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Exploit Intelligence Project
Intel-driven case study from 2011 How do we use intel to mitigate a threat? What are optimal defenses for mass malware? How do crimepacks acquire exploits? Is security research being applied by
crimepack authors?
Separate what could happen from what is happening
Clear Market Leaders
NeoSp
loit
Phoe
nix
CRiMEP
ACK
Liber
ty
Web
Attack
er
Eleo
nore
Frag
us
Sibe
ria
JustEx
ploit
Bleed
ing
Life
SEO E
xploit
Kit
Zombie
Gpack
Phoe
nix
Uniqu
e
Nuclear YE
S
Chine
se
Liber
ty
Luck
y
Needle
Nuclear
Drago
n
I-Wor
m -
Kitro
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
# o
f M
alici
ou
s U
RLs
Low Quality Exploits
Memory Corruption (19)
Defeated by DEP 14
Defeated by ASLR 17
Defeated by EMET 19
Logic Flaws (8)
No Java in Internet Zone 4
No EXEs in PDFs 1
No Firefox or FoxIt Reader 2
Developed Elsewhere
DEP Bypasses (5)
Developed by APT 3
Developed by Whitehats 2
Developed by Malware Authors 0
Logic Flaws (8)
Discovered by APT 0
Discovered by Whitehats 8
Discovered by Malware Authors
0
Java is a Path Forward
Malicious
HTML
GoogleChrome
IE8DEP/ASLR
Bypass
DEP/ASLR
Bypass
Sandbox Escape
Integrity Escalatio
n
Java
Shell
Derived Optimal Defenses
Recommended to defend against crimepacks in 2011:1. Enable DEP on browser and plugins
2. Remove Java from Internet Zone
3. Secure Adobe Reader configuration
4. Use EMET when possible / where needed
Then, continue to monitor threat intel for changes…
Crimepacks in 2013
Standard desktop builds use DEP/ASLR/Sandboxes 2009: Windows XP, IE7, Flash 9, Office 2007,
Java 6 2013: Windows 7, IE9, Flash 11, Office 2010,
Java 7
Blackhole / Cool, Sweet Orange, and Gong Da Have these kits invested in bypassing our new
defenses? How have crimeware packs dealt with the
pressure?
The World is Changing
2011
-01
2011
-04
2011
-07
2011
-10
2012
-01
2012
-04
2012
-07
2012
-10
2013
-01
2013
-04
2013
-07
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
IE 6.0IE 7.0IE 8.0IE 9.0IE 10.0
Source: StatCounter January 2011 – August 2013 Browser Versions
Exploit Origins
VUPEN Blog ArticlesAPT CampaignsSecurity Researchers
• All memory corruption exploits came from APT campaigns or the VUPEN blog.
• All Java exploits came from security researchers:• Jeroen Frijters
• TELUS Security Labs
• Adam Gowdiak (Security Explorations)
• Stefan Cornellius
• Sami Koivu via ZDI
• Michael Schierl via ZDI
• “Whitehats Shrugged”
IE / FlashJava
Cool Exploit Kit
Premium version of Blackhole, by the same author Launched a $100k bug bounty for improved exploits Only offered as a hosted service to prevent source leaks
As a result, Cool has several unique exploits: CVE-2011-3402: Windows Kernel TTF font (Duqu) CVE-2012-1876: IE 9 (VUPEN Pwn2Own) CVE-2012-0775: Reader 9/10 (self-developed?)
No privesc included for these targets, relies on payload
How did we stack up?
DEP, remove Java, secure Reader, EMET as necessary Safe from all but TTF font exploit w/o patching!
Systems being deployed now w/o Java are out of reach Win7, IE9, Reader X, EMET as necessary
Mixed messages coming from this data Success! We have pushed crimepacks to the margins Warning! It is easy to predict if you will get owned
Aurora et al.
Highly regarded technical capabilities Prolific developers of zero-day exploits Original source for many crimepack exploits Pioneered “watering hole” attack campaigns Notable for successful compromises of Google,
Bit9
Continues to cross paths with Trail of Bits Exploit profiled in Assured Exploitation Elderwood Exploit Kit dissection and analysis
Elderwood
Think, a “startup” for Aurora to invest in Developed several reusable vuln disc / exploit tools Requires less-skilled people to operate the tools Launch zero-day watering holes on a regular basis
Released new attacks every ~3 months in 2011/2012 4 Internet Explorer, 5 Adobe Flash zero-days Dozens of prominent websites compromised (CFR)
Quality Exploits?
Elderwood
50% of the time
Flash, Java, and Officeplugins available
Internet Explorer 8
All Computers
Modest exploit mitigations are surprisingly effective!
It’s Easy to Get Better
Elderwood NYU-Poly Davis
Plugins Required
Flash, Office, Java
.NET None
Version Support
IE8 / Win XP IE8 / Win7 IE9 / Win7
Reliability ~50% ~95% ~99%
Features Hardcoded ROP Hardcoded ROP
Dynamic ROP
Time to Develop
? (probably 8 hrs)
~5 days ~10 days
Experience Professional Amateur Amateur
Reality
RSA – phishing email with malicious Excel doc Exploited Flash vuln no longer viable in IE
Google – IE6 in remote office to total control of Gmail They found the ONE guy in Google using IE6
Amateurs push as hard as they can. Professionals push as hard as they have to. Rapid discovery and shift to low cost attack
vectors
APT Discoveries
Maybe we should try to make protections that cannot be bypassed by CS undergrads with 40 hrs of training?
We need to push harder since the professional bad guys can own things without caring about mitigations
APT can get better, we know they will, but is it prudent not to act just because you know they will respond?
Variety of Approaches
Drag picture to placeholder or click icon to add
or “An APT breached my network despite my $750,000 IPS and $2,000,000 SIEM. What other vendor products should I buy to
protect myself?” –Jerkface
Phishing Resistance
“99% of the security breaches it investigated in 2012 started with a targeted spearphishing attack.” –Mandiant
“If you go from 35 to 12% on fire, you’re still on fire.” –Zane Lackey
Final Conclusions
Let’s make defenses that bored undergrads can’t take out in one semester, that would be cool!
Let’s build things that help understand your adversary’s capability and intent.
Let’s use the defenses we have. They work, and they work against the people you care about.
Thanks Andrew Ruef and Hal Brodigan!
References
Contagio: An Overview of Exploit Packs http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/
2010/06/overview-of-exploit-packs-update.html
Elderwood Kit Analysis http://blog.trailofbits.com/2013/05/13/elderwood-a
nd-the-department-of-labor-hack/
Detecting Targeted Malicious Email http://papers.rohanamin.com/wp-content/uploads/
papers.rohanamin.com/2010/11/Amin2011-dissertation.pdf