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Israel and Hezbollah: The Prospect of Renewed Hostilities

Hudson Event: July 26, 2016

By, Andrew Larsen, August 2, 2016

This panel focused on how the conflict in Syria has the potential to renew hostilities

between Israel and Hezbollah ten years after the 34 day war in 2006. Moderated by Hudson

senior fellow, Lee Smith, this panel included, Reuven Azar, Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of

Israel to the United States, Hudson senior fellow, Michael Doran, and Tony Badran, a research

fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. This summary highlights the comments

made by Michael Doran and Tony Badran.

Michael Doran:

He is very concerned about the future of Iran-US-Russia relations. Mike claims that he

has always held the view that Iran is the biggest US adversary in the Middle East. During the

Bush Administration, Doran worked on the Hezbollah-Israel war issue in 2006. He understood,

at that time, that this was a proxy war between the U.S. and Iran and that everything in the

U.S.’s power needed to be done to counter Iran and Hezbollah. Israel was given a blank check

by the U.S. to take care of business. In this case, the biggest surprise to Doran was that the

Saudis did not complain when Israel attacked Hezbollah. In fact, the Arab league even blamed

Hezbollah for the war—taking the Jews’ side. This reveals that the Saudis viewed, and rightfully

so in Doran’s opinion, Iran as the biggest threat to the region.

Fast-forwarding to today, 2016, Doran continues to see Iran as the biggest winner under

the current conditions of the US-led coalition against ISIS. He argues, trying not to be too

dramatic, that the day of reckoning between the United States and Iran or Israel and Iran is

within the coming years or even year. The United States has coordinated with Iran on the ground

and Russia in the air in the fight against ISIS in Syria. IRGC forces and Russian airpower are

working on the Syrian northern front, but will soon be heading southward toward the Israeli

border. This is where Israel becomes a key player. Doran points out that Israel has three red lines

for Iran/Hezbollah/Russia:

1. No IRGC Forces on the ground in Southern Syria.

2. No cross border raids

3. No strategic weapons to Hezbollah from Syria1

In Doran’s opinion, the White House’s argument that we do not have to worry about the

coordination between the Russians and Iranians is “bunk.” The argument he discuseed was that

the Russians and Iranians are not getting along and will eventually split and go their separate

1 The Israeli’s explicitly state that they will still act on these redlines even if IRGC and Hezbollah

forces are working under a Russian security umbrella.

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ways. Doran doesn’t see it this way. Instead, He argues that we have a situation with a strong

Iran, strong Hezbollah, an uninterested America, and a tremendously fluid environment; this is

all a recipe for a very bad development.

Furthermore, Mike Doran discussed the issue of, what he calls, the entire “game board”

in the Middle East. He is not fully convinced that the Hillary Clinton camp totally understands

this. Everyone seems to agree that we must fight ISIS and push back against Iran, but this gets

awkward when we start aligning ourselves with Russia in the fight against ISIS, because any

alignment with Russia is a de facto alignment with Iran. Therefore, if we change the equation in

Syria, we also have to consider how this changes the situation in Iraq, with the Iran-backed Shiite

militias there. In Iraq, we work directly with the Shiite government, who in turn work with Iran.

Doran emphasizes that we are currently always one step removed from Iran and they could make

us pay on the nuke deal and in Iraq and Syria if we adjust the balance of power. Therefore, the

implications of changing the game board in any way must be taken into consideration. There is

no in-between, we are either an adversary with Russia and Iran, or we are not.

Doran also discussed his concerns with the belief in the current administration that we

share common interests with Russia. Sergey Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister, defines all

Syrian opposition forces as terrorist, while we only define Nusra front and ISIS as terror groups

and actually arm certain Syrian opposition forces. More importantly, Russia doesn’t define

Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. The idea that we are aligned with Russia in this regard is

ludicrous. When we work with Russia against ISIS and “all terror” groups it plays directly to

their benefit, there is no advantage for us.

As the conflict continues, refugees, fleeing Assad, Russia and Iran, spill into Europe and

into countries along the NATO frontier. Russia loves this. They see all the problems it is causing

for Europe and the U.S. and it’s in their best interest to continue exporting chaos to their

enemies. According to Doran, the Kremlin is calling all the shots. He further pointed out that

Netanyahu has been to Russia 4 times recently, which goes to show that everyone knows who is

in charge and who has the power. It is no longer the U.S., but Russia that people care about.

Another example of the U.S. propagating this new Russian supremacy, was when Turkey shot

down a Russian warplane in December of 2015. Instead of coming to the strong support of

Turkey, a NATO ally, the U.S. treated it as a bilateral problem between Russia and Turkey, and

secretly scolded Turkey behind the scenes. Consequently, instead of supporting NATO, the

Obama administration allowed a Russian fly zone along the NATO frontier. This is not good for

American, European or NATO Interests. It was, to use Doran’s language, “strategically stupid.”

“They could make us pay on the nuke deal and in Iraq and

Syria if we adjust the balance of power.”

–Mike Doran

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In addition, Doran introduces a metaphor for the Russia-Iran axis in Syria. He calls them

Siamese twins. Sometimes they hate each other and they may fight, but they share vital organs.

Russia doesn’t want to send in ground troops, they prefer to use their air force and support the

IRGC and Hezbollah forces on the ground. Additionally, on a geostrategic level, both need

Assad desperately. For this reason, they are completely wedded to each other. If a Sunni

successor were to replace the current Alawite ruling structure in Syria, then Iran would lose its

land bridge to the eastern Mediterranean and Russia would lose its most critical Middle Eastern

ally on the eastern Mediterranean.

Finally, Doran mapped out goals for a future administration:

The next administration must decide if Iran and Russia are our friends or enemies.

We have boxed Israel in and left it alone on the front line to face Iran and Russia,

we have to decide if that is a condition that we are okay with.

The US must create a regional order that is advantageous to its allies by pushing

back hard against Iran and Russia across the board, including Iraq.

In terms of current Presidential candidates, hey says, both are “black boxes.” Both have

contradicted themselves. Trump spoke to AIPAC about working with Putin, but on other

occasions he said rolling up Iran’s terror proxies and fighting ISIS were top priorities. These do

not go together. Hillary Clinton, on the other hand, has talked big about getting tough on Iran,

but has not mentioned increasing the defense budget. These policies are riddled with

inconsistencies.

Tony Badran:

Tony Badran is most concerned about the situation on the ground in Syria. For Badran,

there is no more Assad regime, rather there is a hodgepodge of proxies fighting for Iranian and

Russian interests. Iran now controls the ground and any negotiations will be done on Iran’s

terms, because they control the forces on the ground. Like Doran, Badran agrees that both

Russia and Iran will do anything to keep Assad in power, because his regime is a vital

component of their Mediterranean and Middle Eastern strategy. Finally, Badran is concerned

about Israel and Hezbollah and the potential for future hostilities. He outlines several scenarios,

and concludes that Hezbollah could either be dramatically strengthened by their involvement in

Syria or dramatically weakened, both of which have implications for Israel.

Badran leads off his discussion by going back twenty years to 1996, Hezbollah and Iran

were not even on people’s radar. Then in 2006 there were Iranian rockets on Israel’s border.

“The Russians and Iranians are like siamese twins, they

hate each other and they may fight, but the Russians

know that if they knock out the Iranians they kill

themselves.” –Mike Doran

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Now, in 2016, there is deterrence as a result of the 2006 war, but Hezbollah and Iran have an

unprecedented and unparalleled presence in Syria. Everything revolves around Syria and the

strategic environment there.

He then looks ahead to ten years into the future, in 2026. If Syria stabilizes, Iran is part of

the conversation because they, along with Hezbollah, own the ground. In this period of calm two

things could happen: Hezbollah could be severely weakened from overextending itself and

hemorrhaging in Syria or, Hezbollah could buy new capabilities and have them in Syria. If the

former takes place, then Israel can expect this period of calm to continue. If the latter happens,

then the period of calm will be either shortened or lengthened, depending on the amount of

weapons and their capabilities that are brought into Syria.

More importantly, policy toward Syria has been shaped in way that favors Iran. Iran has

become the commander of the ground. Where there was once the Assad regime, there is now a

variety of militias who answer to Iran. They are all protected by the Russian air force. Any

stabilization conversation will now protect the interests of Iran. To put it in our own President’s

words, Iranian “equities” will be safeguarded. We have accepted that Iran is there to stay.

Badran asserts that once an environment such as this exists on the ground in Syria, then a

conflict between Hezbollah-Iran and Israel will be likely. If we look down the road ten more

years to 2026, it is likely we will be dealing with a nuclear Iran, which has recognized regional

primacy, and an infinitely more capable Hezbollah. This will definitely play a role if an open

conflict between Israel and Hezbollah were to take place. This long term picture is just as

important as the immediate opportunities that the current situation holds. For example, in the

near term the Sunni-Shiite conflict could have a negative effect on Hezbollah, which only has

two enemies: Israel and Sunnis in Syria. They have waged bloody war against both of them. The

Sunnis have greater numbers and Israel is significantly more capable than Hezbollah in Lebanon.

This will have serious consequences for Hezbollah and the Shiites in Lebanon.

Next, Badran discusses the implications of the Iranians moving southward toward Syria’s

border with Israel along with the implications of a potential US-Russia cooperative agreement. In

the case of an agreement, the US Air Force will attack certain terror groups on the ground, this,

in turn, will strengthen Assad. This makes the United States Air Force the de facto air force for

the Assad regime. It puts both the US and Israel on opposing sides of the Syrian conflict. What

happens if Russia says there are Nusra cells in Daraa and Quneitra, Syrian border towns near

Israel, let’s go fight terrorism there, Badran questions? This will put the United States in an

awkward situation, because the US is Israel’s strongest historical ally in the region and has been

very clear about fighting near their border.

Moreover, there’s the issue of who takes the place of these groups in the Golan or Daraa

when the US bombs them. Badran then offers potential outcomes. For example, buffer zones

could be created and run by militias.

“Russia and Iran need Assad—Period.” –Tony Badran

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He agrees with Doran, that the alliance between Russia and Iran is indispensable for both

parties. For example, it doesn’t hurt Iran if Russia gets a base in Syria after everything is settled.

It will add S400s to the eastern Mediterranean and keep the Turks out, this will help destroy

Turkish proxies in Syria. The policy that Syria could be pried away, held by both Israel and the

US for decades, from Iran has always been false. When Assad was in trouble, it was Iran who

came first to their rescue. This fault line never breaks strategically and it never will. Without

Assad Iran loses their entire enterprise on the Eastern Mediterranean. On the other hand, Badran

understands that smaller countries may think about it differently, because Jordan and Israel can’t

afford to go to war with Russia. The United States must readjust, we can afford to go to war with

Russia, and we must protect our interests and the interests of our allies.

Furthermore, Hezbollah is fighting a war of attrition for a land bridge on the

Northeastern Lebanese border, from Homs down to Quinetra. If the US and Russia start striking

Nusra in the Qolamoon, Badran asserts, it will be Hezbollah’s de facto air force. It will help them

to secure that land, which will serve as a buffer zone to protecting the Shia community in

Lebanon.

Badran then explained how Hezbollah works with the Shia community in Lebanon. He

describes a situation where Hezbollah offers protection, money, power and stability, in return for

their absolute loyalty and their sons and daughters. Men from Lebanon have been thrown onto

the front lines in Syria and their rate of attrition is greater than they can resupply. In fact, it takes

a year and a half to train an ‘elite’ Hezbollah fighter. Additionally, top Hezbollah fighters are

dying in Syria. But, Badran is confident that this will not cause them to lose their de facto buffer

zone on the border, the Russian Air Force has proven to protect that.

Badran argues that this creates a new dynamic. In February 2014, there was one strike

from Israel on the Syrian side of the border, to which Hezbollah then retaliated in the Golan.

Hezbollah now has a new capability to retaliate not from Lebanon, but from the Golan. In this

case, Israel has accepted Hezbollah’s terms that they are not going to strike in Lebanon, but in

Syria. At the same time, Badran asserts, that if Israel wants to get Hezbollah into a conflict then

they should strike them in Lebanon. In the event that this new stretch of land consolidates in the

future and it becomes a Russian and Iranian sphere, what will be the Russian as well as

International position on continued Israeli operations in that area? Since the beginning of the

war, Israeli strikes are no longer happening north of Homs. The Russians may likely continue to

limit where Israel can strike Hezbollah. If Israel is forced to strike Hezbollah in Lebanon an open

conflict between Israel and Hezbollah is imminent.

Finally, Badran outlines what Syria could be after this conflict. We might be moving

towards a scenario where there is a settlement. But, we have to remember that never have these

settlements held up. They last for a short period of time and then are broken and conflict

continues.

“Syria is really the lynchpin.” –Tony Badran

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Questions and Scenarios for a future ‘stabilized’ Syria:

If Assad continues to have the support of outside powers, like the Russians, he

will be able to retake Aleppo, then he will control all the major Syrian cities.

Who will be able to hold this ground? Unless, the US and Russia are comfortable

being in a constant war with the Sunnis in Syria, Assad will face a big problem.

There may be a kill zone in eastern Syria, where Sunnis reside, where anyone can

come kill Sunnis in the “guise” of the war on terror.

Will Hezbollah remain as a security force to protect the regime from future

insurgencies?

They may get a year of peace, but what happens when Turkey decides there’s an

opportunity and reignites the conflict for their own territorial and ideological

gain?

Lebanon will likely be what we had in the 80’s. A situation where each power

controls a particular space.

o Kurds will get a canton in the north, Assad in the west, and there will be a

Sunni kill zone in the middle.

Consolidation now exists between the separate parties.

Moreover, Assad and Russia are ethnically cleansing Syria of Sunnis by bombing

hospitals and other humanitarian sites. They are trying to force Sunnis out, because if there are

no hostile populations, then they can better control the land. Additionally, there are several

thousand Palestinian refugees who sympathize with the Syrian revolution. In the event of another

conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, they might take the opportunity to open up another front

against Hezbollah either in Syria or Lebanon. A future war between Hezbollah and Israel is

intertwined with the events in Syria. For example, if there’s a truce in Syria that may be affected

by a war between Israel and Hezbollah and vice versa. “Syria is the lynchpin,” says Badran.

Finally, Badran doesn’t foresee a South Lebanon security force formulating a buffer zone

or a security zone. But, this is preferable to having the Iranians come down to the border and “set

up shop there.”

The Syrian civil war has many moving parts. It has created a space for Radical Islamism

to become a legitimate political force, and allowed Russia and Iran to regain relevance in the

Levant. The conflict between Israel and Hezbollah is also a vital component of the civil war. Like

Tony Badran said, what happens in Syria will decide the future of any conflict between

Hezbollah and Israel. For these reasons, the United States has a vested interest in helping to

stabilize Syria. It must help to create an environment where a cessation of hostilities is

permanent and a unitary government is created, which shares power between Jihadist, Russian,

and Iranian interests. This is immensely difficult, considering the hostility between Sunnis and

Shiites that Iran, Hezbollah, ISIS, and Nusra have created. At this point, it is hard to tell if a

solution is even possible.