Integrating Design and Production a Case Study of the Naval Submarine Program

7/28/2019 Integrating Design and Production a Case Study of the Naval Submarine Program

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International Journal cf Production Economics, 28 (1992) 107-126Elsevier

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ForumIntegrating design and production: A case study of the navalsubmarine program*Thomas J. Ecclesa and Henry S. MarcusbUnited States Navy, Washington, DC, USAhDepartment of Ocean Engineering. Massachusetts Institute of Technolog~~, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA(Received 11 July 1990; accepted in revised form 20 February 1992)

AbstractThe Japanese have shown the benefits of integrating the design and manufacturing functions. The U.S. Naval shipbuilding

program presents formidable challenges to implementing such ideas of integration both between the design and productionorganizations m a given shipyard as well as between Navy designers and personnel in the several competing shipyards.Nevertheless, this paper describes how these challenges were overcome in the introduction of advanced manufacturing conceptsin the Navy submarine program.

1. IntroductionIn recent years, the study of product devel-opment cycles in a wide variety of technology-

based companies has received much attention.The growing economy of Japan and theshrinking role of U.S. industry in the worldmarket have been the main drivers for suchresearch. Examinations of mechanisms ofinnovation, organization of product develop-ment, and methods of designing robustproducts have a recurring theme which is theimportance of achieving a balanced integra-

Correspondence to: H.S. Marcus, Department of OceanEngineering, Room 5-207, Massachusetts Institute ofTechnology. Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.* This article was originally accepted by the Journal ofManufacturing and Operations Management.

tion of design for product performance anddesign for manufacture. In this paper, the issueof design and production integration will beaddressed in terms of the conventional separ-ation of organizational entities and the bene-fits which may be realized through moreoverlap and parallelism in the stages of designwhich lead to full-scale production.The importance of considering structureand methodology in the complex process ofmoving a ship design from concept throughthe details of production may not be obviousat first glance. After all, the evolution of navalarchitecture and ship construction seems tohave been a smooth advancement over thepast two hundred years, marked more by newtechnological innovations than by step cha-nges in how design is done. The historical milemarkers in ship design are measured as tech-nical advancements: steam over sail, steel


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108 J.C. Thomus, S.M. Henry/lntrgratiny design and productionover wood, diesels and gas turbines oversteam, etc.

However, across many product lines whichare distinctly defined by technology attributes,the latitude to influence the costs of produc-tion has been shown to become greatly re-stricted after the formative stages of design.Dixon and Duffy, citing the classic Britishaerospace study which showed that 80% ofmanufacturing costs were committed duringthe first 20% of the design process, describe thecurrent focus in American manufacturing astoo sharply directed at a search for solutionswithin the manufacturing process itself [l, 21.Instead, industry, government and educatorsshould be examining the role of designers andthe framework of the design process as it re-lates to manufacturing, for more leverage inimproving process costsproduct performance. while developing

A common expression for the prevailingmethod of transition of a product from onedesign stage to the next, or from design intoproduction, is the tlzrow it over the wallmethod. The implication is that tasks are seg-mented into stages which employ differentgroups of people in discrete work steps whichare packaged so that when the end of a stage isrecognized, the results of the work are passedto the next team. This serial organization ofwork and resources appeals to a sense of func-tional task accomplishment. But, the pitfalls ofsuch a philosophy are that the teams andproducts from each stage fail to communicatewith the next, or later, stages in the develop-ment process and that the delays in transmit-ting specifications from one stage to anotherwill be costly in the long run in terms of losttime and the lost opportunity to incorporateadvanced methods and technologies in theproduction process.Beyond the lack of congruency amongdevelopment teams, the traditional serialmethods can restrain the design in its eco-nomic use of facilities and equipment which

may be in simultaneous or recent developmentby manufacturing engineers. This is more sig-nificant than a lag in process technology. Thecapacity of design teams which are orientedsolely toward product performance to adaptthe design to the production process is limitedby their inexperience with the manufacturingsector and the lack of incentive to enhance theoverall objective of building an affordableproduct which meets the performance speci-fications. When the target is to get the per-formance design over the wall on schedule,the aim rarely meets the real goal of affordableperformance.The full realization of the benefits of moresynergistic integration of design and produc-tion requires more than consistent leadership.The proper blend of expertise within designteams, the optimal overlap from one phase tothe next, and the institution of feedback mech-anisms are other issues. At a very basic level,the shift from a functional organization to onewhich is product-oriented characterizes manymodern success stories in manufacturing pro-ductivity. Also, a strong emphasis on qualityand robustness must be communicated toevery level of participation so that the idea ofa self-improving process bridging design andproduction may be realized. Finally, methodsof measurement of the goals and benefits needto be derived and communicated clearly sothat a systematic establishment of incentivesmay be brought to bear on the challengingobjective of getting diverse sets of players allmoving toward common goals.To complicate the issues for the case ofnaval ship construction, the performancespecifiers and some designers are part of theNavy, and the remainder of the designers,and essentially all of the manufacturers areprivate sector components which generallycompete with one another mainly on thebasis of naval ship construction contracts.Thus the Navys challenge is to institutechanges which lead to more effective integra-tion of design and production in a multi-participatory environment which is far morecomplicated than within a single corporateentity.


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J.C. Thomas, S.M. Henry/Integrating design and production 1091.2. Synergy in teamwork

Advantages of a product-oriented approachto design and development team structureresult from synergistic coupling of the differentelements making up the multi-disciplinarygroup. A team built of product designers andmanufacturing engineers offers in-house ex-pertise in downstream development. Early iden-tification of conflicts which may occur laterleads naturally to cost saving resolutions andmore advantageous incorporation of processrequirements in the earliest phases of design.Research has shown that in comparableautomobile production, Japanese firms de-signed products in two-thirds the time, usinghalf the engineering effort of American com-panies. That advantage translated into bettermarket responsiveness and faster introductionof new technologies. The number of differentmodels and the quantity of each produced defytraditional explanations which rely on the ad-vantages of mass production. In this auto case,the Japanese systems of development seem towork as flexible methods suited for specialproduction of low quantity, high variety prod-ucts [3, 41.Attributes of successful product develop-ment strategy are arguably appropriate be-yond the auto industry. Indeed, the focus onteamwork, interdisciplinary leadership, andparallelism is being noticed in other industriessuch as consumer electronics and tool manu-facturing. The critical indicator of cost in de-sign is sometimes the time to produce a design.By establishing closer associations and moreopen communications among different func-tionaries, the passage of tasks and ideas fromone phase to another can occur in an overlap-ping, fed-forward and fed-back manner. Thisgives both the sender and receiver an advan-tage in that the proposed design is consideredby the next element before reaching finaliza-tion, and perhaps most important, it gives thenext stage a heads up to begin planningbased on its lead knowledge of what it is aboutto receive.

The formation of multi-functional teamswithin organizations which comprise the naval

shipbuilding community is only part of thesolution to optimize interaction in design andproduction. In Navy shipbuilding, design func-tions are assigned to several of the major ship-builders, as well as within the Naval SeaSystems Command (NAVSEA). In several re-cent ship designs, NAVSEA has assembledintegrated teams of Navy and shipbuilder rep-resentatives early in the process, and workedtoward common, pre-competitive improve-ment of the design. Often, these teams focusedon ship performance and the dissemination ofinformation necessary to make competent bidsfor detailed design and follow-on construction,rather than on specific measures to improveproductivity during the construction phase.Further development of early phase Navy/shipbuilder cooperation on methods of integ-rating productivity factors into the design hasbeen a goal of the Navys Chief Engineer [SJ.

Similar reduction of barriers to essentialcommunications between members of designand production elements may be found insome shipbuilding organizations. In others,labor agreements complicate the structure ofintegration of functions, and some synergy isinhibited. In the research for this report, themost advanced ideas for integration of designand production occurred in environmentswhere production personnel were least re-stricted in crossing trade boundaries. Even inthose cases, the interaction with design func-tionaries who were separately organized withrespect to labor organizations or physicallyseparated from the production site was weak.Generally, more flexible adaptation of teammembers to the responsibilities of others, andthe ability to educate across organizationallines can contribute significantly to the effect-iveness of team performance.1.3. Producibility and quality

The significance of attention to quality indesign and manufacturing has become recog-nized, and received special emphasis in theUnited States in recent years. Many com-panies have become aware of the differencesamong competitors in the costs associated


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110 J.C. Thomas, S.M. Henry!lntrgratiny &sign and productionwith rework, and the costs of maintainingreputation in the face of poor quality productsin the market. Traditional estimates of qualityproblem costs were unrealistically low.Taguchi and Clausing [6] have paraphrasedthe former vice president of Toyota, TaiichiOhno:

Whatever an executive thinks the losses ofpoor quality are, they are actually six timesgreater

Taguchi is the namesake of his principles ofquality engineering, the Taguchi Methods[4, 7). He and Clausing, of MIT, write aboutRobust Quality, and in the article of thattitle they condense several of Taguchis prin-ciples into a simple statement:Quality is a virtue of design

The implication is that the essence of thequality of a manufactured product is deter-mined in the design process. Also implicit is thenotion that the manufacturing process is con-sidered in the design. A design that incorpo-rates integrity of quality lends itself naturallyto a production process which may be oper-ated and monitored to achieve the desiredstandards. Statistical process control methodsare basic to the concept of monitoring, identi-fying problems, and guiding solutions. Theyallow the production manager to glean theimportant information from an over-specifiedcollection of parameters, and pick the at-tributes which may be most significant forerror correction. Generally, the goal is to min-imize scatter, and then guide the aim pointtoward a target in product performance space.All of these controls and monitoring are after-action repairs to a system which is mostlydetermined during design. And that may bethe most important point regarding quality inthe context of this paper. The conclusion issimilar to the idea, mentioned above, that thevast majority of production costs are deter-mined in the earliest phases of the designprocess.So if quality and producibility should bebrought into the design as early as possible,how should design teams do that? Certainly

a team cannot simply decide to increase itsemphasis on manufacturing and quality andexpect to automaticaIly see positive results.There must be an injection of some differentperspective and experience to balance and in-teract with the established product designers.Logically, that input should come from theproduction plant. In shipyards, there typicallyis a group of waterfront design and planningpeople who maintain the link between the con-tracted design and the production work. Theyare oriented toward the facilities and workforce which are particular to that shipyard.Their career evolution often involves an earlyphase in the skilled labor force, masteringa trade, then a move into the planning anddesign side of the operation. The waterfrontdesigners and planners are, today, oftenbrought into the detailed design process (withthe main group of product designers) prior tothe start of production work to bring schedul-ing expertise to the pre-planning effort. Theseexperienced, process-oriented designers areprobably the best group to begin cross-train-ing for use in earlier phases of design, includingthe pre-competitive stages when the Navy andits builders have formed cooperative designteams. Usually however, the industry repres-entatives on such joint groups are profes-sionals and managers who are more detachedfrom the waterfront processes. Theircontribution is designed to enhance productadherence to specification, rather than to bringproducibility concepts and discipline to thedesign.One method of product development archi-tecture which is oriented toward improvingquality within the framework of customer ex-pectations is the House of Quality programdescribed by Taguchi and Hauser [7] and firstimplemented by Mitsubishi. This system in-volves the assembly of a team of people repres-enting major disciplines, including design,manufacturing, and marketing whocooperatively determine weighting factors as-sociated with product attributes. Theseweights are designed to balance the customersperceptions of the product against its competi-tors with the companys perspective of the


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J.C. Thomus, S.M. Henrgllnteyratiny design and production 111products value and the cost of adding features.The system has been adopted by variousAmerican manufacturers, including the FordMotor Company. The House of Quality offersmany ideas for creative product design paths,but it also invokes a simple discipline of com-bining functional resources for the commonpurpose of defining an optimal product de-scription. The mere prerequisite of conveninga multi-disciplined group of decision makerssupplies an answer to interdepartmental com-munications problems. The forward lookingaim of the process avoids some of the familiarproblems inherent in review meetings whereattribution is more emphasized than coopera-tion. And the equal emphasis given to eachdiscipline within this process is crucial toenhancing the influence of production consid-erations.

2. Ship design and acquisition processIn trying to apply the lessons of design-

production integration to Navy shipbuilding,one immediately sees challenges in two areas.First, the shipyard which contains both designand production functions faces the normalover-the-wall syndrome experienced in U.S.industry. Design and production may belocated in different geographic areas with dif-ferent unions, budgets, and organizationalstructures and incentive systems. Second,Navy shipbuilding has the additional problemthat all the early stages of design may be per-formed before the production shipyard is evenchosen.

The Navy has established a formal processof design stages leading to construction con-tract award. The organization of that processhas strong influence on the contracting,pricing, and competition in the naval ship-building industry. Methods of manufacturewhich may reduce production cost or lead toother performance or life-cycle cost enhance-ments often require long lead time recognitionby many parties to ensure incorporation in thenext design. The early association of biddingshipbuilders with the Navy design and pro-

gram management establishments is essentialto optimizing a design for producibility.

2.1. Design fr amew lorkShip design may be considered in four clas-sic consecutive stages:- Concept Design- Preliminary Design- Contract Design

- Detailed DesignWith the selection of a basic set of guidelinesand major characteristics of the ship set byfeasibility studies and a Concept Design, a de-sign team is formed to produce a Prelimi-nary Design which is considerably moredetailed. The Preliminary Design does not in-clude sufficient information to allow exact costdetermination in contractual terms, but it doesaddress complex issues such as stability, sur-vivability, manning, major systems, and lifecycle considerations such as overhaul interval.As with the various feasibility studies, the Pre-liminary Design has historically been an inhouse NAVSEA function. However, since thelate 1970s major shipbuilders have sometimeshad some access to the preliminary design pro-cess, such as the 60 producibility concept stud-ies conducted by seven shipbuilders interestedin the Arleigh Burke (DDG-5 1) class destroyerprogram [S].The Contract Design is intended to be ofsufficient detail that shipbuilders can use it asthe basis for precise bidding against competi-tion for award of the production contract. Thespecification for every weld bead and fittingmay not be spelled out, but the builder canexpect that significant departures from a Con-tract Design will require revision or re-negoti-ation of any resulting production contracts. Inrecent shipbuilding programs, notably theArleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyer, theNavy has included within its Contract Designteam several representatives of each candidateshipbuilder. The shipbuilders participantshave generally been naval architects and sys-tem design engineers.

The Detailed Design is the device used asexact documentation by the shipbuilder to


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112 J.C. Tl~omas, S.M. Hrtli4ilnt~gratitlg design and production

describe the ship to be built. It should reflectevery detail expected by the Navy, and it willform the record base for all future repair andmodification work to be accomplished on theship. The Detailed Design is usually contrac-ted to one shipbuilder from among the candi-dates for construction contracts. In the past,a common practice was to tie award of thedetailed design to the lead ship constructioncontract. The result was nearly concurrent de-tailed design and first ship construction.

2.2. Contemporary design strategiesIn the case of the new Seawolf( SSN-2 1) class

submarine, the detailed design was divided bymajor systems between the only two U.S. sub-marine construction yards (General Dynamicsand Newport News Shipbuilding) and it wasawarded two full years before the anticipatedkeel laying of the lead ship. The interim periodbetween start of detailed design and start oflead ship construction was intended to providea maturity in the design which would presum-ably lead to fewer conflicts and interferences,and which was necessary given the increaseddesign work required in zone-oriented con-struction. Also, teams were created for the re-view of producibility concepts which aroseduring Contract Design. The Seawolf Produci-bility Steering Group (PSG) included designrepresentatives from both of the shipbuildersand from NAVSEA. Working groups focusedon broad system areas to address ideas regard-ing standardization, uniform tolerances, andcommunication of digitally transferred in-formation such as plans and specifications[9-l 11.In a special program to design a new hullform special application vessel calledSWATH/T-AGOS, the Navy and twelve civil-ian shipyards formed a collocated team toconduct a combined preliminary and contractdesign. For the Seawolf, the two submarinebuilders started with a Navy feasibility studyand derived separate preliminary designswhich the Navy used to compile a best ofboth preliminary design. Each shipyard thenused this net preliminary design to derive two

independent proposed contract designs. In1986 the Chief Engineer of the Navy, ViceAdmiral James H. Webber [ 1 l] referred to thisclose coupling of Navy and industry in allphases of design:

The result will be a ship that benefits fromthe innovations of two experienced ship-builders, with close Navy oversight toensure that our performance requirementsare met.Earlier association between the Navy cus-tomer/designer and the shipyard producer/designer should improve the product and the

production cost provided the Navy maintainsa vigilant watch over degradation of perform-ance or quality for the sake of cost cutting.

In the past, the hierarchy of the naval shipdesign process appeared to be a classic overthe wall situation. Traditionally, to a varyingextent, this was certainly the case as the designwas broken into rigid blocks with little interac-tion between the different government and pri-vate sector design agents and the buildingyard. Today, the Navy seems to recognize thevalue of some overlap among the stages ofdesign and production, and of consistency inprogram leadership from early design throughbeginning production. In the most recentmajor ship acquisition programs, the seniorleadership has been maintained througha much longer period than allowed for by thetraditional turnover rate among senior offi-cers. In the case of the Seawolf (SSN-21) classsubmarine, the current program manager hasbeen involved from the earliest phases of de-sign as the Ship Design Manager over eightyears ago (as a Commander) until 1991 (asa Rear Admiral), when he presided over com-pletion of detailed design, lead ship construc-tion and award of follow-ship buildingcontracts.The integration of producibility and qualityconcerns within the design process is also thesubject of a Department of Defense researcheffort coordinated by the Defense AdvancedResearch Projects Agency (DARPA). The termgiven to its approach to an integrated design


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J.C. Thomas, S.M. Henry/Integrating design and production 113methodology is concurrent engineering, andthe DARPA program is called DICE (theDARPA Initiative in Concurrent Engineer-ing). The DICE program is a consortium ofdefense industry representatives and universityresearchers. Their work has been described asintermediate-term and pre-competitive [l].The methodology is highly coupled withinformation systems development to supportadvanced Computer-Aided Design and Manu-facturing (CAD/CAM) systems which willcombine three dimensional product descrip-tions with textual information which may beprocessed for database purposes. The DICEprogram is intended to integrate design, manu-facture, and life-cycle requirements intoa coordinated framework. The obstacle facingDICE concepts today is the more basic devel-opment of the computer base for such concur-rent design.In a related vein, the Defense DepartmentsCALS (Computer-Aided Logistic Support)programe is intended to support the life-cycledevelopment of design, construction and logis-tical data for ships and other major weaponssystems. The SeawoCf (SSN-2 1) submarineclass construction is one of several initial insti-tutions of a the CALS program in defenseacquisition. A major Seawolf initiative is thedevelopment of Sectional Construction Draw-ings (SCD) which support direct creation ofthe production work packages from originaldesign drawings transmitted between organ-izations through a digital data exchange.Other Seawolf program initiatives include theinstitution of a Producibility Steering Groupof designers from the shipbuilders and theNavy to coordinate and evaluate productivityimprovement proposals and standardizationissues, and a Producibility Review processwhich requires review of each shipyards Sec-tional Construction Drawings by the othershipyard. Brucker describes this as a produci-bility review conducted . . . not only in-house, but also by an independent and highlyinterested second party. The shipyards re-view teams include representatives fromdesign, construction, planning and quality as-surance groups. Their inputs are considered

for changes to the SCDs prior to use in pro-duction work packages [9].

3. Production: the industry and technologyThe idea of giving more design considera-

tion to how a ship is built is simple enough atfirst glance: infuse the design process withsome experienced builders. But, the way shipsare built is changing today. The experiencebase is saddled with many years of traditionalshipbuilding practice which may not providethe designer with the relevant background toimprove the producibility of his design fortomorrows construction. Designers should beaware of the basic philosophical changes inship production and the technologies whichenable the methods. The ship designer hasmuch potential to contribute to the science ofship construction through his own innovationand by recognizing design/manufacturesynergies. This section will characterize thefundamental methods which distinguishcontemporary ship construction from thewell established, traditional systems of ship-building which prevailed in the United Statesthrough the 1960s.3. I. Submarine construction industry

Beyond the special control required to en-sure hull integrity for submersibles, the adventin 1955 of nuclear power plants in ships im-posed stringent new technical requirementsupon shipyards which would build and repairsubmarines. Few of the existing builders foundthey could afford to operate in this technicallychallenging and administratively formidableenvironment. Today there are only two com-mercial shipyards and six naval shipyardsqualified to build or repair nuclear poweredships and submarines. The Navys shipyardsmoved out of the new ship construction indus-try in the 1960s. and today they work exclus-ively in ship repair and modernization. Thisleft two commercial submarine yards in theUnited States: the Electric Boat Division


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114 J.C. Thomns, S.M. Hunry/lntryrating design md productionof General Dynamics Corporation (EB) inGroton, Connecticut, and the Newport NewsShipbuilding and Drydock Company (NNS)in Newport News, Virginia.3.2. Shipbuilding procrss innovations

The change in worldwide shipbuilding inrecent decades may be characterized generallyas a transition from a systems oriented con-struction process to one which is zone oriented.Basic changes in welding technology in the1940s enabled shipbuilders to shift from a se-quential process of hull erection and internalsystems outfitting to a more parallel approachof construction by zones. Today, the termszone construction and group technologyrefer to the accepted method of building shipsas assemblies of smaller subassemblies, and theorganization of production work by associatedproducts and zones. Chirillo and Chirillo [ 121have laid out the historical foundations for thismetamorphosis, tracing the Japanese leader-ship position in shipbuilding back to thesystem developed by Henry Kaiser at hisAmerican shipyards during WWII. Establish-ment of postwar commercial ship constructionat Japanese yards which had been spared wardamage brought the concept of Group Tech-nology to Japan through Kaisers superintend-ent, Elmer Hann. The Japanese companyIshikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries Co.,Ltd. (IHI) eventually acquired the yard atKure where Hann had introduced the neworganization. The Kure facility was led byDr.Hisashi Shinto, who had been Hanns ChiefEngineer (and years later was the president ofNTT).Shinto further refined the industrialmethods using statistical process controltaught by Dr. W. Edwards Deming and de-signed a system which Chirillo describes as CIconstantly self-improving shipbuilding systemwith basic Kaiser logic intact. The reversetechnology transfer from IHI to the UnitedStates was facilitated by the National Ship-building Research Program (NSRP), a govern-ment/industry consortium which sponsoredexchange between industrialists and academics

and studied the system at IHI [ 13, 141. Chirillorelates the IHI evolution of product develop-ment in terms of levels, which are illustrated inFig. 1. At each level, the organizations of thework instructions and the work force becomemore parallel. The construction process isimproved by taking advantage of a product-oriented view toward fabrication and assem-bly, and using analysis techniques to measure,control and improve progress.In this report, the advancement of submar-ine construction through the fourth of theselevels, and into the fifth is observed. A basictenet of the IHI observations is that shipbuild-ing technology development is not restrictedto the application of physical technologicalsystems, but also requires a systematic ap-proach to design, work planning, and integra-tion of resources to produce a quality product.The most significant features of the methods ofshipbuilding which were transferred during the1970s were organizational and methodologi-cal, rather than based on facility, machinery, ornational work ethic [12].The issue of a productivity disparity be-tween American and overseas shipyards hasbeen addressed and evidenced by Weiers [ 151.In his study for the U.S. Department of Trans-portation, Weiers summarizes the major con-struction process innovations which mightaccount for improved productivity outside theU.S. In differentiating between systems in-novations and automation, Weiers notes thatsystems innovations are significantly more im-portant in explaining the productivity gap.Weiers simplified history of the developmentof improved shipyard work organization, andthe very complete treatment of shipbuildingmethods given by Starch, Hammon and othersin Ship Production provide a through descrip-tion of the methods and practices of modernshipbuilding, and their evolution in the pastfew decades 1161. In recent years, the Navyand the shipbuilding industry have developedseveral programs to incorporate advancedshipbuilding technologies in naval shipbuild-ing and to formulate new strategies for im-proved design and manufacturing interfaces[17-251.


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J.C. Thomas, KM. Henry/Integrating design and productionPost-Implementation Review of Sheetmetal Cell ProjectActual/Projected Savings Compared to Planned Savings in Direct Labor Manhours

A B C D E F G H TotalSubmarine Projects

m Planned Savings (normalized for Ship H)Actual/Projected* Savings

Fig. 1. Levels of shipbuilding technology development [12].

4. Government programs to improveproducibility

Many projects and programs have beendevised for the purpose of improving produc-tivity in defense acquisitions. The NationalShipbuilding Research Program (NSRP),which was established in about 1970 as acollaborative effort between shipbuilders andthe government, was influential in transferringmethods and systems technology fromJapanese shipyards to the U.S. The NSRPsupports research and has shared industrycosts. One category of its many types of pro-jects has been obtaining consulting servicesfrom Japanese shipbuilders [ 133.This paper will focus on a program estab-lished between the Navy and a naval ship-builder to stimulate the incorporation ofadvanced manufacturing technologies in thenaval ship construction process.

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4.1. The shipbuilding technology programA cooperative relationship between theNavy and industry began in 1983 when theShipbuilding Technology (ShipTech) program

was created at the Electric Boat Division ofGeneral Dynamics. Three projects within thatprogram are used as case studies to supportconclusions of this report. One distinguishingcharacteristic of the ShipTech program is therequirement that a detailed cost-benefit studybe accomplished and documented for projectproposal, and that the performance after im-plementation must be measured and reported.The proposal includes planned costs, benefitsrealizable through ship construction costreductions and a schedule of cash transfersbetween the parties which demonstrates theinvestment feasibility of the project. For theShipTech projects described in this report,forecast Navy ROIs (actually, internal rate of


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116 J.C. Thomas, S.M. Henry/Integrating design and productionreturn - IRR) ranged from 17% to 29%. In thesingle case where a Post-Implementation Re-view was examined, the overall result was thatsignificantly better savings were realized inpractice than were forecast.

The goal of the ShipTech program is toaccelerate into the ship construction processthe incorporation of new technologies whichhave the potential to decrease the costs ofproduction. In this relationship, the Navyagreed to release funds to General Dynamicsfor the purpose of developing and implemen-ting technology modernization projects whichmay prove beneficial ultimately to both par-ties. The funds to be released representamounts earned under existing constructioncontracts (based on percentage of physicalprogress completed), but which are not yetpayable due to limitations in the terms ofpayment of the contracts. The funds releasedare used for development and capital costsassociated with projects submitted byGeneral Dynamics and approved by theNavy. The funds are subsequently recoveredby the Navy in accordance with a schedulebased on General Dynamics pretax reduc-tions of profit due to the developmentcosts.

The basic idea of ShipTech financing is thatthe Navy will release funds which cover devel-opment and implementation capital costs forthe project and then the Navy recovers itsinitial investment plus a share of the resultingcost savings on Navy contract work. Develop-ment cost recovery by the Navy is such thatover the period between release and recovery,the amount released provides a value in termsof the prevailing cost-of-money (per the CostAccounting Standard 414 published in theFederal Register) equal to the pretax profitreductions represented by the total develop-ment costs of the project. Implementationcapital amounts released by the Navy are re-covered on the basis of after-tax cash flows toGeneral Dynamics resulting from project im-plementation. The average value of the Navyinvestment in each of the roughly twenty Ship-Tech projects is on the order of one milliondollars.

5. ExamplesThree examples of ShipTech projects whichincorporate advanced manufacturing tech-niques are described in following paragraphs.

Each of the examples involves some level ofintegration between design and productionfunctions. The first two show how integrationmay be performed between design and produc-tion within the same yard. The third shows thegreater complexity of integrating the Navydesigners, the yard designers and the yardproduction personnel.5.1. Ventilation duct manufacturing case

Sheet metal fabrication in submarine con-struction has traditionally been a very laborintensive, job shop oriented production pro-cess involving hundreds of different shapes anda high degree of shop floor talent and attentionto product design. The ShipTech project whichmotivates this case was derived from a broaderNavy-sponsored project at the Bath IronWorks (BIW) shipyard in Maine (a builder ofNavy destroyers, cruisers and frigates). Underthe auspices of the Navys ManufacturingTechnology (ManTech) program, BIW wasdeveloping a standardization of ventilationsystems components which would lend itself tocomputer aided design implementation ofa limited number of product shapes whichcould be manufactured in higher volume.The General Dynamics project would applythe ManTech program ideas to submarineconstruction. Ventilation system design andconstruction is similar in surface combatantsand submarines, but submarines are consider-ably more constrained in internal volume.Therefore the system designs are more com-plex and have historically used more uniqueparts. Potential gains in this costly environ-ment were considered very significant.5.2. Designing on the shopJEoor

The process of taking very basic designguidance on ventilation system arrangementand specifications and translating it to the


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J.C. Thomus, S.M. Henry/Integrating design and production 117

work process documents used in the sheet-metal shop requires a great deal of unrepeat-able work. The design product traditionallyprovides a very efficient layout of ducting, buteach run is a custom design and requiresunique component shapes. The design plansdo not tell the shop how to unfold the three-dimensional shapes into patterns which maybe laid out on sheetmetal and cut.In the past, the sheetmetal planners wouldcreate a cardboard template from full scaledrawings which they would have produced byredrafting the design guidance. This patternwould represent the exact shape to be cut fromthe sheet stock. It was estimated that the shopstored over 40,000 of these templates. Nestingof various parts was necessarily a manual pro-cess, so the algorithms available for minimi-zing scrap were not applicable. The technicaltalent and labor involved in planning and set-ting up each individual piece of sheet metalwas extremely costly and repetitious of pre-viously accomplished design work. Little gainwas realized from a change in volume and thesystem was very sensitive to a loss of experi-enced craftsmen. Obviously, this system ofelaborate planning effort was costly and ineffi-cient from a manufacturing perspective.

5.3. Standardizing component shapesThe solution required some method tostandardize the ventilation ducting compo-nents used throughout the submarine. Stan-

dardization would make available somecomputing technologies which offer tremen-dous savings potential. In this project, anintegrated CAD/CAM system including anumerically controlled manufacturing cellsupported by a manufacturing control systemwould bring together several fundamentalproduct and process changes with promisingpotential.

First, a library of standard three-dimen-sional geometries is amenable to simple trans-lation from final assembly shape to flatpatterns. This would eliminate the costly andtime consuming process of decomposing theunique shapes into one-of-a-kind cardboard

templates. The geometries would be suffi-ciently generic to support the high perform-ance volume constraints in interiorsubmarine arrangement. Designers wouldspecify a system component by picking afamily of shapes and listing the standard set ofattribute values which completely describe theparameters of the part. These might includelengths of sides, cross-section geometry,transition length, and angular displacementsof faces with respect to a baseline. A simpleexample is illustrated in Fig. 2.Second, by limiting the general geometriesto a relatively small group, the designers andfabricators would reduce the time and effort tolay out and build the system. Standard flatpatterns of various sizes could be cataloguedand handled by an automated nesting systemwhich would integrate outfitting schedulesinto the work planning process. The resultwould be time-sensitive response to the con-struction schedule with minimal scrap.

Perhaps most significantly, families ofshapes are easily communicated from design,through planning, to instruction sets for nu-merically controlled machine tools used toposition, cut, drill, and individually label partson the sheet metal. The numerically controlledmachinery would perform at a cutting ratesubstantially faster than the former methods.Quality and safety considerations were alsoimproved over the more labor intensivemethods. Even the creation of work packagedocumentation for parts assembly by a sheet-metal mechanic was made simpler because theautomated planning process was able to simul-taneously produce drawings of componentshapes and final assembled products. This re-duced the labor effort substantially from thetraditional method where work preparationefforts prior to actual machining typically ac-counted for 30% to 40% of the total manhoursin fabrication. The fabrication process movedfrom job-shop toward a flexible productionline.

Finally, the integration of design and manu-facturing considerations which took place dur-ing the development stage for this effort servedto bridge a gap which had formed between


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118 J.C. Thomas, S.M. Henry/Integrating design and productionr,!B

HUMAN-ACTIVATED ONSTANTLY-MPAOWNG MANUFACTURING YSTEM

TQC - Small-Group Activities

INTEGRATED HULL CONSTRUCTION,OUTFIlTlNG. AND PAINTING

Zone/Area/Stage

Process Analysis a Statistical Control

PROCESS ZONELANES OUTFllTlNG

Systemnone

System

Fig. 2. Simple generic vent component shape description.

design engineers and the shop. Incorporationof the ideas gained through the Navy-spon-sored BIW destroyer work was led by produc-tion personnel. To make the plan work theyneeded to coordinate their generic shape ideaswith the shipyard designers who specify thedetailed product descriptions. Both the de-signers and the producers would realize newefficiencies by adopting the changes, but atfirst those advantages were only apparent tothe production people with the ManTech caseexperience. The upward movement of productand prqcess improvements (from the shopto the designers) which was followed in thistechnology development is the basic character-ization of a modern self-improving manufac-turing strategy.5.4. Structural steel plate cutting case

The process of converting heavy steel platestock into cut and labeled components forwelded assembly into foundations and otherstructures has been a manually intensiveplanning effort and was, until recently, onlyslightly automated in the shops cutting opera-tions. The actual cutting of pieces has, for some

HULL BLOCKCONSTRUCTION I I PREOUTFllTlNG

HULLCONSTRUCnoN I / OUTFllTlNG I

time, been accomplished by several tape-driven, numerically-controlled (N/C) oxy-fuelmachines. The preparatory steps of scheduling,selecting, nesting and programming the workhas been done manually. The movement ofsheets through the process, piece marking,layout, tape-loading, and machine monitoringare also manual operations. The oxy-fuel cut-ting machines typically operate at abouttwelve inches per minute along the-cut path.Some other machines operate by optically fol-lowing a template path, and these machinesare generally slower than the N/C machines.Advancements in the technologies of steelcutting and machine automation have madeimprovement of the process feasible. The oxy-fuel methods are slower than state-of-the-artplasma arc cutting for plate thicknesses lessthan about two inches. Fig. 3 demonstrates themagnitude of time savings for a standardtwelve inch square pattern, depending uponplate thickness.In the submarine construction environment,except for hull plate, nearly all structural steelplate to be cut is one inch thick, or less. So, theplasma arc process offered an average im-provement of between 300% and 800% in


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J.C. Thomas, S.M. Henryflntegrating design and production 119

cl.53 1 .cm 1.50 2.00 2.50Plate Thickness (inches)

Time to cut e 12-inci7 square

Fig. 3. Reduced cutting time for plasma arc over oxygas.

cut time over oxy-fuel. Machine control andintegrated planning and nesting throughdigital networks of related computers also be-came available. The effects of instituting theprogram would be to take advantage to tech-nology improvements and process automationfor increased productivity.5.5. A process aut omat i on probl em

The proposed system for modernizing thesteel plate processing involved several basicprojects. Facility for smoother handling ofplate from the entry point to the output of cutand labeled parts required overhead crane andfloor layout plans. The new plasma arc techno-logy would be fitted to a gantry system whichworks around the plate to be cut. The pro-gramming of schedule, parts layout andlabeling would be integrated on a plannerscomputer so that parts to be produced ondemand would be brought up on a dailyroutine, matched by plate thickness, and auto-matically nested for minimum waste of mater-ial. The resulting work package may becommunicated directly to the digital machinecontrol system. Plates stacked at an entry

point are picked (the crane is sensitive, in a tac-tile way, to alarm if it is picking up the wrongthickness for the job at hand) and transportedto a marking system which uses a dot matrixpeening system to label the plate. Since thesystem is aware of the nested cut patterns,markings can be applied to the uncut plate sothat after cutting, each component has a com-prehensive label. The plate is automat-ically transported to the nearby plasma arecutting machine, and the cut process occursautomatically. In general, a single operatorfrom a booth can control the entire operation.A magnetic gantry picks the cut pieces fromthe plasma arc machines bed and transportsthem to the output point where they may betransported to assembly cells.The supporting database for the design andplanning establishments was converted fromthe previous system for parts associated withships already in production. Additional in-formation which had not been accommodatedin the previous system, such as parts marking,was added. The new database system was de-signed to accept digital data transfer fromincoming design documents which wouldarrive from the Navy sponsor, the other


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120 J.C. Thomas, SM. Henry/Integrating design and productionshipbuilder, and from in-house designers. Thisintegration of information from internal andexternal sources, and the integration directlyfrom the detailed design documents to themachine on the shop floor, are symbolic of thegeneral trend in modern ship design and con-struction and have been emphasized in thedesign and acquisition programs for the Sea-wolf(SSN-21) submarines 19, lo].

This program illustrates the evolution ofproductivity improvements in the U.S. ship-building industry. First, production processesare taking advantage of group technologytechniques to improve local cell efficiency.Then, designers are applying zone-orientedthinking to systems which have been specifiedin functional form. Finally, the design and pro-duction elements are integrating their deliver-able products from one stage to another,reducing the errors and inefficiencies whichmay derive from interpretations and transla-tions. The next steps are to infuse the earlierstages of design development with a motiva-tion to innovate for producibility as well as forfaster and deeper performance.

5.6. Pipe bending taxPiping systems in submarines and surfaceships carry a wide variety of fluids operating atvarious pressures, up to 4500 psi. The equip-ment density in submarines is extremely high,

and piping system fabrication, outfitting, andtesting account for a significant part of thelabor expense in submarine construction.Zone outfitting has encouraged more prefabri-cation of pipe assemblies by allowing section-end access for larger assembly input to thezones. Group technology applications in mostshipyards have resulted in pipe shops buildingand testing more complex pipe assembliesprior to moving the work to the ship than everbefore.There are generally two methods availablefor orienting pipe runs to the shipboardlayout: bending, or cutting and welding fittedjoints such as sleeves and elbows. The bendingoption is usually preferable for several reasons.The alternative method using welded joints is

labor intensive, costs extra for special fittings,may be vulnerable to system failure at thewelded joints, requires additional materialcontrol considerations for certified systems,may reduce system performance character-istics (e.g., flow obstructions), and involvessubstantial additional cost in non-destructivetesting of the joints. Large-diameter pipe be-nding equipment is expensive, and some ship-builders have historically subcontracted suchwork to specialized companies. Integration ofmodern bending technology into the ship-building process offers construction andlife-cycle cost reductions, and has designimplications which can improve the shipsperformance in terms of volume and weight.Submarine designers prefer to minimize thenumber of fittings installed where bending isan alternative, and installing large diameterbending equipment offers the option to bendthrough the full range of pipe sizes. This is anarea where designers clearly can have a majorimpact on producibility, if the production en-vironment is compatible and communicated.Understanding the facility and recognizing themultiple advantages of bending are essential ifpiping system specifiers are topotential to influence the costthe design.5.7. A replacement technology

maximize theireffectiveness of

The technology of pipe bending, for largediameter pipes, has been limited in the past toa manual process of using force application toone end of a restrained pipe length, andbending to a point which results in the desiredangle after accommodating spring-back. Thebending operation required use of an overheadcrane for large forces, and the measurement ofbend angle was completely manual. For pipediameters of 5 inches to 10 inches IPS, espe-cially using strong materials such as Inconeland Copper-Nickel, the manual bending pro-cess is a major effort.Development of machinery for the auto-matic, precise bending of large-diameter pipeenables designers to consider a new set ofbounds on the specification of bends rather


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J.C. Thomas, S.M. Henryl lnt egrat ing design and producti on 121than welded joints. The submarine construc-tion yards have been moving from manualbending methods to automatic machinery. Theincorporation of a large-diameter pipe facilityenables bending every diameter and materialof piping which is specified in current andfuture submarine classes.Integration of the large diameter equipmentwithin the computer controlled facility ofsmaller capacity bending machinery (whichwas already in place) was one of the objectivesof this project. The new arrangement wouldhave a central shop computer distributingwork to machines with different pipe size ca-pacities, as established by the automatic con-vergence of production schedule and designrequirements. Replacement of many joints bybends, in the large diameter cases consideredfor this project, results in the following relativecost savings over the pre-ShipTech method ofdoing business:Cost Savings in Direct Labor 68% to 90%Cost Savings in Direct Material 66%

These figures account for the reduction intotal labor hours as well as the decreased costof more skilled labor which was necessary forthe replaced technology. Material costs reduceas the net of a minor increase in total pipelength required for bends, less the high cost ofpurchasing many special fittings. The in-creased cost in indirect labor hours is about10% to 20% of the direct labor hours savings,depending upon which year is considered. In-direct material cost increase is less than 5% ofthe corresponding direct material savings. Itshould be noted that the cost of revising pipingplans to accommodate the incorporation ofbends where fittings are currently specified isnot considered in the ShipTech project pro-posal, and this is a point of negotiation be-tween the Navy and the builder today. Anassessment of those implications is beyond thescope of this paper.5.8. Design Implications

The systems which employ high strength,large diameter pipes are typically seawater sys-

terns whose failures would place the entiresubmarine at risk. Improving the producibilityof large diameter pipe bends, thus reducing thenumber ofjoints specified by the designers, canimprove reliability as well as reduce construc-tion costs. High strength, large diameter fit-tings are considered very expensive comparedto the alternative of bending because ofthe specialized manufacture of the fittingswelded joint area, its small numbers, and theadditional quality assurance testing and docu-mentation imposed by certification require-ments. Also, the unit weights of pipe fittingsare greater than the equivalent functionallength of pipe, so a replacement of fittings bybends results in piping systems weight reduc-tions.A design trade-off in the amount of volumerequired for piping systems arises from thesubstitution of bends for fittings. Bends resultin the elimination of joint access requirementsfor repairs, but they imply some volume addi-tion for the larger bend radius compared toa more compact fitting. Accuracy control ina welded system may require different consid-eration for designers than does a system withmore pipe bends. Less flexibility in configura-tion and alignment for bent systems may re-quire more close coupling between design andmanufacturing. These considerations affect thedecision-making in design, and ultimately im-pact on the acquisition costs, life-cycle costs,reliability, and performance characteristics ofthe submarine.5.9. Performance of t he cases

The three ShipTech cases examined in thisreport may be summarized in terms of theNavys net cash flows and the cost reductions/increases seen by the Navy as a result of theproject investments. The figures below havebeen made dimensionless by dividing thedollar amounts by the total Navy investmentamount for each project. The data reflect pro-jections of performance, as they are taken fromproject proposals which are made to requestproject approval. In two of these three cases(sheetmetal cell and plate processing system),


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J.C. Thomas, S.M. Henry/lntrgrating design md production

d

fFig. 4. Navy cash flows for several ShipTech projects.

the projects were implemented and have metor exceeded productivity expectations. Thelarge pipe bender project is a more recentproposal, and is still in the evaluation process.Fig. 4 shows the stream of cash flow due tothe net of:- Navy share of pre-tax cost reductions or

(.increases), less- Cost of money reimbursed to the ship-builder, less- Payments or (recovery of funds) by theNavy to cover costs of development andcapital implementation.This stream of payments constitutes the pro-

jected annual cost savings after payment of theinitial investment during the first year or twoof the plan. The project proposals contain cal-culations of the Navys Return On Investment{ROI) from this stream of costs and benefits.To be accurate, the particular type of returncalculated is the Internal Rate of Return (IRR),which is the discount rate for which a wellbehaved stream of payments has Net PresentValue (NPV) equal to zero. The idea behind

using such a measure in capital budgeting orproject evaluation is that a projects accept-ability can be determined by comparing theIRR for the project against the opportunitycost of capital for investments with equivalentrisk. Thus, if the opportunity cost of capital foran investment with risk similar to a ShipTechproject was 12%, and the project promised aninternal rate of return of 15%, exceeding thecapital rate, then the investment in that projectwould be advisable (as the NPV of the projectevaluated at 12% would be positive). In theShipTech projects described here, the propo-sals projections of Navy cash flow lead to therates of return in Table 1.

Use of IRR as a measure for such decisionsis common, but it can lead to false conclusions[26]. Calculat ion of IRR does not distinguishbetween borrowing and lending relationships.Checking for a declining NW with decreasingdiscount rate solves that issue. A project whichhas several changes in sign of cash flows (e.g.,negative followed by positive followed by an-other negative) may have as many solutions tothe IRR as there are zero crossings, orchanges in sign. The number taken as IRRmay be only one of two or three solutions,none of which is really useful. In this report, allthe projects have a single IRR solution. Thecomparison of projects which differ in scalemay be misleading because different patternsof cash flow, or scales of investment can influ-ence the IRR solution, Mutually exclusive pro-jects, which might both be worthwhile, shouldbe evaluated by considering the differences onan incremental basis, so that suitability of onegood idea over another may be determined.Finally, the complexity introduced by unevenpayment structures and different opportunity

Table 1Project title IRR (%)Plate processing 17Large pipe bender 19Sheetmetal fab 29


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J.C. Thomas, S.M. Henry/Integrating design and productionThree ShipTech Cases

Net Navy Cash Flow

123

rNet Positive Income

Net Outlays

0 1 2 3 4 5 6Year

7 a 9 10 11

m -n Line Plate Processing System Large DNCENC Pipe BenderShe&metal Component Fabrication Cell

Fig. 5. Operational cost reductions (increases) for the ShipTech projects.

costs of capital leads to some ambiguity in theutility of IRR measures. Used with these issuesin mind, internal rate of return may be a reas-onable method of describing the value of theNavys investment in ShipTech projects, com-pared with related investments or programs.

Fig. 5 shows the Navys production costcomponent after application of the share rela-tionship for each of the projects. This figureexcludes the investment amount and simplyconsiders the cost of doing a unit amount ofwork during and after the new technologyimplementation. The early cost increases re-flect the cost of implementing a change in theproduction system, and within several yearsthe sign changes as the new method is pre-dicted to provide a net decrease in productioncosts. After payback of the Navys cash invest-ment, these production cost savings are essen-tially all of the downstream cash flow realizedby the Navy.

After at least six months have passed sinceShipTech project has become fully opera-tional, a Post-Implementation Review is con-ducted to compare predicted performancewith actual measured productivity. The origi-nal projections are made by analyzing the pre-implementation methods for a unit of work,then making predictions for the proposedsystem, and contrasting the two costs ofaccomplishing the unit of work. In the Post-Implementation Review, the new method in-troduced by the approved project is evaluatedagainst the same standard of a unit of work,and the difference between projected and ac-tual performance is determined. In the case ofthe Sheetmetal Component Fabrication Cell,the Post-Implementation Review has beenconducted and some dimensionless results arepresented here. The Plate Processing Systemhas not been operational long enough to ratea completed Review, but the early indications


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124

60%

E50%

coar 4 0%>L=-

F30%

z 20%.I--0a 10%

z 0%cza,0G -1 0%

Cost Savings Realized

a Cost Increase,

J.C. Thomas, S.M. Henryflnteyrating design and production

Three ShipTech CasesNet Cost + reduction, - increase)

-20%0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

YearIn-Line Plate Processing SystemShe&metal Component Fabrication Cell

Large DNC/CNC Pipe Bender

Fig. 6. Actual/projected savings per post-implementation review.

of plate throughput and parts quality indicatebetter performance than predicted in the pro-ject proposal.Fig. 6 provides a comparison of the actualdifference in cost of producing sheetmetal ven-tilation system components (before and afterthe new process and equipment) against thedifference in cost which had been predicted inthe project proposal. Here, the productionprogram is divided by ship hull rather thanyear. Five of the eight ships listed were mea-sured after at least 98% of ship completion,and the other three are about 50% complete.The three which have not been completed arereported as a combination of actual costs in-curred plus a remainder figured on a 94%learning curve which is based on previouslycompleted units.These figures demonstrate that the Navy ispredicted to see an excellent return for its in-vestment in each of the projects. The Post-Implementation Review results indicate as

much as a 60% better actual cost reductionthan that which was expected from the projectproposal. The ship projects which indicateda lower than expected cost reduction were sub-stantially dominated by the ships which out-performed expectations.While the data presented on these programstakes aim at the direct cost improvements at-tributable to each, the total benefit of the casesinvolves more complex issues. Each of thesecases introduces a technology advancementwith implications in process improvement.The opportunity to maximize both the costreductions and the performance enhancementsrequires application of the technologies earlyin design. A design process which cannot ac-commodate timely introduction of process andproduct advances will thwart potential gains.A system which enables communication be-tween design and production organizations (inboth directions) should realize schedule im-provements as it becomes more responsive to


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J.C. Thomas, S.M. Henry/Integrating design and production 125the need for process and product integration.In the ShipTech cases, the long term implica-tions are still being determined. But the pro-gram can serve as a model for motivatingindustry/government cooperation in the integ-ration of early Navy designs with contractorconstruction process innovations. Study of theorganizational relationships in successfulShipTech projects would be a logical next stepin capturing the full potential of design/pro-duction integration.

6. ConclusionsThis paper demonstrated several working

production enhancements which seem to pro-vide excellent prospects for high returnedvalue for the modest level of investment re-quired. It portrayed a cooperative programbetween government and industry whichyields benefits to both parties, and in the endreduces the taxpayers outlay for a strong de-fense structure. In the future, it is likely thatimprovements on todays changing systemswill be represented in a structure which uses itsresources efficiently and works towardimprovement through self-generated inno-vations, and through the intelligent incor-poration of outside information, theory, andtechnology.

The Navy should continue to provideleadership and initiative to stimulate innova-tion in shipbuilding technology, and adopta strategy which places more explicit respons-ibility on acquisition programs to set goals fordesigners which drive a more producible de-sign. The key to meeting these goals will befound in establishing a high-level focus of pro-duction and design integration which will seekout productivity improvements from the pro-cess end of development and implement thoseideas at the earliest feasible time in design.

AcknowledgementsThe following persons and their organi-zations were most helpful in the course of

research performed during the preparationof this paper: CDR B. R. Brucker, USN(NAVSEA), Mr. J. Cameron (EB), CDR R.A.Celotto, USN (MIT), RADM M.S. Firebaugh,USN (NAVSEA), LCDR H.A. Malaret, USN(SupShip Groton), and CAPT B.F. Tibbitts,USN (Ret.) (MIT). This paper describes re-search performed under a three year contractnumber N00014-87-C-0466 with the Office ofNaval Research. This work was supported bythe Navy Research and Development Pro-gram 63564, NAVSEA Project SO408.

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Documents

Integrating Design and Production a Case Study of the Naval Submarine Program