Isolation and Propaganda: The Roots and Instruments of Russia’s Disinformation Campaign

8/18/2019 Isolation and Propaganda: The Roots and Instruments of Russia’s Disinformation Campaign

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2015-16 PAPER SERIES

NO. 6

ISOLATION AND PROPAGANDA

THE ROOTS AND INSTRUMENTS OF RUSSIA’S

DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN

Stefan Meister


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On the cover: 2015 Moscow Victory Day Parade. © Kremlin.ru

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1 Stefan Meister is the head of the program on Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia at the German Council on ForeignRelations (DGAP)’s Robert Bosch Center for Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia and a visiting fellow atthe ransatlantic Academy.

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

A War of Words . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Russia’s Counterrevolutionary Military Doctrine. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3Isolation and Propaganda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Putin’s Version of Soft Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

What Is o Be Done? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12


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E S

Western scholars and politicians struggleto understand the elements of Russia’s“hybrid warfare” and how to counter it.

Means for “soft,” non-military Russian influencein the post-Soviet sphere and the European Unionincludes export media such as the televisionbroadcaster R and the media platform Sputnik, thetargeted expansion of informal financial networks,and funding and support for left- and right-wingpopulist political parties and organizations. hechief of the Russian General Staff described newrules of 21st century warfare in a 2013 speech,

where political goals are to be obtained throughthe “widespread use of disinformation… deployedin connection with the protest potential of thepopulation.” he Russian government claims it ismerely copying the instruments and techniques thatthe West itself employs, and deems legitimate, topromote democracy in Russia and the post-Sovietstates. It has also cracked down against foreigninfluence and dissent in Russia through restrictingthe work of Western NGOs and independentmedia. his information warfare is an approachborn out of weakness that provides more flexibility

against a challenger with much greater economicand technological resources.

he possibilities for directly influencingdevelopments in Russia from outside are limited.Europeans, on the other hand, are vulnerableto Russian influence with their open societies,and Russian efforts can help fuel self-doubt inincreasingly fragile and fragmented Westernsocieties. he EU can protect itself by reinforcingits own soft power and improving governancewithin Europe, standing firm on sanctions,improving its knowledge base on Russia andthe other post-Soviet states, and taking steps toimprove pluralism in the Russian-language media

space. It should also come up with a seriousoffer for its eastern neighbors including an EUmembership prospect. If reform efforts succeedin Ukraine, the impact could spread to Russiaand other post-Soviet states. Moscow encouragesdestabilization, corruption, and weak states in orderto maintain relationships of dependency. he EUhas something much more attractive than that tooffer the societies of neighboring countries andshould make greater use of its strategic advantage.


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Two years ater the invasion o Crimea,scholars and politicians are still struggling to

understand the elements o Russia’s “hybrid

warare” and how to counter it. Aside rom the use

o “little green men”1 to covertly stage invasions and

instigate conlict, a question o particular interest

is whether Russia’s “sot,” non-military inluence

in the post-Soviet sphere and the European

Union constitutes a urther “acet” o hybrid

warare — be it in oreign market Russian media

such as the television broadcaster RT (ormerly

Russia Today ) or the media platorm Sputnik,

in the targeted expansion o inormal inancialnetworks, or in unding and support or let- and

right-wing populist parties and organizations

in the EU. O Russia’s non-military methods,

Russia’s “inormation warare,” the goal o which

is to inluence public discussion, especially in EU

member states, is particularly interesting.2

he Russian government claims that it is merely

copying the instruments and techniques that the

West itsel employs, and deems legitimate, to

promote democracy in Russia and the post-Soviet

states. he EU’s European Neighborhood Policy,or example, seeks to establish a “ring o riends”

around the EU and encourages these countries to

modernize their political, economic, and social

policies in a way that harmonizes with the EU

model and standards. o this purpose, the EU uses

sot power to strengthen local civil society, support

independent media, and help the democratic

1 Te term “little green men” has been used to describe

unmarked Russian soldiers first deployed in Crimea in thecontext o the Ukraine conflict. On the terminology, see V.Inozemtsev, “Words Don’t Come Easy: ‘Vezhlivye Lyudi,’” BerlinPolicy Journal, May 21, 2015, http://berlinpolicyjournal.com/words-dont-come-easy-vezhlivye-lyudi/.

2 See U. Franke, “War by Non-Military Means: UnderstandingRussian Inormation Warare,” Swedish Deense ResearchAgency (FOI), March 2015, http://www.oi.se/en/op-menu/Pressroom/News/2015/War-by-Non-Military-means/ .

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transormation process expand to the east.3

hispolicy is in direct conlict with the interests o the

Russian leadership and its remaining post-Soviet

partners who sit at the helm o authoritarian

systems.

From the point o view o Russian security policy,

then, the country’s expansion and implementation

o non-military warare and sot power is primarily

a reaction to the West’s pressure on Russia and

Russia’s position in the post-Soviet realm, one that

makes use o Western tools and methods. Russia’s

leadership understands that it reacts to this externalthreat rom a position o military weakness,

especially toward the United States and NAO and

increasingly China. As a consequence, it avoids any

direct military conrontation. hereore, Russia’s

inormation warare is an approach born out o

weakness that provides more lexibility against

a challenger with much greater economic and

technological resources.4

o understand Russian inormation warare,

it makes sense to look at the why, what, and

how. Why is Russia employing non-military

means? What exactly are its tools? And how

can Europe respond? We can understand the

“why” by examining how Russia itsel perceives

the expansion o its inluence through non-

military means, and the context o its actions. In

term o the “what,” it is noted that the Kremlin’s

inormation activities are deensive and oensive;

misinormation campaigns and channels “protect”

the Russian domestic audience rom external

3 Here the author uses the term “sof power” as Joseph Nye usesit, namely, to describe the power and influence that arises rom

the attractiveness o a country’s culture, economic prosperity,political values, and oreign policy (when it is seen as havingmoral authority).

4 M. Snegovaya, “Putin’s Inormation Warare in Ukraine: SovietOrigins o Russia’s Hybrid Warare,” Institute or the Study oWar, September 2015, http://understandingwar.org/sites/deault/files/Russian%20Report%201%20Putin’s%20Inormation%20Warare%20in%20Ukraine-%20Soviet%20Origins%20o%20Russias%20Hybrid%20Warare.pd .

Russia’s

information

warfare is an

approach born

out of weakness

that provides mo

flexibility against

a challenger with

much greater

economic and

technological

resources.

http://berlinpolicyjournal.com/words-dont-come-easy-vezhlivye-lyudi/http://berlinpolicyjournal.com/words-dont-come-easy-vezhlivye-lyudi/http://www.foi.se/en/Top-menu/Pressroom/News/2015/War-by-Non-Military-means/http://www.foi.se/en/Top-menu/Pressroom/News/2015/War-by-Non-Military-means/http://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Report%201%20Putin's%20Information%20Warfare%20in%20Ukraine-%20Soviet%20Origins%20of%20Russias%20Hybrid%20Warfare.pdfhttp://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Report%201%20Putin's%20Information%20Warfare%20in%20Ukraine-%20Soviet%20Origins%20of%20Russias%20Hybrid%20Warfare.pdfhttp://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Report%201%20Putin's%20Information%20Warfare%20in%20Ukraine-%20Soviet%20Origins%20of%20Russias%20Hybrid%20Warfare.pdfhttp://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Report%201%20Putin's%20Information%20Warfare%20in%20Ukraine-%20Soviet%20Origins%20of%20Russias%20Hybrid%20Warfare.pdfhttp://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Report%201%20Putin's%20Information%20Warfare%20in%20Ukraine-%20Soviet%20Origins%20of%20Russias%20Hybrid%20Warfare.pdfhttp://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Report%201%20Putin's%20Information%20Warfare%20in%20Ukraine-%20Soviet%20Origins%20of%20Russias%20Hybrid%20Warfare.pdfhttp://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Report%201%20Putin's%20Information%20Warfare%20in%20Ukraine-%20Soviet%20Origins%20of%20Russias%20Hybrid%20Warfare.pdfhttp://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Report%201%20Putin's%20Information%20Warfare%20in%20Ukraine-%20Soviet%20Origins%20of%20Russias%20Hybrid%20Warfare.pdfhttp://www.foi.se/en/Top-menu/Pressroom/News/2015/War-by-Non-Military-means/http://www.foi.se/en/Top-menu/Pressroom/News/2015/War-by-Non-Military-means/http://berlinpolicyjournal.com/words-dont-come-easy-vezhlivye-lyudi/http://berlinpolicyjournal.com/words-dont-come-easy-vezhlivye-lyudi/


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meddling while also mounting counter-offensivesto stir discontent in Western societies. Europeansare indeed vulnerable to Russian influence,especially when they are already weakened by issuesof equity and legitimacy. How can the EU protectitself against such an indistinct and diffuse threat?We can start by reinforcing our own soft powerand standing firm on sanctions, but we also needto improve our knowledge base and take steps toimprove pluralism in the Russian-language mediaspace.


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The fact that

the 2003 U.S.

intervention in

Iraq — an attack

on a sovereign

state that led to

the overthrow of

Saddam Hussein

regime — was

partly justified by

bogus evidence

is crucial to the

Russian elite.

The Rose Revolution in Georgia (2003) andthe Orange Revolution in Ukraine (2004-05) aroused particular concern in Russian

political circles. he fear was that Russia waslosing influence to the West in the post-Sovietcountries. Preeminence in this region is key, forthe elite and to Russia’s status as a regional andmajor power. Even worse, a regime change in aneighboring country could potentially inspire thesame in Russia. he theory gained traction that theWest — and in particular the United States — wasattempting to influence domestic developments

in the post-Soviet countries by means of socialnetworks, organized youth groups, and foreign-financed non-governmental organizations (NGOs)— in order to destabilize and weaken Russia.

Many Russian officials argue that the West alsodeployed the same instruments in the Middle East,using the “Arab Spring” to destabilize the region.Social media, NGOs, and the like, they claim,ultimately exist only to expand the Western sphereof influence, weaken current legitimate leaderships,and replace them with governments sympathetic

to the United States. hey say this will contributeto the overthrow of constitutional order in Russiaby means of violent protests.5 he fact that the2003 U.S. intervention in Iraq — an attack on asovereign state that led to the overthrow of SaddamHussein’s regime — was partly justified by bogusevidence is crucial to the Russian elite. In line withthis view, Fyodor Lukyanov, a prominent Russiancommentator, has argued that the West has “made amess” wherever it has intervened. here is a directconnection between the Western failure in the

5 See V. Putin, “Россия и меняющийся мир” [Russia in aChanging World], Moskovskie Novosti [Moscow News], February27, 2012, http://www.mn.ru/ politics/20120227/312306749.html.All translations from Russian are by the author.

Middle East (Iraq and Libya) and Western supportfor Ukraine from this point of view.6

Against this backdrop, the Russian General Staffheld many debates on the new non-linear warfareand an appropriate solution for dealing withit. A particularly significant contribution wasChief of the General Staff Valery Geramisov’smuch-quoted speech of January 2013.7 alkingat the annual meeting of the Russian Academyof Military Sciences, Gerasimov describedthe new rules of 21st century warfare. Political

goals, he argued, are no longer to be attainedthrough conventional firepower but through the“widespread use of disinformation, of political,economic, humanitarian, and other non-militarymeasures deployed in connection with the protestpotential of the population.”8 he Iraq War and the“revolutions” in North Africa and the Middle East,allegedly instigated by the West, are, he claimed,proof that in a matter of months or even days, aflourishing nation could be transformed into anarena of bitter armed conflict, fall victim to foreignintervention, and descend into chaos, humanitarian

disaster, and civil war.

Russian political and military leadership thusperceive non-military, “soft” means of influencingthe domestic affairs of foreign states as threatsagainst which Russia must defend itself if it is notto be weakened by the West and in particular theUnited States. It is hard to gauge how much of thisis ideology and how much of it is opportunism,designed to distract from the shortcomings ofRussia’s own policy. Within the Russian power

6 J. Sherr, “Te New East-West Discord: Russian Objectives,Western Interests,” Clingendael, December 2015, p. 64, http://www.clingendael.nl/publicatie/new-east-west-discord-russian-objectives-western-interests.7 Tis speech was published in full in the journal of the Russianarmed forces: V. Gerasimov, “Ценность науки в предвидении”[Value of Science and Foresight], Voenno-promyslennyikurer, No8 (476), February 27, 2013, http://vpk-news.ru/articles/14632.8 Ibid.

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http://www.mn.ru/%20politics/20120227/312306749.htmlhttp://www.clingendael.nl/publicatie/new-east-west-discord-russian-objectives-western-interestshttp://www.clingendael.nl/publicatie/new-east-west-discord-russian-objectives-western-interestshttp://www.clingendael.nl/publicatie/new-east-west-discord-russian-objectives-western-interestshttp://vpk-news.ru/articles/14632http://vpk-news.ru/articles/14632http://www.clingendael.nl/publicatie/new-east-west-discord-russian-objectives-western-interestshttp://www.clingendael.nl/publicatie/new-east-west-discord-russian-objectives-western-interestshttp://www.clingendael.nl/publicatie/new-east-west-discord-russian-objectives-western-interestshttp://www.mn.ru/%20politics/20120227/312306749.html


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The shock

of the mass

demonstrations

in Moscow and

St. Petersburg

in late 2011 and

early 2012 —

before Vladimir

Putin’s reelection

as president —

further fed the

paranoia of the

Russian security

elite around Putin.

elite, however, the impression of living in anincreasingly unsafe and unstable world is tied inwith the feeling of being systematically “kept down”by the West. At the same time, Russia’s leadersinterpret the processes of social transformation inthe post-Soviet states and the Arab World as beingexternally inspired and orchestrated (by the West),thus denying those societies their autonomy. Froma Russian ruling elite perspective, society is not anindependent actor in politics but one that shouldsupport the regime. Even worse, Putin’s regimediscredits “the very idea of rights of an individual

and personal dignity as a value” as something aliento the Russian culture and inspired by the West.9

It cannot be denied that Western intervention inIraq and Libya contributed to that entire region’sdestabilization. he Russian take on the “ArabSpring,” however, ignores the fact that genuinepopular protest played a crucial role in topplingthe regimes in unisia, Egypt, Libya, and otherMiddle Eastern and North African countries.hese societies were by no means instrumentsof foreign powers with no will of their own; they

were autonomous actors contributing to a processof social change. o confuse such events with themilitary interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan isto misinterpret developments entirely and ignoresocial dynamics in a globalized world.

he shock of the mass demonstrations in Moscowand St. Petersburg in late 2011 and early 2012 —before Vladimir Putin’s reelection as president —further fed the paranoia of the Russian security elitearound Putin. Leaders in Moscow believe that theseprotestors, like all social groups, were manipulated

by the targeted deployment of controlled mediaand propaganda and were incapable of actingon their own initiative. Similarly, the Kremlin

9 O. Zakharova, “How to destroy human rights withouta single protest,” Intersection, February 29, 2016, http://intersectionproject.eu/article/society/how-destroy-human-rights-without-single-protest.

regarded the protest movement in Kyiv as anexternally controlled movement to bring aboutthe overthrow of the elected Ukrainian president,Viktor Yanukovych. In a speech to the officials ofthe Russian ministry of the interior in March 2015,Putin stressed that “they” — that is, the West andparticularly the United States — “use so-calledcolor technologies, from organizing illegal streetprotests to open hate propaganda and hatred insocial networks.”10 he failure of Russian policy inUkraine before the “revolution of dignity” in 2013-14, as before the Orange Revolution in 2004-05,

has its roots in the ignorance of society as a factorin politics. he Russian elite’s perception of societyas something to manipulate, rather than as anindependent actor, applies to foreign and domesticpolicy alike.

his fear of Western-instigated protest is reflectedin the current Russian military doctrine, fromDecember 2014. By focusing on NAO as a keydanger to Russia (Item 12a), it clearly showsthe close link between domestic and foreignpolicy threat perceptions.11 Under Item 13a of

the doctrine, the destabilization of the domesticand social situation in Russia is described as animpending military threat. his includes actionsthat could influence young citizens to underminethe historical, intellectual, and patriotic traditionsof Russia (13w). Under Item 15a, there is mentionof the characteristics of modern military conflict,including the deployment of “political, economic,informational, and other non-military means,”implemented with the “widespread use of theprotest potential of the population and special

10 M. Ivanov, “Владимир Путин разглядел «цветныетехнологии» наулицах и в соцсетях” [Vladimir PutinNotices ‘Color echnologies’ in the Streets and SocialNetworks], Kommersant, March 4, 2015, http://kommersant.ru/doc/2679694.11 Security Council of the Russian Federation, “Военнаядоктрина Российской Федерации” [Military Doctrine of theRussian Federation], December 25, 2014, http://www.scrf.gov.rudocuments/18/129.html.

http://intersectionproject.eu/article/society/how-destroy-human-rights-without-single-protesthttp://intersectionproject.eu/article/society/how-destroy-human-rights-without-single-protesthttp://intersectionproject.eu/article/society/how-destroy-human-rights-without-single-protesthttp://kommersant.ru/doc/2679694http://kommersant.ru/doc/2679694http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/18/129.htmlhttp://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/18/129.htmlhttp://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/18/129.htmlhttp://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/18/129.htmlhttp://kommersant.ru/doc/2679694http://kommersant.ru/doc/2679694http://intersectionproject.eu/article/society/how-destroy-human-rights-without-single-protesthttp://intersectionproject.eu/article/society/how-destroy-human-rights-without-single-protesthttp://intersectionproject.eu/article/society/how-destroy-human-rights-without-single-protest


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The Moscow pow

elite perceive

the influence

and activities

of Western

governmental an

non-governmenta

institutions in

the post-Soviet

countries as

instruments of

war, whose goal

to weaken or eve

topple the Russia

government.

operations forces.” Once again, we are dealingwith the description of a threat scenario in whichexternal powers (the United States, NAO)destabilize Russia by manipulating its domesticpolicy and to which Russian security powers mustrespond. he message is clear: Russia faces enemiesfrom within and without, and it must defend itself.

he Moscow power elite perceive the influenceand activities of Western governmental andnon-governmental institutions in the post-Sovietcountries as instruments of war, whose goal is to

weaken or even topple the Russian government.Moscow believes it has the right to react with thesame methods to this non-linear warfare (whichthey perceive as being waged by NAO and theUnited States) and to respond with “little greenmen,” media manipulation, and exploitationof networks and NGOs. Nikolai Patrushev, thesecretary of the Security Council of the RussianFederation and Putin’s close confidant from thesecret service, told the newspaper Kommersantthat the United States “is not remotely interestedin Ukraine. hey are interested in Russia... [he

United States] would prefer it if Russia no longerexisted at all as a country.”12

12 K. Pyatakova, “Крыму угрожают коррупция и терроризм”[Crimea is threatened by corruption and terrorism], Kommer-sant, June 22, 2015, http://kommersant.ru/doc/2782652 .

his perspective is crucial for our analysis, thoughit is certainly not the dominant Western perceptionof EU or U.S. activities in post-Soviet countries.While we regard the support of NGOs and civilsociety as an appropriate means for promotingdemocracy, the Russian leadership considers suchenterprises as illegitimate methods of meddlingin the domestic affairs of sovereign states. Inparticular, Russia’s powerful intelligence andsecurity elites have no trust for Western cooperativeand integrative approaches to Russia becausethey see deeper U.S. scheming to weaken and

undermine the Kremlin behind every such step.Furthermore, Putin’s inner circle of people from thesecurity apparatus, most of whom were trained inthe Soviet secret service, put their own perceptionof security and their own hold on power above theeconomic interest of the country. Stereotypes of theCold War and Soviet propaganda still shape theirway of thinking, leading to different interpretationsof developments in the post-Soviet region and thepolicy goals of the United States and the EU. Anti-Americanism is closely linked with fears of beinghemmed in.

http://kommersant.ru/doc/2782652http://kommersant.ru/doc/2782652


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Russian leaders

have drawn

two important

conclusions

from this threat

analysis: 1) the

need to protect

themselves from

outside influence

and 2) the need

for offensive

counter-measures.

Russian leaders have drawn two importantconclusions from this threat analysis: 1) theneed to protect themselves from outside

influence and 2) the need for offensive counter-measures.

First of all, it is necessary to isolate those forceswithin Russia that are open to foreign influenceand could thus become “agents” of Western politicsor even of a “color revolution” within Russia. othis end, Russian legislation attempts to precludeforeign influence on Russian civil society and

domestic structures. In 2004, the first laws wereintroduced to step up control over NGOs. heselaws were gradually tightened at the beginning ofPutin’s third term of office in 2012 and now imposestrict restrictions both on the work of WesternNGOs in Russia and on the foreign funding ofindependent Russian organizations. UnwelcomeNGOs are stigmatized as “foreign agents,” theirwork is hindered by immense bureaucratic hurdles,and they find it nearly impossible to get access tofunding that is independent of state-controlledsources. One current law threatens anyone

collaborating with “undesirable foreign NGOs”with a prison sentence of up to six years. By March2016, 122 groups had been labeled as foreignagents, and 14 groups shut down.13 In addition, ablacklist (the so-called “stop list”) is being draw upby the Federation Council to ban certain foreignorganizations, particularly those from the UnitedStates, from working in Russia.14

he last fragments of independent media, such asV channel Dozhd or weekly newspaper NovayaGazeta, which are only consumed by a negligible

proportion of the Russian population, have been

13 Human Rights Watch, “Russia: Government against rightsgroups,” March 13, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/russia-govern-ment-against-rights-groups-battle-chronicle. 14 ASS, “Russia’s ‘stop list’ of undesirable NGOs maybeexpanded to 20 - reports,” July 9, 2015, http://tass.ru/en/russia/807130.

under considerable pressure since independenteditors-in-chief like Svetlana Mironyuk of the newsagency RIA Novosti and Maxim Kovalski fromKommersant Vlast lost their jobs. Business ownersor companies who advertise in critical media suchas Novaya Gazeta and or Grani.ru are harassed. Alaw passed by the Duma requires Russian media toreduce foreign ownership shares to 20 percent shareby February 2017. As a result, foreign investors arelosing control of their Russian media investmentsand publishers like Germany’s Springer arewithdrawing from the Russian market.15

In Russia itself, state control of televisionbroadcasters (the main source of informationfor more than 90 percent of the population)has created a pseudo-reality operating at aconsiderable distance from the world as we knowit. Putin takes center stage in day-to-day reportsand appears omnipresent and irreplaceable. Atthe same time, the world consists only of crises,wars, and accidents — with Russian leadershipproviding the only stability. Controlled coverageis used to generate maximum public approval

for the president and is most obvious in the totalabsence of reporting on unfavorable matters andthe distortion of others through deliberate factualmisrepresentation.16 Media in Russia has become acore instrument of the regime, to manipulate and“educate” public opinion. Independent journalismin Russian mainstream media has lost all credibilityleaving in its place a cacophony of opinions, stories,conspiracy, and beleaguered journalists.

15 F. Schmidt, “Springer lässt sich von Putin verjagen” [Springerflees Putin], Frankurter Allgemeine Zeitung , September 20, 2015http://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/medien/russland-springer-laesst-sich-von-putin-verjagen-13808974.html.16 V. Gatov, “How the Kremlin and the Media Ended Up inBed ogether,” Moscow imes, March 11, 2015, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/how-the-kremlin-and-the-media-en-ded-up-in-bed-together/517323.html.

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https://www.hrw.org/russia-government-against-rights-groups-battle-chroniclehttps://www.hrw.org/russia-government-against-rights-groups-battle-chroniclehttp://tass.ru/en/russia/807130http://tass.ru/en/russia/807130http://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/medien/russland-springer-laesst-sich-von-putin-verjagen-13808974.htmlhttp://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/medien/russland-springer-laesst-sich-von-putin-verjagen-13808974.htmlhttp://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/how-the-kremlin-and-the-media-en-ded-up-in-bed-together/517323.htmlhttp://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/how-the-kremlin-and-the-media-en-ded-up-in-bed-together/517323.htmlhttp://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/how-the-kremlin-and-the-media-en-ded-up-in-bed-together/517323.htmlhttp://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/how-the-kremlin-and-the-media-en-ded-up-in-bed-together/517323.htmlhttp://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/how-the-kremlin-and-the-media-en-ded-up-in-bed-together/517323.htmlhttp://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/how-the-kremlin-and-the-media-en-ded-up-in-bed-together/517323.htmlhttp://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/medien/russland-springer-laesst-sich-von-putin-verjagen-13808974.htmlhttp://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/medien/russland-springer-laesst-sich-von-putin-verjagen-13808974.htmlhttp://tass.ru/en/russia/807130http://tass.ru/en/russia/807130https://www.hrw.org/russia-government-against-rights-groups-battle-chroniclehttps://www.hrw.org/russia-government-against-rights-groups-battle-chronicle


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I P 7

An array of

media outlets

are consciously

geared toward

“revealing” the

weaknesses

of Western

societies, thereb

undermining

their credibility.

Moscow is equal

concerned with

weakening

transatlantic

relations and

pushing the

United States

out of Europe.

The policy of promoting lies, half-truths,and conspiracy theories in the media isalso applied by Moscow externally, with

particular focus on the EU and the United States.he tried and tested methods of Russian domesticpolicy are also being implemented in the country’sforeign policy. his includes the growing ranks ofRussian Internet trolls, who attack critical articlesabout Putin or Russian politics in European andU.S. online media, disseminate fake news items,and distort representation of events on heavilyfunded Russian export media such as R and

Sputnik.17

Russia’s leadership has also developedcounter-measures to use targeted (dis)informationto influence public opinion in other countries. Inthe above-mentioned speech, Gerasimov urgedhis audience to “learn victory from the victors”and to beat the opponent with his own weapons.An array of media outlets are consciously gearedtoward “revealing” the weaknesses of Westernsocieties, thereby undermining their credibility.Moscow is equally concerned with weakeningtransatlantic relations and pushing the UnitedStates out of Europe. Its aim is nothing short of

paralyzing and sabotaging the decision-makingprocesses of EU and NAO, organizations thatdepend on consensus, by influencing politicswithin the individual member states. Bilateralnegotiations with Hungary’s EU-skeptic ViktorOrbán, for instance, serve on one hand todemonstrate that Russia has allies within the EU,and on the other to weaken common EU policy.he same is true of Putin’s talks about investing ina gas pipeline to Greece and other infrastructurein the context of Greek loan negotiations with the

17 ARD [elevision Broadcast], “Was passiert in russischen‘roll-Fabriken’?” [What happens in Russian ‘troll factories’?],July 26, 2015, http:// www.daserste.de/information/wissen-kultur/ttt/sendung/mdr/sendung-vom-26072015-104.html .

EU and the IMF in spring 2015.18

Both Russianand Greek leadership used their meetings andbilateral relations to put the EU under pressureand to improve their bargaining position. Russiademonstrated it was not isolated, while the Greekgovernment showed it had alternatives to EUmoney.

here have been debates about “soft power” andRussian politics ever since the end of the SovietUnion. Russian power elites, however, have alwayshad their own understanding of the term. Joseph

Nye sees a link between the exercise of politicalpower and an attractive culture, prosperity,and moral values.19 For Russian leaders, softpower is not about attraction; it instead refersto non-military instruments for manipulating,undermining, and weakening opponents, asupplement to Moscow’s military power.

hus Putin, in his programmatic 2012 article“Russia in a Changing World,” defined soft poweras “a complex of tools and methods for achievingforeign policy goals without deploying weapons,using information tools and other forms ofintervention.”20 According to Putin, so-called“pseudo NGOs” could provoke extremism,separatism, and nationalism, and manipulate socialperception, thus undermining the sovereigntyof other states. For this purpose, the Russianleadership has, since the 2000s, established newinstitutions, such as the Rossotrudnichestvo (Federal Agency for the Commonwealth ofIndependent States, Compatriots Living Abroadand International Humanitarian Cooperation) and

18 N. Savaricas, “Russia offers to loan Greece funds forinfrastructure and transport works,” Independent , April 8,2015, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-offers-to-loan-greece-funds-for-infrastructure-and-trans-port-works-10163340.html.

19 J.S. Nye, Jr., Sof Power: Te Means o Success In World Politics(New York: Public Affairs, 2004).20 V. Putin, “Россия и меняющийся мир” [Russia in a ChangingWorld].

P’ V S P

4

http://www.daserste.de/information/wissen-kultur/ttt/sendung/mdr/sendung-vom-26072015-104.htmlhttp://www.daserste.de/information/wissen-kultur/ttt/sendung/mdr/sendung-vom-26072015-104.htmlhttp://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-offers-to-loan-greece-funds-for-infrastructure-and-transport-works-10163340.htmlhttp://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-offers-to-loan-greece-funds-for-infrastructure-and-transport-works-10163340.htmlhttp://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-offers-to-loan-greece-funds-for-infrastructure-and-transport-works-10163340.htmlhttp://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-offers-to-loan-greece-funds-for-infrastructure-and-transport-works-10163340.htmlhttp://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-offers-to-loan-greece-funds-for-infrastructure-and-transport-works-10163340.htmlhttp://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-offers-to-loan-greece-funds-for-infrastructure-and-transport-works-10163340.htmlhttp://www.daserste.de/information/wissen-kultur/ttt/sendung/mdr/sendung-vom-26072015-104.htmlhttp://www.daserste.de/information/wissen-kultur/ttt/sendung/mdr/sendung-vom-26072015-104.html


12/19

T A8

By defying the

United States,

the West, and the

“bureaucrats”

in Brussels,

Putin becomes

a surface on

which a possible

alternative can

be projected. In

this way, Moscow

plays on various

existing fears and

frustrations in

Western societies,

although it lacks

an attractive

alternative social

model to offer

those groups.

the Russkiy Mir (Russian World) Foundation.21

Rossotrudnichestvo was originally conceivedto promote Russian language and culture in thepost-Soviet countries but has since extended itssphere of operation to include a wide range of othercountries. he institution’s re-establishment camein response to the activities of the internationallyoperating U.S. Agency for InternationalDevelopment. he main function of Russkiy Miris to maintain the language and culture of Russian-speakers who live abroad and feel themselves partof Russian cultural circles.

In addition, massive expansions were seen in mediadirected at foreign markets such as the televisionbroadcaster R and the radio station Voice o Russia (now merged with RIA Novosti to form Sputnik).Sputnik has developed into a state-funded networkof media platforms, producing radio, social media,and news agency content in local languages in34 countries. he main goal of Russian foreignmedia was originally to provide the internationaldissemination of the Russian worldview as analternative to the Western perspective offered by

the likes of CNN and the BBC . Now, however,Russian foreign media focus on popularizingconspiracy theories and defaming the West, inorder to create the impression that everyone is lyingand that there are no unequivocal facts or truths.o give a different perspective or make foreigners“question [their governments] more” is the aim ofR . hat means Russia has exported its internalmedia cacophony to the EU and its member states,using the pluralism of Western societies andmedia to feed our discourses with propaganda andconspiracy.

At the same time, Russian organizations have begunto cooperate with and support radical and anti-establishment groups in the West. his includes

21 Rossotrundnitseshtvo , http://95.163.77.90; Russkiy Mir Foun-dation, http://russkiymir.ru/en/ .

extreme right parties, such as the Front National inFrance or Jobbik in Hungary, but it also appeals toleft parties like Die Linke (he Left) in Germany.22 hey not only offer financial resources to thesegroups as in the case of the Front National but alsoinvite them into networks and use them for thelegitimization of Russian policy.23 For instance, DieLinke members of the German Bundestag wereinvited to tour the separatist Donesk and Luhanskrepublics in eastern Ukraine. Members of theFront National, as well as of the more mainstreamconservative party of France, Les Républicains

(he Republicans), visited Crimea in 2015, andwere accused by the French foreign minister oflegitimizing the Russian annexation.24

here are no ideological and political barriersregarding with whom the Kremlin cooperates,so long as these partners can contribute toweakening the existing, liberal European (value)system, whether from the left or the right. husPutin’s Russia has become a partner to anti-U.S.,anti-EU and anti-globalization groups in Europe.By defying the United States, the West, and the

“bureaucrats” in Brussels, Putin becomes a surfaceon which a possible alternative can be projected.In this way, Moscow plays on various existing fearsand frustrations in Western societies, althoughit lacks an attractive alternative social model tooffer those groups. By 2011 at the latest — whenPutin made his decision to return to the office ofpresident — Russia’s leadership turned its back onany attempt to modernize the country’s economy or

22 D. Hegedüs, “Te Kremlin’s Influence in Hungary: Are RussianVested Interests Wearing Hungarian National Colors?” GermanCouncil on Foreign Relations (DGAP), February 8, 2016, https:/dgap.org/en/article/getFullPDF/27609.

23 L. Harding, “We should beware Russia’s links with Europe’sright,” Te Guardian, December 8, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/dec/08/russia-europe-right-putin-front-national-eu.24 Unian, “French MPs visit Crimea despite condemnation,”July 25, 2015, http://www.unian.info/politics/1104876-french-mps-visit-crimea-despite-condemnation.html.

http://95.163.77.90/http://russkiymir.ru/en/https://dgap.org/en/article/getFullPDF/27609https://dgap.org/en/article/getFullPDF/27609http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/dec/08/russia-europe-right-putin-front-national-euhttp://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/dec/08/russia-europe-right-putin-front-national-euhttp://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/dec/08/russia-europe-right-putin-front-national-euhttp://www.unian.info/politics/1104876-french-mps-visit-crimea-despite-condemnation.htmlhttp://www.unian.info/politics/1104876-french-mps-visit-crimea-despite-condemnation.htmlhttp://www.unian.info/politics/1104876-french-mps-visit-crimea-despite-condemnation.htmlhttp://www.unian.info/politics/1104876-french-mps-visit-crimea-despite-condemnation.htmlhttp://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/dec/08/russia-europe-right-putin-front-national-euhttp://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/dec/08/russia-europe-right-putin-front-national-euhttp://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/dec/08/russia-europe-right-putin-front-national-euhttps://dgap.org/en/article/getFullPDF/27609https://dgap.org/en/article/getFullPDF/27609http://russkiymir.ru/en/http://95.163.77.90/


13/19

I P 9

political system. Instead, today, the Russian head ofstate epitomizes the power of a small and corruptauthoritarian clique that draws its recruits largelyfrom the security apparatus. Indeed, this group issystematically destroying their own country, botheconomically and morally, with revisionist, anti-liberal, and paranoid policies. he matrix of thispolicy is destructive, it creates enemies, it is alwaysunder pressure, and it claims a legitimate right tostrike back. his is a very similar logic to populistmovements and politicians in the West like MarineLe Pen or Donald rump, which, beyond criticizing

and undermining the existing order, have few ideasfor a positive agenda except returning to a glorifiedand non-existent past.

he Kremlin’s political technocrats and PRconsultants have realized that Western weakness isPutin’s strength. EU member states are now payingthe price of having put off necessary reforms andallowing EU-skeptics to gain political clout. Keypolitical areas such as financial, social, and foreignpolicy have not been sufficiently integrated. Inpolitical decision-making processes, a democratic

deficit stemming from a lack of transparency inthe negotiations between member state leaders isincreasingly alienating citizens from the powercenters. Populist — and racist — parties such asthe Front National in France, the Jobbik partyin Hungary, UKIP in the U.K., and Alternativefür Deutschland (AfD) in Germany are takingadvantage of this trend to gain social acceptance,thus playing on the insecurity of many socialgroups and reinforcing the EU’s credibility crisis inthe member states.

he migration wave coming from the Middle Eastand Africa to Europe is also capturing Russianmedia headlines. It, too, is described as an examplefor the failure of the EU to deal with crises inother regions of the world and to protect itsborders, which will destroy European society. heRussian media threatens its own society with the

image of an unstable world and creates scandalsabout refugees, portraying them as terrorists andrapists. his even influences the public debatein EU member states. Germany for example isincreasingly the target of Russian propagandaand manipulation. Chancellor Angela Merkel’skey role in leading the European Union in severalcrises and in uniting the different member states infavor of sanctions against Russia has encouragedthe Kremlin to push to weaken her position, asdomestic and European pushback against herrefugee policies have already made her vulnerable.

For example, the story of Lisa, a Russian-Germangirl whom Russian media asserted had beenraped by migrants, got huge attention in Russia,Germany, and beyond. his fake story was evenpushed by Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrovin an official statement in which he argued thatGerman authorities failed to act against herassailants because of political correctness withregard to the refugees. he strongest reactioncame from Russian-Germans, who demonstratedagainst refugees and the German authorities’ lack

of response to the attack. he Russian-speakingminority in Germany often get their informationfrom Russia media, allowing the Kremlin toactivate EU residents and citizens in support of itsgoals.25 At the same time, Lavrov’s phrase “our girlLisa” shows that even if Russian-Germans haveGerman passports and have lived in Germany formany years, in the eyes of the Kremlin, they willalways be Russians and should be protected bythe Russian state whether or not they want to be.It took German police nearly two weeks to clarifythat there had been no rape and that the girl, who

had problems in school, had been staying with afriend during the 30 hours she had been missing.By then, the far-right National Democratic Party

25 L. Kim, “Russia having success in hybrid war againstGermany,” Reuters, February 7, 2016, http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2016/02/07/russia-having-success-in-hybrid-war-against-germany/ .

Chancellor Ange

Merkel’s key role

in leading the

European Union

in several crises

and in uniting the

different membe

states in favor

of sanctions

against Russia

has encouraged

the Kremlin to

push to weaken

her position,

as domestic

and European

pushback agains

her refugee

policies have

already made

her vulnerable.

http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2016/02/07/russia-having-success-in-hybrid-war-against-germany/http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2016/02/07/russia-having-success-in-hybrid-war-against-germany/http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2016/02/07/russia-having-success-in-hybrid-war-against-germany/http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2016/02/07/russia-having-success-in-hybrid-war-against-germany/http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2016/02/07/russia-having-success-in-hybrid-war-against-germany/http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2016/02/07/russia-having-success-in-hybrid-war-against-germany/


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T A10

Russia’s fairly

successful

propaganda in the

West shows that

political pluralism

and open

societies have

some significant

vulnerabilities

compared to

authoritarian

states, with

regard to speed of

decision-making

and action.

of Germany had supported demonstrations byRussian-Germans, and anti-Merkel populistmovement PEGIDA had used the case to press itsclaims that something is wrong in Germany.

While EU decision-makers struggle to agree on, letalone implement, their policy, Putin demonstratesaction. he more weakly Western leadersrespond to Russian aggression and provocation,the more Russian leadership feels stimulated topress forward. his is the case in propagandaas well as in testing out the responsiveness of

NAO on its borders. hat Lavrov broughtthe “Lisa case” to the top political level showsthe impudence and cynicism of the Russianleadership, instrumentalizing an underaged girl,testing out how far it can go. his is in line withMoscow’s overestimation of its own resourcesand with Russian military actions like in Syria,where consequences are not well thought through.Russian leadership lacks any long-term strategybut is much more willing to take risks to achieve itsgoals when it has the impression that the West isweak or that it can gain a short-term benefit.

All these instruments of manipulation, propaganda,and subversion are not new but date from the ColdWar times. he difference is, while many NAOmembers have stopped acting like they did in theCold War, the Russian leadership has doubled-down, improved their instruments, and upgradedwith 21st century technology. Russia is not only onestep forward but several.

Russia’s fairly successful propaganda in the Westshows that political pluralism and open societieshave some significant vulnerabilities comparedto authoritarian states, with regard to speed ofdecision-making and action. While authoritarianregimes have learned from each other in recentyears about how to repel Western influences suchas NGOs and undermine domestic pro-democracyactors, the West has lost clarity and belief in its own

norms and principles.26

It is not the sophisticatedinstruments of the Russian regime that are thesecret of its success in the West, but the lack ofresilience of our own societies and institutions aswell as our governments’ lack of will to respond tothe reality of Russian policies.27

he renaissance of history in Russia fits neatlyinto this schema, and it corresponds with the wayMoscow exploits the remembrance of the WorldWar II victory, memories of the Cold War, andthe achievements of Stalin and the USSR. o this

day, the old stereotype of the Cold War-era UnitedStates and its European allies continues to shapeRussia’s understanding of the U.S. role in the world.Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev’s use of the terms“West” and “Cold War” at the Munich Securityconference in mid-February 2016 should not onlyremind Russian society about who the enemy isbut also promote Russia’s role in today’s world asthe successor of the Soviet Union, one of the twogreat powers of the Cold War.28 Furthermore,the Soviet victory over fascist Germany plays animportant role in presenting Russia as an important

international player and reminds most Russiansof the positive pictures of this great achievementpromoted by Soviet propaganda. As this victoryplayed an important role in Soviet identity buildingit was and remains an instrument for the creation ofidentity and mobilization against outside enemies.

his is evident, for example, in an interview withSecurity Council Secretary Patrushev. Whenquestioned about Ukraine’s request to close the

26 C. Walker, M. Plattner, and L. Diamond, “AuthoritarianismGoes Global,” Te American Interest , March 28, 2016, http://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/03/28/authoritarianism-goes-global/.27 See S. Meister, “Russia’s Return,” Berlin Policy Journal ,December 14, 2015, http://berlinpolicyjournal.com/russias-return/.28 See S. Meister, “In Search for Lost ime,” Berlin Policy Journal ,March 11, 2016, http://berlinpolicyjournal.com/in-search-for-lost-time/.

http://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/03/28/authoritarianism-goes-global/http://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/03/28/authoritarianism-goes-global/http://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/03/28/authoritarianism-goes-global/http://berlinpolicyjournal.com/russias-return/http://berlinpolicyjournal.com/russias-return/http://berlinpolicyjournal.com/in-search-for-lost-time/http://berlinpolicyjournal.com/in-search-for-lost-time/http://berlinpolicyjournal.com/in-search-for-lost-time/http://berlinpolicyjournal.com/in-search-for-lost-time/http://berlinpolicyjournal.com/russias-return/http://berlinpolicyjournal.com/russias-return/http://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/03/28/authoritarianism-goes-global/http://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/03/28/authoritarianism-goes-global/http://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/03/28/authoritarianism-goes-global/


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I P 11

If Putin argues

in his Crimean

speech that the

Russian state

sees itself as a

“protecting powe

with regard to

its compatriots

abroad, it justifie

a Russian

intervention,

hybrid or

conventional,

in any state

with Russian

minorities.

Russian border, Patrushev compared a potentialblockade of the Donbas to the Siege of Leningrad.29 he Ukrainian government is described as a fascist

junta and its supporters as Banderites, referringto World War II-era Ukrainian independencemovement leader Stepan Bandera, a sometime allyof Nazi Germany.30

Historical comparisons and Soviet symbolism playan important role in creating support from Russiansociety, linked with promoting a value system thatis different from the Western liberal (and U.S.-

dominated) one. On one hand, these narrativesargue for Russia’s uniqueness, while on the other,Russia is portrayed as the bulwark for traditionalEuropean values. his links Russian conservativesociety and elites with Western conservatives,as well as far-right and far-left populist groupsthrough Europe. Even if this mix of historicalpictures, traditional values, and ideology doesnot fit into one concept, it is able to confuse theopponent and unite parts of the Russian societybehind the official position and Russian leadershipwith populist anti-establishment groups in Europe

from former communists to neo-fascists.

Another puzzle of “soft power” in the ideologicalcontext is the Russkiy Mir (Russian World), whichis not only an organization to promote Russianlanguage and culture abroad but also an ideological

29 Pyatakova.30 J. Cohen, “Vladimir Putin calls Ukraine fascists and country’snew law helps make this case,” Reuters, May 14, 2015, http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/05/14/putin-ties-ukraines-government-to-neo-nazis-a-new-law-seems-to-back-him-up/.

concept to unite Russia with Russian-speakingminorities worldwide. In his Crimea speech onMarch 18, 2014, Putin justified the annexationwith key elements of the Russkiy Mir concept.31 Hespoke about the Russians as a “divided nation” andemphasized the “aspiration of the Russian world,the historical Russia to restore unity.” When theRussian government talks about minority rights ofRussians in the Baltic States or Putin questions theexistence of a Kazakh state, this is all about Russkiy

Mir . he same is true when Lavrov describes Lisaas “our girl” despite her German passport; and in

Germany, there is a Russian-German minority ofseveral million people.32 In the Russkiy Mir concept,those who speak Russian act Russian and thinkRussian at the same time. If Putin argues in hisCrimean speech that the Russian state sees itself asa “protecting power” with regard to its compatriotsabroad, it justifies a Russian intervention, hybrid orconventional, in any state with Russian minorities.

31 V. Putin, “Address by President of the Russian Federation,”President of Russia, March 18, 2014, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/

president/news/20603.32 Tis number, given as 2.4 million in a Die Zeit articledescribing them as the largest minority in Germany, involvesRussian-Germans as well as ethnic Germans from post-Sovietcountries ( Aussiedler , or emigrants) and their relatives. U.Lachauer, “Die grösste Minderheit in D.” [Te largest minorityin Germany], Die Zeit , March 11, 2004, http://www.zeit.de/2004/12/Infokasten_Russland . Te number may well behigher: another article estimates more than 4 million Russianspeakers in Germany, hundreds of thousands with Russianpassports, noting the statistics are incomplete. K. Schlögel,“Stiefmütterchen Berlin,” Die Zeit , January 12, 2016, http://www.zeit.de/zeit-geschichte/2015/04/russen-in-deutschland-berlin-charlottenburg-russlanddeutsche-wuensdorf .

http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/05/14/putin-ties-ukraines-government-to-neo-nazis-a-new-law-seems-to-back-him-up/http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/05/14/putin-ties-ukraines-government-to-neo-nazis-a-new-law-seems-to-back-him-up/http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/05/14/putin-ties-ukraines-government-to-neo-nazis-a-new-law-seems-to-back-him-up/http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603http://www.zeit.de/2004/12/Infokasten_Russlandhttp://www.zeit.de/2004/12/Infokasten_Russlandhttp://www.zeit.de/zeit-geschichte/2015/04/russen-in-deutschland-berlin-charlottenburg-russlanddeutsche-wuensdorfhttp://www.zeit.de/zeit-geschichte/2015/04/russen-in-deutschland-berlin-charlottenburg-russlanddeutsche-wuensdorfhttp://www.zeit.de/zeit-geschichte/2015/04/russen-in-deutschland-berlin-charlottenburg-russlanddeutsche-wuensdorfhttp://www.zeit.de/zeit-geschichte/2015/04/russen-in-deutschland-berlin-charlottenburg-russlanddeutsche-wuensdorfhttp://www.zeit.de/zeit-geschichte/2015/04/russen-in-deutschland-berlin-charlottenburg-russlanddeutsche-wuensdorfhttp://www.zeit.de/zeit-geschichte/2015/04/russen-in-deutschland-berlin-charlottenburg-russlanddeutsche-wuensdorfhttp://www.zeit.de/2004/12/Infokasten_Russlandhttp://www.zeit.de/2004/12/Infokasten_Russlandhttp://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/05/14/putin-ties-ukraines-government-to-neo-nazis-a-new-law-seems-to-back-him-up/http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/05/14/putin-ties-ukraines-government-to-neo-nazis-a-new-law-seems-to-back-him-up/http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/05/14/putin-ties-ukraines-government-to-neo-nazis-a-new-law-seems-to-back-him-up/


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T A12

W I T B D

5

The possibilities of directly influencingdevelopments in Russia from outside arelimited. he “partnership for modernization”

promoted in German foreign and economicpolicy broke down long ago, as did the decade-long propagated notion of promoting “changethrough rapprochement.”33 Russia’s civil societyand opposition groups are under immense statepressure, and their scope for action is set to befurther restricted by repressive legislation likethe foreign agent law and massive curtailmentson demonstrations;34 many oppositionists and

advocates of critical media have already left thecountry.

Widespread patriotism also seems undiminished,as is clearly demonstrated by Putin’s high approvalratings, which stand at more than 80 percent sincethe annexation of Crimea.35 Russian society is notliberal, pro-Western, or longing for democracy;Putin reflects a consensus in large parts of societythat feeds off the experiences of the economic,social, and political recession of the 1990s and theauthoritarian heritage of the Soviet Union.

Russian export media outlets like R have limited viewer bases, but their arguments and conspiracytheorizing are becoming part of the mainstreamdiscourse in Western media as alternative opinions.Arguments by former politicians on talk showson major German V channels are picked up byRussian and Western social and mainstream media.he plurality of our media system and openness ofour discourse makes Western societies vulnerable.

33 S. Meister, “How Russia Lost Germany,” Russia in Global Affairs, March 19, 2015, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/How-Russia-Lost-Germany-17365 .

34 See “Amnesty Report Slams “Repressive Legislation,” Moscowimes, May 22, 2013, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/amnesty-report-slams-repressive-legislation/480381.html.35 Levada Center, “ДЕКАБРЬСКИЕ РЕЙТИНГИОДОБРЕНИЯ И ДОВЕРИЯ” [December Rating of Support andrust], December 23, 2015, http://www.levada.ru/2015/12/23/dekabrskie-rejtingi-odobreniya-i-doveriya-5/.

Furthermore, lack of knowledge about Russianpolitics and media makes it easy for Russian “trolls”or “political technologists” to manipulate the debateon Russia in the European public.

While the West mainly focuses on the regimein Russia and has less and less access to Russiansociety, Russian policy is focusing more and moreon European societies via propaganda, bypassingthe governments. Putin gives interviews on DasErste (channel 1 on German V) or to the maintabloid Bild to reach out to the German public,

not German policymakers.

36

he collapse of thetraditional media model worldwide is accompaniedby modern information technology that puts vastamounts of information, often either not checkedfor factuality or intentionally misleading, at the tipof citizens’ fingers. he free flow of informationin open societies is enabling propaganda; Russianmedia and political technologists have learned howto effectively push narratives for Western audiencesfrom Western outlets like Fox News in the UnitedStates. hey have trained for years on how to usemodern “infotainment” at home and now their

skills are reaching Europe and other parts of theworld. Helping fuel self-doubt in increasinglyfragile and fragmented Western societies isthe most successful strategy of the Kremlin’sdisinformation campaign.

How should the European Union, its memberstates, and the United States react to thesechallenges?

Despite significant roadblocks, the West shouldattempt to maintain broad contact with Russiansociety and elites and to promote platforms forexchange. A key element could be facilitating

visas for Russian citizens to the EU. o provide a

36 N. Blome, K. Diekmann, and D. Biskup, “Putin: Te Interview:For me it is not borders that matters,” Bild , January 11, 2016,http://www.bild.de/politik/ausland/wladimir-putin/russian-president-vladimir-putin-the-interview-44092656.bild.html.

Russian export

media outlets like

R have limited

viewer bases, but

their arguments

and conspiracy

theorizing are

becoming part of

the mainstream

discourse in

Western media

as alternative

opinions.

http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/How-Russia-Lost-Germany-17365http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/How-Russia-Lost-Germany-17365http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/amnesty-report-slams-repressive-legislation/480381.htmlhttp://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/amnesty-report-slams-repressive-legislation/480381.htmlhttp://www.levada.ru/2015/12/23/dekabrskie-rejtingi-odobreniya-i-doveriya-5/http://www.levada.ru/2015/12/23/dekabrskie-rejtingi-odobreniya-i-doveriya-5/http://www.bild.de/politik/ausland/wladimir-putin/russian-president-vladimir-putin-the-interview-44092656.bild.htmlhttp://www.bild.de/politik/ausland/wladimir-putin/russian-president-vladimir-putin-the-interview-44092656.bild.htmlhttp://www.bild.de/politik/ausland/wladimir-putin/russian-president-vladimir-putin-the-interview-44092656.bild.htmlhttp://www.bild.de/politik/ausland/wladimir-putin/russian-president-vladimir-putin-the-interview-44092656.bild.htmlhttp://www.levada.ru/2015/12/23/dekabrskie-rejtingi-odobreniya-i-doveriya-5/http://www.levada.ru/2015/12/23/dekabrskie-rejtingi-odobreniya-i-doveriya-5/http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/amnesty-report-slams-repressive-legislation/480381.htmlhttp://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/amnesty-report-slams-repressive-legislation/480381.htmlhttp://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/How-Russia-Lost-Germany-17365http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/How-Russia-Lost-Germany-17365


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I P 13

In its attempt

to respond

appropriately

to Russian

propaganda, the

West should not

develop “counter

propaganda” but

instead help to

make Russian

propaganda

consistently visib

by promoting

responsible

media and

unmasking fakes

positive agenda — in contrast with the tight travelrestrictions placed on Putin’s entourage sincethe annexation of Crimea and the war in easternUkraine — the EU should facilitate entry into theEU for most Russian citizens. At the same time,German, European, and U.S. policy should preparefor the post-Putin era and different potentialscenarios, which might include the destabilizationof Russia or the rise of an even more nationalist andaggressive president. he West needs a long-termapproach for Russia and the post-Soviet countriesthat takes the current challenge seriously, but is

not only focused on demonizing Putin but alsoon an agenda looking beyond the current Russianpresident.

he EU should work on its image and continueto develop and reinforce its own soft power. hereform deficit and economic problems of manymember states are currently giving free play toRussian propaganda, which means that nationalgovernments and the EU commission must comeup with more convincing arguments to counterthe anti-EU propaganda of the right- and left-

wing populists in the member states. his involvesreinforcing the basic values and norms of theEU. Sanction mechanisms are needed for thosegovernments of member states that are attemptingto undermine the basic rights and principles of theEU and weaken EU cohesion. Only then can theEU improve its credibility abroad and at home.

It is also essential to keep up the present policyof sanctions against Russia. hese have hithertodemonstrated the cohesion of the EU memberstates and the transatlantic allies, and they represent

the EU’s credible ability to respond to Russianaggression in Ukraine. After the EU prolongedits sanctions in December 2015 for a period of sixmonths, Moscow has tried and will continue to tryto undermine this common strategy in a variety ofways, for example by using incentives in the form ofinvestments or low energy prices to try to persuade

individual member states to mitigate the sanctionsor to do a tradeoff with the West on Ukraine withregard to other crises, for example Syria. Germanyis one key target of this policy as the Lisa caseand Putin’s Bild interview have shown.37 If Russiais unwilling to defuse the crisis in Ukraine, EUmember states must stand firm in order to preservetheir credibility or even increase sanctions if it isnecessary. Also thanks to the sanctions, Russia’sleaders may have been deterred from interveningin or seizing larger parts of Ukrainian territory ormaking similar moves in Moldova or Georgia.

In its attempt to respond appropriately to Russianpropaganda, the West should not develop “counter-propaganda” but instead help to make Russianpropaganda consistently visible by promotingresponsible media and unmasking fakes. Inthis regard, it is right that the German federalgovernment has provided stronger financialbacking to the German broadcaster DeutscheWelle and its Russian- and Ukrainian-languagechannels, and it is regrettable that the Britishgovernment plans massive cuts to the BBC and its

foreign channels, which offer a reliable alternativeto R . he BBC should in fact maintain itsforeign channels at the same level at least, andconsiderably expand its Russian-language channel.he European Endowment for Democracy haspublished a comprehensive study on improvingpluralism in the Russian-language media space,with several important suggestions for how to reactto Russian propaganda and counter the trend ofdecreasing numbers of independent media outletsinside Russia.38 Possible responses include creatingregional Russian-language media hubs; developing

a Russian-language media competence center tocoordinate the work of NGOs, existing Russian

37 Ibid.38 European Endowment for Democracy, “Bringing Plurality andBalance to Russian Language Media: Final Recommendations,”June 25, 2015, https://www.democracyendowment.eu/news/bringing-plurality-1/.

https://www.democracyendowment.eu/news/bringing-plurality-1/https://www.democracyendowment.eu/news/bringing-plurality-1/https://www.democracyendowment.eu/news/bringing-plurality-1/https://www.democracyendowment.eu/news/bringing-plurality-1/


18/19

T A14

The EU needs to

come up with a

serious offer for

its neighbors in

the east including

a membership

perspective. It

is in the interest

of EU member

states to help

Ukraine become

economically and

politically stable.

If reform efforts

succeed there,

the impact could

spread to Russia

and other post-

Soviet states.

speaking media, and governments; and setting upa foundation to support independent media in thisarea. Without duplicating existing structures withinEU member states, the coordination of all relevantmedia activities in the EU should be improvedand adequately funded by EU member states andinstitutions. At the same time, leading Europeanmedia should expand their permanent networkof correspondents in Russia, Ukraine, and otherpost-Soviet states to enable them to report reliablyon location, and to counter propaganda with facts.Quality investigative journalism is the right answer

to propaganda.

For too long, the EU has come up short in itsanalysis of developments in Russia and otherpost-Soviet states. It urgently needs to remedythis. Greater knowledge of and transparency aboutdevelopments in Russia are as necessary as thedisclosure of Russian networks, financial flows,and economic relations in the EU itself. For thispurpose, it is necessary to strengthen nationalresearch in think-tanks and at universities and toimprove EU-wide coordination among research

establishments. Academic funding in the areashould be increased at the national and EU levelsfor this purpose. Furthermore, the EU delegationsin Moscow and other post-Soviet capitals shouldstrengthen their commitment to explainingdevelopments in Brussels and the EU to the elites aswell as to the wider public in those countries. hereare, at present, significant information deficitsabout the EU and the United States in Russia,which make it easier for the political powers thereto offer Cold War-era stereotypes as explanatorymodels.

In the long term, the EU must make reform effortsto provide consolidation in those areas whereRussian propaganda currently has a soft target. Itshould continue to develop a common energy andforeign policy, reduce its own democratic deficit,tackle the economic problems in the southern EUstates, and reinforce good governance not just inneighboring states but also within the EU itself.his includes strengthening minority rights inthe EU. A tougher approach to corruption in themember states is crucial, as is greater transparencyand law enforcement regarding, for example, the

flow of Russian and post-Soviet money into theEuropean Union and worldwide.

At the same time, the EU needs to come up with aserious offer for its neighbors in the east includinga membership perspective. It is in the interestof EU member states to help Ukraine becomeeconomically and politically stable. If reformefforts succeed there, the impact could spread toRussia and other post-Soviet states. It is to thegreat advantage of the EU that Russia neitherhas the necessary economic power nor offers an

appropriate political alternative to actually developthe countries in its post-Soviet neighborhood.Moscow instead encourages destabilization,corruption, and weak states in order to maintain arelationship of dependency. he EU has somethingmuch more attractive to offer the societies ofthese countries and should make greater use of itsstrategic advantage.


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Documents

Isolation and Propaganda: The Roots and Instruments of Russia’s Disinformation Campaign