Interview With George Habash (1998) - TRANSCRIPT

5/28/2018 Interview With George Habash (1998) - TRANSCRIPT

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T a k i n g S t o c k . A n I n t e r v i e w w i t h G e o r g e H a b a s hA u t h o r ( s ) : G e o r g e H a b a s h a n d M a h m o u d S o u e idR e v i e w e d w o r k ( s ) :S o u r c e : Journal of Palestine Studies, V o l . 2 8 , N o . 1 ( A u t u m n , 1 9 9 8 ) , p p . 8 6 - 1 0 1P u b li sh ed b y : Univers i ty of Cal ifornia Press on b eh a l f of t h e Ins t i tute for Pa les tine StudiesS t a b l e U R L : ht tp: / /www.js tor .org/s table /2538058A c c e s s ed : 3 0 / 1 1 / 2 0 1 2 0 5 :4 2

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I N T E R V I E WT A K I N G S T O C K

A N INTERVIEW WIT H GEO RGE HABASH

Soueid How old were you when you left Lydda? Were you politicallyaware from an early age?Habash I was in elementary school during the Great Rebellion of 1936-39,and I still vividly recall the anti-British demonstrations and strikes organizedby the Palestinian nationalists and slogans like "Down with colonialism " and"Down with the Balfour Declaration " The principal of our school, TawfiqAbu al-Su'ud, was an ardent nationalist. I remember once when a fight brokeput in a corridor among the younger students, he chastised them, saying:"Instead of fighting among yourselves, fight theJews "Another day our arith-metic teacher asked us to stand and observe a minute of silence. I had noidea what it was about, and I don't think anyone else did either. When theminute was up, the teacher said: "At this veiy moment, our young men aregoing to the gallows for fighting for their homeland."1 I was greatly movedby that incident. So I was a nationalist then in a broad sense, but I had nothought of a political career.

When I was thirteen, just after finishing elementary school, my familymoved from Lydda to Jaffa. I enrolled in the [Greek] Orthodox School there,but since it wasn't a full secondaiy school, after the second year I transferredto Terra Sancta2 in Jeaisalem. After I graduated, I returned to Jaffa andworked as a teacher for two years. I used to spend my spare time at theOrthodox Club, reading Egyptian magazines, particularly articles on literaryand cultural topics. In 1944,1 went to Beirut where I enrolled in the Ameri-can University.Soueid Was it at AUB [American University of Beirut] that you becameinvolved in politics?Habash I was immersed in my studies then but was deeply affected by cer-tain landmark events. The 1947 UN partition resolution, for example. It wasdifficult to conceive of my homeland divided. And when Palestinians began

GEORGE HABASH ( 1 9 2 6 - ) is founder of the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM) and thePopular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). He was interviewed in Damascus,wherehe has lived since the Israeli invasion of Beirut in 1982, on 23, 24, and 25 October1997 by Mahmo ud Soueid, director of IPS Beirut. The following are excerpts of the muc hlongerinterview, which was published in its entirety in an Arabic monograph by IPS Beirut.1. In the course of the Great Rebellion, the British hanged some 112 Palestinians.2. A leading private Catholic seconda iy school.

Journal ofPalestineStudiesXXVIII, no. 1 (Autumn 1998),pp. 86-101.


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A N I N T E R V IE W W I T H G E O R G E H A B A S H 87

to be driven out in 1948, I started wondering: since the Arab world is largeand great, how can it be defeated by a handful of gangs?Then, at the beginning of my second year of medical school, a classmate

named Ma' tuqal-Asmar,w ho cam e from Nablus, told me ab out closed semi-nars of twenty to twenty-five students being organized by Professor Con-stantine Zurayk,3 who was talking about Arab nationalism, the Arab nation,and the need for a renaissance. I began to at tend. Ma'tuq also wanted us tomeet wi th an AUB alumnus named Ramiz Shihadeh to discuss how to

George Habash, founder of th e Arab Nationalist Movem ent andPop ular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. IPS Beirut Arch ive)

achieve Arab unity and save Palestine. But by that time, I was determined toreturn to Lydda, so the meeting never took place.Soueid You returned to Lydda during the 1948 war?Habash: It w as Ju ne 1948. Th e acade m ic yea r w as over, an d the universitywas closed. By that time, the Zionist forces had expelled the population ofJaffa, an d th e ex od us from Palestine was at its peak. M any had fled to Lydda,

3. Born in Damascus in 1909, Zurayk was a leading his tor ian and exponent of secular pan-Arabism. His monograph on 1948, The Meaning of the Disaster, had a s t rong impact onArab intellectuals.


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88 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES

including my parents. They were fairly well offmy father had a store, youcou ld call him amerchantand they had sent me money, wanting me to s tayin Beirut . My mother was always worrying about me.

So they were veiy surprised when I showed up in Lydda. They didn' t be-lieve I could be of any use under the circumstances. I thought about it . CouldI fight? Since I had already started to study medicine, I thought I could be ofservice in this area. There was a doctor at Lydda Hospital, from the Zahlanfamily. I began to serve as Dr. Mustafa Zahlan's assistant.Soueid What was the situation in Lydda like at the time?Habash: There was an extraordinaiy anxiety, like in the other towns andvillages that had n't yet fallen to the Jew s. Air raids had th e po pu latio n terror-ized, and the town was overflowing with refugees from the surrounding ar-eas that had been at tacked by the Zionist gangs. The Lydda branch of theArab Higher Committee headed by Hajj Amin al-Husseini urged people tostay put and even tried to prevent them from leaving. Some took comfortfrom the presence of an Arab Legion force near Lydda, 4 thinking i t wouldsave the city w h en th e Jew ish forces launc he d their massive assault.

5

Soueid Where were you at the time of the attack?Habash: I wa s at the hospital, he lpin g Dr. Zahlan. Th e place was overflow-ing with dead and wounded, and the situation was quite terrifying.

I w as totally occ upie d w he n my m other 's m aternal aunt came to the hos-pital looking for me. She wanted me to return home, saying my mother wasworried about me. Of course I refused. Finally she had to tell me that mysister had been killed, my older sister whom I loved dearly [he pauses tocontrol himself]. As I rushed through the streets, there was great confusion,Dead an d wou nde d, so me of w ho m I knew , were s t rewn along the s ide ofthe road.

We buried my sister near our house because we could not get to the cem-etery. Th ree ho urs later, Jew ish fighters storm ed th e hou se, scream ing: "OutOut Get out " My m oth er an d m y sister 's childrenincluding a small childwe had to carryran out, as did other relatives and neighbors. We had noidea where to go, but the Jewish soldiers ordered us to get moving. So wewalked. I t was a hot day in Ramadan. Some people around us were saying i twa s the Day of Judg me nt, othe rs said we w ere already in Hell . W hen wereach ed the outskir ts of tow n, we found a Jewish c heck point w he re thoseleaving were being searched. We had no weapons. But our neighbor 's son,Amin Hanhan, apparent ly had some money concealed on him and wouldn' tlet them search him. A Zionist soldier shot him dead right in front of our

4. A small force, about a company strong (100 soldiers), was stationed halfway betweenLydda and Ramla.5. Ope ration D ani, launch ed 9-10 July 1948. The exp ulsion of the city's inhabitants wascomplete by 14 July. See the in troduction to Spiro Munayyer, "The Fall of Lydda,"inJPS108.


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AN INTERVIEW WITH GEORGE HABASH 89

eyes. His mother and sister rushed to him, wailing. His brother, Bishara, hadbeen in elementary school with me and we were fr iends. We used to s tudyand play together . . . [again he is overcom e with emotion].

You wonder why I have chosen this road, why I became an Arab nation-alist. This is what Zionism is about. After all this, they talk about peace. Thiswas the Zionism that I knew, that I saw with my own eyes.Soueid What happened to your family?Habash: W e w ent to Ramallah. My family the n mo ve d on to Am man, and Iwent back to Beirut to continue my medical s tudies.

Soueid What about your remaining years at AUB ? Which of your fellowstudents do you remember?Habash: Hani al-Hindi,6 Wadi ' Haddad,7 Ahmad al-Khatib,8 Saleh Shibel,Hamed al-Juburi , among many others .9 We were part of a student politicalmovement with members in al l of Lebanon.Soueid Were you thinking then of some undertaking beyond studentactivities?Habash: Of cou rse. With W adi' Ha dd ad, Ah ma d al-Khatib, an d Hani al-Hindi, we were attracted by the idea of direct actionfast and effective ac-tion. We were young at the time. Hani al-Hindi told us about individuals inSyria wh o th oug ht the wa y w e did. That is ho w the Kata ib al-Fida al- Arabi[Arab Com m and o Battal ions] wa s born. I and Hani a nd Jihad D ahi 1 0 andHussein Tawfiq from Egypt and others were active in the Kata ib al-Fida al-Arabi. Our primary targets were first traitors, then the British, and finallyIsrael. However, following the abortive attempt to assassinate Shishakli,11which was carried out by Hussein Tawfiq, possibly at the behest of otherparties (withou t my app rov al or that of Han i and Jiha d), it oc cur red to m ethat it was unreasonable to expect to liberate Palestine through such tacticsand that it was time to start thinking of launching a political movement.

Gu ided b y what Han i and I had be en reading at the t ime, the idea crystal-lized in our minds that it was not possible to liberate Palestine without firstachieving Arab unity. The organ izat ion w e ha d in mind cou ld be ru n only by

6. Hani al-Hindi, a Syrian, was one of the founders of the ANM along with Habash, Had-dad, and al-Khatib. He was later a minister in the Egyptian-Syrian United Arab Republic(UAR: 1958-61).7. A Greek Orthodo x Palestinian from Safad a nd, like Habash , an AUB -trained m edicaldoctor,Haddad became Habash's right-hand man and later operational commander of thePFLP.8. Ahmad al-Khatib, an AUB-trained medical doctor from Kuwait, eventually became amember of parliament and opposition leader in Kuwait.9. Shibel and al-Juburi were Palestinian and Iraqi, respectively.10. A Syrian, later a minister in a UAR cabinet.11. Adibal-Shishakli was president of Syria (1953-54).


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determined men who would forsake their personal careers and dedicatethemselves to the cause. Thus the nucleus of ANM began to form.Of course, a very broad Arab nationalist trend already existed. What char-

acterized the ANM was the belief that the liberation of Palestine requiredArab unity. We believed that the movement had to be very tightknit.Soueid Was there an ideological basis for the core group?Habash: It wa s the thou ght of Zurayk, w h o had writ ten abo ut the Nakbah,and Sati ' al-Husari,12 known then as the father of Arab nationalism. Once,when Husari was asked why we lost in 1948, he replied: "Because we wereseven states ." But of course, reading Zurayk and Husari was not enough.When we began to think of organizing a poli t ical movement, we real izedthat we had to read everything. We determined that we would not al lowourselves to form a movement unti l we were convinced that we had a poli t-ical vision (in keeping with what we understood political vision to be at thet ime) and an iron organizat ion, which had to be proven in act ion, notthrough words .

Regarding ideology, Marxism had not yet come into the picture for uswe had a negative attitude toward it because of the Soviet Union's support ofpartition. In any case, we made an intense effort to learn and did an enor-mous amount of reading. With Hani and Wadi ' Haddad, we read a lot ofhistory, about the Germ an a nd I tal ian unification mo vem ents a nd the FrenchRevolution and so on. I also studied the Qur'an. So did Wadi'. I still have avivid men tal im age of W adi' and Hani, im m erse d in their reading. . . .

W e insisted first o n be ing h on est w ith ourselve s. It w asn 't until three yearsfrom the t ime we began thinking about i t that we announced the formationof the organizat ion. We began to organize in 1951. I went to Amman, andWadi ' fol lowed me there, 1 3 and later it occurred to us that we had to makethe movement our full-time occupation and that no sacrifice would be toogreat. When Ahmad Khatib, who had gone to Kuwait, collected his first paycheck of 100 dinars, he sent us 90 dinars. We said: Now we can begin.

Soueid If you were to organize the Arab Nationalist Movemen t all overagain, what would you do the same and what would you change?Habash: I wo uld introd uce dem ocra cy as a basic motto, start ing in the fam-ily and at school, in club s and associations, all the w ay to de m oc racy in polit-ical activities, organizations, parties, and state institutions. Thus, in additionto recov ering Pa lestine, I w ou ld ad d the issue of dem ocra cy.

12. Sati' al-Husari, director of education in Iraq during the 1940s and a leading theoreticianof Arab nationalism, had a profo und influence on Arab nationalist thinking of the 1950s and1960s.13.Habash and Haddad started a "people's clinic" that dispensed free medical treatment inAmman until 1957.


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A N INTERVIEW WITH GEORGE HABASH 91

I also used to understand unity in terms of the paradigm case of the totaland instantaneous union between Egypt and Syria, without adequate prepa-ration, under Nasir in 1958. Now I understand it differently. We must firstconsider the issue of com pleme ntari ty an d see unity as a cumulative proce ssto be completed in s tages, s tep by step, consolidating achievements condu-cive to unity in the economic, social, or cultural realms.

I see it no w as being ach ieved in successive stages of rap pro che m en t andin regional unitsthe Maghrib states, for example, the countries of the Fer-tile Crescent, Egypt and Sudan, the Arabian peninsula and the Gulf. Movesamong neighbors in one region whether or not s imilar progress is made inothers. Eventually, there could be a federation among the regional unitsmodeled on the United States. In the meantime, at the pan-Arab level, thereshould be freedom of movement for individuals, the promotion of intra-Arabtrade, coordination among Arab universities, and certain civil measures. Wewould be embarking on a long and interl inked process.

Then there is the issue of socialism. At the beginning, socialism was noton our agenda: our motto was "Unity, Liberation, and Revenge revenge forwhat happened in Palestine. Socialism was incorporated later as a result ofgive and take within the party.

I want to emphasize that my principal ideas were formed in response toeventsreal events determined my line of thinking. Reading and party de-bates played a role, but if you are asking about the principal influence onGeorge Habash's thinking, the answer would have to be eventsthebreak-u p of the UAR in 196 1, th e 1967 war, th e 1973 war, th e intifada. First, ev en tsoccur, then the debates about what hap pen ed, then what o ne readsevents ,interactions, readingin that order.Soueid Can we go back to the topic of socialism?Habash: As I said, socialism wa s not part of ou r age nd a at the b egin ning ,even though we knew that the masses were the basis for eveiything. In thatsense, we were progressive.

Then we issued a veiy important circular outlining the stages in whichsocialism had to be realized. That was the first step toward greater democ-racy with regard to the movement's ideology. In those days we were stillable to evolve without creating splits within the movement. Had that state ofaffairs co ntinu ed, the ANM w ou ld not have bro ke n do w n.

The fact that Nasir was advocating socialism at the time of the union withSyria gave rise to a debate within the party. In early 1959, we set up a culturalcommittee in Beirut headed by Muhsin Ibrahim,14 wi th Muhammad al-Zayyat, Jos ep h M ughaizel ,15 'Abdal-HamidSharaf,16 and Ahmad Staitiyya as

14. Muhsin Ibrahim, a Lebanese Shi 'a, later headed a leftist splinter faction of the ANM andul t imately became head of the Organizat ion for Communist Act ion in Lebanon (OCAL).15. Mughaizel , a Lebanese Maroni te , became a prominent lawyer and president of the ArabCultural Club, the leading Lebanese forum for pan-Arab ideas.


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members. Following a discussion between the ANM's command and the cul-tural committee, it was decided to incorporate socialism in the agenda and toreplace the term "revenge" with "recovering Palestine." Thus the ANM'smotto became "Unity, Liberation, Socialism, and Recovering Palestine." Thelat ter change was based on a recommendation of the cultural committee,which argued that the formulat ion "revenge" was not popular . The commit-tee also advised differentiating between Jews and Zionists.Soueid You said earlier that it was the breakup of the UAR that led togreater depth in your socialist thinking and drove you to Marxism.Habash: The break up of the unio n op en ed m y eyes, forcing me to look intothe forces that had brou ght it about. I gained a dee pe r un derstan ding of classstruggle, com ing to realize the ex tent to w hic h it w as a factor in ou r society. Ialso drew lessons from Vietnam. I see no contradict ion between being anArab nationalist and being a true socialist.

But m y real com m itme nt to Marxism ca m e after the 1967 war. My Marxismgrew deeper during my imprisonment in Syria. I am indebted to my jai ler ,'Abd al-Karim al-Jundi, who kept me in solitary confinement for nine or tenmonths, thinking he would break me. I spent that entire period reading al lthe collected works of Marx and Engles, of Lenin, also of Ho Chi Minh andMao. It was after that that I wrote the declaration of the [Popular] Front'ssecond national convention.Soueid How do you see relations between the Popu lar Front for the Libera-tion of Palestine (PFLP) and Fatah now with regard to armed struggle?Habash: Armed st ruggle was a co m m on deno minator betw een us and Fatahuntil Abu 'Ammar [Yasir Arafat] caved in and signed the Oslo agreement.But we always differed on major issues. For example, we always stressed theinterd ep en den ce of the Palest inian and Arab nationalis t dimensio ns, that thel iberat ion of Palest ine cannot be achieved without this interdependence.Fatah's grave errorits fatal errorwas to disengage the Palestinian causefrom the Arab nationalist cause.

Second is the class dimension. When the bourgeoisie achieves its classobjectives, it ceas es to fight. Wha t ha p p en ed wa s that a certain class fraction,represented now by the Oslo team, believes i t has scored an achievement.But what of the masses? What about their interests?

Look at what has become of the masses. The corruption and co-optat ionof the Palestinian masses by Fatah constitutes a calamity that boggles themind. Those same masses that had survived all the wars and the attempts tomarginalize and defeat them, that had withstood the Zionist military machineinside and outside the occupied territories are now, after thirty years, de-spair ing and despondent under their bourgeois leadership, due to the under-

16.Sharaf was a member of the Iraqi Hashimite royal family who later became prime min-ister of Jordan.


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mining of their nationalist achievements and institutions and the stifling ofdemocracy by the repressive state apparatuses. Mafias are on the rise, andconnect ions wi th the occupying power are being exploi ted to secure mo-nopolies on daily necessities.

Still, although I lay the basic blame for the current state of affairs on thePalestinian Authority team, I do not exempt the opposition, which has notrisen to the challenge or been true to its declared objectives and programs.

As for armed struggle, the PFLP advocated it until the intifada. Underarmed struggle, it is the fedayeen who fight, but under the intifada, it is allthe Palestinian peoplechi ldren, women, artists, everybody. With the in-tifada, I felt for the first time that it w as po ssib le to ac hie ve fre edo m an dindependence in some part of Palest ine.

I know now that there were those who turned armed struggle into a sa-cred r ite. W e've go ne be yo nd this notion no w an d see arm ed struggle as partof the wider political battle. Whether or not one adopts armed staiggle isdetermined not by matters of conscience but by the nature and practices ofthe enem y. It is also determ ined by the object ives of the Palest inian p e o p l e -objectives that cannot be achieved by diplomatic action alone but that re-quire a comprehensive struggle in which revolutionary violence, in its vari-ous manifestat ions, has a special place. There is no contradict ion betweenthis and oth er forms of struggle, such as the political, cultural, an d eco no m ic.

But the Oslo agreement squandered the achievements of the int ifada inthe occupied homeland, just as i t squandered the achievements of the armedstaigg le ph ase . In fact, pu tting an e nd to the intifada w as o ne of Israel's basicconditions for agreeing to the Oslo accord.Soueid But by the time the PLO started negotiating, the intifada was al-ready in its death throes.Habash: Abu 'Ammar began making concessions even before that t ime, atthe Algiers conference. This is what caused Israel to demand further conces-sions. He went to negotiate under the worst possible condit ions from thePalestinian, Arab, and international perspectives.

Soueid The PFL P has been criticized for hijackings and hostage taking.What wou ld you say about this matter in terms of ideology and procedures?Habash: Starting in the 1960s, the re was a lot of co nc ern ab ou t Israel 's nu-clear capability; I remember discussing the issue with Nasir. We used to haveanadvisoiy board consisting of Palestinian professors and other friends, andthey thought we should draw world at tention to the nuclear issue. Mean-while Wadi ' and I were tiying to determine how world opinion could beawakened to the injust ice that has been done to the Palest inian people.Wadi ' came up with the hi jacking idea, but he repeatedly used to instaictthose carrying out the operat ions not to hurt anyone in any way. We wantedto attract world attention through some action, and that was it .


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Soueid Do you think that kidnapping civilians has won supporters for thePalestinian cause? Even if one were a supporter of the Palestinian cause,surely such an ordeal would have a negative effect on one s sympathies. ...Habash: We put an end to those operat ions in 1972. But looking at thethree-year period when we carr ied them out , we have to conclude that they

did have an impact . We have to evaluate the opera-We have to evaluate the t ions in a wid er perspe ctive than the bi tter person al

operations in a wider exp erien ce of the individual passen gers, and ourperspective than the bitter evaluation was that these ope rat ions m ade the wo rldpersonal experience of the aw are of our pe op le's suffering.

individual passengers. As for th e op era tio ns again st Israeli civilians, o n eopinion was that all Israelis are settlers and usurpers.

I am o ne of those wh o subscribes to this view. Nevertheless, we focussed onthe military. I agree that there should be an ethical dimension to the struggle,but it is significant that the heated condemnations usually come from Israel 'ssupporters. If you add up all the civilian victims of Zionist state terrorismamong the Palestinians, Lebanese, and other Arabs, you will see that thenumber is tens of times greater than the Israeli civilians killed.Soueid What isyour opinion of suicide bombings and random bombings?Habash: As a Front , our view is that any act ion that un der min es the coh e-siveness of the occupation is beneficial to our cause and our struggle. Ofcourse, our objective is not to harm civilians. Struggle for us is not an act ofvandalism but a means to regain our usurped rights. The enemy's refusal toack now ledg e these r ights (and i ts reco urse to the most brutal m ean s to avoidit) is responsible not only for what has happened to the Palestinians but alsofor what may happen to Israelis.

To those who would l ike me to condemn those operat ions , I say: whysho uld I? I am n ot the party w h o b ears th e responsibility. I wish to affirmIsrael 's responsibility. One must go back to the roots of the issue and deter-mine responsibility at the source.Soueid What lessons can be drawn from the Resistance s ordeals infordanand Lebanon?Habash: Armed struggle cam e abo ut as the natural co nse qu en ce of the 1967defeat . I t was a popular and organized reaction to the loss of homeland andnew forcible exile and occupation at a t ime when the remnants of other co-lonial ventures elsewhere in the world were being dismantled.

The Jordanian army had collapsed in the 1967wa r, and th e U nited Statesquickly put it back together again as a counterrevolutionary force. Theresoon arose a s i tuat ion in which the Resistance was caught between a s trongIsraeli army o n the o ne h and and the Jorda nian army on th e other . TheJord anian army c ould no t be said to be an en em y like Israel, but still, it wa s aregular army caught in a confrontation with revolutionary forces.The Resistance found itself in aveiy difficult situation, though I believe itcould have been saved if a real national unity, in the full sense of the term,


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AN INT E RVIE W W IT H GE O RGE HABAS H 95

ha d be en estab lished, if the Palestinian ma sses had be en m obilized, an d if analliance with the Jorda nian masses as repre sente d by pan-Arab tend enc iesinside Jord an h ad b ee n forged. What hap pe ne d w as that Fatah total ly ne-glected the pan-ArabJordanian elements .

Then there is the question of possible military alliances with neighboringArab states: there w as an Iraqi army unit in Jord an , an d the Syrian army wa snext door. But there was no comprehensive Palestinian vision of the situa-tion. Perh aps the P alestinian Left wa s in a bette r situation than it thou gh t, bu tit was not up to the task.I don't want to minimize the unjustifiable errors of conduct of the Resist-ance in Jord an. We co mm itted grave errors in February, Ju ne , and Septem -ber 1970, but other faults were fabricated in order to heighten populardivisions and to feed the resentment against the Resistance in order to justifya strong attack against it later.Soueid Wou ld it have been different if there had been a nationalist regimeand army in Jordan?Habash: It is true that coe xisten ce be tw ee n two authorities ove r the sam eterritory is difficult. Still, one can imagine a situation where a nationalist re-gime would seek to understand the demands and object ives of the Revolu-tion and, witho ut relinqu ishing its ow n autho rity, perm it it to build a base foritself. For this, of course, it would be necessary to organize the relationshipbetween the two and define the scope of the authori ty of each.Soueid During the war in Leban on, which was not purely a civil war, onecould say that the country was used as a battleground, and that Lebanonwas destroyed without any sense of responsibility on the Arabs part forwhat happened. Have you at the PFL P reflected on this in reviewing theevents in Lebanon?Habash: It is very painful to think abo ut w ha t ha p pe n ed to Leb anon , and itis our duty to reflect deeply and responsibly on the lessons to be learnedfrom the struggles fought there.

As far as the PFLP is concerned, the situation in Lebanon was a quasi-perm ane nt topic for discussion at our con ferences and at the me etings of ourcommand organizations. In Lebanon, one lost all sight of what was essential,and everything was buried under the rubble of inst inct ive reactionssectar-ian, political, and regional. W he n relations a re allow ed to sink to that level ofmoral and intellectual depravity, one wrongs oneself first and then theothers. That is why we issued an important release entitled "Lebanon's Pales-tinians and the choice of a historical reconciliation, internally and withothers" that focused on this ambiguity, i .e., the basic point that the dignityand interests of the Lebanese are part and parcel of the dignity and interestsof the Palestinians, and vice versa. The moral and creative bases of unity reston the acknowledgement of diversity and individual differences, which haveno real meaning outside the framework of unity. In turn, unity has no legiti-macy except insofar as it takes diversity and individuality into account, the


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96 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIESvarious forms of which are basic constituent elements of the public [pan-Arab] self. W ithout this regulator, individual differences be co m e a co nstan tsource of destructive internal struggles and hemorrhaging, just as the publicself in turn becomes a repressive force which seeks to impose a stultifyingsameness. This is how the dynamics st if l ing freedom and democracy areconstantly regenerated.Soueid If the Lebanese N ational Movem ent (LNM) had been in control,wou ld tha t have m ade any d ifference in the course of events?Habash: I am no t sure the results w ou ld have be en very different, b eca use Iam aware of the weaknesses and the serious defects afflicting the LNM at thetime. Its objectives were noble and just, but there was a lack of clarity in itssociopolitical agenda and a weakness in its organizational structure. In fact,the LNM wa s unab le to put forward a progra m and a vision that t ransce nde dthe existing crisis. It continued to be reactive, which is why it could not getbeyond the dominant culture in its political, social, and organizational prac-tices. The Lebanese formula was held in place by both political and socialforces; the confessional mentality and culture in Lebanon were so deeplyentrenched and so widespread that only a veiy strong and mature politicalmovement could br ing about ser ious change.

That wa s why the LNM wa s always dep en de nt u po n o utside forces. Thatis ho w the Palestinian Right in Lebano n ma na ge d to exercise heg em on y overthe decisions of the LNM, depriving it of a vital condition of independenceand forcing on it the Right's own failed and narrow strategies. For in fact, inexploiting the LNM, the Palestinian rightist trend fell into the same fatal trapin Lebanon that it did in Jordan.

Our point of view at the PFLP was that we had to take a constant hard linetoward Israel and to give unlimited support to the LNM and its progressive-democratic plans. That is why we constantly stressed that the leadershipshou ld b e totally in the ha nd s of the LNM, wh ich of co urse h ad to formulatea clear perspective on the confrontation with the Zionist enemy alongside itssociopolitical vision of the solution to the dilemmas of Lebanon.

Soueid What, in your opinion, is the secret of the success of Hizballah?How does that differ from the experience of the Palestinian resistance inLebanon?Habash: Th ere are four basic elem ents: In the first plac e, Hizballah is op er-ating on its own territory, amidst its own people; secondly, there is the se-crecy that surrounds its military apparatus and leadership, its refusal to adoptfixed positions, and its brilliant use of maneuver for strategic and tacticalpurposes; thirdly, Hizballah has a unified leadership; and in the fourth place,Hizballah has benefitted from our experiences, both positive and negative,so that it has not fallen into the same errors that we did. Hizballah is thecrowning achievement of our bi t ter and bloody experiences.


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Soueid Do you believe that the battle of Beirut in 1982 affected the courseof subsequen t events? Did it help launch the intifada, for example?Habash: . . .The re is no dou bt that while arm ed struggle was being wa gedoutside Palestine, the masses inside could rest content that the revolutionwas continuing. When that external horizon was closed off and i t becameclear that the revolution outside Palestine had reached an impasse, the in-tifada began. So the intifada cannot be isolated from the Lebanon war.

At the Palest inian and Arab levels , two trends became apparent: one pro-posing to go on with the intifada, the other saying that we were at the end ofthe road and should take up the poli t ical option so as to secure some of thefruits of twenty years of struggle. But that meant not capitalizing on the ben-efi ts of seasoned experience, forsaking our cumulative achievements, andcutting ourselves off from what we had lived through, tragically placing ourhopes on what the enemy would give us .

In the final days of the Lebanese war, Abu 'Ammar had come to see me atthe PFLP office at the headquarters of al-Hadaf ou r official organ . H e ask edto speak to me in private. He asked me: "What do you say to us leavingtogether?" I asked: "W here to?" H e said "Tunis or Cyprus." I un de rsto od w hathe was thinking. I told him: "If you think that the revolution is over, I don'tshare your opinion. The revolution must go on, even under very difficultcircumstances. We must stay, and safeguard national unity and our ties withthe only power capable of supporting us now: Syria." He left after that, but Idid not leave with him. It was clear which path he wanted to take. The Leba-non war did play a role in that.

Soueid Would you consider the establishment of a Palestinian state inmost of the West Bank and Gaza, withEastJerusalem as its capital, to be anacceptable solution?Habash: First of all , w e are no t anyw he re ne ar such an outc om e. Even if theLabor party were to come back to power in Israel, there would still be theissues of Jerusa lem , the settlem ents, the right of return, bor de rs, and wa terresources. If an acceptable interim solution becomes available, we shouldtell our masses: this is an interim solution, not the end of the matter.Soueid Are you of the opinion that the Palestinian cause w as better offbefore O slo than it is now?Habash: Even a quick revie w of the results ach ieve d sh ow s that w e lost agreat deal more than we gained in Oslo. Conversely, Israel gained muchmore than itlostour losse s are n et ga ins for Israel. This is a reflection of theimpasse to which Oslo has led us and of the Palestinians' difficult circum-stances in our occupied homeland and the diaspora.

We should have hung on to our international legit imacy, coordinated ourposition with the Arab countries. We should have allied ourselves with Syria,put our house in order, and continued to resist in all the ways open to us.


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Soueid Would you agree to a dialogue with the forces in Israeli society thatrecognize the national rights of the Palestinian people? Do you think it use-

ful to work with those forces?Habash: From a tactical persp ective , w e should exploit any divisions withinIsrael that exist. We should bear in mind, however, that the forces in Israelthat advocate Palestinian rights are extremely marginal and have not playedan effective role so far. In fact, they are often used by those who wish tocreate a compliant Palestinian mentality, offering a public relations positionthat wins Palestinian concessions which in turn are paraded before Israelipublic opinion as proof of Israeli good intentions. In our view, divisionswithin Israel will not become serious unless there is a solid Palestinian-Arabfront capable of forcing Israel to come to grips with the difficult questions itlikes to avoid.Soueid What is your assessment of the Arab situation today?Habash: Th ese are the darkest days of the Palestinian cause. W he n I review

the events of 1936, 1948, the fifties, the sixties, theWhen I review the events seventies, I find the curren t pe riod to be the wo rst.of 1936, 1948, the fifties, Why? Be cau se the wo rst thing yo u can do is to sur-the sixties, the seventies, I rende r. As long as you are fighting to regain you r dig-find the current period to nity, wh ich has be en deb ased, and you r occ upie d

be the worst. land, the n things are well. I believ e that regime s, an dsome parties or forces, are capable of surrender.

However, the Arab peoplealthough they may retreat or lie dormant for awhilewill ultimately not accept that their land be occupied and their rightsusurped indefinitely. There are positive developments in Palestine, Egypt,Jorda n, Leban on, ev en in the Maghrib. W he n I me et you th from v arious Arabcountries, I can sense the extent of their commitment to the nationalist cause.

Soueid What wou ld you do about the situation that has emerged since theGulf War?Habash: Concerning what ha pp en ed in theGulf, I am of course against oneArab country occupying another. We said so clearly at the time, as it hasalways been our convict ion that the road to unity must be a democratic one.Unity is a matter of free choice, not violence. One cannot resort to arbitrarymethods, or coercion, to overcome cultural effects and the economic, poli t-ical, and social realities that over time h av e resulted in our d ivision into sepa -rate states. One has to work toward unity gradually and on a long-term basis.

The question is how to remedy the negative results of the war. We have toconcern ourselves with Arab solidarity. For example, three Arab countriesLibya, Sudan, and Iraqare under an embargo by the United States. The en-tire Arab nation must struggle to put an end to it . The opposing alliance'sdetermination to persevere in its hostile actions against the Arab nation re-


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doubles whenever i t sees an increase in weakness and divisiveness in theArab world. If the Arabs were to undertake some kind ofchallengeI don'tme an war, but at least a serious econ om ic confrontat ion or media cam paign,they would improve their posi t ion vis-a-vis the enemy and gain some re-spect am ong nations. . . .

Soueid How do you envisage relations with the Islamic forces that havebecome active in many Arab countries?Habash: This is on e of the greatest dilem m as facing the Arab nation al libera-t ion movement, at the pan-Arab level and within each country. To beginwith, one cannot take an arbitrary decision concerning whether or not tocooperate with the forces of Islam, putting them all in the same basket, as itwe re. Second, on e feels an obligation to deal with them b eca use the se forcesare indigenous to their societ ies , except for some movements or groups withdubious connections. This means that we and the forces of political Islamshould f ind a common denominator that would permit us to work togetherunder the current and foreseeable circumstances.However, we need to differentiate between the Islamic forces that aretruly engaged in the struggle on the basis of their perspectives on societyand their ideology (as is the case with Hizballah in Lebanon, Hamas andIslamic Jihad in Palestine, and th e Jam a'a Islamiyya in Jo rda n) a nd tho seforces an d grou ps w ho se acts are no long er ei ther com preh ensib le or justifi-able on the human, ethical, or Islamic dimensions (as is the case now inAlgeria and Egypt).

W e believe that ou r relations w ith Islamic forces of the first typ e sho uld becharacterized by a de ep al liance in the struggle with the en em y of our nationto bring about a showdown. The condit ion for such an al l iance should bethat joint act ion should be undertaken on a democratic basis .

Soueid The issue of minorities is becom ing increasingly sensitive. For in-stance, there are those who maintain that the Copts in Egyp t are a minoritywith the right to a special status. Some Lebanese M aronites maintain thatLebanon contains tivo comm unities differing in culture and civilizationand that each has the right to organize the lives of its mem bers as it sees fit.Habash: W e must be careful no t to confuse thing s. Th ere is a hu ge differ-ence b etw ee n n ational minori ties with distinct languag es, cultures, and iden-tities and religious or confessional minorities. It is categorically un acc ep tab leto deal with Arab Christians as though they were not part of the social andcultural fabric of the Arab nation; quite simply, they are indigenous Arabs,and their religious beliefs have no bearing on their national and culturalidentity. Can we ever forget the contribution of Christian Arab intellectuals inLebanon to the renaissance of the Arabic language and Arab culture? Theirroots, history, civilization, and culture are Arab, and they must conductthemselves in conformity with that fact.


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This requires two conditions. First, the Arab Muslim majority must beacutely aware of this fact (historically, Islam has been successful in institutingthe principle of diversity and freedom of religious belief), and consequentlythe majority sho uld d eal in a dem ocra tic fashion w ith all citizens o n th e ba sisof full equality and freedom of belief for individuals and confessionalcommunit ies .

The second point is that religious minorities should be cognizant of thefact that they are an authentic part of the Arab nation and behave accord-ingly. Whether they be Muslim or Christian, Sunni or Shi'i, Coptic, Maronite,Syriac, or Orthodox, they have a duty to hold on to their national identity.

Soueid What is your position now on a Palestinian state?Habash: I am in favor of a Palestinian state at this stage . An d I do co nsid erthis to be an issue to be realized in stages; be ca us e I w an t all of Palestine. Allof itSoueid Palestine as a democratic state with equa l rights for all?Habash: Yes.Soueid What isyour view of the proper relationship between Arabism andIslam?Habash: As I see it, Arab ism is an ou tline for nationa l recon stru ctio n at afixed point in time and space. This implies motion, evolutionIwant to con-vey a sense of the Arab world's current state of fragmentation and of thestumbling progress of national liberation and to inject an awareness of thedesigns of colonialism and the reality of cultural distortion.

Islam is first and foremost a religion. But for Islam, religion is more thanjust articles of faith, rites, and rituals, seeing as Islam has transcended theconc ept of religion alone and gon e on to a m ore com prehens ive and dee perlevel. Islam is a constituent of the culture, civilization, identity, and heritageof this nation. In this sense, it is one of the basic componentsif not themost basic oneof Arab nationalism. Similarly, one can say that the cultureof a Christian Arab is Islam. One must try to be definite about the overlap,bearing in mind that there is interact ion between the concepts of Arabismand Islam.

One can speak of Islam in Pakistan without bringing Arabism into thepicture, but one cannot speak of Islam in the Arab homeland in isolationfrom Arabism. Nor can one speak of Arabism in isolation from the Islamicspirit, culture, and civilization at its heart. In this sense, one cannot separatethe frame from the picture.

Soueid What is your current view of terrorism?Habash: It really pain s me that Israel, w hic h was fou nd ed on terrorism, isnow being so sanctimonious about terrorism. Why am I here rather than inLydda? Be cau se I wa s exp elled thro ug h the use of terrorism. Syria has m ad e


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AN INT E RVIE W W IT H GE O RG E HABAS H 101

a very reasonable proposal; it has called for an international conference todefine what is meant by terrorism, which is being used today to get at na-t ional l iberat ion movements.Soueid How would you evaluate the course you have followed? Wherehave you erred and where have you been right? What is your agenda fortoday and tomorrow?Habash: At eac h of its con ferenc es, the PFLP review s the cou rse it has tak ensince the last conference and sorts out the errors it has made. Since I wassecretary general of the Front, I had a role in theseerrorsyou can say thatthese errors are my errors. The y are the errors of the PFLP, bu t they a re m yerrors too. You could therefore say that I have admitted to all the errors thathave been committed by the Front to the present .

However, when I think about your quest ion, i t seems to me that we arereviewing the c ourse of the Palestinian pr ob lem over the last hu nd red years .These are not the errors of this person or that, they are the mistakes of all theArabs, and they represent our collective defeat. Of course, we have to con-sider the exogenous factors that contributed to our defeat. However, what ism ore imp ortant is to engag e in self-examination and to correct the prob lem sfacing the forces that give people hope for victory.

Here, I fear that we have not used our brains as we should have. We firstfought relying on our muscles, then our hearts, because our cause was just.We did not use o ur brains as we sho uld have . W e called for Arab unity, yet ifyou were to review copies of theal-Ra i bulletin we used to publish in Da-mascus, you would see that the Arab Nationalist Movement called for unitybut did not say how it was to be achieved or identify what obstacles had tobe overcome. The same applies to Palest ine and al l the other issues.Soueid What message do you have for future generations?Habash: O n the basis of wh at life has taugh t me , taking the bitter and thesweet together, I am convinced that human history moves in a progressivedirection. I say this confidently and hopefully, in spite of all the failures anddefeats we have suffered. Despite the bitter stmggle between the forces ofprogress and those of darkness, specifically in the Arab region, I predict thatthe future belongs to our nation. But hopes, wishes, and dreams alone wil lno t ach ieve ou r ob jectives or bring victory. . . .

One cannot rol l back the wheel of history, but we can make sure that thelessons of the past are not dissipated or squandered in a fit of emotional,destructive, and unhealthy rejection of history. History is a register open towhoever has the determination and abil i ty to meri t an entry therein and thestaying power to continue to grace its bright and leading pages. I am full ofhope that the generat ions of our children and our grandchildren wil l have afuture that is brighter than our present. I derive immense satisfaction fromthis thought.

Documents

Interview With George Habash (1998) - TRANSCRIPT