DefenceTODAY magazine 1

ISR

Intelligence,Surveillance and

Reconnaissanceduring Operation Iraqi Freedom

Dr Carlo Kopp

The large scale use and integration of Intelligence,Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilitiesduring last year’s Operation Iraqi Freedom air/land

campaign remains the case study in the ISR game. While most observers focused on the impact of large scaleprecision guided munitions use in effecting a defacto ‘threeweek duration war’, these precision weapons relied largely ontargeting data generated by the US ‘ISR Constellation’.What is of no less concern is that in Australia few of the keylessons of OIF have been properly understood, let aloneapplied to ADF force structure planning. As with other currentissues in RAAF force structure, rhetoric supplants analysis.

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Smart air warusing ISR

The decisive role of Intelligence,Surveillance and Reconnaissance(ISR) during Operation Iraqi Freedom

represents as much an evolutionarydevelopment as it is a revolutionarydevelopment. Past air campaigns areillustrative and clearly expose this evolutionin strike ‘targeting cycles’. The ‘targetingcycle’ is the cyclic activity of ‘detection-identif ication-tracking-engagement-assessment’ - this loop encompasses theactivity pattern of an air force in a bombingcampaign. Potential targets are found, theiridentity determined so as to decide whetherthey should be hit, if hostile they arefollowed and hit, and finally the effect of thestrike is evaluated to determine whether arepeat strike is needed. The key measure ofeffectiveness is the duration of the‘targeting cycle’, since most targets in themodern world refuse to stay put and usuallywill not oblige an attacking air force bystaying still.During the Vietnam Rolling Thunder andLinebacker I/II campaigns targeting cyclesof days were not uncommon – asphotographic imagery on wet film had to beprocessed, interpreters had to assess it, highranking bureaucrats and politicians had tobe consulted, and finally the briefing for thestrike had to be telexed to the unit involved.By Desert Storm in 1991 the game hadchanged significantly. While many ISRsystems still used wet film techniques manywere already digitised, permitting muchfaster transmission and processing. Internettechnology and electronic mail permittedvery rapid transmission of digitised data. Apair of the new E-8 JSTARS, in prototypeform and largely crewed by contractorengineers, were available for trials. Theresult of these developments was areasonably consistent 24-hour targetingcycle, with a full Air Tasking Orderproduced daily. The effects of this targetingcycle compression were evident to all - anunprecedented six-week campaign duringwhich vast attrition was inflicted, especiallyagainst dug-in static battlefield targets.Technology evolved further over the decadeand by the 1999 Allied Force campaign theUS Air Force fielded a large fraction of itsE-8 JSTARS fleet and deployed the newRQ-1A Predator A UAV to gather battlefieldintelligence. The scene was set for anothercontraction of the targeting cycle. As historydemonstrated, this was not to be, as theFrench and other NATO council membersinsisted on reviewing all targeting orders inminute detail, resulting in targeting cycledurations claimed to be as great as twoweeks, and repeating the Rolling Thunderexperience. The technological gains of thedecade did not have the opportunity toproduce the expected effect.Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) wasthe first opportunity to apply the newgeneration of ISR systems without

bureaucratic hindrance. Afghanistan wasswept by JSTARS, Predator, U-2s, GlobalHawk, TARPS pod equipped F-14sgathering radar/electro-optical imagery andRC-135V/W Rivet Joint, EP-3E Aries andEA-6B Prowlers gathering electronic,especially communications intelligence.With wideband satellite networkingavailable, and high capacity optical fibrelinks between the CONUS and Mid-Eastoperations centres, the ISR constellationfinally had the opportunity to perform. Andperform it did, seeing to the rapiddestruction of the Taliban and Al Qaedaforces in situ and in transit across thetheatre. So effective was the ISR constellation thatthe strike fleet could not keep up usingconventional striking tactics - the transittime from Diego Garcia or a CBVG in theIndian Ocean was many times longer thanthe time window in which many targetscould be engaged. The traditional model ofbriefing a crew for a strike, loading withtarget specific munitions, and flying out todrop bombs, was largely abandoned infavour of launching aircraft without pre-briefed targets and loaded with ‘swiss armyknife’ weapons mixes to kill yet-to-be-detected targets. Persistent bombardmenttechniques were coupled with ISR toachieve on some occasions, targeting cyclesas short as three minutes between detectionand the bomber arriving overhead.Afghanistan became the proving ground fora new type of ISR-driven air campaign inwhich persistent bombers waited in orbits topounce on ‘emerging’ targets as soon as theISR constellation could unambiguouslydetermine their identity and then proceed tostrike. The B-52H’s circular orbit contrailswill remain the enduring image of EnduringFreedom.Much was learned during OEF, especially interms of demands in communicationscapacity, the need for reliable targetcoordinate transmission, and the need formore automation in transferring targetingdata between platforms. What followed 18months later over Iraq was a full scaleapplication of this warfighting philosophy,with many of the early bottlenecks seenduring OEF removed.The US Air Force leadership today talk interms of ‘compressing the kill chain’ oraiming to contract the targeting cycle asmuch as possible. Analysis of OIF showsthat much remains to be done before thetheoretical bounds on targeting cycle timescan be reached robustly.

‘Shooting fish in a barrel’ was a descriptionapplied to the battlefield bombardment of Iraqiground forces. This imagery, fusing E-8C JSTARSsynthetic aperture radar, GMTI radar and GISdatabases graphically illustrates how naked theIraqi ground force actually was. Imagery - Bosnia in WAS mode, Modrica in SAR mode, time lapse of 1991 retreatfrom Kuwait, Sava River in overlayed MTI/SAR modes, UK countryside in overlayed MTI/SAR modes withGIS, dtto (US Air Force).

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OIF and the ISR constellation

The OIF campaign saw the use of a vastarray of ISR assets, so broad that manyobservers still fail to properly

understand the relative importance of theseassets. The most important and leastunderstood division between categories ofISR asset is not the medium in which theyoperate, radar, passive electronic or optical,but rather the footprint of the sensor system. At the top tier of this information ‘foodchain’ sit the E-8C JSTARS, RC-135V/WRivet Joint, E-3C AWACS, U-2S, E-2C, EP-3E Aries and Low Earth Orbit satellites suchas the KH series thermal and visible bandimaging vehicles, the Lacrosse radarimaging vehicle and the various electronicand signals intelligence gathering vehicles.These large systems typically surveilfootprints hundreds of nautical miles inextent, and tens of thousands of squarenautical miles in area. In this game,typically, the orbital systems are ‘transient’observers, while the airborne systems are‘persistent’ observers of the area of interest.This wide area coverage provides acontinuous and often very detailed pictureof the battlespace, in realtime or nearrealtime. Movements of large groundformations can be tracked continuously, andthe enemy’s intent inferred often veryexactly. The next tier down the information ‘foodchain’ are the focal area surveillance assets,the best examples of which are the RQ-1APredator and RQ-4A Global Hawk, whichcan orbit often for tens of hours surveillingtargets in a specific area of interest. Withlower power radars and optical systemsdesigned to dwell rather than strip map vastareas, these systems provide a closer andmore detailed picture of a small portion ofthe battlespace. Wide area footprint istraded away for a more precise and finerpicture of a smaller footprint.Finally, at the lowest tier of the information‘food chain’ are the fighters tasked as ‘FastFACs’ and their siblings fitted withreconnaissance pods. Highly survivable, butlimited in persistence and often sensorcoverage, their task remains in investigating

potential contacts of interest found bysystems further up the chain, and in the caseof the FACs guiding ‘shooters’ toengagements. The importance of the lowesttier assets should not be denigrated as thesehave some valuable and unique capabilities,such as being able to gather ImageryIntelligence (IMINT) from below a cloudbase, where slow moving UAVs cannotsurvive, and being able to respondextremely quickly due to the sheerperformance differences betweensupersonic fighters and slow moving UAVs.The traditional division betweensurveillance and reconnaissance lies in theformer being ‘persistent’ and the latter‘transient’ – divisions that are now blurredwith platform tasking. A fighter with a reccepod and fast digital datalink, refuelling froma tanker can become a defacto persistentsurveillance system, while an RQ-4 GlobalHawk flying a single pass past a target areabecomes a defacto transient reconnaissancesystem. Both capabilities are mutuallycomplementary and valuable operationally.The OIF campaign was characterised by thecontinuous surveillance of key areas ofinterest across Iraq, especially using the E-8C JSTARS and RC-135V/W Rivet Joint tocollect complementary high resolution radarimages, ground moving target tracks andelectronic and signals intelligence. Thisinformation was ‘fused’ to aid withidentification but also to analyse theopponent’s intentions on the ground. TheGlobal Hawk was used more flexibly, both

as a complementary imaging surveillancesystem and for reconnaissance. The singleGlobal Hawk used was claimed to haveaccounted for 55% of time critical IADStargets, including 13 SAM batteries, 50SAM TELs, 300 missile storage canisters,and 70 missile transloader vehicles. It wasalso credited with 300 armoured vehicledetections.The broader system architecture usedincluded CONUS based teams ofintelligence analysts who worked throughnear real time or real time intelligencetransmitted from the theatre to the US. Thisreduced deployment problems andpermitted a larger number of analysts to beemployed.The US is reported to have used several newtechniques in the campaign. One was‘predictive battlespace awareness’ in whicha historical database of several years worthof data gathered over Iraq was mined forspecific patterns of behaviour, such aspositioning of mobile IADS elements orother assets. If a potential target was knownto have relocated into a general area, thehistorical database more than oftenprovided an exact cue to the location atwhich the system was later found andengaged. One of the wonders of the digitalage is that such patterns of behaviour can bequickly discerned by dredging througharchives of previous intelligence.

The RC-135V/W Rivet Joint fleet is a pivotal element of the US ISR constellation, and can surveil and analyseradar and communications emissions produced by airborne and surface targets. It played a vital role inferreting out Taliban targets in 2001, and more recently IADS, RG and Baath party militia targets in Iraq. Whilelong term planning envisages the replacement of the RC-135V/W Rivet Joint with a 767 based MC2A variant,the aircraft continue to receive ongoing and extensive sensor, and systems upgrades. The most important recentupgrade is the recently initiated retrofit with CFM-56 engines (USAF).

The sole RQ-4A Global Hawk flown in the OIF campaign, although carrying a smaller payload than the U-2S(below), had much greater persistence and performed above expectations.

The U-2S cockpit.

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Coherent Change Detection (CCD), atechnique pioneered in the Predator groundstation, was also widely used. CCD involvestaking imagery of specific areas of terrainfrom exactly the same point in space, atdifferent times, and then digitallycomparing the images pixel by pixel. Thedifferences are then highlighted in colour asan overlay over the newer image to aid ananalyst in quickly finding changes. This technique is exceptionally powerfuland amenable to use with both syntheticaperture radar imagery and optical orthermal imagery. Sample imagery madeavailable in Predator brochures showsvehicle tracks in sand and grass beinghighlighted instantly. Like ‘predictivebattlespace awareness’ the CCD techniqueis one that is a byproduct of the digital ageand is extremely difficult to beat. Acamouflage net, which might deceive ahuman observer, is apt to produce enoughshadowing or contrast difference for thesoftware to detect it as pixel level changesin a scene.Another new technique was the real timeintegration of ground based cryptologicaland language experts with ISR aircraft overthe battlefield to rapidly analyse enemyactivity based on wireless communicationsintercepts. US sources suggest that manyIADS elements and ballistic missilelaunchers were hunted down using pairs ofRC-135V/W Rivet Joint aircraft, workingclosely with analyst teams. The earlierdamage inflicted on the Iraqi cablecommunications infrastructure yielded theimportant dividend of forcing radiocommunications use instead. Used in pairs,the Rivet Joints could very quickly andaccurately triangulate the location of enemytransmitters. Not all of Iraq’s forces were foolish enoughto transmit arbitrarily, especially operatorsof SAM systems who learned over theprevious decade the risks in doing so. Toelicit SAM radar activity to aid targeting,the US Air Force fired a number of expiredBQM-34 Firebee drones into the Baghdadarea, equipped with chaff dispensers to laydown ‘chaff corridors’. This emulatedtraditional ‘chaff corridor’ laying beforestrikes to entice SAM operators to light uptheir radars. A more devious play was theuse of two sacrificial fatigue life expiredRQ-1 Predators, stripped of their sensorpayloads. These were flown into Baghdadairspace to draw Iraqi fire so as to exposethe SAM systems. Six Predators wereprepared for this role but the air defencecollapsed so rapidly that four lived to seeanother campaign. US sources report thePredator seen on Baghdad TV being pulledout of a lake was one of the two aircraft usedafter it ran out of fuel and crashed.A central issue for the US falling out of OIFis the ability to rapidly transmit ISRinformation and targeting coordinatesbetween platforms. A good number of F-16Cs and F-15Es are now equipped with theImproved Data Modem (IDM), which is amultiport voiceband modem (not unlikeconventional home computer modems intechnology) which transmits a digitally

modulated modem carrier over the voicechannel available in the Have Quick II jamresistant radio, widely used on combataircraft. The IDM is a very basic and slowlink but in the absence of alternatives it hasproven itself to be a very useful point-to-point transmission tool, later variantspermitting the transmission of single frameJPEG target imagery in addition tocoordinate and text messages. What the IDM does permit, with goodsoftware integration, is for one platform tofeed aimpoint GPS coordinates into the firecontrol system of another platform with, forall practical purposes, error freetransmission. Coordinate errors resultingfrom human error have been a major factorin known blue-on-blue and collateraldamage incidents. A particularlyunfortunate effect seems to be the verycommon problem of digit or wholecoordinate transposition duringtransmission or garbled voice reception. Atthis time voice-only platforms have to adopttedious procedures such as two or morecrew members writing down the receivedvoice message for comparison, andreadback to the remote end to verify correctreception. This is time consuming, andcurrent thinking in the US is to aim for fullautomation in the channel between theinformation source and ultimately theweapon.The JTIDS/Link-16 datalink has proven tobe another important capability, but in itsbasic configuration it is used primarily forair interception operations, air trafficmanagement, Identification Friend Foe andsituational awareness. The JTIDS system ismuch more complex and expensive, and is atrue dedicated time division multiplexdigital channel designed for text and digitalcoordinate data, using spread spectrum jamresistant signal modulations. It is not wellsuited to the transmission of bulk digitaldata such as target imagery.Longer term US thinking is to use the JointTactical Radio System (JTRS - ‘jitters’) as ageneral purpose datalink channel, using‘smart tankers’ as platforms to deploydatalink relay equipment. The ROBE‘SMART tanker’ concept is a US Air Forceevolution of an idea first used in Vietnamwith dedicated KC-135A and EC-135LCombat Lightning airbornecommunications relay platforms and morerecently revived with the RAF’s JTIDSrelay equipped tankers. The ‘smart tanker’concept essentially fuses the CombatLightning paradigm of a persistent platformwith a package of diverse communicationsrelays with the RAF model of a ‘multirole’tanker acting as a digital datalink relay. Other than basic connectivity the remainingissues in ISR are centred on sensor systems,processing and means of deployment. Atthis time the three pillars of the US ISRconstellation are the E-3C AWACS, E-8CJSTARS and RC-135V/W Rivet Joint, asthese provide wide area sensor coverage,high volume track analysis and processing,and management of target engagements asrequired.

While the Hellfire armed MQ-1A Predators attractedthe most media attention, they played a much lessimportant role than the much larger U-2S and soleRQ-4A Global Hawk flown in the OIF campaign.

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NorthropGrummanBoeing E-8JSTARS

Often colloquially labelled the ‘GroundAWACS’ the JSTARS is the mostpotent asset of its kind in existence

and until replaced by the new Multi MissionCommand and Control Aircraft (MC2A)will remain so.The origins of the JSTARS lie in the late1970s when DARPA and the USAFlaunched the Assault Breaker program,intended to trial a radical new paradigm forbreaking massed Soviet armoured assaultsin the Fulda Gap. Assault Breaker wasambitious and far reaching, and mergedradically new ISR concepts with radicallynew mass attack munition concepts - suchas the SFW/Skeet.The most dramatic breakthroughs in AssaultBreaker came from its ISR segment, whichsaw the development of two competing‘Pave Mover’ X-band radars designedspecifically to track slow moving groundvehicles. The Pave Movers incorporatedthen new developments in Ground MovingTarget Indicator (GMTI) radar techniques,such as Displaced Phase Center Antenna(DPCA), and rapidly evolving digitallyprocessed Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR)techniques to provide a comprehensiveimage of the battlefield in real time. Whilethe SAR techniques had modest demands intransmitter X-band microwave power, thiswas not true of the GMTI function whichlike air-air radar acquisition of low flyingtargets, had to sort faint returns from clutterand cover a large footprint as well. Thedemand for high power output in GMTIsurveillance radars remains an ongoingissue and presents genuine issues especiallyfor UAVs in this role. Global Hawk andJSTARS are to soon acquire new MT-RTIPactive phased array X-band radars for thisreason.The two Pave Movers were trialled assidelooking radars in the weapon bay of anF-111E, and a Low Probability of Intercept

(LPI) variant was to have been carried in thefuselage radar bay of the stealthy Tacit Blue(aka ‘Whale’) demonstrator. The PaveMover on the F-111E would look intohostile territory to surveil the zone just pastthe FEBA, while the Tacit Blue would godeep and surveil ‘follow-on forces’. Theradar imagery was to be relayed to groundbased or airborne processing and analysisstations. From these, commands would beissued to strike aircraft, or batterieslaunching ballistic missiles armed withSensor Fused Weapon or other smartsubmunitions. The waves of Soviet armourwere to have been stopped in the tracks, andthen annihilated by waves of air power.The Assault Breaker program evolved intothe Joint Surveillance Targeting AttackRadar System (JSTARS) and ended up onthe Boeing 707-320/C-137 series airframe,under the label E-8. While the US Air Forcewanted new build C-137 (military 707)airframes, Congress forced the closure ofthe 707 line and used aircraft had to berebuilt for this purpose - often at greater costthan new build C-137s.The heart of the JSTARS is the massiveAPY-3 X-band radar, one of the mostpowerful radars ever built in this band,

carried in the canoe radome under theforward fuselage. The 24ft roll-stabilisedantenna subsystem, designed by formerNorden Systems (now NG), uses a verylarge three segment passive phased arrayand implements DPCA techniques toaccurately locate slow moving groundtargets. The beam is electronically steered inazimuth and manually steered in elevation.No less important is the APY-3’s dataprocessing subsystem, originally builtaround militarised DEC VAX processors ina distributed architecture, with a processorin each of the 17 operator stations.Processed data can be used to manageengagements from the aircraft, or can besent via a high speed datalink to mobileground stations. This highly capable systemcan overlay GMTI track data over SARmaps and stored digital terrain maps, but italso has the capability to overlay historicaltrack data many hours old, permittingspecific patterns of enemy movement to bediscerned. Even hidden sites visited byvehicles at random time intervals will bedetected by the APY-3 system.

The E-8C JSTARS was the pivotal ground surveillance asset used in OIF, accounting for the largest number ofground targets. Flying sorties of up to 17 hours duration with aerial refuelling, the JSTARS stripped away the coverof darkness, cloud, fog and sandstorms to expose Iraqi land force assets to withering aerial firepower (USAF).

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The system has three basic operatingmodes: Wide Area Surveillance(WAS/MTI), Sector Search, a sector limitedGMTI mode, and Synthetic Aperture (SAR)with ancillary beacon tracking and datalinkmodes. The signal processing is reported tobe capable of resolving wheeled and trackedvehicles, and given the presence of modesto detecting rotating radar antennas in theNorden APG-76, is likely to have a similarcapability. The three surveillance modes canbe interleaved.As the APY-3 can look through cloud, rain,fog, dust storms and other impediments toelectro-optical ISR sensors, it provides agenuine all-weather 24/7 capability to lookdeep into the battlespace and trackthousands of surface targets.Of all the ISR systems used in OIF, theJSTARS of the US Air Force 93rd AirControl Wing produced by far the greatestimpact and proved to be the backbone of theeffort to attrit Republican Guard armouredformations.

The RC-135Vand RC-135WRivet Joint

E lectronic reconnaissance andsurveillance played a no less criticalrole in OIF. The most prominent asset

used for this task was the detachment of USAir Force 55th Wing RC-135V/W RivetJoint aircraft.The Rivet Joint fleet has had a long andcolourful history, since the first of theseaircraft were rebuilt from reconnaissancerole modified RC-135C/U aircraft duringthe Vietnam conflict. These aircraft areeasily distinguished by their unique thimbleshaped ‘hognose’ radomes and large cheekbays for mission avionic antennas. Duringthe latter part of the Cold War the RivetJoint fleet was largely occupied withmonitoring Soviet radar andcommunications activity along the USSR’svast borders. Since 1991 these aircraft havebecome used as much for in theatre tacticaloperations as for strategic reconnaissancework. The former is much more demandingas it is ‘real time’ work and has often seenspecialist linguists carried aboard tointerpret data as it is gathered.

The heart of the Rivet Joint is the massiveand complex signals and electronicintelligence gathering system, comprisingthe Raytheon 55000 Electronic SupportMeasures (ESM) and 85000 signalsintelligence (SIGINT) receiver systems,widely regarded to be the most capable suchsystem in existence. It can passivelymonitor and record signals across a verywide spectrum, geolocate them, and analysetheir modulations with very high accuracyfor onboard or ground analysis -encompassing both radar andcommunications signals.While long term US planning envisages theRivet Joint mission package eventuallymigrating to the MC2A, numerous upgradesremain in progress for this unique platform.These include a major upgrade of the cheekantenna arrays to provide a larger number ofsteerable high band beams (SHF High GainSteerable Beam Antenna Upgrades I/II), aten element HF band direction findingreceiver, an additional circular antennaarray for continuous 360 degree coverage,and a range of datalink upgrades to improvedigital connectivity. A vital upgrade now inprogress is retrofitting CFM-56 engines, toimprove fuel burn, performance, enduranceand range.The Rivet Joint receives little mediaattention, yet it is one of the most importantsystems the US deploys in any aircampaign. Its capacity to ‘vacuum up’ andrapidly analyse all electronic signals withina 250 nautical mile circle is invaluable asfew opponents are capable of functioningwithout electronic wirelesscommunications.

Conclusions

If any single capability could be labelledas ‘decisive’ in OIF it was the US ISRconstellation. There can be no doubt that

its capabilities are central to current shift toinformation driven ‘network centricwarfare’. Whether it hides or moves on theground, or emits, one or more platformswill detect the target’s signature.The US Air Force is aggressively pursuingfurther growth in the ISR domain, with theambitious MC2A program, active AESAMT-RTIP upgrades for the E-8C JSTARS,U-2S and RQ-4 Global Hawk, and plans tocarry ISR payloads on air refuellable andenlarged production X-45C UCAVs. TheF/A-22A is expected to relay radar andpassive ESM tracks into the ISRconstellation using datalinks and thuspushing the ‘ISR horizon’ up to 500nautical miles deep into hostile airspace.We should not be surprised if an ISR orrecce derivative of the F/A-22A emerges intime as ‘deep ISR’ is the remaining domainto be conquered by the US Air Force. Smarttankers and universal datalink connectivitybetween ISR platforms and combat aircraftwill further enhance the vast capabilities ofthis ‘warfighting system’.In Australia the rhetoric has been gushing,especially in terms of the ‘future networkedair force’, with the JSF being presented as‘JSTARS-like’ in capability. Global Hawkhas been canvassed publicly, despite thelikelihood that maritime patrol taskingwould devour all hours available in thesmall numbers proposed.What is more telling is that recent decisionsin a number of areas indicate that the wholeparadigm of persistent ISR and persistentfirepower - the central backbone of the USparadigm, have not been intellectuallygrasped. The commitment of $2B into amere five new build tankers rather thanlarger numbers of used airframes, thecommitment to kill the persistent F-111 off,and a failure to even articulate the need fora JSTARS-like ISR platform are all visibleindicators of a force structure paradigm andthought process deeply rooted in Cold Warera thinking.In twenty first century air wars, dominancein the ISR game is a prerequisite forwinning.