemptsonly by ethnically cleansing Nagorny Karabakh of all Armenians.

Third, Azerbaijan thinks that time is on its side, a beliefrooted in the confidence that oil revenues will enhancetheir military capacity. This is a great deception, becausetime is not guaranteed to work in favour of any oneside. International tendencies today are movingtowards reinforcing the right to self-determination. The longer that Nagorny Karabakh maintains its defacto independence, the harder it will be to reverse the wheel of history.

Fourth, the Azerbaijani authorities think an isolatedArmenia will be economically unable to sustain itsposition and will sooner or later agree to seriousconcessions. This is a faulty assumption because it isthe people of Nagorny Karabakh who must first agreeto concessions. Furthermore, both Armenia andNagorny Karabakh have gone beyond mere economicsurvival and are recording growth.

Finally, Azerbaijan has convinced itself that bypresenting Armenia as the aggressor, it will becomepossible to use international resolutions to forceArmenian capitulation. However, Armenians haveconsistently demonstrated that Azerbaijan is a victim of its own aggression. The territories under Armeniancontrol could be returned in order to assure NagornyKarabakh’s security and future; but they could be kept if that assures the same end more effectively. Thepurpose is security and self-determination, notacquisition of territory.

The solution will not be found either through militaryaction or international resolutions, and no solution canbe imposed from the outside. The only way to a solutionis to demonstrate political will and embrace realisticpositions. Armenians remain faithful to their initialpremises that there cannot be a vertical link betweenAzerbaijan and Nagorny Karabakh, that it must have ageographic link with Armenia, and that the security ofthe people of Nagorny Karabakh must be assured.

For us, the basis of resolution is the affirmation of the right of the people of Nagorny Karabakh to self-determination and international recognition of that right. Azerbaijan’s acceptance of this fact – and its formalization in an agreement – will open the wayfor the resolution of the conflict and the elimination of its consequences.

21Old states and new

A KarabakhArmenianperspective

Gegham Baghdasarian

The state of ‘no war, no peace’ and the completeabsence of official relations between Azerbaijan on the one hand and Armenia and the Nagorno-

Karabakh Republic (NKR) on the other pose seriousobstacles to the democratic development of all thestates and political entities involved in the conflict. Inrecent years Azerbaijani officials have used increasinglystrong language regarding the possible use of force toresolve the conflict. In Armenia and Nagorny Karabakhthe populations are seemingly accustomed to this andreconciled to the prospect of renewed war.

Karabakh Armenian demandsThe official position of the NKR is based on three keytenets. First, there can be no direct subordination of one party to the conflict to another – that is, no verticalrelationship between Azerbaijan and the NKR. Second,the NKR cannot be an enclave within Azerbaijan: thepopulation of Karabakh must have overland access tothe outside world. Third, the NKR must have securityguarantees at a level determined by its leadership and itspeople. The fate of the territories surrounding the NKR –referred to in Armenian sources as the ‘security buffer’ –is an object of negotiations. This position has convergedwith the official position articulated by Yerevan followingthe accession of Robert Kocharian, formerly president ofthe NKR, to the Armenian presidency in 1998.

The NKR authorities do not reject outright the idea of the return of the Azeri population that fled Karabakh as a result of the war, but consider this a question to beresolved in tandem with the return of Armenianrefugees to Azerbaijan. Nonetheless, in April 2005 theForeign Minister of the NKR, Arman Melikian, announcedthe promulgation of a citizenship law for the NKR thatwould extend full citizenship rights to any Azerisreturning to Karabakh in addition to a number of culturalrights as a national minority.

22 Accord 17

Gegham Baghdasarian is one of the

founders and the current director of

the Stepanakert Press Club, and

editor of the independent newspaper

Demo. In 1992-93 he ran the press

service of the Nagorny Karabakh

Supreme Soviet, and now also serves

as a member of parliament of the

Nagorno-Karabakh Republic.

A monument near Stepanakert, nicknamedTatik Papik (Grandfather and Grandmother)

and seen as a symbol of Karabakh.

Source: Laurence Broers

Azerbaijan’s rejection of direct contacts with the NKRauthorities, boycott of all processes concerning the NKRand attempt to cast Armenia in the role of aggressor areseen in Stepanakert as unconstructive and intransigent.The attempt to isolate Karabakh and create an economicand humanitarian crisis for its population flouts therights of the Karabakh Armenians and is seen as an effortto force them out of their homeland. The Stepanakertauthorities believe that the negotiations process canonly become effective once the NKR has been properlyincorporated into it; after all, it is the Karabakh authoritiesthat are in a position to make decisions on issues of keyinterest to Azerbaijan, such as territory and refugees. For the Karabakh Armenians, the absence of a soberassessment of the current situation on the part ofAzerbaijan is the key barrier to progress in resolving the conflict. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’spronouncement that adherence to non-violent methodsof resolution is the maximum compromise thatAzerbaijan can undertake merely reinforces this view.

Yerevan-Stepanakert relationsIt is not just Azerbaijan but Armenia that poses problemsfor the NKR’s hopes of securing participation in thepeace process. Stepanakert diplomatically states thatmeetings between the Armenian and Azerbaijanipresidents are viewed with “the necessaryunderstanding”. However, dissatisfaction with the currentformat is easy to discern in these statements, and inNagorny Karabakh displeasure at exclusion from thepeace process is increasingly vocal. Many find Armenia’seffective monopolization of the right to resolve theconflict unacceptable, and there are increasing calls forArmenia to assume no responsibilities other thanguaranteeing the security of Karabakh Armenians. Thishas contributed to increased debate on the respective

rights and obligations of the two Armenian states in theresolution of the Karabakh conflict.

For Karabakh Armenians the question of status isparamount. The ‘step-by-step’ proposal of theOrganization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’sMinsk Group was rejected in Karabakh precisely becauseit proposed to delay the resolution of the status issue.Nonetheless there are differences of position withinKarabakh; according to public opinion surveys thepopulation is split between those favouring union with Armenia and a narrow majority that favoursindependence. Either way, the apparent non-participation of the NKR authorities in what are clearlytheir own affairs is increasingly incomprehensible toKarabakh Armenian society.

Both government and society in Armenia look upon theprospect of the NKR’s independence with scepticism,favouring instead a unified Armenian state. That theArmenian state plays a determining role in the politicalfortunes of the Karabakh political elite plays no small rolein this perception. Yet the relationship works two ways:since the war ‘the Karabakh factor’ has been adetermining one in internal Armenian politics, a realitythat neither government nor society in Armenia canignore. This intricate relationship – the influence of theArmenian state over the Karabakh authorities and thedecisive nature of the Karabakh factor in internalArmenian politics – forms a Gordian knot so far resistantto unravelling, and which contributes to the impasse inwhich we find ourselves.

Societies or elites?How can we move on from this impasse? It is oftenclaimed that while elites are ready for compromise,

23A Karabakh Armenian perspective

societies are not. This is misleading: one of the keyshortcomings of the Karabakh peace process has beenthe underestimation of the role of societies in conflictand the role played by elites in ensuring that societiesare not ready for compromise. In the current context, theestablishment of mutual contacts between the twosocieties (those of the NKR and Azerbaijan) is especiallyimportant for the confidence-building needed forprogress in the peace process.

Mediators have all but ignored this highly significantaspect of the task they face. It is, however, gratifying toobserve a more serious approach to this issue in thesocieties themselves. Murad Petrosian, Karabakhpolitician and editor of the newspaper What is to bedone? has observed:

“ If the construction of peace begins…withoutfundamental changes in public consciousness,then this edifice – even if replete with a roof –sooner or later will share the fate of thePalestinian peace. … The key to real peace for Armenians lies not in the ruling elite ofAzerbaijan but in Azerbaijani publicconsciousness; likewise for Azerbaijanis, the keylies in the public consciousness of Armenians.”

Outwardly it appears that Azerbaijani society is not readyfor conciliation, but this reflects the position of theAzerbaijani political establishment rather than publicopinion. A few years ago I was part of a group ofKarabakh Armenian journalists visiting Baku and weencountered more constructive views amongAzerbaijanis. The atmosphere surrounding our visit was very tense, as the newspaper headlines from the day of our arrival attest: “Armenian terrorists in Baku”. We nonetheless asked if it could be arranged for us tomeet some ordinary citizens, and after long deliberationsour security escort agreed that we could venture out into a crowded street in central Baku and talk with thefirst passers-by we encountered. Nine out of the ten wespoke to received us cordially, speaking calmly about the conflict and their problems. Only one of the tenthreatened us with vengeance.

The media can play an enormous role in objectivelyportraying the Karabakh conflict and peace process, and in rejecting ‘enemy’ stereotypes. However, whilegovernments have it within their power to influencepublic opinion and to prepare the ground for inevitablecompromises, they fear that a developing civil societyand media could empower ‘underground’ (i.e. real)public opinion vis-à-vis the political establishment. Thus elites maintain a propaganda war, most graphicallyillustrated by media approaches in Azerbaijan. Leadingmedia, especially television, are government-controlled(as they are in Armenia) and project the ruling elite’s

views masquerading as public opinion. In Armenia andKarabakh the media have until recently resisted thepropaganda war, although certain symptoms haveappeared suggesting that the Armenian media havetaken up the challenge. This was evident in the reactionsof some Armenian media to the brutal murder of anArmenian officer by an Azerbaijani counterpart inBudapest, Hungary, in 2004, leading some to claim the‘genetic incompatibility’ of the two peoples. Nothing has changed in the Karabakh media, yet the authoritiesreproach journalists for their ‘pacifist’ leanings at a timewhen Azerbaijani journalists are banging the war drum.

Paths to political developmentThe way out of the current impasse lies along the path of democratization, a factor long underestimated inmediation efforts. Events in Georgia, Ukraine andKyrgyzstan have demonstrated the revolutionary potentialof post-Soviet societies; however, a more evolutionary pathof development without serious upheaval is far preferablein unrecognized states like Karabakh.

After the opposition’s success in the 2004 local elections,it prepared itself to strengthen this achievement in theparliamentary elections of June 2005 in NagornyKarabakh. However, a historic opportunity was lost andthe opposition suffered a crushing defeat. While theopposition was critical of the election, especially theexcessive use of administrative resources by theauthorities, the overwhelming majority of foreignobservers (of which there were approximately 130)praised the elections, asserting that they were of higherquality than analogous elections in Armenia andAzerbaijan. The absence of mass falsification and publicdisturbances up to and after the election played a keyrole in this assessment. Many in Karabakh reject thecomparison with Armenia or Azerbaijan, preferring toevaluate the recent elections against internationalstandards and the experience of developed Westernstates, by which measure there is concern thatKarabakh’s political evolution may be stagnating.

The key issue for the peace process is whether theelections influence the resolution of the conflict and towhat extent the two issues are interconnected. ManyKarabakh Armenians look upon democracy as a meansof survival and of protecting their rights. However,democratization also allows for more direct public access to the peace process. At present Karabakh societyis poorly informed about the peace process and remotefrom discussions about it. It is only through democratictransformation that Karabakh society can become moreaware of the concrete details of different peaceproposals, better placed to articulate its concerns and,most importantly, establish a civic dialogue withAzerbaijani society beyond narrow elite circles.

24 Accord 17

A KarabakhAzeriperspective

Tabib Huseynov

Peace talks to resolve the conflict over NagornyKarabakh have been under way for more than a decade with virtually no tangible progress.

Locked in a wearisome ‘no war, no peace’ situation,both Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as the KarabakhArmenian authorities, have effectively adopted ‘waitand see’ approaches. The Karabakh Azeris stand out asthe most obvious losers from the protraction of thecurrent status quo. Many Karabakh Azeris believe thestatus quo harms their interests by increasinglydepriving them of the opportunity to influencedecisions directly affecting them and diminishing their chances of returning to their homeland.

Problems of definitionIn Azerbaijan the term ‘Karabakh Azeris’ used to refer tothe population of the wider historical Karabakh region,which included the area of Nagorny Karabakh alongwith the Lachin and Kelbajar districts (together formingwhat Azeris refer to as ‘upland’ or ‘mountainousKarabakh’) and the adjacent lowland territories(‘lowland Karabakh’). Unlike Armenians, Azerishistorically did not differentiate between the lowlandand mountainous parts and perceived Karabakh as asingle geographical, economic and cultural space,where they have always been politically anddemographically dominant. For this reason, manyAzeris believe the creation of the autonomous region of Nagorny Karabakh in 1923 within ‘artificial’ (i.e. previously non-existent) borders, was aimed atsecuring an Armenian majority region withinAzerbaijan as part of the Soviet/Russian policy of divideand rule. Thus Armenians were perceived as a majortool for keeping Azerbaijan under constant control.

Official Azerbaijani policy now defines the KarabakhAzeri community as the Azeri population of the formerNagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO), whichaccording to the 1989 population census constituted21.5 per cent of the population of the NKAO(approximately 40,000 people). By this definition, the Karabakh Azeris constitute a small part of the600,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) from theoccupied territories.

However, this official definition is rather ambiguousbecause Azerbaijan itself rescinded the autonomousstatus of Nagorny Karabakh in late 1991 (in retaliationfor the self-proclamation of the Armenian ‘Nagorno-Karabakh Republic’) and changed the administrativedivision of the territory, allocating some parts of theformer NKAO to the adjacent Kelbajar, Aghdam andTerter districts. Azeris living in these adjacent districtsno longer fell within the official definition of theKarabakh Azeri community, which was reduced tovirtually the population of Shusha, where over 70 percent of the Azeris of NKAO lived before the conflict.

25A Karabakh Azeri perspective

Tabib Huseynov works for the

International Republican Institute

in Baku. A graduate of the Central

European University, he has

participated in a number of

dialogue and academic meetings

related to Nagorny Karabakh.

Most importantly, this definition excludes thepopulation of Lachin (approximately 60,000 people),even though throughout the negotiations the issue ofthe future status of Lachin has been inextricably linkedwith the future status of Nagorny Karabakh.

Political marginalization At a domestic level, the problems of the Karabakh Azericommunity are indivisible from the wider IDP communityof Azerbaijan of which it is part. Azerbaijan has one ofthe world’s largest per capita IDP populations in theworld, yet the influence of the IDPs on Azerbaijanipolitics is minimal. This situation stems from their poororganization, as well as their socio-economic conditionsand the political restraints placed on them by the state.For example, in all elections since 1995 IDP voting andregistration has not been transparent to monitoring,throwing into question the validity and accuracy ofelections among these communities. The authoritieshave also kept significant parts of the IDP communityliving in temporary shelters and refugee camps invirtual segregation from the rest of the population.Access to these camps by the opposition, mediarepresentatives and civil rights activists has beenseverely restricted.

IDPs have been further deprived of institutions of self-governance. To date the only governing structures theIDPs possess are appointed ‘executive authorities in exile’,which function only nominally and deal mostly with the distribution of social allowances. The Azerbaijaniauthorities have also effectively denied the KarabakhAzeris the right to elect a community leader torepresent them in the negotiations. Instead, thepresidential appointee heading the Shusha ‘ExecutiveAuthority in Exile’, Nizami Bahmanov, has played thisrole since 1992.

This context, combined with growing frustration overthe lack of progress in negotiations and feelings ofabandonment, creates favourable conditions forradicalism and calls for a military solution. Such trendsare reinforced by the dominant nationalist discoursesportraying the conflict in terms of an Armenian-perpetrated ‘genocide’ against the Azeris, aimed at

territorial expansion and the creation of a ‘GreaterArmenia’. In a sense, Azerbaijani society is experiencingtrends in public consciousness – similar to thoseexperienced earlier in Armenian society – stemmingfrom a ‘defeat complex’, unachieved national aspirationsand the perceived ‘victimization’ of the nation.

Of those few non-governmental organizations existingto represent IDP interests the most prominent is theKarabakh Liberation Organization (KLO), which criticizesthe “capitulatory” position of the government, “doublestandards” of the international organizations and callsfor a military solution to the conflict. However, the KLO’spopular slogan, “No Azerbaijan without Karabakh!”conveys the concern of many Azerbaijanis that the lossof Karabakh signifies the disintegration of the countryand the disappearance of the Azeri nation as a whole.Even though the Karabakh Azeri community is weakand disorganized, it has the potential to become apowerful destabilizing force in Azerbaijan tomorrow if its interests are ignored today.

Marginalization from the peace processKarabakh Azeris (along with the Karabakh Armenians)were recognized as constituting an “interested party” to the conflict in 1992 under the Minsk Group mandate,which mentions “elected and other representatives ofNagorno-Karabakh”. However, in practice, the KarabakhAzeri community has been largely dissociated from thenegotiations, mostly because of the respective policiesof Azerbaijan and Armenia as well as the internationalorganizations. Whether referring to an intrastate orinterstate conflict, both Armenian and Azerbaijaniapproaches ignore the existence of a separateKarabakh Azeri community and therefore overlook theinter-communal dimension of the conflict between theArmenians and Azeris of Karabakh.

As the Karabakh Azeris could not participate in directtalks, their interests have been largely ignoredthroughout the negotiation process. The so-called ‘landfor peace’ approach or one of its variants, the ‘5+1+1’formula often referred to during the negotiations,envisages the return of five occupied Azerbaijaniterritories adjacent to Nagorny Karabakh and then the

26 Accord 17

conditional return of Kelbajar and Lachin. The fact thatthe Armenian side is using the occupied territoriesoutside Nagorny Karabakh as a bargaining chip to secureconcessions on Nagorny Karabakh’s independence or itsunification with Armenia directly jeopardizes the interestsof the Karabakh Azeri community.

Safe and dignified returnThe primary concern of the Karabakh Azeris is a safeand dignified return to their homeland. As far as theyare concerned, any peace document signed betweenthe Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents shouldinclude provisions on the future status of the KarabakhAzeris within Nagorny Karabakh, and hence the futurestatus of Shusha and Lachin. Shusha is the cornerstoneof the Karabakh Azeris’ identity and existence, and theirattitude to any peace proposal depends directly on howthis proposal allows them to return there in safety anddignity. Shusha was the only one of the five provinces inthe former NKAO with an overwhelming Azeri majority(91 per cent) before the conflict and also has a greatsymbolic meaning for the Azeris, being a historicalcentre of Karabakh and home to many prominent Azeri cultural figures.

Whereas the Azerbaijan government currently seems to be mostly preoccupied with the return of theAzerbaijani provinces adjacent to Nagorny Karabakh,the Karabakh Azeris cannot envisage the return ofadjacent territories without the return of Shusha.Throughout the negotiations the Armenian side hastried to link the return of the Karabakh Azeris to Shushawith the issue of return of Armenians to other parts ofAzerbaijan outside of Nagorny Karabakh. However, theKarabakh Azeris believe such a formulation is false anda pretext for denying their right to return, because thequestion of repatriation of Armenian refugees fromparts of Azerbaijan outside of Nagorny Karabakh shouldbe dealt with in parallel with the recognition of a similarright for Azeri refugees from Armenia.

One of the gravest concerns of the Karabakh Azericommunity today is active resettlement of the occupiedterritories by the Armenian authorities. Thus, accordingto the ‘official’ programme adopted by the KarabakhArmenian authorities, the population of NagornyKarabakh would be increased twofold from under150,000 in early 1990s to 300,000 by 2010. These illegalresettlements and fait accompli mindset may significantlycomplicate the peace process and in the long term maybecome a major obstacle to conflict resolution.

Not a “new minority”The Armenian side constantly refers to the KarabakhArmenians’ right to self-determination, which theywant to realize in the form of secession. Azerbaijan

always counters with the principles of territorialintegrity and inviolability of the international borders.However, this alleged self-determination versus territorialintegrity dispute surprisingly overlooks the fact that theKarabakh Azeris also have the right to self-determination;moreover, the rights to self-determination of eitherKarabakh Armenians or Karabakh Azeris do notnecessarily imply a right to secession.

The Karabakh Azeris are determined not to accept asolution putting them in an inferior position in relationto their Karabakh Armenian counterparts. The KarabakhArmenians have repeatedly declared that they do notwant to be treated as a minority within Azerbaijan,arguing for non-hierarchical relationships between the Azerbaijani state and the Karabakh Armenianauthorities. Similarly, the Karabakh Azeris do not want a settlement that makes them a ‘new minority’ withinan Armenian-dominated Nagorny Karabakh. ManyKarabakh Azeris would not return to their homes inKarabakh if placed under the jurisdiction of their formerfoes and not provided with parallel security guaranteesand a degree of self-government similar to thoseprovided for the Karabakh Armenians.

ConclusionUnfortunately, the dominant discourses in bothArmenian and Azeri societies and media have largelyignored the problems and concerns of the oppositeside. The solution to the conflict requires fundamentalshifts in the approaches and policies adopted by bothArmenian and Azerbaijani parties to the conflict. Itrequires a new look at the traditional notions ofsovereignty, self-determination, national and ethnicborders and majority-minority relationships. In thisregard, the European experience, particularly thepotential of the integrative model of the EuropeanUnion, can be very useful to consider.

There is no doubt that the solution lies in co-existenceand cooperation both between Armenia andAzerbaijan as well as between the Karabakh Armeniansand the Karabakh Azeris. Further progress in thenegotiations requires more active participation by bothArmenian and Azeri representatives of NagornyKarabakh. The international community should helppromote civil initiatives involving direct contacts notonly between Armenian and Azerbaijani representativesbut also between Karabakh Armenians and Azeris. Theexistence of the Karabakh problem is also a seriousimpediment to the development of democracy in bothAzerbaijan and Armenia. At the same time, decisions onpainful compromises need to be made by strong,democratic and legitimate governments.

27A Karabakh Azeri perspective

Two children, displaced from Karabakh, playin an abandoned oil field in Baku.

Source: Panos/Heidi Bradner

Divided family My name is Asmik Akopyan and I live in the village ofKarabulak. I am 68 years old and a pensioner. I went tomedical school as a young woman and in 1954 wassent to work in Shusha as a nurse. It was there that Imet a handsome young Azeri among my neighbours.Despite the fact that both his and my parents didn’tapprove of our meetings, we paid no heed andeventually married. We were blessed with a largefamily – I gave birth to two boys and two girls. Theywere clever, good-looking children, all of them wenton to higher education. I was very happy. But then in1988 the conflict began. I fell ill, and had to convalescein Ashkhabad in Turkmenistan. I couldn’t be treated inStepanakert because my husband was an Azeri and I

couldn’t go to Baku because I was Armenian. So myson-in-law took me to Ashkhabad, where he hadrelatives. It was there that I learned from the televisionthat Shusha was now under Armenian control and noAzeris remained in the town. I lost contact with myfamily, knowing only that my children had left forBaku. Then I learnt that my mother was ill, and Ithought I should go and look after her and wait forthis war to end. Thus I came to Karabulak in 1992, but I never expected this situation to go on for so long. I miss my children terribly, and live only for the hopethat we will see each other again. There is nothing I want more.

Basra In the 1980s I worked as a contract translator at anelectricity plant in Nasiriya, Iraq. This was at the height of the Iran-Iraq war and there were frequentbombardments from Iran. Soviet specialists were notpermitted to move about freely, but it fell to me to goonce a week from Nasiriya to Basra because theauthorities dealing with foreigners and visas werelocated there. There were a number of Soviet specialistsworking in Nasiriya, among them Azeris. I becamefriends with one of them, Abil Askerov. He had been inIraq longer than me, and as his contract was about toexpire he asked me to take him to Basra one time asgoods were cheaper there, and he wanted to buy somepresents before he left. This was not allowed, butnonetheless I agreed and off we went. We were walkingaround Basra when an artillery bombardment from Iran

suddenly started. Shells were exploding around us as we rushed to the car to get out of the danger zone.Suddenly a shell landed right near us. I had no time torealize what was happening as Abil pressed me upagainst a wall and covered my body with his own. Seeingthe shrapnel scars on the wall around us, we thankedGod we had survived. On the way back I asked him whyhe had protected me instead of running for cover. I willnever forget his words. He said “in that moment Ithought let fate have its way with me, but let nothinghappen to you, as it would be my fault if it did. And thenhow would I live with myself?” Later, after everything hadbegun, he called me in Yerevan asking me if there wasanything he could do to help, knowing the situation wewere in. After that we lost contact, though I would dearlylove to know where he is, how he is.

These personal stories from Armenia and Azerbaijan are drawn from the South Caucasus radio diaries project, which grew out of a

two-year pilot project run by Conciliation Resources with Georgian and Abkhaz journalists. Over 20 radio stations in the South Caucasus

now participate, broadcasting stories recorded by ordinary people and edited by local journalists.

28 Accord 17

Personal stories

29Personal stories

The nightingale of Shusha I will never forget an encounter I once had in Karabakh.It was the Bulbul [nightingale] Festival in Shusha, andwe decided to take a break from the programme. We had guests from Moscow and quickly organized an impromptu picnic by the Isa Bulagu spring, witheverything except alcohol as this was the time ofGorbachev’s anti-drink drive. Everything was fine exceptfor this lack of wine or spirits, and because of that thepicnic ended quite soon. I was in the process of leavingwhen I heard a mysterious, surprising voice. I took outmy dictaphone and walked up the hill, to the pointwhere the voice was coming from. There I found atypical Azerbaijani ensemble with traditionalinstruments - a tar and a kyamancha, both similar to alute. Next to them stood a tall woman holding a daftambourine. She didn’t seem to notice me and carriedon singing an Azeri folksong from the popular epic

‘Gachag Nyabi’. When she had finished she turned tome and asked me to stop recording. It was only thenthat I realized that she was totally blind. She then toldme about her singing career, how she had sung for thegreat Khanom Shushinsky to get into his academy inBaku. “He accepted me and proposed to take me toBaku. But then my brother Suren forbade me fromgoing”, she told me. Hearing the name Suren, Iunderstood that this woman was Armenian, althoughshe sang Azeri folksongs in flawless Azeri. Some timelater, after everything had happened in Karabakh, I triedto find out what had happened to this woman. I foundout that she had never left Shusha and that she stillsang Azeri folksongs on the hill above Isa Bulagu. Theyhad asked her to stop singing those songs, but shedidn’t listen and carried on as before.

My path I’ll tell my story. I was called up in 1992, at thebeginning of the year. It was very difficult – physically,morally. There were a lot of casualties. That was hard,when you’d sit and get talking with someone beforethe battle, you’d find out about his problems, try to helpout in some way and all that, then a few hours laterafter an artillery bombardment you’d find out thisperson had been killed. Our division went on theoffensive. I knew that even if we took these positions,these heights, we’d never be able to hold them. It was3,000 against 117 of us – that’s just overwhelming force.Yet we fulfilled our orders. And at the last minute, whenwe’d nearly finished everything, they wiped the floorwith us. A very powerful artillery barrage began, and Iwas injured in the head. I came to in a field hospital. Itlater became clear that I had lain there for two weeks. Iwas sent to Baku and installed in a hospital. One and a

half months I had to lie there. In February my wife andtwo children came to visit me. She didn’t have money tocome on the bus, she came by foot – seven kilometresthere and seven kilometres back, every day. Her bootswere all ripped, her feet cold and wet. She’d have onechild in a pushchair, one in her arms and a string bagwith food in it hanging off one of the pushchair handles.That’s how she looked after me, and that’s why I gotbetter so quickly. After leaving hospital I got myselfdischarged. Now I have a small workshop, where I makefurniture. It’s worked out well, people know of me and Imake ends meet. I get a lot out of life and I’ve raised mytwo children. But if I had to do things over again, Iwouldn’t change anything. Because when I was inmilitary training college, day and night they instilled inus three basic psychological concepts for men andcitizens – Honour, Courage and the Motherland.

The role of the OSCEan assessment of internationalmediation efforts

Volker Jacoby

“ It has to be a solution that works for thegovernment of Armenia and the government ofAzerbaijan, and the people of Armenia and thepeople of Azerbaijan.”Carey Cavanaugh, former US co-chair of the Minsk Group,commenting on talks in Key West, Florida, 2001

“ To underestimate the position of Karabakh is a major mistake.”Terhi Hakala, Roving Ambassador of Finland to the South Caucasus

The Conference on Security and Cooperation inEurope (CSCE) began to work on the NagornyKarabakh conflict in March 1992, soon after newly

independent Armenia and Azerbaijan had joined theorganization. This coincided with a unique historicalmoment in which the iron curtain had fallen and thereappeared to be mutual understanding among the CSCEparticipating states that cooperation was better thanconfrontation. In this euphoria, it appeared that theSoviet Union’s successor states, especially Russia, couldbe included in a world system of equals. The CSCE tookthe first steps to transform itself into the Organizationfor Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE – thename was changed only in December 1994) in anattempt to address issues of common interest in whatmay now appear a naive spirit of mutual trust andshared values prevailing over narrow national interests.

With its regional remit the CSCE appeared better placedthan the United Nations (UN) to deal with the Karabakhconflict, although Armenia and the Karabakh Armeniansfavoured the UN as a forum for resolution as its historical‘friends’ France and Russia were members of the SecurityCouncil. Azerbaijan, for the same reason, favoured theinvolvement of the CSCE, of which its biggest allyTurkey was a member. It was also the strong convictionof key state actors that a breakthrough was imminentthat led the CSCE to assume responsibility for mediationin the Karabakh conflict.

30 Accord 17

Volker Jacoby worked as Assistant to

the Personal Representative of the

OSCE Chairman-in-Office for the

Nagorny Karabakh conflict 1998-99.

In 1999 he completed a PhD on

the politics of Armenia, and from

1999-2004 held different positions

within the OSCE Mission to Georgia.

Presidents Heydar Aliyev and Robert Kocharian with thethree Minsk Group co-chairs and US Secretary of State

Colin Powell at the Key West talks, April 2001.

Source: Andy Newman/AFP/Getty Images

When the CSCE initiated what was to become the‘Minsk Process’, it was expected that a conferencewould be held in Minsk, Belarus, as early as spring 1992where the details of a peaceful settlement would bedetermined. The CSCE community believed that onlytechnical details would need to be clarified, thegroundwork having been worked out by a preparatorybody: the ‘Minsk Group’ of eleven CSCE countries.However, as ever more problems surfaced, thediplomatic preparatory body itself evolved into theforum for negotiations, and the Minsk conference was indefinitely postponed. The participating statesaccepted this makeshift arrangement without dissent.

Establishing a role: national versussupranational agendasBy 1994, the CSCE confronted a twofold task: firstly, tomediate, facilitate and support a peaceful settlement ofthe Nagorny Karabakh conflict, and secondly to negotiaterelations between its participating states and determinethe role of the CSCE and, specifically, of the Minsk Processwithin it. Particularly in the initial phases, frictionsbetween key CSCE players complicated both agendas.

Russia has played a dual role as member of the MinskGroup and as a dominant regional actor. Russia hasalways had its national objectives in its ‘near abroad’ (thefourteen formerly Soviet republics, now independentstates), not necessarily shared by other members of theMinsk Group. This contradiction manifested itself inRussia’s competing mediation efforts: it was Russia, andnot the Minsk Group, which brokered the May 1994ceasefire. The other CSCE participating states honoured this, but were reluctant to agree to sendingpeacekeeping forces. However, all parties to the conflict

agreed that multinational troops would be preferable to only Russian ones, and in December 1994 the now OSCE established a High Level Planning Group in Vienna, tasked with preparing the stationing of OSCEpeacekeeping forces in the conflict zone.

The US, at least from 1994, developed interests in theregion linked to the presence of oil in the Caspian basin and its agenda of diversifying oil production and transportation while circumventing Iran. Tensionsbetween Armenia and Turkey, a Minsk Group memberstate supporting Azerbaijan, mounted in the aftermathof the Armenian occupation of Kelbajar in March 1993:Turkey declared a blockade on Armenia and admittedto supporting Azerbaijan’s army with military hardware.

In mid-1993, the Swedish Minsk Group chair,responding to conflicts generated by the differentnational agendas, moved to limit the circle ofparticipants in the peace talks. Minsk Group playersseen as less important would be informed but wouldnot take part in the subsequent negotiations. After theceasefire Russia assumed a role as Minsk Group co-chairwith Sweden, and in 1997 a permanent ‘Troika’ of co-chairs, consisting of Russia, the US and France, wasformed. This was followed by an active period of shuttle diplomacy to find a resolution, hampered by the fact that Minsk Group co-chairs are less likely to act exclusively as individual mediators than asrepresentatives of their respective states. The only OSCE body in place on the ground is the PersonalRepresentative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, a post occupied since 1997 by Ambassador AndrzejKasprczyk of Poland. His mandate, however, does not include negotiations.

31The role of the OSCE: an assessment of international mediation efforts

The Minsk Process: issues, proposals and principlesOnce more stable working relationships had beenestablished within the Minsk Group its discussionsfocused on Nagorny Karabakh’s status and security, aswell as refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs)and the problem of the once Azerbaijani-dominatedKarabakh town of Shusha. Between 1997 and 2001 fouroptions, representing different methodologies ofresolution, were discussed. The first, referred to as the‘package solution’, favoured talking about all issues,including Karabakh’s final status, simultaneously toachieve the optimum balance. Given the number ofissues on the table, this approach would offer moreleeway for compromise. The package proposalpresented by the co-chairs in May-July 1997 consistedof two agendas: ‘Agreement I’ on ending the conflict,including troop withdrawals, deployment ofpeacekeepers, return of displaced persons and securityguarantees; and ‘Agreement II’ on Karabakh’s finalstatus. The agendas were separate, as the 1997 OSCEMinisterial Council reported, ‘to allow the parties tonegotiate and implement each at its own pace, butwith a clear understanding that at the end of the day alloutstanding issues will have to be resolved.’ Reactionsin Baku and Yerevan were encouraging, butStepanakert rejected it.

The so-called ‘step-by-step’ solution, proposed inSeptember 1997, was premised on sealing Agreement Ifirst before dealing with Agreement II, with the questionof the Lachin corridor linking Nagorny Karabakh withArmenia moved to Agreement II. Nagorny Karabakhwould continue to exist in its present form untilagreement on final status was reached, but would gaininternationally recognized ‘interim status’. In principlethe step-by-step solution would build a constructiveatmosphere in the early stages focused on militaryaspects, paving the road for negotiations on the more complex political issues.

However, the Karabakh Armenians were not ready toagree to make the first step by withdrawing from theoccupied regions of Azerbaijan. Stepanakert arguedthat this buffer zone was its main source of leverage,which could not be given up without agreement onwhat concrete security guarantees it would receive in return. Once again, the Karabakh Armeniansdemonstrated that despite the restricted statusaccorded to them in the negotiations, Stepanakertwielded significant power of veto over possiblesettlement options.

The ‘common state’ proposal, presented in November1998, proposed a vaguely defined common statebetween Azerbaijan and Nagorny Karabakh, featuringmore or less ‘horizontal’ relations between Baku and

Stepanakert. It was rejected by Azerbaijan on thegrounds of the violation of its territorial integrity and of the principles agreed by the OSCE at its summit inLisbon, December 1996, where Armenia had beenalone in rejecting a statement reiterating principles for a settlement stressing the territorial integrity ofAzerbaijan. Finally, President Robert Kocharian ofArmenia and President Heydar Aliyev of Azerbaijandiscussed a proposal based on an exchange of accessto territory in 2001, though this never got as far as anOSCE draft agreement. In the course of the domesticdebates launched only after the talks, Aliyev reported(and Kocharian denied) that it had involved Armeniasurrendering access to a strip of its southern district ofMeghri, offering Azerbaijan direct access to Nakhichevan,in return for accepting Armenian control over theLachin corridor connecting Karabakh with Armenia.

None of the proposals could bring the sides close toagreement on status by reconciling the needs of self-determination with territorial integrity to the liking ofall parties. Being founded on the Helsinki principles(named after the 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the CSCE),the OSCE stands for the inviolability of the frontiers ofits participating states. Although the principle ofterritorial integrity is stipulated with a view to interstateconflicts, how this aspect should be dealt withregarding intrastate conflicts is determined onlyimplicitly. The Final Act speaks of the right of peoples to self-determination “in conformity…with…territorialintegrity of States”. This convinces some authors of theOSCE’s inability to be neutral. The Helsinki principles,however, stipulate one important aspect: any decisionto alter frontiers must take place ‘by peaceful meansand by agreement’. Hence there is no contradictionbetween accepting the inviolability of frontiers andbeing neutral at the same time, provided any agreementreached is acceptable to the parties to the conflict.

Preconditions for compromiseAzerbaijan perceives the OSCE as an ‘internationalexecutor’ that should help it regain at the negotiationtable the territorial integrity it lost on the battlefield.This problem has become clearly visible in thediscussions around whether Nagorny Karabakh shouldbe accepted as a party to the conflict; at present it isonly as an ‘interested party’ with lower negotiatingstatus in the OSCE process than Armenia andAzerbaijan. Within the Minsk Group it was widelybelieved that Yerevan would have enough influence inStepanakert to secure the Karabakh Armenians’compliance with any peace deal reached, therebyobviating the need for their separate and equalrepresentation in the peace process. This has turnedout to be a crucial error. On the other hand, elevatingNagorny Karabakh to the status of equal party inthe negotiations process is not palatable for Azerbaijan.

32 Accord 17

The Minsk Group so far has not managed to bridge this gap.

The assumption that agreement can be effectivelynegotiated man-to-man between the presidents ofArmenia and Azerbaijan has also proved mistaken.Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosian was forced tostep down in 1998 by his own ministers after publiclyadvocating making concessions to Azerbaijan.President Heydar Aliyev came under intense pressure in 2001 when he returned home from talks withKocharian at Key West, and the results achieved in Key West vaporized in the face of domestic criticism.Commenting on what happened in Key West, FrenchMinsk Group co-chair Carey Cavanaugh commendedboth presidents for being “ahead of their population”.Yet Ter-Petrosian’s resignation and Aliyev’s rapidabandonment of compromise raise fundamentaldoubts regarding the sustainability of agreementsreached by leaders in isolation from their societies. If a strategy to involve the population including thepolitical opposition is absent, peacemaking is likely tofail. The converse argument that it was Ter-Petrosian’sattempt to include and inform the population that ledto his downfall is inaccurate. The 1997 press conferencewhere he appeared to attempt to do this was his firstpress conference in five years. It had been preceded bya long silence and no substantial attempts to get theArmenian population on board his peace project.

Room for peacebuilding?The activities of the Minsk Process since its inceptionhave been almost exclusively focused on peacemaking– achieving an agreement rather than a comprehensivesolution or a change in attitudes. In contrast, the conceptof peacebuilding accepts the need to change attitudesin order to create an atmosphere in which anagreement is feasible as a first step towards acomprehensive solution. Exclusive reliance on politicalleaders exposes any deals they may strike to the risk ofrejection back home. The desirability of complementingpeacemaking with peacebuilding is underscored bythis need for more communication with the widersocieties, without which there can be no sense of publicownership of the peace process. As the Karabakh caseshows, no agreement is feasible without popular support.

The problem goes beyond questions of public relations,however, to touch upon fundamental concepts ofnational identity and interest. For example, amongArmenians the differing positions of Stepanakert andYerevan may in turn each differ from positionsoriginating in the Armenian diaspora. Yet conflictamong Armenians is itself a taboo in Armenian politicalculture, in which attempts are often made to excludeone or other view by labelling it as ‘betraying’ Armenian

national ideals. On the Azeri side, there is also acompelling argument for greater internal dialogueamong the different stakeholders, and in particular with the Azeri IDP community. A range of conciliationprocesses within and between all the different socialgroupings is required before a stable consensus can bereached at the leadership level. Here too there could bea role for the OSCE in supporting forums for conciliatorydiscussions and in encouraging the parties to theconflict to embark on processes of establishing asocietal consensus on what the ‘national interest’ onthe Karabakh issue actually is.

The OSCE has so far not taken up this issue nor workedwith the leaders to develop such a complementaryapproach. Though unprecedented for the OSCE, trackone diplomacy should be complemented by track twoand track three diplomacy undertaken by other actors inan integrated multi-track approach. Obviously, this wouldmean allowing direct contacts between Armenians andAzerbaijanis. Given the rejection of this idea in Azerbaijan,one possible focus of the Minsk Group could be toconvince the parties to agree on the complementarynature of peacemaking and peacebuilding. This wouldalso include accepting direct talks with the de factoauthorities in Stepanakert. Closely linked to that could bethe role of the Minsk Group in advocating the opening ofa direct road link (possibly under international control)across the line of contact, allowing internationalorganizations access to Nagorny Karabakh withoutviolating the de jure border of Azerbaijan.

The OSCE can only be as strong as its participatingstates allow it to be. Yet antagonisms between theinterests of OSCE participating states endure. TheOSCE’s experience of mediating in the Karabakhconflict shows there are no grounds to assume that anagglomeration of actors is stronger or more forward-thinking than its individual members. However,mediating in this conflict also poses the dilemma ofsimultaneous and gradual processes. One process is the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace process, another thedevelopment of OSCE capacity within the framework ofthe conflicting agendas of its participating states, whileintra-societal discussions comprise a third. This list isnot complete. The interconnectedness of all theseprocesses is evident, yet the conceptual and institutionalframeworks at hand to deal with such complex issuesare not sufficient. Peace processes elsewhereunderscore the importance of third parties maintainingclearly defined roles, and highlight the value ofcomplementary efforts between a range of differentstate and non-state actors in support of a multi-levelpeace process. The efforts and constraints of OSCEmediation symbolize the world we live in, and invite usto conceive a completely new, holistic style of politics.

33The role of the OSCE: an assessment of international mediation efforts

The elusive‘right formula’ atthe ‘right time’a historical analysis of theofficial peace process

Gerard J. Libaridian

In March 1992, with the accession of Armenia andAzerbaijan, the Conference for Security andCooperation in Europe (CSCE) adopted a ministerial

decision to mediate the Nagorny Karabakh conflict.Mediation by the CSCE (renamed the Organization forSecurity and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 1994)through its ‘Minsk Conference’ soon became the mainavenue for continued negotiations. Yet although thenegotiations have provided opportunities to test aseries of formulas that might still be useful in achievinga solution, the OSCE mediation has failed to bring asolution. Even the ceasefire of 1994, achieved throughtwo stages, was the result of unilateral Russian effortsand direct talks between the parties.

The Minsk Conference’s aim of convening an assemblywhere the status of Nagorny Karabakh would benegotiated was initially confounded by developmentson the battlefield. The conference intended for summer1992 never convened, and later in the year the MinskConference was reformulated as the Minsk Group andlater the ‘Minsk Process’. Continued military operationsconstantly shifted the ground from under Minsk Groupmediation: the Armenian occupation of successivedistricts throughout 1993 forced mediators tosubstitute proposals with “timetables” for dealing withthe consequences of military hostilities. To increaseefficiency, the Minsk Group started meeting withoutArmenia and Azerbaijan, whose veto power in thegroup would condemn any proposal before it was evenformulated. Subsequently even that group of ninestopped meeting. The co-chairs assumed fullresponsibilities for proposals and often did not eveninform the others of their actions. By the spring of 1999the co-chairs (Russia, the US and France) took a stepback and assumed a role supporting direct talksbetween the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan,more recently supported by talks between the foreign ministers.

34 Accord 17

From 1991 to 1997, Gerard Libaridian served

as adviser, and then senior adviser to the first

president of Armenia and was closely involved

in the Karabakh negotiations. He now

specializes in the Caucasus at the University

of Michigan’s History Department.

Presidents Heydar Aliyev (left) and Levon Ter-Petrosian (right)with Turkish President Suleyman Demirel in April 1997.

Source: Reuters

It is not possible to give a full account of the OSCEprocess’s weaknesses here. They included, among otherthings: the ambivalence of Nagorny Karabakh towardsa process in which its representatives participated onlyas an ‘interested party’ rather than full member;unstable leadership of the process in the early years;uneven levels of interest among key group members,whose attention often shifted to other internationalcrises, and their own self-interested dividedness andinability to exert concerted pressure on the conflictingparties; and the cumbersome nature of the process,involving eleven countries plus Nagorny Karabakhrepresentatives. In the absence of a determined effort,the Minsk Conference, conceived as arbitration,functioned for a while as a mediation process andended up as a facilitation mechanism.

Problems and responsibilities of partiesin conflictUltimately, though, the parties to the conflict areresponsible for any solution. A determined set ofconciliatory policies by the parties could haveovercome obstacles posed by the internationalizationof the conflict. Yet each side had ardently-heldhistorical, moral and legal justifications for their actions.It appeared to both sides that any concession, minor ormajor, symbolic or real, would endanger their security,sense of identity and survival. These beliefs becamepart of the political and nationalist discourse thatreplaced the ‘brotherhood’ of Soviet republics.Sometimes blinded by these strong beliefs, orcompromised by the fragile and fractured nature of the emerging political structures in their newlyindependent republics, the parties often miscalculated

their military, economic, political and diplomaticresources, or exaggerated their ability to impose theirwill on the other. This was particularly true of Azerbaijanin the early years of the conflict and Armenia after 1997.Azerbaijan was sure it could win militarily and ideallyexpel Armenians from the Nagorny KarabakhAutonomous Region (NKAO), but lost. The Armenianside believed military victory would compel theAzerbaijanis to make concessions they were not readyto make, given the international community’s supportfor the principle of territorial integrity. On at least onecritical occasion during the negotiations, each of theparties rejected proposals that would have satisfiedtheir needs, hoping for more and calculating that timewas on their side.

Moreover, all negotiations were confidential, if notsecret. The OSCE and the parties preferred not todisclose details of formulas and proposals until therewas agreement on a document. This approach left thepublic out of the process, casting a shadow of suspicionover all proposals, which became vulnerable todemagogic exploitation by opposition groups. Thecharge of ‘selling out’ was one not easily overcome bypolitically weak authorities. In an atmosphere filled withnationalistic rhetoric, authorities often failed to garnerpublic support for reasonable solutions, and foundthemselves blaming their ‘peoples’ for theirunreadiness for compromise.

Armenia and its dilemmasDifferences between the positions of the governmentsin Armenia and Nagorny Karabakh further complicatedthe process. Notwithstanding the fact that many

35The elusive ‘right formula’ at the ‘right time’

mediators expected Armenia to determine policies in both capitals, and Azerbaijan’s portrayal of suchdifferences as an Armenian ploy, Nagorny Karabakh’sdevelopment as a separate political entity produced apermanent tension between the authorities in Yerevanand Stepanakert. Having taken Armenia’s economic andmilitary support for granted, Nagorny Karabakh couldafford to be a single-issue government in its externalrelations, whereas Yerevan’s relations with itsneighbours and the world were necessarily more multi-dimensional. Just as its position on the conflictdetermined the scope and character of its relationswith the international community, so other dimensionslimited its options with regard to resolving the conflict.Where Yerevan was ready for compromises, Stepanakertwas able to resist and, more often than not, prevail,since Nagorny Karabakh’s struggle for extraction fromAzerbaijani suzerainty held a universal appeal forArmenians everywhere as historical vindication for a victimized nation.

Once the ceasefire was established and held, relationsbetween Yerevan and Stepanakert reflected theproblems of the peace process revolving around twosets of issues: first, substantive positions with regard to the three main problems: status, security, andconsequences of the conflict (including blockades,refugees and displaced persons); second, themethodology of a solution: should all three key issuesbe resolved in a ‘package deal’ or should the statusproblem, being the most difficult, be relegated to asecond stage agreement?

Armenia’s President Levon Ter-Petrosian had revised hisapproach to the Karabakh problem since leading theKarabakh Committee in 1988, when he had been anadvocate of reunification with Armenia. Under hispresidency the Armenian government’s approach wasto define the issue as the security of Nagorny Karabakhand its right to self-determination – not necessarilymeaning the internationally unpopular goals ofindependence or reunification with Armenia. Ter-Petrosian sought a compromise where the Armenianside would concede that Nagorny Karabakh would belegally part of Azerbaijan; in return Azerbaijan wouldagree to a status above the nominal autonomy that theNKAO had enjoyed until 1988, but a notch belowindependence. Further, Azerbaijan would lift theirblockades and provide strong security guaranteesincluding Armenian control of the Lachin corridor andArmenia’s right to defend the status and people of theterritory. It was also understood that as a result of anyagreement on Karabakh, Turkey would agree to anormalization of relations with Armenia. Thus, Ter-Petrosian refused to recognize the NKAO’s unilateraldeclaration of independence and hoped that Azerbaijanwould revise its goal of attaining complete control of

Karabakh through military victory and ethnic cleansing. Azerbaijan’s obstinacy on settling the status issue on itsown terms was mirrored by a similar insistence by theKarabakh authorities. With agreement on status stilldistant, the failure to make progress on a ‘package deal’was unacceptable for the Ter-Petrosian administration,which by 1993 pragmatically opted for the ‘step-by-step’approach. The rationale for this was that while Armeniacould survive the blockades, economic developmentwould be difficult if not impossible for as long asrelations with its neighbours were not normalized andrenewed fighting remained on the agenda. The ‘no war,no peace’ situation required substantial state resourcesto be devoted to war preparedness, diverting them fromother needs, such as economic or social reforms, orattracting much needed investment. The administrationdid not believe support from the diaspora sufficient tocounterbalance Azerbaijan’s advantages: the support of the international community (including Armenia’spresumed friends Russia and Iran) for Azerbaijan’sterritorial integrity, and oil as a financial resource andweapon of diplomacy.

Shying away from a policy that might imply territorialambitions, Ter-Petrosian’s focus was the continuedsecure and free existence of the Karabakh Armenianpopulation in their historic land. The basic formula for anegotiating strategy would be the return of territoriesfor peace. Nagorny Karabakh, on the other hand, byand large opted for a ‘territories for status’ formula,arguing that the occupied territories were the strongestcard it held to obtain its goal of a full “divorce” fromAzerbaijan, if not in favour of a union with Armenia, atleast independence from Azerbaijan. Baku, on the otherhand, believed that time and the combination of oildiplomacy and outside support for the principle ofterritorial integrity would ultimately deliver Karabakh.Thus the step-by-step approach was in essencerejected by both Nagorny Karabakh and Azerbaijan,and the negotiations became exercises in futility.

Missed opportunitiesNonetheless both package and step-by-stepapproaches could have been fruitful and came close tosuccess. Direct and confidential negotiations initiatedby Armenia between the personal and plenipotentiaryrepresentatives of Presidents Aliyev and Ter-Petrosianbetween December 1995 and November 1996 madeserious progress and could have culminated inresolving the status issue had Azerbaijan not decidedthat the concessions it made during the negotiationsmight not be warranted if it played its oil diplomacycard at the OSCE Lisbon Summit in December 1996.Aliyev believed that countries granted oil explorationconcessions by Azerbaijan could be induced to forceArmenia to accept Nagorny Karabakh as part of

36 Accord 17

Azerbaijan in return for vague promises of autonomyand security. The manoeuvre at the summit, vetoed by Armenia, destroyed the chance that the onlysubstantive negotiations on status until then mighthave reached a negotiated solution.

Some elements of the confidential negotiations were,nonetheless, incorporated in two successive MinskGroup ‘package deal’ proposals presented to theparties in May and July 1997. The leadership ofKarabakh rejected them outright, Azerbaijan wavered,while Armenia accepted them with serious reservationsas a basis for further negotiations.

The result was the Minsk Group proposal of September1997, which adopted the step-by-step approach. It leftthe question of status and the Lachin district to be dealtwith in the future but offered solutions to the questionsof occupied territories, blockades and refugees andproposed a peace treaty and normalization on thatbasis. Armenia and Azerbaijan accepted it with seriousreservations, but the Karabakh authorities and a fewpowerful members of Ter-Petrosian’s administrationrejected it, insisting on a package deal. This internalopposition led to Ter-Petrosian’s resignation, and theaccession of the former president of Nagorny Karabakh,Robert Kocharian to the Armenian presidency in April1998. In opposing the September 1997 proposal as abasis for negotiations, Kocharian and his allies believedthat the Armenian side was in a position to insist on apackage deal that could achieve independence or unitywith Armenia. They did not share Ter-Petrosian’s urgencyto resolve the conflict, ascribing less significance to theblockades’ effect on stalling economic development.Instead they blamed him for failing to fully utilize thediaspora or maximize the “spiritual” resources of thecountry, such as the general yearning for redress ofhistoric grievances, appeals to a common sense ofrighteousness deriving from those grievances, andpatriotic fervour transcending political differences.

Almost a year after the September 1997 offer, the MinskGroup offered another package deal document basedon the ‘common state’ formula considered in otherconflicts. The proposal reflected the principle of a‘horizontal’ relationship between Nagorny Karabakhand Azerbaijan instead of the vertical one implied inthe concept of autonomy. Armenia and NagornyKarabakh accepted it with some serious reservations;Azerbaijan reportedly accepted early in the drafting ofthe document, but ultimately rejected it. Beginning inApril 1999 the negotiations moved to the level of thepresidents, turning the Minsk Group co-chairs mainlyinto spectators. By the summer of 1999 the basis ofnegotiations had moved to what can best be describedas a land swap. Kocharian had demanded that NagornyKarabakh be annexed to Armenia and, in principle,

accepted Aliyev’s return demand for Azerbaijani controlof the Meghri district of southern Armenia thatseparates the exclave of Nakhichevan from Azerbaijan.This unlikely and widely unpopular formula began tounravel as Kocharian changed his position. He thenoffered passageway rights to Azerbaijan through or overMeghri in return for full sovereignty over the disputedterritory. Aliyev had had enough trouble selling theinitial exchange and was not in a position to accept therevised formula. A final attempt by the US to make theformula work at a meeting of the two presidents in 2000in Key West, Florida, failed to achieve any results.

Back to basics?Since 2003, negotiations have been conducted betweenthe foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan, withoccasional meetings between the two presidents.Azerbaijan has returned to a step-by-step approach,continuing to believe that time is on its side, especiallywith the completion of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oilexport pipeline. Armenia has reluctantly followed,although Yerevan would prefer that any first stageagreement make at least some reference to the way thestatus would be determined in the future. The Minsk co-chairs have not produced a proposal of their own sincethe Key West meeting and their participation seems tobe perfunctory. Content with a situation of no renewedhostilities, Russia, the US and France have had a long listof more imminent issues to deal with, while Stepanakerthas not participated in the bilateral discussions.

The passing of time has favoured none of the conflictparties. The more time passes, the more difficult it is to return occupied territories. Economic progress inArmenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorny Karabakh has not beenreflected in improved living standards for most. Contraryto Armenia’s expectations the international communityhas not approved the status quo, yet Azerbaijan has alsobeen disappointed with the same community’s refusal tocompel Armenian withdrawal, despite its formal positionand legal argument. Similarly, while the diaspora hascontinued its political and economic support of Armenia,it has not made much of an impact on the position of themajor powers and has increasingly focused its attentionon genocide recognition.

Ultimately, a negotiated solution depends on threefactors: the degree of urgency felt by the parties to theconflict to reach a solution; sufficient political capitalheld by their leaders to sell a compromise solution topublics used to hard-line rhetoric; and the combinedand determined support of regional and internationalplayers to support such a solution. The two alternativesto a negotiated solution – a renewal of hostilities or asolution imposed through forceful action by the majorpowers – cannot be attractive to either party.

37The elusive ‘right formula’ at the ‘right time’

Obstacles toresolutionan Azerbaijani perspective

Tofik Zulfuqarov

Azerbaijan’s pursuit of international mediation bythe Conference for Security and Cooperation inEurope (CSCE) in the early 1990s was motivated

by a number of factors. It was hoped internationalinvolvement in the negotiations and implementation of agreements reached would forestall accusations ofpartiality or bias in Azerbaijan’s approach to resolvingthe problems underlying the conflict, while alsooffsetting the weakness of Azerbaijan’s military andadministrative resources in responding to Armenianaggression. Furthermore, it was hoped that the Westernpowers might offset Russia’s political and militarysupport for Armenia. The principles of the CSCEprivileged the preservation of the territorial integrity of participating states, while European experience and standards of autonomies could be used in thedevelopment of a model for the Armenian minority inAzerbaijan. Finally, the CSCE’s framework of ethical andmoral principles could potentially help put an end tothe ethnic cleansing of Azeris in the conflict zone (ahope that proved to be unfounded).

1992-1994: between the negotiatingtable and the battlefieldFollowing discussion at various levels, the CSCEMinisterial Council adopted a set of resolutions inMarch 1992, the main thrust of which was that allhostilities should cease immediately and the ground be prepared for talks on the future status of NagornyKarabakh. This decision formed the legal basis ormandate for a planned conference in Minsk, Belarus,due to open in May 1992 involving eleven CSCEparticipating states including Azerbaijan and Armenia.

The Azeri and Armenian communities of NagornyKarabakh were to participate in the conference as‘interested parties’. Azerbaijan agreed to this format on the understanding that although the KarabakhArmenians’ status in the negotiations could not andshould not equal that of Minsk Conference

38 Accord 17

Tofik Zulfuqarov served as foreign

minister of Azerbaijan 1998-99, and

as deputy foreign minister 1994-98.

He has participated extensively in

Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations,

and now serves as Azerbaijan’s

ambassador to Latvia.

Presidents Heydar Aliyev (left) and Robert Kocharian at an OSCE summit in 1999.

Source: Joyce Naltchayan/AFP/Getty Images

participating states, their active involvement was vital.This approach is still followed by Azerbaijani negotiatorstoday, despite claims by the Armenians and someinternational observers that Azerbaijan refuses to holdtalks with ‘Nagorny Karabakh’. This is nothing more than a propaganda tool to legitimize (already at thenegotiating phase) the Karabakh Armenians’ claim to independent statehood and the mono-ethniccomposition of Karabakh’s population achievedthrough ethnic cleansing.

In the first half of 1992 intensive clashes on thebattlefield continued alongside the CSCE’s initialmediation efforts. The success of Armenian armedforces in taking Shusha and the Lachin region andkilling the Azeri population of the town of Khojalyresulted in the total ethnic cleansing of Azeris fromNagorny Karabakh. These developments cut theground from underneath the ongoing talks, as theconsequences of the occupation of Shusha and Lachinbecame the priority issue for the Minsk Conference,demanding resolution before Nagorny Karabakh’sstatus could be decided. At the suggestion of USSecretary of State Warren Christopher, it was decided to hold pre-conference talks in Rome and a series ofextraordinary preparatory meetings. The mediators putforward the so-called ‘Calendar of Urgent Measures’outlining specific steps for the withdrawal of Armeniantroops from the Shusha and Lachin districts and thereturn of the Azeri population.

The approach taken in the period to 1996 by the CSCE(or OSCE after December 1994 when it metamorphosedfrom ‘Conference’ to ‘Organization’) was characterizedby the assumption that the status of Nagorny Karabakhcould only be discussed once the consequences ofmilitary action had been resolved and an internationalpeacekeeping force deployed in order to ensure the

safety of returnees. However, mediation efforts wereagain overtaken by events on the ground. Armeniasuccessfully exploited the political instability and 1993regime change in Azerbaijan to annex Azerbaijanidistricts around Nagorny Karabakh and cleanse them of their Azeri population. In the light of such events,negotiation efforts were hollow. It was not until theautumn-winter of 1993 that Armenian militaryexpansion finally met with some real resistance fromAzerbaijani forces. The intensity of the struggle andsignificant losses of human life and military hardwareserved to warn the Armenian leadership of the costs of its expansionist military strategy. Thus previouslyunsuccessful attempts of mediators to secure aceasefire agreement finally bore fruit in May 1994 as a result of Russia’s active intervention.

Around that time the conflict transformation processbegan to divide into two strands. One was concernedwith the structure and forms of internationalinvolvement, in particular the nature of andresponsibility for the international peacekeepingoperation and observer mission; the other focused on issues directly connected with the Armenian-Azericonflict and the proposals put forward to resolve it.

Competing mediator agendasMany Azerbaijani experts believe that Russia and theWestern powers see control of any Karabakhpeacekeeping operation as the key to overall influence in the region. The lack of a common standpoint betweenthe region’s would-be hegemons on this issue is one ofthe main obstacles to progress in the negotiations.

Until 1995, Russia attempted to establish a monopolyon the right to lead, mediate and control the peaceprocess, despite co-chairing the Minsk Group with

39Obstacles to resolution: an Azerbaijani perspective

Finland. From the perspective of Azerbaijaninegotiators discussion of the substantive issues wasless important to Russia than preserving a one-sidedframework for mediation. Mediator Vladimir Kazimirov’smain desire, it seemed, was to substitute thequadripartite negotiations format involving Armenia,Azerbaijan and the Nagorny Karabakh Armenians andAzeris as interested parties, with a tripartite formatinvolving Armenia, Azerbaijan and the Armenians ofNagorny Karabakh.

The second thrust of Russia’s interests was focused onimposing on the CSCE its ‘special role’ in controlling,staffing and implementing the peacekeeping operationin the conflict zone. Its proposed Commonwealth ofIndependent States (CIS) peacekeeping initiative wasperceived by Azerbaijan as a thin disguise for a plainlyRussian operation. Russia further sought the role ofguarantor of Nagorny Karabakh’s status, arguing thatthe draft agreement should contain an article assigningit that function. The Western states declined Russia’ssuggestions and adhered to Azerbaijan’s position thatonly a multinational operation conducted under theaegis of the CSCE could be considered.

These differences between the standpoints of Russiaand Armenia on the one hand, and Azerbaijan and theWest on the other, were at their most obvious in late1994, on the eve of the OSCE Budapest summit. Prior tothe summit Azerbaijani President Aliyev declined aninvitation from Russian President Boris Yeltsin to discussa Russian or CIS-led peacekeeping operation to beagreed at the forthcoming event. By the time of thesummit, the Western countries had already made theirdecision: the peacekeeping operation would be amultinational, OSCE-led initiative. This standpoint wasreflected in the summit’s special resolution. Russia’sformal consent contrasted with its fundamentalrejection of any such initiative, leading to a new tacticin Russian diplomatic efforts. This consisted of insistingupon a prior peace agreement between Armenia andAzerbaijan as a precondition for any subsequentpeacekeeping operation. Given the absence of such anagreement, the international peacekeeping operationcould not go forward. As the current state of ceasefireprevents the imposition of sanctions on Armenia, aswell as reducing any imperative to agree to peace, the‘no war, no peace’ situation has continued for the lasteleven years.

Resolution efforts: the ‘status forterritory’ impasseFrom 1996 Armenia began to adopt a harder line,insisting on the simultaneous resolution of NagornyKarabakh’s status and liberation of the occupiedterritories around Nagorny Karabakh. This positionessentially reflects the ‘status for territory’ formula: the

return of Azerbaijani territories occupied as aconsequence of war in return for determining NagornyKarabakh’s political status. This stance caused a radicalbreak in the approach taken by mediators since 1992,as well as fundamentally contradicting the letter andspirit of the UN Security Council resolutions.Unfortunately, the mediators failed to show thenecessary firmness, going along with this unconstructivesuggestion and taking the negotiations process intothe impasse in which it still finds itself today.

In March 1996, Swiss Foreign Minister Flavio Cotti andhis Russian counterpart Yevgeny Primakov discussedthe possibility of including points on the status ofNagorny Karabakh in the preliminary agreement.Following their meeting, positions defining NagornyKarabakh’s status in very broad terms became thesubject of negotiations within the Minsk Group. Itshould be noted that both Russia and the Westsupported the notion that any model consideredshould necessarily preserve the territorial integrity ofAzerbaijan. This united position was firmly backed byAzerbaijan and featured in the statement made by theacting president of the OSCE at the organization’sLisbon Summit in December 1996. The endorsement ofthis position in such an important document arousedArmenian indignation as it clearly demonstrated thatthe international community was not prepared to standby and watch Armenia annex Azerbaijani territory.

In early 1997, the Minsk Group came to be chaired byRussia, France and the United States. Azerbaijan hadactively lobbied for the inclusion of the United States inthe capacity of co-chair as a counterweight to Russiaand, in part, France, which is perceived as pro-Armenianby Azerbaijani society. Azerbaijan’s proposal forGermany’s inclusion was unfortunately not backed by Armenia.

In the year following the formation of the Minsk Group’stripartite co-chairmanship, the co-chairs put forwardtwo proposals for the settlement of the conflict, bothconsidered by Azerbaijan as acceptable starting-pointsfor further negotiations. While accepting the proposalsas a basis for renewed talks, Baku pointed out that byintroducing attempts to define the issue of status intodocuments dealing with the conditions for theliberation of the occupied territories around NagornyKarabakh, the mediators were leading the peaceprocess to stalemate.

The Armenian side declined both proposals, calling onthe co-chairs to develop a ‘package solution’ grantingNagorny Karabakh the status of an independent state,after which the liberation of part of the occupiedterritories around Nagorny Karabakh would be feasible.This led to a hiatus in the peace process until November1998, when the co-chairs put forward a third proposal

40 Accord 17

41Obstacles to resolution: an Azerbaijani perspective

based on an entirely new concept. On the whole closeto the first two proposals, the third further suggestedthe possibility of the creation of a ‘common state’.However, far from implying the integration of Karabakhinto Azerbaijan by means of some mechanism yet to bedefined, this document proposed the integration oftwo equal sovereign entities. The sometimes-reportedview that this proposal was initially greeted withenthusiasm in Azerbaijan is mistaken. The lack ofreaction among official sources in Azerbaijan was takenby some of our negotiating partners as a positive sign,but in reality any proposal that sought to predeterminea sovereign status for Karabakh was naturallyunacceptable to Azerbaijan.

The Minsk Group co-chairs then proposed directnegotiations between the presidents of Armenia andAzerbaijan. These meetings were intended to providean opportunity for the sides to develop a commonmodel for settlement. Although the meetings are stillbeing held today, this aim has not been met. Azerbaijanfeels that this is due to the stance adopted by Armenia,as declared by Robert Kocharian upon coming topower. The basic premises of this standpoint are that:the liberation of part of the territories around NagornyKarabakh is possible only after Azerbaijan’s agreementto the independence of Nagorny Karabakh; and theterritory situated between the administrative of theformer Nagorny Karabakh Autonomous Oblast andArmenia must be given to Armenia.

This strategy is clearly intended to reduce Azerbaijan tocapitulation, an outcome seen by the Armenian side asthe logical consequence of its own military victory.

The Charter of FourIn the light of these territorial demands, the so-called‘land swap’ proposal was developed. The parameterssurrounding this proposal were kept secret, and eventoday it is difficult to say precisely what the proposalinvolved or who authored it. Nevertheless, the author of this article resigned in protest from his post asforeign minister of Azerbaijan at the admissibility ofeven discussing such a project. The fragments ofinformation filtering through to the Azerbaijani publiccaused widespread protest, leading finally to thepublication of the so-called ‘Charter of Four’. Thisdocument was prepared and published by prominentcivic rather than political actors (this author, one of thefour behind the document, was no longer in publicoffice) and supported by hundreds of social andpolitical organizations. Outlining the approach theauthors felt the Azerbaijani government should pursuein attempting to resolve the Karabakh issue, itrepresented a kind of ‘mini-referendum’ on thegovernment’s Karabakh policy.

Its main points were:• the acceptability of the use of force, alongside

political methods, in order to resist aggression andrestore territorial integrity;

• the possibility of granting the entire NagornyKarabakh population – Azeri and Armenian – a widedegree of autonomy;

• the necessity of a phased approach to the resolutionof the conflict, whereby the status of NagornyKarabakh would be decided only after thesurrounding territories are liberated. Only after theliberation of these lands could the parameters andnorms for a model of broad autonomy of NagornyKarabakh within Azerbaijan be determined;

• the necessity of wide international involvement inthe process at all stages at the levels of negotiations,implementation of agreements and post-conflictrehabilitation.

The Azerbaijani government subsequently used theCharter of Four as ‘evidence’ of the Azerbaijani public’sunreadiness for compromise. Rather, the documentprovided an indication of the parameters of compromisepalatable to the Azerbaijani public, which Aliyev hadclearly exceeded in his negotiations with Kocharian.

ProspectsAliyev’s illness and death, and the change of leadershipin Azerbaijan slowed the process of conflict settlement.After Ilham Aliyev’s accession, the meetings betweenpresidents were resumed and supplemented bymeetings between the foreign ministers of the two countries.

In August 2005, the co-chairs proposed a new concept:interim status. Some of the territory around NagornyKarabakh could be liberated in exchange forrecognition of the de facto present-day situation inKarabakh until the final status of the region isdetermined through negotiations facilitated byinternational mediators. This proposal reflects anattempt to break out of the ‘package’ versus ‘step-by-step’ impasse in structuring peace proposals. As suchexpert opinion on both sides positively assesses the‘interim status’ model as a way of progressing from the‘package’ versus ‘step-by-step’ dichotomy thatcharacterized the late 1990s, but has now lost itscurrency. However, there are indications that Armeniannegotiators have attempted to include in the preliminaryagreement points predetermining the status of NagornyKarabakh as an independent state. This suggests thatYerevan is once again seeking to exchange liberation ofoccupied territories for independent status. Unless thisstrategy is abandoned, the talks have little chance ofsuccess and tensions arising from the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict will persist.

Self-regulatingceasefireOksana Antonenko

For more than a decade the ceasefire line, or line ofcontact (LOC), separating Azerbaijan and de factoArmenian-controlled Nagorny Karabakh, has been

observed by all parties without external peacekeepersor a permanent monitoring force. This self-regulatingaspect of the ceasefire line is unique to the Karabakhconflict. In other conflicts where no political settlementhas been reached, such as Kashmir or Cyprus, a third-party force (in these cases the United Nations) observesand sometimes enforces the ceasefire. In the formerSoviet Union, a joint peacekeeping force composed ofRussian, Georgian and North Ossetian units observesthe ceasefire in South Ossetia; in both Abkhazia andTransnistria Russian peacekeepers are deployed under a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) mandate.

Limited instances of ceasefire violations, low casualtylevels (around 200 dead and wounded) and noinstances of military escalation beyond the LOC testifyto the unprecedented success of this self-regulatingsystem. Some experts believe that the ceasefire hasbeen observed due to an existing military balancebetween the sides, assuring neither of military victoryshould a new confrontation occur. However, thequestion remains to what extent this system issustainable and effective in the long run without anyprogress towards the political settlement of the conflict.

The Russian mediated ceasefire between Armenia andAzerbaijan was drafted as an initiative of the CIS Inter-Parliamentary Assembly, Parliament of the KyrgyzRepublic, and the Federal Congress and Ministry ofForeign Affairs of the Russian Federation, and came into effect at midnight on 11-12 May 1994. However,mediators and parties to the conflict were unable toagree on the deployment of a peacekeeping force, themain obstacle being its composition. The Azerbaijaniside rejected any involvement of a Russian-ledpeacekeeping force, yet the Conference for Security andCooperation in Europe (CSCE later OSCE – Organizationfor Security and Cooperation in Europe) lacked amechanism to create a multinational peacekeepingforce, and in any case Western armies were preoccupiedwith Bosnia.

On 5-6 December 1994 the OSCE Summit in Budapestagreed in principle that a multinational peacekeeping

force should be sent to Nagorny Karabakh. According to the OSCE initiative, this force would consist of 3,000soldiers with no country providing more than 30 percent. Following the Budapest summit the OSCEestablished the High-Level Planning Group (HLPG)mandated to make recommendations regarding thedeployment of an OSCE peacekeeping force. However,the HLPG document made the deployment of thepeacekeeping force dependent on the successfulimplementation of the political settlement process.Without progress towards a political settlement nopeacekeeping force could be deployed.

In the absence of a permanently deployed force, OSCEmonitors carry out monitoring of the LOC throughregular visits. These visits are announced in advance andinvolve visits separately to both sides of the LOC fromAzerbaijan and from Armenia. In the past monitors alsomade symbolic crossings of the LOC after a corridor hadbeen de-mined by both sides. However, these crossingshave ceased after an incident involving a mine thatexploded. This system includes neither the permanentpresence of monitors nor any element of surprise. It alsodoes not incorporate any confidence-building measuresbetween the forces deployed on both sides of the LOC,between which no clear rules of engagement exist inthe absence of a political settlement. As a result boththe de facto authorities of Nagorny Karabakh and thegovernment of Azerbaijan maintain high levels ofmilitary presence at the line as well as a well-developedinfrastructure of trenches and other fortifications. Anumber of measures have been discussed, includingpossibilities for a direct ‘hotline’ of communicationbetween commanders, cooperation on pest controlwith benefits for both sides, and the exchange ofinformation regarding non-strategic minefields.

If a settlement is reached, the issue of deploying apeacekeeping force will again be raised in accordancewith OSCE decisions. Under these circumstancespeacekeeping forces will most likely be mandated notto observe the line of separation between the parties tothe conflict, but to promote safe movement of people,observe some disarmament and confidence-buildingmeasures and possibly to oversee the process of refugee return. However, the old disagreements remain regarding the composition and rules ofengagement of any future peacekeeping force. TheArmenian side supports the deployment of a Russian-led force along the LOC, while the Azerbaijani sidesupports the deployment of a bigger international force throughout the entire conflict area, with a muchbroader mandate including support for refugee return.In the meantime, however, making OSCE inspectionsmore intrusive and implementing minor confidence-building measures could help to make the system more effective.

42 Accord 17

Oksana Antonenko is the Programme Director for Russia and Eurasia at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London.

A last chancefor peace?Sabine Freizer

In the autumn of 2005 Azerbaijan and Armenia seemto be as close to peace as they have ever been. Butwill the negotiations fail once again? If they do

prospects for a resumption of large-scale combat aremuch more real than before. Burgeoning militaryexpenditures, increasing ceasefire violations, and thedemonization of the other side are all ominous signsthat the time for talks is running out.

Since May 2004 the Azerbaijani and Armenian foreignministers have met on eleven occasions in what hascome to be known as the Prague Process. The countries’presidents have expressed their support of the progressbeing made in their own tête-à-tête encounters. InAugust 2005 Minsk Group co-chairs apparentlypresented a one-page settlement strategy. If partiescontinue talks based on this discussion document, acomprehensive peace agreement may be ready in 2006.

The two sides are closer then ever before because they have accepted that any peace deal will beimplemented step by step. Nagorny Karabakh’sultimate status can only be resolved after the impact ofconfidence-building measures and security guaranteesare felt on the ground. Karabakh Armenian forcesbacked by Armenia will withdraw from all or most ofthe occupied territories. International peacekeepingforces will be deployed, internally displaced people will return to their pre-war homes and trade andcommunication links will be restored. Only after this –in ten, fifteen or twenty years – would the status ofNagorny Karabakh be determined after aninternationally sanctioned self-determination plebiscitewith the exclusive participation of Karabakh Armeniansand Azeris. Until then Nagorny Karabakh will remain de jure part of Azerbaijan, yet de facto independent.

This is not the first time that the negotiators appear tohave found a winning formula. After the April 2001 Key West talks the signing of a comprehensive peaceproposal also seemed possible. Yet the negotiationsground to a standstill. Former Minsk Group co-chairCarey Cavanaugh rationalized, “the presidents wereahead of their people,” to explain the failure, but a morepersuasive explanation would be that the gap betweenwhat the Armenian and Azerbaijani leadership wassaying in private and in public was too wide. Today

nothing has changed. While the Prague Process inches forward little is being done in Baku, Yerevan orStepanakert to prepare people for peace. Regionalleaders have for years strategized that tough talk boosts domestic ratings.

While there may have been little ethnic basis for thewar when it started, official propaganda has helpedensure the build up of mutual hatred. Both populationshave been psychologically prepared to begin anothercycle of fighting and killing. In Azerbaijan in particularover half a million internally displaced people fromNagorny Karabakh and the surrounding districts havebecome a strong pro-war constituency, some 84 percent calling for the use of force to resolve the conflict in a 2004 poll by the Baku Press Club.

Azerbaijan’s rocketing oil revenues are changing thesituation on the ground. In July 2005 AzerbaijaniPresident Ilham Aliyev announced an increase inmilitary spending from US$135 million in 2003, toUS$300 million in 2005. After Armenian officials statedthat they would respond in kind, Baku promised tospend US$600 million on the military in 2006. Armenia,which continues to suffer from exclusion from regionalprojects and a persistent blockade, cannot afford tomatch Azerbaijan’s expenditures. A new generation ofAzerbaijani officers trained in or by Turkey, and thecountry’s provision of troops to Anglo-American-ledoperations in Iraq and Afghanistan, have increased themilitary’s battle readiness. After over a decade ofneglect, the Azerbaijani army must still overcomeproblems of outdated weaponry, corruption, inefficientoperational planning, programming and budgetsystems, but a real willingness to reform to carry out a winning offensive can bring rapid change.

Azerbaijan’s threat to employ force to restore itsterritorial integrity is real. Armenian hardliners arguethat withdrawal from the security zone around NagornyKarabakh is suicide, yet continual occupation ofAzerbaijani territory while Baku is rapidly arming itselfonly provides justification for an Azerbaijani attack.

Withdrawal is the best security guarantee availabletoday to Stepanakert. Should Nagorny Karabakh forceswithdraw from the occupied districts and internationalpeacekeepers be deployed, Azerbaijan would be boundby an internationally recognized peace agreement notto resort to force. If it violates the agreement byattacking, it will undermine the very international linksit depends on for its newfound wealth as a producerand safe transit for oil and gas for years to come.

Both Baku and Yerevan have an interest to reach apeace settlement soon. Otherwise they will have fewlevers to stop the wheels of war.

43A last chance for peace?

Sabine Freizer is the Caucasus Project Director for the International Crisis Group.

44 Accord 17

Bridging dividescivil society peacebuildinginitiatives

Avaz Hasanov and Armine Ishkanian

Independent civil society groups and socialmovements emerged in Armenia and Azerbaijanonly in the last decade of Soviet rule. Following

the Soviet collapse, democracy promotion became a central part of Western aid programmes as civil society development came to be seen as critical fordemocratization and a successful transition. These efforts led to the phenomenal growth in the number ofnon-governmental organizations (NGOs). Attempts bycivil society actors to influence the Armenian-Azerbaijanipeace process have thus been simultaneous to theiremergence as a constituency for democratization acrosstheir respective societies. On a range of issues this hasoften pitted civil society against governments suspiciousand unaccustomed to autonomous initiatives and wary of the foreign funding that supports theseorganizations. Nonetheless, since 1994 civil societyinitiatives, often working in very difficult conditions,have addressed various issues including the protectionof human rights, the release of hostages and prisonersof war (POWs), the problems affecting refugees andinternally displaced persons (IDPs), and the need to find a peaceful solution to the conflict.

Current circumstances, including the controversialrenewal of the Aliyev regime in Azerbaijan,government-opposition confrontation in Armenia and the wave of ‘revolutions’ across the former SovietUnion, have worsened conditions for civil society whilesimultaneously creating new opportunities for it. While regimes are perhaps more reluctant than ever toloosen their monopoly on peacemaking, the need formovement in the peace process is creating openingsfor new forms of civic contact across the conflict divide.

Peacebuilding: possibilities and challenges A number of factors have limited the effectiveness andimpact of NGOs in Armenia and Azerbaijan: capacity,the political environment and the nature of thesocieties of which civil society itself forms part.

Avaz Hasanov is the director of the Society

for Humanitarian Research in Azerbaijan

and editor of their magazine, Human

Rights in Azerbaijan. He has participated

widely in dialogue meetings with

Armenian counterparts.

Armine Ishkanian is a lecturer at the

London School of Economics and Political

Science. She has published widely on

civil society, democracy-building,

development, gender and human rights

in Armenia and the former Soviet Union.

Human rights campaigners protest against violenceby the Armenian authorities, Yerevan, April 2004.

Source: Photolure/ITAR-TASS

45Bridging divides: civil society peacebuilding initiatives

Increased poverty in these countries has meant thatfew organizations are membership based andsupported, making NGOs dependent on foreign donorsfor the overwhelming majority of their funds. Thisallows politicians as well as journalists to question the motivations and aims of NGOs that work onpeacebuilding and conflict resolution. At the same time international involvement specifically targeted atconflict resolution efforts has been less forthcomingthan, for example, in neighbouring Georgia. This hasbeen in part a question of access, as Baku andStepanakert have not been able to agree on a commonmandate arrangement allowing international NGOs to have a mutually approved presence in NagornyKarabakh. The fact that most of the NGOs engaged inthis work are also quite small, with a limited scope ofoperations, compounds these problems: NGOs reach asmall segment of the population while the larger publicremains unaware of their work and cynical towards thevery notion of civil society. There is consequently alimited level of participation in the peace process and a very low sense of ownership of it.

Beyond issues of capacity, current political realitiesfurther circumscribe opportunities for NGOdevelopment. In 1999 President Heydar Aliyevannounced that “for as long as we have not signed apeace agreement with Armenia there is no need forcooperation between our NGOs and Armenians. WhenKocharian and I resolve the issue, it will inevitablyinvolve compromises with which many will disagree.Then let NGOs reconcile the two peoples”. In otherwords, NGOs are assigned the role not of active playersin the peace process but mitigators of public criticismdirected at their leaders. Activists on both sides

engaged in meetings with representatives of the otherside have faced reprisals, sometimes physical, on theirreturn home, creating an intimidating atmosphereintegral to governmental attempts to monopolize thenegotiations process. These conditions often demandconsiderable personal courage on the part of civilsociety actors in the everyday conduct of their work,and combined with competition over funds, have putconsiderable strain on personal relationships withinalready small NGO communities. Especially (but notonly) in Azerbaijan, personal conflicts and turf battleshave divided civil society and debilitated its capacity to present a united front.

The politicization of NGOs in the context ofgovernment-opposition struggles is also significant.Particularly since the civil society-driven ‘Rose’ and‘Orange’ revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine,governments in Armenia and Azerbaijan have regardedtheir own civil societies with renewed suspicion ascovert vehicles of opposition. A long-standing strategyfavoured by governments in addressing this threat hasbeen the proliferation of government-funded ‘front’organizations (or GONGOs – government-organizedNGOs). A recent term that has come to describeGONGOs in Armenian is grbanayin (‘pocket’) NGOs, a term used to describe NGOs seen as working for or ‘in the pocket’ of the authorities. In Azerbaijangovernment-controlled militant ‘quasi-NGOs’, such asthe Karabakh Liberation Organization, pose asexpressions of pluralism but serve as instruments ofintimidation. There has been very little in the way ofalliances between NGOs and political parties topromote civic peacebuilding initiatives, underlining the rift between ‘political society’ and civil society.

Yet the fact should not be underestimated that mostcivil society actors in Armenia and Azerbaijan, whilesharing commitments to non-violence and democracy,adhere to incompatible visions for the future ofNagorny Karabakh. Civil societies, after all, form part of – and emerge from – wider societies; with thosesocieties reproducing ever more antagonistic visions ofthe conflict and its future, it is unrealistic to expect thatcivil society actors should be close to one another intheir thinking. On both sides civic actors may activelycampaign for a non-violent and participatory peaceprocess and to mitigate excesses of enemy stereotypingobtaining in official propaganda. However, thisconsensus on method cannot be taken to imply aconvergence of their political goals in the resolution of the conflict. Assessments of civil society’s mediatorypotential must take this factor into consideration. Civicactors may have particular capacities to channel theconcerns of their own societies to the leadership, andto open up difficult or taboo subjects. Yet bridgingpolitical divides between societies, and addressing thecompeting visions of justice underlying them, arguablypresents a distinct set of challenges requiring theidentification and development of additional mediatorycapacities to dedicate to this task.

The projects and the organizations Local NGOs in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and NagornyKarabakh have organized and participated in dialoguesbetween the parties involved in the conflict, they haveworked for the release of POWs, organized youthcamps, and led civic education and conflict resolutiontraining programmes as well as skills trainingprogrammes for refugees and IDPs. The aim of theseactivities has been to keep the lines of communicationopen, to allow individuals from Armenia and Azerbaijanto meet, to combat processes of de-humanization andenemy stereotyping, and to foster social attitudes morereceptive to reconciliation and dialogue. One of the firstinitiatives, the 1991 Peace Caravan, organized by theHelsinki Citizens’ Assembly (HCA) chapters in Armenia,Azerbaijan and Georgia, provided the context forArmenian and Azeri civil society activists to meet on theAzerbaijani-Armenian border at Kazakh-Ijevan (referredto as the ‘peace corridor’) to discuss prospects for theresolution of the conflict and to issue a joint appeal forpeace. The HCA chapters in the Caucasus, which arepart of the larger HCA global network of organizations,also established ‘The Transcaucasus Dialogue’ in 1992to coordinate and support the work of the individualHCA chapters in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia andNagorny Karabakh as well as their regional cooperation.In 1992, Anahit Bayandour (Armenia) and ArzuAbdullayeva (Azerbaijan) were awarded the Olof PalmeMemorial Fund Peace Prize and in 1998 Abdullayevaalso received the ‘European Union and USGovernment’s Award for Democracy and Civil Society’.

Another successful initiative was a conference in 1995 held in Bonn, Germany, with the support of theOrganization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.The conference resulted in a series of agreedconfidence-building measures including the release ofhostages and POWs, and mutual visits by civil societyactivists, journalists, and students. In the following yearshundreds of hostages and POW exchanges took placeas part of the agreed confidence-building measures,but as Mary Kaldor and Mient Jan Faber argue, due topolitical circumstances and a lack of momentum thisprocess came to a standstill in the late 1990s. From thelate 1990s there have been various regional meetingsand initiatives. These include the 1998 Nalchik seminar,leading to the creation of the Caucasus Forum, one ofthe longest-lasting and most important forums for NGOcooperation, and the 2001 Tsakhkadzor conference,which created opportunities for civil society activists todiscuss pathways to peace. These meetings were anexample of local NGOs cooperating with internationalcounterparts, being facilitated by International Alert.One can also note the founding in 2001 of theCaucasian Refugee and IDP NGO Network (CRINGO),established in order to assist the displaced population.

More recently the Consortium Initiative, implementedby a coalition of international non-governmentalorganizations (INGOs) made up of Catholic ReliefServices, Conciliation Resources, International Alert, and the London Information Network on Conflicts and State-building (LINKS), has sought to bring a morecomprehensive approach. The Consortium Initiativerepresents a government-funded initiative (it is fundedby the United Kingdom government) aimed at a morestrategic approach of intersecting strands taking inpolitical and civil society dialogue, conflict-sensitivedevelopment and public awareness of the conflict andpeace process. It is also explicitly aimed at including allthe constituencies in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Karabakhand among displaced communities with a stake in theresolution of the conflict.

Regional approaches have frequently been necessarygiven the constraints imposed by authorities onmeetings with representatives of the other side in eachother’s countries. Although this has diluted the potentialfor direct Armenian-Azerbaijani dialogue by situatingcontacts within a regionalist agenda, it has at timesbeen the only way to incorporate Karabakh Armeniansdue to Baku’s reluctance hitherto to approve meetingsbetween Azeris and Karabakh Armenians in particular.It has also been one of the few means of fostering asense of pan-Caucasian commonality of interest in aregion riven by conflict, blockades and front lines.

In addition to NGOs, there are some smaller grassrootsorganizations comprised of refugees, the mothers orwives of soldiers, and families of hostages or POWs.

46 Accord 17

These organizations often work with NGOs and there is an increasing tendency for these organizations toinstitutionalize over time and to register as NGOsthemselves. Armenian diasporic communities,particularly those in the US, have lobbied for foreign aid and publicized the Armenian position. Althoughdiasporic NGOs and individuals from the US, Europe,and the Middle East have contributed to humanitarianaid and development initiatives since independence,there has been little in the way of cooperation with andsupport for local NGOs involved in peacebuilding andconflict resolution initiatives in Armenia. On thecontrary, some diasporic organizations, especiallynationalist political parties, have taken moreintransigent positions.

Women’s NGOs and networks A striking feature of NGOs in the former Soviet states isthe considerable number of women involved. Womenfrom Armenia and Azerbaijan have been workingtogether through NGOs as well as transnationaladvocacy networks to promote peacebuilding andconflict resolution. An example of women’s NGOs’collaborative efforts is the Transcaucasus Women’sDialogue, which was established in 1994 under theaegis of the National Peace Foundation in Washington,DC. From 1997-99, the Transcaucasus Women’sDialogue organized various projects involving theenvironment, democratic rights and education,including a three-year summer school at Tbilisi StateUniversity. Another women’s regional initiative was the‘Working Together – Networking Women in theCaucasus’ programme (1997 – 2002) sponsored by theInstitute for Democracy in Eastern Europe (IDEE) withfunding from the Bureau of Educational and CulturalAffairs of the US Department of State. ‘WorkingTogether’ was a programme for women leaders inArmenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia to promote greatercross-border networking. Through a range of training,civic education, NGO development and cross-bordernetworking activities, the IDEE programmes attemptedto enhance the leadership abilities and capacity ofwomen leaders and their NGOs, and to advancewomen’s participation in public life.

Mixed prospects The capacity of civil society to impinge upon theKarabakh peace process has always been subject tocycles of opportunity and constraint imposed byinternal political developments in Armenia andAzerbaijan. It may appear in the current period that civilsociety faces more constraints than opportunities, andin some senses prospects do not appear good. Theconflict is no closer to resolution, momentum is difficultto maintain, militant rhetoric is on the increase, and thereis a danger that individual activists and organizations will

become disillusioned by the lack of progress. Evenwhere they enjoy access, civil society actors do notappear to be able to influence politicians. Furthermore,rising oil revenues and the successful opening of theBTC pipeline suggest greater, rather than less,autonomy for the Azerbaijani state from society.

Against this somewhat bleak picture, there is no doubtthat since the ceasefire of 1994 NGOs have played a keyrole by maintaining dialogue, promoting a culture ofpeace and human rights, working toward the release ofPOWs, and facilitating the meeting of individuals fromthe parties to the conflict. Over the years NGOs havegained experience and developed new skills andcapacities leading even the most conservative circles ofgovernment to recognize the potential of civil society.On 14 June 2005 a statement issued by the AzerbaijaniMinistry of Foreign Affairs actively supported priorinternational calls for the establishment of directcontacts between the Karabakh Armenian and KarabakhAzeri communities. According to the statement, directinter-communal dialogue and associated confidence-building measures will contribute to creating theprerequisite conditions for normalizing relationsbetween Karabakh Armenians and returning Azeris.This represents an important opening for these twocore constituencies to establish a dialogue for the firsttime since the war. Another trend is the growth of civilsociety in Karabakh itself, a nascent phenomenontempering the influence of the military in KarabakhArmenian politics.

Looking to the future, the key priority for civil society is to act as a conduit for wider, more informedparticipation in the peace process. Broad-based publicawareness of and participation in the peace process isessential for the region to develop democratically and a mutually acceptable, sustainable solution to theconflict to be found. This requires civil society todevelop proposals on both substantive and proceduralissues for consideration by the negotiating parties. Italso demands outreach to marginalized communitiesand internal dialogue on painful, often taboo issues.The accession of both Armenia and Azerbaijan to theCouncil of Europe in June 2000, and their resultingobligation to resolve the Karabakh conflict by peacefulmeans, should serve to indicate to peacebuilders in theregion that they can count on the support of Europeanstructures such as the Council of Europe and theEuropean Union. This support will be crucial for civilsocieties; ultimately however, the challenge is toinclude disaffected populations in a meaningfuldialogue on options for peace, and to thereby instil in them a sense of ownership over the resulting peace process.

47Bridging divides: civil society peacebuilding initiatives

Betweenfreedom and taboomedia coverage of theKarabakh conflict

Mark Grigoryan and Shahin Rzayev

The Karabakh conflict provides a useful prismthrough which to examine the vicissitudes ofmedia freedom in post-Soviet Armenia and

Azerbaijan. In neither state have robust mediaindependent of the state or other political or businessinterests emerged. Although the conflict posed a majorchallenge to Soviet traditions of state-muzzled media,the post-ceasefire situation since 1994 has seen abacktracking trend towards media conformity withofficial positions. This is linked to a homogenization of political views dictated by positions of victory anddefeat respectively, and to the political economy of the post-Soviet information market. Current mediacoverage of the conflict tends to be nationalistic,although media in Armenia, which has more reason to be satisfied with the status quo, tends to be morereserved and ready to express preparedness to restoregood relations. In both countries, however, societies aredeprived of objective or full information on the contentand direction of the negotiations to resolve the conflict,an information deficit precluding any meaningfulpublic participation in the peace process.

The Soviet period (1988–1990)The birth of the movement in 1988 to bring NagornyKarabakh under Armenian control came at a time whenthe Soviet press was flourishing. Thanks to Soviet leaderMikhail Gorbachev’s reforms, previously censoredmaterials – archive documents, forbidden literary worksand critiques of Soviet policy – could now be madepublic in the Moscow press. This only applied to thepast, however. When it came to coverage of currentaffairs, the media offered comment and analysis frompositions put forward and approved by the Communistauthorities, rather than providing objective information.

Predictably enough, the Soviet media’s first response tothe mass demonstrations in Stepanakert and Yerevanwas profound silence. Subsequent events in Kafan inArmenia (the flight of Azeris) and Sumgait in Azerbaijan(anti-Armenian pogroms) received little or no mentionat all. Instead, the media resorted to the standarddidactic promotion of Soviet internationalism and the

48 Accord 17

Formerly a reporter for the newspaper

Istiglal, Shahin Rzayev has worked for the

Institute of War and Peace Reporting in

Azerbaijan since 1999.

Mark Grigoryan, a founder of the

Caucasus Media Institute in Yerevan,

moved to London after an attempt on his

life. He writes on journalism in the former

Soviet Union and has been involved in

training journalists from the region. He is

now a producer for the BBC World Service.

The widow of killed Azeri investigative journalist Elmar Huseynov and other mourners call on the government to speed up the investigation

into his murder and give more freedom to the press.

Source: Reuters/Rafail Shakirov

‘brotherhood of peoples’; the hundreds of thousands ofdemonstrators were labelled ‘a handful of nationalistsand extremists’, labels completely at odds with thejubilant mood of patriotic fervour sweeping throughArmenian society and indeed the reality it could seebefore its very eyes. Azerbaijani society was alsofrustrated by the lack of information: it was only knownthat ‘something was happening in and around Karabakh’.Throughout the summer and autumn of 1988, thepublic on both sides perceived the Moscow media, onwhich they depended in the absence of any localreporting on the conflict, as supporting the enemy.

The Soviet media’s attempts to conceal the seriousnessof the conflict contributed to a climate of rumour andspeculation conducive to escalation. They also forcedpopulations to seek alternative sources of information.Public rallies formed one: people even spoke about‘information meetings’. The alternative dissident press,known as samizdat, formed another. Samizdattraditionally reported facts never seen in the officialpress, but reached only a small audience. Samizdatpublications flourished at this time, printingnationalistic and anti-Soviet material that could not bepublished by official sources and was largely seen bythe public as ‘the truth’. By summer 1989, over tenperiodicals were coming out in Yerevan. The firstindependent newspaper to appear in Baku wasAzerbaydzhan, the organ of the Committee for People’sAid to Karabakh. Around that time, programmes suchas ‘Dalga’ (Wave), openly discussing the escalatingconflict, began to be shown on Azeri television.

In autumn 1989, the USSR adopted a law on the pressand abolished censorship. This inaugurated a period ofnew, openly non-Communist newspapers both

disseminating and reflecting emergent nationalistplatforms in their respective societies. Althoughrepresenting an alternative to official sources, theseoutlets (such as Hayk, published by the ArmenianNational Movement, and Azadlyg, published by thePopular Front of Azerbaijan) cannot be seen as thedevelopment of a genuinely free press. Rather, theyrepresented ‘counter-propaganda’, shaped by rejectionof Soviet stereotypes and labels and thus a discourse stillstructured by Soviet rules of the game. A battle had beenjoined in the media between the Soviet establishmentand nationalist constituencies for reform, but the termsof engagement were still defined by the regime.

Soviet collapse and conflict escalation The attainment of independence from the Soviet Unionin 1991 was followed by the emergence of newindependent papers in Armenia and Azerbaijan. InAzerbaijan many of these became extremely popular,notably Ayna, Zerkalo, Seher, 7 Giun and Aidynlyg.Azerbaijan’s first independent information agencyTuran appeared around that time, as did partynewspapers: Millet of Etibar Mamedov’s NationalIndependence Party; Istiglal of the Social DemocraticParty led by the Alizade brothers; and Yeni Musavat ofIsa Gambar’s Musavat party. Chingiz Mustafayevestablished an independent television studio 215 KL. As well as providing a more widely trusted source ofinformation the quality and timeliness of conflictreporting significantly increased. New independentpapers were also springing up in Armenia. Munetik,Vremya, Azg (the newspaper of the Ramkavar-Azatakanparty) and Yerkir (affiliated to the ArmenianRevolutionary Federation) began to gain popularity.

49Between freedom and taboo: media coverage of the Karabakh conflict

Many of these outlets enthusiastically projecteddiametrically opposed nationalist visions of the eventsunfolding in Karabakh. It was common in the Armenianmedia to portray Armenians as victims of Stalin’s policyand the Bolsheviks’ territorial agreement with Turkey, andmore recently of the Kremlin’s political short-sightednessand Turkey’s allegiance to Azerbaijan. Further, the mediaclaimed Azeris had responded to peaceful and lawfulArmenian demonstrations by subjecting Armeniancivilians living in Azerbaijan to terror, ethnic cleansingand mass deportation, including ‘Operation Ring’ fromApril 1991. Naturally, this stance was effective inenhancing images of ‘victim’ and ‘aggressor’.

Articles in the Azerbaijani media tended to contrastArmenian nationalist tendencies with the Azeri spirit of internationalism. Often written by members of theintelligentsia, they also dwelt on the ‘friends of theArmenians’ in the Kremlin, the corruption of Moscowjournalists, the information blockade of Azerbaijan,Armenian terrorist organizations such as the ArmenianSecret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) andthe mass deportation of Azeris from Armenia underStalin. The native population of Karabakh was said toconsist of assimilated Caucasian Albanians, withArmenians coming in to settle from Turkey during the Russian imperial period.

Full-scale war in KarabakhThe onset of full-scale war in Karabakh in 1992 providednew evidence of the power and potential of the newgeneration of journalists, a number of whom becamewar correspondents reporting from or near the frontline. Working far from centres of censorship and at atime of general political upheaval, war correspondentswere harder to control. The resulting divergencebetween official reports of events on the battlefield andthe eyewitness accounts and video coverage broadcastin independent sources contributed to the rise and fallof governments. Azerbaijani President Ayaz Mutalibov’sdismissal was in part due to revelations in independentsources regarding the numbers of Azeris killed atKhojaly in February 1992.

The significance of the media’s new-found power wasnot lost on those who acceded to power in part as aresult of its influence. The Popular Front of Azerbaijan,led by President Abulfaz Elchibey, that replacedMutalibov’s administration oversaw the rise of amultitude of new publications and private TV and radiocompanies; Elchibey’s administration also passed a newlaw on the media. This flourishing of the media wasexpedient for as long as it supported the regime. MostAzerbaijani media supported Elchibey, calling on Azeristo continue the fight for Karabakh until ‘victory wastheirs’. Dissenting voices were few – only the SocialDemocratic Party newspaper Istiglal contradicted the

hawkish chorus with an article entitled ‘Time to stop!’ atthe height of the Azerbaijani offensive in summer 1992after the capture of Mardakert/Agdere. This call wasignored by most media and the population at large, yet Istiglal proved right: the fleeting Azeri victories were soon followed by heavy losses. The onset of thestunning series of military defeats in 1993 was met witha media clampdown in Azerbaijan. On 2 April 1993, onthe eve of the Armenian occupation of the Kelbajardistrict, Elchibey issued a decree introducing militarycensorship. In the end the Popular Front governmentfell to a military coup rather than media revelations;military and political censorship nonetheless continuedfor another five years.

In spite of the conflict strong links between informationagencies of the two sides were forged during the war.Partnership was developed between the Azeri Turanand Armenian Snark (now Arminfo). The agenciesexchanged information throughout the entire war and continue to do so today.

Post-ceasefire developmentsIn the period of state building and consolidationfollowing the ceasefire of 1994 the media in bothcountries have undergone a transformative processreflecting new social and political realities. Forimpoverished populations television is by far the mostinfluential medium, which consequently attractsoverweening influence from both the state andbusiness interests with political ambitions (or at leastdesires to appease those in control of regulatorymechanisms). While there is a higher margin ofautonomy in the press, the influence of political groupsand wealthy individuals is also significant here. Leanresources, undeveloped distribution networks, self-censorship and in some cases harassment further limitthe potential for independent print journalism.

The post-ceasefire period has seen an overall decline ofinterest and coverage of the conflict, despite periodicpeaks related to specific events in the peace process. Inboth Azerbaijan and Armenia discourse on the peaceprocess in governmental and oppositional media haveconverged to express seemingly consensualunderstandings of ‘national interests’. A key implication is the wide observation of taboos on the nature andspecifics of concessions that could be made to the other side. These taboos are supported by ingrainedterminologies used to structure discourse on the conflict.In Azerbaijan, for instance, Armenia and Armenians areroutinely referred to as ‘aggressors’, while ArmenianForeign Minister Vartan Oskanian was forced to retreatbefore a media storm when he publicly referred to the‘occupied territories’, rather than the popular labels‘security zone’ or even ‘liberated territories’.

50 Accord 17

In Armenia, a consistent decline of interest towards theKarabakh problem over the post-ceasefire years reflectsthe public mood that the conflict is solved by de factoArmenian control over Karabakh. Even if public opinionalso considers concessions necessary to gain a peacefulresolution to the conflict, the specifics of Armenia’spossible concessions remain one of the most tabooedsubjects in the press. Few analytical articles are publishedon Nagorny Karabakh, and those that are usually dealwith the legal and political reasons for Karabakh’ssecession, Armenia’s historical right to Karabakh and the‘liberated territories’ (the seven neighbouring districts),or the might of the Armenian army.

By contrast Azerbaijani public opinion does not believe that the conflict is over, a view reflected andencouraged by the media. The possibility of a militarysolution features increasingly frequently, occasionallyspilling over into blatant war propaganda. For instance,ANS, the leading private Azerbaijani TV and radiocompany, opens its daily news programmes with thewords ‘Armenia’s aggression towards Azerbaijancontinues’. ANS presenters refer to the conflict as the‘first Karabakh war’, thereby clearly preparing viewersfor a second. In the state-controlled Azerbaijani media,‘pro-Armenian tendencies’ and ‘cooperation withArmenians’ are negative labels regularly used incampaigns to discredit opposition parties andindependent NGOs. Human rights activists andjournalists who meet and communicate with Armeniancolleagues are ostracized.

Media in Azerbaijan have also had to contend with adramatically deteriorating political climate since 2002.Regulatory mechanisms have multiplied, financialpressure has increased and non-conformist media havefaced increasing persecution, culminating in themurder in March 2005 of journalist Elmar Huseynov,editor of what was widely seen as Azerbaijan’s mostoutspoken newspaper Monitor; the newspapersubsequently closed. The scope for autonomousinitiatives, including contacts with Armenian journalists,is thus extremely narrow. Some contacts havenonetheless been maintained, some within regionalframeworks, others bilaterally. A regional example is theInternews Crossroads programme, a project producinga half-hour magazine programme with ten minutesapiece from Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. TheInstitute for War and Peace Reporting also worksthroughout the region to support independentjournalists. Bilateral contacts have been maintained bythe Yerevan and Baku Press Clubs, including joint publicopinion surveys. Contacts between Azerbaijani andKarabakh Armenian journalists remain especially sparse.Although groups of Armenian and Azerbaijanijournalists have visited Baku and Stepanakertrespectively, these contacts have declined in recent

years. Contacts are now limited to one or twoindividuals, notably journalist Eynulla Fatullaev’s visit to Karabakh in 2005, covered in the newspaper RealnyAzerbaydzhan. A small number of articles from theAzerbaijani press are printed in the independentnewspaper Demo published by the Stepanakert PressClub and supported as part of the Consortium Initiative.

Room for debate? Coverage of the Karabakh conflict has evolved parallelto and as a result of changing political realities in post-Soviet Armenia and Azerbaijan. In the conflict’sinitial stages Soviet traditions of propaganda andmisinformation predominated. Once the conflict hadescalated into war, however, two parallel processesoccurred: the professionalization of the media tookplace simultaneously with its ‘nationalization’, that is, its adoption and projection of nationalist values andnarratives. These values were seen as compatible withdemocracy, insofar as national democratic forces wereseen, at least initially, as upholding media freedoms andpluralism. Furthermore, censorship and control weredifficult to enforce in the conditions of war and politicalupheaval characterising the early 1990s.

However, the outcome of the war, the linking ofpolitical legitimacy to stances arising from it and newsocio-economic realities have inhibited the post-wardisentanglement of the media from nationalistplatforms. In Armenia, victory has dulled interest inquestioning the outcome of the war or the nationalidea underlying it; in Azerbaijan a fragile regime’sexploitation of defeat as a ‘consensus issue’ has madenationalist rhetoric compelling. In both countries,impoverished populations, rudimentary infrastructureand a tough regulatory environment mean that mediaoutlets do not survive through direct relationships withtheir consumers, but through patronage from eitherthe state or individuals vulnerable to state pressures onaccount of their wealth. This situation differs from theBalkans, where Western policy rendered far moreassistance to independent media, especially if theywere oppositional. As a result success in the Armenianor Azerbaijani media market dictates theaccommodation of official policy lines on key issues.

Whereas nationalist discourse in the media in the early1990s was initially associated with anti-Soviet anddemocratic values, it is now associated with ahomogenization of political views and conformity with official state positions in the peace process. Stillprimarily concerned with their own survival, the mediain Armenia and Azerbaijan have yet to secure thenecessary autonomy to engage their respectivesocieties in a debate on the Karabakh peace processthat is critical, yet constructive.

51Between freedom and taboo: media coverage of the Karabakh conflict

War, socialchange and ‘nowar, no peace’syndromes inAzerbaijani andArmeniansocieties

Laura Baghdasarian and Arif Yunusov

Like any war, the Nagorny Karabakh conflict haswrought numerous significant social changes,including waves of refugees and humanitarian

and social crises. However, when addressing change inArmenian and Azerbaijani societies it is useful todistinguish between ‘post-war’ consequences of theconflict and what could be termed ‘no war, no peace’syndromes relating to the current impasse. The latterinclude militarization and the integration of combatantsinto the ‘peace process’, the stalling of democraticdevelopment, the internalization of identities of victor(Armenia) and victim (Azerbaijan) and contradictoryapproaches to mediation. The prevalence of thesesyndromes and their role in maintaining animositytowards the ‘enemy’ warns against labelling them as‘post-war’. On the contrary, they can be seen assyndromes potentially leading to a second round ofarmed hostilities. This ambiguity is a defining feature ofthe situation today: while certain radical forces withingovernment and opposition in both states seek tomaintain a certain level of public antagonism towardsthe ‘other’, there is also a need to prevent this conditionfrom reaching crisis point. ‘Managed antagonism’ affordskey players certain political dividends, encouraging thedeployment of the Karabakh factor in internal politicalstruggles. An important consequence is the perceptionthat it is societies, and not political elites, who are notready for resolution of the conflict and that hostility andhatred define Azerbaijani-Armenian relations.

Consequences of the war andsocial changeBefore looking more closely at the ‘no war, no peace’syndromes, it is useful to review some of the changes inAzerbaijan and Armenia societies as a consequence ofthe war. Above all, large-scale population movementsduring and after the war have reshaped the Armenianand Azerbaijani demographic and political landscapes.At the outset of the conflict the refugee issue was arallying cry and key argument between the conflictingparties. Over the years, however, refugees anddisplaced persons have assumed different functions inthe discourse of Armenian and Azerbaijani negotiators.The continued existence of ‘tent camps’ (or ‘tent cities’)holding displaced Azerbaijani populations has servedas an unequivocal reminder of the unresolved status ofthe conflict for Azerbaijani society as a whole, and as agraphic demonstration of Azerbaijan’s suffering as aresult of the conflict for international actors visitingthese camps. By contrast, the issue of Armenianrefugees has not been so politically charged. Thefollowing sections show how the two countries havebeen affected differently by population shifts.

52 Accord 17

Laura Baghdasarian is currently the director of the

‘Region’ Centre for Investigative Journalism in

Yerevan. A graduate of Moscow State University, she

has focused on South Caucasian politics since 1990.

Arif Yunusov was a research fellow at the

Azerbaijani Academy of Sciences 1972-92, before

directing the information unit of the presidential

administration 1992-93. He now heads the

Department of Conflict and Migration Studies at the

Institute of Peace and Democracy in Baku.

The wall of a room belonging to a family of ArmenianIDPs from Baku, currently staying in Shusha.

Source: Laurence Broers

Refugees and displaced persons

After the beginning of the conflict in 1988 both sideswere overwhelmed by mass population movements. By 1990 the Azerbaijani government was registeringlarge numbers of refugees from Armenia (see figure 1)as well as 48,000 Meskhetian Turks from Uzbekistan.

Figure 1. Refugees from Armenia into Azerbaijan, 1990

Registered Registered February September

Azeris from Armenia 186,000 201,000

Kurds from Armenia 18,000 2,500*

Russians from Armenia 3,500 1,500 *

* many Russian and Kurdish refugees moved to Russia during 1990.

Figure 2. Azerbaijan State Statistical Department figures for Azeri IDPsdisplaced from NK and seven occupied regions, 1993

April December

243,000 779,000

Calculating the number of Azeris internally displacedfrom Nagorny Karabakh was hugely complicated, but in 1993-94 on the basis of State Statistical Departmentfigures (see figure 2) the Azerbaijani governmentannounced the presence of more than one millionrefugees and displaced persons in the republic,accounting for 12 per cent of its population. Despitesubsequent political stabilization in Azerbaijan, thegovernment continues to cite similar figures. However,according to the data of independent experts, the

United Nations (UN) and the International Organizationfor Migration there may now be around 750,000 refugeesand displaced persons in Azerbaijan, accounting forslightly more than 9 per cent of the population.

Figures regarding the number of refugees anddisplaced persons in Armenia are again difficult tobreak down. At the end of 1993, according to theofficial figures, the number of refugees and displacedpersons from the Karabakh and Georgia-Abkhaziaconflicts amounted to nearly 11 per cent of thepopulation of Armenia (see figure 3). These figures areprobably exaggerated and have worked their way intointernational sources: the UN cited a figure of nearly500,000 refugees in Armenia on the basis of suchofficial information. Over time, part of the refugeepopulation returned to Karabakh or otherwise leftArmenia, so by December 2000 refugees accounted for more than 8 per cent of the republic’s population.Some 30,000 refugees from Azerbaijan took Armeniancitizenship at the beginning of 2002.

Figure 3. Numbers of refugees and IDPs registered by theArmenian government

End 1993 Dec 2000

Armenians from 335,000 238,000 Azerbaijan and NK

Displaced persons from 78,000 72,000border regions

Refugees from Abkhazia 6,000 8,000

Refugees from Chechnya – 3,000

53War, social change and ‘no war, no peace’ syndromes

Post-war migration outflows

After the ceasefire in 1994 migration outflows fromboth republics continued, but were now associatedwith political instability and economic hardship,reflected in the fact that these outflows werecomposed mainly of Azerbaijanis and Armenians ratherthan minority groups. Out-migration remainsuncontrolled and it is impossible to determine reliablefigures, but official sources in Azerbaijan acknowledgethat the figure of 800,000 outward migrants since 1994is an underestimate. Between 1991 and 2000 more than1.5 million left for Russia alone, where according tounofficial sources up to 2 million Azerbaijani citizens(equivalent to 25 per cent of the population ofAzerbaijan) live and work today.

As in Azerbaijan, the Karabakh ceasefire put an end tothe flow of refugees from the conflict zone to Armenia,but as the socio-economic situation in Armeniadeteriorated the number of migrants leaving thecountry increased noticeably. According to the data of independent experts up to one million people leftArmenia in the period 1990-2001 (see figure 4),suggesting at least 26 per cent of Armenia’s populationleft in the first decade after independence.

Figure 4. Independent estimates of people leaving Armenia forselected destinations, 1990-2001

Russia 620,000

United States 100,000

Ukraine 80,000

Western Europe 20,000

Belarus 15,000

Demographic change

The demographic profiles of both republics showfurther changes wrought by the war and resultingsocio-economic and political developments. During the conflict not less than 600,000 Azerbaijani citizensbelonging to national minorities left the country; as aresult, more than 90 per cent of the population are now ethnic Azeris. The composition of the non-Azeripopulation has also sharply changed: if beforeArmenians and Russians were the dominant non-titulars (see the political glossary), now Lezgins, Talyshand Kurds have taken their place.

The biggest wave of migrants from Armenia wascomposed of Azeris and Muslim Kurds. The almostcomplete removal of Armenia’s Muslim populationoccurred during the most difficult years of the conflict.Migration of representatives of other groups fromArmenia, already demographically marginal in theSoviet period, did not have such a significant impact on Armenia’s population profile.

All of the above data bear witness to the humanitariandisaster caused by the conflict. Behind these statisticalfacts lie real people with serious psychological traumas,even if some have established new lives in newsurroundings. The displaced Azerbaijani populationliving in ‘tent camps’ finds itself in the worst situation:confronted by disease, poverty, declining humanitarianaid and a government that would sooner exploit it forpropaganda purposes than address its problems, thispopulation is increasingly vulnerable to radicalization.Efforts to voice its problems have resulted in publicdisorder, blocked highways and clashes with securityforces. Opposition forces also attempt to exploit theirfrustration, further aggravating their predicament andcomplicating approaches to alleviating it.

Former combatants

During the war combatants were seen in their ownsocieties as heroic defenders of the homeland. Theirpolitical role, however, has been perceived moreambivalently. Armenian and Azerbaijani militias andarmed bands appeared spontaneously in the period1988-91 and were used by many political forces,including political parties, as vehicles for banditry andthe removal of political opponents. Armenia perceivedthe danger posed by armed bands first and in 1990-91nearly all militias were incorporated into the body ofregular armed forces, while many militias simply movedto the conflict zone in Nagorny Karabakh. At least halfof the arms in the republic (some tens of thousands ofunits) remained in the possession of the population, afactor reflected subsequently in levels of violent crime.

In Azerbaijan the process of forming regular militaryunits took place later, and as late as 1993 self-defencevolunteers and militias affiliated with politicalorganizations were engaged on the Karabakh front.During the fiercest fighting in Karabakh in 1992Azerbaijani forces were made up of 21,000 regular armysoldiers, 7,000 volunteers from battalions of the PopularFront and other political parties and up to 4,000members of special police units. The scale of volunteerengagement was of no small concern to thegovernment in Baku: in 1993 President Heydar Aliyevdisbanded 33 volunteer battalions consisting mainly ofopposition followers. Aliyev’s disbandment policy to agreat extent accounted for the subsequent crisis on thefront and contributed to the fall of seven regionsaround Karabakh to Armenian forces. In 1994-95 Aliyevdealt his internal security forces a similar blow, arresting710 officers and disbanding its militias.

Since the ceasefire the role of former combatants in each society has been different. Organizationscomposed of former combatants have assistedveterans, the war-wounded and bereaved families, aswell as seeking to educate younger generations in a

54 Accord 17

military-patriotic tradition. These have been viewedpopularly as entirely legitimate agendas aimed atproviding justice for deserving elements of societyshort-changed by the state.

The most influential combatants’ organization inArmenia, Yerkrapah (‘Defenders of the Land’) wasformed in 1994 on the initiative of the first ArmenianMinister of Defence Vazgen Sarkisian. Sarkisian was a keyfigure in the military-political life of Armenia from theoutset of the Karabakh conflict and continued to wieldgreat influence at the Ministry of Defence even afterleaving his post. Yerkrapah was effectively financed fromthe coffers of the Ministry of Defence and its membershad the right to wear ceremonial arms. With a sizeablemembership (40,000), it played a significant role in theinternal politics of the country, especially in the aftermathof the 1996 presidential election. Responding toopposition street protests against the election result,Yerkrapah members enforced the state of emergencydeclared by the authorities in Yerevan. They did sowearing full camouflage uniforms (which by law canonly be worn by regular army soldiers) and bearingmachine guns, grenade launchers, sniper rifles and handgrenades. Yerkrapah continued to wield significantinfluence until Sarkisian’s assassination in 1999.

In Azerbaijan a different situation developed after theceasefire. While formally declaring a policy of welfare,from the outset the government regarded veterans ofthe Karabakh war with great suspicion. It spared noeffort to prevent the emergence of veterans’ social orpolitical organizations, resorting to repressive measuresin some cases. In October 1994 the Nijat (‘Salvation’)organization, supporting bereaved families, wasdisbanded and nearly 40 Karabakh veterans sentenced.In the second half of the 1990s the Azerbaijanigovernment initiated a number of proceedings againstmembers of former volunteer battalions, such as thecase of the Garangush brigade charged with anattempted coup in the Autonomous Republic ofNakhichevan, and imprisoned dozens of veterans. InJanuary and February 2001 the government mercilesslydealt with protest actions mounted by members of theSociety for the Wounded of Karabakh demanding a risein pensions: 14 disabled protesters were arrested. Morethan once the government has cracked down onactivists of the Karabakh Liberation Organization. Againsta backdrop of increasing socio-economic hardship inAzerbaijan and rising disenchantment with the peaceprocess, these actions against veterans (especially thedisabled) have provoked indignation in society andpredisposed veterans to ever more radical positions.Surveys provide evidence of the more radical stancesheld by veteran groups, a factor commonly highlightedwhen public attitudes towards developments in thepeace process are probed.

‘No war, no peace’ syndromesThe patriotic mood of societies is reflected in attitudestowards their armies and the strengthening of theircombat capacity. Questions of military spending are seen not through the lens of the dangers of militarizationbut from the perspective of an evident threat posed bythe enemy, and the need to be prepared in case ofaggression. Such formulations as, ‘the Azerbaijani armymust be prepared to take back territories occupied bythe Armenians,’ or, ‘the armies of Armenia and NagornyKarabakh must be ready and forever prepared to resistAzerbaijani revanchism,’ have been a constant instatements regarding possible changes in the post-warstatus quo over the past eleven years.

It is no surprise that according to opinion pollsconducted by the authors in Armenia and Azerbaijan at the end of 2004 the majority of respondents in bothcountries considered their own army the probable victor in the event of renewed hostilities. Moreover, therespondents did not connect their belief in the victoryof their own side to levels of economic developmentobtaining in their own or the other country, nor indeedwith any other factor. It comes as no surprise that withthe prominence of these attitudes and in the context of two possible outcomes of the ‘no war, no peace’situation, questioning militarism in both Armenia andAzerbaijan is taboo. In each country the logic behind thetaboo is different, yet the result is the same. In Armeniathe logic is that since the army won the war it hasearned the right to be trusted by society; in Azerbaijan,it is claimed that any imposition of review or oversighton the army would obstruct the strengthening of itscapacity to re-establish Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity.

The ‘victor’ and ‘victim’ syndromes in Armenian andAzerbaijani societies are undoubtedly among the keyconsequences of the Karabakh war. We have focusedhere on some of the less obvious symptoms of thesesyndromes, such as taboos on public recognition ofmilitarization. Other aspects of these syndromes arereflected in the results of public opinion surveys carriedout by the authors. Victor and victim syndromes affectsocieties’ perceptions of threat: whereas Azerbaijansees the non-resolution of the Karabakh conflict as themost serious threat to its security, Armenians perceivegreater threat from internal political developments andconsider the Karabakh conflict ‘solved’. Similarly publicperceptions of foreign countries and internationalorganizations in Azerbaijan are strongly influenced bytheir stances on the Karabakh conflict; Armenianperceptions are more differentiated. These views derivefrom skewed information disseminated by the massmedia in each country. The mutual isolation ofArmenian and Azerbaijani societies will continue untilgreater efforts to build new bridges are made.

55War, social change and ‘no war, no peace’ syndromes

The cost ofstalemateeconomic aspects of theNagorny Karabakh conflict

Phil Champain

Since 1994, when the armed conflict betweenArmenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorny Karabakhgave way to a situation of ‘no war, no peace’, the

different parties have faced mixed economic prospects.While oil has fed the coffers of government and a smallelite in Azerbaijan, economic security for the majorityremains cripplingly low. In Armenia the psychologicalbenefits of military victory over Azerbaijan are tarnishedby lost economic opportunities, while economicmigration to Russia and the West has arguably halvedthe population. Karabakh itself suffers from severeunder-employment and is increasingly dependent on‘external’ support, particularly from Armenian diasporagroups in the West and from ‘inter-state’ loans fromArmenia. It seems that only elites are winning.

Balancing symbolic and materialresourcesOn the whole, understandings of the economic costs ofconflict are minimal on all sides, while the potential fora ‘peace dividend’ has not resulted in visible policychanges by any party. What kind of economic leveragecan each side bring to bear on the other in the ongoingdiplomatic struggle? Azerbaijan has oil and this iscertainly part of the dynamic of diplomacy. Not only is the prospect of oil revenues cited to supportstatements about increased military capacity, but it is also used to court the support of the internationalcommunity. Research conducted by International Alertin 2003-4, in rural areas of Azerbaijan far removed fromBaku, demonstrated that oil was regarded as key to thereturn of lost territories amongst the Azerbaijanipopulation. A commonly held opinion amongst thesecommunities is that oil brings funds for the army andguarantees support from those Western governmentswhose companies extract Azeri oil, which will bring anend to economic hardship and, moreover, lead to thereturn of Karabakh. It is also a theory of change thatsuits those who want to strengthen stereotypes of the‘Armenian enemy’ already prominent within thesesame communities.

56 Accord 17

Phil Champain is Director of

Programmes at International Alert.

He has worked in the Caucasus, Nepal,

Liberia and Sri Lanka, facilitating

dialogue between conflicting parties

and has also written widely on

economic aspects of conflict resolution.

Bibi Heybat Mosque and oil derricks on theshores of the Caspian Sea in Baku.

Source: Reuters/Grigory Dukor

If Azerbaijan has the resources but not the militaryvictory, then Armenia has the victory but lacks theresources. However, it too has its entrepreneurs, whohave sought to reach out to Turkey through informalbusiness-to-business contacts. Indeed, in seeking tohold onto victory Armenian business interests looktowards strengthening ties with Turkey, rather thantowards resolving differences with Azerbaijan. Yet theTurkish option is not an easy one either. Although thereare flights from Turkey to Armenia and movement ofpeople across borders in this sense, the physical borderbetween Armenia and Turkey is closed - a diplomaticimpasse deriving from a combination of the disputedassessment of the Ottoman Empire’s treatment of itsArmenian community in 1915 plus Turkey’s alliancewith its Turkic neighbour Azerbaijan over the Karabakhconflict. Turkey’s partnership with Azerbaijan has beenreinforced by the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which strategically aligns Azerbaijan,Georgia and Turkey and thereby amplifies the conflictfault-line in the region.

Oil: a resource for peace or war? The significance of oil as an economic force in theSouth Caucasus and a component of the conflictdynamic is worth unpacking. At one level impactswithin Azerbaijan can be categorized in wayssuggested by Stanford University’s Terry Lynn Karl andothers. These impacts are generic in that they can also

be seen in countries such as Angola, Colombia andNigeria, and Western oil-producing countries, such as the UK and Norway. In particular, large revenues from oil tend to strengthen the currencies of the oilproducer, making its exports less competitive (‘theDutch Disease’). According to Caspian Revenue Watch,at a price of US$25 per barrel, between 2003 and 2010the government of Azerbaijan’s share of oil profits fromthe Azerbaijani-Chirag and deepwater Gunashli oilfields will amount to about US$16 billion. At US$18 perbarrel Azerbaijan’s total earnings would come to US$7.2billion. In such a context it is hard to imagineAzerbaijan’s agricultural sector recovering to providegoods for export to Russia, which used to beAzerbaijan’s largest agricultural export market.

Oil revenues also fuel corruption and therebystrengthen ‘corruption networks’ (detailed furtherbelow). Oil-driven development, and the opportunitiesit offers to distribute patronage and largesse, tends tostrengthen elites who will do anything to hold ontooffice given that it becomes the main source of powerand prosperity. If efforts to reduce corruption arecoupled with the gradual increase in the influence oflocal ‘oil watchdog’ non-governmental organizations(NGOs), and with the international community’sbacking of transparency initiatives such as theExtractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), thenAzerbaijan may yet move decisively towards moretransparent state structures that can regulate the

57The cost of stalemate: economic aspects of the Nagorny Karabakh conflict

58 Accord 17

oil-dominated economy effectively. However, if futureelectoral practice reinforces the clan-based politics ofthe past, then the business environment in Azerbaijanis likely to remain problematic, with the continuation of patronage politics, neglect of the non-oil sector and,despite Azerbaijan joining the EITI, little or no supportfor capacity building of NGOs to scrutinize transparencyin oil revenues. In particular, communities outside thecapital will remain impoverished, fuelling discontent,much of which will be directed towards Armenia in acontext of unabated militant propaganda. Oil, seenthrough the eyes of these communities, then becomesthe solution to both economic betterment and thereturn of Nagorny Karabakh – and a resource for war.

On the other hand, if oil money can be kept within theformal economy and directed towards strengtheningthe non-oil sector, then there are prospects for thebenefits to be felt beyond those cocooned in Baku. If this happens (in tandem with positive policydevelopments at the international level), there is apossibility that peace will become a greater politicaland economic motivator for Azerbaijan than conflict.The EITI may then gather momentum and Azerbaijanwill begin to develop a more far-reaching economicrole as the hub for regional economic development inthe South Caucasus region.

Unofficial trade and informal authorityThe region’s economic dynamic is further characterizedby blockades and fault-lines. Land borders betweenArmenia and Turkey and between Azerbaijan andArmenia are closed, not to mention blockades furthernorth between Georgia and Abkhazia and Georgia andSouth Ossetia. This has created a particular economicdynamic in the region that is both a consequence andfeeder of the conflict. In reality, the blockades areporous, giving rise to unregulated trade across borders,whilst the conventional wisdom of the internationalcommunity prevents international economic actorsfrom lending economic support to unrecognizedentities such as Nagorny Karabakh.

Existing trade links functioning in spite of theseconditions are testament to the inevitability of businessactivity. Trade is a key component of community life inthat it provides the lifeblood for employment andincome generation. Without trade of some kind,communities cannot survive. Traditionally, tradebetween Armenia and Azerbaijan was commonplaceand dynamic. The official closing of borders put a stopto much of this, but it has not stopped altogether. TheArmenian news agency ArCNews estimates thatunofficial trade between Azerbaijan and Armeniareached US$40 million annually by 2002, whilst trade

between Armenia and Turkey reached US$60-80million. Georgia and Iran play the role of middlemen toenable Armenian goods to find their way to Azerbaijanand vice versa.

Lacking regulation, this unofficial trade clearly affectsthe fiscal relationship between the governments ofAzerbaijan and Armenia and their citizens. The rhetoricof good governance and democracy suggests thatgovernments elected by the people for the peopleshould have the legitimacy to tax their citizens in orderto provide the services required for society’s needs tobe met. Lack of trade regulation means that these taxesare not collected and that service provision based ondemocratic principles is replaced by inconsistentprovision and ‘protection’ by what some refer to as‘corruption networks’. In a narrow sense this term refers to the cross-border links between people ofcomparable levels of authority and resourcefulness.Most often these are local authorities and specializedlaw-enforcement institutions, namely police, borderguards and customs officials. Such a context certainlyprovides alternatives for survival to those trading inlegitimate goods, but it also creates space within whichexploitation is commonplace and criminality prospers.Criminal activities, such as trade in weapons and drugs,endure with some degree of overlap with the corruptionnetworks within the public sphere of the SouthCaucasus sovereign states and unrecognized republics.

Stability without regulationThe Sadakhlo market is a clear example of this dynamic– a space created by the conflict where, amongst othergoods, flour, bran and salt are sold into Armenia andArmenian smoked fish into Azerbaijan. Located onGeorgian territory at the point where Georgian,Azerbaijani and Armenian borders meet, it was the onlyplace where cross border trade was possible betweenthe two conflicting sides in 1991-92. The dependenceof this market on the conflict dynamic is perhaps bestillustrated by the nervousness with which its tradersview the prospect of an opening up of the Armenian-Turkish border. This would arguably spell the death ofthe market through the competition it would create.The traders dependent upon Sadakhlo want thestability that it brings, in a context devoid of effectivepublic institutions. The price of stability is theunregulated system, which sustains the ‘no war, nopeace’ situation. For this context to be transformed into positive peace, efforts must be made to establishjust, efficient and transparent state structures which can work in partnership with the private sector and civil society. But can the private sector play a role insuch a transformation process?

What role for the private sector?There is certainly potential to engage the ‘legitimate’business community (as opposed to those involved inthe trade of guns, drugs and people). A meeting ofbusiness people from across the South Caucasusconvened by International Alert in Trabzon inDecember 2004 demonstrated that there is anoutward-looking business community in the Caucasusaware of the status quo’s detrimental effects to theirinterests, and which in response seeks ‘to improve thelegal framework for business, strengthen the dialoguebetween business and state and expand the reach ofbusiness from a national to a regional level’. Regionalmeetings of this nature are one way of establishing a safe space for Azerbaijani and Armenian businesspeople to engage with one another. However, it isimpossible to imagine concrete business venturesmaterializing without a change in the political context.The role of business must therefore be to first lobby for political support for cross-border economiccollaboration, and second to prepare to act swiftlywhen the political context offers opportunities to do so.

The importance of regional approachesIn crafting such roles for business communities,peacebuilding organizations can bring a conflict-sensitive lens to the development of business ideas, forit cannot be assumed that business will always act inthe interests of peace. In addition, taking a regionalapproach to economic cooperation is likely to bringgreater rewards. The term ‘regional’ is used here in thebroadest sense of the word, to include a considerationof links between Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia andTurkey, including Abkhazia, South Ossetia and NagornyKarabakh. Such a regional outlook should ideally alsoconsider Russia and Iran. The debate surroundingpotential rail links in the South Caucasus is an exampleof the importance of taking a regional perspective.Whilst some argue for opening a Baku-Nakhichevan-Yerevan-Gyumri-Kars railway link connecting Azerbaijanand Armenia that would take in Nagorny Karabakh,others suggest opening the Baku-Ijevan-Yerevan-Nakhichevan route, which would avoid and excludeKarabakh. Meanwhile, Georgia actively lobbies for aTbilisi-Kars rail link that would connect Azerbaijan withTurkey via Georgia, thereby marginalizing Armenia.Economic and political interests are impossible toseparate and some kind of regional approach will berequired if compromises acceptable to Azerbaijan andArmenia are to be found.

The oil industry operating out of Baku has not as yetmanaged to lend its considerable weight to such aregional approach, with the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhanpipeline bypassing Armenia and reinforcing East-Westalliances between Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey.However, the new neighbourhood policy of theEuropean Union (EU) does offer potential for a moreinclusive approach to economic cooperation. WithTurkey now progressing towards membership, the EUmay yet offer an economic framework, (succeeding thatprovided by the Soviet Union before 1990), in whichArmenia and Azerbaijan can find ways of developingtransparent and regulated economic linkages.

Looking to the futureThis article has sought to sketch a picture of some ofthe economic dimensions of the Karabakh conflict. The conflict has starved the conflicting sides ofopportunities for transparent and regulated trade,leading inevitably to a questioning among broadersocieties of the benefits of transition to a marketeconomy. In place of regulated business, cross-bordertrade is by necessity conducted through unregulatednetworks that both feed and feed off corrupt practices.This context is more likely to sustain the ‘no war, nopeace’ status quo than to offer any new openings forpositive peace. Local business networks do have thepotential to contribute to transforming this context,however, especially if they are able to partner withpeacebuilding organizations and adopt regionalapproaches that provide opportunities for Azerbaijani,Karabakh and Armenian business people to meet. TheEU’s new neighbourhood policy also has potential tooffer a new framework for economic cooperation. In themeantime, each party has its own sources of economicsupport allowing it to continue surviving the currentimpasse. In particular, oil in Azerbaijan remains causefor concern, although international and local efforts arebeing made to ensure that the ‘black gold’ is more abenefit than a curse.

59The cost of stalemate: economic aspects of the Nagorny Karabakh conflict

60 Accord 17

Dr. Rasim Musabayov worked as an

advisor to the president of Azerbaijan

1991-92 and to the Azerbaijani

Parliament 1992-93. He is now an

independent expert and the author of

more than 100 articles and books.

The Karabakhconflict anddemocratizationin Azerbaijan

Rasim Musabayov

From its outset, the conflict over Nagorny Karabakhserved as a key impulse to the awakening ofnational sentiment in Azerbaijan, stimulating

ethnic mobilization and drawing wide sectors of thepopulation into the movement for social and politicalreform. It spawned mass political opposition under theSoviet system, paving the way for the first democraticprocesses in Azerbaijani society. At the same time, theArmenian-Azeri conflict has been, and still is, used bypolitical elites as a pretext to limit the rights andfreedoms of citizens and delay much needed politicaland economic reform.

Karabakh and the crisis of power The Karabakh conflict initiated a crisis of power inAzerbaijan, beginning with cadre changes in theCommunist leadership and later spilling over into atotal transformation of the ruling elite and politicalsystem. Yet despite elite turnover and AzerbaijaniCommunist Party leader Ayaz Mutalibov’s introductionof the position of president (to which he promptlyelected himself ), without Moscow’s assistance the oldCommunist Party nomenklatura elite proved incapableof containing the conflict. Ensuing waves of protestserved as a catalyst for the emergence of a newcounter-elite composed of members of the nationalistintelligentsia. A third grouping was made up of former First Secretary Heydar Aliyev’s supporters. The‘Karabakh factor’ was used actively both by these rivalelites and by individual competing leaders within them to further their cause.

With the onset of full-scale armed hostilities, a patternwas established whereby governments in Baku rose orfell as a result of developments on the battlefield. InMarch 1992 the pro-Russian Mutalibov was forced toresign in the aftermath of the massacre of thepopulation of the Azeri village of Khojaly by separatistKarabakh Armenian units and evidence of Soviettroops’ involvement in the killings. Following thesubsequent fall of Shusha and Lachin, Mutalibov

Opposition supporters clash with police in Baku,October 2003, after Ilham Aliyev was declared

winner of the presidential election.

Source: Reuters/Sergei Karpukhin

unsuccessfully tried to regain power; this attemptended in the coming to power of the nationalistAzerbaijani Popular Front, led by Abulfaz Elchibey. The Popular Front administration initially enjoyedconsiderable legitimacy, securing the departure ofSoviet military forces stationed in Azerbaijan andcreating a national army. However, the new leadership’sinexperience, and its inability to either force a militaryvictory in Nagorny Karabakh or have the courage andflexibility to seek a peaceful solution, resulted inwidespread disappointment.

The Popular Front government fell following a couporganized from the city of Ganja; Elchibey fled thecapital, appealing to Aliyev for help, and both thePopular Front and basic social order disintegrated.Azerbaijan descended into anarchy and lawlessness, inwhich armed groups and criminality burgeoned;exploiting this situation Armenian forces were able tooccupy a further five districts around NagornyKarabakh. In autumn 1993 Heydar Aliyev gained anoverwhelming majority at the ensuing extraordinaryelections, thus becoming Azerbaijan’s new president.Aliyev preserved the state of emergency institutedunder Elchibey: mass demonstrations, marches andmeetings were prohibited, and the media were subjectto strict censorship. The Karabakh conflict was

becoming an obstacle to stable development,democracy and freedom in Azerbaijan. Yet by early1993 events on the battlefield were pointing tostalemate. Attempts to advance brought devastatinglosses to both sides amidst shortages of ammunition,crumbling military hardware and troops in dire need of regrouping. Unable to proceed with vitally necessaryeconomic and political reform for as long as warcontinued, Armenia and Azerbaijan signed a ceasefireagreement in May 1994.

From chaos to stabilityThe ceasefire allowed Aliyev to tighten his control ofthe state administration. He dispensed with primeminister and Ganja coup leader Suret Husseynov. Anuprising of the special police force (OPON), led byKarabakh veteran and Deputy Minister of the InteriorColonel Rovshan Javadov, was put down, and Aliyevensured that opposition forces in the Ministry of theInterior, army, government and regional authoritieswere duly quelled.

The freezing of armed hostilities allowed Azerbaijan toreturn to a semblance of political normality. The state of emergency was abolished, political activity resumedand censorship stopped. Yet opinion over the cessation

61The Karabakh conflict and democratization in Azerbaijan

of hostilities was divided in Azerbaijan. The majority ofopposition parties and organizations criticized theceasefire agreement, summoning the people to fightfor the full liberation of all Armenian-occupied territories,a view shared by many in the army and government.Indignation at the prospect of a peacekeeping force,perceived as a return of Russian troops to Azerbaijan, ranhigh. Swayed by public discontent and the views ofTurkish and Western leaders, Aliyev refused to acceptunilateral Russian mediation, turning instead to theOrganization for Security and Cooperation in Europe(OSCE) Minsk Group.

Differences of opinion on how to deal with theKarabakh problem did not emerge as a salientgovernment/opposition cleavage in the parliamentaryelections of 1995 and presidential elections of 1998.Virtually all candidates spoke of the need to restore the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. However, theopposition questioned the effectiveness of the hithertofruitless negotiations facilitated by the Minsk Group,proposing to strengthen the army in order eventuallyto return the occupied territories by force. Typically,marginal candidates unburdened by responsibility for their statements proved the most jingoistic. TheKarabakh issue was, however, exploited by theauthorities to justify harsh measures repressing protestat the conduct of the elections. The regime consistentlyinvoked the need for social stability, claiming thatAzerbaijan’s defeat in the war had been due todomestic turmoil.

Internal debatesFollowing the failure of the various Minsk Groupproposals of 1997-98 Aliyev made an unusual decision.Ignoring his obligation to keep the negotiations strictlyconfidential, the president publicized all of theproposals on the table and organized a parliamentarydebate on the subject, to which members of the publicand political parties were invited. The debate was notconstructive. Most speakers expressed their totalsupport for the official line, calling for national unityand swearing their readiness to give anything for theterritorial integrity of Azerbaijan. A large number ofparties in the nationalist/reformist camp, such as thePopular Front and Musavat, ignored the parliamentarydebate, seeing it as only a political manoeuvre to offset public discontent with the lack of progress in the negotiations process. Opposition leaders publiclyexpressed their lack of confidence in Aliyev’s strategy ofdistributing oil contracts to great powers as a means ofenlisting their support in lobbying Armenia. However,Aliyev achieved his goals at least in part. Society hadbeen informed and it had been shown that the regime’sopponents had no constructive proposals for theresolution of the conflict. The negative reaction to the

leaked proposals further legitimized the search for analternative format for the negotiations.

The ‘Karabakh factor’ in AzerbaijanipoliticsWhat role does the Karabakh conflict play in theAzerbaijani political arena? Azerbaijan’s primitivepolitical system is characterized by clan struggles andcompetition between regional elites. One of theconsequences of the Karabakh conflict was theascendance in government and business of Azerisdisplaced from Armenia (the so-called yerazi) and Azerisfrom the Autonomous Republic of Nakhichevan. TheseAzeris had had more contact – and direct experience of conflict – with Armenians. Although Azeris fromKarabakh were and still are well-represented inbusiness and government, the Armenian occupation ofKarabakh and the surrounding regions has significantlyreduced their economic and political potential. Otherregional elites, such as the Baku-Shirvan, Ganja-Kazakhand Mugan-Lankaran groups, have been completelymarginalized by the conflict.

Political parties and elites have sought to use theconsistent preoccupation of public opinion with theKarabakh issue to their own advantage. Publicconsciousness of this ploy is reflected in opinion pollsfocusing on the factors behind continued Armenian-Azeri enmity, including polls conducted by the author.These have shown that the deployment of theKarabakh issue by internal political forces in theirstruggle for power, cited by 34.1 per cent ofrespondents, only marginally trails the interest whichcompeting world and regional powers have inprolonging the conflict (35.4 per cent), a factorconsistently emphasized in the media.

Whilst the disputes of clans and elites remain largelysecret, political parties have to declare a public positionon the Karabakh conflict. However, party positions vis-à-vis the Karabakh conflict are largely superficial anddeclarative, lacking specific suggestions regarding theformat or content of the negotiations or the nature of possible compromises. Opposition parties such asMusavat, the Popular Front, the National IndependenceParty and the Democratic Party are less inclined tocompromise than the ruling New Azerbaijan Party.Opposition leaders claim that it is only national patrioticforces that can mobilize the state’s resources to free theoccupied territories and restore the territorial integrity ofAzerbaijan. Superficial and facile, the opposition’s plan ofaction involves strengthening the economy by fightingcorruption, improving the country’s defences and puttingincreased political and military pressure on Armenia. To alesser extent, they criticize the ruling elite’s corruptionand violations of human rights as factors damaging

62 Accord 17

Azerbaijan’s reputation and lessening internationalsupport for the country. The highly numerous marginalparties and leaders are still more intractable, seeking tobalance a grovelling attitude towards the authoritieswith a militant stance vis-à-vis Armenia.

In 2001, a group of competent and well-knownpoliticians put forward the so-called ‘Karabakh Charter’or ‘Charter of Four’. The group was made up of formerforeign minister Tofik Zulfuqarov, former head of thePresidential Secretariat Eldar Namazov, formerpresident of the state oil company Sabit Bagirov andeconomist Nazim Imanov. Realizing that criticism ofgovernment policy and patriotic rhetoric were notenough to solve the Karabakh problem, the group felt the need for a consolidated standpoint enjoyingwidespread popular support and understanding. TheCharter demanded that the Azerbaijani authoritiescease to make unilateral concessions and adopt aphased approach to resolving the conflict, therebyensuring the return of occupied Azerbaijani territoriesaround Nagorny Karabakh. The Charter was muchdiscussed and gained the support of over 20 politicalparties, as well as hundreds of public bodies andfigures. The Charter established a sort of ‘maximumtolerance level’ of compromise for Azerbaijan, and fireda warning shot across the bows of the ruling elite thatpassing this level would elicit wide and consolidatedsocial protest. Subsequent negotiations held at thehighest level in Paris and in Key West came close toachieving agreement between the two leaders. Yet onreturning to Baku President Aliyev was not able tosecure the approval of even his own circle to a planproposing the release of the occupied territories inreturn for the de facto ceding of Nagorny Karabakh to Armenia.

From the point of view of the opposition and civilsociety, current government policy on Karabakh isconservative, insufficiently flexible and, where the levelof information is concerned, extremely primitive. Theconcentration of decision-making power exclusively inthe head of state, a consequence of the consolidationof authoritarian rule in Azerbaijan, has a deleteriouseffect on the management of the peace talks. Dialoguebetween the government and the Armenian side iskept secret not only from the public at large, but alsofrom important politicians, experts and even MPs. Theregime reacts nervously to any popular or civicinitiatives to advance the process of conflicttransformation in Nagorny Karabakh.

Since the accession of President Ilham Aliyev there hasbeen a certain hardening of the official position on theconflict. Bellicose statements about a readiness toresort to force to liberate the occupied territories havebeen accompanied by a substantial increase in militaryexpenditure (from US $170 million in 2004 to US $300

million in 2005) and a rise in the number of ceasefireviolations along the line of contact. Simultaneouslythere has been a marked increase in Azerbaijanidiplomatic activity in international forums (the UnitedNations, the OSCE and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe) aimed at securing acondemnation of the occupation and resettlement ofAzerbaijani territory by Armenia. Ilham Aliyev’s lowerlevels of legitimacy compared to his father forces himto take a more hard-line position. On the other handthe growth of oil revenues frees Baku from foreigndonors, a factor which strongly differentiates thesituation from Armenia’s, where nearly one third of the state budget comes from external sources.

External and internal audiencesThe behaviour of the ruling elite in Azerbaijan is, in sum,highly contradictory. The current leadership owes itsrise to power to skilful manipulation of popular protestover the handling of the Karabakh issue, and to loudpledges to resolve the conflict quickly and withoutlosses to the territorial integrity and sovereignty ofAzerbaijan. A retreat from this position now would bedangerous and potentially threatening to government’slegitimacy. At the same time the need to consolidate itshold over key positions in the governing apparatus andthe economy prompts the regime to try, throughcompromise and concessions, to move from thecurrent unstable scenario of ‘no war, no peace’ to amore stable situation. Portraying itself to theinternational community as the ‘party of peace’ and the opposition as extremists advocating the return ofKarabakh by force, the Azerbaijani government isseeking carte blanche to quash its political opponents.Yet for internal consumption, the ruling elite continuesto churn out populist militant rhetoric. The difficultcompromises vital for peace cannot be made until theregime abandons this duplicitous approach andengages in dialogue with authoritative oppositionpoliticians and civil society representatives.

With a significant portion of Azerbaijani territory underArmenian occupation no political party or responsibleleader would risk political suicide by suggestingacquiescence with Armenia’s territorial claims. Anyonedoing so would quickly be branded a ‘traitor’ and‘collaborationist’, with the result that any healthy ideasregarding democratization and reform tied in with such a position would fall on deaf ears. As the party losing themilitary phase of the conflict, Azerbaijan faces theprospect of significant concessions in the course of thepeace process. In these conditions the opposition, as thechannel of protest and contrarian views, can onlyarticulate more hard-line positions than the government,explaining the paucity of constructive ideas emanatingfrom the opposition on the Karabakh issue.

63The Karabakh conflict and democratization in Azerbaijan

New structures,old foundationsstate capacities for peace

Hratch Tchilingirian

Both Armenia and Azerbaijan are characterized bya number of deficiencies in terms of theirdemocratic transitions. Yet it would be a mistake

to attribute them to the Karabakh conflict and itsconsequences. Other post-Soviet states lackingsecessionist conflicts do not exhibit superiordemocratic credentials, as the examples of Belarus orTurkmenistan demonstrate. Rather, the absence ofdesired levels of democratic development in Armenia,Azerbaijan and other states in the region is due to acombination of regime-induced and inherited systemicproblems. Consideration of these problems is relevantbecause, as case studies have shown, states wellendowed with popular mandates and substantivedemocracy are more likely to provide longer-termsolutions to armed conflicts.

Dilemmas of charismatic leadership After a decade of peace talks since the ceasefire of May1994, the statements of the presidents of Azerbaijanand Armenia are telling. Speaking in September 2005President Ilham Aliyev made it very clear: “We arecreating a strong military potential, and the enemymust know that Azerbaijan is capable of liberating itslands at any moment”, adding that Baku is doubling itsmilitary budget in 2006 to about US$600 million. HisArmenian counterpart, Robert Kocharian, formerpresident and a native of Karabakh, put it more bluntly:“Nagorno-Karabakh has never been part of Azerbaijanand never will be. This is the bottom line. Beyond [that]one can think of some solutions and invent newstatuses”. To the disappointment of most mediators andoutside observers, these statements are not utterancesmerely for domestic audiences, but a reflection ofwhere the political leaders stand.

Such deterministic views on the part of political leadershave had a great impact on public perceptions. Indeed,the over-dependence on and centrality of individualleaders – rather than institutions and wider society – inresolving the conflict is a major part of the problem.

64 Accord 17

Hratch Tchilingirian is Associate Director

of Eurasia Research Programme in the

Judge Institute of Management,

University of Cambridge, and holds a

PhD from the London School of

Economics and Political Science.

Armenian opposition membershold a rally in Yerevan, April 2004.

Source: Reuters/Mkhitar Khachatrian

For instance, in 2002 Heydar Aliyev claimed: “If I cannotresolve the Karabakh problem then no one in the worldwill resolve it”. Similarly, many think Karabakh-nativesKocharian or Serzh Sarkisian, Armenia’s DefenceMinister, are the only people who can ‘sell’ anagreement to Armenians. Since the end of the SovietUnion, virtually all the countries emerging asindependent states are run by various kinds of‘charismatic authority’. As the German Sociologist MaxWeber defined it, charisma is “a character specificallyforeign to everyday routine structures” of governing,based on “the validity and practice of personalqualities” rather than set rules. This implies a lack ofstrong state institutions, low and slow levels ofdemocratic development, a crude political environmentand related structural capacity problems. Indeed,charismatic authority in these newly emerged republicshas put the independence of the various branches ofgovernment into question: neither the legislative northe judiciary branches are independent from theinfluences of the executive.

In terms of conflict resolution, the question is whether a charismatically led state with critical structuralweaknesses – such as Azerbaijan, Armenia or Georgia –is in a position to resolve conflicts within its borders andoffer the necessary guarantees of rights to its formerautonomous regions. Leadership and governanceproblems and the lack of structural capacity are

compounded by the absence of convincing plans for resolution of the conflict. The lack of a ‘sellable’proposal as to how Azerbaijan intends to reintegratethe Armenians of Karabakh into the Republic ofAzerbaijan has pushed Karabakh Armenians furtheraway from such a ‘reunion’. Since the ceasefire in 1994,Baku has not provided credible guarantees or tolerantdemocracy even within Azerbaijan. If a government isnot willing to tolerate political opposition inside thecountry, its capacity to deal constructively with the‘enemy’ outside is clearly in question. Other than thepromise to grant ‘high autonomy’ to Karabakh,Azerbaijan has not elaborated on the specifics of whatit is willing to offer, nor is there any public discussion ofwhat autonomy would mean for the granting state andhow would it benefit the receiving society. This lack ofpublic discourse on the promised autonomy and itsbenefits – coupled with continued bellicose statementsby senior government officials in Baku – gives littlereason for the Karabakh Armenians to trust Azerbaijaniintentions. Instead, the lack of seriousness with whichproposals for self-government are treated hascontributed to Karabakh’s growing integration withArmenia in recent years.

The ‘Karabakh factor’ in Armenian politicsArmenia also suffers from ‘charismatic authority’, theramifications of which have played out differently. The

65New structures, old foundations: state capacities for peace

‘Karabakh card’ has been variously used and exploitedby opposition parties in Armenia to denounce theruling regimes. The most well known case is the forcedresignation of Levon Ter-Petrossian, who was accusedof defeatist policies on Karabakh by a large spectrum ofpolitical parties and former allies. In recent years,President Kocharian’s credentials as Karabakh ‘war hero’have not allowed him to escape criticism that under hispresidency the conflict between Karabakh andAzerbaijan has been transformed into a bilateral conflictbetween Armenia and Azerbaijan, with Karabakhsidelined in the negotiations process. As expressed byopposition party leader Stepan Demirchian, the fear isthat Armenia might thus be forced to make territorialconcessions to Azerbaijan (for example, by ceding partsof Armenia’s southernmost Meghri region). Theargument is that Armenia’s sovereign territory shouldnot be subject to negotiations, a position held by bothopposition parties and those in the ruling coalition.

However, the lines between differences overmethodologies of conflict resolution and outrightcriticism of the sitting regime are often blurred. Becauseopposition parties generally lack broad political bases,their political activity tends to focus solely on criticismof the ruling authorities. Yet their criticisms of thegovernment have been ineffective and do not offerviable alternative political or economic policies forArmenia or for the resolution of the Karabakh conflict.Their scattered public support is less in recognition of their policies or ideology than an expression ofdissatisfaction with the Kocharian government. As inAzerbaijan, there is no margin in the political arena forpositions associated with compromise. No party inArmenia would want to appear to be ‘giving up’Karabakh; when ‘moderates’ refer to ‘territorialconcessions’ similar to the ‘land for peace’ approach inIsrael, it is the return of occupied Azerbaijani territoriesoutside Karabakh, not Karabakh itself, that is implied.

The Armenian diaspora, although expressing growingdissatisfaction with Kocharian’s government overcorruption, protection of legal rights and a host ofsocio-economic problems, has on the whole beensupportive of Karabakh’s bid for separation fromAzerbaijan, especially through large financial assistanceprograms. Armenia and Karabakh have also benefitedimmensely from the lobbying efforts of diasporacommunities in the US, Europe and Russia. However, it is important to note that lobbying efforts areconducted in coordination with Yerevan andStepanakert, and that the diaspora as such does notrepresent a different agenda or “vision” for Karabakh.Just as with Armenian-Turkish relations, it is veryunlikely that the diaspora would interfere with theArmenian government’s or Karabakh Armenians’

policies vis-à-vis Azerbaijan. While certain groups in the diaspora might disagree with the terms of aneventual peace agreement, by and large Armenian-Azerbaijani relations and the resolution of the conflictare considered as matters best decided by the societiesaffected by it.

Exclusionary politicsThe personalization of politics and government has also contributed to extreme forms of ‘othering’: that is,the demonization and exclusion of the ‘other group’,whether Armenians in Azerbaijan or Azerbaijanis inArmenia and Karabakh. This has been an overlookedaspect of the conflicts in the Caucasus. The conflicts inthis region are primarily rooted in problems ofrestructuring of minority-majority relations and notnecessarily the ‘historical’ animosities often presentedin the media. The ‘othering’ discourse makes therelationship of the minority (Karabakh Armenians) with the majority (Azerbaijanis) even more tenuous.President Kocharian, for instance, said in January 2003:

“ The Armenian pogroms in Sumgait and Baku,and the attempts at mass military deportation of Armenians from Karabakh in 1991-92indicate the impossibility for Armenians to livein Azerbaijan in general. We are talking aboutsome sort of ethnic incompatibility…”

His Azerbaijani counterpart at the time, Heydar Aliyev,was just as undiplomatic when he claimed in 2001 that,“Armenian aggressors do not differ in any way fromHitler’s armies, from German fascism”.

Such a discourse overshadows centuries of neighbourlyrelations among diverse peoples in this region.Especially in recent years, the positive aspects ofrelations between ethnic groups have rarely beendiscussed in the societies of the South Caucasus. Onlywhen outsiders or journalists ask do individuals tend torecount examples or experiences of good relationshipswith the ‘other’.

Beyond the structural weaknesses of the metropolitanstates and the lack of convincing offers for reintegrationof the former autonomies, the ideological and socialdiscourse of ‘othering’ presents the most formidableproblem to conflict resolution. If a lasting peace isultimately a process of reconciliation between societies,it is imperilled by the persistent demonization of the‘other’ prevalent in the South Caucasus. For theAzerbaijanis, the ‘othering’ discourse is rooted in thesense of military defeat, loss of territory, socio-economic conditions and, most importantly, the plightof the nearly 800,000 refugees and internally displaced

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persons (IDPs). The frustration and the enormousproblems the refugees and IDPs face in their daily livespresent powerful emotional and political bases of‘othering’. The Armenian discourse of ‘othering’ isprimarily rooted in a sense of national victimhood andirredentism rooted in the memory and fear of genocide,both in history and modern times. Further, Armenianspopularly equate Azerbaijanis with ‘Turks’, thustransferring the historical animosity towards Turkey to Azerbaijanis.

The issue is not whether the ‘othering’ discourse isjustified or whether there are legitimate reasons forsuch a discourse, but its sociological implications forconflict resolution. Crucially, the strict us-them divide, as well as the process of projecting individual acts orparticular events on entire populations, makes thepeaceful resolution of the conflict increasingly unlikely. Instead the extreme ‘othering’ discourse hasled to more militancy in societies that under suchcircumstances are far from engaging in a process ofreconciliation.

New structures, old foundationsResolving decades-long conflicts has proven to becomplex and difficult for far more developed states and fully-fledged democracies such as Israel andCyprus, let alone developing states such as Armeniaand Azerbaijan. The state restructuring process and the modernization of state and government from theremnants of the former system is still ongoing in theSouth Caucasus. One generalization that could bemade is that statehood – or the determination of typeof statehood – is still evolving. More than a decade after independence, the question whether to have apresidential or parliamentary model of statehood is stillactively debated in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.The constitutions of the three republics are still beingamended and reshaped. The make up, sphere ofcompetencies and ethics of the civil service are stillunder discussion. These questions are also prevalent inKarabakh (and the region’s other de facto states), butwith one important difference: due to internationalnon-recognition and a dire need for essential resources,the question in Stepanakert is about the level andintensity of integration with Armenia.

The radical restructuring of former power relationsbetween the autonomous regions and themetropolitan states, and the de facto ‘new order’ thatexists in Karabakh comprise the first phase of thereorganization of the state in the South Caucasus.However, while externally the new order has not beeninternationally legitimated, the most essential feature ofthe independence of the former Soviet autonomies is

the comprehensive redrawing of political, social,economic and national boundaries. For the elite andsociety of Karabakh, this is the most significantachievement of independence. As far as they areconcerned, Karabakh Armenians are no longer aminority in a titular state, but the majority in arestructured state. They are no longer dependent ondecisions made in distant centres of power, but decideupon their own course of action.

Given this context, compromises and accommodationsagreed upon by the parties require basic structuralcapacities that a granting and receiving entity musthave. The question is whether a still-evolving statepossesses such stable structures. It is important todistinguish the internal and external bases of structuralweaknesses. Internally, the starting point of staterebuilding is the dilapidated infrastructure inheritedfrom Soviet times: South Caucasian states are engagedin a process of building new structures on oldfoundations. For the de facto states, structuralweaknesses are largely due to external factors, the most critical of which are the lack of formalinternational support, foreign investment, aid forrebuilding infrastructure, communications with theoutside world (especially in information andtechnology) and substantial assistance fordevelopment of civil society. The denial of suchinternational assistance and engagement,notwithstanding the work of NGOs, is meant to punishsecessionism and somehow force a negotiated end tothe conflict. But this has had other consequences:deepening isolation and a reinforcement of suspicionsthat the international community is not impartial andfavours the position of the metropolitan states.

Minorities in autonomous republics were not regardedprimarily as citizens of the majority’s state, but definedby the majority as the ‘other’: the Armenians were ‘non-Azeris’, ‘settlers’ or ‘latecomers’ in the majority’sstate. With independence, minorities now seethemselves as having eliminated the ‘social control’ ofthe majority, the heavy burden of being the ‘other’. IfCyprus and Palestine/Israel are any indication, theresolution of the conflicts in the South Caucasus willtake a very long time. Mediation and efforts to findsolutions should not only look for political will and asellable agreement, but an understanding of leadershipand structural capacity, democratic development andinter- and intra-society discourses.

67New structures, old foundations: state capacities for peace

The politics ofnon-recognitionanddemocratization

Laurence Broers

Until very recently international organizations andmany Western states rejected engagement withEurasia’s de facto states (Nagorny Karabakh,

Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria) as legitimatingethnic cleansing and undermining the primacy ofterritorial integrity in Western responses to the formationof post-Soviet states. As a result, the region’s de factostates have rarely been looked at through the sameapproaches of transition and democratization applied to the region’s de jure states. Instead of being seen aspolitical environments in their own right, de facto statestend to be seen only in the context of their interactionswith external actors and peace processes. This omissionhas been challenged by some de facto states, which haveincreasingly used the language of democratization tofurther their claims to independence. This strategyappears to have resonated with some Western observers.Since 2003, Karabakh Armenian politicians have drawnattention to Nagorny Karabakh’s assessment as ‘partlyfree’ in Freedom House’s ‘Freedom in the World’ index.Although the Freedom House index presents a highlysimplified system for grading democratic practices,Karabakh crucially scored higher than Azerbaijan, whilerivalling Armenia.

If, as is sometimes suggested, democratization is aprerequisite of conflict resolution we need to engagewith de facto states as political systems in their ownright and as participants, albeit in the margins, of thebroader processes transforming the post-Soviet space.Furthermore, withholding support for democraticprocesses in de facto states ultimately encumbers thedevelopment of genuinely participatory and pluralistpolitics, on which, as most observers seem to agree, anyfuture settlement must be predicated. Thus engagingde facto states could and should be seen as consistentwith support for democratic governance, rather than asnecessarily inconsistent with adherence to the principleof territorial integrity. The developments outlinedabove invite a number of questions. How important arerecognition and membership of the international statesystem to democratization outcomes? Can wedistinguish between the practice and the rhetoric ofdemocracy? If so, how has the discourse of democracybeen incorporated by de facto states into their quest forlegitimacy in the eyes of the international community?To consider these questions is not to a priori legitimatethe existence of de facto states, but a necessary corollaryto any attempt to engage them in peace processes.

Starting points matterTheories of transition suggest that starting points arecritical to the success or failure of democratization. Inthe case of Karabakh, the unfavourable legacy ofviolent conflict was mitigated by a number of factors.First, unlike Chechnya, Karabakh’s armed forces did notfragment into competing warlord armies rooted in

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Arkady Ghukasian casts his ballot during presidentialelections in Stepanakert, 11 Aug 2002.

Source: AP Photo/Photolur

‘clannish’ affiliations. Although a power struggle diddevelop between the de facto president, ArkadyGhukasian, and Minister of Defence Samvel Babayan,this struggle was contained and resolved in 2000 withBabayan’s imprisonment on charges of an attemptedassassination. Second, Armenia’s wide-ranging support,in economic and other terms, has mitigated the impactof war losses. Armenia (and beyond, the Armeniandiaspora) provides more than half of Nagorny Karabakh’sbudget, as well as a wide range of goods and services inmilitary, energy and other spheres. Third, althoughunification with Armenia was the central tenet of the‘Karabakh movement’ that emerged in 1988, it alsorapidly became identified with a dissident discoursepromoting democratic values. As a result the discourse(at least) of democracy was and is accorded a centralplace in Karabakh Armenian political culture; thisprovides an important resource for opposition, reflectedin references to the contemporary relevance of thepolitical values associated with the Karabakh movement.

Against these factors a number of structural drawbacksneed to be considered. Although Karabakh avoidedclan wars of the sort that have so debilitatedChechnya’s bid for independence, its political culture isnonetheless highly militarized. A regime of martial lawis still technically in place, renewed yearly by

presidential decree, while political partnershipsbetween key individuals forged in war remain abovecritical reflection. While this has not forestalled theemergence of civil politics, continued martial law allowsthe regime to seclude certain key types of information,such as population statistics, crucial for transparentelectoral processes. Second, Armenia’s support is adouble-edged sword so far as democratization isconcerned. While attenuating hardship for the broaderpopulation by providing a source of externally derivedresources, it alleviates the need for the regime inStepanakert to negotiate a social contract with localsociety. This to some extent lends the Stepanakertregime a ‘rentier’ profile, that is, a regime maintained byresources external to the society over which it rules andbefore which it is thus less accountable.

A key result of the war was the ethnic homogenizationof Nagorny Karabakh through the removal of the Azeripopulation. This removed a key political cleavage,enabling a certain core consensus on the existence andpurpose of the resulting de facto state. However, it hasalso closed off a potential avenue for the articulation ofa civic rather than ethnic sense of membership;although multiethnic Abkhazia has yet to reap genuinedemocratic dividends from incorporating minorities,their existence in itself creates political space for

69The politics of non-recognition and democratization

competing visions of Abkhazian statehood. In Karabakhethnic homogenization has shut off debates on thenature of political membership and underpinned theeffacement of a Karabakh Azeri identity.

Vectors of democratizationHow then do the above factors interact with thecontext of non-recognition to influence democraticoutcomes in Nagorny Karabakh? Since declaring itselfindependent in 1991 Nagorny Karabakh has held threepresidential elections and four sets of parliamentaryelections. Although they increasingly attract observersfrom a range of international non-governmentalorganizations, as well as the Commonwealth ofIndependent States (CIS), they are not recognized bythe international community as a whole. The ruling elitein Karabakh emerged out of the wartime leadership,which since the accession of Ghukasian as presidenthas increasingly turned towards outwardly civic politicsostensibly rooted in multiparty politics. Opposition inKarabakh has developed in response to specificallylocal factors but also as a function of wider Armenianpolitics. The main ‘opposition’ party, the ArmenianRevolutionary Federation (ARF, or Dashnaks) forms partof the ruling coalition in Armenia and is a major politicalforce in the Armenian diaspora (see profiles); previouslyallied with the government in Karabakh, the ARF wentinto opposition after a dispute over its representation ingovernment cadres. Other opposition parties have beenformed by reform-minded intellectuals, successors tothe communist tradition and allies of the ruling eliteseeking to fragment the opposition vote. Elections inKarabakh nonetheless revolve less around concreteissues or policy choices than raw questions of power:who gets the impunity conferred by political office?

Regime candidates generally dominated elections untilthe victory of a candidate for Movement-88, a newreformist party, in the 2004 elections to the mayoraltyin Stepanakert. Expectations that oppositional successwould be repeated at the June 2005 parliamentaryelections proved false, however. The main oppositionbloc, composed of the ARF and Movement-88, wononly 3 of 33 mandates with 25 per cent of the vote; theregime-backed parties Democratic Artsakh and FreeHomeland dominated the vote with 64 per centbetween them. Some 130 international observers,including representatives of the CIS, the British HelsinkiHuman Rights Group and a number of United Statespolicymakers, observed the elections; their assessmentwas almost exclusively positive. Independent mediaand civil society representatives, however, articulatedcomplaints regarding the conduct of the pre-electioncampaign, especially the alleged provision of economicincentives to vote for regime-backed parties, andchanges to the electoral code removing the ‘50 percent plus’ requirement to win in one round and the

second round run-off system where this is notachieved. In sum, observers and oppositionrepresentatives did not question their validity orconduct, yet by further entrenching the incumbentregime the elections appeared to move Karabakh nonearer to a genuinely participatory politics.

What explains the divergence between the apparentlyassiduous conduct of the elections and their failure toact as a mechanism for internal political transformation?At least in part this may be explained by the paradoxicalways in which non-recognition structures the legitimacyof de facto governments. The withholding of recognitionin a context of permanent insecurity and a homogenizedpopulation allows the Stepanakert regime to be asingle-issue government embodying the quest forsovereignty. Non-recognition thus locates the internallegitimacy of the de facto state in its mere existence,rather than its adherence to democratic principles orresponsiveness to society. The reification of ‘stability’ asthe cornerstone of Karabakh politics reflects a tacitconsensus across the political arena on the parametersof dissent under conditions of constant ‘siege’. Thedisparagement shown by government and oppositionalike to revolutionary events in Georgia, Ukraine andKyrgyzstan reflects this consensus. This suggests animportant distinction between the rules of the game inKarabakh politics as internal players perceive them, andcriteria of democracy perceived by external observers.

Nonetheless, the government of Karabakh goes togreat lengths to demonstrate compliance withinternational expectations of democratic states. It hasvoluntarily implemented a number of internationalstandards applying to de jure states. As the 2005parliamentary elections demonstrated, it also takesgreat care to ensure procedural and technical regularityin its electoral processes, far more so than manyregimes in the region’s de jure states. Certainly, thisstrategy may be seen as contributing to the regime’sinternal legitimacy, yet it may also be seen as aresponse to Western agendas of democratization,where the presence of certain ‘markers’ such as regularelections and multiparty politics is taken to indicate ahealthy transition. This is a rational response whereWestern policymakers have framed the issue ofrecognition in terms of ‘standards before status’, as theyhave done in Kosovo.

In this context it seems appropriate to speak ofcontrasting internal and external vectors ofdemocratization. Internally we are witnessing anuneven and highly contested process of liberalizationnot dissimilar to that of de jure states but wherereformists are encumbered by the peculiar conditionsof non-recognition. Externally we see the projection ofdemocratic statehood to the outside world in supportof Karabakh’s claim to sovereignty. The outcome of the

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2005 elections may be better understood from thisperspective. In their internal function the elections didlittle to channel the recent emergence of greaterpluralism, serving instead to entrench the incumbentregime and fortify it from challengers. Externally,however, the elections successfully projected the idealof a pluralistic, participatory process worthy of afunctioning democratic state.

Mediating between society and the defacto stateWhat levers exist, then, for society to shape the politicsof the de facto state? Unlike civil societies in de jurestates empowered by substantial external support, civilsociety in Nagorny Karabakh faces far greater difficultiesin influencing the state. Of about 80 registered non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Karabakh, only atenth are thought to be active. The key problem forNGO development is the absence of resources, acorollary of the fact that until very recently apart fromhumanitarian assistance international organizationshave been unwilling to engage in single-communityprogramming in Karabakh (unlike Abkhazia and SouthOssetia, where the United Nations, Organization forSecurity and Cooperation in Europe, European Unionand a wide range of international NGOs implementactivities – in part due to easier access). Civil societyactors in Karabakh have been caught between thechairs of inclusion in region-wide initiatives, logisticallyand politically fraught bilateral initiatives with Azerbaijanipartners and the overpowering influence of diaspora-funded and -run activities.

For international donors and the government in Bakusingle-community programming for civil societydevelopment in Karabakh presents a dilemma. On theone hand the implication of a poorly developed civilsociety is that it will not have sufficient capacity tomediate between society and state in the case of apeace settlement. Any sustainable peace settlementwill demand a certain level of consensus within thesocieties party to it, which can only be reached throughthe participation of civil society in channelling differentagendas, articulating public concerns and establishingthe parameters of what is acceptable. On the otherhand, single-community programming can and is oftenseen as capacity building for separatism. Yet a decadeof isolation of de facto states has not brought themetropolitan states any closer to reincorporating them.It is therefore for international donors and theAzerbaijani state to ponder the wisdom of, respectively,ruling out and obstructing funding for single-community programming in Karabakh.

Rhetoric or real politics?It is now clear that ethnic ideologies of secession havefailed to garner international legitimacy for the de factostates, unlike the earlier secession of union republicsfrom the Soviet Union. Much to their chagrin the titularnationalities of the de facto states have not succeeded inconvincing the world that Georgia, Azerbaijan andMoldova in their Soviet-era boundaries are imperialstates as deserving of fragmentation as the SovietUnion. However, the renewed emphasis placed byleading Western powers on notions of ‘democracy’ and‘freedom’ has opened new rhetorical spaces receptive to the advocacy of sovereignty by and for de facto states.In this context we have begun to witness what could betermed ‘competitive democratization’, the attempt todemonstrate indicators of democracy superficiallyrecognizable to Western observers in advance of asignificant other, in this case, the metropolitan state.

Is the ‘democratization-for-recognition’ strategyworking? Increasing interest across a range of non-governmental Western actors towards politicalprocesses in Karabakh may suggest chinks in the wall of non-recognition. However, against this it is evidentthat external state actors continue to make territorialintegrity a precondition of conflict resolution, and,furthermore, accept the legitimacy of de jure boundariesregardless of what political conditions for democracyexist within them. This would suggest that any argumentlinking democratization to recognition is a fallacy.

Implicit in competitive democratization is a claim thatbeyond historical grievances or ethnic differences, theArmenian-Azerbaijani conflict is ultimately a conflict of values, structured by the adherence of KarabakhArmenians to ‘Western’ democratic values and theincompatibility of these values with Azerbaijani politicalculture. This is suggestive of a disturbing elision ofdemocracy and identity, drawing upon orientalist East/West stereotypes to transplant the ‘clash of civilizations’thesis to the realm of possible political orders and theircompatibility with Armenian and Azerbaijani identities.However, confusing political values with identity carriesthe danger of elevating these values ‘above’ politics.Karabakh Armenian society currently stands in thrall tothe value of independence, an ideal that has become amission and ‘higher’ vision absolving the regime inStepanakert of the need to engage in real politics acrossa range of issues. In this visionary politics ‘democracy’ isbeing configured as a means to the end of independence,rather than a set of universally binding principles andprocedures capable of transforming politics in Karabakhand structuring the inevitable future of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations. This leaves the question: for howlong can the promised afterlife of sovereignty outweighthe deficit between the procedural façade favoured bythe regime and a genuinely participatory politics?

71The politics of non-recognition and democratization

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■ Resolution by the Soviet of theAutonomous Region of NagornyKarabakh requesting incorporationinto the Armenian SSR, Stepanakert,20 February 1988 [unofficialtranslation].

■ Resolution of the Presidium of theUSSR Supreme Soviet regarding thedecisions of the Supreme Soviets ofAzerbaijan and Armenia on NagornyKarabakh, Moscow, 18 July 1988.

■ Joint resolution of Armenia SSR and Nagorny Karabakh Oblast onreunification, 1 December 1989.

■ Decision of the Supreme Soviet of theAzerbaijan SSR in connection withthe decision of the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR on uniting theArmenian SSR and the NKAO, Baku, 6 December 1989.

■ Law on Secession, USSR, 3 April1990 [unofficial translation; extracts].

■ Zheleznovodsk Declaration,Zheleznovodsk, 23 September 1991.

■ Summary of Conclusions of theCouncil of Ministers of the CSCE,Helsinki, 24 March 1992.

■ Joint Declaration by the Heads ofState [of Armenia, Azerbaijan andIran], Tehran, 7 May 1992.

■ Agreement between the threeforeign ministers of NagornyKarabakh, Armenia and Azerbaijan on ceasefire, Alma-Ata, 1 September1992

■ Agreement on the halting ofhostilities, Sochi, 19 September 1992.

■ Section 907 of the Freedom SupportAct (Public Law 102-511),Washington, DC, 24 October 1992.

■ UN Security Council Resolution 822,30 April 1993.

■ UN Security Council Resolution 853,29 July 1993.

■ UN Security Council Resolution 874,14 October 1993.

■ UN Security Council Resolution 884,12 November 1993.

■ Declaration of the Heads of State ofthe Commonwealth of IndependentStates, Moscow, 15 April 1994.

■ The Bishkek Protocol, Bishkek, 5 May 1994 [unofficial translation].

■ Ceasefire agreement, Bishkek, 11 May 1994.

■ CSCE Summit Decision on NagornyKarabakh, Budapest, 6 December1994.

■ Agreement on the Settlement ofIncidents [along the ceasefire line], 6 February 1995.

■ Statement of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Organization for Securityand Co-operation in Europe 1996Summit, Lisbon, 3 December 1996.

■ Joint Declaration of the Presidents ofthe Russian Federation, United Statesand France, Denver, 23 June 1997.

■ Minsk Group proposal (‘packagedeal’), July 1997 [unofficialtranslation].

■ Minsk Group proposal (‘step-by-step deal’), December 1997[unofficial translation].

■ Minsk Group proposal (‘commonstate deal’), November 1998[unofficial translation].

■ Council of Europe Resolution 1416,Strasbourg, 25 January 2005.

■ Report of the OSCE Fact-FindingMission to the Occupied Territories of Azerbaijan Surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh, Prague, 6 February 2005.

The resolution of theAutonomous Region ofNagorno Karabakhrequesting incorporationin Soviet Armenia20 February 1988

Special meeting of the 20th session,the Soviet of People’s Deputies,Autonomous Region of NagornoKarabakh. RESOLUTION: Regarding mediation for the transferof the Autonomous Region of NagornoKarabakh from the Azerbaijani SSR tothe Armenian SSR: After listening to and reviewing thestatements of the people’s deputies ofthe Autonomous Region of NagornoKarabakh Soviet “regarding themediation of the SSR Supreme Sovietbetween the Azerbaijani SSR andArmenian SSR for the transfer of theAutonomous Region of NagornoKarabakh from the Azerbaijani SSR tothe Armenian SSR,” the special sessionof regional soviet of the 20th regionalsoviet of Nagorno Karabakh resolves,Welcoming the wishes of the workersof the Autonomous Region of NagornoKarabakh to request the SupremeSoviets of Azerbaijani and ArmenianSSRs that they appreciate the deepaspirations of the Armenian populationof Nagorno Karabakh and to transferthe Autonomous Region of NagornoKarabakh from the Azerbaijani SSR tothe Armenian SSR, at the same time tointercede with the Supreme Soviet ofUSSR to reach a positive resolutionregarding the transfer of the regionfrom the Azerbaijani SSR to theArmenian SSR.

Extracts from the USSR’sLaw on Secession 3 April 1990

Concerning the procedure ofsecession of a Soviet Republic fromthe USSR. The law of the USSR ofApril 3, 1990 (Register of theCongress of the People’s Deputies ofUSSR and Supreme Soviet of USSR.1990, issue No. 13, p. 252)Article 1: The procedure of secessionof a Soviet Republic from the USSR isconducted in accordance with theArticle 72 of the Constitution of theUSSR under the present Law.

Key texts and agreementsA selection of texts and agreements from the Nagorny Karabakh conflict andpeace process. Texts in bold are printed here; additional materials are available at www.c-r.org/accord

Article 2: The decision on secessionof a Soviet Republic from the USSR is made by the will of the people of that Soviet Republic by means of areferendum.The decision to conduct a referendumis to be ratified by the Supreme Sovietof a Soviet Republic based either onits own will or on the request made bythe 10 per cent of permanent residentswho have a right to vote according tothe USSR laws.The referendum is to be conductedaccording to the referendum law ofthe USSR, referendum law of a givenSoviet or autonomous Republic if they do not contradict this law.The referendum is to be conducted by a secret vote not earlier than 6 months and not later than 9 monthsafter the decision to conduct thesecession referendum has been madeby a Soviet Republic.Citizens of the USSR, permanentlyresiding on the territory of theRepublic by the time the decision toconduct a referendum is made andwho have a right to vote according to the USSR laws, have a right toparticipate in the referendum.No agitation on the subject of thereferendum is allowed during thecourse of the referendum.Article 3: In case the Soviet Republichas autonomous republics,autonomous regions or autonomousterritories within its borders,referendums are to be conductedseparately in each of the autonomies.The people residing in the autonomiesare given a right to independentlydecide whether to remain in theSoviet Union or in the secedingRepublic as well as to decide on their state legal status.Referendum results are to beconsidered separately for the territoryof a Soviet Republic with a compactlysettled ethnic minority population,which constitutes majority on thatparticular territory of the Republic.Article 6: Decision of a SovietRepublic to secede from the USSRmust be made by means of areferendum if so voted by not lessthan two-thirds of the citizens of theUSSR, who permanently resided on theterritory of the Republic and areeligible to vote in accordance withlaws of the USSR by the time thedecision was made to conduct a

referendum on secession from theSoviet Union.Results of a referendum are to bereviewed by the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Republic. In a republic,which has autonomous republics,autonomous regions, autonomousterritories or territories with compactlysettled national minority population asmentioned in Article 3 of the presentLaw within its borders, the results ofthe referendum are to be reviewed bythe Supreme Soviet of the SovietRepublic jointly with the SupremeSoviet of the autonomous republic andrespective Soviets of People’s Deputies.The Supreme Soviet of a SovietRepublic then submits the results ofthe referendum to the Supreme Sovietof the USSR. The Supreme Soviet ofthe Soviet Republic which hasautonomous republics, autonomousregions, autonomous territories orterritories with a compactly settlednational minority population within itsborders as mentioned in second part of Article 3 of the present Law submitsthe results for each autonomousrepublic, autonomous region,autonomous territory or territory witha compactly settled national minoritypopulation to the Supreme Soviet ofthe USSR separately along withnecessary conclusions and suggestionsmade by respective state authorities. If it is verified that the referendum isconducted in accordance with the law,the Supreme Soviet of the USSR takesit to the Congress of the People’sDeputies of USSR for review.

RESOLUTION 822 Adopted by the Security Council at its3205th meeting, on 30 April 1993

The Security Council, Recalling the statements of thePresident of the Security Council of29 January 1993 (S/25199) and of 6 April 1993 (S/25539) concerning the Nagorny-Karabakh conflict, Taking note of the report of theSecretary-General dated 14 April 1993(S/25600), Expressing its serious concern at thedeterioration of the relations betweenthe Republic of Armenia and theRepublic of Azerbaijan, Noting with alarm the escalation inarmed hostilities and, in particular,

the latest invasion of the Kelbadjardistrict of the Republic of Azerbaijanby local Armenian forces, Concerned that this situation endangerspeace and security in the region, Expressing grave concern at thedisplacement of a large number ofcivilians and the humanitarianemergency in the region, in particularin the Kelbadjar district, Reaffirming the respect forsovereignty and territorial integrity of all States in the region, Reaffirming also the inviolability of international borders and theinadmissibility of the use of force for the acquisition of territory, Expressing its support for the peaceprocess being pursued within theframework of the Conference onSecurity and Cooperation in Europeand deeply concerned at the distruptiveeffect that the escalation in armedhostilities can have on that process, 1. Demands the immediate cessationof all hostilities and hostile acts with a view to establishing a durablecease-fire, as well as immediatewithdrawal of all occupying forcesfrom the Kelbadjar district and otherrecently occupied areas of Azerbaijan; 2. Urges the parties concernedimmediately to resume negotiations for the resolution of the conflict withinthe framework of the peace process of the Minsk Group of the Conferenceon Security and Cooperation in Europeand refrain from any action that willobstruct a peaceful solution of theproblem; 3. Calls for unimpeded access forinternational humanitarian reliefefforts in the region, in particular in all areas affected by the conflict inorder to alleviate the suffering of thecivilian population and reaffirms thatall parties are bound to comply withthe principles and rules of internationalhumanitarian law; 4. Requests the Secretary-General, inconsultation with the Chairman-in-Office of the Conference on Securityand Cooperation in Europe as well asthe Chairman of the Minsk Group ofthe Conference to assess the situationin the region, in particular in theKelbadjar district of Azerbaijan, and tosubmit a further report to the Council; 5. Decides to remain actively seized ofthe matter.

73Key texts

RESOLUTION 853 Adopted by the Security Council at its3259th meeting, on 29 July 1993

The Security Council, Reaffirming its resolution 822 (1993)of 30 April 1993, Having considered the report issuedon 27 July 1993 by the Chairman ofthe Mink Group of the Conference onSecurity and Cooperation in Europe(CSCE) (S/26184), Expressing its serious concern at thedeterioration of relations between the Republic of Armenia and theAzerbaijani Republic and at thetensions between them, Welcoming acceptance by the partiesconcerned at the timetable of urgentsteps to implement its resolution 822(1993), Noting with alarm the escalation inarmed hostilities and, in particular,the seizure of the district of Aghdamin the Azerbaijani Republic, Concerned that this situationcontinues to endanger peace andsecurity in the region, Expressing once again its graveconcern at the displacement of largenumbers of civilians in the AzerbaijaniRepublic and at the serioushumanitarian emergency in the region, Reaffirming the sovereignty andterritorial integrity of the AzerbaijaniRepublic and of all other States in theregion, Reaffirming also the inviolability ofinternational borders and theinadmissability of the use of force for the acquisition of territory, 1. Condemns the seizure of the districtof Aghdam and of all other recentlyoccupied areas of the AzerbaijaniRepublic; 2. Further condemns all hostile actionsin the region, in particular attacks oncivilians and bombardments ofinhabited areas; 3. Demands the immediate cessationof all hostilities and the immediatecomplete and unconditionalwithdrawal of the occupying forcesinvolved from the district of Aghdamand all other recently occupied areasof the Azerbaijan Republic; 4. Calls on the parties concerned toreach and maintain durable cease-firearrangements;

5. Reiterates in the context ofparagraphs 3 and 4 above its earliercalls for the restoration of economic,transport and energy links in theregion; 6. Endorses the continuing efforts bythe Minsk Group of the CSCE toachieve a peaceful solution to theconflict, including efforts to implementresolution 822 (1993), and expresses itsgrave concern at the disruptive effectthat the escalation of armed hostilitieshas had on these efforts;7. Welcomes the preparations for aCSCE monitor mission with atimetable for its deployment, as wellas consideration within the CSCE ofthe proposal for a CSCE presence inthe region; 8. Urges the parties concerned torefrain from any action that willobstruct a peaceful solution to theconflict, and to pursue negotiationswithin the Minsk Group of the CSCE,as well as through direct contactsbetween them, towards a finalsettlement; 9. Urges the Government of theRepublic of Armenia to continue toexert its influence to achievecompliance by the Armenians of theNagorny-Karabakh region of theAzerbaijani Republic with itsresolution 822 (1993) and the presentresolution, and the acceptance by this party of the proposals of theMinsk Group of the CSCE; 10. Urges States to refrain from thesupply of any weapons and munitionswhich might lead to an intensificationof the conflict or the continuedoccupation of territory; 11. Calls once again for unimpededaccess for international humanitarianrelief efforts in the region, inparticular in all areas affected by theconflict, in order to alleviate theincreased suffering of the civilianpopulation and reaffirms that allparties are bound to comply with theprinciples and rules of internationalhumanitarian law; 12. Requests the Secretary-Generaland relevant international agencies toprovide urgent humanitarianassistance to the affected civilianpopulation and to assist displacedpersons to return to their homes; 13. Requests the Secretary-General, inconsultation with the Chairman-in-

Office of the CSCE as well as theChairman of the Minsk Group, tocontinue to report to the Council onthe situation; 14. Decides to remain actively seizedof the matter.

RESOLUTION 874 Adopted by the Security Council at its3292nd meeting, on 14 October 1993

The Security Council, Reaffirming its resolutions 822 (1993)of 30 April 1993 and 853 (1993) of 29July 1993, and recalling the statementread by the President of the Council,on behalf of the Council, on 18 August1993 (S/26326), Having considered the letter dated 1 October 1993 from the Chairman of the Conference on Security andCooperation in Europe (CSCE) MinskConference on Nagorny Karabakhaddressed to the President of theSecurity Council (S/26522), Expressing its serious concern that acontinuation of the conflict in andaround the Nagorny Karabakh regionof the Azerbaijani Republic, and ofthe tensions between the Republic of Armenia and the AzerbaijaniRepublic, would endanger peace and security in the region, Taking note of the high-level meetingswhich took place in Moscow on 8October 1993 and expressing the hopethat they will contribute to theimprovement of the situation and thepeaceful settlement of the conflict, Reaffirming the sovereignty andterritorial integrity of the AzerbaijaniRepublic and of all other States inthe region, Reaffirming also the inviolability ofinternational borders and theinadmissibility of the use of force forthe acquisition of territory, Expressing once again its graveconcern at the human suffering theconflict has caused and at the serioushumanitarian emergency in the regionand expressing in particular its graveconcern at the displacement of largenumbers of civilians in the AzerbaijaniRepublic, 1. Calls upon the parties concerned tomake effective and permanent thecease-fire established as a result of thedirect contacts undertaken with theassistance of the Government of the

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Russian Federation in support of theCSCE Minsk Group; 2. Reiterates again its full support forthe peace process being pursuedwithin the framework of the CSCE,and for the tireless efforts of the CSCE Minsk Group; 3. Welcomes and commends to theparties the Adjusted timetable ofurgent steps to implement SecurityCouncil resolutions 822 (1993) and853 (1993) set out on 28 September1993 at the meeting of the CSCEMinsk Group and submitted to theparties concerned by the Chairman ofthe Group with the full support ofnine other members of the Group, andcalls on the parties to accept it; 4. Expresses the conviction that allother pending questions arising fromthe conflict and not directly addressedin the adjusted timetable should besettled expeditiously through peacefulnegotiations in the context of theCSCE Minsk process; 5. Calls for the immediateimplementation of the reciprocal andurgent steps provided for in the CSCEMinsk Group’s Adjusted timetable,including the withdrawal of forcesfrom recently occupied territories andthe removal of all obstacles tocommunications and transportation; 6. Calls also for an early convening ofthe CSCE Minsk Conference for thepurpose of arriving at a negotiatedsettlement to the conflict as providedfor in the timetable, in conformitywith the 24 March 1992 mandate ofthe CSCE Council of Ministers; 7. Requests the Secretary-General torespond favourably to an invitation tosend a representative to attend theCSCE Minsk Conference and toprovide all possible assistance for thesubstantive negotiations that willfollow the opening of the Conference; 8. Supports the monitoring missiondeveloped by the CSCE; 9. Calls on all parties to refrain fromall violations of internationalhumanitarian law and renews its callin resolutions 822 (1993) and 853(1993) for unimpeded access forinternational humanitarian reliefefforts in all areas affected by theconflict; 10. Urges all States in the region torefrain from any hostile acts and fromany interference or intervention whichwould lead to the widening of the

conflict and undermine peace andsecurity in the region; 11. Requests the Secretary-Generaland relevant international agencies toprovide urgent humanitarianassistance to the affected civilianpopulation and to assist refugees anddisplaced persons to return to theirhomes in security and dignity; 12. Requests also the Secretary-General, the Chairman-in-Office ofthe CSCE and the Chairman of theCSCE Minsk Conference to continueto report to the Council on theprogress of the Minsk process and onall aspects of the situation on theground, and on present and futurecooperation between the CSCE andthe United Nations in this regard; 13. Decides to remain actively seizedof the matter.

RESOLUTION 884 Adopted by the Security Council at its3313th meeting, on 12 November 1993

The Security Council, Reaffirming its resolutions 822 (1993)of 30 April 1993, 853 (1993) of 29 July1993 and 874 (1993) of 14 October1993, Reaffirming its full support for thepeace process being pursued withinthe framework of the Conference onSecurity and Cooperation in Europe(CSCE), and for the tireless efforts ofthe CSCE Minsk Group, Taking note of the letter dated 9November 1993 from the Chairman-in-Office of the Minsk Conference onNagorny Karabakh addressed to thePresident of the Security Council andits enclosures (S/26718, annex), Expressing its serious concern that acontinuation of the conflict in andaround the Nagorny Karabakh regionof the Azerbaijani Republic, and ofthe tensions between the Republic ofArmenia and the AzerbaijaniRepublic, would endanger peace andsecurity in the region, Noting with alarm the escalation inarmed hostilities as consequence ofthe violations of the cease-fire andexcesses in the use of force inresponse to those violations, inparticular the occupation of theZangelan district and the city ofGoradiz in the Azerbaijani Republic,

Reaffirming the sovereignty andterritorial integrity of the AzerbaijaniRepublic and of all other States inthe region, Reaffirming also the inviolability of international borders and theinadmissibility of the use of force forthe acquisition of territory, Expressing grave concern at the latestdisplacement of a large number ofcivilians and the humanitarianemergency in the Zangelan districtand the city of Goradiz and onAzerbaijan’s southern frontier, 1. Condemns the recent violations of the cease-fire established between the parties, which resulted in aresumption of hostilities, andparticularly condemns the occupationof the Zangelan district and the cityof Goradiz, attacks on civilians andbombardments of the territory of theAzerbaijani Republic; 2. Calls upon the Government ofArmenia to use its influence toachieve compliance by the Armeniansof the Nagorny Karabakh region ofthe Azerbaijani Republic withresolutions 822 (1993) , 853 (1993)and 874 (1993) , and to ensure thatthe forces involved are not providedwith the means to extend theirmilitary campaign further; 3. Welcomes the Declaration of 4 November 1993 of the ninemembers of the CSCE Minsk Group(S/26718) and commends theproposals contained therein forunilateral cease-fire declarations; 4. Demands from the partiesconcerned the immediate cessation ofarmed hostilities and hostile acts, theunilateral withdrawal of occupyingforces from the Zangelan district and the city of Goradiz, and thewithdrawal of occupying forces fromother recently occupied areas of theAzerbaijani Republic in accordancewith the adjusted timetable of urgentsteps to implement Security Councilresolutions 822 (1993) and 853 (1993)(S/26522, appendix), as amended bythe CSCE Minsk Group meeting inVienna of 2 to 8 November 1993; 5. Strongly urges the partiesconcerned to resume promptly and tomake effective and permanent thecease-fire established as a result of thedirect contacts undertaken with theassistance of the Government of the

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Russian Federation in support of theCSCE Minsk Group, and to continueto seek a negotiated settlement of theconflict within the context of theCSCE Minsk process and the Adjustedtimetable, as amended by the CSCEMinsk Group meeting in Vienna of 2 to 8 November 1993; 6. Urges again all States in the regionto refrain from any hostile acts andfrom any interference or intervention,which would lead to the widening ofthe conflict and undermine peace andsecurity in the region; 7. Requests the Secretary-General and relevant international agencies to provide urgent humanitarianassistance to the affected civilianpopulation, including that in theZangelan district and the city ofGoradiz and on Azerbaijan’s southernfrontier, and to assist refugees anddisplaced persons to return to theirhomes in security and dignity; 8. Reiterates its request that theSecretary-General, the Chairman-in-Office of the CSCE and the Chairmanof the CSCE Minsk Conferencecontinue to report to the Council onthe progress of the Minsk process andon all aspects of the situation on theground, in particular on theimplementation of its relevantresolutions, and on present and futurecooperation between the CSCE andthe United Nations in this regard; 9. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

The Bishkek Protocol 5 May 1994

Participants of the meeting held inMay 4-5 in Bishkek on the initiativeof the CIS Inter-ParliamentaryAssembly, Parliament of KyrgyzRepublic, Federal Congress andMinistry of Foreign Affairs of theRussian Federation: express determination to assist in all possible ways to the cessation ofarmed conflict in and around NagornoKarabakh, which does not only causeirretrievable losses to Azerbaijani andArmenian people, but also significantlyaffects the interests of other countriesin the region and seriously complicatesthe international situation; supporting the April 15, 1994Statement by the CIS Council of headsof states, express readiness to fully

support the efforts by heads andrepresentatives of executive power oncessation of the armed conflict andliquidation of its consequences byreaching an appropriate agreement as soon as possible; advocate a naturally active role of the Commonwealth and Inter-Parliamentary Assembly in cessationof the conflict, in realization ofthereupon principles, goals and theUN and OSCE certain decisions (firstof all the UN Security Councilresolutions 822, 853, 874, 884); call upon the conflicting sides tocome to common senses: cease to fireat the midnight of May 8 to 9, guidedby the February 18, 1994 Protocol(including the part on allocatingobservers), and work intensively toconfirm this as soon as possible bysigning a reliable, legally bindingagreement envisaging a mechanism,ensuring the non-resumption ofmilitary and hostile activities,withdrawal of troops from occupiedterritories and restoration ofcommunication, return of refugees; agree to suggest Parliaments of theCIS member-states to discuss theinitiative by Chairman of Council ofthe Inter-Parliamentary Assembly V.Shumeyko and Head of the Assembly’sPeacemaking Group on NagornoKarabakh M. Sherimkulov on creatinga CIS peacemaking force; consider appropriate to continue suchmeetings for peaceful resolution of thearmed conflict; express gratitude to the people andleadership of Kyrgyzstan for creatingexcellent working conditions,cordiality and hospitality. [Signatories]

Lisbon Document 3 December 1996

ANNEX 1: STATEMENT OF THEOSCE CHAIRMAN-IN-OFFICE You all know that no progress hasbeen achieved in the last two years to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakhconflict and the issue of the territorialintegrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan.I regret that the efforts of the Co-Chairmen of the Minsk Conference toreconcile the views of the parties onthe principles for a settlement havebeen unsuccessful.

Three principles which should formpart of the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict were recommendedby the Co-Chairmen of the MinskGroup. These principles are supportedby all member States of the MinskGroup. They are: • territorial integrity of the Republicof Armenia and the AzerbaijanRepublic; • legal status of Nagorno-Karabakhdefined in an agreement based onself-determination which confers onNagorno-Karabakh the highest degreeof self-rule within Azerbaijan; • guaranteed security for Nagorno-Karabakh and its whole population,including mutual obligations toensure compliance by all the Partieswith the provisions of the settlement. I regret that one participating Statecould not accept this. These principleshave the support of all otherparticipating States. This statement will be included in theLisbon Summit documents.

Minsk Group ‘package’proposalJuly 1997

Unofficial translation of Russianoriginal

Comprehensive agreement onthe resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflictCo-Chairs of the Minsk Group of the OSCEPreamble:The Sides, recognizing fully theadvantages of peace and cooperationin the region for the flourishing andwellbeing of their peoples, expresstheir determination to achieve apeaceful resolution of the prolongedNagorny Karabakh conflict. Theresolution laid out below will create a basis for the joint economicdevelopment of the Caucasus, givingthe peoples of this region thepossibility of living a normal andproductive life under democraticinstitutions, promoting wellbeing and a promising future. Cooperation in accordance with the presentAgreement will lead to normalrelations in the field of trade, transportand communications throughout theregion, giving people the opportunity

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to restore, with the assistance ofinternational organizations, theirtowns and villages, to create thestability necessary for a substantialincrease in external capital investmentin the region, and to open the way tomutually beneficial trade, leading tothe achievement of naturaldevelopment for all peoples, the basisfor which exists in the Caucasusregion. Conciliation and cooperationbetween peoples will release theirenormous potential to the benefit oftheir neighbours and other peoples of the world. In accordance with these wishes, theSides, being subject to the provisionsof the UN Charter, the basic principlesand decisions of the OSCE anduniversally recognized norms ofinternational law, and expressing theirdetermination to support the fullimplementation of UN SecurityCouncil Resolutions 822, 853, 874 and884, agree herewith to implement themeasures laid out in Agreement I inorder to put an end to armedhostilities and re-establish normalrelations, and to reach an agreementon the final status of NagornyKarabakh, as laid out in Agreement II.

Agreement I – The end ofarmed hostilitiesThe Sides agree:I. To reject the use of armed force toresolve disputes between them,including disputes arising in connectionwith the present Agreement.II. To withdraw armed forces in twostages: In the first stage forces positionedalong the current line of contact to theeast and south of Nagorny Karabakhwill be withdrawn kilometres to linesagreed in Appendix I of the High LevelPlanning Group recommendations,with the aim of securing conditions forthe deployment of a forwarddetachment of international OSCEforces in a militarily secure bufferzone, separating the Sides along thisline and guaranteeing security for thesecond stage of withdrawal. At the second stage forces will bewithdrawn in accordance with thetimetable agreed in Appendix I, asfollows:A. The armed forces of Armenia willbe withdrawn to within the borders ofthe Republic of Armenia.

B. The armed forces of NagornyKarabakh will be withdrawn to withinthe 1988 borders of the NagornyKarabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO;with the exceptions detailed below inClauses VIII and IX).C. The armed forces of Azerbaijan will be withdrawn to positions agreedin Appendix I on the basis of the High Level Planning Group’srecommendationsD. Heavy weaponry will be withdrawnfurther to positions agreed in AppendixI on the basis of the High LevelPlanning Group’s recommendationsand subject to conditions oftransparency and accountability.E. Upon the completion of withdrawalthe buffer zone will be located asindicated in the map shown inAppendix I, along the 1988 borders ofthe NKAO and the northern part of theArmenian-Azerbaijani border.III. That territories released as a resultof the withdrawal of armed forces willform a division zone, in which OSCEpeacekeeping forces will implementmonitoring of security conditions inconjunction with a Permanent JointCommission. Neither side will bepermitted to introduce its forces intothis zone except by permission ofOSCE peacekeeping forces and thePermanent Joint Commission inaccordance with the implementationof Appendix II, in which agreedsubdivisions are envisaged for customsservices, demining and civil policeforce functions. The Sides agree not tocarry out any military flights over thedivision zone and buffer zone. IV. To cooperate with the deploymentof international OSCE peacekeepingforces in the buffer zone in order toguarantee security in conjunction withthe Permanent Joint Commission.OSCE peacekeeping forces will consistof forces appointed by the OSCE,whose mandate will be defined by UNSecurity Council resolution andrenewed on the recommendation of theOSCE Chairman-in-Office.V. To implement the return of displacedpersons to their original places ofpermanent settlement in the divisionzone. OSCE peacekeeping forces inconjunction with the Permanent JointCommission will observe the securityconditions for the returning populationand provide guarantees to all Sides

regarding the observance ofdemilitarization in this zone.VI. That simultaneously with thewithdrawal of armed forces measureswill be implemented aimed at therestoration of roads, railways,electricity transmission lines andconnections, trade and other relations,including any other actions implied inthe achievement of these goals. TheSides guarantee the free use of theseconnections for all, including ethnicminorities, and guarantee the latteraccess to their ethnic groups locatedin other parts of the region. Each Sidepledges to remove all blockades and toallow the passage of goods and peopleto all other Sides. Armenia andAzerbaijan guarantee the free and saferail connection between their territories,including the Baku-Horadiz-Meghri-Ordubad-Nakhichevan-Yerevan route. VII. To cooperate with theInternational Committee of the RedCross and the United Nations HighCommission for Refugees and otherinternational humanitarianorganizations to secure the return ofall persons detained as a result of theconflict, ascertainment of the fate ofthose disappeared without trace andthe repatriation of all remains. VIII. In relation to the followingmeasures concerning the Lachincorridor:A. Azerbaijan will lease the corridorto the OSCE, which will conclude acontract on the exclusive use of thecorridor by the Nagorny Karabakhauthorities (with exceptions envisagedfor transit, explained below inClause E). B. The OSCE will observe securityconditions in conjunction with theNagorny Karabakh authorities.C. The boundaries of the Lachincorridor are agreed in Appendix IIwith due consideration of therecommendations of the HLPG.D. The OSCE will observe theconstruction of roads around the townof Lachin. Upon the completion ofroad construction the town of Lachinwill be excluded from the Lachincorridor. It will return to Azerbaijanijurisdiction (as part of the divisionzone) and its former inhabitants willbe able to return.E. Permanent settlement or armedforces are not allowed in the corridor,

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with the exception of permitted securityforce contingents. Representatives ofofficial bodies, observers and OSCEpeacekeeping forces have the right oftransit subject to prior notification, asdo Azerbaijani inhabitants of theregion in transit from the Lachindistrict to the Gubatly district or viceversa. Territory of the Lachin districtlying outside of the corridor formspart of the division zone.IX. With regard to the followingmeasures, concerning the town ofShusha and the Shaumian district:A. The Sides will withdraw theirarmed forces from both districts, withthe exception of anti-aircraft defencesmanned with limited crews.B. The local authorities will assist thedeployment of observers from theOffice of Democratic Institutions andHuman Rights (ODIHR) of the OSCE.C. Displaced persons will be able toreturn to their places of formerpermanent residence. The relevantlocal authorities will guarantee their security.D. Returnees will enjoy full civilrights, including the right to formpolitical parties. They will beappropriately represented inparliaments in Baku and Stepanakertand in the elected councils, policeforces and security structures of thesedistricts in accordance with theirproportional share of the localpopulation.E. A permanent joint commissionwill coordinate the allocation ofinternational aid in these locations onthe basis of justice and mutual benefitof both parts of the population. F. Inhabitants of the town of Shushaand Shaumian district will haveguaranteed access to roads,connections and other communicationlinks to the rest of Azerbaijan andwith Nagorny Karabakh.X. To establish a Permanent JointCommission (PJC) to observe theimplementation of measures foreseenin the present Agreement addressingthe problems of Azerbaijan andNagorny Karabakh. The PJC has threeco-chairs: one Azerbaijani, one fromNagorny Karabakh and onerepresentative of the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE. The implementationof the Agreement forms the principalresponsibility of the Azerbaijani and

Nagorny Karabakh co-chairs; mediationand arbitration in case of disputeforms the main responsibility of theOSCE co-Chair. The PJC has thefollowing sub-commissions: military,economic, humanitarian and cultural.The functions of the PJC and its sub-commissions are laid out inAppendix II.XI. To re-establish full diplomaticrelations between the Republic ofArmenia and the Republic ofAzerbaijan. XII. To establish a Bilateral Armenian-Azerbaijani Commission (BAAC), withone co-chair from the Republic ofArmenia and one from the Republic of Azerbaijan. The Chairman-in-Officeof the OSCE will be represented in thiscommission. The BAAC will work toprevent border incidents and willmaintain links between the borderforces and other correspondingsecurity forces of both countries, andwill observe the implementation ofmeasures to open roads, railways,communications, pipelines, trade andother relations. XII. The United Nations SecurityCouncil is the guarantor of the presentAgreement. XIV. The present Agreement willremain in force until the conclusion at the OSCE Minsk Conference of acomprehensive peace agreement,which will, in part, establishpermanent security and peacekeepingmechanisms replacing those foreseenin the present Agreement. [Appendices I & II]

Agreement II – StatusPreambleThe status of Nagorny Karabakh andthe preservation of its original ethnicand cultural character are issues ofconcern for the internationalcommunity, including the Republic of Armenia. Its status cannot bedetermined by unilateral acts of either the Azerbaijan Republic or theNagorny Karabakh authorities. Itsstatus will be determined according to the following parameters:I. All Sides in the conflict recognizethe territorial integrity of Azerbaijanand Armenia and the inviolability oftheir borders.II. Nagorny Karabakh forms a state-territorial entity within Azerbaijan,and its self-determination comprises

the rights and privileges laid outbelow, agreed between the AzerbaijanRepublic and the Nagorny Karabakhauthorities, approved by the MinskConference and incorporated into theConstitutions of Azerbaijan andNagorny Karabakh. III. Nagorny Karabakh andNakhichevan have the right to freeand unimpeded transport links andcommunications with Armenia and Azerbaijan.IV. The administrative boundaries ofNagorny Karabakh are determined on the basis of the boundaries of the former Nagorny KarabakhAutonomous Oblast (Region). V. Nagorny Karabakh has its ownConstitution, adopted by the people of Nagorny Karabakh on the basis of a referendum. This Constitutionincorporates an official agreementbetween the Nagorny Karabakhauthorities and Azerbaijan as to theform of self-determination on thebasis of the present document.Azerbaijan will introduce thenecessary changes into its Constitutionto incorporate these agreements.Nagorny Karabakh has its own flag,national symbols and anthem. VI. The Constitution and laws ofNagorny Karabakh are effective onthe territory of Nagorny Karabakh.The laws, rules and executive decreesof Azerbaijan are effective on theterritory of Nagorny Karabakh only if they do not contradict the latter’sConstitution and laws. VII. Nagorny Karabakh independentlyforms its legislative, executive andjudicial bodies.VIII. The population of NagornyKarabakh elects representatives to the parliament of Azerbaijan andparticipates in elections for thepresident of Azerbaijan. IX. Nagorny Karabakh has the right to establish direct external relationswith foreign states and internationalorganizations in the spheres ofeconomic relations, science, culture,sport and humanitarian issues, and tohave appropriate representativesabroad for the conduct of theserelations. Political parties in NagornyKarabakh have the right to relationswith political parties in other countries. X. Citizens of Nagorny Karabakh haveAzerbaijani passports with a specialstamp indicating ‘Nagorny Karabakh’.

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Citizens of Nagorny Karabakh are notconsidered foreigners with regard tothe laws of Armenia, they have theright to emigrate to Armenia at anytime, and in case of permanentsettlement in Armenia they may adopt Armenian citizenship.XI. Nagorny Karabakh comprises afree economic zone with the freecirculation within it of currencies. XII. Nagorny Karabakh has a nationalguard and police force. Citizens ofNagorny Karabakh have the right todo their military service on theterritory of Nagorny Karabakh. XIII. The army, security forces andpolice of Azerbaijan do not have theright to enter the territory of NagornyKarabakh without the permission ofthe Nagorny Karabakh authorities. XIV. The budget of Nagorny Karabakhis formed of contributions derivedfrom its own resources. Thegovernment of Nagorny Karabakhencourages and guarantees theinvestment of capital by Azerbaijaniand foreign individuals and companies.XV. Nagorny Karabakh has a multi-ethnic character; all citizens have the right to the use of their nationallanguage in all official andunofficial contexts.XVI. The United Nations SecurityCouncil is the guarantor of the presentAgreement.

Confidence building measuresfor the Nagorny KarabakhConflictAs a demonstration of their will toachieve a peaceful settlement of theconflict the Sides may implement,without expectation of any furtheragreement, any or all of the followingmeasures for the enhancement of trustand security:A. Azerbaijan and Armenia may takeupon themselves responsibility for theresumption of the ceasefire regimewithout delay along the boundary inthe Ijevan-Kazakh sector. This regime,applied in 1992, included a telephonehotline connection and joint borderpatrols;B. The Sides may agree on an increasein the OSCE Chairman-in-Office’sobserver mission, in order to implementadditional monitoring in connectionwith Nagorny Karabakh, for examplealong the Armenian-Azerbaijaniborder in the Ijevan-Kazakh sector;

C. Dialogue with the assistance of theUN High Commissioner on Refugeesand the International Committee ofthe Red Cross (ICRC) in order to assesshumanitarian needs (for both displacedAzerbaijani populations and withinNagorny Karabakh itself). This couldbe implemented in agreement witheither the UN High Commissioner orthe ICRC; D. The opening of weekly or dailymarkets in the Nagorny Karabakhregion, open for both Armenians andAzerbaijanis. This will demand thecreation of border crossing points andthe demining of transport routes tomarket places and agreementregarding the modalities of transportarrangements and rules of trade.

Minsk Group ‘step-by-step’ proposalDecember 1997

Unofficial translation of Russianoriginal

Agreement on the end of theNagorny Karabakh armedconflictPreamble [not reproduced here – see the near-identical preamble to the ‘packageproposal’]I. The Sides reject the use of force orthe threat of the use of force as ameans of settling disputes betweenthem. They will resolve disputes,including such disputes as may arise in connection with theimplementation of the presentAgreement, by peaceful means, in the first instance by means ofnegotiations, including negotiationswithin the framework of the MinskProcess of the OSCE. II. The Sides withdraw their armedforces in accordance with thefollowing provisions and the detaileddiscussion in Appendix 1:A. In the first phase armed forcescurrently situated along the line ofcontact to the east and south ofNagorny Karabakh will be withdrawnto the line shown in Appendix 1 andin accordance with the timetableindicated in it, taking into dueconsideration the recommendations ofthe High Level Planning Group(HLPG), with the aim of making

possible an initial deployment ofmultinational OSCE divisions in amilitarily secure buffer zone, theseparation of the Sides along this lineand to guarantee security conditionsfor the second phase of withdrawal.B. In the second phase forces will be withdrawn simultaneously inaccordance with the timetable laid outin Appendix 1, in the following way:(1) All Armenian forces locatedoutside of the borders of the Republicof Armenia will be withdrawn tolocations within those borders.(2) Nagorny Karabakh forces will bewithdrawn to locations within the1988 boundaries of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO),with the exception of the Lachincorridor.(3) Azerbaijani armed forces will bewithdrawn to the line indicated inAppendix 1 on the basis of theHLPG’s recommendations, and will be withdrawn from all territories ofArmenia.(4) Heavy weaponry will be withdrawnto positions indicated in Appendix Ion the basis of the High LevelPlanning Group’s recommendations, tobe observed by the OSCE peacekeepingmission and subject to conditions oftransparency and accountability laidout in this Appendix.III. Territory released as a result of thiswithdrawal of forces forms a bufferzone and a dividing zone, as laid outin detail in Appendix 2.A. Upon the completion of withdrawalof armed forces the buffer zone willbe located along the 1988 boundariesof the NKAO and the north and southboundaries of the Lachin corridor. The buffer zone will remain withouthuman population and is completelydemilitarized, with the exception ofelements forming part of the OSCEpeacekeeping mission. B. The dividing zone is demilitarizedwith the exception of forces assignedto assist the work of the PermanentJoint Commission, as indicated indetail in Appendix 2, including:(1) Units forming part of thepeacekeeping mission;(2) Units assigned for border patroland demining purposes;(3) Civil police forces, the number and permitted weaponry of which are determined in Appendix 2.

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C. In the buffer and dividing zones ano-fly zone, into which the Sides willnot conduct military flights, isestablished under the control of theOSCE peacekeeping mission, asdetailed in Appendix 2.D. Security conditions in all districtscontrolled by the Nagorny Karabakhauthorities after the withdrawal offorces in accordance with Article IIwill be guaranteed by the existingmilitary and security structures ofNagorny Karabakh.IV. In accordance with the decisions ofthe OSCE Budapest summit of 1994the Sides invite and will assist withthe deployment of multinational OSCEpeacekeeping forces (PKF), which willwork together with the PermanentJoint Commission (PJC) and theArmenian-Azerbaijaniintergovernmental commission (AAIC)stipulated in Article 7. The PKFobserves the withdrawal of armedforces and heavy weaponry, theprohibition of military flights, supportof the demilitarization regime and thesituation on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, as laid out inAppendix 2. The Sides call upon theUN Security Council to adopt aresolution appropriate to theseobjectives for an initial period of notmore than one year and to renew thestatus of this resolution according tonecessity as determined by therecommendations of the OSCEChairman-in-Office. The Sides agreethat the overall duration of thepeacekeeping mission will be theminimum necessary relative to thesituation in the region and the pace of the wider resolution of the conflict.The Sides fully cooperate with thePKF, in order to guarantee theimplementation of the presentAgreement and to avoid anydisruption or interruption ofpeacekeeping operations.V. The Sides assist the safe andvoluntary return of displaced personsto their places of former permanentresidence in the division zone, as laidout in Appendix 2. The PKF inconjunction with the Permanent JointCommission observes the securityconditions for the returningpopulation, in order to provideassurances to all sides of themonitoring of the demilitarizationregime in this zone. The Sides conduct

negotiations on the implementation of the immediate, safe and voluntaryreturn of all other persons, other than those covered by the presentAgreement or general settlementagreement, who were displaced as a result of the conflict and tensionsbetween Armenia and Azerbaijansince 1987. VI. Simultaneous to the withdrawal of armed forces the Sides implementwithout delay measures to open roads,railways, electrical transmission andcommunications lines, trade and otherrelations, including all actionsnecessary to achieve this in theshortest possible time in accordancewith the timetable and concreteprovisions laid out in Appendix 3. The Sides guarantee the use of theseconnections by all, including ethnicminorities, guaranteeing the latteraccess to co-ethnic groups in otherdistricts of the region. Each Sidepledges to remove all blockades andto guarantee the delivery of goodsand people to all Sides withoutobstruction. The Sides guarantee freeand safe railway communicationsbetween them. VII. The Sides cooperate fully with theInternational Committee of the RedCross, the United Nations HighCommissioner on Refugees and otherinternational organizations in order toensure the swift and secure return ofall persons detained as a result of theconflict, investigation of the fate ofthose disappeared without trace, therepatriation of all remains and thedelivery without discrimination ofhumanitarian and reconstruction aidacross territory under their control toregions afflicted by the conflict. TheSides cooperate with the OSCE PKFthrough the good offices of thePermanent Joint Commission toimplement confidence-buildingmeasures. IX. The Sides without delay establisha Permanent Joint Commission (PJC)to observe the implementation of theprovisions envisaged in the presentAgreement relating to the problemsaffecting Azerbaijan and NagornyKarabakh. The chair of the PJC is arepresentative of the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE, working with onevice-president from Azerbaijan andone vice-president from NagornyKarabakh. The principal obligation

of the PJC is to observe theimplementation of the Agreement; the obligations of the OSCE Chairlikewise include mediation in cases of disagreement and the sanctioningof measures taken to deal withemergency situations, such as natural disasters. The PJC has sub-commissions for military, economic,humanitarian, cultural andcommunications affairs. The structure,functions and other details concerningthe PJC are laid out in Appendix 4.The Sides establish without delay an Armenian-AzerbaijaniIntergovernmental Commission (AAIC)in order to avoid border incidentsbetween Armenia and Azerbaijan, theconduct of communications betweenborder forces and other security forcesof both countries and the monitoringand assistance of measures to openroads, railways, communications,pipelines, trade and other relations.The AAIC has two co-chairs, one fromArmenia and one from Azerbaijan. A representative appointed by theChairman-in-Office of the OSCE formspart of the Commission. The structure,functions and other details concerningthe AAIC are laid out in Appendix 5.The Azerbaijan Republic and theRepublic of Armenia establishcommunications offices in eachother’s capital cities.X. The Azerbaijan Republic and theRepublic of Armenia enter intobilateral and multilateral negotiationsat the appropriate international andregional forums with the aim ofsecuring improved security in theregion, including militarytransparency and completeconformity with the OSCE agreement. XI. The three Sides in the presentAgreement, having thus put an end tothe military aspects of the conflict,agree to continue the conduct ofnegotiations in good faith and withthe assistance of the MinskConference co-Chairs and other Sidesinvited as appropriate by theChairman-in-Office of the OSCE,aimed at the urgent achievement of acomprehensive settlement for otheraspects of the conflict, includingpolitical aspects such as thedetermination of the status ofNagorny Karabakh and the resolutionof the problems posed in Lachin,Shusha and Shaumian; following the

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attainment of an agreement at thesenegotiations and its signing by thethree above-mentioned Sides, it wouldbe subject to recognition by theinternational community at the MinskConference, to be convened as soonas possible. XII. Each Side fully respects thesecurity of other Sides and theirpopulations. The Sides pledge todevelop neighbourly relationsbetween their peoples, assisting tradeand normal interrelations betweenthem, and to refrain from statementsor acts capable of undermining thepresent Agreement or good relations. XIII. In addition to the concreteprovisions concerning peacekeepingand the monitoring of militarywithdrawal laid out above, andrecalling the corresponding principlesand obligations of the OSCE,including those expressed in theHelsinki document of 1992 and theBudapest document of 1994, using theappropriate mechanisms the OSCEobserves the complete implementationof all aspects of the currentAgreement and takes appropriatesteps in accordance with theseprinciples and decisions to avoid theviolation of the conditions laid downin the present Agreement andopposition to it. Witnesses of thepresent Agreement, acting through the offices of the Permanent Councilof the OSCE and the United NationsSecurity Council, assist in its completeimplementation. In case of seriousviolation of the present Agreementthey consult among themselvesregarding necessary measures to betaken, inform without delay theChairman-in-Office of the OSCE, theChair of the United Nations SecurityCouncil and the Secretary-General ofthe United Nations, and request thatthe OSCE Permanent Council or theUN Security Council considerappropriate measures in this regard. XIV. The Sides take upon themselvesmutual obligations to ensure theobservance of the provisions of thepresent Agreement, includingguarantees of the security of NagornyKarabakh, its population andreturning displaced persons, and totake any necessary steps for thefulfilment of all obligations flowingfrom the present Agreement.

XV. The present Agreement comesinto force from the moment of itssigning and ratification and remainsin effect with those exceptionsflowing from a comprehensivesettlement mentioned in Article XI.The present Agreement can bechanged, added to and abrogated byagreement of all Sides.[appendices listed]

Minsk Group ‘commonstate’ proposalNovember 1998

Unofficial translation of Russianoriginal

On the principles for acomprehensive settlement ofthe armed conflict overNagorny KarabakhFirmly resolved to realize the peacefulsettlement of the Nagorny Karabakhconflict in accordance with the normsand principles of international law,including the principles of theterritorial integrity of states and theself-determination of peoples,Armenia, Azerbaijan and NagornyKarabakh agree the following:

I. Agreement on the status ofNagorny KarabakhThe Sides will conclude an agreementon the status of Nagorny Karabakh,which will include the followingprovisions:Nagorny Karabakh is a state-territorialformation in the form of a Republicand constitutes a common state withAzerbaijan in the latter’sinternationally recognized borders. Azerbaijan and Nagorny Karabakhwill sign an agreement on the divisionof spheres of responsibility and themutual delegation of powers betweencorresponding state governmentalbodies, which will have the status of constitutional law.Azerbaijan and Nagorny Karabakhform a Joint Committee, which will becomposed of representatives of thepresidents, prime ministers andspeakers of parliament, for thedetermination of policy areas andactivities belonging to spheres of jointjurisdiction.In order to maintain contacts andcoordinate joint activities

representative missions of NagornyKarabakh and Azerbaijan will beestablished in Baku and Stepanakertrespectively.Nagorny Karabakh will have the rightto enter into direct external relationswith foreign states in economic, trade,scientific, cultural, sporting andhumanitarian fields, and with regionaland international organizationsassociated with these fields and tohave appropriate representativemissions abroad for the conduct ofthese relations. Political parties andsocial organizations in NagornyKarabakh will have the right toestablish connections with politicalparties and social organizations offoreign states. Nagorny Karabakh participates in theimplementation of Azerbaijan’sforeign policy on issues touchingupon its interests. Decisions on suchissues cannot be taken without theagreement of both sides.The government of Nagorny Karabakhmay have its representatives inembassies or consular missions ofAzerbaijan in foreign states, in whichit has special interests, and likewise tosend its experts as part of Azerbaijanidelegations to participate ininternational negotiations, if theseconcern the interests of NagornyKarabakh. The borders of Nagorny Karabakh will correspond to the borders of the former Nagorny KarabakhAutonomous Oblast. Their possibleclarification or revision can becomethe subject of special mutualagreements between Azerbaijan andNagorny Karabakh. The borders between Azerbaijan andNagorny Karabakh will be open inboth directions for the free movementof civilians. In travelling across theseborders and in conducting businessthey will not be subject to customsduties or other tolls. The right to grantpermanent residency rights will fallwithin the purview of thecorresponding governments.Azerbaijan and Nagorny Karabakh willnot use force or the threat of force toresolve disputes between them.In case of disputes or disagreementsnot overcome within the frameworkof the Joint Committee, the Sides maycall for the consultative opinion of the

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OSCE Chairman-in-Office, which willbe taken into consideration before theadoption of a final decision. The status of Nagorny Karabakh willalso include the rights and privilegeslisted below in the formulations usedin the Agreement on the Status ofNagorny Karabakh, approved by theMinsk Conference.1. Nagorny Karabakh will have itsown Constitution, adopted by thepeople of Nagorny Karabakh by meansof a referendum. This Constitution will incorporate the provisions of theAgreement on the Status of NagornyKarabakh. Azerbaijan will introducethe appropriate changes into itsConstitution to incorporate thisagreement. The terms of this Agreement or ofthose parts of the Nagorny Karabakhand Azerbaijan Constitutionsincorporating it cannot be changedwithout the agreement of all threeSides. 2. On the territory of NagornyKarabakh the Constitution of NagornyKarabakh and its laws will have effect.The laws, regulations and executivedecrees of Azerbaijan will have effecton the territory of Nagorny Karabakhonly if they do not contradict thelatter’s Constitution and laws. 3. Nagorny Karabakh will have itsown flag, national symbols andnational anthem. 4. Nagorny Karabakh forms itslegislative, executive and judicialbodies independently in accordancewith its Constitution. 5. As personal identity documentscitizens of Nagorny Karabakh willhave Azerbaijani passports with aspecial stamp indicating ‘NagornyKarabakh’. Only the government of Nagorny Karabakh or a bodyauthorized by it will have the right to issue such passports. Citizens of Nagorny Karabakh ofArmenian origin may emigrate toArmenia and in case of permanentsettlement there may receiveArmenian citizenship in accordancewith the laws of that country. 6. The population of NagornyKarabakh has the right to electrepresentatives to the parliament of Azerbaijan and to participate in elections for the president ofAzerbaijan.

7. Nagorny Karabakh will form a freeeconomic zone, have the right to itsown currency issue, which willcirculate equally with Azerbaijanicurrency issue, and to issue its own stamps.8. Nagorny Karabakh will have theright to free and unimpeded transportlinks and communications withArmenia and Azerbaijan. 9. Nagorny Karabakh will possess anational guard (security forces) andpolice force, formed on a voluntarybasis. These forces cannot operateoutside of Nagorny Karabakh withoutthe agreement of the government ofNagorny Karabakh. 10. The army, security forces andpolice of Azerbaijan will not have theright to enter the territory of NagornyKarabakh without the agreement ofthe government of Nagorny Karabakh. 11. The Armenian language is theprincipal official language of NagornyKarabakh, while Azeri is the secondofficial language. Its citizens canlikewise use other native languages inall official and unofficial instances.12. The budget of Nagorny Karabakhwill be composed of contributionsgenerated by its resources. Thegovernment of Nagorny Karabakh will encourage and guarantee capitalinvestment by Azerbaijani and foreigncompanies and individuals.

II. Concerning the LachinCorridorThe question of the use of the Lachincorridor by Nagorny Karabakh forunimpeded communication betweenNagorny Karabakh and Armenia is thesubject of a separate agreement, ifother decisions on a special regime inthe Lachin district are not takenproceeding from the agreementbetween Azerbaijan and NagornyKarabakh. The Lachin district mustremain a permanently and fullydemilitarized zone.

III. Concerning the towns ofShusha and ShaumianThe Sides agree that all Azerbaijanirefugees may return to their formerplaces of permanent residence in thetown of Shusha. The appropriateauthorities of Nagorny Karabakh willguarantee their security. They willenjoy equal rights with all other

citizens of Nagorny Karabakh,including the right to form politicalparties, to participate in elections atall levels, to be elected to statelegislative bodies and institutions oflocal government, and to work inofficial posts including those in lawenforcement agencies. Armenian refugees returning to thetown of Shaumian will enjoy thesame rights. Inhabitants of the towns of Shushaand Shaumian will have guaranteedaccess by roads, communications andother means with other parts ofAzerbaijan and Nagorny Karabakh. The authorities in Nagorny Karabakhand Azerbaijan will cooperate withthe deployment and activities in thetowns of Shusha and Shaumianrespectively of representative officesof the Office for Democratic Institutionsand Human Rights of the OSCE.

The agreement on the status ofNagorny Karabakh will be signed bythe three Sides and come into forceafter its approval by the MinskConference.

IV. Agreement on Ending theArmed ConflictThe Sides agree that the Agreementon Ending the Armed Conflict willinclude the following provisions:I. The Sides agree to reject the use offorce or the threat of the use of forceto resolve disputes between them.They resolve all such conflicts,including those that may arise inconnection with the implementationof the Agreement on Ending theArmed Conflict by peaceful means, in the first instance through directnegotiations or within the frameworkof the OSCE Minsk Process.II. The Sides effect the withdrawal oftheir armed forces in accordance withthe following provisions and as laidout in detail in Appendix 1:A. In the first phase forces deployedalong the current line of contact tothe east and south of NagornyKarabakh will be withdrawn to thelines shown in Appendix 1 inaccordance with the timetableindicated there, taking intoconsideration the recommendations ofthe High Level Planning Group(HLPG), with the aim of creating

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conditions for the initial deploymentof a forward division of multinationalOSCE forces in a militarily secure,temporary buffer zone, the separationof the Sides along this line and theguaranteeing of security during thesecond phase of withdrawal. B. In the second phase armed forceswill be withdrawn simultaneously andin accordance with the timetable setout in Appendix 1, in the followingway:(1) All armed forces of Armeniadeployed outside of the borders of theRepublic of Armenia will bewithdrawn to within those borders.(2) The armed forces of NagornyKarabakh will be withdrawn to withinthe 1988 boundaries of the NagornyKarabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO),with the exception of the Lachincorridor until the achievement of anagreement on unimpededcommunication between NagornyKarabakh and Armenia. (3) The armed forces of Azerbaijanwill be withdrawn to lines indicated in Appendix 1 on the basis of theHLPG’s recommendations, and will bewithdrawn from all territories of theRepublic of Armenia.(4) Heavy weaponry will bewithdrawn to locations indicated inAppendix 1 on the basis of theHLPG’s recommendations, under theobservation of the OSCE peacekeepingmission and in conformity with thedemands of transparency andaccountability laid out in thisAppendix. III. Territories released as a result ofthis withdrawal of forces forms abuffer zone and a division zone inaccordance with the followingprovisions and as set out in detail inAppendix 2:A. Upon the completion of withdrawalthe buffer zone will be situated alongthe 1988 boundaries of the NKAO.Pending the reaching of an additionalagreement it could extend along theboundaries of the Lachin district. Thebuffer zone remains unpopulated andfully demilitarized, with the exceptionof units forming part of the OSCEpeacekeeping mission.B. The division zone is demilitarizedwith the exception of forces permittedfor the operations of the PKF incooperation with the Permanent Joint

Commission, as set out in detail inAppendix 2, including: (1) elements of the peacekeepingoperation,(2) Azerbaijani border patrol anddemining sub-units,(3) Azerbaijani civil police, numbersand permitted weaponry of which aredetermined in Appendix 2. C. A no-fly zone is established in thebuffer zone and division zone underthe control of the OSCE peacekeepingmission, into which the Sides will notallow military flights, as set out inAppendix 2.D. Security in all regions controlledby the authorities of NagornyKarabakh after the withdrawal ofarmed forces in accordance withArticle 2 will be guaranteed by theexisting security structures ofNagorny Karabakh. IV. In accordance with the decisions ofthe OSCE Budapest summit of 1994the Sides invite and assist in thedeployment of multinational OSCEpeacekeeping forces (PKF), which willwork in conjunction with thePermanent Joint Commission (PJC)and the Armenian-AzerbaijaniIntergovernmental Commission (AAIC).The PKF observes the withdrawal ofarmed forces and heavy weaponry, theprohibition of military flights, supportof the demilitarization regime and thesituation on the Armenian-Azerbaijaniborder, as set out in Appendix 2. The peacekeeping mission isestablished in accordance with anappropriate resolution of the UNSecurity Council for an initial periodof not more than one year and isrenewed as required on therecommendation of the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE. The Sides agreethat the overall duration of thepeacekeeping mission will be theminimum necessary relative to thesituation in the region and the pace of the wider resolution of the conflict.The Sides fully cooperate with thePKF, in order to guarantee theimplementation of the presentAgreement and to avoid anydisruption or interruption ofpeacekeeping operations.[V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, notreproduced: near-identical to step-by-step proposal except the latter’s pointXI is deleted in this proposal]

XII. In addition to the concreteprovisions concerning peacekeepingand the monitoring of militarywithdrawal laid out above, andrecalling the corresponding principlesand obligations of the OSCE, includingthose expressed in the Helsinkidocument of 1992 and the Budapestdocument of 1994, using theappropriate mechanisms the OSCEobserves the complete implementationof all aspects of the current Agreementand takes appropriate steps inaccordance with these principles anddecisions to avoid the violation of theconditions laid down in the presentAgreement and opposition to it.XIII. The Agreement on Ending theArmed Conflict will be signed by thethree Sides and will come into effectafter its approval by the MinskConference and ratification by theParliaments of the three Sides.XIV. The Azerbaijan Republic and theRepublic of Armenia establish fulldiplomatic relations with permanentdiplomatic missions at ambassadoriallevel after the signing of theagreements and their approval by the Minsk Conference.

V. On Guarantees1. The Sides take upon themselvesmutual obligations to guaranteeconformity with the above provisions,including guarantees of the security of Nagorny Karabakh, its populationand refugees and displaced personsreturning to their former places ofpermanent residence.2. The UN Security Council will followclosely the implementation of thecomprehensive agreement.3. The Agreement on the Status ofNagorny Karabakh and the Agreementon Ending the Armed Conflict may besigned by the Minsk Conference co-Chairs as witnesses. The presidents ofRussia, the United States and Franceaffirm the intention of their threecountries to act together to ensure thethorough monitoring of progress inthe implementation of agreements and the adoption of the appropriatemeasures for the fulfilment of thisAgreement. In case of need, the OSCEor the UN Security Council may takediplomatic, economic or, in the lastinstance, military measures inaccordance with the UN Charter.

83Key texts

Profiles

Azerbaijan

Heydar Aliyev

Exhibiting a remarkable capacity for adaptation tochanging political realities, Heydar Aliyev played a keyrole in Azerbaijani politics for three decades. He wasborn in 1923 in Azerbaijan’s autonomous republic ofNakhichevan to a family originating from Zangezur inArmenia. These origins allowed him to straddle two ofthe most influential clan networks in Azerbaijan, theYerazi and Nakhichevanis. In 1967 he became the firstnon-Russian head of Azerbaijan’s KGB, and in 1969 FirstSecretary of Azerbaijan’s Communist Party. In 1982 hewas appointed to the Politburo as first deputy chairmanof the Soviet Council of Ministers, but was dismissed in1987 by new Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.

Aliyev subsequently kept a low political profile living inMoscow, but his resignation from the Communist Partyfollowing the January 1990 killings in Baku signalled the beginning of his return to Azerbaijani politics. InSeptember 1991 he was elected speaker of theNakhichevan parliament, then in June 1993, afterPresident Abulfaz Elchibey had been deposed by acoup, was invited back to Baku by the Popular Frontgovernment. Aliyev then orchestrated his own electionas president in October with 99 per cent of the vote. As president, Aliyev skilfully exchanged Soviet fornationalist symbols, consolidated control over internalpolitics and successfully wooed Western powers withcontracts for exploitation of Azerbaijan’s oil wealth. Heentrenched family members and other loyal figures inkey posts and established a new party-state in the form of the Yeni Azerbaycan Party (New AzerbaijanParty or YAP), which became the main forum for what approached a personality cult of Aliyev. He was re-elected president in 1998, but from 1999 wasdogged by speculation over his health.

Reportedly enjoying a good personal rapport withArmenian President Robert Kocharian, Aliyevsuccessfully reached wide margins of agreement oncore issues of contention during face-to-face talks.However, his political style of absolute control withinAzerbaijan precluded engagement and mobilization of wider constituencies for peace. Aliyev died inDecember 2003, having overseen his son Ilham’ssuccession to the presidency.

Ilham Aliyev

Heydar’s only son, Ilham (born 1961) was working inRusso-Turkish business when his father assumed powerin the newly independent Azerbaijan in 1993. Ilhamwas subsequently elevated to influential economicposts, becoming the vice-president of the State OilCompany of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) in

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May 1994, where he attracted allegations in the Turkishpress of concessions made to a Turkish constructiongroup in Baku in recompense for his alleged gamblingdebts. Ilham’s entry into politics began with his electionto the Azerbaijan Parliament through the YAP in 1995.Over time he assumed an increasingly visible publicpersona, assuming a number of high-ranking positions.In December 1999 Ilham became one of YAP’s five vice-presidents. He was appointed prime minister in August2003, and then elected president in the controversialOctober elections. Compared to his father, Ilham’sinexperience and more fragile mandate, in addition toexternal pressures for democratization, introducedgreater room for manoeuvre for political elites.Although this has prompted him to take a more pro-Russian stance on some issues, Ilham has not waveredfrom his father’s pro-Western, pro-market and secularistagenda. Nonetheless Ilham’s grip on government facessignificant challenges from internal elite rifts, the‘revolutionary’ wave sweeping across former Sovietrepublics and the conspicuous failure to permit ademocratic process in the 2005 parliamentary elections.

The Milli Meclis (Azerbaijani parliament)

The 125-member Milli Meclis is a largely formalinstitution, packed with clienteles loyal to the president.Parliamentary debates are perfunctory, and the role ofthe Meclis is largely restricted to approving legislationput before it by the presidency. In August 2002 theMeclis’s formal powers were further curtailed by acontroversial referendum amending some forty articlesof the constitution. These changes included the transferof power to the prime minister (appointed by thepresident) in case of the president’s incapacitation,rather than the parliamentary speaker, and theabolition of the proportional party list systemaccounting for a fifth of the Meclis’s seats. Oppositionparties saw these changes as further marginalizing theirchances of representation and protested vigorously,but the referendum passed with a 97 per cent approvalrating. Elections to the Milli Meclis in November 2005, inwhich YAP and pro-governmental ‘independents’ won acrushing majority of seats according to official returns,were widely condemned by international and domesticobservers as failing to comply with internationalstandards. The flawed electoral process posed seriousquestions regarding Ilham Aliyev’s ostensiblecommitment to reform and indeed the stability of hisregime as a whole.

Azerbaijani political parties

Formal multiparty politics has flourished in Azerbaijansince independence, yet meaningful representationand pluralism have been strictly curtailed throughsystematic falsification of election results. Politicalparties tend to be weakly ideologically differentiated,

subject to fragmentation and dominated by keypersonalities and their clienteles. Government-opposition divisions expressed in terms of parties areless politically significant than divisions withininfluential networks and clans, often underpinned byregional and generational identities. Since 1995 theparty of government has been the Yeni AzerbaycanParty (YAP), established by Heydar Aliyev in 1991.

Clienteles associated with the Nakhichevani network,intersecting with familial ties (many of the president’srelatives are to be found in its higher echelons),dominate the party. Reproducing one-party systemnorms inherited from the Soviet era, employmentopportunities in both public and private sectors aretightly linked to membership of YAP, which numbersseveral hundred thousand. YAP’s platform ostensiblystands for privatization, secularism, market reforms and a Western-oriented foreign policy.

Opposition parties in Azerbaijan have traditionally been noted for their fragmentation and mutualanimosity. They also face considerable pressure fromthe state; many have a history of evictions from theiroffices, harassment, competing with regime-sponsorednamesakes, and bringing unsuccessful legal casesagainst fraudulent election results. First formed in 1988,the Popular Front of Azerbaijan (PFA) movementspearheaded demands for reform in the perestroikaperiod. The only force not composed of formernomenklatura elites to have governed post-SovietAzerbaijan, it swept to power in 1992 partially as aresult of catastrophes on the battlefield in NagornyKarabakh, but also due to the popularity of its reformist,pro-democracy and pan-Turkic agenda. The PFAgovernment, headed by President Abulfaz Elchibey,governed for only one turbulent year before falling toan army-led coup in June 1993. The movement wasreconfigured as a political party, the Popular Front Party of Azerbaijan (PFPA) in 1995. Since Elchibey’sdeath in 2000, the PFPA has fragmented. The dominant‘reformers’ wing is led by Ali Kerimli, recognized insideand outside the PFPA as its leader, who claims tocontinue Elchibey’s vision for the party.

Musavat (‘Equality’) claims to be the continuation ofthe original Musavat party founded in 1911 in Baku. Thehistorical Musavat played a key role in the formation ofthe independent Azerbaijani state in 1918-20 and wassubsequently outlawed by the Soviet regime. Themodern Musavat party stands for market reforms, socialwelfare, secularism and a both pro-Western and pro-Turkic orientation. Its leader Isa Gambar served asparliamentary speaker in 1992-93 and briefly as actingpresident before Abulfaz Elchibey. Musavat is thoughtto have received some 30 per cent of the vote in the2000 parliamentary elections, but official returns

85Profiles

granted it just less than the 6 per cent needed to securerepresentation in the Milli Meclis. Gambar stood forpresident in 2003 and while he claimed victory, officialreturns gave him only 14 per cent of the vote.

The Azerbaijan National Independence Party (ANIP)is led by former Soviet dissident Etibar Mamedov andoffers a nationalist, centre-right agenda. Mamedov wasalone among opposition leaders in standing againstHeydar Aliyev in the 1998 presidential election. He isnoted for his antagonistic relationship with Isa Gambar,to which the failure of the opposition to field singlecandidates is often attributed.

The Azerbaijan Democratic Party (ADP) is led by RasulGuliev. Appointed parliamentary speaker in 1993, heresigned in 1996, leaving Azerbaijan and energeticallycriticizing the Aliyev regime from exile in the UnitedStates. The regime responded by convicting him in hisabsence on charges of embezzlement and accusinghim of planning a coup. In 2003 his application tocontest the presidential election was rejected by theCentral Electoral Commission, resulting in clashesbetween security forces and ADP supporters in Baku.

Resolving their differences to present a united front for the first time, the PFPA, Musavat and ADP togetherformed the bloc ‘Azadlyq’ to contest the 2005parliamentary elections. ANIP allied with formerpresidential staff member Eldar Namazov to form the Yeni Siyaset (New Politics, or YeS) bloc.

Karabakh Liberation Organization

Formed in 2000, the Karabakh Liberation Organization(KLO) is a vocal critic of international and civicmediation efforts for failing to identify Armenia as theaggressor in the Karabakh conflict. Formally a civicorganization but more of a political movement, it hasregularly called for the resumption of armed hostilitiesagainst Armenia and has been involved in numerousincidents harassing civil society actors engaged incontacts with Armenian counterparts. Headed by AkifNagi, the extent of membership and autonomy of theorganization are unclear. Although at times its activitieshave brought it into conflict with the authorities, theKLO may also be seen at least in part as providing adomestic foil of radicalism used to demonstrate theAliyev regime’s inability to compromise in formal peacetalks. At the same time it undoubtedly expressespopular sentiments of humiliation and frustration at the lack of progress in the peace process.

Karabakh Azeris and Internally Displaced Persons(IDPs)

A number of different institutions have been created in the name of the displaced population (IDPs) fromKarabakh and adjacent occupied territories, but few of them offer concrete opportunities for politicalrepresentation. Since 1995 IDPs have been able to votefor the members of parliament representing sevenelectoral districts created to reflect the seven wholly orpartially occupied regions around Karabakh and twofurther seats for Karabakh itself. However, KarabakhAzeris have no elected community leader: thepresident appoints the heads of ‘executive committeesin exile’ for Nagorny Karabakh and the seven adjacentoccupied regions, figures of undefined role led by thehead of the Shusha Executive Committee ‘in exile’,Nizami Bahmanov. The IDP community at large remainspolitically marginalized, although the lack of electedrepresentatives for it and the Karabakh Azeri communityhas been the subject of lobbying by IDP activists.

State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic(SOCAR)

SOCAR is the key national actor in the exploitation ofAzerbaijan’s Caspian oil resources, and also has a 10 percent share of the Azerbaijan International OperatingCompany (AIOC). SOCAR has until recently been thelargest contributor of tax revenue, providing about one third of government revenues, but also the largestdebtor due to its provision of significant subsidies, such as discounted fuel to refugees, households andinefficient public sector enterprises, and repaying Iranfor energy supplies. Furthermore, until 2003 any profitshad to be channelled into the State Oil Fund (SOFAZ).The company’s management is tightly knit with theAliyev family.

State Oil Fund of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOFAZ)

Established by presidential decree in December 1999,SOFAZ is composed of proceeds from hydrocarbonexploitation, and rents and bonuses from foreign firms.It is an independent (and extra-budgetary) legal entitywith its own administrative structure; its director isappointed and can be dismissed by the president. Thepurpose of the fund is to ensure that profits fromhydrocarbon exploitation feed into nationwideregeneration. Two major projects financed by SOFAZ to date have been the provision of housing and otherbasic goods to the refugee and IDP population, andAzerbaijan’s share of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC)pipeline construction. However, the rules for SOFAZexpenditure allocation are ambiguous, and thepresident has complete control over how the fund is run with no mechanisms in place for externalaccountability.

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Armenia

Levon Ter-Petrosian

The first president of independent Armenia, Ter-Petrosian was born in Syria in 1945; the family migratedto Armenia one year later. His political activity began in the 1960s, a period associated with nationalistdemonstrations in Yerevan in 1965-67. In 1988 hebecame a member of the eleven-man ‘KarabakhCommittee’, which led resistance to Soviet rule inArmenia during the perestroika period. In 1989 Ter-Petrosian became leader of the Armenian NationalMovement and in 1990 chairman of the ArmenianSupreme Soviet. He was elected president of Armeniain October 1991.

Ter-Petrosian’s presidency was associated with a‘pragmatic’ approach to reconciling the demands of the Armenian ‘cause’ with what he saw as the politicalrealities of Armenian independence. His refusal to makegenocide recognition a precondition of diplomaticrelations with Turkey brought him into conflict with theArmenian diaspora and the Armenian RevolutionaryFederation (ARF). This antagonistic relationship with the diaspora was reflected in Ter-Petrosian’s belief thatdiaspora funds were not a substitute for home growndevelopment of the Armenian economy and state. His political legitimacy was compromised by allegedfalsifications of the referendum to adopt theconstitution in 1995 and the presidential election ofSeptember 1996, which he won with 51.7 per cent ofthe vote. However, his advocacy of a more pragmaticstance on Karabakh led to his political downfall. Hisown key ministers, led by Prime Minister RobertKocharian, rebelled against his endorsement of theMinsk Group’s ‘step-by-step’ plan, forcing him to resignin February 1998. Since his resignation Ter-Petrosian hasreturned to his academic post, although speculationregarding his potential for a comeback is common.

Robert Kocharian

Born in Stepanakert in 1954, Robert Kocharian rosethrough a range of local party positions until becomingactive in the Karabakh movement from 1988. Duringthe war period Kocharian became the Chairman of theState Defence Committee and then prime minister ofNagorny Karabakh. On 24 December 1994 he waselected president of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic by its regional Soviet, confirmed by popular vote inNovember 1996.

In March 1997 Kocharian was appointed prime ministerof Armenia, and became a key figure in the oppositionto President Ter-Petrosian’s advocacy of compromise onKarabakh. Kocharian argued that the diaspora could

replace foreign investment in developing Armenia’seconomy, obviating the need for such compromise.Kocharian played a key role in Ter-Petrosian’s resignationand succeeded him as president of Armenia in March1998. Although Kocharian had not yet fulfilled theresidency requirements for formal Armeniancitizenship, the Central Electoral Commission’sreasoning for allowing him to run for president wasbased on a past Karabakh declaration of unificationwith Armenia (notwithstanding the more recentdeclaration of independence). Kocharian’s electionresulted in a convergence of Yerevan’s position withthat of Stepanakert after the rifts associated with Ter-Petrosian’s presidency. He was re-elected presidentin a controversial poll in March 2003; protest at allegedfalsification resulted in a Constitutional Court rulingthat Kocharian should submit to consultativereferendum on confidence in his presidency one yearlater. In April 2004, with the vote of confidence yet totake place, demonstrations were violently dispersed incentral Yerevan. Kocharian has remained above partypolitics, relying instead on his charisma as a ‘war hero’and relationships forged with key individuals in thearmy and ‘power’ ministries, many of them hisappointees and fellow Karabakh Armenians. SerzhSarkisian, Armenia’s Defence Minister and a fellowKarabakh Armenian, is his closest ally.

The Armenian National Assembly

Armenia’s Constitution of 1995 provides for a mixedpresidential-parliamentary system, in which thepresident’s strength is derived from majority support in parliament. An oppositional majority in the NationalAssembly can force the president to accept its choice ofprime minister (or resign or dissolve parliament), whichhappened in 1999 when the Republican Party/People’sParty of Armenia coalition forced President Kocharianto appoint Vazgen Sarkisian as prime minister. On 27 October 1999, speaker Karen Demirchian, PrimeMinister Vazgen Sarkisian and six other high officialswere assassinated by gunmen in the National Assembly.Combined with the influx of many technocrats ratherthan experienced legislators at the 1999 elections, themassacre served to weaken parliament in the periodthat followed. The parliament elected in 2003 againreflected the influence of business in Armenian politics.

Armenian political parties

Armenia’s multiparty system shares common post-Soviet features, including personality-based parties,fragmentation and transience. Unlike Azerbaijan,however, there has been no consistently dominantparty since independence and diaspora support alsolends some parties greater ideological and financialconsistency. The Armenian National Movement

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(ANM) developed out of the original KarabakhCommittee, essentially diversifying the Committee’ssingle-issue agenda into a multidimensionalprogramme for political and economic regeneration.The ANM formed a winning coalition for the 1990elections to the Armenian Supreme Soviet, wrestingcontrol from the Communist Party of Armenia. As theparty of government, the ANM became closelyassociated with Ter-Petrosian’s stance of advocacy forcompromise on Karabakh. While retaining a substantialmembership and experienced leaders, the ANM has yetto recover from Ter-Petrosian’s resignation.

A number of other parties emerged in the early 1990s,including the National Democratic Union, theRepublican Party of Armenia (RPA), the People’s Partyof Armenia (PPA), and Orinats Yerkir (‘Country of Law’).Composed mainly of former nomenklatura elites, theRPA allied with the PPA to contest and win the 1999parliamentary elections. The PPA was then devastatedby the assassination of its leader in the October 1999parliament shootings. The PPA contested the 2003parliamentary election as part of Stepan Demirchian’s‘Justice’ bloc of nine parties, but it was its former partnerthe RPA that received the largest number of votes in the2003 parliamentary elections. It formed a governmentin coalition with the ARF and Orinats Yerkir.

A number of Armenian political parties, historicallyformed in various diaspora locations, continue to have a strong diaspora following but are also active inArmenian politics. These include the Social DemocraticHnchakian Party (or Hnchaks) and the ArmenianDemocratic Liberal Party (or Ramkavars). The principal‘diaspora party’ is the Armenian RevolutionaryFederation (ARF or Dashnaktsutiun, Dashnak/Tashnagparty), which was historically aimed at securing politicaland economic rights for the Armenian population inthe Ottoman Empire and was re-introduced intoArmenia in 1988. International recognition of the 1915massacres as a genocide became the key aspect of theARF’s ideology. This brought it into conflict withPresident Levon Ter-Petrosian’s decision not to makegenocide recognition a pre-condition of openingdiplomatic relations with Turkey. In December 1994 Ter-Petrosian banned the ARF in Armenia on the groundsthat foreign (i.e. diaspora) control of political partieswas illegal, a charge upheld by the Supreme Court (asecond charge of terrorist activity was not). The banwas lifted by Robert Kocharian, for whom the range andsolidity of the ARF’s networks constitute a major asset.The ARF entered the ruling coalition in 2003; it is alsoactive in Nagorny Karabakh.

The Armenian diaspora

Geographically scattered centres of Armeniansettlement outside of Armenia have long been afeature of Armenian history. However, the large majorityof the diaspora is formed by survivors of the massacresof Armenians in the Ottoman Empire in 1915-17 andtheir descendents. International recognition of thesemass killings as a genocide has subsequently formedthe key pillar of diaspora identity and activities. TheArmenian diaspora has significant centres in the UnitedStates, Western Europe, the Arab Middle East andbeyond. In the United States opportunities for lobbyingin Washington have made a formidable weapon of thesizeable American Armenian population. Notably,Armenian lobbyists in Washington were able to curtailUS aid to Azerbaijan in 1992 by excluding it from theFreedom Support Act providing aid to post-Sovietstates. However this exclusion, known as Section 907,has been waived every year since 2002 by PresidentGeorge W. Bush.

Veterans’ organizations

Founded by future Prime Minister Vazgen Sarkisian,Yerkrapah (‘homeland defenders’, also known as theUnion of the Volunteers of the Karabakh War inArmenia) is a veterans’ organization established in 1993.Referring to its members as azatamaratik (‘freedomfighters’) Yerkrapah is a public organization addressingthe needs of veterans and bereaved families. Althoughformally non-partisan and non-political, Yerkrapah haswielded significant influence in criticizing concessionarypolicies towards Azerbaijan. Ter-Petrosian’s 1997advocacy of compromise on Karabakh inducedYerkrapah to vote against the president, causing him to lose a supportive majority in parliament. Sarkisianintegrated into the RPA in 1999, whose coalitionsubsequently won the 1999 parliamentary election.

Nagorny Karabakh

Arkady Ghukasian

Born in Stepanakert in 1957, Ghukasian joined theKarabakh Movement in 1988. He was imprisoned in1990 for writing articles condemning the organizers ofthe anti-Armenian pogroms in Baku. In 1992 he waselected a member of parliament in Nagorny Karabakhand appointed advisor on political issues to thechairman of the Nagorny Karabakh State Committee forDefence. From July 1993 Ghukasian became the foreignminister of the de facto Nagorno-Karabakh Republic(NKR), and in the extraordinary presidential elections ofSeptember 1997 was elected president. In 2000 anunsuccessful assassination attempt was made on hislife, attributed to the former wartime commander and

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Minister of Defence Samvel Babayan; Babayan wasarrested and imprisoned until 2004. Ghukasian was re-elected president in August 2002 with 89 per cent the vote.

De facto power structures in Nagorny Karabakh

Nagorny Karabakh to date has not adopted aconstitution but adheres to a presidential model ofgovernment. The president appoints ministers withoutparliamentary approval on the prime minister’srecommendations. The de facto National Assembly inKarabakh, composed of 33 seats, is dominated by thepro-regime parties winning the 2005 parliamentaryelection. These are the Democratic Party of Artsakh(DPA) and Free Homeland, parties composed offormer nomenklatura elites and local business interests.The DPA has been the ruling party since 2000. Theseparties have been challenged by a number of smallreformist parties generally led by civil society activists:Movement-88, Moral Revival and the Social JusticeParty. Movement-88 achieved a striking success in2004 when its leader Eduard Agabekian was electedmayor of Stepanakert. In addition there are localchapters of parties active in Armenia, including the ARF.

The Nagorno-Karabakh Defence Army is a majorforce, though since the arrest of then commander-in-chief Samvel Babayan, its political role has declined. Thede facto authorities claim the army comprises some20,000 soldiers (independent analysts put the figure at18,500). A large number, possibly a majority, of theseare from Armenia. Although substantial input fromArmenia in terms of training, equipment and contractpersonnel is acknowledged in Karabakh, Armenianmilitary presence in Karabakh and the occupiedterritories is denied.

International actors

Russia

Russia’s role in the post-Soviet Caucasus has beencomplicated and often contradictory, as it has sought toretain influence and power in the territories controlledby Moscow during the Soviet era, while also seekingstability along its southern borders. Russia has soughtto dominate the mediation process as a proxy forregional domination, while at times simultaneouslyundermining it by engaging in separate diplomaticefforts. During the war Russian support, in the form ofarms, spare parts and fuel shipments, mainly favouredArmenia, although assistance to Azerbaijan was notunknown. In 1994, under the auspices of theCommonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Russiabrokered the ceasefire; its subsequent efforts at

mediation were blocked by Azerbaijan and the CSCEMinsk Group (of which Russia was also a member).Russia then became co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Groupin 1995, and since 1997 has co-chaired with France andthe US.

Russia’s ambivalent position reflects its regionalinterests. Since the formation of the CIS in 1991 Russia’spolicies have aimed at reintegration of its formerlySoviet neighbours through military basing agreements,deployment of border guards to defend commonborders of CIS countries and domination of key sectorsof CIS states’ economies. While secessionist conflicts inAzerbaijan and Georgia have weakened their capacityto resist Russian influence, Russia itself faces securityconcerns deriving from its conflict in Chechnya sincethe mid-1990s. Regardless of its actual policies vis-à-visde facto states in the region, Russia thus shares acommitment to the principle of territorial integrity.

Armenia has long had a ‘special relationship’ withRussia as both an economic partner and a securityguarantor in its difficult relationship with Turkey.Armenia’s economic dependence on Russia rangesfrom remittances from Armenians in Russia to Russia’scontrol and supply of energy resources, althoughrecently Armenia has looked to cooperation with Iran to relieve this situation. Russia has three military basesand 2,500 troops in Armenia, a presence assured for 25 years by a 1995 treaty, while a 1997 friendship treatyprovides for mutual assistance in the event of a militarythreat to either country. More recently, however, newdifficulties have arisen in Russian relations withArmenia, stemming in part from domestic resistance in Armenia to substantial Russian-owned shares in thecountry’s infrastructure.

Russia’s relations with Azerbaijan were strained byPresident Elchibey’s pro-Western, pan-Turkicprogramme in 1992-93. Heydar Aliyev initiallysmoothed relations by taking Azerbaijan into the CIS,but Azerbaijan’s commitment to CIS structures hasalways been lukewarm. As Baku looked more towardsNATO, Azerbaijan did not renew its membership of theCIS Collective Security Treaty in 1999. Azerbaijansuccessfully courted Western interests to secure an oilpipeline route sidelining Russia, although Russian firmLUKOIL is a member of the Azerbaijan InternationalOperating Company. Russia bowed to the inevitable in 2002 and dropped its resistance to the BTC pipelineand resolved its dispute with Azerbaijan over thedivision of the Caspian Sea. With regard to theKarabakh peace process, however, Russia’s intentionsare still viewed with suspicion in Azerbaijan.

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United States

Since 1997 the United States has co-chaired the MinskGroup, at the same time as the South Caucasus hasbecome increasingly important to US interests.American stances on the Karabakh conflict have beenshaped by the presence of influential Armenian-American lobbies in the United States, desires tosupport democracy in the region and countervailingstrategic and security interests deriving from Caspianoil and the ‘war on terror’ respectively. Given thepriority of diversifying global energy supply away fromthe Middle East, it is the latter that ultimately underpinsUS policy.

US policy towards Armenia and Azerbaijan has beencharacterized by an open split between the WhiteHouse and Congress. In 1992 Congress, influenced byAmerican-Armenian lobbyists, passed the Section 907amendment to the Freedom Support Act, limitinggovernment-to-government aid to Azerbaijan.However, this approach was subsequently moderatedby interest in regional stability in order to accessCaspian oil. The BTC pipeline was explicitly intended toreward Turkey for its support of the US in the 1991 GulfWar. In 2002 President George W. Bush secured a waiverfor the Section 907 ban (renewed annually since then)in recognition of Baku’s support for the ‘war on terror’,and he has effectively blocked genocide recognitionefforts in the United States. Nonetheless, the American-Azerbaijani relationship is moderated by realizationsthat Azerbaijan’s oil potential is not as promising as itseemed in the early 1990s, and by ebbs and flows inAzerbaijan’s relations with Russia and Iran. TheAzerbaijani government has made it clear it will nothave any US military bases on its territory, althoughsome opposition groups have seized the opportunityto agitate in favour of them.

Turkey

Turkey has been closely allied to Azerbaijan in theKarabakh conflict. Sharing cultural affinities and acommitment to secularist modernization, Turkeyprovides a model for many in Azerbaijan. It providedmilitary supplies to Azerbaijan during the war andmaintains an economic blockade on Armenia.Nonetheless, early post-Soviet projections of arenaissance of Turkish influence across Azerbaijan andthe Turkic states of Central Asia have proved false.Turkey’s influence has been limited by energydependence on Russia, its own desires for integrationwith Western structures and its less prominent rolewithin the Minsk process.

Turkey’s relations with Armenia have been historicallyextremely strained by the mass killings of Armenians inthe Ottoman Empire in 1915-17, which Armenia

campaigns to have internationally recognized asgenocide. Ter-Petrosian’s administration did not makegenocide recognition a precondition of diplomaticrelations with Turkey, but Kocharian (1998-present) has insisted it be a subject of bilateral talks with Ankara.An initiative to improve Turkish-Armenian relations, the Turkish Armenian Reconciliation Commission, wasestablished in July 2001 and concluded in April 2004; a number of informal cycles of meetings also take place between diplomats and scholars on each side.Nonetheless, while disappointing Azerbaijaniexpectations of greater support, Turkey has maintainedits blockade of Armenia and provided strategicpartnership for Azerbaijan through the BTC pipeline.

Iran

While Iran formally supports the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, geopolitical concerns and historicallyfriendly relations with Armenia have shaped a generallymore pro-Armenian stance in the Karabakh conflict.This is conditioned by wariness of irredentism amongIran’s own Azeri population (estimated at a quarter ofthe population), concentrated in the regions borderingAzerbaijan. Iran has not been an actor in the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace process since mediation efforts inearly 1992, when it secured a brief ceasefire whileworking in parallel to the Russian initiatives. Not amember of the OSCE, it has been excluded from theMinsk process, although the Minsk co-chairs and the US State Department have recognized Iran’s legitimateinterest in remaining briefed on this process.

Iranian trade with Armenia was crucial to the latter’ssurvival during the war. More recently, Iran and Armeniasigned an agreement in 2004 to construct a pipelinethat would carry natural gas from Iran to Armenia, withsubstantial financing from Tehran, reducing Armenia’sdependence on Russia for energy supplies and bringingIran closer to European markets. Tensions withAzerbaijan, on the other hand, also exist aroundCaspian energy resources. Under US pressure,Azerbaijan decided against routing the Caspianpipeline by the cheapest route through Iran, but fromBaku to Ceyhan in Turkey via Tbilisi instead. In 2001Iranian-Azeri tensions over disputed Caspian Seaboundaries almost erupted in military exchanges.Recently Iran has made goodwill gestures towardsAzerbaijan, including sanctioning the opening of anAzerbaijani consulate in Tabriz, but Azerbaijan will facepressure from the United States to resist rapprochement.

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The Azerbaijan International Operating Company /British Petroleum

In 1994 Azerbaijan signed the ‘contract of the century’, a thirty-year production sharing agreement regardingthe exploration and exploitation of three offshoreCaspian oil fields. The contract was to be implementedby the Azerbaijan International Operating Company(AIOC), a consortium of ten major international oilcompanies and the State Oil Company of theAzerbaijan Republic (SOCAR). British Petroleum Amoco(BP Amoco) assumed operatorship of AIOC in 1999 andalso has the controlling interest in the consortium thatoperates the BTC oil pipeline linking the Caspian to theMediterranean. This is the most controversial pipeline in the region, a major American and British-backedventure routed via Georgia and Turkey. BP was initiallysceptical about the commercial viability of the BTCoption but its position changed after its merger in 1998with the American Oil Company (Amoco). The BTCPipeline Company was formed in 2002 to construct,own and operate the pipeline. Construction began in2002 and the pipeline opened in 2005.

Multilateral actors

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

The Organization for Security and Cooperation inEurope (OSCE), known as the Conference for Securityand Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) until December1994, was founded in Helsinki in 1975 with 35 membercountries from both NATO and the Soviet bloc. TheCSCE assumed responsibility for mediating in theKarabakh conflict in March 1992, shortly after newlyindependent Armenia and Azerbaijan had becomemembers. It was envisaged that a conference to thisend would be convened in Minsk, Belarus. This was pre-empted by the unfolding escalation of the conflict,and to date the conference has never been held. OSCEmediation efforts instead took the form of the MinskGroup, originally a preparatory body for the conferencenow transformed into the main forum for mediation.The composition of the Minsk Group has changed overtime, but has always included Armenia, Azerbaijan,Belarus, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Sweden, Turkey,and the USA. The de facto authorities in Karabakh wererecognized as an ‘interested party’. The group’s effortsto bring the parties to the conflict closer to anagreement became known as the Minsk Process.

The High-Level Planning Group (HLPG) was formed in December 1994 and located in Vienna to makerecommendations on developing a plan for theestablishment of a multinational OSCE peacekeepingforce. At the same time, co-chairmanship of the MinskGroup was established between Russia and Sweden.

Finland replaced Sweden in 1995, and when Finlandstepped down at the end of 1996, the US and Francejoined Russia in a co-chairing ‘Troika’. The Chairman-in-Office is supported by a Personal Representative,supported in turn by five international staff.

The Minsk Group has presented at least four proposalsas a framework for talks: the ‘package’ solution (May-July 1997), the ‘step-by-step’ proposal (September1997), the ‘common state’ proposal (November 1998)and the so-called ‘land swap’ proposal (2001). TheMinsk Group has often been criticized for its lack ofsuccess with any of these proposals.

European Union

The European Union (EU) has become more interestedin the South Caucasus in recent years. It extended itsEuropean Neighbourhood Policy to the South Caucasusin 2004, a policy that allows a significant degree ofeconomic integration and a deepening of politicalcooperation with the EU. Correspondingly, it hasbecome increasingly interested in playing a role in the peace process. European Commission PresidentRomano Prodi suggested in May 2004 that the bloccould help “speed up the solution” without interferingwith the OSCE’s mandate. The EU has pursued astrategy of “triangulation” involving Armenia,Azerbaijan and Turkey, an incremental approach thatwould see Armenia initiating a pullback of its forcesfrom the occupied areas of Azerbaijani territorysurrounding Nagorny Karabakh in order to secure an easing of the border closure with Turkey.

Commonwealth of Independent States

The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is a Moscow-led organization of post-Soviet republicsformed in 1991, of which Armenia and Azerbaijan areboth members. The CIS has played a role in peace talksbetween the warring parties. In 1993-94 it competedfor influence with the CSCE, both organizations seeking to establish their identity and purpose. In 1994Parliamentary delegations from CIS countries gatheredin Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, in May, signing a protocol on a ceasefire that has lasted ever since. The Russiansaccused the Minsk Group of trying to sabotage theirinitiative, while the Western powers countered thatRussia was trying to wreck the formation of a broader-based alternative peace plan. The rivalry receded withRussia’s co-chairmanship of the OSCE Minsk Group from 1995, which has made that the main body formediation and facilitation of the peace process. CISmeetings continue to be a forum for periodicArmenian-Azerbaijani meetings. However, the CISappears increasingly redundant as an institution thatcan advance Russia’s political and economic agenda in the former Soviet space.

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Chronology

Ancient and medieval historyIn pre-modern times the territory including today’sKarabakh is thought to have been part of the kingdomof the Caucasian Albanians, a now extinct ethnic groupthat had converted to Christianity in the fourth centuryand was partially Armenianized. Waves of eleventhcentury Seljuk invasion contributed to the Islamizationof lowland areas in the early mediaeval period, resultingin a mixed population, some sedentary, some nomadic,with a mixed system of rule by Muslim khans andArmenian meliks (princes). During the period of earlymedieval Armenian statehood, the territory was knownto Armenians as the province of Artsakh. Overallsovereignty in the early modern period was exercisedby the Persian empire (Iran).

Nineteenth centuryKarabakh is formally incorporated into the RussianEmpire by the Treaty of Gulistan in 1813. In 1868 itbecomes part of the Elizavetpol province of the Russian Empire.

1905 Armeno-Azerbaijani violence erupts in the Karabakhtown of Shusha.

1915 Large-scale deportations and massacres of Armeniansoccur in Anatolia (now recognized by several countriesas the Armenian Genocide).

1918 As the Russian Empire collapses in the wake of theBolshevik-led revolution, massacres of Azerbaijanis (inMarch) and Armenians (in September) take place inBaku, Azerbaijan. Armenia and Azerbaijan each declaretheir independence on 28 May. The new regimesquarrel over their common borders, especiallyregarding Nakhichevan, Zangezur and Karabakh.

1920-21 The Azerbaijani army sacks Shusha in March 1920 inresponse to an Armenian rebellion. On 28 April, theBolshevik Red Army takes Baku and deposes theAzerbaijani government, then takes Karabakh in Mayand Armenia in November. On 1 December,Nakhichevan, Zangezur and Karabakh are declared partof Soviet Armenia by the Azerbaijani Communist leaderNariman Narimanov. His statement is soon retracted –whether it had been a ploy to advance the Red Army’sprogress into Armenia or the result of duress is unclear.

In the ensuing months, Nakhichevan comes underAzerbaijani control and Zangezur under Armeniancontrol, initiating long-term processes in each region

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of corresponding demographic homogenization. In July1921 the Caucasian Bureau of the Russian Communistparty (Kavburo) resolves to attach Karabakh to Armenia,then almost immediately reverses the decision,attaching it to Azerbaijan with ‘wide regional autonomy’.

1922 The Soviet Union is formed; Armenia and Azerbaijan are incorporated together with Georgia as part of theTranscaucasian Federative Republic.

1923 On 7 July the Nagorny Karabakh Autonomous Oblast(NKAO) is established as an autonomous region withinAzerbaijan. Its borders are drawn a month later.

1936The Transcaucasian Federative Republic is dissolvedand Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia become unionrepublics.

1945The First Secretary of the Armenian Communist partyGrigoriy Arutinov writes to Stalin in November askingfor Karabakh to be transferred to Armenia.

1948-50 A further period of demographic homogenization takesplace in Armenia, as Azerbaijanis are deported andimmigrants settle from the diaspora.

1960s During the 1960s an ongoing affirmation of Armeniannational identity coalesces around the themes of the1915 genocide, national themes in literature and art,and Karabakh. In 1963, a petition protesting against thecultural and economic marginalization of Armenians inKarabakh with 2,500 signatures is sent to Soviet leaderNikita Khrushchev.

1977 Karabakh Armenians demonstrate in Karabakh forattachment to Armenia.

1987 A petition for Karabakh’s unification with Armenia withtens of thousands of signatures is sent from Karabakhand Armenia to Moscow in August.

In October, former First Secretary of the AzerbaijaniCommunist Party Heydar Aliyev is removed from thePolitburo, and speaking in Paris in November AbelAganbekian, one of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’sadvisors, suggests Moscow might view Karabakh’sunification with Armenia sympathetically.Demonstrations take place in the Armenian capital

Yerevan protesting the treatment of Armenians in thearea north of Karabakh, and intercommunal violencebreaks out in Kafan, Armenia, in November.

1988 January

The first forced population movements of the emergingconflict take place as Azerbaijanis flee Kafan.

February

Demonstrations begin in Stepanakert in mid-February,echoed by mass demonstrations in Yerevan, followedby the local Soviet of Peoples’ Deputies’ resolutionrequesting transfer to Armenia. Karabakh party leaderBoris Kevorkov is removed from his post.

On 27-29 February anti-Armenian pogroms take placein Sumgait, Azerbaijan, killing up to 32 peopleaccording to official sources. Almost all of the town’sArmenian population leaves.

May-July

The First Secretaries in both republics are replaced inMay and a ‘war of laws’ begins in June: while theArmenian Supreme Soviet affirms the transfer ofKarabakh to Armenia, the Azerbaijani Supreme Sovietaffirms its status within Azerbaijan. The latter position isconfirmed in July by the Presidium of the SupremeSoviet of the USSR. Party official Arkady Volsky is sent tothe region as the Representative of the CentralCommittee of the Supreme Soviet.

September-November

Population movements within Karabakh increase asArmenians are driven out of Shusha and Azerbaijanisout of Stepanakert. In September ‘special administration’(direct rule from Moscow) is introduced to Karabakh. InNovember, Azerbaijanis are expelled en masse fromArmenia, leading to mass demonstrations in Baku.

December

On 7 December Armenia is struck by an earthquake,killing 25,000 people.

The Karabakh Committee, the eleven-man leadership ofthe Armenian opposition movement, is arrested (theyare released six months later without charge).

1989This year sees a fragmentation of the bodies claimingsovereignty over Karabakh. On 12 January Volskyestablishes a Special Administration Committee forKarabakh; in Karabakh, a 79-person National Council iselected in August declaring it will only co-operate withVolsky’s committee on its own terms. In September

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Azerbaijan’s Supreme Soviet passes a declaration ofsovereignty over Karabakh, and direct rule nominallyreturns to Baku in November. In December theKarabakh National Council passes a joint resolutionwith the Supreme Soviet of Armenia declaring NagornyKarabakh’s unification with the Armenian SSR.

1990In Azerbaijan’s ‘Black January’, anti-Armenian pogromstake place in Baku on 13-15 January, killing about 90and forcing virtually all Armenians to flee the city, and a state of emergency is imposed in Karabakh and theborder regions. The state of emergency is declared inBaku from midnight of 19-20 January, when Soviettanks and troops enter and are met by nationalistprotestors, resulting in some 150 civilian deaths. AyazMutalibov becomes party leader in Azerbaijan. SecondSecretary Viktor Polyanichko goes to Karabakh to set up anew Organizational Committee as Volsky’s team departs.

In May the Armenian National Movement is swept topower in elections for the Supreme Soviet of Armenia.The Karabakh Committee’s Levon Ter-Petrosian iselected Speaker in August, and on the 23rd a declarationis passed stating Armenia is heading towardsindependence.

1991 March

On 17 March Azerbaijan takes part in the referendumon the preservation of the Soviet Union. Armenia doesnot participate in the vote.

April-July

‘Operation Ring’ begins in April as part of the plandevised in Baku and Moscow to ‘disarm illegal armedformations’ in Karabakh. Soviet troops, Azeri police andspecial forces units initiate attacks on Armenian villagessurrounding Karabakh to the north. Operation Ringcontinues through July.

August-September

In the aftermath of an attempted coup againstGorbachev in Moscow, Azerbaijan declaresindependence on 30 August. Mutalibov is electedpresident of Azerbaijan on 8 September. Aliyev iselected speaker of the parliament of the AutonomousRepublic of Nakhichevan on 3 September.

Karabakh announces its secession from Azerbaijan on 2 September, proclaiming itself the Nagorno-KarabakhRepublic. Armenia declares independence on 23September, as a joint Kazakh-Russian peace plan forKarabakh is signed in Zheleznovodsk, Russia.

October-November

Ter-Petrosian is elected president of Armenia. TheZheleznovodsk peace plan is abandoned after anAzerbaijani helicopter carrying high-rankingAzerbaijani, Russian and Kazakh military personnelcrashes over Karabakh on 20 November. Azerbaijan’snew National Council votes to revoke NagornyKarabakh’s autonomous status and declare it anordinary province.

December

On 10 December Karabakh Armenians vote in favour of independence in a referendum. The Soviet Unioncollapses on 31 December.

1992 January

On 6 January Nagorny Karabakh declares itselfindependent, but is not recognized by any state,including Armenia; Artur Mkrtchian becomes its firstleader as Chairman of its Supreme Soviet (but is killed in mysterious circumstances in April). On 30 JanuaryArmenia and Azerbaijan are admitted to theConference for Security and Cooperation in Europe(CSCE), which assumes responsibility as mediator forthe conflict.

February

On 25-26 February hundreds of Azerbaijanis aremassacred in the Karabakh village of Khojaly, leading to President Mutalibov’s resignation on 6 March.

March

The Minsk Group is formed at a CSCE conference onKarabakh in Minsk.

May

As Ter-Petrossian and acting Azerbaijani leader YaqubMamedov meet in Tehran, signing a communiqué onthe general principles of a peace agreement, Armenianforces capture Shusha on 8-9 May.

Mutalibov is temporarily restored to power inAzerbaijan by former Communist deputies on 14-15May, before being forcibly removed. Armenian forcescapture Lachin on 18 May, creating a land link betweenNagorny Karabakh and Armenia.

June-July

On 7 June the Popular Front’s Abulfaz Elchibey iselected president of Azerbaijan. As Minsk Groupnegotiations open in Rome on 1 June, they are rapidlyovertaken by the recapture of Shaumian region by anAzerbaijani offensive on 12 June, followed by Mardakert(renamed Agdere) in northern Karabakh on 4 July.

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August

A new State Defence Committee is established asNagorny Karabakh’s executive body, with RobertKocharian as its head.

October

On 24 October the United States Congress passesSection 907 of the Freedom Support Act prohibiting US government aid to Azerbaijan.

1993 February-April

Against a backdrop of lacklustre military performance,Suret Huseynov is sacked as Azerbaijan’s ‘specialrepresentative’ on Karabakh. Between 27 March and 5 April Armenian forces capture Kelbajar (Azerbaijaniterritory situated between Karabakh and Armenia),which becomes the subject of UN Resolution 822 (30 April) calling for Armenian withdrawal.

June-August

On 4 June Huseynov initiates an uprising in Ganjaagainst President Elchibey. On 15 June Aliyev becomesspeaker of the Azerbaijani Parliament, and Elchibeyflees the capital three days later. Aliyev is grantedextraordinary presidential powers on 24 June, which he uses to appoint Huseynov as prime minister. Thispolitical upheaval in Azerbaijan fuels a number ofcatastrophic military defeats resulting in the fall ofMardakert in June, Aghdam in July, and Fizuli, Jebrailand Gubatly in August. These become the subject ofUN Resolution 853 (29 July), calling for Armenianwithdrawal.

September-December

In Moscow to seal Azerbaijan’s accession to theCommonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Aliyevmeets Karabakh Armenian leader Kocharian in secret.On 3 October Aliyev is elected president of Azerbaijan,but at the end of the month Armenian forces againcapture more territories: the town of Goradiz and thedistrict of Zengelan. UN Resolution 874 (14 October)stipulates a timetable for the withdrawal of Armenianforces from the occupied territories. UN Resolution 884(12 November) condemns the occupation of Goradizand Zengelan. The year ends with a renewedAzerbaijani offensive.

1994January-February

Both Azerbaijani and Armenian forces suffer heavylosses in fierce fighting from late January to mid-February.

May

At talks attended by Armenia, Azerbaijan, NagornyKarabakh representatives, the CIS (dominated byRussia) and hosts Kyrgyzstan, the Bishkek Protocol issigned and a ceasefire begins on 12 May.

September-October

Azerbaijan signs a contract to develop its offshoreAzeri-Shirag-Gunashli oil fields with foreign companieson 20 September. Huseynov flees Azerbaijan as thesuspected organizer of an alleged failed coup on 3-4 October.

November-December

In the third round of talks since the ceasefire, Azerbaijanmakes new demands for the inclusion of KarabakhiAzeris in the process and insists on a CSCE-mediatedpeace process. At the CSCE summit in Budapest, inwhich the CSCE becomes the OSCE, Russia and Swedenbecome co-chairs of the Minsk Group. The High LevelPlanning Group of the OSCE is formed 20 December.Robert Kocharian is voted de facto president of NagornyKarabakh by parliament on 22 December.

1995March

A coup attempt led by Deputy Minister of the InteriorColonel Rovshan Javadov fails in Baku 13-17 March.

April

Finland replaces Sweden as co-chair of the MinskGroup.

May-June

A new round of negotiations in Moscow in mid-Mayfails, with Azerbaijan insisting that representatives ofboth Armenian and Azerbaijani communities fromNagorny Karabakh be included as armed – but notpolitical – actors.

1996January-March

Talks in Moscow fail to make substantial progress, as the sides reject new proposals by the OSCE, Russia and the US.

95Chronology

September

Ter-Petrosian wins the disputed Armenian presidentialelections with 51 per cent of the vote on 23 September.A state of emergency is declared after election protests.

November

Kocharian is elected de facto president of NagornyKarabakh by popular vote on the 24th.

December

At the OSCE’s Lisbon Summit, the chair-in-office issues a statement on the principles of resolution that supportAzerbaijan’s territorial integrity. Armenia prevents thembeing part of the final communiqué: they are insteadincluded as an annex, with Armenia’s responserecorded in a second annex.

1997January-February

On 1 January France succeeds Finland as co-chair of theMinsk Group. In response to Azerbaijani displeasure, theUS is admitted as a third co-chair on 14 February.

March

Kocharian becomes prime minister of Armenia.

May

The Minsk Group presents a new peace proposal.

June-July

Minsk co-chairs discuss the latest proposals withleaders in Armenia and Azerbaijan, who eventuallyaccept the proposal in principle as a basis for peace,Armenia with “serious reservations”. A modified‘package’ proposal is worked on by Minsk Group co-chairs after meetings with Aliyev in Baku in July. In late July, Aliyev visits the US, signing treaties oninvestment with President Bill Clinton. Revealing theconfidential peace proposals, Aliyev announces thatAzerbaijan would agree to a staged withdrawal fromthe occupied territories, leaving Lachin under NagornyKarabakh’s control at the first stage.

August

On 25 August Nagorny Karabakh rejects the peace plansubmitted in late May.

September

Arkady Ghukasian wins Nagorny Karabakh’s presidentialelections (condemned by Azerbaijan and Russia). In thewake of the failure of the latest efforts, a modified ‘step-by-step’ peace proposal is presented by the MinskGroup. Ter-Petrosian endorses the new approach andcomments publicly on need for compromise. His move

opens divisions within his own government and sparksa number of opposition demonstrations.

October-NovemberArmenia and Azerbaijan accept the latest OSCE peaceplans as a basis for further negotiations with somereservations. Nagorny Karabakh rejects them,demanding a package approach, citing securityconcerns with the step-by-step proposal. Ghukasiansays a “confederative relationship” with Azerbaijancould be discussed, but not proposals that subordinatethe region to Baku.

December

At an OSCE meeting in Copenhagen, no breakthroughis announced and requests by Nagorny Karabakh to beincorporated as a third party are rejected. A step-by-step proposal is discussed and rejected. No new OSCEdocuments are produced as Armenia blocks a re-iteration of the 1996 Lisbon principles.

1998 January-February

At a meeting of Armenia’s National Security Council,powerful figures including Kocharian, Vazgen Sarkisianand Serzh Sarkisian (not related) side against Ter-Petrosian in rejecting the Minsk Group proposal. Ter-Petrosian resigns on 3 February.

March

In Armenian presidential elections, Kocharian wins inthe second round in a poll criticized by internationalobservers.

October

Aliyev is re-elected president of Azerbaijan.

November

A Minsk Group ‘common state’ proposal is rejected by Azerbaijan.

1999April

Aliyev and Kocharian attend the 50th anniversarysummit of NATO in Washington. It is their first meetingsince 1993 but is the first of many meetings over thenext two years.

May-June

The ‘Unity’ bloc, consisting of Vazgen Sarkisian’sRepublican Party and Karen Demirchian’s People’s Partyof Armenia wins parliamentary elections in Armenia inMay. Sarkisian is appointed prime minister on 11 June.

96 Accord 17

October

Aliyev and Kocharian meet on the Nakhichevan-Armenia border. A revival of the so-called ‘Goble Plan’for territorial exchange is discussed, provokingresignations among Aliyev’s senior officials. It is highlycontroversial in Armenia as well.

On 27 October gunmen storm a session of theArmenian National Assembly and kill eight high officialscomprising the core of the new political elite, includingPrime Minister Vazgen Sarkisian and Speaker KarenDemirchian.

December

Prominent wartime commander Samvel Babayan issacked as chief of the Nagorny Karabakh armed forces.On 29 December President Aliyev issues a decreeestablishing a state oil fund in Azerbaijan.

2000March

Ghukasian is seriously wounded in an assassinationattempt in Stepanakert; Babayan is arrested in itsaftermath.

Armenian Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian admitsArmenia’s internal troubles following the Octobermassacre have almost “closed down” talks on Nagorny Karabakh.

June

Nagorny Karabakh holds unrecognized parliamentaryelections.

September

Kocharian and Aliyev meet at the UN MillenniumSummit in New York, reaffirming the importance of thedialogue begun in 1999.

2001January-March

Azerbaijan and Armenia become full members of theCouncil of Europe. Aliyev and Kocharian meet in Paris inJanuary and again on 4-5 March. Former OSCE peaceplans are leaked to the Armenian and Azerbaijanimedia in February.

April-July

Peace talks are held in Key West, Florida, which manybelieve were based on principles established in Paris inMarch. Despite both presidents’ public optimism, overthe following weeks the still confidential proposalsencounter serious opposition within the Azerbaijanipolitical elite and little encouragement in Armenia.

September-November

Following a slowdown in the peace process since April,Minsk co-chairs visit Yerevan and Baku but are unableto secure sufficient support for an allegedly amendedversion of the broad agreement discussed at Key West.Contrary to expectations, Aliyev and Kocharian do notmeet for one-on-one talks at the CIS Summit on 30November.

2002January-March

President George W. Bush of the United States liftsAmendment 907 of the Freedom Support Act restrictingAmerican aid to Azerbaijan, in reward for Azerbaijan’scooperation in the ‘war on terror’. Minsk co-chairs visitBaku and Yerevan to discuss “new ideas to reinvigorateand energize the peace process”.

May-August

Armenian and Azerbaijani Deputy Foreign Ministersmeet in Prague in Minsk Group-mediated discussions.On 12 August Ghukasian is re-elected de factopresident of Nagorny Karabakh. On 24 August anational referendum in Azerbaijan approves significantamendments to the Constitution, including the transferof power in case of the president’s incapacitation to the prime minister and not parliamentary speaker, with a 97 per cent approval rate.

September

Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Vilayat Guliev criticizes the UN Security Council for failing to seek Armeniancompliance with its resolutions of 1993.

Construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipelinebegins.

2003January

The Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, Walter Schwimmer, criticizes President Kocharian for a speech suggesting that Armenians and Azerbaijanis are “ethnically incompatible” and cannot live in thesame state.

February

In the first round of voting in the Armenian presidentialelection, more than 250 opposition activists, supportersand observers are detained.

March

Kocharian is re-elected in the Armenian presidentialelection run-off with 60 per cent of the vote.

97Chronology

April

The Armenian Constitutional Court rules that thepresidential election result should stand, but thatgovernment should hold referendum of confidence in Kocharian within one year. Kocharian rejects this. On 21 April Aliyev collapses twice during an officialceremony being broadcast live on television.

May

In parliamentary elections in Armenia, a pro-presidential coalition of the Republican Party, ArmenianRevolutionary Federation and Orinats Yerkir parties iselected.

July-August

Defence Ministers Serzh Sarkisian and Safar Abiyevagree on 8 July to ease the tension between the twocountries’ armed forces after meeting on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border. On 9 July Aliyev is taken to hospitalin Turkey; in August he is transferred to Cleveland, USA.On 4 August the Azerbaijani parliament approvesAliyev’s son Ilham’s appointment as prime minister.

October

In presidential elections in Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev winsin the first round; public disorder and clashes betweensecurity forces and protesters ensue. The internationalcommunity is largely uncritical, with the exception ofNorway, although part of the OSCE observer missiondissociates itself from the OSCE Preliminary Statementon the elections as being too mild.

December

The group accused of the October 1999 Armenianparliament shootings is sentenced after a three-yearhearing.

Heydar Aliyev’s death is announced on 12 December.

2004January

Ilham Aliyev declares in Paris that Azerbaijan will neveraccept Karabakh’s independence or integration withArmenia. Oskanian dismisses an Azerbaijani offer to liftArmenia’s economic blockade in exchange for thereturn of Armenian-controlled Azerbaijani territoriesaround Nagorny Karabakh.

February

Armenian army officer Lieutenant Gurgen Markarian,attending a NATO training course in Hungary, is hackedto death with an axe by an Azerbaijani officer.

The European Parliament refuses to back its chief SouthCaucasus rapporteur Per Gahrton’s calls for the return of

Armenian-controlled territories adjacent to NagornyKarabakh in exchange for the lifting of Azerbaijan’seconomic blockade of Armenia.

March

The deadline for a referendum of confidence inKocharian approaches and passes amid risingopposition.

April

The opposition protests in Yerevan against Kocharianand the failure to hold a referendum. Demonstratorsare dispersed by force during the night of 13 April, andparty offices of Republican Party, National Unity Partyand People’s Party are raided.

Beginning a regular cycle of meetings known as the‘Prague Process’, new Azerbaijani Foreign Minister ElmarMammadyarov meets his Armenian counterpartOskanian in Prague on 16 April.

May

The European Union announces intentions to increaseits role in the South Caucasus, incorporating Armenia,Azerbaijan and Georgia within its ‘EuropeanNeighbourhood Policy’.

July

In a press conference in Yerevan, the Minsk Groupmediators announce they will not bring any newproposals for the conflicting sides, saying that Armeniaand Azerbaijan bear the responsibility for reachingagreements and settlement.

August

In unrecognized local elections in Nagorny Karabakhthe opposition Movement-88 party scores a majorsuccess by winning the vote for the Stepanakertmayoralty.

September

The eleventh anniversary of the ceasefire is met with aworsening situation on the line of contact, as each sideaccuses the other of violations. Presidents Aliyev,Kocharian and Putin meet in Astana, Kazakhstan, on 15September. They reportedly moot a new idea –Armenian withdrawal from the occupied districts inreturn for two referenda: one in Karabakh and one inAzerbaijan as a whole. NATO cancels plannedmanoeuvres in Azerbaijan when Armenian militarypersonnel are refused visas.

Babayan is released from jail and granted a partialamnesty.

98 Accord 17

October-November

The Council of Europe’s PACE adopts a resolution criticalof Armenia’s democratic record. Azerbaijan urges theUnited Nations General Assembly to acknowledgeArmenian settlement of the occupied territories.

December

The Armenian Revolutionary Federation withdraws itssupport from President Ghukasian in protest againstthe sacking of its only cabinet minister, Armen Sarkisian.

2005January

The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europeadopts a resolution criticizing Armenian occupation ofAzerbaijani territory and containing references toethnic cleansing.

February

OSCE officials make their first inspection of Armenian-controlled Azerbaijani territories. They conclude thatthere is no significant involvement of Armenia inongoing settlement processes in the occupiedterritories, while they observe some direct involvementof the Nagorny Karabakh authorities, above all in Lachinand a limited area east of Mardakert.

April

Oskanian and Mammadyarov meet separately with theMinsk Group co-chairs in London.

Ceasefire violations along the line of contact escalate.

May

Presidents Aliyev and Kocharian meet at the Council of Europe summit in Warsaw, reportedly discussingArmenian withdrawal from the occupied territories and approving further meetings between the foreign ministers.

The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline is opened in Baku.

June

Oskanian and Mammadyarov meet in Paris. Oskaniantells the media that “common ground is in sight”. On 14 June a statement issued by the Azerbaijani Ministryof Foreign Affairs supports international calls forintercommunal contacts between Karabakh Armeniansand Karabakh Azeris.

Political parties loyal to President Ghukasian win asurprise landslide victory in Nagorny Karabakh’sparliamentary elections, winning nearly two-thirds of the vote.

July

Anonymous Armenian sources suggest that agreementwith Azerbaijan on the possible use of a referendum to determine Karabakh’s future status is close. TheAzerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs quickly deniesthis.

August

Azerbaijan’s military prosecutor reopens a criminalinvestigation of the killings at Khojaly in 1992.

Amid rising tensions surrounding the forthcomingparliamentary elections Azerbaijan’s Prosecutor-Generalarrests a youth movement leader on charges ofattempting a coup and taking money from Armeniansecurity forces to do so.

Kocharian and Aliyev meet in Kazan on 27 August, butdespite calling the meeting positive no further detailsare divulged. Speculation surrounds reports of newapproaches being discussed by Oskanian andMammadyarov, allegedly comprising a combined‘package’ and ‘step-by-step’ approach to thewithdrawal of Armenian forces from the occupiedterritories and the future use of a referendum todetermine Karabakh’s status.

November

Despite numerous commitments on the part ofPresident Aliyev to an improved electoral process,parliamentary elections in Azerbaijan are widelycriticized. YAP and pro-regime 'Independence' dominatethe new Milli Meclis. While the ensuing protests appearto pose no immediate threat to the regime, Aliyev'slonger term credibility sustains damage.

99Chronology

100 Accord 17

Further readingHistory, background and analyses ofthe conflict■ Chorbajian, Levon (ed.) The making

of Nagorno-Karabagh: from secessionto Republic (Basingstoke/New York:Palgrave, 2001)

■ Croissant, Michael. The Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict: causes andimplications (London: Praeger, 1998)

■ De Waal, Thomas. Black garden:Armenia and Azerbaijan throughpeace and war (New York: New YorkUniversity Press, 2003)

■ Libaridian, Gerard. Modern Armenia.People, Nation, State (NewBrunswick/London: TransactionPublishers, 2004)

■ Lynch, Dov. Engaging Eurasia’sseparatist states: unresolved conflictsand de facto states (Washington, DC:United States Institute of Peace Press,2004)

■ Rasizade, Alec. ‘Azerbaijan afterHeidar Aliev’ Nationalities Papers, vol.32, no. 1 (March 2004): 137-164

■ Yunusov, Arif. Islam in Azerbaijan(Baku: Friedrich Ebert Foundation/Institute of Peace and Democracy,2004)

Peace processes■ Betts, Wendy. ‘Third party mediation:

an obstacle to peace in NagornoKarabakh’ SAIS Review, vol. 19, no. 2(1999): 161-183

■ Caspian Studies Programme.‘Negotiations on Nagorno-Karabagh:where do we go from here?’ (HarvardUniversity, John F. Kennedy School ofGovernment, 23 April 2001)

■ Dehdashti, Rexane. ‘Nagorno-Karabakh: A Case Study of OSCEConflict Settlement’ in Michael Bothe,Natalino Ronzitti and Allan Rosas(eds.) The OSCE in the maintenance of peace and security (The Hague,London, Boston: Kluwer LawInternational, 1997)

■ Druckman, Daniel & Terrence Lyons.‘Negotiation processes andpostsettlement relationships:comparing Nagorno-Karabakh withMozambique’ in William Zartman &Victor Kremenyuk, Peace versus justice:negotiating forward-and backward-looking outcomes (Lanham, MD:Rowman & Littlefield, 2005)

■ Faber, Mient-Jan & Andrzej Kasprzyk.‘How should the OSCE deal with theNagorno Karabakh conflict?’ HelsinkiMonitor, vol. 14, no. 1 (2003): 1-6

■ Gamaghelyan, Philip. ‘Intractability of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: a myth or reality?’ Peace & ConflictMonitor, Special Report, July 2005.

■ International Crisis Group. ‘Nagorno-Karabakh: viewing the conflict fromthe ground’ (Tbilisi/Brussels: EuropeReport, no. 166, 14 September 2005)

■ International Crisis Group. ‘Nagorno-Karabakh: a plan for peace’(Tbilisi/Brussels: Europe Report, no. 167, 11 October 2005)

■ Laitin, David & Ronald Suny. ‘Armeniaand Azerbaijan: thinking a way out of Karabakh’ Middle East Policy, vol. 7, no. 1 (October 1999): 145-76

Other themes■ Faber, Mient Jan & Mary Kaldor.

‘Study Group on Europe’s SecurityCapabilities: South Caucasus Paper’(London School of Economics, Centrefor the Study of Global Governance,draft paper, 2004)http://lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/StudyGroup/SouthCaucasusPaper.htm

■ Human Rights Watch/Helsinki.Azerbaijan. Seven Years of Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh (New York:Human Rights Watch, 1994)

■ Human Rights Watch. CrushingDissent. Repression, Violence andAzerbaijan’s Elections (New York:Human Rights Watch, January 2004)

■ Human Rights Watch. Cycle ofRepression: Human Rights Violations in Armenia (New York, Human RightsWatch Briefing Paper, 4 May 2004)

■ Kaufman, Stuart. ‘Peace-Building and Conflict Resolution in NagornoKarabakh’, (PONARS Policy Memo164, University of Kentucky, 2000)

■ Matveeva, Anna. 2002 ‘NagornoKarabakh: A StraightforwardTerritorial Conflict’ in Paul vanTongeren, Hans van de Veen &Juliette Verhoeven (eds.) Searching for peace in Europe and Eurasia:overview of conflict prevention andpeacebuilding activities (Boulder, CO:Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002)

■ Article 19. Under lock and key: freedomof information and the media inArmenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia(London: Article 19, 2005)

■ Panossian, Razmik. ‘The irony ofNagorno-Karabakh: formalinstitutions versus informal politics’Regional & Federal Studies, vol. 11, no. 3 (2001): 143-164

■ Tsalik, Svetlana. Caspian Oil Windfalls:Who Will Benefit? (New York: OpenSociety Institute, 2003)

■ Tchilingirian, Hratch. ‘Nagorno-Karabakh: transition and the elite’Central Asian Survey, vol. 18, no. 4(1999): 441-445

Public opinion surveys■ Azerbaijanian Sociological

Association. Armenian-Azeri MutualPerception Project. Country Report onthe “Potential of Azerbaijanian andArmenian Peoples in Peacebuildingand Post-Conflict Cooperation” Surveyin Azerbaijan (Baku: AzerbaijanianSociological Association/AmericanUniversity, 2003)

■ Baku Press Club, Yerevan Press Club.The Karabakh Conflict and Prospectsfor Settling it. The results of sociologicalresearch and media coverage of theKarabakh settlement problem (Baku:Yeni Nesil, 2004)

■ Stepanakert Press Club, FriedrichEbert Foundation (Berlin) and Centerof Social Technologies (Yerevan).Mountainous Karabakh in the mirror of public opinion (Stepanakert:Stepanakert Press Club, 2004)

News websites■ ANS: http://www.ans-dx.com■ Armenia Liberty:

http://www.armenialiberty.org■ ArmeniaNow.com:

http://www.armenianow.com■ BBC Karabakh page [Russian]:

http://news8.thdo.bbc.co.uk/hi/russian/in_depth/2004/karabakh/

■ BakuToday.net:http://www.bakutoday.net

■ EurasiaNet:http://www.eurasianet.org

■ Institute for War and PeaceReporting: http://www.iwpr.net

■ Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty:http://www.rferl.org

Peacebuilding websites■ Consortium Initiative:

http://www.consortium-initiative.org■ South Caucasus Parliamentary

Initiative: http://www.scpi.org.ge

conciliation resources

101About CR

Conciliation Resources (CR) supports people working toprevent violence, promote justice and transform conflictinto opportunities for development.

CR’s organizational goals are to:

• Support people working at local, national andinternational levels in developing innovative solutionsto social, economic and political problems related toviolent conflicts

• Provide opportunities for inclusive dialogue andimproved relationships within communities and across conflict divides at all social and political levels

• Influence governments and other decision makers toemploy conflict transformation policies that promotealternatives to violence

• Improve peacemaking practice and policies bypromoting learning from peace processes around the world

• Strengthen the media’s capacities in divided societies tochallenge stereotypes and increase public awareness ofhuman rights, conflict and peace issues

In addition to the Accord programme, CR has recentlyworked with:

• Civic groups in Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia

• Kacoke Madit and its partners in northern Uganda

• Non-governmental organizations and officials in the Caucasus

• The Citizens’ Constitutional Forum in Fiji

For more information or to make a donation contact:

Conciliation Resources173 Upper StreetLondon N1 1RGUnited Kingdom

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Abkhaz and Georgian journalists filming theirdocumentary ‘Hoping for Peace’, which explores the lives of people in the Gal/i region.

102 Accord 17

The Liberian Peace Process 1990–1996

Issue 1 | 1996

The Liberia issue documents the lengthy and

fractious Liberian peace process and provides

insight into why thirteen individual peace

accords collapsed in half as many years.

Negotiating Rights: The Guatemalan Peace Process

Issue 2 | 1997

The signing of the peace agreement in 1996

brought an end to 36 years of civil war in

Guatemala. The publication analyses issues

of impunity, indigenous rights, political

participation and land reform.

The Mozambican Peace Process in Perspective

Issue 3 | 1998

The Mozambique issue documents the diverse

initiatives which drove the parties to a negotiated

settlement of the conflict as well as illustrating

the impact of changing regional and

international dynamics on Mozambique.

Demanding Sacrifice: War and Negotiation in Sri Lanka

Issue 4 | 1998

The Sri Lanka issue documents the cycles of

ethnic/national conflict which have blighted the

country since 1983. It analyses negotiations and

other peace initiatives that have taken place since

1993 and outlines fundamental issues

that need to be confronted in future

peacemaking efforts.

Safeguarding Peace: Cambodia’s Constitutional Challenge

Issue 5 | 1998

This publication documents issues around

the signing of the 1991 Paris agreements

which officially "brought to an end"

Cambodia's long war and the violent

collapse of the country's governing

coalition in July 1997.

Compromising on Autonomy: Mindanao in Transition

Issue 6 | 1999

The GRP-MNLF 1996 Peace Agreement was

a milestone in many ways. The publication

analyses features of peacemaking in

Mindanao and examines the challenges

of implementation.

2003: Supplement issue

A question of sovereignty:the Georgia–Abkhazia peace process

Issue 7 | 1999

The publication explores the background

and issues at the heart of the Georgia-

Abkhazia conflict, provides a unique insight

into a political stalemate and points towards

possible avenues out of deadlock.

Striking a balance: the Northern Ireland peace process

Issue 8 | 1999

Accord 8 explores the factors that led to

the negotiations resulting in the Belfast

Agreement, describing the complex

underlying forces and the development

of an environment for peace.

2003: Supplement issue

The Accord seriesAccord: an international review of peace initiatives is published by Conciliation Resources (CR). It provides detailed narrativeand analysis on specific war and peace processes in an accessible format. The series is intended to provide a practical resourcefor reflection for all those engaged in peacemaking activities.

103The Accord series

Paying the price: the Sierra Leone peace process

Issue 9 | 2000

The Lomé Peace Agreement of July 1999 sought

to bring an end to one of the most brutal civil

wars of recent times. Accord 9 explores earlier

attempts to bring the conflict to an end and in

doing so seeks to draw valuable lessons for

Sierra Leone’s transition.

Politics of compromise: the Tajikistan peace process

Issue 10 | 2001

Accord 10 describes the aspirations of the

parties to the conflict in Tajikistan and

documents the negotiation process leading to

the General Agreement of June 1997. It looks

at the role of the international community,

led by the UN, as well as local civil society, in

reaching a negotiated settlement.

Protracted conflict, elusive peace: initiatives to end the violence in northern Uganda

Issue 11 | 2002

While a meaningful peace process in Northern

Uganda remains elusive, this issue documents

significant peacemaking initiatives undertaken

by internal and external actors and analyses

their impact on the dynamics of the conflict

and attempts to find peace.

Owning the process: public participation in peacemaking

Issue 13 | 2002

The first thematic publication documents

mechanisms for public participation in

peacemaking. It features extended studies

looking at how people were enabled to

participate in political processes in

Guatemala, Mali and South Africa. It also

contains shorter pieces from Colombia,

Northern Ireland and the Philippines.

Alternatives to war: Colombia’s peace processes

Issue 14 | 2004

This issue provides an overview of more

than 25 years of peace initiatives with

Colombia's guerrilla and paramilitary

groups. It includes analysis of civil society

efforts at local, regional and national levels

and identifies the necessary elements of a

new model of conflict resolution.

From military peace to social justice?The Angola peace process

Issue 15 | 2004

The Luena Memorandum of 2002 brought

an end to Angola’s 27-year civil war. This

issue reviews Angola’s history of

peacemaking efforts, and analyses the

challenges remaining if the absence of

violence is to develop into a sustainable

and just peace.

Future issues The government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January2005, yet Sudan continues to be afflicted by violent conflict, especially in Darfur. This Accord issue will document the peace process that led to the signing of the CPA, identifying the challenges that remain for north-south relations and analysing implications for theresolution of Sudan’s other conflicts. The issue will also address non-official and civil society initiatives, international roles and the scopefor more inclusive peacemaking

Weaving consensus: The Papua NewGuinea – Bougainville peace process

Issue 12 | 2002

Accord 12 documents efforts leading to the

Bougainville Peace Agreement of 2001. The

issue describes an indigenous process that

drew on the strengths of Melanesian

traditions, as well as innovative roles played

by international third-parties.

Choosing to engage:armed groups and peace processes

Issue 16 | 2005

Non-state armed groups, key actors in many

internal armed conflicts, have participated in

peace processes across the world. This issue

draws on these experiences to explore the case

for engaging with armed groups, and the

different options, roles and challenges for

such engagement.

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Issue 1 The Liberian peace process 1990–1996 ■■Issue 2 Negotiating rights: the Guatemalan peace process ■■Issue 3 The Mozambican peace process in perspective ■■Issue 4 Demanding sacrifice: war and negotiation in Sri Lanka ■■Issue 5 Safeguarding peace: Cambodia’s constitutional challenge ■■Issue 6 Compromising on autonomy: Mindanao in transition

(including 2003 supplement) ■■ Supplement only £5.00 ■■Issue 7 A question of sovereignty: the Georgia–Abkhazia peace process ■■Issue 8 Striking a balance: the Northern Ireland peace process

(including 2003 supplement) ■■ Supplement only £5.00 ■■

Issue 9 Paying the price: the Sierra Leone peace process ■■

Issue 10 Politics of compromise: the Tajikistan peace process ■■

Issue 11 Protracted conflict, elusive peace: initiatives to end the violence in northern Uganda ■■

Issue 12 Weaving consensus: the Papua New Guinea – Bougainville peace process ■■

Issue 13 Owning the process: public participation in peacemaking ■■

Issue 14 Alternatives to war: Colombia’s peace processes ■■

Issue 15 From military peace to social justice?The Angolan peace process ■■

Issue 16 Choosing to engage: armed groups and peace processes ■■Issue 17 The limits of leadership: elites and societies in the

Nagorny Karabakh peace process ■■

a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e v i e w o f p e a c e i n i t i a t i v e s

Issue Editor Laurence Broers

Elites and societies in the Nagorny Karabakh peace process

The limits of leadership

The limits of leadership:elites and societies in the Nagorny Karabakh peace process

Since the ceasefire of 1994, the conflict between Azerbaijan andArmenia over the region of Nagorny Karabakh has remained firmlydeadlocked. An internationally-sponsored peace process based onclosed talks between Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders has yieldedseveral proposals but no significant agreement. Rather than preparingpopulations for possible compromises, leaders in the region have longsought to bolster their domestic ratings with hardline stances.Theirzero-sum approaches to the competing principles of territorial integrity and self-determination make renewed violence as likely as a peaceful resolution.

With insufficient space in either society for the articulation ofconstructive solutions or the identification of common ground,The limits of leadership: elites and societies in the Nagorny Karabakh peaceprocess highlights the obstacles to a sustainable agreement. Inparticular, it explores the central challenge of bridging the gap betweenpotential for agreement at the negotiating table and popular resistanceto the compromises this entails.

With distrust in the present process so widespread, could a moreinclusive and multi-faceted approach address the dynamics ofpolarization and provide greater chances of reaching a solutionacceptable to all?

Featuring contributors from diverse constituencies, this issue of Accord presents perspectives on the peace process and analysis of the impacts of the conflict. It explores the roles of civil society and themedia, the economics of war and peace, and the challenges for furtherdemocratization. It also contains key texts and agreements, profiles of key actors and a chronology of the peace process.

Conciliation Resources and the Accord programmeConciliation Resources (CR) is an international non-governmentalorganization which supports people working to prevent violence,promote justice and transform armed conflict. CR’s Accord programmeaims to inform and strengthen peace processes, providing a uniqueresource on conflict and peacemaking.Working collaboratively withlocally based organizations, we document peace processes, increaseunderstanding and promote learning from past and comparablepeacemaking experiences.

“[Accord materials]…serve as valuable inputs and ready referencesfor our peace officers as we come up with more creative ways inpromoting peace and development on our side of the world.”

Rene V. Sarmiento, Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, Philippines

“…the series is of utmost importance for me. It provides a very goodreference source for empirical research.”

Hans J. Giessman, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy, University of Hamburg

The full text of all issues in the Accord series can be found on theConciliation Resources website at http://www.c-r.org

Issue 17 2005

ISSN 1365-0742£17.00

Accord 17Conciliation Resources

The Nagorny Karabakh peace process

C o n c i l i a t i o n R e s o u r c e s