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INSTITUTIONS AND DECISION MAKING. Main Elements. Free trade in goods. Eliminate tariffs, quotas and all other barriers that act like tariffs or quotas. Common trade policy with the rest of the world. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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© Baldwin&Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration, 2nd Edition 1
INSTITUTIONS AND DECISION MAKING
© Baldwin&Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration, 2nd Edition 2
Main Elements• Free trade in goods.
– Eliminate tariffs, quotas and all other barriers that act like tariffs or quotas.
• Common trade policy with the rest of the world.– Formation of a Customs Union necessary to avoid controls inside
EU (Rules of Origin); also forces a degree of supranationality.• Ensuring undistorted competition (to avoid other policies
offsetting trade barrier removal). Main:– State aids prohibited,– Anti-competitive behaviour,– Approximation of laws (Euro-jargon for harmonisation) necessary
to ensure free movement of goods,– Taxes (weak restrictions aimed at preventing subsidies via lower
tax rates for some firms); no explicit harmonisation or coordination.
© Baldwin&Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration, 2nd Edition 3
Main elements (cont’d)• Unrestricted trade in services.
– ToR established principle of freedom of movement of services, but implementation has been hard.
• barriers are part of domestic economic regulations that are not explicitly coordinated by ToR (e.g. banking regulation is necessary, not subject to EU decision making and can hinder cross-border banking).
• Single European Act made some progress, new EU Services Directive (maybe adopted in 2006) should do more.
• Labour and capital market integration.– Free movement of workers in ToR.
– Free movement of capital was in principle but many loopholes.• 1950s economists were sceptical about capital mobility after inter-war
problems;
• most EU nations retained important capital controls until the Single European Act.
© Baldwin&Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration, 2nd Edition 4
Main elements (cont’d)• Exchange rate and macroeconomic co-ordination
– ToR includes mechanisms for coordinations; most macro and exchange rate coordination remained informal or outside EU institutional structure until Maastricht Treaty.
• See Chapters 13 and 15.
• Common agriculture policy (CAP).– Commitment in ToR but no details; CAP set up in 1962.– Used to be a much more important sector than it is today
• In France about 1/3 of population was involved in agriculture in 1950s; today less than 5%.
• See Chapter 9.
© Baldwin&Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration, 2nd Edition 5
Omitted elements• Social policies.
– Argument was that ‘general policies’ (i.e. not sector specific) did not distort competition and so did not need to be harmonised (contrast with competition policy).
• Gains to harmonisation small.
• France forced exception for one policy into ToR: equal pay for men and women (was aimed at avoiding uneven competition in clothing section in 1950s).
– Basic idea was that national wage and exchange rates would adjust to offset any unfair advantage.
• If lower social standards meant lower production costs, long-run result would be higher wages that offset the advantage.
– Political costs of harmonisation very high.• Social policies touch workers lives and EEC6 had very different
approaches.
© Baldwin&Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration, 2nd Edition 6
Omitted elements• Single currency.
– EU founders believed fixed exchange rates were important to economic integration and political support for free trade.
• e.g. inter-war experience of link between ER volatility and protectionist pressures.
– But, 1950s exchange rates fixed worldwide by well-function IMF system “Bretton Woods” so no need for strong measures in ToR.
– First plan for single currency came in 1970 (“Werner Report”) as pressure on Bretton Woods began to grow.
© Baldwin&Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration, 2nd Edition 7
Maastricht: 2nd ‘foundation treaty’• The Maastricht Treaty (known as Treaty
Establishing the European Union) was:– Massive step up in economic integration
• Monetary union
– Massive institutional change that delimited extent of future EU integration more clearly (the pillars).
© Baldwin&Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration, 2nd Edition 8
Organisational structure: 3 pillars & a roof• Member State concern over
“creeping competencies” led to introduction of pillars in Maastricht Treaty and creation of EU.– EU’s tendency to expand
integration to new areas.– ToR goal “ever closer” union
+ Commission & Court interaction produced progressively deeper & wider integration.
• EC (old EEC) is now 1st pillar.
• The EU’s 3-Pillar Structure– 1st: Economics– 2nd: Security & Foreign– 3rd: Justice
• EU is ‘roof’ over the three pillars.
European Union
ECThe European Community
(Supranational decision making)
Justice and Home Affairs
(no supranational decision making)
JHACommon Foreign
and Security Policy
(no supranational decision making)
CFSP
• Pillar structure limits the authority of EU Court and Commission to 1st pillar issues.
• Makes it clear that Member States in charge of 2nd and 3rd pillar issues.
© Baldwin&Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration, 2nd Edition 9
Quantifying European economic integration
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
1950
1952
1954
1956
1958
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
Inte
grat
ion
ind
ex
Customs Union phased in 1958-68
CAP, 1962 Monetary
integration failures
EMS, 1979
Single Market Programme phased in, 1986-1992
EMU phased in, 1993-2001
DFFM index
BN index
© Baldwin&Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration, 2nd Edition 10
EU Law• One of the most unusual features of the EU is its
legal system.– No other regional integration arrangement in the world is
even close to extensiveness of supra-national law.– Formally ‘EC Law’ is part that has strong supranational
elements, while ‘EU Law’ is more intergovenmental.• EC Law applies only to first pillar (this would change if the
Constitutional Treaty is passed since it eliminates the pillars).
• Understanding basics of EU law is critical to understanding past & future developments of European economic integration (applies mostly to economic issues).
© Baldwin&Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration, 2nd Edition 11
Law: “Sources” of EC Law• The EU Court created by the Treaty of Rome
– Court then established the Community’s legal system. – two landmark cases in 1963 and 1964.
• EC law was established on the basis of:– The EU institutions ensuring that actions by the EC take
account of all members’ interests, i.e. the Community’s interest;
– The transfer of national power to the Community.• Source: Borchardt (1999 p.24)
• Constitutional Treaty (CT) would replace this as the source of EU law.– CT repeals & replaces all other EU Treaties.
© Baldwin&Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration, 2nd Edition 12
Law: Key principles of EC Law• 1. Autonomy
– system is independent of members’ legal orders.
• 2. Direct Applicability– has the force of law in member states so that Community
law can be fully and uniformly applicable throughout the EU.
• 3. Primacy of Community law– Community law has the final say; e.g. highest French court
can be overruled on a matters pertaining to intra-EC imports. • Necessary so Community law cannot be altered by national,
regional or local laws in any member state. – Source: Borchardt (1999)
© Baldwin&Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration, 2nd Edition 13
Law: Types of EU legislation
• Primary legislation.– Treaties.
• Secondary legislation. – Collection of decisions made by EU institutions
“acquis communitaire.”
• 5 types of secondary law– 1. regulation
• applies to all member states, companies, authorities and citizens. Regulations apply as they are written, i.e., they are not transposed into other laws or provisions. They apply immediately upon coming into force.
© Baldwin&Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration, 2nd Edition 14
Law: Types of EU legislation – 2. directive
• may apply to any number of member states, but they only set out the result to be achieved.
• member states what needs to be done to comply with the conditions set out in the directive (e.g. new legislation, or change in regulatory practice).
– 3. decision • is a legislative act that applies to a specific member state,
company or citizen.
– 4. & 5. Recommendations and opinions • These are not legally binding, but can influence behaviour of,
for example, the European Commission, national regulators, etc.
• Would be simplified if CT is ratified.
© Baldwin&Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration, 2nd Edition 15
Some important facts: Population• ‘Big’ nations (>35 million); Larger
than largest city in the world.– Germany, the UK, France, Italy, Spain
and Poland.
• ‘Medium’ nations (8 to 11 million; like mega-city, e.g. Paris metro region).– Greece, Portugal, Belgium, the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Sweden and Austria, Bulgaria.
• ‘Small’ nations (like big city, e.g. Barcelona, or Lyons. – Denmark, Slovakia, Finland, Ireland,
Lithuania, Latvia, Slovenia, and Estonia.
• ‘Tiny’ nations (like small city, e.g. Genoa).– Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta.
• Netherlands & Romania fall in between big and medium.
82.570.2
59.959.7
57.942.3
38.221.8
16.311.010.510.410.210.1
9.08.17.8
5.45.45.2
4.03.4
2.32.01.40.70.50.4
0.0 20.0 40.0 60.0 80.0 100.0
GermanyTurkeyFranceBritain
ItalySpain
PolandRomania
NetherlandsGreece
PortugalBelgium
Czech Rep.HungarySwedenAustria
BulgariaDenmarkSlovakiaFinlandIreland
LithuaniaLatvia
SloveniaEstoniaCyprus
LuxembourgMalta
Population 2004 (millions)
© Baldwin&Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration, 2nd Edition 16
Facts: income per capita • 11 high income (above EU25
average) over €21,400 – Denmark, Ireland, Austria,
Netherlands, Belgium, Finland, Italy, Germany, France, UK, and Sweden.
• 10 medium income category – from €10,000 to €21,000– Spain, Greece and Portugal,
Cyprus, Slovenia, Malta, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and Estonia .
• 6 low income nations, less than €10,000– Lithuania, Poland, Latvia,
Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey • Luxembourg is in the super-
high income category by itself. – per capita income is almost twice
that of France.
45,90028,300
26,20026,10025,80025,30025,200
24,60024,300
23,70023,10022,800
20,90017,40017,300
16,40016,00015,800
14,70012,900
11,10010,400
9,8009,800
8,8006,7626,3776,185
€ 0 €5,000
€10,000
€15,000
€20,000
€25,000
€30,000
€35,000
€40,000
€45,000
€50,000
LuxembourgIreland
DenmarkAustria
NetherlandsBritain
BelgiumSwedenFinlandFrance
GermanyItaly
SpainCyprusGreece
SloveniaPortugal
MaltaCzech Rep.
HungarySlovakia
EstoniaLithuania
PolandLatvia
RomaniaBulgariaTurkey
Income per inhabitant 2003 (PPS)
PPS is Commission’s adjustment for cost of living (Purchasing Power Standard
© Baldwin&Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration, 2nd Edition 17
Facts: Size of economies • Economic size distribution is VERY
uneven.• 6 nations (Germany, the UK, France,
Italy, Spain and the Netherlands) account for more than 80% of EU25’s economy.
• Other nations are small, tiny or miniscule,
• ‘Small’ is an economy that accounts for between 1% and 3% of the EU25’s output.– Sweden, Belgium, Austria, Denmark,
Poland, Finland, Greece, Portugal and Ireland.
• ‘Tiny’ is one that accounts for less than 1% of the total.– Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovak
Republic, Luxembourg, Slovenia, Lithuania, and Cyprus.
• Miniscule as one that accounts for less than one-tenth of one percent. – Latvia, Estonia and Malta.
GDP, current prices, 2004
I
F
UK
IrePGr
L
EstMal
E
D
FinDKSNL B A
Lat
PolCz
Hu
SRSl
LithCyp
© Baldwin&Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration, 2nd Edition 18
The budget: Expenditure
Expenditure is on 3 things:- Agriculture (about half).- Cohesion (about one third)- All else (rest)
© Baldwin&Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration, 2nd Edition 19
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1958
1961
1964
1967
1970
1973
1976
1979
1982
1985
1988
1991
1994
1997
2000
2003
2006
% o
f Bud
get
Administration
External
Other Internal
Cohesion
CAP
Evolution of spending priorities
© Baldwin&Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration, 2nd Edition 20
Evolution of spending, level
Total Spending, Million euros, 1958-2006
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
© Baldwin&Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration, 2nd Edition 21
0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500
UK
Germany
Sweden
Italy
Austria
NL
EU average
Finland
France
Spain
Denmark
Portugal
Belgium
Greece
Ireland
Luxembourg
euro per person
Operational Expenditure/Pop
Expenditure/Pop
Evolution of spending, level
0 3,000 6,000 9,000 12,000 15,000
Luxembourg
Finland
Sweden
Austria
Denmark
NL
Ireland
Portugal
Belgium
Greece
UK
Italy
Germany
Spain
France
Million euros
CAP
Cohesion
Oth. Internal
Administration
© Baldwin&Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration, 2nd Edition 22
Funding of EU Budget• EU’s budget must balance every year• Financing sources: four main types
– Tariff revenue – ‘Agricultural levies’ (tariffs on agricultural goods)– ‘VAT resource’.
• Like a 1% value added tax (reality is complex).
– GNP based. • tax paid by members based on their GNP.
• Miscellaneous– relatively unimportant since 1977– taxes paid by eurocrats, fines and earlier surpluses– Pre-1970s direct member contributions
© Baldwin&Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration, 2nd Edition 23
Evolution of Funding sources
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
197119721973197419751976
19771978197919801981
19821983198419851986198719881989199019911992199319941995199619971998199920002001
Shar
e of
tota
l rev
enue
GNP
VAT
Miscellaneous
Customs Duties
Agricultural Duties
Source: “The Community Budget: The facts in figures” European Commission, 2000. Downloadable from http://eurpoa.eu.int/budget/
© Baldwin&Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration, 2nd Edition 24
Contribution vs GDP, 1999, 2000• % of GDP per
member is approximately 1% regardless of per-capita income
• EU contributions are not ‘progressive’
• e.g. richest nation, (L) pays less of its GDP than the poorest nation (P)
0.0%
0.2%
0.4%
0.6%
0.8%
1.0%
1.2%
Portugal
Greece
Spain
Italy
France
Belgium
UK
Finland
EU
15 Median
Netherlands
Ireland
Germ
any
Austria
Sweden
Denm
ark
Luxem
bourg
€0
€5,000
€10,000
€15,000
€20,000
€25,000
€30,000
€35,000
€40,000
€45,000
€50,000Contribution/GDP, 1999
Contribution/GDP, 2000
GDP per capita, 1999 (right scale)
© Baldwin&Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration, 2nd Edition 25
Net Contribution by Member
-€8,000 -€6,000 -€4,000 -€2,000 €0 €2,000 €4,000 €6,000 €8,000
SpainGreece
PortugalBelgium
IrelandLuxembourg
FranceDenmark
EU15 MedianFinland
ItalyAustriaSweden
NetherlandsUK
Germany
Net Financial Contribution, 2000
Net Financial Contribution, 1999
© Baldwin&Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration, 2nd Edition 26
Task allocation and subsidiarity • Key question: “Which level of government is
responsible for each task?”– Setting foreign policy
– Speed limits
– School curriculum
– Trade policy, etc
• Typical levels:– local
– regional
– national
– EU
• Task allocation = ‘competencies’ in EU jargon
© Baldwin&Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration, 2nd Edition 27
Subsidiarity principle• Before looking at the theory, what is the practice in
EU?• Task allocation in EU guided by subsidiarity
principle (Maastricht Treaty)– Decisions should be made as close to the people as
possible, – EU should not take action unless doing so is more
effective than action taken at national, regional or local level.
• Background: “creeping compentencies”– Range of task where EU policy matters was expanding. – Some Member States wanted to discipline this spead.
© Baldwin&Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration, 2nd Edition 28
3 Pillars and task allocation
• 3 Pillar structure delimits range of:– Community competencies (tasks allocated to EU).– Shared competencies (areas were task are split
between EU and member states).– National competencies.
• 1st pillar is EU competency.
• 2nd and 3rd are generally national competencies– details complex, but basically members pursue
cooperation but do not transfer sovereignty to EU.
© Baldwin&Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration, 2nd Edition 29
Theory: Fiscal federalism• What is optimal allocation of tasks?
• Basic theoretical approach is called Fiscal Federalism.– Name comes from the study a taxation, especially which
taxes should be set at the national vs sub-national level.
© Baldwin&Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration, 2nd Edition 30
Fiscal federalism: The basic trade-offs • What is optimal allocation of tasks
– NB: there is no clear answer from theory, just of list of trade-offs to be considered.
• Diversity and local informational advantages• Diversity of preference and local conditions argues for setting policy at low
level (i.e. close to people).
• Scale economies• Tends to favour centralisation and one-size-fits-all to lower costs.
• Spillovers• Negative and positive spillovers argue for centralisation.
– Local governments tend to underappreciated the impact (positive or negative) on other jurisdictions. (Passing Parade parable).
• Democracy as a control mechanism• Favours decentralisation so voters have finer choices.
• Jurisdictional competition• Favours decentralisation to allow voters a choice.
© Baldwin&Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration, 2nd Edition 31
Closer look at the trade-offs
© Baldwin&Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration, 2nd Edition 32
Diversity and local information• One-size-fits-all
policies tend to be inefficient since too much for some and too little for others.
• central government could set different local policies but Local Government likely to have an information advantage. Qd2Qd1 Qc,1&2
D1
D2
Davg
MC per person
MVc,2
MVc,2
A
B
Quantity
euros
© Baldwin&Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration, 2nd Edition 33
Scale• By producing public
good at higher scale, or applying to more people may lower average cost.
• This ends to favour centralisation.– Hard to think of
examples of this in the EU.
Qd1 Qc,1&2
D1
Davg
MC p.p. (decentralised)
C
D
MC p.p. (centralised)
Quantity
euros
© Baldwin&Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration, 2nd Edition 34
Spillovers• Example of a positive
spillovers.• If decentralised, each region
chooses level of public good that is too low.– e.g. Qd2 for region 2.
• Two-region gain from centralisation is area A.
• Similar conclusion if negative spillovers.– Q too high with
decentralised.
Qd2 Qc,1&2
Combined region 1 & 2 Marginal Benefit Curve
MCd
Quantity
euros
Private and Social Marginal Cost
Region 2’s Marginal Benefit Curve (demand curve)
MCc A
© Baldwin&Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration, 2nd Edition 35
Democracy as a control mechanism• If policy is in hands of local officials and these are
elected, then citizens’ votes have more precise control over what politicians do.
• High level elections are take-it-over-leave-it for many issues since only a handful of choices between ‘promise packages’ (parties/candidates) and many, many issues.– Example of such packages:
• Foreign policy & Economic policy.
• Centre-right’s package vs Centre-left’s package.
• At national level, can’t choose Centre-right’s economics and Centre-left’s foreign policy.
© Baldwin&Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration, 2nd Edition 36
Jurisdictional competition• Voters influence government they live under via:
– ‘voice’ • Voting, lobbying, etc.
– ‘exit’. • Change jurisdictions (e.g. move between cities).
• While exit is not a option for most voters at the national level, it usually is at the sub-national level. And more so for firms.– Since people/firms can move, politicians must pay
closer attention to the wishes of the people. – With centralised policy making, this pressure
evaporates.
© Baldwin&Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration, 2nd Edition 37
Economical view of decision making• Using theory to think about EU institutional
reforms.– e.g., Institutional changes in Constitutional Treaty, Nice
Treaty, etc.
• Take enlargement-related EU institutional reform as example.
© Baldwin&Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration, 2nd Edition 38
EU enlargement challenges
• Since 1994 Eastern enlargement was inevitable & EU institutional reform required.– 3 C’s: CAP, Cohesion & Control. – Here the focus is on Control, i.e. decision making.
• Endpoint: EU leaders accepted the Constitutional Treaty June 2004.
• Look Nice Treaty and Constitutional Treaty.– Nice Treaty is in force now and will remain in force until
new Treaty is ratified.
• Focus on Council of Ministers voting rules.– See Chapter 2; these are the key part of EU decision
making.
© Baldwin&Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration, 2nd Edition 39
Distribution of power among EU members• For EU15, NBI is very similar to share of Council votes, so
the distinction is not so important as in 3 country example.
Power measures in EU15
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
NBI Vote share
NBI 11.2% 11.2% 11.2% 11.2% 9.2% 5.9% 5.9% 5.9% 5.9% 4.8% 4.8% 3.6% 3.6% 3.6% 2.3%
Vote share 11.5% 11.5% 11.5% 11.5% 9.2% 5.7% 5.7% 5.7% 5.7% 4.6% 4.6% 3.4% 3.4% 3.4% 2.3%
D UK F I E NL Gr B P S A DK SF Ire L
© Baldwin&Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration, 2nd Edition 40
Do power measures matter?
y = 0.9966x + 0.0323R2 = 0.7807
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
0 1 2 3 4
Vote Share/Population Share
Bud
get S
hare
/Pop
ulat
ion
Shar
e
Ireland
Greece
BelgiumPortugal
DenmarkSpain
Finland
AustriaSwedenNL
France
Italy
UK
Germany
© Baldwin&Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration, 2nd Edition 41
Do power measures matter?
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
0 5 10 15 20 25
Vote Share/Population Share
Bud
get S
hare
/Pop
ulat
ion
Shar
e
Luxembourg
© Baldwin&Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration, 2nd Edition 42
Legitimacy in EU decision making• Legitimacy is slippery concept.
– Approach: equal power per citizen is legitimate ‘fair’.
• Fairness & square-ness.– Subtle maths shows that equal power per EU citizen requires Council votes to
be proportional to square root of national populations.
• Intuition for this:– EU is a two-step procedure
• Citizens elect national governments, • These vote in the Council.
– Typical Frenchwoman is less likely to be influential in national election than a Dane.
– So French minister needs more votes in Council to equalise likelihood of any single French voter being influential (power).
– How much more? – Maths of voting says it should be the square root of national population.
© Baldwin&Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration, 2nd Edition 43
Nice Treaty Voting Rules• 3 main changes for Council of Ministers:
• Maintained ‘weighted voting’.– Majority threshold raised.
• Votes re-weighted. – Big & ‘near-big’ members gain a lot of weight.
• Added 2 new majority criteria: – Population (62%) and members (50%).
• ERGO, triple majority system.– Hybrid of ‘Double Majority’ & Standard QMV.
© Baldwin&Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration, 2nd Edition 44
Post Nov 2009 rules• If the Constitution is ratified, then New system after
November 2009: Double Majority.
• Approve requires ‘yes’ votes of a coalition of members that represent at least:– 55% of members,– 65% of EU population.
• Aside: Last minute change introduced a minimum of 15 members to approve, but this is irrelevant.– By 2009, EU will be 27 and 0.55*27=14.85– i.e. 15 members to win anyway.