Introduction The Epistemology of testimony The novice/expert … · 2014. 11. 10. · Introduction The Epistemology of testimony The novice/expert problem Reductionism versus non

IntroductionThe Epistemology of testimony

The novice/expert problem

Introduction to Social Epistemology

Carlotta Pavese

11.18.14

Carlotta Pavese Introduction to Social Epistemology

Outline

Introduction

The Epistemology of testimony

Outline

Introduction

Social epistemology versus traditionalepistemology

I Traditional epistemology is a “highly theoretical andabstract enterprise”.

I Traditional epistemologists rarely present theirdeliberations as critical to the practical problems oflife . . . ;

I Skeptical problems themselves are really distant fromeveryday practical concerns.

I However some issues in epistemology are indeed ofpractical importance.

I Social epistemology addresses some issues ofpractical importance, such as the problem oftestimony and the novices/experts.

I However some issues in epistemology are indeed ofpractical importance.

I Social epistemology addresses some issues ofpractical importance, such as the problem oftestimony and the novices/experts.

Reductionism versus non reductionismLiberalism versus conservatism

Outline

Introduction

Related Issues: the epistemology oftestimony

I Is one ever justified in relying on somebody’stestimony?

I If so, why so?I If we are justified, what makes us justified?

I If so, why so?

I If we are justified, what makes us justified?

I If so, why so?I If we are justified, what makes us justified?

Outline

The Epistemology of testimonyReductionism versus non reductionismLiberalism versus conservatism

I The most prominent debate in the epistemology oftestimony is between “reductionism” and“non-reductionism,” terms due to Coady 1973.

I The earliest clear statements of these positionsappear in David Hume and Thomas Reid.

I The most prominent debate in the epistemology oftestimony is between “reductionism” and“non-reductionism,” terms due to Coady 1973.

I The earliest clear statements of these positionsappear in David Hume and Thomas Reid.

Hume on reductionism

There is no species of reasoning more common,more useful, and more necessary to human life,than that which is derived from the testimony ofmen, and the reports of eye-witnesses andspectators. . . . Our assurance in any argumentof this kind is derived from no other principle thanour observation of the veracity of humantestimony, and of the usual conformity of facts tothe reports of witnesses. (Hume 1748, section X,at 74.)

Reductionism about epistemology

I Hume’s picture is that we properly form beliefs basedon testimony only because we have seen otherconfirmed instances.

I Testimonially-based justification is therefore reducibleto a combination of perceptually-, memorially-, andinferentially-based justification.

I But is it plausible that we are justified in acceptingtestimony in virtue of past confirmed instances?

Objection to reductionism

I What about children (Reid)?

I It seems that they properly trust others even whenthey lack any past inductive basis in their experience:

I What about children (Reid)?I It seems that they properly trust others even when

they lack any past inductive basis in their experience:

If credulity were the effect of reasoning andexperience, it must grow up and gather strength,in the same proportion as reason and experiencedo. But, if it is the gift of Nature, it will bestrongest in childhood, and limited andrestrained by experience; and the mostsuperficial view of human nature shews, that thelast is really the case, and not the first. . . .Nature intends that our belief should be guidedby the authority and reason of others before itcan be guided by our own reason. (Reid 1764,chapter 6, section 24, at 96.)

Anti-reductionism

I Reid suggests that we have an innate faculty,unconfirmed by personally-observed earlierinstances, which properly causes us to trust thosewho testify.

I Testimonially-based justification flows from thereliability of this faculty, and so it is not reducible toperceptually- and inferentially-based justification.

Anti-reductionism

I Reid suggests that we have an innate faculty,unconfirmed by personally-observed earlierinstances, which properly causes us to trust thosewho testify.

I Testimonially-based justification flows from thereliability of this faculty, and so it is not reducible toperceptually- and inferentially-based justification.

Anti-reductionism

I Another way to characterize disputes overtestimonially-based beliefs is to ask to what extenttestimonially-based justification is analogous toperceptually-based justification.

I The Humean-reductionist tradition sees strongdisanalogies, while the Reidian-non-reductionisttradition sees a strong analogy between the sources.

Anti-reductionism

I Another way to characterize disputes overtestimonially-based beliefs is to ask to what extenttestimonially-based justification is analogous toperceptually-based justification.

I The Humean-reductionist tradition sees strongdisanalogies, while the Reidian-non-reductionisttradition sees a strong analogy between the sources.

Outline

The Epistemology of testimonyReductionism versus non reductionismLiberalism versus conservatism

Another debate

I Another debate in the epistemology of testimony hasto do with what it takes to get a justified belief (orknowledge) through testimony.

I Conservatives are more demanding and dispensetestimonially-based epistemic honors moreconservatively.

Another debate

I Another debate in the epistemology of testimony hasto do with what it takes to get a justified belief (orknowledge) through testimony.

I Conservatives are more demanding and dispensetestimonially-based epistemic honors moreconservatively.

Liberalism: The ‘blind trust’ position

I Some people (Burge, Foley) think that the bareassertion of a claim by a speaker gives the hearer aprima facie reason to accept it, quite independently ofanything the hearer might know or justifiably believeabout the speaker’s abilities, circumstances andopportunity to have acquired that piece ofinformation.

I According to this position, one is “prima facie” entitledto accept as true something that is presented as trueand that is intelligible to him, unless there arestronger reasons not to.

Liberalism: The ‘blind trust’ position

I Some people (Burge, Foley) think that the bareassertion of a claim by a speaker gives the hearer aprima facie reason to accept it, quite independently ofanything the hearer might know or justifiably believeabout the speaker’s abilities, circumstances andopportunity to have acquired that piece ofinformation.

I According to this position, one is “prima facie” entitledto accept as true something that is presented as trueand that is intelligible to him, unless there arestronger reasons not to.

The ‘blind trust’ position

I How plausible is this position?

I It is important to distinguish between prima facie andultima facie justification by testimony.

I Foley and Burge are interested in the prima faciepart.

I How plausible is this position?I It is important to distinguish between prima facie and

ultima facie justification by testimony.

I Foley and Burge are interested in the prima faciepart.

I How plausible is this position?I It is important to distinguish between prima facie and

ultima facie justification by testimony.I Foley and Burge are interested in the prima facie

part.

I This kind of position thinks of justification throughtestimony on the model of justification throughperception.

I Just like there is a prima facie justification in believingwhat we see, similarly we are prima facie justified inaccepting information through testimony.

I But many disagree that we should be as liberal abouttestimony justification as we are about perceptualjustification.

Testimony versus perception

I Is there a relevant distinction between testimony andperception that should discourage us to apply thesame standards to both?

I Some people think so: people have the ability to lie,but the things in our perceptual environment don’t.

A possible response?

I Perceptually-based beliefs can also suffer from theinfluence of deception.

I Fake objects, for instance, can be the result ofdeception, and perceptual-based beliefs about fakeobjects can obviously go awry because of theinfluence of agency on a perceptual environment.

I If the possibility of deception is a good reason to thinkthat S requires positive reasons to believe T, thenthere seems to be equally strong reason to requirethat S have positive reasons to believe that theobjects of her perceptually-based beliefs are genuine.

A possible response to such response?

I How could the conservativist reply to such argument?

I The conservative might respond that deception maysometimes be at stake in a perceptually-based belief,but the difference is that deception is always apossibility for testimonially-based ones.

I However, this seems clearly untrue as a conceptualmatter; it is at least possible for your informant to be areliable robot lacking freedom.

I And even among common human experience, thereare cases where people lack the time to deliberateabout deception; human free human action is notalways at stake in testimonially-based belief.

I How could the conservativist reply to such argument?I The conservative might respond that deception may

sometimes be at stake in a perceptually-based belief,but the difference is that deception is always apossibility for testimonially-based ones.

Outline

Introduction

Alvin GoldmanCast of Characters

I Ph.D., Princeton 1965I Board of Governors Professor of

Philosophy and Cognitive ScienceRutgers, The State University of NewJersey

I Author of 12 books, including A Theoryof Human Action (1977), Epistemologyand Cognition (1986); and Knowledge ina Social World (1999).

I Basically the founding father of socialepistemology in contemporary times.

The problem of the novices/experts

Goldman’s focus

First example: mathematical claims

Second example: cars colors

Conclusion

I The hearer’s evidence about the reliability of thespeaker can defeat or bolster his justification inaccepting the testimony.

I What kind of evidence should one have in choosingbetween experts?

Conclusion

I The hearer’s evidence about the reliability of thespeaker can defeat or bolster his justification inaccepting the testimony.

I What kind of evidence should one have in choosingbetween experts?

The novice problem

So the question is: Can novices, while remainingnovices, make justified judgments about therelative credibility of rival experts? When andhow is this possible?

The novice problem

I In the problem at issue, the novice is not in a positionto evaluate the target experts by using his ownopinion;

I Or the novice does not have enough confidence inhis opinions in this domain to use them inadjudicating or evaluating the disagreement betweenthe rival experts.

I He thinks of the domain as properly requiring acertain expertise, and he does not view himself aspossessing this expertise

The novice problem

The analogy with the listener/eye-witnessproblem

What is an expert?

I Who qualifies to be an expert in a certainE(expertise)-domain?

I Goldman proposes: ”As a first pass, experts in agiven domain (the E-domain)have more beliefs (orhigh degrees of belief) in true propositions and/orfewer beliefs in false propositions within that domainthan most people do (or better:than the vastmajorityof people do).”

I Can you think of possible counterexamples?

What is an expert?

The novice/two experts problem

I What is special to the novice/two-experts problem isthat the hearer has no opinions of his own.

I Is there any way for him to choose (justifiably)between two putative experts?

I If he could decide who is the greater authority, hecould use this information to decide whom to trust.

I But how can someone who lacks knowledge aboutthe domain justifiably choose between twoself-proclaimed experts?

The nature of the problem: assigningauthority to Y

I Kitcher (1993: 314, 316) says that we sometimes“directly calibrate” a putative authority by comparingthe output of that authority with our own opinions onquestions where our judgments overlap.

I If X wishes to decide how much authority to ascribeto Y with respect to domain D, X should ascertainwhat opinions Y has expressed about D on which Xhas independent opinions.

I Then X should assign Y a degree of authorityproportional to the truth-ratio of Y’s D-relatedstatements as judged by X’s own opinions.

An hard problem

I In the novice/two-experts problem, however, Xdoesn’t have any opinions in domain D, at least nonehe feels confident in deploying. So how can X make ajustified determination of degree of authority orexpertise?

I Goldman considers several methods the novice mighttry to use.

An hard problem

I In the novice/two-experts problem, however, Xdoesn’t have any opinions in domain D, at least nonehe feels confident in deploying. So how can X make ajustified determination of degree of authority orexpertise?

I Goldman considers several methods the novice mighttry to use.

Possible solutions?

I One is to listen to a debate between the contendingexperts.

I Another is to solicit judgments from other(meta-)experts about the comparative expertise ofthe two contenders.

I A third is to investigate the opinions of additionalexperts, to see which position has more adherents.

Possible solutions?

Problems

I There are tricky theoretical questions in each case,however, about the quality of evidence that a novicecould obtain via these methods.

I How much can the novice be illuminated by hearing adebate on a topic on which his own ignoranceprecludes him from judging the correctness of thevarious premises?

I How can the novice assess the relativetrustworthiness of the third parties who assess theoriginal experts? Their trustworthiness may be asproblematic as that of the initial experts.

Problems