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Introduction to Immunity &
Susceptibility
Randy J. Jost, Ph. D.
August 3, 2014
MO-AM-1
Overview
• Description of Immunity & Susceptibility
• Source of unwanted signals
– Electromagnetic Environment
– RF and transient immunity issues
• Path of unwanted signals
– Conducted signals
– Radiated signals
• Victims of unwanted signals
• Mitigation Strategies
• Electrostatic discharge (ESD)
• Summary
What is Electromagnetic Compatibility?
• Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) is the ability
of an electronic system to
– Function properly in its intended Electromagnetic
Environment (EME)
– Not be a source of interference to other systems in
that (or any other) Electromagnetic Environment
• Based on the above, EMC has two major
components
– Susceptibility / Immunity
– Emission control
• Conducted Emissions
• Radiated Emissions
Electromagnetic Environment
What is Electromagnetic Compatibility?
Source (Transmitter) => Path => Victim (Receiver)
Immunity / Susceptibility
• Immunity is the ability of a system or device (the receiver or victim equipment) to operate correctly in the presence of electromagnetic emissions in all designed for electromagnetic environments.
• Immunity and susceptibility are opposites -equipment which has high immunity has low susceptibility, and vice versa.
• The goal of EMC design is to develop a system which has high immunity, as well as low or no emissions, except for those intended to be emitted.
• Good system design and good EMC design are two sides of the design coin.
Understanding Immunity/Susceptibility
• The easiest way to understand the concepts of
Immunity/Susceptibility is to start with the
traditional EMC model:
Source => Path => Victim
• Your guiding thought should be “follow the
electrons (or fields)”
• You must follow ALL the electrons (fields)
– Not just the ones you wanted
– Not just the ones you put there intentionally
– Not just the ones you know about
SOURCES
• There are many sources of unwanted energy
– Sources external to the system, equipment or devices (victim)
– Sources internal to the system, equipment or devices (victim)
• The totality of these electromagnetic emissions are called the Electromagnetic Environment (EME)
• The impact of the electromagnetic environment on systems, equipment or devices is called Electromagnetic Environment Effects (E3)
SOURCES
• 4.124 environment, electromagnetic.
(1) The time distribution of the levels of power,
voltage(s),current(s), and electric and magnetic field(s),
within various frequency ranges, of the conducted and
radiated electromagnetic emissions that may be
encountered in the environment of a system or
subsystem when performing its assigned mission.
(2) The totality of electromagnetic phenomena existing at a
given location. (IEC 50(161)(1990) [7]) (NATO [15])
ANSI C63.14-1992 American National Standard Dictionary for Technologies of Electromagnetic
Compatibility (EMC), Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) , and Electrostatic Discharge (ESD)
SOURCES
• 4.102 electromagnetic environment effects (E3). The impact of the electromagnetic environment upon
the operational capability of electronic or electrical
systems, equipment, or devices. It encompasses all
electromagnetic disciplines, including electromagnetic
compatibility; electromagnetic interference;
electromagnetic vulnerability; electromagnetic pulse;
electronic countermeasures; hazards of electromagnetic
radiation to ordnance and volatile materials; and natural
phenomena effects of lightning and precipitation static
(p-static). (NATO [15])
ANSI C63.14-1992 American National Standard Dictionary for Technologies of Electromagnetic
Compatibility (EMC), Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) , and Electrostatic Discharge (ESD)
SOURCES
• Practical definition of EME
– The measureable electromagnetic field(s) that
exist within a definable region(s) where
equipment or systems must operate, either
individually or in conjunction with other
equipment or systems
– Note that an electromagnetic environment may
be composed of several sources of
electromagnetic fields depending upon the
specific quantities measured
SOURCES
• Electromagnetic Environments can be characterized in many ways.
• One way to look at them is to subdivide them into two major location categories:
– Interior or Indoor
– Exterior or Outdoor
• In a similar fashion, noise sources can be subdivided into two major categories:
– Natural Noise Sources
– Man-made Noise Sources
• Immunity evaluation must take into account all relevant combinations of noise and location
Interior/Indoor Environment Regions
• Residential
• Industrial
• “Special” Cases (examples)
– Shielded room, anechoic
– Shielded room, non-anechoic
– Hospitals and Medical Centers
– High background situations
Environment Regions – Indoors
Source: http://www.ets-lindgren.com/page/?i=iSeries-71
Source: http://www.ets-lindgren.com/page/?i=MicrowaveChambers
Source: http://www.dundee.ac.uk/medther/tayendoweb/images/mriscnr.jpg
Exterior/Outdoor Environment Regions
• Rural
• Suburban
• Urban
• “Special” Cases (examples)
– Open Area Test Sites (OATS)
– High background situations
• High Voltage Substations and Switch Yards
• Airports, Military Bases, Aircraft Carriers
Environment Regions – Outdoors
http://www.npl.co.uk/electromagnetics/rf-microwave/products-
and-services/test-site-evaluation
http://www.teseq.com/com/en/products_solutions/systems/
chamber_calibration/chamber_calibration_reader.php
Environment Regions – Outdoors
http://205.243.100.155/frames/500_kV_Switch1.jpg
http://205.243.100.155/frames/B-1196 switching failure.JPG
Westfield Shoppingtown Office Tower at Doncaster, Victoria.
Environment Regions – Outdoors – AirportsTypical airport comm./nav. spectrum usage:
Communication
VHF: 118-137 MHz
UHF: 243-380 MHz
Marker Beacon
75 MHz
Non-Directional Beacon (NDB)
190-530 kHz
1600-1800 kHz
Instrument Landing System (ILS)
Localizer: 108.1-111.95 MHz
Glide Slope: 329.15-335.0 MHz
VHF Omnidirectional Range (VOR)
108.0-117.95 MHz
Distance Measuring Equipment (DME)
Ground: 962-1213 MHz
Air: 1025-1150 MHz
Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN)
Ground: 960-1215 MHz
Air: 1023-1152 MHz
One location can have very many frequencies to deal with
Environment Regions – Outdoors – Airports
http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2005/10/13/new_antenna_ends_radar_errors_at_logan/
Typical aviation radar spectrum usage:
L Band
Secondary Surveillance Radar – 1030-1090 MH
Long Range Surveillance Radar – 1240-1370 MHz
S Band
Primary Surveillance Radar – 2700-2900 MHz
NEXRAD WX Radar – 2700-3000 MHz
C Band
Radar Altimeter – 4200-4400 MHz
Airborne WX Radar – 5350-5470 MHz
Terminal Doppler WX Radar – 5600-5650 MHz
X Band
Airborne WX Radar – 8750-8850 MHz
Surface Detection Radar – 9.0-9.2 GHz
Precision Approach Radar – 9.0-9.2 GHz
Airborne WX Radar – 9300-9500 MHz
Ku Band
WX Radar – 13.25-13.4 GHz
Surface Detection Radar – 15.7-16.2 GHz
One location can have very many frequencies to deal with
The Natural Electromagnetic Environment
• The Natural Electromagnetic Environment
– Natural Noise Sources
– Effects of Natural Noise on System Performance
• Man-made EM Noise Sources
– Noise Sources
– Effects of Man-made Noise on System Performance
The Natural Electromagnetic Environment
• The Natural Electromagnetic Environment
– Natural Noise Sources
• Terrestrial Sources
• Celestial Sources
– Effects of Natural Noise on System Performance
• Man-made EM Noise Sources
– Noise Sources
– Effects of Man-made Noise on System Performance
The Natural Electromagnetic Environment
• The Natural Electromagnetic Environment
– Natural Noise Sources
• Terrestrial sources
– Lightning discharges
– Emissions from atmospheric gases
– Ground and other obstructions within the main beam of
antennas
Source: http://www.uwec.edu/jolhm/EH3/Group2/Pictures/lightning.jpg Source: http://apod.nasa.gov/apod/image/0603/aurora_andreassen_big.jpg
Source: http://apod.nasa.gov/apod/ap140420.html
The Natural Electromagnetic Environment
Natural Noise from 0.1 Hz to 10 kHz
The Natural Electromagnetic Environment
Natural Noise from 10 kHz to 100 MHz
The Natural Electromagnetic Environment
Natural Noise from 100 MHz to 100 GHz
The Natural Electromagnetic Environment
• The Natural Electromagnetic Environment
– Natural Noise Sources
– Effects of Natural Noise on System Performance
• Elevation of the noise floor
• Reduced receiver sensitivity
• In severe cases, can damage measurement systems or
the system under consideration
• Man-made EM Noise Sources
– Noise Sources
– Effects of Man-made Noise on System
Performance
The Man-made Electromagnetic Environment
• The Natural Electromagnetic Environment
– Natural Noise Sources
– Effects of Natural Noise on System Performance
• Man-made EM Noise Sources
– Noise Sources
• Unintentional Emissions of EM Energy
• Intentional Emissions of EM Energy
– Gaussian or white noise
– Impulsive noise
– Transient noise
– Effects of Man-made Noise on System Performance
The Man-made Electromagnetic Environment
• Man-made EM Noise Sources
– Noise Sources
• Many types of man-made noise/signal for many reasons
– Characterize by “Reason”
• Unintentional Emissions of EM Energy
• Intentional Emissions of EM Energy
– Characterize by Type
• System Generated Signals
• Gaussian or white noise
• Impulsive noise
• Transient noise
Transient Signals – EMP• Actual waveform dependent upon many
factors
• High-Altitude Burst EMP
• Low-Altitude Burst EMP
• Surface Burst EMP
• MHD EMP
• System Generated EMP (SGEMP)
• Internal Generated EMP (IEMP)
• Characterized as “double exponential”
waveform
• For analysis construct a generalized high-
altitude EMP electric- and magnetic-field
time waveform.
• Short rise time (High Freq. Content)
• Long fall time (Low Freq. Content)
• Large amplitude in generation
region
( ) ( ) ( )4 6 85.25 10 exp 4 10 exp 4.76 10 V
E t x x t x tm
= − − −
Typical Parameter Values
Peak value: 50 kV/m
Trise_10-90%: 5 nsec
Tfall_50%: 200 nsec
Transient Signals – EMP
High-altitude EMP spectrum and
normalized energy density spectrum
( )( ) ( )
13
6 8
2.47 10 sec
4 10 4.76 10
x VE
mj x j xω
ω ω
− =
+ +
While both lightning and EMP are
transient phenomena, they have
distinctly different responses.
Transient Signals – Lightning• Strike instantaneous currents range from 2
kA to 200 kA
• Typical strikes have 18kA – 20 kA of current
Lightning Frequency Spectrum
• According to NASA Technical
Memorandum 87788, the lightning strike
spectrum has substantial content up to 300
MHz
• Comparison of frequency spectra of a
lightning current surge (blue – according to
K Berger) and a test current surge of
10/350 µs (red – according to IEC 61312-1)
The Man-made Electromagnetic Environment
• The Natural Electromagnetic Environment
– Natural Noise Sources
– Effects of Natural Noise on System Performance
• Man-made EM Noise Sources
– Noise Sources
– Effects of Man-made Noise on System
Performance
• Elevation of the noise floor
• Reduced receiver sensitivity
• In severe cases, can damage measurement systems or
the system under consideration
Effect of Man-made Noise: Aircraft Carrier
Apertures
Sources
Receivers (victims)
Effect of Man-made Noise: Aircraft Carrier
USS Enterprise (CV-65)14 January 1969
Massive fire started when a Zuni rocket
accidentally exploded under the wing of an
F-4.
Losses totaled 28 dead, 343 wounded, and
15 aircraft destroyed. Required 3 months for
repairs, primarily to flight deck armor plating
USS Forrestal (CV-59)29 July 1967
Caused by the “self-firing” of a Zuni missile
134 Dead, 161 injured, 21 aircraft stricken
from inventory; Required almost 7 months
for repairs. Cost to US Navy - $72 Million
Path
• Signal/Energy Paths often considered to be
due to radiation or conduction.
• In all day-to-day situations, you will always
have both paths to deal with
– One or the other may dominate in certain regions
of the device, system or external environment
– Maximum immunity achieved when both
addressed
Propagation Path - Radiated
• Signals may be propagated over short or long distances.
• Distances should be thought of in wavelengths
• For long distance propagation (far-field), interfering signals may be attenuated (reduced) enough to be a non-issue.
• Short range propagation (near-field) is another matter
• Sufficient attenuation may only be achieved by adding appropriate absorbers or shielding.
Propagation Path - Radiated
• Far-field propagation (long distance - many λ’s)
– Fields will decrease from source as 1/r
– Need to consider multipath and blockage
• Near-field propagation (short distance - few λ’s)
– Fields contain 1/r2 & 1/r3 terms
– Certain assumptions that are used in the far field are
NOT valid in the near field
Far Field vs. Near Field
Source: Capps, C., “Near field or far field?”,EDN, pp 95-102, August 16, 2001.
(((( )))) j ro
2 2 3
kI 1 1 1 VE j sin e
4 r jkr k r m
ββββθθθθ η θη θη θη θ
ππππ−−−−
= + −= + −= + −= + −
llll
(((( )))) jkro
2
kI 1 1 AH j sin e
4 r jkr mφφφφ θθθθ
ππππ−−−−
= += += += +
llll
(((( )))) j ro
r 2
I 1 1 VE cos e
2 jkr r m
ββββη θη θη θη θππππ
−−−− = += += += +
llll
Fields from an infinitesimal dipole antenna
2 2k ω µεω µεω µεω µε====
119.9169832
120
376.730313...
µµµµηηηη
εεεε
π Ωπ Ωπ Ωπ Ω
π Ωπ Ωπ Ωπ Ω
ΩΩΩΩ
====
====
≈≈≈≈
≈≈≈≈
length of dipole
radius of dipole
( )
a ( a )
λλλλ
λλλλ
====
====
l l l l l l l l
Far Field vs. Near Field
Source: Capps, C., “Near field or far field?”,EDN, pp 95-102, August 16, 2001.
Rayleigh criterion for path difference: phase error of 1/16 of wavelength
Atmospheric Attenuation
VICTIM
• Victim is any system that has paths into it for transferring unwanted energy into the system or has operational vulnerabilities due to lack of robust design.
– Conductive Paths
• Lines through penetrations
• Existing lines in system
– Radiated (Energy) Paths
• Apertures/Holes
• Antennas – Intentional and unintentional
– Operational Vulnerabilities
• Low “margins/tolerances”
• Lack of error checking and correction
Interference – Standards
• With regards to “standards”, there are two
types to be aware of
– HOW to measure emissions, radiated or
conducted
• Example: ANSI C63.4 (American National Standard for
Methods of Measurement of Radio Noise Emissions
from Low-Voltage Electrical and Electronic Equipment
in the Range of 9 kHz to 40 GHz)
– WHAT the limits are, radiated or conducted
• Example: FCC Part 15
• Example: CISPR 22
Interference – Standards
CISPR Class A Conducted EMI Limit
Frequency of Emission
(MHz)
Conducted Limit (dBμV)
Quasi-peak Average
0.15 - 0.50 79 66
0.50 - 30.0 73 60
CISPR Class B Conducted EMI Limit
Frequency of Emission
(MHz)
Conducted Limit (dBμV)
Quasi-peak Average
0.15 - 0.50 66 to 56* 56 to 46*
0.50 - 5.00 56 46
5.00 - 30.0 60 50
CISPR Class A 10-Meter Radiated EMI Limit
Frequency of Emission
(MHz)Field Strength Limit (dBμV/m)
30 - 88 39
88 - 216 43.5
216 - 960 46.5
above 960 49.5
CISPR Class B 3-Meter Radiated EMI Limit
Frequency of Emission
(MHz)Field Strength Limit (dBμV/m)
30 - 88 40
88 - 216 43.5
216 - 960 46.0
above 960 54.0
*Decreases with the logarithm of the frequency.
Field strength limits for conducted and radiated emissions
FCC Class A Conducted EMI Limit
Frequency of Emission
(MHz)Conducted Limit (μV)
0.45 - 1.6 1000
1.6 - 30.0 3000
FCC Class B Conducted EMI Limit
Frequency of Emission
(MHz)Conducted Limit (μV)
0.455 - 1.6 250
1.6 - 30.0 250
FCC Class B 3-Meter Radiated EMI Limit
Frequency of Emission
(MHz)Field Strength Limit (μV/m)
30 - 88 100
88 - 216 150
216 - 1000 200
above 1000 200
FCC Class A 30-Meter Radiated EMI Limit
Frequency of Emission
(MHz)Field Strength Limit (μV/m)
30 - 88 30
88 - 216 50
216 - 1000 70
above 1000 70
Interference – Conducted Signals
• Common Mode Signals
• Differential Mode Signals
• Power Lines
• Control Lines
• Signal Lines
– Analog
– Digital
Interference – Conducted Signals
• Common Mode Signals
• Differential Mode Signals
Decomposition of the currents on a two-
wire transmission line into common-mode,
IC, and differential-mode, ID, components.
I1 = IC + ID
I2 = IC – ID
ID = ½(I1 –I2)
IC = ½(I1 + I2)
Susceptibility Mitigation
• Must consider both radiated and conducted
signals
Illustration of the relative radiated emission potential of (a) differential-mode currents and
(b) common-mode currents. Notice that common-mode currents are the most likely
source of radiated electric fields. Also, a small common-mode current can produce the
same level of radiated electric field as a much larger value of differential-mode current.
Mitigation of Radiated Signals• Design Strategies
– Enclosures
– Location (Distance)• Near Field
• Far Field
• Eliminate Unwanted Antennas
• Eliminate Unneeded Apertures / Holes
• Shielding
• Filtering– RF Filters
– Chokes
• Attenuation by Materials– Absorbers
– Gaskets
Mitigation of Radiated Signals – Shielding
• Shielding Against Conducted Coupling
• Shielding Against Radiated Coupling
• Shielding Against Static/Quasi-static Electric Fields
• Shielding Against Static/Quasi-static Magnetic Fields
• See Dr. Todd Hubing’s Fundamentals presentations on Grounding and on Shielding for detailed explanations
Mitigation of Radiated Signals – Shielding
Yes, there is such a thing as too much shielding …
Mitigation of Conducted Signals
• Design Strategies
• Transient Voltage/Overvoltage Suppression
Devices (TVS/OVS)
• Filters
• Ferrites
• Line Impedance Stabilization Networks (LISN)
Impedance of AC Power Line
• Plot of minimum and
maximum impedance of the
115-V AC power line.
• Based on measurements
from 36 unfiltered
commercial AC power lines at
different locations across the
US.
• Impedance values range from
approximately 2 to 450 Ω.
• This widely varying
impedance makes consistent,
repeated conducted
emissions tests very difficult
Mitigation of Conducted Signals - LISN
• Line Impedance Stabilization Networks (LISN)
• Used when testing products (DUT) to see if they meet conducted emissions requirements
• LISNs have several purposes:
– Provides a known, stable, and reasonable impedance to the DUT from the power line over the frequency range of the conducted emission test (150 kHz – 30 MHz)
– Filters or suppresses noise from the power line so that it does not interfere with the measurement of the conducted emissions due to the DUT
– Provides a port for the measurement of the conducted emissions from the product
– Provides 60 (or 50) Hz power to the product under test
Electrostatic Discharge (ESD)• ESD is an example of the complete spectrum of
conducted & radiated susceptibility/immunity
• However, ESD is more than just EMI. It is EMI plus direct charge injection into the victim equipment
• ESD events can be as large as lightning or as small as a spark from finger to door knob or equipment knob
• Sudden flow of electrons between two objects caused by contact or an electrical short
Electrostatic Discharge (ESD)
• Causes of ESD include static electricity and
electrostatic induction
• Creation of static electricity and subsequent
ESD event can be considered a three-step
process:
– A charge is generated on an insulator
– Charge is transferred onto a conductor by contact
or induction
– The charged conductor comes near an object and a
discharge occurs.
Electrostatic Discharge (ESD)• Understanding charge
transfer is key to understanding ESD
• Charge transfer depends on many things– Materials involved
– Humidity & Temp.
– Existing E fields
• Triboelectric Series helps understand charge transfer (not the same as the Galvanic Series)
• Separation of materials in the series does notnecessarily indicate magnitude of charge created
Order in the series and magnitude of the charges are
dependent upon the properties of the substance, but
these properties are modified by factors such as
purity, ambient conditions, pressure of contact,
speed of rubbing or separation and the contact area
over which the rubbing occurs. [MIL-HDBK-263B, p.
24-25]
Electrostatic Discharge (ESD)
Simple model of human body ESD
In MIL-STD-883G the charged human
body is modeled by a 100 pF capacitor
and a 1500 Ω discharging resistance
Mitigation of the ESD Event
• There are essentially three approaches for
preventing problems caused by an ESD event:
– Prevent the occurrence of the ESD event
– Prevent or reduce the coupling (conduction or
radiation) to the electronic circuitry of the product
(create hardware immunity)
– Improve (or add) inherent immunity to the ESD
event in the electronic circuitry through more
robust software (create software immunity)
Summary
• Immunity/Susceptibility best understood using
the EMC triad of source, path, victim
• Select/Control the EME to minimize unwanted
signals
• Use good EMC design principles to minimize
signals, path and victim issues
• Mitigation can be done to each part of the EMC
triad
• Pick solution approaches that are robust enough
to deal with changes in the EMC triad
References
• Bogatin, E., Signal Integrity – Simplified,
Pearson Education, Inc., Upper Saddle River,
NJ, 2004.
• Duff, W., Designing Electronic Systems for
EMC, SciTech Publishing, Inc., Raleigh, NC,
2011.
• Kaiser, K., Electromagnetic Compatibility
Handbook, CRC Press, Boca Raton, FL, 2005
References
• Morrison, R., Grounding and Shielding: Circuits and Interference, 5th ed., John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Hoboken, New Jersey, 2007.
• NTIA, US Dept. of Commerce, Manual of Regulations and Procedures for Federal Radio Frequency Management, May 2013.
• Ott, H., Electromagnetic Compatibility Engineering, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Hoboken, NJ, 2009.
• Paul, C., Introduction to Electromagnetic Compatibility, 2nd ed., John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Hoboken, NJ, 2006.
Standards for Spectrum/EME
Measurement & Characterization
• Example Standards and References– IEEE 473-1985: IEEE Recommended Practice for an
Electromagnetic Site Survey (10 kHz to 10 GHz) [13 December 1985, reaffirmed 6 May 1992, administratively withdrawn 3 February 2006].
– ANSI/IEEE C63.4-2009: American National Standard for Methods of Measurement of Radio-Noise Emissions from Low-Voltage Electrical and Electronic Equipment in the Range of 9 kHz to 40 GHz
– IEC 61000 family• IEC/TR 61000-2-1, Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) - Part 2:
Environment - Section 1: Description of the environment -Electromagnetic environment for low-frequency conducted disturbances and signalling in public power supply systems
• IEC/TR 61000-2-3, Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) - Part 2: Environment - Section 3: Description of the environment -Radiated and non-network-frequency-related conducted phenomena
• Standards– CISPR 11, Industrial, scientific and medical (ISM) radio-frequency
equipment - Electromagnetic disturbance characteristics - Limits and methods of measurement.
– CISPR 16-1, Specification for radio disturbance and immunity measurement apparatus and methods - Part 1: Radio disturbance and immunity measuring apparatus
– CISPR 16-2, Specification for radio disturbance and immunity measurement apparatus and methods - Part 2: Methods of measurement of disturbances and immunity
– CISPR 16-3, Specification for radio disturbance and immunity measurement apparatus and methods - Part 3: Reports and recommendations of CISPR
– CISPR 16-4, Part 4-1: Uncertainties, statistics and limit modeling —Uncertainties in standardized EMC tests
– CISPR 22, Information technology equipment - Radio disturbance characteristics - Limits and methods of measurement
– CISPR 24, Information technology equipment - Immunity characteristics - Limits and methods of measurement.
Standards for Spectrum/EME
Measurement & Characterization