Intro to Ethics Notes (PHI 105)

8/17/2019 Intro to Ethics Notes (PHI 105)

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PHI 105 (1/19/09)An act is legal, if and only if, it’s permitted by the law.

This is not what determines if an act is morally right or wrong.

Ex.) Adultery, lying, historical example: Slavery.Acts that are morally permissible but illegal. Examples?

Speeding late at night, little traffic no cameras. Smoking cannabis, which you grew yourself, in

the privacy of your own home.

Marrying someone of a different race in South Carolina prior to 1998.

Moral claims are distinct from prudential claims.

Morality is essentially tied to the welfare of others, whereas prudence is not.

Imprudent: Not wise. Lack of caution I practical affairs.

Prudent: careful and sensible; marked by sound judgment.

Sometimes its morally impermissible to do what’s in your long-term best interest.

Examples:Get refunded money for college, send all to Haiti.

**Moral claims are distinct from claims about etiquette.

I expect Doug not to pick his nose during class, but it’s not morally wrong.

Etiquette: “Delineates expectations for social behavior according to contemporary conventional

norms within a society, social class, or group.” (Wiki)

Examples of some norms of etiquette?

Morality, by contrast, delineates those actions for which we can rightly be held blameworthy

or praiseworthy.

Agents are necessarily blameworthy for freely and knowledgeably violating the requirements

of morality, but agents are not necessarily blameworthy for freely and knowledgeablyviolating the requirements of etiquette.

Whether a person is blame worthy only depends on if we believe what they did was wrong.

What we have then is a disagreement of if what the person done is actually wrong or not.

Normative Ethics (and its three branches)

A theory of the Right: What makes an act right//wrong?

A theory of the right takes the following firm:

An act is morally permissible (or impermissible or obligatory or supererogatory (actions

that go beyond the call of duty)) if and only if, and because…

Example: An act is morally impermissible if and only if, and because, it is forbidden by

God.

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Normative Ethics (Cont.)

A Theory of the Good: What features of tings, events, or states of affairs make them good or

bad?

A Theory of Virtue: What character traits make a person virtuous or vicious?

Meta-Ethics:


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Moral Language

Moral Metaphysics

Are their facts about what’s right or wrong?

Moral Epistemology

Study of knowledge. How do we know what the facts are.Moral Psychology

What’s the relationship between making a moral judgment and being able to act

accordingly?

Applied Ethics:

Is this or that particular type of action (e.g., abortion, capital punishment, affirmative action, etc.)

right or wrong?

Categories of Deontic Evaluation:

Morally Obligatory – that which is required, that which it would be wrong to refrain from doing.

Morally right/permissible – which is not prohibited.

Morally optional – that which is neither required nor prohibited.

Supererogatory – that which is above and beyond what is morally required; that which is

both morally optional and morally better than some other permissible alternative.

Ex.) Bring a sick friend soup. Buy from store but you spend all day making soup.

Merely permissible: that which is morally optional but not supererogatory.

Divine Command Theory: What god says makes things right or wrong.

The Aims of Moral Theory:

Practical Aim: The main practical aim of moral theory is to discover a decision procedure that

can be used as a guide in our moral deliberations about what to do.

Theoretical Aim: The main theoretical aim of moral theory is to discover what underlying

features of actions make them right and wrong and then, on that basis, to formulate a criterion

of moral rightness that states the most general conditions under which actions are right or

wrong.

Moral Theorizing: The Method of Narrow Reflection Equilibrium you want to just keep going

straight on one moral path. You want a theory that is consistant with your morals. - (An equilibrium

in which you don’t want to change your intuition or moral)

Start with some provisional moral judgments.

Formulate some provisional moral theory (or general principle) that accounts for these

provisional moral judgments.

Test this provisional moral theory (or general principle) to see whether its implications conflict

with any of your other moral judgments. When conflicts arise, it is an open question as to

whether it is the theory or the judgments that need to be revised. Decide which to revise on the

basis of which seems more intuitively plausible after reflection. Do this until no further revisions


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are necessary.

An illustration via a set of cases:

Does it matter is you chose to be in the situations or not? Or if you were forced to choose.

The Boat Rescue (Save the 1 person or the 5)

The Transplant (Kill your patient (non-consented) to save 5 people who need the

patients organs)What’s the moral judgment that explains why you don’t save five people in

the transplant?

Right of self ownership?

(1) It is permissible to let someone die to save five, but not

permissible to kill one to save five.

The Runaway Trolley

Train can run through 5 people, unless you flip a switch which then makes the

train run only over one person.

If you choose to kill the one then (1) is flawed.

You still kill one person through the action of killing that one person.Doctrine of allowing?

~Doing harm is wrong but allowing harm is ok?~

Why we shouldn’t stop after having only reached a narrow reflective equilibrium.

The method of narrow reflective equilibrium is too conservative. It helps to us to render our

moral beliefs consistent, but we should not be satisfied with simply rendering our own beliefs

consistent.

To enrich our reflection, we must reflect on alternative theories, alternative judgments,

counterarguments to our theory, counterarguments to our judgments, the source of moral

judgments and the reliability of that source, our background assumptions, and our competencyto judge.

The Method of Wide Reflective Equilibrium

The method tells us to do three things (DePaul):

Reflect on the interconnections among our beliefs.

Leave nothing out of our reflections. Reflect not only on our own initial beliefs and their

interconnections, but also on ourselves and our competency to judge, and reflect on alternative

beliefs, theories, and arguments.

Settle any conflicts that emerge, deciding what to believe on the basis of what seems to be the

most intuitively plausible upon reflection.

Is there any rational alternative to this?

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DCT: An act is obligatory if and only it, and because, God commands it.

H1: God commands/forbids certain actions, because they are obligatory/wrong.


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H2: Actions are obligatory/wrong, because God commands/forbids them.

A tyrant is someone who exerts power over others without either the proper moral authority of

sufficient moral justification for doing so.

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DTC (Cont.)On DCT, what is it to say that God is good?

Answer: It’s to say that God is it doesn’t make sense with this view because it is to say

something that god commands us to bring about or preserve. But, surely, this can’t be

right. God’s not good. Not bad. Neutral.

This is the depriving God of His goodness objection.

Argument Against H1

P1: If H1 is true, then God can’t change the fact that X is wrong (or right).

P2: If God can’t change the fact that X is wrong (or right), then God isn’t omnipotent.

P3: God is omnipotent.C: Therefore, H1 is false.

What does it mean to say that God is omnipotent?

Can God create a boulder that even He cannot lift?

He can do anything that is logically possible. Anything that does not create a

contradiction.

The Problem of Evil

The fact that X is wrong (or right) is either a necessary truth or a contingent truth. If it’s a

necessary truth, we should reject P2. And if it’s a contingent truth, we should reject P1. So,

either way, then, the argument is unsound.

Necessary and contingent truths.Which of the following are necessary? Which are contingent?

Barack Obama was the President of the United States in 2009. Contingent.

Either it is the case that Doug has a wife or it is not the case that Doug has a wife. Necessary.

Masses attract one another. Contingent.

All bachelors are unmarried. Necessary.

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Another Argument Against H1

P1: If H1 is true, there’s a standard of right and wrong that’s independent of God.

P2: If there’s a standard of right and wrong that’s independent of God, then God didn’t create

morality.

P3: If God didn’t create morality, then God isn’t the Creator of all that is.

P4: God is the Creator of all that is.

C: Therefore, H1 is false.

Is this a good argument?


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Evaluating this argument

P1. H1 claims only that morality is independent of God’s commands, not that morality is

independent of God. Two Examples: (1) Fiona and her dad. (2) The laws of nature and

God.

Of course, one might argue that, unlike the laws of nature, the laws of morality are

necessarily what they are. What then?We should, then, reject P4. He is not the creator of all that is. Only contingent truths.

God is the Creator of that is contingent. After all, [Redacted].

Some Conclusions

The DCT/H2 seems to conflict with a number of common theistic tenets: (1) God is good. (2) that

gos commands are not morally arbitrary, and (3) that God is not a tyrant.

The DCT/H2 also implausibly implies that anything goes with regard to what’s right and wrong.

H1, by contrast, conflicts with no theistic tenets. It’s compatible with both the idea that God is

the creator of all that contingently is and with the idea that God is omnipotent.

It seems, therefore, that even the theist should reject DCT and embrace H1.

1. Moral Relativism

What’s right and wrong for a person to do is ultimately determined by the fundamental (i.e., basic) moral

norms of his or her culture.

More precisely, moral relativism says: an act, A, performed by a subject, S, who is a member of a

culture, C, is morally permissible if and only if, and because, the fundamental moral norms of C permits

A to perform S.

2. Definitions

D1: C is a culture =df. C is a collection of people, often living in close proximity to each other, sharing aset of social norms, conventions, and practices.

D2: X is a moral norm =df. X is a standard (that is, a rule or a principle) that renders some verdict

regarding the moral status of some act-type (e.g., “it is wrong to commit adultery”).

3. Continued

D3: X is a fundamental moral norm =df. X is a moral standard that doesn’t derive from any more

fundamental moral standard. (e.g., the divine command theorist takes “it is wrong to act as God

forbids” to be a fundamental moral norm).

D4: X is a fundamental moral norm of C =df. the vast majority of the members of C believe that X is a

fundamental moral standard.

4. Moral Absolutism and Moral Non-Absolutism

Moral absolutism is the view that certain types of acts are wrong no matter how valuable their

consequences. Examples: Pacifists. Kant and the Inquiring Murderer.

The distinction between an act-token and an act-type.

Moral non-absolutism is the view that there are no types of acts that are wrong types of acts that are

wrong no matter how valuable their consequences.


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Note that there is a problem with defining the moral absolutist as one who believes that there are

absolute (exception-less) moral rules. Consider act-consequentialism: an act is morally permissible if and

only if, and because, there is no available alternative that would produce more good than it would.

5. The Context-Sensitivity ThesisTimmons defines the thesis as follows:

“The rightness or wrongness of an action (performed in some particular context) partly depends

on nonmoral facts that hold in the context—facts concerning agents and their circumstances” (p.

42).

This thesis is fairly uncontroversial, but it should not be confused with moral relativism.

Someone can accept this thesis and deny moral relativism. And someone can accept this thesis

while also accepting moral relativism.

6. Moral Objectivism

Moral Objectivism (a.k.a. the Universality Thesis): There are universal moral norms that arebinding on all persons irrespective of the culture/society to which they belong. On moral

objectivism, the truth of a moral claim/judgment does NOT depend on whether it

conforms to the norms, beliefs, attitudes, or conventions of any group or individual. It

depends, rather, on what the objective moral facts are.

7. Continued…

More precisely, moral objectivism says: an act, A, performed by a subject, S, is morally

permissible if and only if, and because, the universal moral norms that are binding on all

persons permit S to perform A.

Examples: Act-Consequentialism; Divine Command Theory.Can the moral objectivist accept moral non-absolutism?

8. A practice quiz (but first some preliminaries)

P and Q are compatible =df. it is logically possible for both P and Q to be true.

P and Q are incompatible =df. it is logically impossible for both P and Q to be true.

Are the following sets of claims compatible?

A1: John is married. A2: John is a bachelor. (Incompatible.)

B1: John is a professional philosopher. B2: John is a rock star. (Compatible.)

C1: John is not happy. C2: John is not unhappy. (Compatible.)

D1: John is not insane. D2: John is not sane. (Incompatible.)E1: John Kerry is tall. E2: George W. Bush is a Democrat. (Compatible.)

9. The Questions

For each of the numbered claims below, state (a) whether it’s compatible or incompatible with

moral relativism (MR) and (b) whether it’s compatible or incompatible with moral objectivism

(MO).


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(C1) Acts of cruelty, slavery, terrorism, and genocide are wrong whether people or societies

condemn or condone them.

MR?

MR: Incompatible. Thus. MR has some seriously counterintuitive implications.

MO?

MO: Compatible.

10. Continued…

(C2) In the United States, certain fundamental moral norms (e.g., those with regard to how

women and minorities should be treated) have changed for the better.

MR?

MR: Incompatible. Note that, on MR there can be no moral progress in the sense of society's

norms changing for the better. There can only be moral progress in the sense of peoples rate of

compliance with the moral norms increases.

11. Continued…MO?

MO: Compatible. On MO, there is an objectively correct set of moral norms. And, thus, there

can be moral progress when our society's moral norms change from those that are incorrect to

those that are correct.

12. Continued…

(C3) The people of different societies accept different moral norms.

MR?

MR: Compatible.

MO?MO: Compatible. According to MO< there is one objectively correct set of moral norms. But the

moral objectivist does not claim that all societies accept these norms or even that all societies

will accept the same norms.

13. Continued…

(C4) Whether lying is right or wrong depends on the value of the consequences of doing so.

MR?

MR: Compatible.

MO?

MO: Compatible. The moral objectivist can be a moral non-absolutist.

14. Continued…

(C5) Although it would be wrong for DWP to let his grandparents freeze to death just so that he

can use his disposable income to take a vacation rather than to pay their heating bill, it wasn’t

wrong for the Eskimos to let their elders freeze to death as they sometimes did prior to the 20th

century.

MR?


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MR: Compatible.

MO?

15. Continued…

MO: Compatible. The moral objectivist can accept C5 by asserting that the following is a

universal moral norm: This principle yields different moral verdicts for DWP and the historicalEskimos given that their circumstances are/were very different. But, of course, if DWP did

ever find himself in relevantly similar circumstances, then the moral objectivist must admit that

DWP would be permitted to let his elders die.

16. Continued…

(C6) What it is right and wrong to do can depend on the customs of a given society.

MR?

MR: Compatible.

MO?

MO: Compatible. On MO, fundamental moral norms are universal, but the moral objectivist canaccept the context-sensitivity thesis and hold that derivative moral norms vary from one culture

to another.

17. Continued…

Suppose that the following is a universal, fundamental moral norm: "Be polite to a gracious

host." Given this principle, what should a man do before entering a church? A synagogue? What

should someone do if invited into someone’s home in Japan? The mainland U.S.? Since what’s

right and wrong to do can depend on what’s considered polite, and since what’s considered

polite just depends on the customs of a given society, what it is right and wrong to do can

(indirectly) depend on the customs of a given society

18. Continued…

(C7) Whether or not women should go around bare-breasted and whether or not men should

wear a suit and tie to work is just a matter of custom. There is no objective truth about such

matters.

MR?

MR: Compatible.

MO?

MO: Compatible. Arguable, norms of dress are not moral norms, but rather norms of etiquette.

The moral objectivist is only committed to there being an objective truth about morality, notetiquette.

19. Continued…

(C8) One’s own society isn’t in a privileged position with regard to knowing what’s right and

wrong for one to do.

MR?

MR: Incompatible. One's own society is in a privileged position with regard to knowing what's


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right and wrong for one to do, for, on MR, what's right and wrong for one to do just depends on

what the norms of one's society.

MO?

MO: Compatible.

20. Continued…(C9) People of all societies should be tolerant of one another’s religious beliefs.

MR?

MR: Incompatible. Whether or not someone should be tolerant of someone else's religios

beliefs is a moral question. And, on MR, such moral questions are determined by the moral

norms of one's culture. Since, in some cultures...

21. Continued…

MO?

MO: Compatible. Indeed, since C9 is stating a universal moral norm, one most be an moral

objectivist to accept C9.

22. Why accept or reject moral relativism?

Next, we will look at various arguments for and against moral relativism.

23. The Moral Diversity Thesis (MDT)

Many people accept MR on the basis of the following thesis.

The Moral Diversity Thesis: People in different societies accept different fundamental moral

norms (a.k.a. basic moral norms).

Note that the MDT is a claim about what people believe to be true, whereas MR is claim about

what is true.Is MDT true?

24. The Argument for the Moral Diversity Thesis

People in different societies make different moral judgments regarding the same type of action.

If people in different societies make different moral judgments regarding the same type of action,

they must accept different fundamental moral norms.

Therefore, people in different societies accept different fundamental moral norms. (The Moral

Diversity Thesis)

25. P2 is falseSome other possible explanations for moral disagreement:

Different Non-moral beliefs (Ex. Apply “One ought not kill sacred beings” to both Hindu and

Christian cultures.)

Different Customs (Ex. Apply “One ought to be polite to a gracious host.” to different

cultural contexts.)


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26. Continued…

Different Environmental Conditions (Ex. Apply “Save people from death unless doing so

will very likely increase the number of deaths overall.” to different environmental

conditions.)

Although P2 of the Argument for the Moral Diversity Thesis is false, it doesn’t follow that the

moral diversity thesis is false. So, for the sake of argument, I will grant the proponent of moralrelativism that it is true. The following are two arguments based on the moral diversity thesis.

27. The Argument from Fundamental Moral Disagreement, v1 (a.k.a. The Anthropologist’s

Argument, v1)

People in different societies accept different fundamental moral norms. (=MDT)

If people in different societies accept different fundamental moral norms, then MO is false.

Therefore, MO is false.

28. Evaluating the Argument

Is this a good argument?Well, as we saw, P1 is questionable.

In any case, P2 is false. The fact that people disagree about X does not entail that there

is no objective fact about X.

Consider the shape of the Earth.

29. The Argument from Fundamental Moral Disagreement, v2

OBSERVATION: The quality and quantity of moral disagreement appears to differ significantly

from the quality and quantity of disagreement that we find with regard to objective matters of fact

(e.g., matters of science).

EXPLANATION: One possible explanation for the observation in P1 is that there is no objectivemorality.

COMPARISON: No other explanation for the observation in P1 provides at least as good an

explanation as the explanation given in P2.

Therefore, there is no objective morality.

30. The Main Thrust of the Argument

Some philosophers believe that what explains inter- and intra-societal moral disagreement is that

there are simply no moral facts, but only differing moral attitudes. According to these

philosophers, differences in moral belief are more readily explained by the hypothesis that they

reflect people’s differing attitudes than by the hypothesis that they reflect people’s variousdistortions, misperceptions, or ignorance of an objective moral reality.

31. Continued…

Now we should note that there has been an awful lot of genuine disagreement in the areas of

science and metaphysics, and from this, we do not conclude that there are no scientific facts

and no metaphysical facts. So these philosophers must claim that moral disagreement is


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somehow more substantial or more fundamental than the kind of disagreement we find in these

other areas where there is clearly some objective fact of the matter.

32. Is moral disagreement more fundamental or substantial?

We must keep the following in mind:

There may be less moral disagreement and more moral agreement than you think.Disagreement about specific moral rules often issues from disagreement concerning the

relevant non-moral facts. Consider, for example, the issues of abortion and capital punishment.

And there is a fair amount of moral agreement. For example, there is wide agreement that

suffering is bad and ought to be prevented.

33. Continued…

There may be more disagreement in the sciences than you think. At bottom, science relies on

abductive reasoning. But there is nearly as much disagreement concerning the principles of

abductive reasoning as there is concerning moral principles.

Non-religious moral inquiry is relatively young compared to scientific inquiry. If we look atscientific inquiry in its infancy, there was a tremendous amount of disagreement. Yet we would

have be wrong to conclude back then, that the best explanation for these disagreements was

that there are no objective scientific facts.

34. Continued…

Consider that the breadth and depth of disagreement regarding other philosophical issues is no

greater than that regarding moral issues in particular. Philosophers disagree just as much about

metaphysical issues—such as, about whether God exists, about whether free will is compatible

with determinism, and about whether the mind is identical to the brain—as they do about moral

issues—such as, whether the ends justify the means. So we face a dilemma: either this breadthand depth of disagreement warrants denying objectivity about any of these issues or it warrants

denying objectivity about none of these issues. But do we really believe that there is no objective

fact as to whether, say, God exists?

35. Problems with Moral Relativism

Problems of Formulation

The Problem of Intercultural Evaluation - cant evaluate other cultures based on our

fundamentally moral norms.

The Problem of Intracultural Evaluation -

The Moral Reformer Problem - There is no objective truth about what's morally right orwrong so moral laws cant be reformed for the better. (Or worse)

The Problem of Conflicts with Our Considered Moral Judgments

36. Moral Relativism and Tolerance

Suppose that we grant that moral relativism is true. Would it follow that people of all societies

should be tolerant of each other’s differing norms and practices? After all, it’s not as if one’s

society’s norms and practices would be any better than another society’s norms and practices,


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would it?

37. Evaluating DCT

Consistency

Determinacy

Intuitive AppealInternal Support

Explanatory Power

External Support

38. Conclusions

We’ve found no good argument in support of moral relativism.

We’ve found that moral relativism, but not moral objectivism, is wildly at odds with our

commonsense intuitions.

Douglas Portmore

LECTURE 4:

Values in a Scientific World

Last Updated: 1/28/10

1. The Challenge for Moral Objectivism

“Suppose, with [moral] objectivism, that moral judgments are true, and true quite independently

of what we happen to think of them. They are true, when they are, because they accurately

report objective moral facts. But the nature of such facts can appear very mysterious. We readily

grant that geologists and chemists, physicists and astronomers deal in objective truth, because

we believe that their findings are targeted on a natural world whose features exist independently

of whether anyone recognizes them. Botanical facts are facts about plants; geological facts are

facts about rocks….”

2. The Challenge for Moral Objectivism (continued…)

“…In botany and geology, evidence is supplied by three-dimensional, tangible, physical stuff. We

can taste it, smell it, and see it. We can’t taste wrongness or hear rightness. Moral facts, if they

were to exist, would have to be quite odd sorts of things, certainly nothing at all like the kinds of

phenomena studied by the recognized sciences” (91).

3. Are moral facts scientifically confirmable (i.e., scientifically verifiable)?

Can we see, touch, taste, hear, or smell the wrongness of an act?

Some reject the idea that there are moral facts given that moral facts are not scientifically

confirmable.

4. The Confirmation Test


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According to the confirmation test, a claim (or putative fact) is true if and only if it is

scientifically confirmable (i.e., empirically verifiable).

Note that only true claims can be confirmed. However, some true claims are not

scientifically confirmable. For instance, we cannot scientifically confirm either that parallel

lines do not intersect or that the sum of the angles of any triangle equals 180 degrees.

The confirmation test cannot be true. If it were true, it would refute itself, for it states a claimthat is not itself scientifically confirmable. Thus, it's a self-refuting claim.

5. The Confirmation Test (continued…)

In any case, even scientific claims (such as the claim that the Earth is not flat) cannot be

confirmed via empirical observation alone.

The example of a boat disappearing over the horizon.

Observations are theory-laden. And, thus, at the end of the day, science must rely on abductive

reasoning (reasoning from best explanation). And the principles of abductive reasoning are not

themselves scientifically confirmable. So even science rests on claims that are not themselves

scientifically confirmable.

6. But are moral facts needed to explain anything?

People’s moral beliefs? People’s moral attitudes? People’s moral (or immoral) behavior?

What about other moral facts? Might we need some moral facts to explain other moral facts?

Perhaps, but this would beg the question.

It seems, then, that we do not need to postulate moral facts to explain any non-moral fact. And

although we might need moral facts to explain other moral facts, we can’t just assume that there

are any moral facts that need explaining, for doing so would amount to begging the question.

7. Occam’s RazorSome might employ Occam’s razor against the idea that there are moral facts.

Occam’s razor (a.k.a. the principle of parsimony): Other things being equal, one hypothesis is

better than another if it is simpler than the other, and one hypothesis is simpler than another if

and only if it requires us to postulate the existence of fewer unknown facts, entities,

properties, or processes-- that is, fewer facts, entities, properties, and processes

beyond those that we already know about it.

8. Occam’s Razor (continued…)

The simplest explanation is not necessarily the one that is the least complex or the easiest

to understand.Examples: Explaining (1) biological organisms, (2) crop circles, (3) reports of alien abduction, (4)

noises in the walls when the hot water is turned on, etc.

Occam’s razor doesn’t say that it is more likely that there are n as opposed to n+1 facts, entities,

properties, or processes in the universe. It does not say, for instance, that, in absence any

evidence either way, it is more likely that silicon-based life-forms don’t exist than it is that

silicon-based life-forms do exist, other things being equal. Rather, it says only that, in the

absence of any evidence for the existence of silicon-based life-forms, an explanation that doesn’t


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postulate their existence is superior to one that does, other things being equal.

9. Occam’s Razor (continued…)

Why is the one superior to the other?

Answer: Because it has fewer commitments that might turn out to be false.

Of course, this means that an explanation that postulates nothing with respect to whethersilicon-based life-forms exist is, other things being equal, superior to an explanation that

postulates that silicon-based life-forms don’t exist.

Thus, an explanation that postulates some unknown negative existential claim is just as

worrisome as an explanation that postulates some unknown positive existential claim.

So Occam’s razor does not support the contention that there are no facts or properties beyond

those that are needed to explain our empirical observations. Indeed, such a contention is quite

controversial.

10. The Argument from Explanatory Impotence

If X (some fact, entity, property, or process) exists or is real, then its reality/existence must benecessary to explain some of our empirical observations.

The reality/existence of moral facts and properties isn’t needed to explain any of our empirical

observations.

Therefore, moral facts and properties don’t exist and are not real.

11. Why we should reject Premise 1 of the explanatory impotence argument

Why accept Premise 1?

Premise 1 has counter-intuitive implications. Premise 1 implies that such things as

“atmospheres, rock strata, newts, and dandelions” don’t exist or are unreal, for none of these are

needed to explain our empirical observations. After all, it seems that we need only postulate theexistence of sub-atomic particles to explain our empirical observations.

But even if you don’t have a problem with such a sparse ontology, there is another reason to

reject premise 1. If we accept Premise 1, then we must deny the reality of all normative facts

and properties, including the normative fact that we ought to infer the Conclusion (i.e., 3) from

Premises 1 and 2.

12. Why all normative facts seem to be in the same boat

A normative fact is a fact about whether S ought or has reason to φ, where S stands for some

rational subject and φ stands for some reason-sensitive attitude such as a desire, a belief, or an

intention. These facts includes prudential and epistemic facts.No normative fact is scientifically confirmable. Nor are normative facts needed to explain any of

our empirical observations.

So if we reject moral facts on such grounds, then we must reject all normative facts, including all

prudential facts and all epistemic facts. And that’s a tough pill to swallow.

13. Explanation versus Prescription


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To insist that, for moral facts and properties to exist, they must be able to explain some of our

empirical observations is just to miss the point and purpose of moral thinking. The “point of

thinking about what is right or wrong, good or bad, just or unjust, is not, it seems, to figure out

what happened or why, but to figure out what should happen and why” (Sayre-McCord). Thus the

point is prescription, not explanation—that is, to prescribe what ought to be the case as opposed

to explain what is the case.

14. Continued…

So, yes, it’s true that moral facts and properties are not needed to explain anything, but that

doesn’t mean that we should deny that there are such facts and properties, for explanation is not

all that there is. There is also prescription (or normativity). And, for there to be prescription, there

must be normative facts and properties.

15. Are moral facts compatible with a scientific worldview?

The answer depends on whether the scientific worldview is taken to be (a) the view that there

are no other facts or properties besides those that are studied by empirical sciences or(b) the view that all events in space and time are best given scientific explanations.

If (a), the answer to the above question is no.

If (b), the answer to the above question is yes.

Which is more plausible: (a) or (b)?

16. Continued…

It may seem that if normative claims are non-scientific claims, then they must conflict with the

claims of science. This is not so. Of course, some non-scientific claims do conflict with the

claims of science, viz., those that “involve claims about events occurring in space and time, and

about what things cause or are caused by them” (Scanlon). But unlike various causal claimsinvolving the paranormal and the supernatural (ESP, ghostly hauntings, acts of God, therapeutic

touch, demonic possessions, etc.), which are all very implausible given our ordinary empirical

standards for assessing such causal claims, normative claims make no claims about events in

space and time.

17. Continued…

It may be objected that our beliefs about normative facts must have motivational efficacy if

they’re to retain their practical relevance. And thus our normative beliefs must be able to cause

us to have the attitudes that they support our having, and this, some might argue, would be just

as mysterious as supernatural causal powers, such as therapeutic touch. But there is nothingmysterious here, for it is not the normative fact that must have motivational/causal efficacy.

Rather, it is the normative belief (a natural, psychological state) that must have

motivational/causal efficacy. So it is the natural state of believing some normative fact, not the

normative fact itself, that has the power to cause the formation of the attitude that is called for by

the normative fact.


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18. Conclusions

We’ve seen that that the fact that moral facts are not scientifically confirmable does not support

the contention that there are no moral facts.

We’ve seen that Occam’s razor does not support the contention that there are no moral facts.

And we’ve seen that the fact that moral facts are not needed to explain any of our empirical

observations does not support the contention that there are no moral facts.Furthermore, we’ve seen that moral facts seem to be in the same boat as other normative facts.

If we reject moral facts on the grounds that they’re not empirically verifiable, then we would have

to also reject epistemic facts, for they are no more empirically verifiable than moral facts are.

And if we reject epistemic facts, then we must deny that there is any reason to reject the view

that there are moral facts.

Possible Exam Questions concerning Lecture 4

(a) What does the confirmation test say? (b) Is the confirmation test true? Explain.

(a) Explain Occam’s razor. (b) Give an example where, according to Occam’s razor, one

explanation is superior to another. (c) Is the simplest explanation the one that is the easiest tounderstand? Explain. (d) Does Occam’s razor support the contention that there are no moral

facts or properties? Explain.

Are moral facts needed to explain anything? Explain.

Critically assess the following argument:

If X (some fact, entity, property, or process) exists or is real, then its reality/existence must be

necessary to explain some of our empirical observations.

The reality/existence of moral facts and properties isn’t needed to explain any of our empirical

observations.

Therefore, moral facts and properties don’t exist and are not real.

What is point of thinking about what is right or wrong, good or bad, just or unjust? Are moral facts compatible with a scientific worldview? Explain.

PHI 105

LECTURE 5:

Utilitarianism

Last Updated: 3/2/10

1. Act-Utilitarianism Characterized

The view is consequentialist: Actions are to be judged right or wrong solely in virtue of the

goodness or badness of their consequences.The view is welfarist: In assessing the goodness (or badness) of an act’s consequences,

the only thing that matters is welfare (i.e., that which makes someone’s life go well for

him or her). Welfare is the only thing good for its own sake.

The view is universalist, impartialist, and aggregative: The right act is the one the

produces the greatest net sum of welfare while weighing impartially increases and

diminutions in the welfare of all those affected by the act.

The view endorses a maximizing conception of right action: An act is permissible if and


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only if there is no available alternative that would produce more utility than it would.

2. Hedonistic Act-Utilitarianism

Hedonistic Act Utilitarianism: An act is morally permissible if and only if, and because, it

maximizes hedonic utility.

Hedonic Utility: The hedonic utility of an act equals the total amount of hedons itproduces minus the total amount of dolors it produces, where a hedon is the standard

unit of measurement of pleasure and a dolor is the standard unit of measurement of

pain.

An act maximizes hedonic utility if and only if there is no alternative act available to

the agent that would produce more hedonic utility than it would. Note, then, that

more than one act can maximize hedonic utility.

3. An Example of the HAU Calculus

An Example of the HAU Calculus: Suppose that the available alternatives are a1, a2, a3,

and a4. And suppose that the people who would be affected are p1, p2, p3, and p4…

4. An Example of the HAU Calculus (continued…)

p1 p2 p3 p4 HU

a1 10 6 14 -10 =20

a2 100 -90 8 0 =18

a3 5 5 5 5 =20

a4 -10 -10 -10 35 =5

5. The Motivation for HAU

The thought is that HAU is just a natural extension of the familiar balancing and

maximizing conception of rationality from diachronic intrapersonal contexts to

diachronic interpersonal (moral) contexts.

The diachronic intrapersonal context: The temporal location of a benefit or harm within a

life does not, as such, have any rational significance. We should, therefore, be temporally

neutral with respect to when harms and benefits occur in our lives. And we should be

willing to make sacrifices now for the sake of future benefits that will more than offsetthese sacrifices.

6. Continued…

The diachronic interpersonal (moral) context: From the moral point of view, no one

person’s welfare is any more or less important that another’s. So, the location of a benefit

or harm within a population of persons has no moral significance. And thus, as we move


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from the point of view of individual rationality to the point of view of morality, we should not

only be temporally neutral with respect to when harms and benefits occur, but also be

person-neutral (or impartial) with respect to who receives some harm or benefit.

Furthermore, we should again be willing to make trade offs (to balance) for the sake of

maximizing welfare over time and across individuals.

7. Getting a feel for the theory: A Practice Quiz

Answer the following questions according to what hedonistic act utilitarianism (HAU)

entails. Answer either “Necessarily True” or “Not Necessarily True.”

(Q1) An act is morally impermissible if it causes someone a lot of pain and no pleasure.

Necessarily true or not necessarily true?

Answer: [Redacted].

8. Continued…

Suppose that there are exactly three act alternatives available to the agent: a1-a3. Further

suppose that these acts will have effects on only three persons: p1-p3. Now let ‘HU(p1)’stand for ‘p1’s hedonic utility’, and let ‘HU’ stand for ‘the total aggregate utility’. Suppose,

then, that the scenario is this:

act HU(p1) HU(p2) HU(p3) HU moral status

a1 +10 −100 +130 +40 permissible

a2 +5 +5 +5 +15 impermissible

a3 +15 +25 0 +40 permissible

9. Continued…

Lesson: On HAU, [Redacted]. This means that one may permissibly impose great

sacrifices on some for the sake of greater gains in the aggregate.

(Q2) An act is morally impermissible if it produces, in the aggregate, more pain than

pleasure. In other words, an act is morally impermissible if it has negative hedonic utility.


10. Continued…

Answer: [Redacted]. Consider, for instance, the following scenario:act HU(p1) HU(p2) HU(p3) HU moral status

a1 +10 −100 +30 −60 impermissible

a2 +5 −5 −5 −5 impermissible

a3 +15 +25 −41 −1 permissible


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11. Continued…

Lesson: According to HAU, whether or not an act is permissible can only be determined

by [Redacted].

(Q3) If an act produces pleasure for many and pain for no one, then it is morally

permissible. Necessarily true or not necessarily true?

12. Continued…

Answer: [Redacted]. On HAU, it’s not always sufficient to produce pleasure for many

and pain for no one; one must [Redacted]. Consider the following scenario:


a1 +10 −100 +130 +40 impermissible

a2 +100 +100 +100 +300 impermissible

a3 +100 +101 +100 +301 permissible

13. Continued…

Lesson: Because HAU requires that we always maximize hedonic utility, it will be a

[Redacted]. It will require each of us to perform an altruistic self-sacrificing act whenever

the self-sacrifice that we thereby make will be more than offset by altruistic benefits we

thereby bestow on others.

(Q4) It is morally impermissible to listen to Metallica on the car’s CD player if the othertwo people in the car would get more pleasure from listening to The Beatles. Assume

that listening to Metallica and listening to The Beatles are the only two available options.

Assume that you and the other two people in the car are the only ones who will be

affected by this choice. Necessarily true or not necessarily true?

14. Continued…

Answer: [Redacted]. If HAU was a democracy, it would be “[Redacted]”; it would not be

“[Redacted].” Let a1 = listen to Metallica, and let a2 = listen to The Beatles. Now

suppose that the scenario is this:


a1 +10 +10 +80 +100 permissible

a2 +15 +15 +15 +45 impermissible


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15. Continued…

Lesson: Some people will [Redacted] simply because they stand to gain or lose more

than others do. There might even be utility monsters: people who get so much pleasure

from getting what they want that the rest of us would all be morally required to do

whatever we can to fulfill their every desire.

(Q5) In an effort to help his patient, Dr. Smith injects Jones with a shot of penicillin afterdutifully asking him whether he’s allergic to penicillin and hearing Jones say that he isn’t.

Nevertheless, it turns out, unbeknownst to Jones even, that Jones is severely allergic to

penicillin, and, consequently, he dies as a result of the injection. Assuming that there

would have been more hedonic utility had Dr. Smith not injected Jones with the shot of

penicillin, it follows that what Dr. Smith did was wrong. Necessarily true or not

necessarily true?

16. Continued…

Answer: [Redacted]. On HAU, [Redacted] are irrelevant in assessing whether his or her

act is permissible or not; it’s only the consequences of the action and of their alternativesthat matter.

Lesson: HAU says nothing about [Redacted]. Thus it does not require that we are

always motivated to act out of a concern to maximize hedonic utility. Sometimes we will

act out of a partial concern for ourselves or for our loved ones, but what’s important is

that our acts accord with HAU, not that they are motivated by a desire to act in

accordance with HAU.

17. Continued…

(Q6) Anyone who acts wrongly as Dr. Smith did above is a morally bad person,

deserving of both blame and punishment. Necessarily true or not necessarily true?

Answer: [Redacted]. As it stands, HAU evaluates [Redacted]. So it entails nothingabout whether such a person is morally bad or deserving of blame.

18. Continued…

Caveat: Even if HAU commits us to the view that an agent’s motives and intentions are

irrelevant when assessing the moral value of her actions, it doesn’t commit us to the view

that an agent’s motives and intentions are irrelevant when assessing the moral goodness

of her character.

(Q7) It is morally permissible to torture an innocent baby in certain circumstances.


Answer: [Redacted]. On HAU, [Redacted], and thus virtually any type of act can, inprinciple, be justified and, indeed, will be justified if it maximizes hedonic utility.

19. Continued…

To illustrate, let a1 = torture the innocent baby, a2 = refrain from torturing the innocent

baby, p1 = the would-be torturer, and p2 = the would-be torture victim. Now consider the

following scenario:


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act HU(p1) HU(p2) HU moral status

a1 +100 −99 +1 permissible

a2 0 0 0 impermissible

20. Continued…

Lessons: First, on HAU, everyone’s welfare counts, and counts equally, regardless of

desert. Second, on HAU, it is permissible to maim, murder, and even massacre innocent

people provided that doing so will maximize hedonic utility. On HAU, most any type of act

is, in principle, justifiable.

(Q8) The effects that our actions will have on people’s welfare millions of years from now

are just as important as their immediate effects. Necessarily true or not necessarily true?

21. Continued…

Answer: [Redacted]. On HAU, [Redacted]. Let a1 = stay after class and talk to John, a2= go home immediately after class, stopping to talk to no one, pc = the six billion or so

people that currently exist, and pf = the ten billion or so people that will exist three

generations from now. And let’s suppose that if I stay after class and talk to John, John

will after we’re finished go to the local coffee shop and meet a woman standing behind

him in line, a woman whom he falls in love with and has a child with. Assume that this

child’s grandchild ends up being an evil fascist dictator who causes untold suffering.

Lastly, assume that had I not stayed after class to talk with John, he would have left for

the coffee shop much earlier, and, consequently, this evil fascist dictator would have

never existed.

22. Continued…

Suppose, then, that the scenario is this:

act HU(pc) HU(pf) HU moral status

a1 +1 −100 tr. −999,999,999,99

9

impermissible

a2 0 0 0 permissible

23. Continued…Lesson: Given that there are, at any given moment, an infinite number of available act

alternatives, and given that one would need to know what effects each of these will have

from now until the end of time to know what their hedonic utilities are, one can never

know with any degree of certainty what one morally ought to do on HAU. Some have,

therefore, objected to HAU on the grounds that it is too impractical to be action guiding.


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24. Continued…

(Q9) While waiting at a crosswalk, Mr. Smith sees a stranger about step off the curb into

the path on an oncoming, speeding bus. Without thinking, Mr. Smith reaches out, grabs

the stranger, and pulls him back onto the curb, saving his life. Mr. Smith does this without

even thinking about what the hedonic utility of this act or any of its alternatives might be.

What Mr. Smith did was wrong. Necessarily true or not necessarily true? Answer: [Redacted]. On HAU, what matters is not [Redacted], but whether the way you

in fact acted maximized hedonic utility.

25. Continued…

To illustrate, let a1 = your instinctually grabbing the stranger and pulling him back to

safety, a2 = your calculating the likely hedonic utility of each of the various act alternatives

available to you while the stranger is struck and killed by the bus, p1 = you, and p2 = the

stranger. Suppose, then, that the scenario is this:

act HU(p1) HU(p2) HU moral status

a1 +20 0 +20 permissible

a2 −20 −999,980 −1 mil. impermissible

26. Continued…

Lesson: HAU is a [Redacted]. To understand the difference, consider the difference

between the criterion for being HIV infected (or brain dead), and the procedure that we

might use to determine whether someone is HIV infected (or brain dead). And note that

HAU is no more impractical than the view that the most prudent act is the one that willmaximize one’s utility over time. And no one would suggest that we ought to reject the

investment principle “Buy low, and sell high” just because it is often times practically

impossible to know whether the price of a stock is headed up or down.

27. Continued…

(Q10) If you promised a kid ten bucks to wash your car and he did as promised (he

washed your car and did a nice job), you should give him the ten bucks. Necessarily true

or not necessarily true?

Answer: [Redacted]. Whether or not you should give the kid the ten bucks depends, not

on whether [Redacted], but rather on whether [Redacted].Lesson: HAU is entirely [Redacted]. What happened in the past is, on HAU, irrelevant in

determining what one morally ought to do. The past is irrelevant, because nothing you do

now can affect the hedonic utility of any past event.

28. Continued…

(Q11) Mr. Smith has an extra $500 this month after paying all his bills. He uses that $500

to buy his son a set of encyclopedias to help with his son’s schoolwork. But had Smith


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instead used that $500 to buy some stranger’s kid a set of encyclopedias that would have

produced slightly more hedonic utility. What Mr. Smith did was wrong. Necessarily true or

not necessarily true?

Answer: [Redacted]. On HAU, [Redacted] pleasures and pains count equally,

regardless of one’s relationship to those affected. The hedonic utility of one’s friends and

family members are no more (or less) important, on HAU, than that of completestrangers.

Lesson: On HAU, there are no special obligations, and special relationships have no

intrinsic importance.

29. Continued…

(Q12) In deciding what to eat for breakfast this morning, Mr. Johnson is morally required

to make the choice that produces the greatest hedonic utility. Assume that, according to

HAU, Mr. Johnson ought to eat something for breakfast this morning, and that what

choice he makes will affect only himself. Necessarily true or not necessarily true?

Answer: [Redacted].Lesson: According to HAU, morality is [Redacted]. Every practical decision and choice

is a moral one, even those that are quite trivial and have no ramifications for anyone but

the agent. There is no moral asymmetry between the self and others. You have just as

much moral reason to promote your own hedonic utility as to promote anyone else’s.

30. Continued…

(Q13) The King of Siam must adopt either policy X or policy Y. This decision will affect

only those people belonging to one of the following two populations: population A and

population B. Population A consists in a hundred poor persons with 10 hedons each.

Population B consists in a hundred affluent persons with 100 hedons each. The King ofSiam adopts policy X, which has no effect on the people in population A, but raises the

number of hedons for each person in population B by 90 hedons. Had the King of Siam

adopted policy Y instead, this would have had no effect on the people in population B, but

would have raised the number of hedons for each person in population A by 90 hedons.


31. Continued…

Policy X, therefore, worsens the already existing inequality that exists between the two

populations, whereas policy Y would make things equal by raising the level of welfare of

the worse off. Given that the people in population A are equally deserving of 100 hedons

as the people in population B are, it was wrong of the King of Siam to have adopted policy

X.

32. Continued…

Answer: [Redacted]. Let a1 = adopt policy X, a2 = adopt policy Y, pA = population A, and

pB = population B. The scenario is as follows:


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act HU(pa) HU(pb) HU moral status

a1 +10,000 +10,000 +20,000 permissible

a2 +1000 +19,000 +20,000 permissible

33. Continued…

Lesson: On HAU, [Redacted]. HAU is not sensitive to concerns about desert or

distributive justice.

(Q14) On HAU, there are no supererogatory acts (i.e., acts that go above and beyond

what duty requires). Necessarily true or not necessarily true?

Answer: [Redacted]. Whether it is true or not depends on what counts as a

supererogatory act. Some define supererogatory acts as those that do more for the sake

of others than duty requires. Others define supererogatory acts such that S’s performing

x is supererogatory only if there exists some available alternative, y , such that (a) S ismorally permitted both to perform x and to perform y , and (b) S has more moral reason

to perform x than to perform y .

34. Continued…

If the former definition is correct, then HAU can accommodate supererogatory acts. But if

the latter is the correct definition, then HAU cannot accommodate supererogatory acts.

Let HU(s) = the hedonic utility that accrues to oneself and HU(o) = the hedonic utility that

accrues to others.

act HU(s) HU(o) HU moral status

a1 +10 +5 +15 permissible

a2 +5 +10 +15 perm. or super.(?)

a3 +10 0 +10 impermissible

35. Continued…

Lesson: Either HAU leaves no room for supererogatory acts or there is no more moral

reason to perform a supererogatory act than there is to perform some permissible but

non-supererogatory alternative.(Q15) Mr. Smith knowingly sends an innocent man to prison for ten long years. What Mr.

Smith did was wrong. Necessarily true or not necessarily true?

Answer: [Redacted]. It may be that punishing this innocent man [Redacted].

36. Continued…

Lesson: On HAU, we should punish someone if and only if [Redacted]. This means that,


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on HAU, we should punish the innocent and we should refrain from punishing the guilty

whenever doing so will maximize hedonic utility. Also, on HAU, the severity of the

punishment should not necessarily be in proportion to the severity of the crime. The

punishment for a less severe crime should be greater than the punishment for a more

severe crime if this will maximize hedonic utility.

37. The Practical Objection to HAU

On HAU, it is often times practically impossible to know how you ought to act. To know

what you ought to do, you would have to consider every possible alternative act open to

you, and, for each, you would need to know, all of its effects from now until the end of

time.

Response: HAU is a criterion of rightness ([Redacted]) not a decision procedure

([Redacted]).

Note that HAU is no more impractical than the view that the most prudent act is the one

that will maximize one’s utility over time. No one would suggest that we ought to reject

the investment principle “Buy low, and sell high” just because it often times practicallyimpossible to know whether the price of a stock’s price is headed up or down.

Note that the utilitarian can employ [Redacted].

38. Theoretical Objections to HAU

Punishment: HAU will, in certain circumstances, call for punishing the innocent as well as

call for disproportionate punishment vis-à-vis the severity of the crime.

Rights: HAU doesn’t allow for the notion that people have rights that protect them from

certain forms of treatment absent their autonomous consent.

Distributive Justice: [Redacted].

39. Continued…

Backward-Looking Reasons: HAU is entirely forward-looking. Thus the fact that

someone, in the past, made some promise, committed some injustice, or was the victim

of some injustice is morally irrelevant.

Demandingness: HAU is extremely demanding. There are few moral options on HAU.

HAU requires great personal sacrifice even when the resulting outcome is only marginally

better than it would be had you not sacrificed.

40. Continued…

Supererogation: On HAU, there are no supererogatory acts. An act is supererogatory if

and only if there is more moral reason to perform it than to perform some morallypermissible alternative.

Special Relationships: On HAU, one’s special relationships are morally irrelevant. HAU

requires acting in a way that’s completely impartial. (However, it doesn’t require that your

motives be impartial.)

41. Responses to these theoretical objections

First Line of Defense: Appeal to [Redacted]. Some proponents argue that, in most real


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world cases, HAU does not have the wildly counter-intuitive implications that it is

purported to have.

42. Continued…

Second Line of Defense: [Redacted]: Some proponents admit that HAU does have

wildly counter-intuitive implications in at least hypothetical cases, but they cite variousreasons for questioning our commonsense intuitions in such cases.

Evolutionary Reasons: Greene’s Work on Our Intuitions in Different Trolley

Cases: Personal vs. Impersonal Violations

Anthropological Reasons: Our intuitions have been wildly mistaken in the past:

The Case of Slavery and the Subjugation of Women.

Consistency Reasons: Our intuitions are often inconsistent: Singer on charity and

animal experimentation

Possible Exam Questions concerning Lecture 3

(a) Explain hedonistic act-utilitarianism (HAU). (b) What is the hedonic utility of an action?(c) Fill in the blank: An act maximizes hedonic utility if and only if…. (d) Explain the

motivation for hedonistic act-utilitarianism.

(a) Explain hedonistic act-utilitarianism (HAU). (b) Explain four of the seven theoretical

objections to HAU that were discussed in class.

(a) Against these theoretical objections, the utilitarian can appeal to remote effects.

Explain how this defense goes. (b) The utilitarian could also just bite the bullet and argue

that the fact that HAU has counter-intuitive implications isn’t overly worrisome given that

our intuitions about such matters are suspect. Explain how this defense goes.

(a) Explain hedonistic act-utilitarianism (HAU). (b) Critically assess the practical objection

to HAU. (c) What sort of decision procedure should hedonistic act-utilitarians adopt? (d)Explain the distinction between a criterion of rightness and a decision procedure.

Answer the following questions according to what hedonistic act utilitarianism (HAU)

entails—answer either “Necessarily True” or “Not Necessarily True.” In each case, explain your

answer and what lesson (or lessons) we should take from it.

An act is morally impermissible if it causes someone a lot of pain and no pleasure.


An act is morally impermissible if it produces, in the aggregate, more pain than pleasure.

In other words, an act is morally impermissible if it has negative hedonic utility.


If an act produces pleasure for many and pain for no one, then it is morally permissible.


It is morally impermissible to listen to Metallica on the car’s CD player if the other two

people in the car would get more pleasure from listening to The Beatles. Assume that

listening to Metallica and listening to The Beatles are the only two available options.

Assume that you and the other two people in the car are the only ones who will be

affected by this choice. Necessarily true or not necessarily true?

In an effort to help his patient, Dr. Smith injects Jones with a shot of penicillin after


27/39

dutifully asking him whether he’s allergic to penicillin and hearing Jones say that he isn’t.

Nevertheless, it turns out, unbeknownst to Jones even, that Jones is severely allergic to

penicillin, and, consequently, he dies as a result of the injection. Assuming that there

would have been more hedonic utility had Dr. Smith not injected Jones with the shot of

penicillin, it follows that what Dr. Smith did was wrong. Necessarily true or not

necessarily true? Anyone who acts wrongly as Dr. Smith did above is a morally bad person, deserving of

both blame and punishment. Necessarily true or not necessarily true?

It is morally permissible to torture an innocent baby in certain circumstances. Necessarily

true or not necessarily true?

The effects that our actions will have on people’s welfare millions of years from now are

just as important as their immediate effects. Necessarily true or not necessarily true?

While waiting at a crosswalk, Mr. Smith sees a stranger about step off the curb into the

path on an oncoming, speeding bus. Without thinking, Mr. Smith reaches out, grabs the

stranger, and pulls him back onto the curb, saving his life. Mr. Smith does this without

even thinking about what the hedonic utility of this act or any of its alternatives might be.What Mr. Smith did was wrong. Necessarily true or not necessarily true?

If you promised a kid ten bucks to wash your car and he did as promised (he washed

your car and did a nice job), you should give him the ten bucks. Necessarily true or not

necessarily true?

Mr. Smith has an extra $500 this month after paying all his bills. He uses that $500 to buy

his son a set of encyclopedias to help with his son’s schoolwork. But had Smith instead

used that $500 to buy some stranger’s kid a set of encyclopedias that would have

produced slightly more hedonic utility. What Mr. Smith did was wrong. Necessarily true or

not necessarily true?

In deciding what to eat for breakfast this morning, Mr. Johnson is morally required tomake the choice that produces the greatest hedonic utility. Assume that, according to

HAU, Mr. Johnson ought to eat something for breakfast this morning, and that what

choice he makes will affect only himself. Necessarily true or not necessarily true?

The King of Siam must adopt either policy X or policy Y. This decision will affect only

those people belonging to one of the following two populations: population A and

population B. Population A consists in a hundred poor persons with 10 hedons each.

Population B consists in a hundred affluent persons with 100 hedons each. The King of

Siam adopts policy X, which has no effect on the people in population A, but raises the

number of hedons for each person in population B by 90 hedons. Had the King of Siam

adopted policy Y instead, this would have had no effect on the people in population B, but

would have raised the number of hedons for each person in population A by 90 hedons.


On HAU, there are no supererogatory acts (i.e., acts that go above and beyond what duty

requires). Necessarily true or not necessarily true?

Mr. Smith knowingly sends an innocent man to prison for ten long years. What Mr. Smith

did was wrong. Necessarily true or not necessarily true?


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1. Singer’s Thesis

All animals (human and non-human) are equal, in the same sense that all humans are

equal.

2. The Notion of EqualityWhen we claim that all human beings, whatever their race, creed, or sex, are equal, what

exactly are we asserting?

Are we asserting that all human beings are equal in their abilities and capacities?

Are we asserting that all races, and both sexes, are equal in their abilities and capacities?

Two reasons why we ought not to base our opposition to racism and sexism on any kind

of actual equality, even the limited kind that asserts that variations in capacities and

abilities are spread evenly between the different races and both sexes:

It may turn out that variations in capacities and abilities are not spread evenly between

the races and sexes, and some variations turn out to be innate.

We would, then, have no basis for opposing an inegaltarian society based on factualdifferences.

4. Factual Equality vs. Prescriptive Equality

“The principle of the equality of human beings is not a description of an alleged actual

equality among humans; it is a prescription of how we should treat humans.”

5. The Basic Principle of Equality

The Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests: We ought to give equal consideration to

the interests of all sentient beings—whatever their race, creed, sex, or species—in our

moral deliberations.

6. Interests and Suffering

The capacity for suffering is sufficient for having interests. Any being with the capacity to

suffer has an interest in avoiding suffering.

Most animals (unlike stones, plants etc) have the capacity to suffer.

Therefore, most animals have an interest in avoiding suffering.

Equal consideration requires that animal interests in not suffering be taken equally into

account with human interests in not suffering.

Failure to give equal consideration to both human and animal interest is speciesm.

7. Racism, Sexism, and Speciesism

What is racism? What is sexism?

Speciesism: A bias towards the interest of the members of one's own species and

against those of the members of another species.

species : speciesism :: race : racism :: sex : sexism

Note, then, that on Singer’s conceptual framework the view that one race/sex/species is


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superior to another is a certain respect is not racist/sexist/speciest.

8. Why is racism wrong?

Why is racism wrong? Why is it wrong to let our treatment of others be dictated by their

race?

Answer : Because race is not itself, relevant to how others ought to be treated.

9. Is species membership relevant?

Is species membership morally relevant? What is it to belong to the species Homo

sapiens?

Does one have to have the capacity for language?

Does one have to have the capacity for abstract reasoning?

Membership in the species Homo sapiens seems both too narrow and too broad to serve

as a legitimate basis for giving direct moral consideration.

Direct versus indirect moral consideration.

Too Narrow: Intelligent aliens.Too Broad: Brain-dead humans.

11. The Argument from Marginal Cases

The Argument from Marginal Cases is meant to show that if we don’t owe animals direct

moral consideration, then we don’t owe marginal cases of humanity direct moral

consideration either. Here’s the argument:

If we are justified in denying direct moral consideration to animals, then we are justified in

denying direct moral consideration to the marginal cases.

We are not justified in denying direct moral consideration to the marginal cases.

Therefore, we are not justified denying direct moral consideration to animals.

12. To avoid being speciesist…

…must we treat all animals the same?

Equal consideration for different beings may lead to different treatment where

interest differ, treatment may differ.

“Animals can feel pain…, [and] there can be no moral justification for regarding the pain

(or pleasure) that animals feel as less important than the same amount of pain (or

pleasure) felt by humans.”

13. HoweverHowever, we must note that…

The same amount of physical pain can cause more total human suffering than animal

suffering; humans have extra capacities:

human memory and anticipation

emotional ties between humans

social communication and stability

But this may not apply to orphan human infants.


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We also must note that an animal’s lack of ability to understand may lead to its greater

suffering.


…must we extend the same rights to all animals?

Equal consideration for different beings may lead to different rights e.g. asserting thatdogs have a right to vote is just as asserting that men have a right to an abortion.


…must we value the lives of all animals equally?

We may admit that some features of certain beings (e.g., self-awareness, the ability to

understand abstract concepts, the ability to act for a reason, etc.) make their lives

more valuable than the lives of other beings who do not have these features; but

there will surely be some nonhuman animals whose lives, by any such standards, are

more valuable than the lives of some humans.

16. Continued…

The question is should we treat severely disabled humans as we now treat nonhuman

animals with equivalent abilities and capacities, or should we treat these nonhuman

animals with the same care that we currently extend to even the most severely disabled

humans. Or perhaps we should adopt some middle position.

17. Why the belief that human life, and only human life, is sacrosanct is speciesist?

To hold that the boundary of the right to life runs exactly parallel to the boundary of our

own species is irredeemably speciesist. “Those who hold the sanctity of [human] life do

this because while distinguishing sharply between humans and other animals they allowno distinctions to be made within our own species, objecting to the killing of the severely

retarded and the hopelessly senile as strongly as they object to the killing of normal

adults.

18. The test for speciesism:

If we are willing to do X to certain nonhuman animals but unwilling to do X on humans

who are in all morally relevant respects inferior to these nonhuman animals, then

we are acting speciesist in doing X to those nonhuman animals.

19. Speciesism in Practice:Factory Farming

Defenses?

Animal Testing and Experimentation

Defenses?

20. A Potential Problem with Singer’s Account of Sexism/Racism/Speciesism


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Is it sexist for a woman to donate her money to breast cancer research as opposed to

prostate cancer research even if the principle of equal consideration of interests supports

the latter?

Is it racist for an African American to set up a scholarship for disadvantaged African

Americans as opposed to setting up a scholarship for disadvantaged Native Americans

even if the principle of equal consideration of interests supports the latter?The importance of special relationships…

21. Continued…

Do we have a special relationship with other members of our species in the way that,

say, women have a special relationship with other members of their sex?

How does this problem bear on Singer’s arguments against practices such as animal

testing and factory farming?

22. The argument from fairness, an argument against speciesism

Fairness demands that beings that are alike in all morally relevant respects be treatedalike.

Fairness demands that brings that are alike in all morally relevant respects

be treated alike.

Speciesism/racism/sexism involves treating different beings differently

simply because they belong to a different species/race/sex.

What species/race/sex a being belongs to is not, in itself, morally relevant.

Therefore, speciesism is unfair.

What species/race/sex a being belongs to is not, in itself, morally relevant.

Therefore, speciesism is unfair.Objections?

The Problem: Absolute Poverty

Nearly one-fifth of the world’s population lives in absolute poverty. Absolute poverty is

poverty by any standard, which is to be distinguished from the relative poverty that we are

familiar with in industrialized nations. Robert McNamara, past president of the World

Bank, describes absolute poverty as follows: “A condition of life so characterized by

malnutrition, illiteracy, disease, squalid surroundings, high infant mortality rate and low lifeexpectancy as to be beneath any reasonable definition of human decency.”

2. Continued…

Those living in absolute poverty have:

An infant mortality rate that is eight times higher than that in most industrialized nations.

A life expectancy that is one-third lower that that in most industrialized nations.

A nutritional level, for one of every two in the population, below acceptable standards.


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Little to no access to even basic health care.

Little to no access to safe drinking water.

-- The above information is from Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, 2nd Edition (New York:

Cambridge University Press, 1993).

3. Some widely available facts about some easily preventable deathsEach year millions of children die from easily preventable causes. Each year around

three million children die from dehydrating diarrhea. Most of these deaths can be

prevented by administrating oral rehydration salts at a cost of around 15 cents a packet.

Also millions of children die from immunizable diseases. Each year over a million die

from measles alone, and it only costs $17 to vaccinate a child against measles.

Pneumonia claims 3.5 million children each year, making it the leading childhood killer.

However, most of these deaths can be prevented with a simple shot of antibiotics costing

about 25 cents. Many malnourished children have a deficiency in vitamin A, causing their

immune systems to be greatly debilitated. Many of these children can be saved with a

semiannual dose of vitamin A costing only 10 cents.

4. Some misconceptions about the problem

Reducing the infant mortality rate in the Third World would cause a population explosion.

The best available evidence supports the claim that decreasing infant mortality rate

actually lowers the rate of population growth. Consider the poverty-ridden Indian state of

Kerala. In this state, the infant mortality rate is significantly lower than average. Yet it has

a low Total Fertility Rate, 1.9, meaning that the population size is actually in decline.

Reducing the infant mortality rate would be pointless because there is little chance that

even those children that make it through infancy will live on into adulthood.Those children that make it through the first five years of life have a 90 percent chance of

living beyond the age of 21.

5. Continued…

Poverty is inseparably linked with high infant mortality and low life expectancy.

Consider again the Indian state of Kerala, one of India's poorest states. Because

Keralans have an adequate supply of food, safe drinking water, and basic health care,

they have the highest life expectancy of any state in India and a lower than average infant

mortality rate.

There is not enough food to meet the nutritional needs of everyone in the world.There is more than enough food to feed the world's population. Most of the grain

produced in industrialized nations is fed to farm animals, converting it into meat, milk, and

eggs. Because this is a very inefficient process, wasting up to 95% of the nutritional value

of the animal feed, people in countries such as the U.S. consume more than three times

as much grain per capita than those countries that consume less animal products.

-- The above information comes from Peter Unger’s Living High and Letting Die: Our


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Illusion of Innocence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).

6. Focusing on the Philosophical Issue

For our purposes, we will not be concerned with whether or not Unger and Singer have

their facts right. We will instead be interested in the following philosophical question: If

these facts are correct, does it follow that we have an ethical obligation to do somethingto alleviate absolute poverty and, if so, what exactly?

And, for the sake of argument, let’s assume that there are some easily identifiable

organizations (such as, Oxfam and UNICEF) such that the following is true: were you to

give a substantial portion of your income to those organizations, the good that that

organization would do with your money would far exceed the good that would come from

your spending that money luxuries for yourself and for your loved ones. More specifically,

let’s assume that for each $200 donation that you make some child who would otherwise

die in infancy will instead live a reasonably long life that is well worth living.

7. Singer’s ArgumentIf [it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby

sacrificing anything of moral significance, we ought, morally, to do it.], we ought,

morally, to do it.

Absolute poverty (i.e., suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care) is

bad.

There is some absolute poverty that we can prevent without sacrificing anything of

(comparable) moral significance.

Therefore, we (morally) ought to prevent some absolute poverty.

8. Critically Assessing the ArgumentIs the argument valid?

Yes.

The argument is valid because there is no possible way for the conclusion

to be false while the premises are true.

Which, if any, premises are controversial?

Premise 2 is incontrovertible.

Premise 3 is controversial, but we're going to accept it for the sake of the

argument since we’re interested in the philosophical issue of whether assuming

that Premise 3 is true we’re obligated to do something to prevent absolute

poverty.This leaves us with Premise 1.

9. Premise 1: Singer’s Principle

By “without sacrificing anything of (comparable) moral significance,” Singer means

without causing anything else (comparably) morally bad to happen, or doing something

that is wrong in itself, or failing to promote some moral good (comparable in significance


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to the bad thing we can prevent).

Does giving up luxuries count as sacrificing anything of moral significance let alone as

sacrificing anything of comparable moral significance?

By eliminating both the parentheses and the words enclosed by them, we obtain the

moderate principle. By eliminating the parentheses and keeping the words they

enclosed, we obtain the strong principle.

10. Getting Clear on What the Principle Says

Is either version of Singer’s principle equivalent to the act-utilitarianism (a.k.a. the

principle of utility)?

Answer: No.

Neither principle requires that we do anything in a world in which nothing

bad is going to happen. Act-utilitarianism requires us not only to prevent

what is bad but also to promote what is good.

What does he mean by “morally ought to give aid”? Does he mean that it would be

supererogatory to do so or that it would be wrong not to do so? Answer: He means that you're morally obligated to give and thus it would

be wrong not to do so.

What does Singer say in support of his principle?

Answer: He gives the example of the shallow pond and our intuition of we

are morally obligated to save the child.

11. Two Implications of His Principle

It makes no difference whether the person I can help is a neighbor’s child ten yards away

from me or a Bengali whose name I shall never know, ten thousand miles away.

The situation where there are millions of other people who are equally able to provide aidbut are not doing so is not significantly different, morally speaking, from the situation

where I am the only person who can provide aid.

12. With regard to the first implication

Proximity may make it more likely, for obvious psychological reasons, that I shall assist

him, but it is not obvious that proximity makes any difference concerning whether I ought

to assist him.

Distance can matter indirectly, as where proximity puts me in a better position to judge

what a person needs are. But is it at all unclear what the Bengali’s refugee’s needs are?

Distance can also matter indirectly, as where proximity puts me in a better position toeffect a positive outcome. But famine relief organizations have people in the field who

can direct our aid to distant strangers in need just as effectively as we could someone on

our own block. In fact, they might even be more effective.

13. With regard to the second implication

Consider the case where I see other people around the shallow pond, no further away


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than I am, who have also noticed the drowning child but are doing nothing.

Is my obligation to save the child diminished?

But suppose that if everyone was to give $10 to the Bengal Relief Fund, there would be

enough to provide food, shelter, and medical care for all the refugees. Why should I be

required to give more than $10?

Here’s the argument:If everyone in circumstances like mine were to give $10, I would have no obligation to give

more than $10. Therefore, I am not obligated to give more than $10. This is invalid.

What premise would we need to add to make the argument valid?

Is that premise true?

People in the same circumstances have the same obligation, but the fact that others

have given or not given, or are expected or not expected to give, are relevant

circumstances.

14. Objections

Does his principle (the moderate version) imply that we should take care of those inabsolute poverty before taking car

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Intro to Ethics Notes (PHI 105)