International Institutions

Erik Gartzke 154A, Lecture 6

November 06, 2012

What is an IO?

• What is an international organization?

• Def: group designed to achieve collective action, usually across international borders.

• Inter-governmental organizations (IGOs): international organization of states

• Non-governmental organizations (NGOs): international organization of non-states

What is an IO?, cont.• International organizations deal with problems that

span international borders (global/regional).

• A problem becomes international when either the problem, its side-effects, or solutions are not physically contained within national boundaries(pollution, trade, piracy, health, migration, war).

• Examples of early IGOs

• International Telecommunications Union (1865)

• Universal Postal Union (1874)

Theories of IO

• Theories of international organization and international institutions can be organized along conventional lines of the paradigms:

• Realism

• Constructivism

• Liberalism

• But there are also some unique traditions:

• Functionalism

Theories of IO, cont.

• Most agree that IGOs matter in some form or in certain contexts

• No consensus exists as to the extent of IGO influence and how best to think about IGOs

• By “matter,” scholars usually mean that IGOs should be capable of altering state behavior.

Theories of IO, cont. 2

• On one side, constructivists, functionalists, and liberal institutionalists claim that IGOs are (or can be) a central component of world order.

• On the other side, realists argue that IGOs are only marginally influential in world politics, and that IGOs reflect status quo power relations.

Realism

• Realists typically see international organizations as unnecessary, unhelpful, or even harmful:

• Mearsheimer (1995a) argues that international organizations are epiphenomenal.

• Power relations determine action

• IOs reflect, rather than effect, power

• Schweller and Priess (1997) argue that IOs can assist powerful states in managing the system.

• IOs still reflect existing power relationships

IO Optimism

• Global politics is increasingly organized around regimes and institutions that foster cooperation

• Provide information and organization structure

• Promote norms and common belief systems

• Reduce transaction costs in cooperating

IO Optimism, cont.

• Realpolitik should become less important:

• With rise of multiple channels of interaction

• Growing salience of non-state actors

• Increasing overlaps between state interests

• Rising difficulties of “going it alone” in an interdependent and interconnected world

Functionalism

• Functionalists argue that the world is becoming more interconnected (Haas 1964; Keohane and Nye 1989; Young 1986, 1992; Ruggie 1983)

• The “dense network” of dependencies in the international system is like a web

• Traps states and forces them to cooperate

• Could violate one agreement or IO

• Cannot disentangle from many treaties

Constructivism

• Constructivists take this argument a step further (Wendt 1995; Finnemore 1996; Barnett and Finnemore 2004)

• It is not just that IOs condition relations

• IOs and other forms of interaction lead states want different things

• Participation in IOs make states have different preferences -- prefer to cooperate, not fight

Liberalism

• Neoliberal-institutionalists accept Kantian/ functionalist prescription for world politics

• Also accept realist tenets of systemic anarchy, centrality of power, primacy of state interests (Keohane 1984; Axelrod 1984, Powell 1991; Snidal 1991; Keohane and Martin 1995).

Liberalism, cont.

• Collective security/cooperation are nevertheless feasible where states possess common interests

• + where states value absolute > relative gains.

• Snidal (1991): predictions of absolute and relative gains depend on number of actors

• IGOs can foster cooperation by encouraging reciprocity and regularizing interaction.

• Recent research shows how shadow of the future can inhibit cooperation (Fearon 1998)

Where’s the Beef?• Empirical literature on institutions is sparse.

• We do not actually know whether IGOs are as effective (or ineffective) as partisans claim.

• Theory stands to advance most quickly when confronted with contrasting evidence.

• Several studies offer preliminary tests of IOs (Singer and Wallace 1970; Wallace and Singer 1970; Domke 1988; Young 1992; Martin and Simmons 1998)

• Much remains to be done

Dem Peace “Spillover”• Dem peace researchers have become interested

in IGOs (Russett et al. 1998; Oneal and Russett 1999; Oneal et al. 2003).

• Perhaps the strongest evidence that IGOs alter state behavior is found in these studies.

• Oneal and Russett argue that dyads that share many IGO memberships less often fight.

• Yet, this result only occurs under special cirumstances (politically relevant dyads and the GEE estimator, Oneal and Russett 1998)

Dem Peace “Spillover,” cont.

• In their own analysis, IGOs increase conflict or have no effect under other conditions.

• Other studies find no indication that IGOs bring peace (Jacobson 1986; Domke 1988)

• Oneal and Russett 1999b and Gartzke et al (2001) provide evidence implying that IGOs increase interstate conflict among members.

Mixed Effects• The most recent research suggests that IOs have

a mixed effect on conflict and interstate peace

• IOs with strong institutional structure and a mandate to intervene in security affairs tend to be the most effective in promoting peace

• IOs with limited institutional structure, a divided membership, or no mandate have no effect on whether nations fight or are peaceful

• IOs with an economic mandate are actually associated with increased conflict - spurious.

Conclusion• Paradox:

• IOs very popular as a solution to warfare

• Not much evidence that they are effective

• Limited role may have more to do with their cumulative effect -- many IOs are important

• Part of a larger picture of efforts to cooperate

• Do IOs effect or reflect peace?

• Could help in ways suggested here

• Could also manage ongoing cooperation