Interagency Intelligence MemorandumInteragency Intelligence Memorandum India: Present Scene, Future Prospects NIO IIM 76-021 May 1976 DECLASSIFIED Copy N2 126A/ISS/IPS, Department

InteragencyIntelligence

Memorandum

India: Present Scene, Future Prospects

NIO IIM 76-021May 1976

Copy N2 126DECLASSIFIED A/ISS/IPS, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended October 11, 2007

24 May 1976

INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM*

SUBJECT: India: Present Scene, Future Prospects

KEY POINTS

-- Prime Minister Gandhi is fully in control of po-litical life in India and appears likely to faceno serious opposition over the next one to threeyears.

- Most Indians seem to have accepted the nationalemergency proclaimed in June 1975.

- Continued support for Gandhi will be heavily de-pendent on her ability to maintain sufficientfood stocks, to control inflation, and to stimu-late economic activity.

-- Gandhi, aware that opposition is likely to mount ifthe emergency continues indefinitely, might ease someof the restrictions, though the basic authoritarianstructure constructed since the emergency will prob-ably remain.

- She might well choose to hold national electionslater this year or in 1977 and the Congress Party

* This memorandum has been prepared jointly by the Cen-tral Intelligence Agency, the Defense IntelligenceAgency, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of .theDepartment of State, and the Department of the Treasury.

DECLASSIFIED A/ISS/IPS, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended October 11, 2007

would almost certainly win overwhelmingly.

- Gandhi has indicated some form of control overthe press will continue indefinitely.

-- India is likely to become more active in interna-tional affairs.

- Gandhi may try to reassert India's leading rolein the non-aligned movement.

- India will continue to have little tolerancefor opposition to New Delhi's policies on thepart of the smaller states in the region.

- Relations with Bangladesh present the most likelysource of trouble and Indian military interven-tion cannot be ruled out.

- The re-establishment of diplomatic relations betweenIndia and Pakistan will improve communications be-tween them, but relations will probably be cool andcorrect and interspersed with periods of heightenedtensions.

- Any major improvement in Sino-Indian relations ap-pears to be a long-term proposition.

- India will become somewhat less reliant on Mos-cow for military supplies but political ties willremain close.

- Relations with the United States will probablyremain restrained.

-- New Delhi will almost certainly conduct additionalnuclear tests, but the timing of such tests is un-certain, and we believe that no test is likely be-fore this fall.


THE DETAILS

NOTE

This memorandum is an attempt to describethe present political situation in India andto estimate what is likely to happen, both indomestic politics and foreign relations, overthe period of the next one to three years. Itdiscusses some of the factors underlying thewidespread acceptance in India of the nationalemergency, proclaimed in June 1975, and thepresent impotence of the opposition to PrimeMinister Gandhi. At the end of the memorandum,we examine, briefly, what might happen in theevent Gandhi were suddenly removed from thescene.

The Present Internal Scene

The Government and Congress Party

1. Prime Minister Gandhi has fully establishedher dominance over the nation.

- Within the cabinet, the two men once consid-ered potential rivals of Gandhi, Foreign Min-ister Y. B. Chavan and Minister of Agricul-ture Jagjivan Ram, have been neutralized byGandhi's astute maneuvering.

- Within the Congress Party, the group of rela-tively young parliamentary members who, onoccasion, criticized the prime minister andthreatened to become an opposing bloc withinthe Party are now either in jail or silent.

2. Gandhi's domination of the Party is exercisedfar beyond the capital. She has replaced those statechief ministers who had achieved independent bases ofsupport with politicians of known loyalty. The lastremaining chief minister within the Congress Partywho could claim an independent power base was removedin 1975.


-- In early 1976 Gandhi eliminated the only twomajor state governments, Tamil Nadu andGujarat, not under rule of the Congress Partyor its allies. Both states are now underdirect rule from New Delhi.

3. In both government and party, Gandhi has madeit clear that she wants individuals whose loyalty toher is beyond question.* Development of a personalitycult around the prime minister has been one of the moreprominent features of the emergency. While not exactlyalien to Indian tradition, it is at odds with the na-tion's political history since independence. Gandhi'sfather, Jawaharlal Nehru, was the leader of his nationfor 17 years, but he rejected setting himself beyondcriticism, fearing it would lead to dictatorship.During his years in power, he generally sought com-promise rather than confrontation, urging on his coun-trymen "the politics of consensus."

4. The prime minister relies for advice on asmall group of confidants including her 30-year-oldson, Sanjay. This inner circle is composed of bureaucratsand family retainers, reflecting the prime minister'sgeneral distrust of politicians who might one daychallenge her control. Sanjay holds no position inthe government and only recently was elected to theexecutive committee of the youth wing of the CongressParty. In this post he has traveled widely through-out the country and has already established a cadreof youthful supporters who apparently are intent onhitching their wagons to Sanjay's rising star. Theprime minister has apparently encouraged the recentcampaign to publicize Sanjay and present him to thenation as a potential successor.

5. The Military. Gandhi's government has main-tained the loyalty of the military and the securityforces during the emergency. The officer corps ofthe armed forces is highly nationalistic and tradi-tionally apolitical. Some senior military officers

* Typical is the present Minister of Defense, BansiLai, who openly boasts that his Loyalty is not tothe office of prime minister but rather to Gandhias a person. D.K. Barooah, President of the Con-gress Party, is credited with originating the widelypublicized slogan "Indira is India and India is Indira."

-4-


have privately applauded the greater sense of na-tional discipline which exists under the emergency.The army would prefer not to participate in inter-nal security operations, and Gandhi, cognizant ofthis, has thus far relied primarily on paramilitaryforces. The government has ample well-trained andequipped paramilitary forces at its disposal for themaintenance of internal security. These includethe Border Security Force (80,000), the CentralReserve Police (60,000), and the Provincial ArmedConstabulary (242,000).

Supporters of the Emergency

6. There is widespread acceptance of the emergency.

-- The upturn in the Indian economy since theemergency was declared in June 1975, eventhough the emergency played only a minorrole in it, has worked in Gandhi's favor.

-- The largest fall harvest in history, due toa good monsoon last year, combined with tightmonetary policies started in 1974, have keptfood available and prices down for urbanworkers.

-- Many Indians applaud the government's ener-getic drive against economic crimes, suchas hoarding and black marketeering, and itsefforts to reduce corruption and improve thefunctioning of the civil service.

-- Businessmen are generally pleased by the curbon strikes and by the government's relativelyfavorable action toward the private sector.

-- The rural landlords are pleased by the gov-ernment's emphasis on discipline and with thehigh priority accorded agriculture.


- The Indian peasantry, which makes up 80 per-cent of the population, has remained apatheticand fatalistic.

Opponents of the Emergency

7. Under the emergency, the opposition, bothopen and covert, operates under many constraints,none perhaps as limiting as the tight censorshipof the media. By closely controlling the domesticpress and radio, the government can insure thatspeeches by opposition members of parliament,proclamations by jailed leaders, mass demonstra-tions, or acts of sabotage will receive no pub-licity. As a result of this and other governmentpolicies, the opponents of Gandhi are isolated,weak, and ineffective.

8. Opposition to the emergency comes largelyfrom the following:

- The numerically small intelligentsia,including most of the now muzzled Indianpress; this is basically a non-activist op-position which criticizes, usually privately,Gandhi's actions.

-- The universities, where there has been someopen opposition -- usually broken up quicklyby the police; many student leaders and somefaculty members have been intimidated andsome jailed.

-- The judicial system, particularly at thestate level (the Supreme Court, in partreflecting Gandhi's use of her appointivepower, has been relatively cooperative);Gandhi has called for "basic reforms" inthe legal system.

- Opposition political parties, many of whosetop leaders are in jail; this source of op-position has been ineffective and many party


members have sought admission to Gandhi'sCongress Party.

- Some elements of the labor movement, manyof whose leaders are in jail.

-- Political prisoners (out of the estimated70,000-100,000 persons believed jailed sincethe emergency, perhaps 20,000 purely politi-cal prisoners remain incarcerated).

- Underground opposition; despite minor actsof sabotage, the underground movement ispresently insignificant.

Foreign Relations

9. In the foreign policy field, the emergencyhas permitted Gandhi to act more freely in the knowl-edge that there would be no criticism or demonstra-tions by opponents of her policies. This freer hand,for instance, has allowed her to move toward im-proved relations with China and Pakistan withoutthe open denunciation by the leaders and newspapersof the Jana Sangh or other Hindu nationalist organi-zations that might well have occurred prior to lastJune.

10. China and Pakistan. Gandhi's diplomaticinitiatives toward these two neighbors, first takenin April 1976, are probably aimed primarily at demon-strating India's independence and refurbishing thenation's credentials as a truly non-aligned statein preparation for the Non-Aligned Summit in Colomboin August. (A few third world countries have criti-cized India's close ties to the Soviet Union -- inparticular, the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty of 1971.)Beyond this immediate goal, Gandhi probably views im-proved relations with Peking, exemplified by the an-ticipated exchange of ambassadors after a lapse of 15years, as useful in trying to limit Chinese diplomaticand material support for Pakistan and possibly as ameans of neutralizing potentially unfriendly Chineseinfluence in Bangladesh.


11. Agreement was reached with Pakistan in May1976 to re-establish diplomatic relations, severedin 1971, to renew overflights and direct airlinks,and to restore rail communications between the twocountries. New Delhi probably expects that normal-ization with Pakistan will help improve India'sinternational standing, particularly among the Mus-lim nations, which have generally been sympatheticwith Pakistan.

12. Bangladesh. Relations with Bangladesh havebeen less than cordial since the overthrow of the gov-ernment of Mujibur Rahman in August 1975. Subsequently,Bangladesh's improved relations with Pakistan andChina caused suspicion in India. Widespread popularand governmental distrust of New Delhi exists in Bangla-desh, fueled by reports of Indian support for armeddissidents operating near the border and by India'saction in diverting some water from the Ganges Riverupstream from the smaller country. Occasional fire-fights along the border have added to the tensiondespite agreement between the two nations to estab-lish a joint border commission to investigate suchincidents.

13. India appeared during the confusion thatfollowed the second and third coups in Bangladeshlast November to be seriously considering militaryintervention. Spokesmen in New Delhi then andsince have repeatedly warned that if unrest inBangladesh resulted in communal violence and anew horde of Hindu refugees fled across the borderinto India, as happened in 1971, Indian armed forceswould intervene. Bangladesh leaders view the Indianthreat seriously and have taken action to preventcommunal clashes. Relations between the two coun-tries remain cool and occasionally tense, but itappears that the government in New Delhi has con-cluded that the present regime in Dacca is the bestthat can reasonably be expected at this time.

14. USSR. Relations with the Soviet Union re-main close, based in part on New Delhi's present re-liance on Soviet military and economic assistance but


also on general agreement regarding most important in-ternational issues. For their part, the Sovietsopenly praised Gandhi's decision to impose the emer-gency last summer. They have instructed the CommunistParty of India (CPI), an informal ally of Gandhi's,to continue to support the prime minister on mostissues.

15. Differences between Moscow and New Delhi,however, have arisen on occasion. Repeated Sovietrequests for Indian diplomatic support for an Asiancollective security pact have been rejected in NewDelhi, as have Soviet requests for permanent repairand supply facilities for naval vessels in Indianports. The recent Soviet refusal to allow India torepair Egyptian aircraft was a blow to India's imageas an independent leader of the non-aligned. Moscowhas not made an issue over India's recent initiativetoward China.

16. US. Relations between India and the UnitedStates have remained cool since imposition of the emer-gency. Gandhi has been bitterly resentful of Americanand other Western criticism of her repressive actions.Her occasional public attacks on the United Statesover such issues as "interference" in South Asia andcreation of a "naval base" on Diego Garcia are incontrast with her government's quiet support of ini-tiatives to improve bilateral economic and culturalrelations. A consistent irritant in relations forthe last two decades -- Indian concern over the supplyof American arms to Pakistan -- was exacerbated byremoval of the US arms embargo on South Asia inFebruary 1975.

The Future

Government and Congress Party

17. For the short term, Gandhi appears firmlyin control of India. There are no viable alternativesto her. Gandhi will continue her practice of re-moving from power anyone who appears to be developing


an independent power base. Over the longer range,through mid-1979, we expect her to retain power.Challenges against her, however, could arise if theagricultural situation deteriorated.

18. Gandhi will continue to rely on her son,Sanjay, and a handful of relative unknowns for po-litical advice. The rise to prominence of Sanjayhas been one of the more remarkable developmentsduring the emergency. We believe that he, en-couraged by his mother, will exert increasing in-fluence over domestic political developments.He is obviously being groomed for high office --possibly as eventual successor to his mother.Gandhi must be aware, however, that her son'srapid rise to power has irritated many -- bothwithin and outside the Congress Party -- and shewill probably try to bring Sanjay along slowly.A seat in the next parliament is possible, althoughhigher office within the Congress Party appearsmore likely. Conceivably, Sanjay may choose toretain only his present post in the youth wing ofthe Congress while gathering around him youngermembers of the party whose loyalty could be usefulto him in a contest for power some years from now.

19. Gandhi can probably count on the con-tinued loyalty of the military and the securityforces. The military will remain with her as longas:

- it gets sufficient attention;

- economic disorders do not erupt on a widescale; and

- the facade of legality exists.

We believe these conditions will be fulfilled in thetime span of this memorandum.


Support Dependent on Economy

20. Urban popular support for Gandhi will remainheavily dependent on her ability to maintain sufficientfood stocks, control inflation, and stimulate economicactivity. Thanks to the recent record-breaking foodgrain harvest and continued procurement of foodgrainsfrom abroad, stocks of rice and wheat appear sufficientfor the nation to survive at least one bad monsoon with-out serious food shortages or unduly high prices.

21. The Indian government's annual economic sur-vey, supported to some extent by a recent World Bankreport, is relatively optimistic about the presentstate and future trends of the economy. Much of theoptimism is based on the estimated 114 million tonrecord harvest of foodgrains this crop year -- ascompared to 101 million tons last year.* Over thenext few years, however, the government will have topress energetically for more irrigation, better seeds,and increased use of fertilizers and pesticides if itis to reach the World Bank projection of 125 milliontons by 1978-79. India will also have to grapplewith massive unemployment and underemployment in thecities, and in this area the prospects are not prom-ising. Over the still longer term, government at-tempts to improve living standards of the people willbe as dependent on efforts to increase agriculturalproduction as on a decline in population growth rates.

22. Industrial production has increased duringthe past year,but much of the industrial sector re-mains sluggish and troubled, with many firms facingslack demand and increasing inventories. The budgetfor 1976-77 contains a variety of tax incentives andoffers of direct governmental financial assistancewhich will probably facilitate some increased in-dustrial production.

.* All tonnages used in this section are metric.


23. The Indian balance-of-payments outlook isrelatively good, assuming that net foreign aid con-tinues at present levels of about $1.25 billion peryear. Indian officials predict, somewhat optimisti-cally, that because of recent petroleum discoveriesin the Arabian Sea near Bombay total Indian produc-tion will increase from a million tons in 1975to over 20 million tons by 1980. Moreover, coalproduction, which has increased from 78 milliontons in 1973-74 to 98 million tons in 1975-76, isexpected to reach 135 million tons by 1978-79. Bothfactors will decrease India's dependence on foreignoil. Although their ambitious energy goals may notbe fully met, the increased production combined withanticipated increases in domestic supplies of non-ferrous metals, steel and fertilizer could lead to adecrease in the large annual trade deficit that Indiahas registered for the last three years.

24. Gandhi appears likely to continue her pro-gram of publicly advocating socialist changes whileattempting to stimulate the private sector of theeconomy with various incentives and a prohibitionon strikes. Her long history of advocacy of social-ism, however, could bring this program to an abrupthalt if the economy fails to respond. Sanjay, whoboasts of advocating highly pragmatic policies toincrease productivity, could be influential on hismother's thinking in this field. Businessmen haveapplauded the proposed budget for 1976-77.

25. Although some progress is likely, it isdoubtful that India will make a major breakthroughin stepping up economic growth during the next severalyears. Much will depend on increased investment anda substantial boost in development expenditures. Onbalance, however, India's economy will continue to relyon its agricultural output, and despite some improve-ments in irrigation and increased use of fertilizer,the uncontrollable and unpredictable whims of themonsoons will be the critical factor.


Possible Opposition

26. Organized labor, weak in India even beforethe emergency, can be expected within the next year tochafe under the ban on strikes and other labor agita-tion. Active resistance to the emergency appears un-likely, however, at least in the absence of a new roundof inflation. Failure of the government to satisfywage demands and prevent industrial layoffs at thehigh rate established in 1975 could cause isolatedoutbreaks of unrest.

27. Opposition to the emergency in rural areasis unlikely to develop into significant proportions,at least over the period of this estimate. Largelandowners are nervous as a result of Gandhi's re-peated calls for land reform but are encouraged bythe history of government inaction that has accom-panied such calls in the past. Small landowners andlandless workers are unlikely to take an interest inpolitics but will become increasingly cynical ifGandhi's repeated exhortations to her government toenforce her Twenty Point Economic Program comes tonothing. Rural violence, however, is likely to beisolated and thus pose no great threat to the govern-ment.

28. The small urban middle class and the in-telligentsia will continue to furnish the majorityof Gandhi's active opponents. Student oppositionis likely to grow if the emergency is continuedmuch beyond the end of this year. To be effective,however, student agitation would need allies with-in the ranks of labor or the bureaucracy -- or eventhe police -- and prospects for such help appearremote over the short term.

29. The opposition political parties, with thepossible exception of the ideologically motivatedJana Sangh and Communist Party of India/Marxist, areunlikely to recover from the blows to their organiza-tions administered under the emergency. Despite theobvious need for unity among the opposition parties,


the distrust stemming from ideological and personalitydifferences will continue to make more than surfaceunity difficult to achieve. The movement of oppositionlegislators into the Congress Party can be expectedto continue as individuals opportunistically seek tobetter their political fortunes.

30. There is only a slight possibility thatthe pro-Soviet Communist Party of India will abandonits de facto alliance with the Congress Party despiteeconomic moves to the right by the government. Onlyeconomic chaos or a sharp turn away from socialism,improbable in the near term, would be likely to drivethis faction of Communists into active opposition.Furthermore, pressure from Moscow will probably con-tinue to be exerted on the Party to keep it alliedwith Gandhi.

31. The underground opposition may grow slowlyin size and effectiveness over the next three yearsif the emergency is prolonged. Again, the economywill be instrumental in determining the future suc-cess or failure of an underground campaign. Atpresent, the security and intelligence forces appearloyal to the government and adequate in size andtraining to contain any dissident movement.

32. Frustration and repression, nevertheless,could lead to an increase in the number of incidentsof anti-government violence over the next few years.Among the politically conscious, Gandhi is eitheridolized or hated; the emergency has polarized In-dian politics as probably nothing else since inde-pendence. With no legal outlet for their oppositionto the government, politically active Indians couldturn increasingly to clandestine activities and violence.

33. The present repression could also eventuallystimulate latent regional opposition to the center.While probably beyond the time frame of this paper,there is a potential for the growth of significantopposition, to the central government in the extremesouth of India, in West Bengal, and in Kashmir.Gandhi's concentration of power in New Delhi has


tended to eliminate some of the strengths of thefederal system so important for a country as ethnicallyand culturally diverse as India.

Possible Course of Action

34. Gandhi could defuse somewhat the threat ofviolence and dissident regionalism by moving to con-ciliate her enemies. The most obvious moves would besuspending the emergency, releasing political prisoners,and holding national elections.

35. With the continued absence of significantopposition, Gandhi could well choose to lift theemergency -- it could be reimposed at any time --and hold national elections. Elections would appearlikely late this year or in the first half of 1977.Having little to fear in elections from the disparateopposition, we would expect her to release most, ifnot all, of the political leaders now in jail. Somemight be released, however, only on condition theyquit politics. Any election held, even if carriedout with scrupulous honesty, would almost certainlylead to a very large Congress Party victory -- giv-ing Gandhi, once again, the majority in Parliamentnecessary to amend the constitution at will.

36. Some form of censorship, meanwhile, is likelyto remain in force indefinitely. During her ten yearsin office, Gandhi has frequently demonstrated resent-ment at the press for its criticism of her and itssupport of her enemies. She probably had newspapersin mind when she warned shortly after the emergencywas proclaimed that there could be no return to the"permissiveness of the past." It is possible thatcensorship will continue to be loosened, as it hasbeen slightly since the early days of the emergency,but not removed entirely. Editors and reporters canbe expected to continue to test the barriers to de-termine how far they can safely go. Meanwhile, Gandhihas moved in another direction to assure friendlycoverage in the large newspaper chains in India byexerting increasing influence over their publishers.


37. Gandhi's campaign against the restraintswhich the courts have sought to place on her can alsobe expected to continue. In April 1976, the WorkingCommittee of the Congress Party proposed constitutionalchanges which would restrict the power of judicial re-view at both federal and state levels of legislation.Another proposal is to the effect that amendments tothe constitution cannot be called into question "inany court on any ground." If eventually passed byparliament, as seems inevitable, this latter changewould surmount a major hurdle to government plansfor basic changes in the constitution via the amend-ment process.

38. In short, now that Gandhi has clearly es-tablished herself as the unchallenged leader of India,she may be willing to lift some repressive measures.It is unlikely, however, that she will retreat froma basically authoritarian approach to governing.

International Relations

39. The prime minister and most of her country-men harbor a deep-seated desire to make India strongenough to stand on its own, free from dependency onany other power. They also want to limit foreigninvolvement in bilateral disputes within South Asia.India's recent initiatives toward China and Pakistan,as well as the sending of an ambassador to Moscowafter a year's hiatus, probably indicate a decisionby New Delhi to play a more active role in internationalaffairs. Recent years have seen India concentrate oninternal problems while abdicating to more radicalstates a once leading position in the Third World.At the Non-Aligned Summit Conference, scheduled forColombo in August 1976, India's apparent goal ofreasserting a leading role in the movement may be-come clearer. Meanwhile, New Delhi can be expectedto continue its active effort to restrict membershipin the movement to those states not allied to eitherEast or West. The primary object of this activitywill be to keep the traditional enemy, Pakistan, outof the non-aligned group.


40. The possibility exists of growing rivalrybetween India and Iran, the only other regional nationwith major power ambitions. India's hopes for furtherIranian economic assistance, concessional oil prices,and its desire to minimize Tehran's political and mil-itary support of Pakistan, should keep New Delhi frompermitting a serious confrontation to develop. Tehran,likewise, is interested in reducing the likelihood offriction, and Iran has worked for better relations inrecent years on a number of fronts.

41. India's vast size and relative power withinSouth Asia will continue to worry smaller states in theregion. New Delhi considers South Asia as an area ofits primacy, if not hegemony, and will have little tol-erance for opposition from its smaller neighbors. Bhutan,and to a lesser degree Nepal, will continue to be dom-inated by India. Relations with Sri Lanka are good andare likely to remain so for the period of this memoran-dum.

42. Relations with Bangladesh present the mostlikely source of trouble during the next three years.Political instability, compounded by almost insurmount-able economic problems, will remain a feature of life inDacca. While the present government is apparently ac-ceptable to New Delhi, there is no assurance it willremain in power for even one, let alone three years.Any successor would probably be less acceptable tothe Indians.

43. Violent political changes in Bangladeshcould be accompanied by communal clashes and a large-scale movement of Hindu refugees into India. Thecommunal disturbances could erupt as a result oflong-standing Hindu-Muslim hatreds or, conceivably,could be stimulated by New Delhi as a pretext foreventual military intervention. The latter wouldincrease in probability if there were a change ofgovernment in Dacca followed by a shift of foreignpolicy toward greatly improved relations with Is-lamabad and Peking. Regardless of the cause of therefugee flow, India could be expected to first threatenand then actually intervene militarily in Bangladesh.


44. The restoration of diplomatic relationswith Pakistan, as agreed to in the May 1976 bilateralnegotiations, will make communication between NewDelhi and Islamabad easier, but the historic driveof India for regional leadership will continue to berejected by Pakistan. At best, relations will prob-ably be cool and correct, interspersed with periodsof heightened tension. Basic differences, e.g., thestatus of Kashmir, will remain, although neither gov-ernment will be likely to press any issue to openconfrontation. Probably the most dangerous scenariofor the next three years in South Asia would evolveif India were to move militarily into Bangladesh andthe latter called for international assistance. Inthe case of Pakistan, we would expect Prime MinisterBhutto to try to calibrate his nation's response soas to avoid another war with a militarily superiorIndia.

45. Despite the upcoming exchange of ambassa-dors, India's relations with China will probablyimprove only marginally because of the reservoir ofmutual suspicion and a competitive interest in SouthAsia. While the present leadership in Peking pre-sumably will continue its efforts to detach Indiafrom its close ties to Moscow, it is unlikely to bewilling to jeopardize its own intimate relationshipwith Pakistan in the absence of firm indicationsfrom New Delhi that a major realignment of Indianforeign relations is likely. We do not expect Indiato make such a realignment.

46. Gandhi has made it clear that a basicplank of her foreign policy is continued close re-lations with the Soviet Union. New Delhi's efforts,however, to diversify its sources of military equip-ment, combined with growing indigenous defense pro-duction, will make India less reliant on Moscow.In the political arena, the two nations' interestsare likely to coincide more often than not. Evenso, New Delhi will probably seek to improve rela-tions to a limited degree with China and the UnitedStates in an effort to establish a more balanced re-lationship with the three great powers.


47. Relations with the United States can be ex-pected to continue much as they have existed over thepast three years with periods of strain alternatingwith moves toward accommodation. Gandhi would liketo see her regime gain more acceptance from other coun-tries, especially the United States. While Indianleaders would like to retain an aid tie to Washington,especially for food aid, they remain suspicious ofUnited States' aims and activities in South Asia andin the Indian Ocean. Any major commitment of US armsto Pakistan would strain US-Indian relations, at leasttemporarily. Finally, Gandhi and many of her as-sociates will continue to find the United States aconvenient scapegoat whenever a diversion is neededfrom domestic problems.

48. India's drive for recognition as a majorpower in the world was given a substantial boost bythe explosion of a nuclear device in May 1974. In-dian leaders claimed then, and still do, that theyare developing nuclear explosives solely for peace-ful purposes. No second blast has occurred, but theIndians have repeatedly indicated that more nucleartests will be conducted after the results of the firstexplosion have been thoroughly studied. In February1976, the chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Com-mission stated that the analysis had already beencompleted. A major constraint on carrying out asecond test was removed in May 1976 when the Canadiangovernment announced that it would not resume assist-ance, suspended following the first test, for India'snuclear power program. As long as the negotiationsfor resumption of Canadian assistance were underway,India was unlikely to conduct another blast.

49. With the removal of this factor, the Indiansmay move ahead with plans to conduct a second test.Little information is available on the timing of thenext test, however, and it is likely that the Indianleadership, itself, has not established a firm test-ing schedule. India will approach the decision toresume testing very pragmatically. Considerationswhich India will take into account include the present


delicate stage in the normalization of relations withPakistan and China, the forthcoming Non-Aligned SummitConference in August, and the license application fornuclear fuel shipments for the Tarapur reactors pend-ing before the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

[text not declassified], it is likely thatno such event will occur before this fall.

50. In any event, it is prudent to assume thatover the next few years India will move to develop amodest stockpile of nuclear weapons, but there is asyet no firm evidence that this is so. A major con-straint on the size and shape of any Indian nuclearweapons force would be delivery capability. The onlybombers now in the Indian inventory are slow Can-berras, which have a combat radius of only about1,000 nm with a 5,000-lb payload. The Indiansare looking at planes which are faster and more man-euverable than the Canberras, but which have a con-siderably shorter combat radius. In order to obtaina long-range nuclear delivery capability within thetime frame of this memorandum, India would have topurchase suitable long-range bombers. Efforts todevelop a suitable missile delivery capability havebeen in progress since the 1960s; however, it willbe the mid-1980s before that capability is realized.

51. This memorandum up to this point has beenbased on an assumption that no totally unexpectedevents occur -- such as the sudden disappearance ofGandhi from the scene. It is impossible to createwith any degree of assurance a scenario of events thatwould be likely to follow her demise. Gandhi's sud-den removal would undoubtedly heighten factionalismwithin the Congress Party and fuel opposition activity.This could create a temporary law and order problem.

52. With Gandhi gone, there might initiallybe a period of collegial rule. Fairly soon, how-ever, there would be a move to select a singleleader, probably a senior cabinet member. There


is no obvious choice,but either Minister of Agricul-ture Jagjivan Ram or Foreign Minister Y. B. Chavandespite their advanced ages, would be possible choices.Alternatively, the Congress high command might settleon some lesser known figure acceptable to most, ifnot all, of the party.

53. Conceivably, Sanjay Gandhi would attemptto succeed his mother. A move by Sanjay to grab powerfor himself would fly in the face of recent Indianhistory and traditional Indian preference for olderleaders. Perhaps more likely would be an effort bySanjay to act as a power broker.

54. Direct involvement by the armed forces inany succession struggle would be likely only if theCongress Party failed to unite around a singlecandidate and if, in the confusion that followed,there were threats of disintegration of the nation'spolitical structure. Even then, they would probablyconsult first with the president, to whom they areresponsible according to the constitution. Any ac-tion taken by the armed forces would probably beaccompanied by a commitment for early return of thenation to civilian government.

55. Assuming that the transition to anotherCongress government was orderly, we would expect nobasic change in Indian foreign policy -- at leastin the near term. These policies have evolved overa period of nearly three decades. Probably the mostsignificant immediate change to be noted by the out-side world would be a lack of decisiveness at thetop, possibly combined with renewed dissensionwithin party ranks. There is some potential dangerin such a scenario as the new leadership, uncertainof its support within India, might attempt to rallythe nation by adopting a strongly nationalistic --even bellicose -- attitude toward some of its neigh-bors.


Documents

Interagency Intelligence MemorandumInteragency Intelligence Memorandum India: Present Scene, Future Prospects NIO IIM 76-021 May 1976 DECLASSIFIED Copy N2 126A/ISS/IPS, Department