International Workshop on Maritime Autonomous Surface ...3) Ship... · Rolls-Royce plc 2018 The information in this document is the property of Rolls-Royce plc and may not be copied,

International Workshop on

Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships and

IMO regulations.

Ship Intelligence and the Autonomous

Infrastructure

Bernard Twomey

Rolls-Royce Plc

14thMay 2018

Agenda

Rolls-Royce Proprietary Information

• Regulatory requirements

• Terminology

• Technology Developments

• Fundamental Principles for Safety

• Issues and Opportunities

Terminology


• Autonomy–does not mean an unattended vessel, there are levels of autonomy.

• Autonomous infrastructure –includes maritime and land based systems, plus the legal framework

• Inherent safety –Preventing specific harm occurring by avoiding key hazards

• Safety case/safety argument –a structured argument, supported by a body of evidence that a system is safe for a given application in a given environment.

• System–set of elements that interact according to design.

• Stakeholder/Actor–An entity that interacts with a system to achieve a specific goal

• Use Case –specification of a set of actions performed by a system of value for one or more actors or stakeholders

IMO Mission Statement


"The mission of the International Maritime

Organization (IMO) as a United Nations specialized

agency is to promote safe, secure, environmentally sound, efficient and

sustainable shipping through cooperation. This will be accomplished by

adopting the highest practicable standards of maritime

safety and security, efficiency of navigation and prevention and control

of pollution from ships, as well as through consideration of the

related legal matters and effective implementation of IMO’s

instruments with a view to their universal related and uniform

application.

IACS


The purpose of the Classification Society is to provide classification and

statutory services and assistance to the maritime industry and regulatory

bodies as regards maritime safety and pollution prevention, based on the

accumulation of maritime knowledge and technology.

‘ Aim to achieve this objective through the development and

application of their rules and by verifying compliance with

International and/or national statutory regulations on behalf of the

flag administration.’

Classification Societies and the

Autonomous Infrastructure


• LR – Produced the first guidance documents for autonomy .

• BV – Produced a guidance document in 2017.

• CCS – Produced Rules in 2018

• DNV/GL – Guidance document/Rules in development.

• ABS/RINA,NK,CRS,PRS,IRS,RS

Marine 4.0 – the Ship Intelligence era

1.0 Steam engines 2.0 Mass production

3.0 Containerization

4.0 Digitalization1860 – 1910 1940

2010+

1957

Our Ship Intelligence Portfolio


Fundamental Principles

FP1 Responsibility for Safety The prime responsibility for safety must rest with the

person or organisation responsible for the activities

that give rise to an intolerable risk.

FP2 Leadership and Management

for Safety

Effective leadership and management for safety must

be established and sustained throughout the systems

life cycle

FP3 Safety Assessment The ‘dutyholder’ must demonstrate effective

understanding of the potential hazards and their

control for the autonomous infrastructure through a

comprehensive and systematic process of safety

assurance

FP4 Prevention of Accidents All reasonable practicable steps must be taken to

prevent and mitigate accidents.

FP5 Emergency Preparedness

and Response

Arrangements must be made for emergency

preparedness and response in the event of a total

failure of the autonomous ship or its infrastructure.

Fundamental Principles for Safety

Maritime Autonomous Framework Level Name Definition

(Proposed Maritime Autonomy Framework)

Who is in

Control?Sustained operational

task

Who takes

over control?Fail Safe

Operational Task

System

Capability

0 No Autonomy All aspects of operational tasks perform by human operator

even when enhanced with warning or intervention system.

Human operator safely operates the system at all time. (e.g.

Select pumps)

n/a

1 Partial Autonomy The targeted operational tasks perform by human operator but

can transfer control of specific sub-tasks to the system. The

human operator has overall control of the system and safely

operates the system at all time. (e.g. start engine sequence)

Some

Operational

Tasks

2 Conditional

Autonomy

The targeted operational tasks perform by automated system

without human interaction and human operator perform

remaining tasks. Human operator is responsible for its safe

operation.

Majority of

Operational

Tasks

3 High Autonomy The targeted operational tasks perform by automated system

without human interaction and human operator perform

remaining tasks. System is responsible for its safe operation.

(e.g. PMS, DP)

Majority of

Operational

Tasks

4 Full Autonomy All operational tasks perform by an automated system under all

defined conditions.

All Operational

Tasks

Manual

Automation

Semi-

Autonomous

Semi-

Autonomous

Full

Autonomous

Defence in Depth


Objective Level 1: Prevention of abnormal operation and failures by design

Defence/Barrier:

Conservative design, high quality in construction, maintenance and operation in accordance with appropriate safety criteria,

engineering practices and defined quality levels.

Objective Level 2: Prevention and control of abnormal operation and detection of failures.

Defence/Barrier:

Control, limiting and protection systems, other surveillance features and operating procedures to prevent or minimise damage from

failures.

Objective Level 3 Control of faults within the design basis to protect against escalation to an accident

Defence/Barrier:

Engineered safety features, multiple barriers and accident or fault control procedures

Objective Level 4 Control of severe ship or infrastructure conditions, in which the design basis may be exceeded, including

protecting against further fault escalation and mitigation of the consequences of severe accidents.

Defence/Barrier Additional measures and procedures to protect against or mitigate fault progression and for accident

management.

Objective Level 5 Mitigation of accident consequences through emergency responses.

Defence/Barrier Emergency control and on- and off-site emergency response (e.g. salvage, fire-fighting tugs, etc).

Operational Areas


• Coastal waters:– Advisory with no impact

on Statutory or Classification Rules

– Can result in a non-compliance with SOLAS

– Can result in agreement required by the Classification society

– Will require local/national agreements

• International waters:– Same as coastal waters

plus:-

– Will require local/national/international agreements

– Will require the legal framework to be agreed.

Land Based Remote Operating Centre (ROC)


• Identification of the Stakeholders/Actors:

– Nation state where the ROC is located

– the flag state of the vessel

– the flag states where the vessel is operating

– the legal framework under which the ROC has to operate

With respect to the legal framework of the ROC, there are extra jurisdictions that shall be considered.

If the ROC is not located in the Flag State of the vessel under control, then the operators in the ROC might have to follow the law of the flag and the law of the state where they are based.

• For consideration:

– Will the ROC need to comply with national HSE law?

– Educational qualifications of the operators and maintainers of the autonomous infrastructure.

– The land based requirements for the ROC, e.g, access, physical security, lighting, evacuaton etc.

– PSC, Vetting, Classification Surveyors, Pilots etc – what skills are required?

Intelligent AwarenessLook beyond your horizon

Providing increased awareness of vessel surroundings

Assisting bridge crew with safer operations

Highlighting hazards in real time

Providing short and medium range object detection

What is the defined ‘Use Case’?

Remote &Autonomous

Use Cases plus Legal have to be defined.

Remote & Autonomous timeline

2018

2020

2025 202x‘X’ is subject to regulation

REMOTE SUPPORT, OPERATION

OF CERTAIN FUNCTIONS

REMOTE AND AUTONOMOUS

SHORT SEA VESSELREMOTE AND AUTONOMOUS OCEAN GOING VESSEL

REMOTE AND AUTONOMOUS

LOCAL VESSEL

Intelligent AssetManagement

EnergyManagementSolutions

Reducing your fleet’s fuel

and energy consumption,

thereby reducing operational

costs and emissions

HealthManagementSolutions

Reducing the cost of ownership

of your assets, improving safety

and availability at predictable cost

Solution overview

ONBOARD

SYSTEMS

SECURE

CONNECTION

RR DATA

CENTRE

SECURE

CONNECTIONS

ONSHORE

INTERFACES

Legal Jurisdiction


• We cannot assume that the IMO will have sole legaljurisdiction over the Maritime Autonomous Infrastructureand this could be a barrier to the introduction of fullautonomy and remote control centers.

• Consider the requirements of UNCLOS and any claim forcriminal jurisdiction over a foreign flagged autonomousvessel.

• If the operator is in a ROC, certain nation states mayrequire an extradition treaty agreement with the statewhere the ROC is located.

Issues and Opportunities


• A lack of prescriptive requirements is not a barrier to innovation.

• Use of Goal Based Approach (GBA) should be encouraged.

• Mandate a systems Engineering approach to support the safety case/safety argument and GBA.

• Opportunities to attract new skills into the maritime sector.

• Use humans intelligently in the autonomous infrastructure, even if partial autonomy is introduced.

We kindly ask the IMO to

mandate the following:• Requirement for a ‘Whole autonomous

infrastructure safety case/safety argument to be carried out’.

• Requirement that the maritime sector provides a body of evidence to demonstrate that the ‘Fundamental Principles for Safety’ are complied with.

• Stop referring to the Autonomous Ship, as it is the Autonomous Infrastructure that needs to be considered.

Rolls-Royce plc 2018

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International Workshop on Maritime Autonomous Surface ...3) Ship... · Rolls-Royce plc 2018 The information in this document is the property of Rolls-Royce plc and may not be copied,