Introduction Antidumping

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    An Introduction to the Law and

    Economics of Antidumping

    James P. DurlingVinson & Elkins LLP

    Washington DC

    Thomas J. PrusaRutgers University and NBERNew Brunswick NJ

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    Overview

    Goals for the presentation: Focus on AD

    Basic concepts of AD

    Practical impact of AD measures Emerging issues to consider

    Approach for presentation:

    Assume no prior knowledge

    No technical jargon

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    AD The Trade Remedy of Choice

    Key trade remedies Safeguard Actions (escape clause): injury

    Countervailing Duty (CVD): injury & govt subsidy

    Antidumping (AD): injury & pricing

    AD is the dominant law

    More AD disputes than all other trade laws combined

    Between 1995-2005, WTO members reported: 2,851 antidumping disputes initiated

    181 countervailing duty disputes initiated

    142 safeguard disputes initiated

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    0

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    1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002

    #cas

    es

    0%

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    Users

    Worldwide Use of Antidumping, 1980-2003

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    AD in International Context

    International framework: AD rules included in Kennedy, Tokyo, and

    Uruguay Rounds

    Distinctive domestic laws implement this

    broader international framework

    To adapt the old phrase, the devil is often inthe domestic details

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    What is Antidumping?

    Dumping:charging an export price below normal value

    Lower export price than domestic price price discrimination

    Sales below cost

    It is not illegal or criminal

    It is not economically unfair:

    domestic price discrimination & sales below cost is often

    implied by standard microeconomic theory

    But it does trigger a legal right to offsetting duties

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    Key Substantive Elements

    An export price below normal value Domestic prices in the exporting country

    The most comparable third country prices

    Constructed value cost of producing the item

    Injury to the domestic industry

    Caused by the low-priced imports

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    Key Procedural Elements

    A petition to start the case. A finding of unfairly low prices

    A finding of injury caused by imports Preliminary and final findings

    Sometimes more than one agency

    U.S. antidumping practice as an example

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    AD Case Filed (Day 1)

    AD Duties

    Almost always

    affirmative & largeAffirmative to 2/3(often higher for new

    users)

    Preliminary Injury Preliminary LTFV

    (5-7 months)

    Final Injury Final LTFV

    (9-14 months)

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    Average margin rises

    from 15% to over 50%(compare with MFN tariff levels)

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    Also a steady increase in affirmative

    injury decisions (but not as sharp)

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    AD Case Filed (Day 1)

    Preliminary Injury Preliminary LTFV

    Final Injury Final LTFV

    AD Duties

    (5-7 months)

    (9-14 months)

    When does AD

    begin to matter?

    After duties imposed

    (e.g., tariff)

    Before case filed (threat)

    After preliminary

    LTFV

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    Answer?

    AD impacts trade before, during, and afterinvestigation

    U.S. estimates: AD imposes larger costs

    than any other protective measure except

    MFA (which is now defunct)

    EU estimates: AD about as costly asagriculture protection

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    Pre-Duty Impact

    Before the case: Rumors or explicit signaling

    Exporters pull back (even with antitrust risk)

    During the case:

    Importers and exporters get nervous

    Some systems have great uncertainty

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    Post-Duty Impact

    AD impacts trade flows regardless ofoutcome

    Duties Levied

    Settled Cases (price/quantity agreements)

    Rejected Cases

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    Value of Trade Subject Countries

    -60%

    -50%

    -40%

    -30%

    -20%

    -10%

    0%

    10%

    t0 t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4

    Time

    %Change

    fromyear

    t0

    High Duty (Affirmative)

    Low Duty (Affirmative)

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    AD induces trade diversion

    High Duty Cases

    -60%

    -40%

    -20%

    0%

    20%

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    60%

    80%

    100%

    t0 t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4

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    Changefromyeart0

    Subject Countries

    Non-subject countries

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    Measured Post-Duty Impact

    Fall/RiseRise

    40-80%

    Rise

    20-40%Non-subj

    Rise20-25%

    Fall

    60-70%Fall50-60%Subject

    AUVQuantityValue

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    Measured Investigation Effects

    Once preliminary AD duties imposed, tradevolumes fall dramatically

    Estimates are that at least half the impact on

    trade occur during the investigation

    Trade impact can be significant enough that

    the investigation effectalone makes thecase profitable

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    Emerging Issues

    Proliferation of AD users The treatment of so-called non-market

    economies

    The changing dynamics of multi-lateral

    negotiations

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    Implications for EU & U.S.

    EU & U.S. have long been the biggestadvocates for AD protection and the driving

    force behind the weakening of AD rules

    Will they regret making AD so easily

    abused?

    Filing trends suggest

    Yes

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    Drop Steel Industry

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    Non-Market Economies

    China is the most important NME Many countries use special rules:

    Export prices determined same way

    Use of surrogate values: Chinese unitquantities and surrogate unit values

    Enormous unpredictability

    Some countries have graduated China tomarket economy status.

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    The Next Frontier for NMEs

    For more than twenty years, no CVDagainst NMEs like China.

    U.S. has its first case: AD and CVD cases

    against coated paper from China.

    Enormous uncertainty about whether and

    how the U.S. will proceed with this case.

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    Negotiating Dynamics

    Doha Round has been stalled; prognosisuncertain due to the major issues.

    The rules negotiations have been

    proceeding slowly. Large increase in AD users has shifted roles

    played by different countries.

    Political support for concept of AD withoutunderstanding the details.

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    Conclusions

    AD and trade remedies of growingimportance.

    Crucial for all involved to understand at

    least the basics.

    Important for decision-makers to begin

    thinking about the broader implications.