Intro_Saxena.docx

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INTRODUCTION

In recent times, history has been moving towards a post-modernist perspective, as part of the

larger shift towards postmodernism. Postmodernism demands that its readers recognise the

use of history as an instrument of enforcing, as well as expressing hegemony, either cultural

or political. Thus, postmodernists claim that this recognition has allowed the suppressed

groups to widen historys record to include their side of the story as well, thus allowing the

claim that the postmodernist view of history creates the ground for democratic

empowerment.1

However, the post-modernist claims of history lacking truth have not been positively

accepted by many.2 Most historians stubbornly believe that the use of sufficient amount of

evidence can guarantee the truth of their statements.3 This notion of truth drawn from

evidence has been emphasized ever since the times of Ranke. In fact, to a large extent, this

issue of truth being ascertainable or not has been manifested in the form of a debate around

the notion of the historical fact, particularly since Carrs influential piece, What is History?.

There is no denying that historical facts are important to history- Oakeshott calls facts the

basis of history.4 This refers to the position of the facts as a statement which provides

support to the theories that historians put forward. Facts are often utilised as the standard of

assessing the inherent strength of a claim.

However, the debate continues because of two issues, firstly the post-modern retort that

historical facts are not objective has created considerable doubt in the certainty of the history

(among other arguments as well of course), and secondly, the issue of the notion of the

historical fact itself. As Munslow states, historians have no agreed definition of a fact. 5 Yet

there is no denying the privileged position of the historical fact in the field of history. This

staunchly defended position and the direct conflict deems a look into the concept of the

historical fact. The intention of the author is to directly contest the definition of the historical

1J. Tosh, THE PURSUIT OF HISTORY, 194, (3

RDedn., 2002).

2Tosh, supra note 1, at 195-6.

3C. J. Napier, The Historian as an Auditor: Facts, Judgements andEvidence, 29(2) THE ACCOUNTING

HISTORIANS JOURNAL, 131,131-2, (December 2002).4M. Oaskeshott, ON HISTORY AND OTHER ESSAYS, 33, (1983).

5A. Munslow, THE NEW HISTORY,12,(2003).


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fact, as well as question the process of its formulation, to arrive at upon an opinionated stance

regarding this particular concept.


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CHAPTERONE

The intention of this chapter is eventually conclude upon a justified definition of the

historical fact. However, Munslows comment about the lack of an agreeable conception of

history must first be addressed. The researcher believes that historical facts are not separated

from the sources and traces of the past. The multiplicity of terms utilised in the historical

discourse generates this confusion- one that, as per Jenkins, historians such as Carr and Elton

are guilty of. 6.

The distinction between sources and factsA number of historians distinguish between sources (or traces or evidences or relics) and

historical facts (themselves referred to as evidences on occasion). However, facts are

distinguishable from data in that they are considered to be assured statements of truth, or at

least are sufficiently secured in that claim, by being supported by data.7 Data become the

support structure upon which the fact is based. Renier may be cited here, as he points out a

distinction between occurrences and events. For Renier, an event is a system of occurrences

that form a description by creating a sequential hierarchy so as to constitute that event.8Thus,

for Renier, traces are evidences of sequence of events.9 To an extent, Renier suffers from

the same issue of using interchangeable terms without clarification as was pointed out earlier.

To clarify, it is assumed that evidences or traces are sources, with an event being equivalent

to the historical fact (or at least the definition that the author seeks to push, that in turn shall

be arrived at shortly). What we glean out of this is that sources somehow constitute facts, by

a particular process of selection.

This process of selection is what actually gives facts and sources their meaning, as well as

points out their distinction. Sources gain meaning based on the historians perception of their

significance within their own (past) context; facts gain meaning within the framework of

theory that the historian wishes to present. Facts are established truths that are laid down by

historians by drawing from sources; but in that drawing from sources, these truths are taken

6K. Jenkins, RE-THINKING HISTORY, 60, (2004).

7

C.A.J. Coady, Collingwood and Historical Testimony, 50 (194) PHILOSOPHY, 409, 409, (October 1975).8G.J. Renier, HISTORY, ITS PURPOSE AND METHOD, 95, (1950).

9Renier, supra note 8, at 118.


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out of their (presumed) context into the context of theory set by the historian, and yet the

historian asserts them to be true based on the context within which the sources are placed. So

when we state that the battle at Waterloo took place in 1815, (which we know because we

have documents stating it10), we are in fact making a statement that is a mere repetition of a

raw source, or raw evidence (perhaps evidence is more suitable), while the statement that the

battle of Waterloo marked the end of the rule of Napoleon over France, we are creating a fact,

or a justified description. This is because the fact that Napoleons rule over France ended

after this battle makes links between the battle taking place, why Napoleon lost, and how that

led to the end of his rule; we are making links between different occurrences to arrive at a

conclusive description- the battle of Waterloo ended Napoleons rule over France.

When Munslow distinguishes between data, and fact, he echoes the above position. Historical

fact for him is a justified historical description, ala McCullagh.11 For him, the data is just one

part of determining a fact, as the theoretical conceptions that shape the historians ontology,

play into establishing the methodology of approaching that data. So in establishing whether

or not Japan is a patriarchal society, Munslow states that a historians approach to the data

will be marred by his desire to seek out patterns that prove whether or not it actually is such a

society or not- this could simply take place by asking particular questions that follow along

the lines of the historians preconceived ideologies- his ontology. Basically, the historiansontological commitments act as a filter through which his/her factual statements are written.

Two ideas jump out of this encapsulation of Munslows idea of the fact; the first, this notion

of a justified historical description, the next, this issue of selection- both of which are dealt

with as follows.

An acceptable conceptionMunslow sees facts as descriptions that cannot be absolutely accurate-something which

apparently all historians admit.12 For other historians such as Lester Stephens, historical facts

are simply an event which actually happened, anything which is true or real.13 For

Stanford, facts are a slippery concept14 that are statements which state the truth, not what

the statements are about. For him, facts are an amalgam between words and things, belonging

to both, but exclusively to neither. This amalgam is created by the interplay of the human

10See J. Booth, THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO, (1815).

11Munslow, supra note 5, at 14.

12

Munslow, supra note 5, at 12.13L. Stephens, PROBING THE PAST,23,(1974).

14M. Stanford, THE NATURE OF HISTORICAL KNOWLEDGGE, 74, (1986).


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mind, which makes the necessary association between word and world, to create that fact.

Thus, historical facts are historical judgments about not just events, but also about statements

that relate to them.15

What we see here is a notion of a historical fact as a justified historical description, in that

facts describe particular events, and they are justified as per the historian, not as per the

evidences. If we consider the differences between sources and facts, then it is easy to

consider facts as descriptions. However the issue arises now with the justification

component- what justifies the truth value as being ascribed to a particular fact?

Objectivity or lack thereofThe authenticity of historical facts is often taken as given.16 However, there have been two

major prongs of attack on this assumption. First, the way facts are constituted. Secondly, the

sources utilised to constitute them.

When dealing with constitution, one must state Carrs distinction between facts of the past

and facts of history17. This is indicative of the selection process that is undertaken by the

historian. Since the historian cannot fully gain access to the past, traces of the past themselves

are either preselected by their paucity, or by the historian himself, in narrowing down the

body of traces he has to operate within. This latter function is done according to thesubjective significance of the facts as perceived by the historian.18 Oakeshott agrees with

Collingwood in stating that facts are created by a process of reconstitution in the histori ans

mind, when the historian works upon the evidence provided. 19 Michael Stanford further

states that historical facts are necessarily uncertain, as they are derived by inductive reasoning

by the historian, and are not a reflection of past reality.20

In an infinite time stream, pegging certain facts of the past as historical facts is necessarily

one of selection- historians have little justification for claiming certain facts as significant,

and doing so betrays an ignorance of their own biases. A. Toynbee agrees with Carrs

position rather religiously, citing him directly in framing his conception of the fact, as created

15Stanford, supra note 14, at 73.

16F. H. Knight, Philosophy andHistory, 25(4) JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS, 587, 587, (October-

December 1964).17

E.H. Carr, WHAT IS HISTORY?, 4-6, (1961).18

Stephens, supra note 13, at 31.19Carr, supra note 17, at 8.



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by the historian through the formulation of his theory.21 He further goes on to say that since

all facts are ultimately human creations, they can hardly be distinguished on the basis of the

illusory ground22 of objectivity. Renier agrees with the role of imagination in the

arrangement of occurrences to form an event, and how imaginations effect varies from

person to person, but he places a considerable amount of faith in the historian, by stating that

the historian can account for this problem of subjectivity.23 Hayden White dictates that

history provides no way of preferring one notion of a fact over the other, barring the needs of

the historian.24 Jenkins is scathing in his attack on the epistemological framework of history,

which is fraught with subjectivity, and interpretation by the historian.25 Tosh states that

historical writing is rarely ever composed entirely out of unassailable facts26; the usage of

facts in general is dictated by the purpose intended for the concerned historical piece.

Even the sources themselves are problematic. Marwick details out how the number of

interpretations of evidence varies with how imperfect the evidence is. 27Sources themselves

are not absolute; the need for mechanisms of criticism and evaluation, as detailed by a

number of historians as part of their methodology is indicative of this flawed nature of

sources.28 Further, the sources of history are not only a sliver of the past, but also themselves

subject to interpretation, and often betray the biases of their creators. So while documents

shall reflect the desires of the authors (Marwicks defence of charters and treaties isultimately no exception29), other sources such as artefacts or oral accounts are betrayed by

their anachronistic analysis- one has to assume what an artefact was used for, or what certain

words or phrases may have meant to the people they relate to, for example. Meanings of

sources differ according to biases of their creators, as well as their understanding. Much

literature has been dedicated to proving that sources are different from the past; to list them

out would amount to needless repetition. Tosh advocates the multiplicity of meanings that

can be drawn from documents, citing that as a reason for calling sources traces. 30

21A.J. Toynbee, A STUDY OF HISTORY, 486, (1960).

22Id. at 487.

23Renier, supra note 8, at 186-8.

24Tosh, supra note 1, at 190.

25Jenkins, supra note 6, at 40.


27A. Marwick, THE NATURE OF HISTORY, 241, (2

ndedn., 1981)

28

L. Stephens, supra note 13, at 34.29W. Thomson, WHAT HAPPENED TO HISTORY, 110, (2000).



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What we see here then that the historical descriptions are justified according to not only

problematic sources, but also subject to the interpretations by the historians in formulating

those descriptions. However, historians draw their interpretations from facts, and give

assurances of validity, based on a faith in the facts intrinsically allowing for the derivation of

those interpretations.31 To deal with these attacks of epistemological fragility, historians often

resort to theories of truth that help the historian remove the issue of arbitrariness in

determining facts.32

W.H. Walsh details out two main theories of truth. He details out the first, which is the

correspondence theory that the truth of a statement is guaranteed by its relation to facts

(which in this paradigm is taken to mean sources). This may seem logically coherent, but it

has important limitations, that firstly experiences are ignored under this theory for they

cannot carry the guarantee of certainty documents have, and secondly historical evidences

cannot be assessed for their validity, for the past cannot be retrieved. Thus, since sources

themselves are not authentic components of the past, but rather simply traces or

representations that are fraught with the subjectivity of selection, one cannot create justified

historical descriptions, but simply plausible descriptions.

There is an alternative, which is the coherence theory.33 This theory accepts the creation of

facts by the historian, by stating that theories create facts, thus allowing them to revised, as

per one grand theory of the universe. This theory allows sources to be relative, and allows

sources to be prioritized by the selection process. Facts thus are defined to be true by the

historian, when he gives a coherent meaning to them within the larger theory. This theory,

however, suffers from the assertion of truth as being defined with reference to coherence, for

this means that truth can be defined by the historian, and thus, it is not self-evident, but rather

a convenient and fabricated standard.

Thus, we see that historical facts are not the perfect examples of objectivity that they are

claimed to be. They are often justified in circular fashions. However, if the author is to

proceed with the notion of justified historical descriptions as facts, then the justification must

be provided. This justification is sought to be provided in the next chapter.

31

Jenkins, supra note 6, at 41.32W.H. Walsh, PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY: AN INTRODUCTION, 72-93, (1960).

33Id.


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CHAPTERTWO

If facts cannot draw their validity from sources or from historians, then how are facts justified

in history? One must resort to Carrhere. Carrs example of Kitson Clark citing a little known

event in his lecture indicates that the process by which a fact of the past becomes a historical

fact, involves that fact being affirmed by the community of historians.34 The now-famous

quote that history is a series of accepted judgements35 may be built upon by giving the

notion of the fact being whatever is judged to be the most acceptable description of an event,

by the historical community. Michael Stanford supports this by stating that historians reach

different conclusions based on the probability of events taking place, and these probabilities

reinforce each other, creating a consensus of conclusions regarding these events, thus

ensuring their occurrence beyond a reasonable level of doubt. However, the historians cannot

ever confirm these conclusions from the concerned subjects, and thus, history is no more

than a tissue of mutually supporting probabilities.36 Thus historical facts are mutually

supported by each other. Barraclough mentions that all historians can join each other in

condemning those actions which have morally hazardous consequences.37 This is only

possible if the above stated argument plays out- for if the consensus of historians is

contingent on historical facts describing those actions as hazardous, and the historian

supplying those facts desires this, then he or she shall have to cater to their standard of

morality. Hitlers actions are considered immoral in those circles which deem them so- the

supporters of Nazis did not disagree, yet they are shunned from the international community

from simply that reason (which further prompted the Holocaust denial as a clamour for

acceptance38). The Historian chooses to try to explain, and then chooses among possible

explanationthe resultis a matter of judgment, finally of agreement in some community. 39

Historians however claim that they utilise standards and methodologies to arrive at definite

facts. The problem with this is highlighted when G. Iggers states that historical facts can be

34Carr, supra note 17, at 6.

35Barraclough as cited in Carr, supra note 17, at 6.

36Stanford, supra note 14, at 59.

37G. Barraclough, History, Morals andPolitics, 34(1) INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 1, 13, (January 1958).

38B.B. Weber, Shades of Revisionism: Holocaust Denial and the Conservative Call to Reinterpret German

History, 6 UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT: HISTORY REVIEW, available athttp://www.uvm.edu/~hag/histreview/vol6/weber.html (Last visited on May 20, 2013).39

Knight, supra note 16, at 593.


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assessed by critical methods that are agreed upon by the practitioners of the discipline. 40 This

means that historical facts are ultimately created by historical consensus, within a particular

community. Further, Frank Knight says that even the validity of sources themselves requires

their endorsement by many. Broadly, belief in facts requires the cooperation of historians,

which in turn requires harmony between their conceptions of values (such as justice or

equality), by which to judge facts.41

Truth of the statement itself, Habermas states42, is granted by the consensus between

historians, who agree on the basis of the evidence. However, if the evidence itself is subject

to biased, then so is the consensus which grants that status of truth. This makes it increasingly

plausible that statements become historical facts, when a number of historians agree that it

suits them to do so.

This is evident from Reniers argument. Renier states an example of Mazzarini43, who was

deemed villainous by Voltaire. Later, another historian, Andr Cherul gave his own account

of Mazzarini which was more tempered. Renier states that while Voltaire called Mazzarini a

builder of absolutism, Cherul wished to describe Mazzarini in a fashion that was part of a

larger movement in France at the time to find relief in the power of the past. Today, it is

Voltaires account that is regarded as more acceptable. Thus, we see that facts get aligned in

historical writing according to the direction towards which a particular discourse (of which

the concerned historian is part) is moving. Historians are influenced by the societies of which

they are part, with the undercurrents of their historical works often reflecting the dispositions

of these societies at that particular point in time.

Thus, historical facts are ultimately given that status by the community as per the desires of

that community at a particular point of time. The problem with this is the issue of exclusivity

and perpetuity. Chesneaux criticises history for having a deeply entrenched sense of

intellectualism that for him, is a false but uncontested assumption.44 Further, the

intellectualism creates a code of professional jargon, understandable to only other

historians.45 What this means is that historical assumptions can only be countered within that

framework of jargon. Marwick clearly establishes how new interpretations may be rejected

40G.G. Iggers, HISTORIOGRAPHY IN THE 20

THCENTURY, 16, (1997).

41Knight, supra note 16, at 588-9.

42Habermas as cited in C.B. McCullagh, THE TRUTH ABOUT HISTORY, 55, (2003).

43

Renier, supra note 8, at 94.44J. Chesneaux, PAST AND FUTURES AND WHAT IS HISTORY FOR, 13, (1978).

45Id. at 53.


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by the ever-ready police battalions of the historical guild46, if the interpretation is not in

good faith, as per the jargon decided by that community. This allows for the discrimination of

certain accounts of histories, by communities on methodology alone. In a piece about Mao

Tse-tungs conception of history, the author states that his writings are useful in detailing out

the history of China and in understanding the role of history in formulating policy, but also

states that his writings are unlikely to be considered as history due to lack of basis in

Historical Facts47. This shows the exclusivity the Western historical discourse displays,

primarily on their need for the certainty that facts lend. Considering that facts in fact grant

little certainty, this hypocritical position is heavily problematic, for it prevents history from

expanding and including the histories of societies that are not Western, thus maintaining a

Western hegemony on important knowledge.

Further, certain facts become increasingly standardized as absolute truths, by simply being

used and advocated a number of times. The logic behind Carrs example of the fish

swimming in the ocean can be extended to those fish which have caught and re-caught by so

many, that not catching them is not possible. This may sound absurd, but the point is that

certain facts have been utilised so many times (such as the famous Caesar crossing the

Rubicondescription) that they are accepted as axiomatic. Brendan McCullagh agrees that if

certain facts are granted legitimacy by an entire community of supporting scholars, it makes

the uncovering of biases difficult.48 BC Hurst further argues that if a particular description is

supported by a vast number of narratives, then disproving it becomes incrementally difficult,

and only when sufficient number of data is produced to counter the existing notion can the

notion be changed. 49 The Aryan theory is an excellent example, as it was never really based

on evidences, but rather on a linguistic analysis misconstrued as an indicator of race.50 Yet it

was regarded as practically solid fact by a number of historians, and tied together with

Hegelian notions for the purposes of achieving a sense of justified superiority.

Further, biases and conceptions of facts can vary across communities, due to the position of

the historian in society. An extreme example of this is the Holocaust denial. The 1980s show

the rise of the historical conflict regarding the Holocaust. It was largely an issue of whether

46Marwick, supra note 27, at 241.

47See H.L. Boorman, Mao Tse-Tung as a Historian, (28) THE CHINA QUARTERLY, 82-105, (October-December

1966).48

C.B. McCullagh, THE TRUTH OF HISTORY, 110, (2003).49See B.C. Hurst, The Myth of Historical Evidence, 20(3) HISTORY AND THEORY, 278-290, (October 1981).

50See K. Dunlap, The Great Aryan Myth, 59(4) THE SCIENTIFIC MONTHLY, 296-300, (October 1944).


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and if so, how much Germany is to blame for the Holocaust.51 The conservatives wished to

either deny the abhorrence of the Nazi period, or to at least reduce its importance, or to blame

the Nazis as separate from the rest of Germans, or to compare it to other events, in order to

reduce its historical significance. It was claimed that many of the reports of atrocities were

exaggerated. However, the role of a particular historian, Friedrich Meinecke, who was fairly

respected in the community, must be focused on. In 1946, he published a paper attempting to

establish the genesis of Nazism, but he ignored the Holocaust entirely, which can only be

considered to be a deliberate omission. He wished to dissociate the German people and the

Nazis, but most Germans did support the Nazi rule, a fact he overlooked.52 Meinecke further

attempted to blame others actions as equally evil, but this does not allow the atrocities

committed by Germans to be considered acceptable. Habermas provides a justification, that

Germans feel immense guilt, and further wished to be dissociated from the crimes of their

parents. He criticises the proponents of the Holocaust Denial from understanding the role of

the Allies in stopping the Holocaust, another aspect overlooked. However, he goes on further,

to state that the Germans must face that part of their history which is negative, in order to

maintain their respect in the long run.53 Thus, we see two conflicting conceptions of facts

being argued simultaneously by two representatives of two opposing communities.

Thus, while it can be said that historical facts are historical descriptions justified as per thedesires and interests of a particular community, two major issues arise. If different

conceptions of historical facts are asserted by different communities, then how do certain

conceptions gain acceptance? This hoodwinking can only take place if there are certain

structures which allow for this to happen. This structures draw out from the intellectualism

that Chesneaux pointed out earlier- history is a discriminatory field of knowledge. This is

looked upon in the next chapter.

51

Weber, supra note 38.52Weber, supra note 38.

53Weber, supra note 38.


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CHAPTERTHREE

It must be clarified that it is not being said that histories are outright fabrications, but rather

they are distorted in favour of certain prejudices, and asserted as the truth.54 Sources cannot

be ignored in the establishment of facts, precluding pure invention from entering the domain

of acceptable histories. This does not safeguard one against historical facts being skewed in

their construction, however.

It has been safely concluded various communities create various skewed conceptions of

historical descriptions of events, in order to achieve some purpose.

This skewing in practice of explanation of historical events towards one side of the spectrum

is not an exceptional, neither an inexcusable choice by the historian. To make content

important is to ensure that it is memorable; importance ensures that the content is widely-

read.55 Thus, to make it interesting is to identify ones target audience correctly, which is

other historians, more so than the public.56 The desire of the historian is to create that

historical past from which he would want to descend from. He desires a utopian past to

reassure his position (and the position of the community he represents) in the present, and

thus, tries to construct such a past.57 Thus, the skewing of descriptions by historians

themselves is explainable, if not justified. However, the larger issue is the skewing of

historical descriptions by communities, as detailed out earlier. The issue with this is that such

skewing is more difficult to contest, due to the power structures created within a particular

community. Chesneaux argues how power structures supervise the knowledge base regarding

the past, from the sources themselves. Sources are destroyed or fabricated, and reality is

distorted as per the desires of the oppressive regime.58 He goes on to argue that facts are

manipulated to create histories favourable to those creating them. So while those in power

create histories that legitimize that position, those who are oppressed use history to empower

mass movements.59 He gives examples of aboriginal Indians of the United States, the French

54W. Thomson, supra note 29, at 161.

55See H. White as cited in Knight, supra note 16, at 594.

56Chesneaux, supra note 44, at 58-59.

57A. Easthope, Romancing the Stone: History-Writing and Rhetoric, 18(2) SOCIAL HISTORY, 235, 243, (May

1993).58Chesneaux, supra note 44, at 19.

59Chesneaux, supra note 44, at 25-28.


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Revolution and the struggle of Chinese peasants against feudalism to indicate this process of

struggle based on history.

Further, the aura of intellectualism allows historians to advocate a particular format of

education that must be learnt by new historians in order to become part of a particular

community. Jenkins states that the dominant discourse does not merely present facts as they

are, (as is usually claimed), but rather it is concerned with ensuring the perpetuity of its

dominance, by the transmission of a certain culture. To be accepted as part of that culture

involves the copying of those academics that constitute it.60G.J. Renier states that historical

knowledge is inherited by new historians as part of their education.61 This intellectualism thus

not only indoctrinates new historians, but also reinforces the intellectuals hold over history;

by doing so, historians help to keep the machine of existing society in operation.62

Chesneaux details out how the historians career of the researcher, the direction his material

and publications are to take is shaped entirely by the promotion mechanisms engrained within

the profession that manifests in the form of commercial control.63 To climb the pyramid, one

must play by the rules set by those at the top. Further, Chesneaux details out how these power

structures compartmentalize and control historical knowledge by indoctrinating new

historians in favour of their version of history. Subjects are chosen by those running the

educational institutions and certain specialised fields are incentivised by the recognition

given by the scholarly community.64 Thus, the existing systems label historians on the basis

of their work, thus preventing them from ever getting a holistic look at the historical field,

while also incentivising their compliance by promotions through the power mechanisms.

Chesneaux does recognise exceptions, but leaves them at that.65 He gives the example of

Charles Beard in the United States, who was boycotted by the power structures of the

historical community for thirty years; the power structure being those from the Ivy League.

Further, he states that the commercialisation of history has made historical knowledge a

market good, subject to its vagaries and the interests of the public. This capitalistic capture of

historical knowledge forces historians (most of them at least) to cater to populist demands,

60Jenkins, supra note 6, at 64.

61Renier, supra note 8, at 88.

62Chesneaux, supra note 44, at 54.

63

Chesneaux, supra note 44, at 55-7.64Chesneaux, supra note 44, at 59.

65Chesneaux, supea note 44, at 60.


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thus buying into the dominant order of the time.66 It is commercialisation and the power

structure that controls the historical community, and historical knowledge; peer review is not

so much peer as it is review by those in power. Ratification by those with reputations controls

the historical body of knowledge. Thus, we see that within a particular community, those

with influence are deemed so by their ability to represent the interests of that community;

further, these influential historians perpetuate that notion of history that serves those interests.

Language is a new basis on which historical facts are created in a skewed manner. As Roland

Barthes points out67, language and discourse play an important role in the creation of

historical facts, as well as the differences in their conceptions across various societies. He

states that facts are placed beyond the particular discourse and asserted as fixed standards that

can be used to validate theories within the discourse; however, historians often ignore the fact

that they placed that objective fact in the first place, as part of the discourse.68Thus, history

creates a conception of the reality that it seeks to write about, and presents its products as that

reality. This means that through language, history claims a notion of objectivity or truth that

is derived from facts that it is itself places there.

Here, Nietzsche comes in as he argues that truth as a notion was designed to advance

interests and interpretations that, within a cultural framework, favoured those in power.

Objective facts do not exist, as they do not exist outside of ones position, and outside of

interpretation. The facts thus cannot be the final standard of assessment, for they themselves

are descriptions existing within our framework of interpretation.69

Thus, the objectivity of facts is difficult to accept as it is due to the intellectualism and

consensus of the historical community that notions of facts are accepted as objective. In

actuality, those descriptions that are created by those dominant within the community are

extended as a truth.

However, there is a larger stage at which the skewing takes place along structures of

dominance, at the level of different communities, at the level of the discourse. Here,

Foucaults theory of power/knowledge comes into play. It describes the role of power in a

discourse and how knowledge both frames and is framed by the exercise and control over


67R. Barthes, The Discourse of History, 3 COMPARATIVE CRITICISM, available at

http://www.clas.ufl.edu/users/pcraddoc/barthes.htm (Last visited on May 20, 2013).68Barthes as cited in Jenkins, supra note 6, at 60.



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power. He even details out how this takes place by knowledge being internalised by the

oppressed, instead of it being imposed by them70. Although he has been criticised, his ideas

are difficult to completely ignore71, even if only Orwellian fears come to mind. For Foucault

history ratifies the exercise of power; Hayden White goes further to state that historical facts

are created from evidence by the exercise of power manifested in the form of figures of

speech.72 Foucaults notion of discourse extends it from being a language pattern, to it being

a regulatory tool that confines people to certain conceptions.73 Jenkins reinterpretation of

Skidelskys theory of position of historical facts applies here as well. Since different

discourses get placed differently in a continuous spectrum, the positioning of historians

according to certain places within a discourse remains contained within that discourse.74 Thus

a historians viewpoint that a particular fact is universally accepted cannot be applied beyond

the limits of his universe within his discourse. The ideological positioning of a historian

shapes his viewpoint and his position within a particular discourse, but it cannot extend to a

fixed position on the spectrum of history. This not only shows how objectivity is not possible,

but how it is through the exercise of power, not inherent truth or objectivity from facts, that

certain discursive practices become dominant.Further, Jenkins goes on to show how the

dominant discursive practices attempt to control those histories which they seek to reject,

either by incorporating them into the mainstream, thus reducing their oppositional nature

(which granted them the attention they needed), or by using the post-modern movement to

reject histories outright.75

However, these discursive practices are not absolute. Chesneaux points out how with

migration and the capitalistic order, the hegemony of the ruling classes over the history of the

concerned region is being challenged. Oppressed classes are rebelling against their

historically-justified oppression, such as the struggles by the Corsicans and Catalans in

France.76 Thus, the consensus based on power and reputation can be broken by rebellion.

Historical change does ultimately take place according to the change in dominant powers of

the time thus changing the waysin determining the role of interpretation and historical

creation in giving meaning to historical facts, but also in terms of the basic essential process

70Thomson, supra note 39, at 151.

71Thomson, supra note 39, at 154.

72A. Munslow, DECONSTRUCTING HISTORY, 184-7, (2

ndedition, 2006).

73Tosh, supra note 1, at 187,

74

Jenkins, supra note 6, at 44.75Jenkins, supra note 6, at 80.



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of forming historical facts themselves. Discourses are constantly in flux. 77 Different

communities also exist along which historical interpretations can fluctuate.

Thus, ultimately when we ask the question, what are historical facts, then the most theoretical

accurate definition is that historical facts are statements about the past, that are determined by

the historical community, whose validity is based upon acceptance by the majority of the

community, and thus are given meaning along the dominant discursive practices manifested

across different communities and thus these can be defined and redefined with changes in

discursive practices. Further, as a final reminder, objectivity can no longer be claimed from

facts.

Only two questions remain. What does this mean for history, and what replaces objectivity?

Consensus formation only provides us with an explanation of how facts arise, not how facts

are to be assessed. In his conclusion, the author hopes to answer these questions.

77M. Dobson and B. Ziemann in READING PRIMARY SOURCES, 12, (M. Dobson and B. Ziemann eds., 2009).


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CONCLUSION

Considering the impact of historians on public opinion78, it is only fair to expect

contemporary historians to dump the assertion of concrete historical facts, and express the

subjectivity contained within their work. With the dispersal of the myth of objectivity due to

this assertion being dumped, however, problems arise. However, Peter Novick provides a

solution. He the idea of objectivity being a myth ensuring that the subject of history has value

of cohesion79; there is no reason why historical facts cannot be considered to do the same for

its product- (what can crudely be considered to consist of) histories of various societal

factions- as well. However, instead of them being considered a myth, the historian suggests

that it is necessary to accept that historical facts are not absolute truths, but rather opinions

about events, to allow for change. Thus the legitimacy that is drawn from facts can be based

instead on belief in their occurrence, with recognition that it is belief. Sources still exist, and

can still be used to support facts (or rather beliefs); certain irrefutable facts like the fall of

Constantinople can instead be considered to be strongly supported beliefs. It is a question of

semantics, but an important one to break structures in society that base themselves on facts.

This questioning of facts asserted, and the change in their notion as beliefs can ensure more

sceptical decision-making based instead on ones values rather than on descriptions that are

impossible to ascertain for sure. Thus, by bringing in and recognising subjectivity, legitimacy

can be based on plausibility, while history can allow for people to question that plausibility.

What this means for history, is that firstly, it would provide greater leeway for making moral

judgements, a desirable goal in itself as per Barraclough.80 Further, Hurst says that once

evidence is recognised as (largely) fabrication, greater attention can be given to historys

ability to predict.81 Finally, Tosh provides a standard by which legitimacy of an identity can

be drawn by creating histories that appeal to members not associated with that identity, but

creating those histories which appeal to a larger class. 82 Drawing from Jenkins83, greater

legitimacy can be granted by those histories which can declare their biases and still cross

boundaries to gain acceptance from those outside their support base. This is the ultimate end-

78

Barraclough, supra note 37, at 1-4.79

P. Novick, THAT NOBLE DREAM, 10, (1988).80

Barraclough, supra note 37, at 4.81

See Hurst, supra note 49.82Tosh, supra note 1, at 197,

83Jenkins, supra note 6, at 77-84.


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goal in restating a historical fact as a historical plausibility. Thus, historians need not worry,

for they can continue to do history, such as collate sources, and write history 84, except with

the necessary recognition that everything is subject to change; power structures themselves

can change, as new descriptions espousing greater plausibility than existing ones arise. This

will hopefully make history a more accepting discourse.

84Dobson and Ziemann, supra note 77, at 14.

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