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RTAs and Contingent Protection:
Are Anti-Dumping Measures (ADMs) Really an Issue?
by
Dean Spinanger([email protected])
Institute of World Economics24100 Kiel, Germany
WTO Regional Seminar on Regionalism and the Multilateral Trading
System, Geneva/Switzerland, 26 April 2002
Contents
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND............................................................1
II. ANTI-DUMPING AND OTHER CONTINGENT PROTECTION
MEASURES..............................................................................................................2
III. ADMS AND RTAS – WHAT’S GOING ON?.......................................................11
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS......................................................................16
BIBLIOGRAPHY..............................................................................................................19
List of Text Tables
Table 1: UNCTAD Classification System for Non-Tariff Measures (used in the TRAINS DataBase)...............................................................................5
Table 2: Typology of Non-Tariff Barriers by Deardorff and Stern.....................6Table 3: Trying to Keep Markets Closed: Some Elastic Examples....................7Table 4: Overview of Relevant Issues re. Anti-Dumping Legislation................8Table 5 : Summary Comparison of PTAs..........................................................13
Table 6: Anti-Dumping Measures Initiated by RTAsa, against Membersb/Other Economiesc and against RTAs by Membersb/Other Economiesc: % of Total Initiations.....................................................14
Table 7: Anti-Dumping Measures in Selected RTA'sa: Number and Intensity: 1989–2001...........................................................................................15
RTAs and Contingent Protection:
Are Anti-Dumping Measures (ADMs) Really an Issue?
I. Introduction and Background
When the curtain was finally allowed to fall on the WTO Ministerial Meeting in
Doha last November, there were not just a few observers who were somewhat
surprised. After all, the agenda for the next round of multilateral trade
negotiations (MTNs) contained some elements, which would not necessarily
have been on a normal, or probably not even on a risk-loving punter’s betting
chit. This applies in particular to the inclusion of ADMs on the agenda, even if
such were referred to only under the non-descript heading of “WTO Rules.”
Indeed, such definitely became the case when the 142 WTO contracting parties
agreed on the 14th of November, 2001, Ministerial meeting in Doha upon a
comprehensive agenda for the next round of multilateral trade negotiations.1
The agenda is to include (as stated in paragraphs 28-29 of the Ministerial
Declaration) an examination of WTO rules defining the scope and use of
contingent protection measures (i.e. in particular anti-dumping measures –
ADMs), as well as those dealing with trade and competition policies (as noted in
paragraphs 23-25 of the same document).
It is the purpose of this paper to examine the role of contingent protection
measures in the context of RTAs. In this paper – given the relatively short time
1 While "officially" the new round is supposed to be called the "Doha Round" it would nonetheless definitely seem fitting to call it the "Harbinson Round", in light of the accomplishments of the appointed head of the WTO's General Council, Stuart Harbinson, Hong Kong's WTO ambassador in Geneva. He drew the consequences of the failure in Seattle and produced an agenda that did not contain all those empty spaces with parenthesis, brackets, braces and whatever else might be used as substitutes for agreeing on an agenda framework. It was thus a document that been passed by the 284 eyes of the heads of the contracting parties. While there may not have been agreement as to what should be included under the specific topics or what was or was not implied, there was at least the feeling that the bones of contention would somehow be dealt with and clarified during the Ministerial. And the results show that such was the case, despite the usual negotiating poker in the final hours.
1
constraints – the focus will be on anti-dumping measures. The next section will
deal with an overview of all those measures which fall into the category of
contingent protection. This is followed in section three by an analysis of all
major RTAs and the degree to which their members have initiated ADMs
against themselves or against non-member countries or rather have been targeted
by members or non-member counties. All this is then put in a better perspective
by examining the intensity of ADMs within and outside RTAs. The paper
concludes by drawing conclusions from the above results, particularly in light of
the fact that it seems that ADMs in the year ending June 30th, 2002, could well
exhibit the greatest number of ADMs ever initiated.
II. Anti-Dumping and Other Contingent Protection Measures
There can be no question that countries liberalizing their trade regimes and
providing improved market access as a result of multilateral trade negotiations
(or even WTO accession negotiations) seem to feel the need to have some sort
of fallback (i.e. contingent) protection on the books. After all, the political
economy of trade policies in many countries is often shaped by the viewpoint
that there are always numerous experienced companies out there in the world
just waiting to expand into newly opening markets. Hence, the necessity to
prepare and legislate the required laws and ordinances – albeit in line with WTO
guidelines – is given utmost priority.
However, by falling into such a mindset the entire basic philosophy behind
liberalizing trade and improving market access – namely to increase the welfare
of the individual countries – is being negated. Thus it seems to be quite
legitimate to ask the following question: why should the initial steps taken by
countries lowering trade barriers to improve their degree of integration into the
world economy be immediately accompanied by moves to ensure that the
integration process is countered? In the context of RTAs this would also mean
that relatively stricter criteria are applied to goods coming from non-member
countries.
2
With the acceptance of the Uruguay Round agreement on anti-dumping rules in
1994 (Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade) there was at least some initial hope that the massive surge in
anti-dumping measures (ADMs) in the early 90s could not only be halted, but
even scaled back. After all, ADMs had almost doubled from a total of 384 in the
period 1988-91 to 730 in the years 1991-94. And, indeed, developments seemed
to be promising in the initial years following the Uruguay Round agreement, as
from 1994-97 ADMs dropped by almost one third to 508. However, the hoped-
for easing off of ADM initiations failed to be of permanent nature so that in the
last three-year period through 6/01 they jumped by almost 2/3rds. to 825,
making it the highest three-year level ever.
Without going into detail, what might be the overriding factors which can be
considered as shaping this increase2?
Is it perhaps that the Uruguay Round conceivably led to tariff rate
reductions to the extent that in ever more economies authorities were
pressured by domestic producers to revert to contingent protection,
namely to initiate non-tariff barriers in the form of ADMs?
Or maybe it is just the simple fact that, ever more developing economies
have been putting AD legislation on the books conforming to WTO
criteria. In doing so is it possible that the mere existence of such
legislation led to an increased demand for its application?
Could it also conceivably be that the globalization of markets has induced
much greater competition and thus caused authorities to intervene ever
more on behalf of domestic companies?
Or are there ever more global companies out there which truly attempt to
"dump" in order to eliminate competition in other markets? In other
2 For more background on this see Messerlin (2000), Blonigen and Prusa(2001), James (2000) and Vermulst and Bordalba (2001)
3
words, is dumping in the true predatory sense, as perceived by the
founding members of GATT in 1947, actually on the increase?
While antidumping measures represent a most divisive instrument its demise
may unfortunately be long in coming, because “governments are concerned
about the potential for their partners to engage in beggar-thy-neighbor industrial
policies. They may consider antidumping a useful defensive instrument in this
connection because it can be used as a substitute for …counterveiling
duties….which might be more difficult to pursue. If so, it must be recognized
that antidumping is a particularly ineffective and costly instrument. Indeed, a
case can be made that this is another reason to eliminate it in the PTA context as
this will help focus attention on the real source of problems (industrial policies;
government intervention), rather than on the symptoms (allegations of “unfair
dumping” (Hoekman, 1998, p. 35). Obviously as tariffs continue to come down,
it becomes increasingly important for economies/RTAs/PTAs to tackle other
impediments to trade.
The following two tables (drawn from the PECC study on "Non-tariff measures
in goods and services trade" (May, 2000)), exhibit possible approaches to
classifying non-tariff barriers in a formalized manner, and it would surely be
worthwhile to examine a some key RTAs in such a manner. A more mundane
approach was applied by the ATMI in classifying actual barriers to entry in
particular markets. Although the collection of barriers was carried out in a
subjective manner, and it is difficult to determine whether the barriers are just of
temporary nature or longer lasting, they do straightforwardly get to the heart of
the manner. Finally, Table 4 lays open the individual problems encountered in
just dealing with anti-dumping issues. It clearly reveals the potential depth
involved in each and every NTB/contingent protection measure.
4
Table 1: UNCTAD Classification System for Non-Tariff Measures (used in the TRAINS DataBase)
1. Price control measures administrative pricing voluntary export price restraint variable charges antidumping measures countervailing measures
2. Finance control measures advance payment requirements multiple exchange rates restrictive official foreign exchange allocation regulations concerning terms of payment for imports transfer delays
3. Automatic licensing measures automatic licence import monitoring surrender requirement
4. Quantity control measures non-automatic licensing quotas import prohibitions export restraint arrangements enterprise-specific restrictions
5. Monopolistic measures single channel for imports compulsory national services
6. Technical measures technical regulations pre-shipment formalities special customs formalities obligation to return used products
7. Miscellaneous measures for sensitive product categories
marketable permits public procurement voluntary instruments product liability subsidies
Source: PECC (2000) based on UNCTAD.
5
Table 2: Typology of Non-Tariff Barriers by Deardorff and Stern
Quantitative Restrictions and similar Specific Limitations on Imports or Exports
Import quotas Export limitations Licensing Voluntary export restraints Exchange and other financial controls Prohibitions Domestic content and mixing requirements Discriminatory bilateral agreements Countertrade
Non-tariff Charges and related Policies affecting Imports
Variable levies Advance deposit requirement Antidumping duties Countervailing duties Border tax adjustments
Government Participation in Trade; Restrictive Practices; General Policy
Subsidies and other aids Government procurement policies State trading, government monopolies, and exclusive
franchise Government industrial policy and regional
development measures Government financed research and development;
technology policies National systems of taxation and social insurance Macroeconomic policies Competition policies Foreign investment policies Foreign curruption policies Immigration policies
Customs procedures and administrative practices
Customs valuation procedures Customs classification procedures Customs clearance procedures
Technical Barriers to Trade Health and sanitary regulations and quality standards Safety and industrial standards and regulations Packaging and labeling regulations, including
trademarks Advertising and media regulations
Source: From PECC (2000); Deardorff and Stern (1997), Measurement of Non-Tariff Barriers, Paris: OECD.
6
Table 3: Trying to Keep Markets Closed: Some Elastic ExamplesEGY
PRC
ARG
BRA
IDA
PAK
IDO
BGL
ROK
COL
THA
RUS
UKR
VNM
ROM
RSA
MOR
JAP
MAL
MAR
SRI
AUS
CHL
ROC
URU
PHI
1. Allowing/tolerating corruption x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x2. Intellectual property rights (designs, etc.) infringement x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x3. Subsidizing domestic industry x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x4. Not binding tariffs x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x5. Lower tariffs but imposing (specific) duties x x x x x x x x x x x x x x6. Keeping tariffs prohibitively high x x x x x x x x x x x x x x7. Valuating imports by ad hoc means x x x x x x x x x x x x8. Creating difficult, expensive customs procedures x x x x x x x x x x x9. Lowering tariffs but adding new taxes x x x x x x x x x x10. Changing customs rules without notification x x x x x x x x x11. Changing applied rates frequently x x x x x x x x x12. Avoiding applying VAT to domestic goods x x x x x x13. Restricting imports for unusual reasons x x x x x x14. Imposition of arcane technical/quality standards x x x x x x15. Difficult marking rules x x x x x16. Forming domestic cartels x x x x x17. Faking "automatic" licensing systems x x x18. Preinspection of imports for high fees x x x19. Adherence to strange rules of origin x x x20. Keeping distribution system hard to breach x x x21. Making LCs unacceptable, demanding cash x x22. Buy-domestic policies by government x
( = 7.3) 16 16 14 12 12 11 10 10 9 9 9 8 8 7 6 6 5 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 1ARG = Argentina; AUS = Australia; BGL = Bangladesh; BRA = Brazil; CHL = Chile; COL = Colombia; EGY = Egypt; IDA = India; IDO = Indonesia; JAP = Japan; MAL = Malaysia; MAR = Mauritius; MOR = Morocco; PAK = Pakistan; PHI = Philippines; PRC = China; ROC = Taiwan; ROK = South Korea; ROM = Romania; RSA = Rep. South Africa; RUS = Russia; SRI = Sri Lanka; THA = Thailand; UKR = Ukraine; URU = Uruguay; VNM = Vietnam.
Source: Adapted from ATMI (2000: 27).
Table 4: Overview of Relevant Issues re. Anti-Dumping Legislation
1. Determining the Act of Dumping
a. Minimum domestic sales test;b. Exclusion of sales below cost; ordinary course of trade;c. Constructed normal value, cum selling/general/admin. expenses + reasonable profit;d. Fair comparison: symmetrical comparisons, credit costs, duty drawbacks, level of trade, cost
accounting methods, zeroing.e. Non-market economy treatment;f. Constructed export price, including reasonable profit margins;g. De minimis dumping;h. Exchange rate fluctuations;i. Cyclical industries.
2. Determining Injury
a. Negligible imports;b. Cumulationc. Definition of industry;d. On behalf of industry;e. Credibility of information;f. Lesser duty rule;g. Causation.
3. Procedures
a. Back-to-back complaints;b. Sunset reviews;c. Questionnaires (language, details, length);d. Independent bodies for determining dumping and injury;e. Facts available/best information available;f. Price undertakings;g. Sampling.
4. Other Specific Concerns
a. Investment diversion;b. Guilty by association;c. Buckshot approach;d. Cost of defense, lack of capabilities;e. Problems of SMEs;f. Post-Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) implications.
Note: Own compilation based on background literature and interviews with government officials as well as companies in numerous developing countries.
8
In order to assist accession countries in setting up and carrying out anti-dumping
legislation conforming to WTO AD principles, the Rules Division of the WTO
has been providing a model piece of AD legislation, which allows countries to
adapt and extend to their own use as they see fit. It is broken down into 7
sections and 2 appendices as follows:
Part I: Definitions and Principles
Part II Determination of Dumping, Injury and Causal Link;
Part III: Initiation and Conduct of Investigations;
Part IV: Conclusion of the Investigations
Part V: Duration and Review of Anti-Dumping Duties and Price
Undertakings;
Part VI: Administration and Judicial Review;
Part VII: Final Provisions;
Annex I: Procedures for On-the-Spot Investigations;
Annex II: Reliance on Information Available.
While this model is a help, it has neither been subjected to a formal WTO legal
review, nor does it eliminate the ambiguities in the Uruguay Round text. As
noted by Qureshi (2000: p. 32), the model is just the first step, as an effective
[and efficient] anti-dumping machinery needs to be set up. This involves highly
qualified administrators, lawyers and economists and in RTAs it means setting
this up across different legal systems.
In setting up the necessary administration the AD guidelines have led to a
variety of structures, which can best be summarized as follows (see Blonigen,
Prusa, 2000: pp.6-7)3:
All AD users delegate AD investigations to special bureaucratic units: the
extent to which these units are isolated from political pressure and 3 See also the paper by Neufeld (2001) which deals with the issues for developing countries.
9
independent of Executive Authority varies across member states.
However, even in those countries where the investigative agency is
independent, cases often appear to hinge on political pressure.
Jurisdiction of determining dumping and then determining injury is either
split or unified. Whereas the USA and Canada authorize one agency each
to handle the dumping determination and injury determination, the EU and
Australia have but a single agency for both cases. While the split authority
could theoretically be more objective since two mutually independent
agencies must affirm the legislation, there is no guarantee that this will
happen. On the other hand, the one-stop-shop minimizes resources and
avoids conflicting judgments.
Transparency varies substantially across countries, particularly in the case
of new users (i.e. developing countries just having set up AD legislation
and now applying it) are explanations missing in connection with
calculations of dumping margins.
Confidential business information is not always available to the parties.
While the EU and Australia limit the access to confidential information to
the investigating agencies, the US and Canada permit the respective legal
counsels to access all confidential information.
Price undertakings (i.e. agreements to raise prices in lieu of applied AD
duties) are common in EU and Australia, but less so in US and Canada.
While most countries require a preliminary injury determination before
duties can be collected, often some of the above-mentioned new users are
subjecting accused dumpers to such levies just days after the petition is
accepted.
Some countries, like the US and Canada, apply the full AD duty that has
been calculated. Others, however, like the EU and Australia, can require
10
that only that amount of the AD duty be applied to relieve the injury being
inflicted on the said industry.
III. ADMs and RTAs – What’s Going On?
Given the well researched documents produced by the WTO it is not necessary
to delve into the fine points of the individual RTAs re. ADMs or other
contingent protection measures (see e.g. WT/REG/W/44, WT/REG/W/38,
WT/REG/W/37, WT/REG/W/26). The study here examined 29 RTAs and
APEC over the time period 1989-2001 with respect to all ADMs initiated by or
against the individual countries in the RTAs.. These tables can be found in the
Appendix. Table 31 summarizes the results from these tables by relating the
internal and external ADMs to all ADMs, calculating thereby the degree to
which RTAs directed their contingent protection activities at other members or
rather third parties.
Let us examine two possible major hypotheses, which might explain the
direction of ADMs within an RTA.
1. As liberalization within an RTA progresses, member countries revert to
using more contingent protection against other members. This would lead
to an increase in the share of internal ADMs and cause the intensity of
ADMs (i.e. the value of one dumping action expressed in terms of
millions of US$) vis-à-vis RTA members to decrease.
2. As liberalization within an RTA progresses, increased efforts are made to
make the best out of the mutual liberalization process. This could then
lead to an increase in ADMs against non-members (external share of
ADMs increases) and the intensity of ADMs decreases.
Of course the world is not quite as simple as that, as many other things can
happen as well (see Table 5 for a comparison of the different PTA systems,
which could all influence the results), but these are left aside for discussion in a
later paper.
11
There are of course numerous possibilities that have been put forward (see
Hoekman (1998) and James (2000), but also the proceedings of the PECC
conference on “Regional Trading Arrangements: Stocktake and Next Steps”) To
the extent that these measures are all aimed at thwarting competition stemming
from internationally agreed-upon liberalization steps, they will prevent
economies from allocating capital and labor to their most productive uses and
thus hinder economies from achieving the projected increases in their well being
expected from multilateral trade negotiations. By hindering an efficient
allocation of capital to the most productive sectors, such measures not only
cause downstream industries to become less competitive, since they must pay
higher prices for their intermediate inputs, they accordingly cause consumers to
pay higher prices for goods and services. But let us not stray to far from our
simple evidence here.
The initial evidence is presented in Tables 6 and 7:
In Table 6 the AD initiations by PTAs against themselves do not reveal a
confirmation of either of the hypotheses. The most promising example is
NAFTA where the share of measures against each other does seem to be
steadily decreasing over the course of time.
As concerns the intensity of ADMs,(see Table 7), MERCOSUR and
APEC seem to apply ADMs to non-members all the easier, hence the
lower values per ADM. Are they really acting against non-members or are
there structural issues.
While the above evidence is not overwhelming, it does seem to be pointing in a
direction which might make it worthwhile to further pursue. In particular a
sectoral breakdown could very well highlight where countries prefer to do it
together, as opposed to maintain links with non-members.
12
Table 5 : Summary Comparison of PTAs
EC EEA EA ÊMA NAFTA CER MERCOSUR CAN-CHILE APEC
Free labor mobility Yes Yes No No No Yes No No No
Free capital flows Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes Largely
Free services trade Yes Yes Yes No Significant Significant No In part Some
Competition policy rules* Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No No
Harmonization of national antitrust Partly, ex post Partly, ex post Partly, ex ante No No Significant In part No No
Area-wide antitrust rules conditional on "trade effects" test
Yes Yes Yes Yes n.a. Yes Yes n.a. No
Formal cooperation agreements between antitrust authorities
n.a. Yes Yes No Yes Yes t.b.d. Yes No
Supranational enforcement of antitrust
Yes Yes No No n.a. No No n.a. No
Binding dispute settlement on antitrust
No No No No n.a. No t.b.d. n.a. No
Elimination of contingent protection Yes Yes No No No Yes t.b.d. Yes on agenda
* Defined as significant disciplines on industrial policies (e.g., subsidies)
n.a.: not applicable, t.b.d.: to be determined
Source: Adapted from Hoekman (1998).
Table 6: Anti-Dumping Measures Initiated by RTAsa, against Membersb/Other Economiesc and against RTAs by Membersb/Other Economiesc: % of Total Initiations
PTA AD Initiations by PTAs AD Initiations against PTAsAll
years89-92 92-95 95-98 98-01 All
years89-92 92-95 95-98 98-01
AFTA/ASEAN 19.4 50.0 11.8 26.9 4.7 1.3 8.7 7.1
BAFTA 100 100 100 100
BANGKOK 27.1 10.0 37.0 27.7 25.9 9.9 1.1 6.9 11.9 14.6
CACM 33.3 50.0 50.0 50.0
CAN 5.5 20.0 6.5 11.8 20.0 50.0
CARICOM
CEFTA 3.1 14.3 0.8 2.2
CEMAC
CER
CIS
COMESA
EAC
EAEC
EC 0.3 1.5 0.2 0.7
ECO 2.7 4.3 1.2 3.0
EEA 0.8 3.1 1.2 0.5 1.4 0.7
EFTA
GCC
GSTP 29.3 37.1 23.3 27.8 31.8 29.1 15.9 18.3 41.4 36.6
LAIA 18.3 21.7 10.0 22.6 19.5 43.4 23.2 25.0 70.0 54.4
MERCOSUR 12.5 18.2 3.8 16.0 12.9 27.7 5.9 6.3 55.2 45.7
MSG
NAFTA 15.0 21.2 14.4 15.5 9.2 49.8 66.2 61.5 26.7 38.9
OCT
PTN 15.8 20.0 11.7 11.9 22.6 15.6 12.5 16.7 14.6 17.7
SAPTA 0.6 1.0 0.9 2.6
SPARTECA
TRIPARTITE 0.6 0.9 0.9 2.5
UEMOA/WAEMU
APEC 55.7 55.3 50.9 58.6 59.8 58.0 83.8 51.8 49.4 46.1
Source: Own calculations based of WTO AD notifications.
Table 7: Anti-Dumping Measures in Selected RTA'sa: Number and Intensity: 1989–2001
YearsExports Imports
Number of measures Trade weightedb Number of measures Trade weightedb
Internalc Externald Internalc Externald Internalc Externald Internalc Externald
AFTA/ASEANAll years 12 50 59007 26324 12 241 50700 1094389-91 0 0 – – 0 34 14031 1186292-94 1 1 333035 520981 1 74 9533 795995-97 4 30 60305 26065 4 42 50459 2169698-00 7 19 34263 45849 7 91 24553 8062
BANGKOKAll years 59 159 3668 19321 59 536 4118 544989-91 1 9 9687 48022 1 94 5929 487292-94 10 17 3631 35205 10 134 4646 455995-97 18 47 4236 19714 18 133 4596 670798-00 30 89 3139 12962 30 175 3594 5486
MERCOSURAll years 36 252 4108 2498 36 94 4343 6996989-91 2 9 6460 13802 2 32 4074 255992-94 2 51 14651 2730 2 30 14983 421795-97 16 84 3253 2107 16 13 3382 1701398-00 16 108 3349 1751 16 19 3640 11868
APECAll years 810 643 10785 12035 810 587 20661 1403689-91 223 180 11034 7333 223 43 11548 3357792-94 218 210 15662 7982 218 135 16240 1297495-97 156 110 30836 20426 156 160 31960 1513598-00 213 143 25073 17450 213 249 26450 10532
aFor a description of the RTAs see appendix tables. – bTrade weighted represents the amount of exports/imports per ADM applied in millions of US$. – cInternal refers to all those ADMs initiated within a RTA. – dExternal refers to all those ADMs against or by non-member countries.
Source: Own calculations based on WTO AD notifications and IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (CD-ROM).
15
IV. Summary and Conclusions
Although the evidence presented above does not strongly reveal a preference for
members of RTAs to initiate more measures against non-members, it definitely
needs more underpinning. Perhaps the question also ought to be asked if there
isn’t a different approach would makes it easier to deal with the underlying AD
issues. Would something headed in the direction of competition laws help?
Table 8: Anti-Dumping and Competition Laws: A Rough Comparison
Anti-Dumping Competition
Objectives: Basic Protects competitors (domestic).
Protects competition.
Actual Protects domestic competitors from foreign competitors.
Generally no distinction between domestic and foreign competition.
Initiation Actions can only be initiated by executive branch and the relevant industry.
In addition , private litigants can initiate proceedings.
Administration Partly/mostly by the executive branch/commerce or foreign trade ministry appeals through courts
Subject to full supervision by courts.
Standards Injury Injury
Requires only showing that unfair practice "contributed" to material injury above the so-called minumum injury level (i.e.de minimus).
Requires direct causation and showing of unreasonable restraint of trade or substantial lessening of competition.
Pricing Pricing
No requirements on intent. Requires showing of predatory intent with respect to pricing aimed at competitors.
Does not require showing of selling below-cost.
Requires showing of below-cost pricing and capability of recoupment.
16
The simplicity of the comparison between anti-dumping and competition laws in
Table 5 of course glosses over the difficulties involved in an area that is viewed
by some as a possible future fief of the WTO. As the organization itself noted in
its 1997 review of trade and competition policy (WTO: 1997e, p. 33) the key
issue can be summarized as follows: "will the positive spillovers from
competition laws drawn up and applied basically for national purposes
adequately address the problems for trading partners from trade restrictive or
distortive enterprise practices?"
While the complexity of the issue is not a topic for this paper, what can be noted
is that the primary role of the WTO itself is to avoid trade disputes, not to
encourage them (Eglin: 2001, p. 14). Given this brief and keeping the "T in
WTO", it would seem like a viable path for a country to fit WTO conform anti-
dumping laws into domestic competition policy laws. This would help weed out
most of the most evident misuses of AD laws. As the EU's chief negotiator in
the Uruguay Round noted: dumping "is unfair by nature....If a period of selling
at a loss forms part of an export strategy aimed at wiping out the competition in
the target market" countermeasures are allowed (Palmeter: 1996, p. 68).
All that would have to be done would be to apply competition principles and
standards regarding price discrimination; the same would apply to pricing
practices. AD proceedings within the country would be fully adjudicated in the
courts with judicial procedures, presumption of innocence and higher standards
of evidence. Finally AD proceedings would have to include a macroeconomic
welfare analysis to cover the impact on consumers as well as the industry,
whereby private litigants would be given a standing in the proceedings.
Whatever, the issues need to be looked and more in depth, and I consider these
brief remarks to be just the beginning of such a project.
17
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Vermulst, Edwin, Marius Bordalba (2001). Anti-Dumping and Safeguards in Foreign Markets: What to do? Paper prepared for the World Bank, Beijing 10/2001.
World Trade Organization (1998). Inventory of Non-Tariff Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements, WT/REG/W26, 5 May.
18
WTO (World Trade Organization) (1995–2000). Report of the Committee on Antidumping Practices. Geneva, respective annual reports.
— (1995). Trade Policy Review (TPR): European Union 1995. Vol. I and II. Geneva.
— (1996a). Trade Policy Review (TPR): Korea 1996. Geneva.— (1996b). Trade Policy Review (TPR): New Zealand 1996. Geneva.— (1997a). Trade Policy Review (TPR): Brazil 1996. Geneva.— (1997b). Trade Policy Review (TPR): Canada 1996. Geneva.— (1997c). Trade Policy Review (TPR): Colombia 1996. Geneva.— (1997d). Trade Policy Review (TPR): United States 1996. Geneva.— (1997e). Annual Report, Vol. I. Geneva.— (2000). Synopsis of "Systemic" Issues Related to Regional Trade Agreements,
WT/REG/W/37, 2 March.— (2000). Further Work on Systemic Issues, WT/REG/W38, 20 June.— (2001). Appellate Body (WT/DS141/AB/R). European Communities – Anti-
Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India. Geneva.
— (2002). Basic Information on Regional Trade Agreements. Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, WT/REG/W/44, 7 February.
19
RTAs and Contingent Protection:
Are Anti-Dumping Measures (ADMs) Really an Issue?
Appendix Tables
by
Dean Spinanger
WTO Regional Seminar on Regionalism and the Multilateral Trading
System, Geneva/Switzerland, 26 April 2002
20
Appendix Tables
Anti-Dumping Measures by and against RTAs: Actual Numbers
Table A1: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against AFTA: Established 28.2.1992... .A1Table A2: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against BAFTA: Established 1.4.1994....A2Table A3: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against BANGKOK: Established 17.6.1976A3Table A4: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against CACM: Established 12.10.1961. A4Table A5: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against CAN: Established 25.5.1988......A5Table A6: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against CARICOM: Established 1.8.1973A6Table A7: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against CEFTA: Established 1.3.1993....A7Table A8: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against CEMAC: Established 24.6.1999
(No data available).......................................................................................A8Table A9: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against CER: Established 1.1.1983.........A9Table A10: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against CIS: Established 30.12.1994.....A10Table A11: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against COMESA: Established 8.12.1994A11Table A12: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against EAC: Established 1.1.1994 (No
data available)............................................................................................A12Table A13: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against EAEC: Established 8.10.1997. .A13Table A14: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against EC: Established 1.1.1958..........A14Table A15: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against ECO: Established ???................A15Table A16: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against EEA: Established 1.4.1994.......A16Table A17: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against EFTA: Established 3.5.1960.....A17Table A18: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against GCC: Established ???...............A18Table A19: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against GSTP: Established 19.4.1989...A19Table A20: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against LAIA: Established 18.3.1981. . .A21Table A21: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against MERCOSUR: Established
29.11.1991.................................................................................................A22Table A22: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against MSG: Established 22.7.1993 (No
data available)............................................................................................A23Table A23: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against NAFTA: Established 1.1.1994..A24Table A24: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against OCT: Established 1.1.1971 (No
data available)............................................................................................A25
Table A25: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against PTN: Established 1.2.1973.......A26Table A26: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against SAPTA: Established 7.12.1995 A27Table A27: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against SPARTECA: Established 1.1.1981A28Table A28: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against TRIPARTITE: Established
1.4.1968.....................................................................................................A29Table A29: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against UEMOA/WAEMU: Established
1.1.2000.....................................................................................................A30Table A30: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against APEC: Established 11.1998......A31
Anti-Dumping Measures Initiated by and against RTAs: % of Total Initiations
Table A31: Anti-Dumping Measures Initiated by RTAs, against Members/Other Economies and against RTAs by Members/Other Economies: % of Total Initiations...................................................................................................A32
Table A32: List of Abbreviations and Dates of Entry into Force..........................................A38
Table A1: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against AFTAa: Established 28.2.1992
89-9
0
90-9
1
91-9
2
92-9
3 b
93-9
4
94-9
5
95-9
6
96-9
7
97-9
8
98-9
9
99-0
0
00-0
1
All
Yrs
89-9
2
92-9
5
95-9
8
98-0
1
Initiations by AFTAInternal 1 2 2 1 6 12 1 4 7
Brunei DarussalamCambodia Indonesia 1 2 3 1 2Laos Malaysia 1 2 1 1 5 3 2Myanmar Philippines 3 3 3Singapore 1 1 1ThailandVietnam
External 1 12 18 4 11 4 50 1 30 19Total 2 14 20 5 17 4 62 2 34 26
Initiations against AFTAInternal 1 2 2 1 6 12 1 4 7
Brunei Darussalam Cambodia Indonesia 1 1 1 3 2 1Laos Malaysia 1 2 3 1 2Myanmar Philippines Singapore 1 1 1Thailand 1 1 1 2 5 2 3Vietnam
External 2 11 21 18 35 21 10 16 16 28 29 34 241 34 74 42 91Total 2 11 21 18 35 22 10 18 18 29 35 34 253 34 75 46 98
aAFTA = ASEAN Free Trade Area. – bYear established.
A1
Table A2: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against BAFTAa: Established 1.4.1994
89-9
0
90-9
1
91-9
2
92-9
3
93-9
4 b
94-9
5
95-9
6
96-9
7
97-9
8
98-9
9
99-0
0
00-0
1
All
Yrs
89-9
2
92-9
5
95-9
8
98-0
1
Initiations by BAFTAInternal
EstoniaLatviaLithuania
ExternalTotal
Initiations against BAFTAInternal
EstoniaLatviaLithuania
External 1 3 3 4 2 2 4 19 7 4 8Total 1 3 3 4 2 2 4 19 7 4 8
aBAFTA = Baltic Free-Trade Area. – bYear established.
A2
Table A3: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against BANGKOKa: Established 17.6.1976
89-9
0
90-9
1
91-9
2
92-9
3
93-9
4
94-9
5
95-9
6
96-9
7
97-9
8
98-9
9
99-0
0
00-0
1
All
Yrs
89-9
2
92-9
5
95-9
8
98-0
1
Initiations by BANGKOKInternal 1 5 1 4 4 7 7 7 6 17 59 1 10 18 30
Bangladesh ChinaIndia 1 1 1 3 3 4 5 7 5 16 46 1 5 12 28Republic of Korea 4 1 1 3 2 1 1 13 5 6 2LaosSri Lanka
External 3 2 4 5 4 8 7 31 9 36 25 25 159 9 17 47 86Total 3 2 5 10 5 12 11 38 16 43 31 42 218 10 27 65 116
Initiations against BANGKOKInternal 1 5 1 4 4 7 7 7 6 17 59 1 10 18 30
Bangladesh 1 1 1China 3 1 4 3 5 6 4 4 13 43 8 14 21India 1 1 2 1 1Republic of Korea 1 1 1 2 1 3 2 2 13 1 1 4 7LaosSri Lanka
External 16 27 51 43 55 36 39 44 50 53 51 71 536 94 134 133 175Total 16 27 52 48 56 40 43 51 57 60 57 88 595 95 144 151 205
aBANGKOK = Bangkok Agreement.
A3
Table A4: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against CACMa: Established 12.10.1961
89-9
0
90-9
1
91-9
2
92-9
3
93-9
4
94-9
5
95-9
6
96-9
7
97-9
8
98-9
9
99-0
0
00-0
1
All
Yrs
89-9
2
92-9
5
95-9
8
98-0
1
Initiations by CACMInternal 1 1 1
Costa RicaEl SalvadorGuatemala Honduras Nicaragua 1 1 1
External 1 1 2 1 1Total 1 2 3 1 2
Intiations against CACMInternal 1 1 1
Costa Rica 1 1 1El SalvadorGuatemala Honduras Nicaragua
External 1 1 1Total 2 2 2
aCACM = Central American Common Market.
A4
Table A5: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against CANa: Established 25.5.1988
89-9
0
90-9
1
91-9
2
92-9
3
93-9
4
94-9
5
95-9
6
96-9
7
97-9
8
98-9
9
99-0
0
00-0
1
All
Yrs
89-9
2
92-9
5
95-9
8
98-0
1
Initiations by CANInternal 2 1 1 4 2 2
Bolivia Colombia EcuadorPeru 1 1 2 1 1Venezuela 1 1 2 1 1
External 4 4 13 4 12 23 7 2 69 8 29 32Total 4 6 14 4 13 23 7 2 73 10 31 32
Initiations against CANInternal 2 1 1 4 2 2
Bolivia 1 1 1Colombia 1 1 1EcuadorPeru 1 1 2 1 1Venezuela
External 1 4 5 2 6 2 5 3 2 30 10 8 2 10Total 1 4 5 2 6 2 1 2 1 5 3 2 34 10 10 4 10
aCAN = Andean Community.
A5
Table A6: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against CARICOMa: Established 1.8.1973
89-9
0
90-9
1
91-9
2
92-9
3
93-9
4
94-9
5
95-9
6
96-9
7
97-9
8
98-9
9
99-0
0
00-0
1
All
Yrs
89-9
2
92-9
5
95-9
8
98-0
1
Initiations by CARICOMInternal
Antigua & BarbudaBahamasBarbadosBelizeDominicaDominicaGrenada GuyanaHaiti Jamaica Monserrat Trinidad & TobagoSt. Kitts & Nevis St. Lucia St. Vincent & the GrenadinesSurinam
External 5 1 6 6Total 5 1 6 6
Initiations against CARICOMInternal
Antigua & BarbudaBahamasBarbadosBelizeDominicaDominicaGrenada GuyanaHaiti Jamaica Monserrat Trinidad & TobagoSt. Kitts & Nevis St. Lucia St. Vincent & the GrenadinesSurinam
External 1 2 3 1 2Total 1 2 3 1 2
aCARICOM = Caribbean Community and Common Market.
A6
Table A7: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against CEFTAa: Established 1.3.1993
89-9
0
90-9
1
91-9
2
92-9
3
93-9
4 b
94-9
5
95-9
6
96-9
7
97-9
8
98-9
9
99-0
0
00-0
1
All
Yrs
89-9
2
92-9
5
95-9
8
98-0
1
Initiations by CEFTAInternal 1 1 1
Bulgaria Czech Republic Hungary Poland Romania Slovak RepublicSlovenia 1 1 1
External 24 1 5 1 31 24 1 6Total 24 1 6 1 32 24 1 7
Initiations against CEFTAInternal 1 1 1
Bulgaria Czech Republic Hungary 1 1 1Poland Romania Slovak RepublicSlovenia
External 7 7 8 16 10 3 4 12 12 17 10 18 124 22 29 28 45Total 7 7 8 16 10 3 4 12 12 18 10 18 125 22 29 28 46
aCEFTA = Central European Free Trade Agreement. – bYear established.
A7
Table A8: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against CEMACa: Established 24.6.1999 (No data available)
89-9
0
90-9
1
91-9
2
92-9
3
93-9
4
94-9
5
95-9
6
96-9
7
97-9
8
98-9
9
99-0
0 b
00-0
1
All
Yrs
89-9
2
92-9
5
95-9
8
98-0
1
Initiations by CEMACInternal
Cameroon Central African RepublicChad Congo Equatorial Guinea GabonGabon
ExternalTotal
Initiations against CEMACInternal
Cameroon Central African RepublicChad Congo Equatorial Guinea GabonGabon
ExternalTotal
aCEMAC = Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa. – bYear established.
A8
Table A9: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against CERa: Established 1.1.1983
89-9
0 b
90-9
1
91-9
2
92-9
3
93-9
4
94-9
5
95-9
6
96-9
7
97-9
8
98-9
9
99-0
0
00-0
1
All
Yrs
89-9
2
92-9
5
95-9
8
98-0
1
Initiations by CERInternal
Australia New Zealand
External 23 52 89 65 47 15 17 23 40 22 24 25 442 164 127 80 71Total 23 52 89 65 47 15 17 23 40 22 24 25 442 164 127 80 71
Initiations against CERInternal
Australia New Zealand
External 2 3 2 1 2 3 5 2 20 2 5 3 10Total 2 3 2 1 2 3 5 2 20 2 5 3 10
aCER = Closer Trade Relations Trade Agreement. – bYear established.
A9
Table A10: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against CISa: Established 30.12.1994
89-9
0
90-9
1
91-9
2
92-9
3
93-9
4
94-9
5 b
95-9
6
96-9
7
97-9
8
98-9
9
99-0
0
00-0
1
All
Yrs
89-9
2
92-9
5
95-9
8
98-0
1
Initiations by CISInternal
AzerbaijanArmenia BelarusGeorgiaMoldova KazakhstanRussian Federation Ukraine Uzbekistan Tajikistan Kyrgyz Republic
ExternalTotal
Initiations against CISInternal
AzerbaijanArmenia BelarusGeorgiaMoldova KazakhstanRussian Federation Ukraine Uzbekistan Tajikistan Kyrgyz Republic
External 13 12 32 24 1 12 20 33 17 22 186 13 68 33 72Total 13 12 32 24 1 12 20 33 17 22 186 13 68 33 72
aCIS = Commonwealth of Independent States. – bYear established.
A10
Table A11: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against COMESAa: Established 8.12.1994
89-9
0
90-9
1
91-9
2
92-9
3
93-9
4
94-9
5 b
95-9
6
96-9
7
97-9
8
98-9
9
99-0
0
00-0
1
All
Yrs
89-9
2
92-9
5
95-9
8
98-0
1
Initiations by COMESAInternal
Angola Burundi Comoros Democratic Rep. of Conga Djibouti EgyptEritrea EthiopiaKenya Madagascar Malawi MauritiusNamibiaRwanda SeychellesSudan Swaziland Uganda ZambiaZimbabwe
External 5 1 4 1 11 5 6Total 5 1 4 1 11 5 6
Initiations against COMESAInternal
Angola Burundi Comoros Democratic Rep. of Conga Djibouti EgyptEritrea EthiopiaKenya Madagascar Malawi MauritiusNamibiaRwanda SeychellesSudan Swaziland Uganda ZambiaZimbabwe
External 1 2 1 3 1 1 3 1 1 14 3 1 5 5Total 1 2 1 3 1 1 3 1 1 14 3 1 5 5
aCOMESA = Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa. – bYear established.
A11
Table A12: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against EACa: Established 1.1.1994 (No data available)
89-9
0
90-9
1
91-9
2
92-9
3
93-9
4
94-9
5 b
95-9
6
96-9
7
97-9
8
98-9
9
99-0
0
00-0
1
All
Yrs
89-9
2
92-9
5
95-9
8
98-0
1
Initiations by EACInternal
Kenya Tanzania Uganda
ExternalTotal
Initiations against EACInternal
Kenya Tanzania Uganda
ExternalTotal
aEAC = East African Cooperation. – bYear established.
A12
Table A13: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against EAECa: Established 8.10.1997
89-9
0
90-9
1
91-9
2
92-9
3
93-9
4
94-9
5
95-9
6
96-9
7
97-9
8 b
98-9
9
99-0
0
00-0
1
All
Yrs
89-9
2
92-9
5
95-9
8
98-0
1
Initiations by EAECInternal
Belarus Kazakhstan Kyrgyz Republic Russian Federation Tajikistan
ExternalTotal
Initiations against EAECInternal
Belarus Kazakhstan Kyrgyz Republic Russian Federation Tajikistan
External 10 7 19 14 1 8 14 22 12 12 119 10 40 23 46Total 10 7 19 14 1 8 14 22 12 12 119 10 40 23 46
aEAEC = Eurasian Economic Community.
A13
Table A14: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against ECa: Established 1.1.1958
89-9
0
90-9
1
91-9
2
92-9
3
93-9
4
94-9
5
95-9
6
96-9
7
97-9
8
98-9
9
99-0
0
00-0
1
All
Yrs
89-9
2
92-9
5
95-9
8
98-0
1
Initiations by ECInternal 1 1 1European Community
Austria BelgiumDenmark FinlandFrance Germany Greece Ireland Italy LuxembourgNetherlands Portugal Spain Sweden 1 1 1United Kingdom
External 18 18 28 37 47 37 16 26 44 41 49 29 390 64 121 86 119Total 19 18 28 37 47 37 16 26 44 41 49 29 391 65 121 86 119
Initiations against ECInternal 1 1 1European Community
Austria BelgiumDenmark FinlandFrance Germany 1 1 1Greece Ireland Italy LuxembourgNetherlands Portugal Spain SwedenUnited Kingdom
External 24 61 50 78 38 21 34 54 61 53 36 60 570 135 137 149 149Total 25 61 50 78 38 21 34 54 61 53 36 60 571 136 137 149 149
aEC = European Community.
A14
Table A15: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against ECOa: Established ???
89-9
0
90-9
1
91-9
2
92-9
3
93-9
4
94-9
5
95-9
6
96-9
7
97-9
8
98-9
9
99-0
0
00-0
1
All
Yrs
89-9
2
92-9
5
95-9
8
98-0
1
Initiations by ECOInternal 1 1 1
Afghanistan Azerbaijan Iran Kazakhstan Kyrgyz Republic Pakistan Tajikistan Turkey 1 1 1TurkmenistanUzbekistan
External 20 2 5 7 2 36 22 5 9Total 21 2 5 7 2 37 23 5 9
Initiations against ECOInternal 1 1 1
Afghanistan Azerbaijan Iran Kazakhstan Kyrgyz Republic Pakistan 1 1 1Tajikistan Turkey TurkmenistanUzbekistan
External 2 10 5 14 13 5 2 8 10 8 8 85 12 32 15 26Total 2 10 5 15 13 5 2 8 10 8 8 86 12 33 15 26
aECO = Economic Cooperation Organizatioon. – bYear established.
A15
Table A16: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against EEAa: Established 1.4.1994
89-9
0
90-9
1
91-9
2
92-9
3
93-9
4
94-9
5 b
95-9
6
96-9
7
97-9
8
98-9
9
99-0
0
00-0
1
All
Yrs
89-9
2
92-9
5
95-9
8
98-0
1
Initiations by EEAInternal 2 1 3 2 1European Community 1 1 2 1 1
Austria BelgiumDenmark FinlandFrance Germany Greece Iceland Ireland Italy LichtensteinLuxembourgNetherlands NorwayPortugal Spain Sweden 1 1 1United Kingdom
External 17 18 28 37 47 37 16 25 44 41 49 29 388 63 121 85 119Total 19 18 28 37 47 37 16 26 44 41 49 29 391 65 121 86 119
Initiations against EEAInternal 2 1 3 2 1European Community
Austria BelgiumDenmark FinlandFrance Germany 1 1 1Greece Iceland Ireland Italy LichtensteinLuxembourgNetherlands Norway 1 1 2 1 1Portugal Spain SwedenUnited Kingdom
External 25 61 53 78 38 21 34 55 61 53 36 61 576 139 137 150 150Total 27 61 53 78 38 21 34 56 61 53 36 61 579 141 137 151 150
aEEA = European Ecnomic Area. – bYear established.
A16
Table A17: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against EFTAa: Established 3.5.1960
89-9
0
90-9
1
91-9
2
92-9
3
93-9
4
94-9
5
95-9
6
96-9
7
97-9
8
98-9
9
99-0
0
00-0
1
All
Yrs
89-9
2
92-9
5
95-9
8
98-0
1
Initiations by EFTAInternal
Iceland LichtensteinNorwaySwitzerland
ExternalTotal
Initiations against EFTAInternal
Iceland LichtensteinNorwaySwitzerland
External 2 3 3 1 1 1 11 5 4 2Total 2 3 3 1 1 1 11 5 4 2
aEFTA = European Free Trade Association.
A17
Table A18: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against GCCa: Established ???
89-9
0
90-9
1
91-9
2
92-9
3
93-9
4
94-9
5
95-9
6
96-9
7
97-9
8
98-9
9
99-0
0
00-0
1
All
Yrs
89-9
2
92-9
5
95-9
8
98-0
1
Initiations by GCCInternal
Bahrain KuwaitOmanQatar Saudi Arabia United Arab Emirates
ExternalTotal
Initiations against GCCInternal
Bahrain KuwaitOmanQatar Saudi Arabia United Arab Emirates
External 1 3 2 4 2 2 14 4 2 8Total 1 3 2 4 2 2 14 4 2 8
aGCC = Gulf Cooperation Council. – bYear established.
A18
Table A19: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against GSTPa: Established 19.4.1989
89-9
0 b
90-9
1
91-9
2
92-9
3
93-9
4
94-9
5
95-9
6
96-9
7
97-9
8
98-9
9
99-0
0
00-0
1
All
Yrs
89-9
2
92-9
5
95-9
8
98-0
1
Initiations by GSTPInternal 2 4 20 7 16 14 26 26 20 31 37 40 243 26 37 72 108
AlgeriaAngola Argentina 2 14 3 4 7 7 14 51 2 21 28BangladeshBenin Bolivia Brazil 2 5 14 1 7 1 2 6 38 7 15 8 8Cameroon Chile 1 2 1 4 8 1 2 5Colombia 1 4 1 2 8 1 5 2Cuba Ecuador 1 1 1 Egypt 1 3 4 1 3Ghana Guinea Guyana Haiti India 4 1 1 1 5 2 11 5 10 40 4 2 8 26Indonesia 5 2 4 1 12 7 5Islamic Republic of Iran IraqDem. People's Rep. of Korea Republic of Korea 2 1 1 3 1 5 13 2 2 9Libya Malaysia 1 3 1 1 6 4 2Mexico 2 2 11 4 2 3 1 3 1 29 15 9 1 4Morocco MozambiqueNicaraguaNigeriaPakistanPeru 3 2 1 3 2 11 3 6 2Philippines 1 4 5 1 4QuatarRomaniaSingapore 1 1 1Sri LankaSudanThailandTrinidad and Tobago 3 1 4 4TunisiaUnited Rep. of TanzaniaUruguay 2 2 2Venezuela 1 3 2 2 2 10 1 5 4VietnamYugoslaviaZimbabwe
External 12 13 19 31 47 44 49 74 64 87 70 75 585 44 122 187 232Total 14 17 39 38 63 58 75 100 84 118 107 115 828 70 159 259 340
A19
Table A19 continued
89-9
0 b
90-9
1
91-9
2
92-9
3
93-9
4
94-9
5
95-9
6
96-9
7
97-9
8
98-9
9
99-0
0
00-0
1
All
Yrs
89-9
2
92-9
5
95-9
8
98-0
1
Initiations against GSTPInternal 2 4 20 7 16 14 26 26 20 31 37 40 243 26 37 72 108
AlgeriaAngola Argentina 3 3 1 3 1 1 1 1 3 17 6 4 2 5Bangladesh 1 2 1 4 3 1Benin Bolivia 1 1 1Brazil 4 2 6 9 3 5 12 3 4 8 4 9 69 12 17 19 21Cameroon Chile 1 1 3 2 3 1 3 5 19 1 1 8 9Colombia 2 1 1 1 5 2 2 1Cuba 1 1 1Ecuador 1 1 1 Egypt 1 1 1Ghana Guinea Guyana Haiti India 2 5 3 3 1 4 3 3 2 6 32 7 7 7 11Indonesia 1 2 1 3 3 5 7 7 29 1 2 7 19Islamic Republic of Iran 1 1 2 2 IraqDem. People's Rep. of Korea Republic of Korea 3 1 9 6 4 5 6 6 9 11 11 11 82 13 15 21 33Libya Malaysia 1 4 1 1 1 1 2 3 14 1 5 2 6Mexico 1 2 5 2 1 3 4 1 5 3 3 30 8 6 5 11Morocco MozambiqueNicaraguaNigeriaPakistan 1 1 1 3 1 1 1Peru 1 1 1 3 1 1 1Philippines 2 2 2QuatarRomania 1 1 1 1 2 3 1 5 15 1 2 3 9Singapore 1 1 1 1 2 1 7 2 1 4Sri Lanka 2 2 2SudanThailand 1 1 4 1 5 2 7 2 5 28 1 6 7 14Trinidad and Tobago 1 2 3 1 2TunisiaUnited Rep. of TanzaniaUruguay 1 1 1 3 1 1 1Venezuela 2 3 1 3 2 2 2 2 17 5 4 2 6Vietnam 1 1 1Yugoslavia 1 2 1 4 3 1Zimbabwe
External 30 52 56 63 63 39 24 31 47 74 49 64 592 138 165 102 187Total 32 56 76 70 79 53 50 57 67 105 86 104 835 164 202 174 295
aGSTP = General System of Trade Preferences among Developing Countries. – bYear established.
A20
Table A20: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against LAIAa: Established 18.3.1981
89-9
0
90-9
1
91-9
2
92-9
3
93-9
4
94-9
5
95-9
6
96-9
7
97-9
8
98-9
9
99-0
0
00-0
1
All
Yrs
89-9
2
92-9
5
95-9
8
98-0
1
Initiations by LAIAInternal 2 3 8 3 4 6 20 8 7 8 13 15 97 13 13 35 36
Argentina 1 1 13 2 3 6 4 10 40 2 18 20Bolivia Brazil 2 1 1 4 1 5 14 3 1 4 6Chile 1 2 2 5 1 2 2ColombiaCubaEcuador 1 1 1Mexico 2 1 7 3 2 2 1 2 20 10 7 1 2Paraguay Peru 1 2 1 3 2 9 1 6 2Uruguay 2 2 2Venezuela 1 3 1 1 6 1 3 2
External 9 12 26 25 54 38 44 40 36 55 42 52 433 47 117 120 149Total 11 15 34 28 58 44 64 48 43 63 55 67 530 60 130 155 185
Initiations against LAIAInternal 2 3 8 3 4 6 20 8 7 9 13 15 98 13 13 35 37
Argentina 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 2 1 2 2Bolivia 1 1 1Brazil 2 3 1 1 3 12 3 3 5 3 9 45 5 5 18 17Chile 1 3 2 1 1 3 3 14 1 6 7Colombia 2 1 1 4 2 1 1Cuba 1 1 1Ecuador Mexico 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 11 1 1 3 6Paraguay 1 1 2 1 1Peru 1 1 1 3 1 1 1Uruguay 1 1 1 3 1 1 1Venezuela 1 1 1 1 1 2 7 2 1 1 3
External 10 20 13 19 11 9 4 4 7 18 4 9 128 43 39 15 31Total 12 23 21 22 15 15 24 12 14 27 17 24 226 56 52 50 68
aLAIA = Latin American Integration Association.
A21
Table A21: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against MERCOSURa: Established 29.11.1991
89-9
0
90-9
1
91-9
2 b
92-9
3
93-9
4
94-9
5
95-9
6
96-9
7
97-9
8
98-9
9
99-0
0
00-0
1
All
Yrs
89-9
2
92-9
5
95-9
8
98-0
1
Initiations by MERCOSURInternal 2 1 1 11 2 3 5 3 8 36 2 2 16 16
Argentina 1 1 11 2 3 5 1 7 31 2 16 13Brazil 2 2 4 2 2Paraguay Uruguay 1 1 1
External 9 4 30 17 32 35 17 22 37 49 252 9 51 84 108Total 2 9 4 31 18 43 37 20 27 40 57 288 11 53 100 124
Initiations against MERCOSURInternal 2 1 1 11 2 3 5 3 8 36 2 2 16 16
Argentina 1 1 1 3 1 2Brazil 1 10 1 3 5 1 7 28 1 14 13Paraguay 1 1 2 1 1Uruguay 1 1 1 3 1 1 1
External 8 13 11 17 6 7 4 4 5 8 5 6 94 32 30 13 19Total 8 15 11 17 7 8 15 6 8 13 8 14 130 34 32 29 35
aMERCOSUR = Southern Common Market. – bYear established.
A22
Table A22: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against MSGa: Established 22.7.1993 (No data available)
89-9
0
90-9
1
91-9
2
92-9
3
93-9
4 b
94-9
5
95-9
6
96-9
7
97-9
8
98-9
9
99-0
0
00-0
1
All
Yrs
89-9
2
92-9
5
95-9
8
98-0
1
Initiations by MSGInternal
Fiji Papua New Guinea Solomon Islands Vanuatu
ExternalTotal
Initiations against MSGInternal
Fiji Papua New Guinea Solomon Islands Vanuatu
ExternalTotal
aMSG = Melanesian Spearhead Group. – bYear established.
A23
Table A23: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against NAFTAa: Established 1.1.1994
89-9
0
90-9
1
91-9
2
92-9
3
93-9
4
94-9
5 b
95-9
6
96-9
7
97-9
8
98-9
9
99-0
0
00-0
1
All
Yrs
89-9
2
92-9
5
95-9
8
98-0
1
Initiations by NAFTAInternal 12 16 21 22 11 7 4 8 4 9 4 8 126 49 40 16 21
Canada 5 4 7 8 3 4 1 3 1 3 1 40 16 15 5 4Mexico 5 9 6 7 8 1 3 1 6 2 48 20 15 5 8United States 2 3 8 7 3 2 2 2 3 1 5 38 13 10 6 9
External 38 62 82 107 81 50 20 25 42 63 30 114 714 182 238 87 207Total 50 78 103 129 92 57 24 33 46 72 34 122 840 231 278 103 228
Initiations against NAFTAInternal 12 16 21 22 11 7 4 8 4 9 4 8 126 49 40 16 21
Canada 1 1 5 5 2 2 1 4 21 7 5 4 5Mexico 2 2 3 2 3 2 1 2 1 1 19 7 5 3 4United States 9 13 13 15 11 4 2 5 2 6 3 3 86 35 30 9 12
External 6 7 12 8 11 6 16 15 13 15 9 9 127 25 25 44 33Total 18 23 33 30 22 13 20 23 17 24 13 17 253 74 65 60 54
aNAFTA = North American Free Trade Agreement. – bYear established.
A24
Table A24: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against OCTa: Established 1.1.1971 (No data available)
89-9
0
90-9
1
91-9
2
92-9
3
93-9
4
94-9
5
95-9
6
96-9
7
97-9
8
98-9
9
99-0
0
00-0
1
All
Yrs
89-9
2
92-9
5
95-9
8
98-0
1
Initiations by OCTInternal
ArubaBritish Antarctic Territory British Indian Ocean TerritoryBritish Virgin IslandsCayman IslandsFalkland IslandsFrench PolynesiaFrench South.&Antarctic Terr.Greenland Mayotte MonserratNetherlands AntillesNew Caledonia PitcairnSaint Pierre and Miquelon S. Georhia/S. Dandwich Isl.St. Helena Ascension IslandTristan da CunhaTurks and Caicos IslandsWallis and Futuna Islands
ExternalTotal
Initiations against OCTInternal
ArubaBritish Antarctic Territory British Indian Ocean TerritoryBritish Virgin IslandsCayman IslandsFalkland IslandsFrench PolynesiaFrench South.&Antarctic Terr.Greenland Mayotte MonserratNetherlands AntillesNew Caledonia PitcairnSaint Pierre and Miquelon S. Georhia/S. Dandwich Isl.St. Helena Ascension IslandTristan da CunhaTurks and Caicos IslandsWallis and Futuna Islands
ExternalTotal
aOCT = Overseas Countries and Territories.
A25
Table A25: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against PTNa: Established 1.2.1973
89-9
0
90-9
1
91-9
2
92-9
3
93-9
4
94-9
5
95-9
6
96-9
7
97-9
8
98-9
9
99-0
0
00-0
1
All
Yrs
89-9
2
92-9
5
95-9
8
98-0
1
Initiations by PTNInternal 2 1 10 2 11 5 4 7 4 7 14 7 74 13 18 15 28
Bangladesh Brazil 1 3 6 1 3 1 2 4 21 4 7 4 6Chile 2 1 1 4 8 2 6Egypt 1 1 1 3 1 2Israel 1 1 1 3 2 1Republic of Korea 1 1 1Mexico 2 7 2 2 2 1 4 1 21 9 6 1 5Pakistan Paraguay Peru 2 2 1 1 2 8 2 4 2Philippines 1 1 2 1 1Romania Tunisia Turkey 3 3 6 3 3Uruguay 1 1 1Yugoslavia
External 12 16 24 33 67 36 18 54 39 42 28 26 395 52 136 111 96Total 14 17 34 35 78 41 22 61 43 49 42 33 469 65 154 126 124
Initiations against PTNInternal 2 1 10 2 11 5 4 7 4 7 14 7 74 13 18 15 28
Bangladesh 2 2 2Brazil 2 3 1 1 2 2 2 3 2 18 5 4 4 5Chile 1 1 2 1 2 7 1 4 2Egypt Israel Republic of Korea 3 1 3 2 2 3 4 3 21 3 6 2 10Mexico 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 1 1 2 3Pakistan 1 2 1 4 1 2 1Paraguay Peru 1 1 1Philippines 2 2 2Romania 1 1 2 1 5 1 3 1Tunisia Turkey 2 2 4 4Uruguay 1 1 2 1 1Yugoslavia 1 1 1
External 24 34 33 40 27 23 34 20 34 56 28 46 399 91 90 88 130Total 26 35 43 42 38 28 38 27 38 63 42 53 473 104 108 103 158
aPTN = Protocol relating to Trade Negotiations among Developing Countries.
A26
Table A26: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against SAPTAa: Established 7.12.1995
89-9
0
90-9
1
91-9
2
92-9
3
93-9
4
94-9
5
95-9
6 b
96-9
7
97-9
8
98-9
9
99-0
0
00-0
1
All
Yrs
89-9
2
92-9
5
95-9
8
98-0
1
Initiations by SAPTAInternal 1 1 1
Bangladesh BhutanIndia 1 1 1Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka
External 5 3 1 9 5 20 11 38 27 36 155 5 13 36 101Total 5 3 1 9 5 20 11 38 27 37 156 5 13 36 102
Initiations against SAPTAInternal 1 1 1
Bangladesh 1 1 1BhutanIndia Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka
External 3 6 10 7 16 4 5 10 13 11 11 15 111 19 27 28 37Total 3 6 10 7 16 4 5 10 13 11 11 16 112 19 27 28 38
aSAPTA = South Asian Preferential Trade Arrangement. – bYear established.
A27
Table A27: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against SPARTECAa: Established 1.1.1981
89-9
0
90-9
1
91-9
2
92-9
3
93-9
4
94-9
5
95-9
6
96-9
7
97-9
8
98-9
9
99-0
0
00-0
1
All
Yrs
89-9
2
92-9
5
95-9
8
98-0
1
Initiations by SPARTECAInternal
Australia Cook IslandsFiji Kiribati Marshall Islands MicronesiaNauru New Zealand Niue Papua New Guinea Solomon Islands Tonga Tuvalu Vanuatu Western Samoa
External 23 52 89 65 47 15 17 23 40 22 24 25 442 164 127 80 71Total 23 52 89 65 47 15 17 23 40 22 24 25 442 164 127 80 71
Initiations against SPARTECAInternal
Australia Cook IslandsFiji Kiribati Marshall Islands MicronesiaNauru New Zealand Niue Papua New Guinea Solomon Islands Tonga Tuvalu Vanuatu Western Samoa
External 2 3 2 1 2 3 5 2 20 2 5 3 10Total 2 3 2 1 2 3 5 2 20 2 5 3 10
aSPARTECA = South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement
A28
Table A28: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against TRIPARTITEa: Established 1.4.1968
89-9
0
90-9
1
91-9
2
92-9
3
93-9
4
94-9
5
95-9
6
96-9
7
97-9
8
98-9
9
99-0
0
00-0
1
All
Yrs
89-9
2
92-9
5
95-9
8
98-0
1
Initiations by TRIPARTITEInternal 1 1 1
Egypt 1 1 1India Yugoslavia
External 5 3 1 9 5 20 16 39 30 38 166 5 13 41 107Total 5 3 1 9 5 20 16 39 31 38 167 5 13 41 108
Initiations against TRIPARTITEInternal 1 1 1
Egypt India 1 1 1Yugoslavia
External 6 11 8 10 8 4 6 11 13 14 9 16 116 25 22 30 39Total 6 11 8 10 8 4 6 11 13 14 10 16 117 25 22 30 40
aTRIPARTITE = Tripartite Agreement
A29
Table A29: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against UEMOA/WAEMUa: Established 1.1.2000
89-9
0
90-9
1
91-9
2
92-9
3
93-9
4
94-9
5
95-9
6
96-9
7
97-9
8
98-9
9
99-0
0
00-0
1 b
All
Yrs
89-9
2
92-9
5
95-9
8
98-0
1
Initiations by UEMOA/WAEMUInternal
Benin Burkina Faso Côte d'IvoireGuinea Bissau Mali Niger Senegal Togo
ExternalTotal
Initiations against UEMOA/WAEMUInternal
Benin Burkina Faso Côte d'IvoireGuinea Bissau Mali Niger Senegal Togo
External 2 2 2Total 2 2 2
aUMMOA/WAEMU = West African Economic and Monetary Union. – bYear established.
A30
Table A30: Anti-Dumping Measures by and against APECa: Established 11.1998
89-9
0
90-9
1
91-9
2
92-9
3
93-9
4
94-9
5
95-9
6
96-9
7
97-9
8
98-9
9
99-0
0
00-0
1
All
Yrs
89-9
2
92-9
5
95-9
8
98-0
1
Initiations by APECInternal 42 72 109 97 81 40 41 52 63 63 60 90 810 223 218 156 213
Australia 12 21 40 32 27 3 6 9 14 10 14 16 204 73 62 29 40BruneiCanada 8 8 10 12 8 5 3 6 3 5 6 20 94 26 25 12 31Chile 1 2 1 1 1 2 8 1 4 3ChinaHong KongIndonesia 5 8 6 19 13 6Japan 1 2 3 1 2Korea 2 6 4 1 6 10 4 4 4 3 44 2 11 20 11Malaysia 1 6 2 1 10 7 3Mexico 8 10 15 19 16 1 3 3 4 10 3 4 96 33 36 10 17New Zealand 6 13 1 2 7 6 1 4 2 6 2 50 19 10 11 10Papua New GuineaPeru 3 4 2 2 3 3 17 3 8 6Philippines 1 1 2 4 2 10 2 8RussiaSingapore 1 1 1TaiwanThailand 1 1 1United States 14 25 30 27 24 18 11 13 16 25 12 38 253 69 69 40 75Viet Nam
External 34 60 86 104 63 43 14 41 55 47 24 72 643 180 210 110 143Total 76 132 195 201 144 83 55 93 118 110 84 162 1453 403 428 266 356
Initiations against APECInternal 42 72 109 97 81 40 41 52 63 63 60 90 810 223 218 156 213
Australia 2 2 1 2 1 8 2 3 2 1BruneiCanada 1 2 6 6 1 2 4 1 4 27 9 6 7 5Chile 1 1 1 3 1 2 9 1 1 4 3China 4 12 16 21 20 13 9 15 11 6 7 22 156 32 54 35 35Hong Kong 2 2 3 1 3 1 12 7 4 1Indonesia 1 1 5 4 1 3 3 2 7 6 10 9 52 7 8 12 25Japan 6 11 10 10 7 2 6 3 7 8 6 6 82 27 19 16 20Korea 5 7 17 11 9 6 3 5 8 9 9 14 103 29 26 16 32Malaysia 1 3 3 3 1 1 2 2 3 4 23 4 7 3 9Mexico 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 2 1 1 23 9 6 4 4New Zealand 1 1 1 1 1 5 2 1 2Papua New GuineaPeru 1 1 1Philippines 1 1 1 3 2 1Russia 3 4 2 6 4 8 2 4 33 3 6 10 14Singapore 4 3 2 5 2 1 3 1 21 7 7 2 5Taiwan 6 6 13 8 7 3 2 6 8 7 5 11 82 25 18 16 23Thailand 1 4 6 6 5 2 4 2 2 5 7 6 50 11 13 8 18United States 13 17 18 19 14 4 7 8 4 7 4 4 119 48 37 19 15Viet Nam 1 1 1
External 7 9 27 23 57 55 43 60 57 91 79 79 587 43 135 160 249Total 49 81 136 120 138 95 84 112 120 154 139 169 1397 266 353 316 462
aAPEC = Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation. – bYear established.
A31
Table A31: Anti-Dumping Measures Initiated by RTAsa, against Membersb/Other Economiesc and against RTAs by Membersb/Other Economiesc: % of Total Initiations
89-9
0
90-9
1
91-9
2
92-9
3
93-9
4
94-9
5
95-9
6
96-9
7
97-9
8
98-9
9
99-0
0
00-0
1
All
Yrs
89-9
2
92-9
5
95-9
8
98-0
1
Initiations by AFTA (92)d/ASEAN (77)d against ...Internal 50.0 14.3 10.0 20.0 35.3 19.4 50.0 11.8 26.9External 50.0 85.7 90.0 80.0 64.7 100 80.6 50.0 88.2 73.1Total 2 14 20 5 17 4 62 2 34 26
Initiations against AFTA/ASEAN by ...Internal 4.5 11.1 11.1 3.4 17.1 4.7 1.3 8.7 7.1External 100 100 100 100 100 95.5 100 88.9 88.9 96.6 82.9 100 95.3 100 98.7 91.3 92.9Total 2 11 21 18 35 22 10 18 18 29 35 34 253 34 75 46 98
Initiations by BAFTA (94)d against ...InternalExternalTotal
Initiations against BAFTA by ...InternalExternal 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100Total 1 3 3 4 2 2 4 19 7 4 8
Initiations by BANGKOK (76)d against ...Internal 20.0 50.0 20.0 33.3 36.4 18.4 43.8 16.3 19.4 40.5 27.1 10.0 37.0 27.7 25.9External 100 100 80.0 50.0 80.0 66.7 63.6 81.6 56.3 83.7 80.6 59.5 72.9 90.0 63.0 72.3 74.1Total 3 2 5 10 5 12 11 38 16 43 31 42 218 10 27 65 116
Initiations against BANGKOK by ...Internal 1.9 10.4 1.8 10.0 9.3 13.7 12.3 11.7 10.5 19.3 9.9 1.1 6.9 11.9 14.6External 100 100 98.1 89.6 98.2 90.0 90.7 86.3 87.7 88.3 89.5 80.7 90.1 98.9 93.1 88.1 85.4Total 16 27 52 48 56 40 43 51 57 60 57 88 595 95 144 151 205
Initiations by CACM (73)d against ...Internal 50.0 33.3 50.0External 100 50.0 66.7 100 50.0Total 1 2 3 1 2
Intiations against CACM by ...Internal 50.0 50.0 50.0External 50.0 50.0 50.0Total 2 2 2
Initiations by CAN (88)d against ...Internal 33.3 7.1 7.7 5.5 20.0 6.5External 100 66.7 92.9 100 92.3 100 100 100 94.5 80.0 93.5 100Total 4 6 14 4 13 23 7 2 73 10 31 32
Initiations against CAN by ...Internal 100 100 100 11.8 20.0 50.0External 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 88.2 100 80.0 50.0 100Total 1 4 5 2 6 2 1 2 1 5 3 2 34 10 10 4 10
A32
Table A31 continued
89-9
0
90-9
1
91-9
2
92-9
3
93-9
4
94-9
5
95-9
6
96-9
7
97-9
8
98-9
9
99-0
0
00-0
1
All
Yrs
89-9
2
92-9
5
95-9
8
98-0
1
Initiations by CARICOM (73)d against ...InternalExternal 100 100 100 100Total 5 1 6 6
Initiations against CARICOM by ...InternalExternal 100 100 100 100 100Total 1 2 3 1 2
Initiations by CEFTA (93)d against ...Internal 16.7 3.1 14.3External 100 100 83.3 100 96.9 100 100 85.7Total 24 1 6 1 32 24 1 7
Initiations against CEFTA by ...Internal 5.6 0.8 2.2External 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 94.4 100 100 99.2 100 100 100 97.8Total 7 7 8 16 10 3 4 12 12 18 10 18 125 22 29 28 46
Initiations by CEMAC (99)d against ...InternalExternalTotal
Initiations against CEMAC by ...InternalExternalTotal
Initiations by CER (83)d against ...InternalExternal 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100Total 23 52 89 65 47 15 17 23 40 22 24 25 442 164 127 80 71
Initiations against CER by...InternalExternal 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100Total 2 3 2 1 2 3 5 2 20 2 5 3 10
Initiations by CIS (94)d against ...InternalExternalTotal
Initiations against CIS by ...InternalExternal 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100Total 13 12 32 24 1 12 20 33 17 22 186 13 68 33 72
A33
Table A31 continued
89-9
0
90-9
1
91-9
2
92-9
3
93-9
4
94-9
5
95-9
6
96-9
7
97-9
8
98-9
9
99-0
0
00-0
1
All
Yrs
89-9
2
92-9
5
95-9
8
98-0
1
Initiations by COMESA (94)d against ...InternalExternal 100 100 100 100 100 100 100Total 5 1 4 1 11 5 6
Initiations against COMESA by ...InternalExternal 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100Total 1 2 1 3 1 1 3 1 1 14 3 1 5 5
Initiations by EAC (94)d against ...InternalExternalTotal
Initiations against EAC by ...InternalExternalTotal
Initiations by EAEC (97)d against ...InternalExternalTotal
Initiations against EAEC by ...InternalExternal 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100Total 10 7 19 14 1 8 14 22 12 12 119 10 40 23 46
Initiations by EC (58)d against ...Internal 5.3 0.3 1.5External 94.7 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 99.7 98.5 100 100 100Total 19 18 28 37 47 37 16 26 44 41 49 29 391 65 121 86 119
Initiations against EC by ...Internal 4.0 0.2 0.7External 96.0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 99.8 99.3 100 100 100Total 25 61 50 78 38 21 34 54 61 53 36 60 571 136 137 149 149
Initiations by ECO (??)d against ...Internal 4.8 2.7 4.3External 95.2 100 100 100 100 97.3 95.7 100 100Total 21 2 5 7 2 37 23 5 9
Initiations against ECO by ...Internal 6.7 1.2 3.0External 100 100 100 93.3 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 98.8 100 97.0 100 100Total 2 10 5 15 13 5 2 8 10 8 8 86 12 33 15 26
A34
Table A31 continued
89-9
0
90-9
1
91-9
2
92-9
3
93-9
4
94-9
5
95-9
6
96-9
7
97-9
8
98-9
9
99-0
0
00-0
1
All
Yrs
89-9
2
92-9
5
95-9
8
98-0
1
Initiations by EEA (94)d against ...Internal 10.5 3.8 0.8 3.1 1.2External 89.5 100 100 100 100 100 100 96.2 100 100 100 100 99.2 96.9 100 98.8 100Total 19 18 28 37 47 37 16 26 44 41 49 29 391 65 121 86 119
Initiations against EEA by ...Internal 7.4 1.8 0.5 1.4 0.7External 92.6 100 100 100 100 100 100 98.2 100 100 100 100 99.5 98.6 100 99.3 100Total 27 61 53 78 38 21 34 56 61 53 36 61 579 141 137 151 150
Initiations by EFTA (60)d against ...InternalExternalTotal
Initiations against EFTA by ...InternalExternal 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100Total 2 3 3 1 1 1 11 5 4 2
Initiations by GCC (??)d against ...InternalExternalTotal
Initiations against GCC by ...InternalExternal 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100Total 1 3 2 4 2 2 14 4 2 8
Initiations by GSTP (89)d against ...Internal 14.3 23.5 51.3 18.4 25.4 24.1 34.7 26.0 23.8 26.3 34.6 34.8 29.3 37.1 23.3 27.8 31.8External 85.7 76.5 48.7 81.6 74.6 75.9 65.3 74.0 76.2 73.7 65.4 65.2 70.7 62.9 76.7 72.2 68.2Total 14 17 39 38 63 58 75 100 84 118 107 115 828 70 159 259 340
Initiations against GSTP by ...Internal 6.3 7.1 26.3 10.0 20.3 26.4 52.0 45.6 29.9 29.5 43.0 38.5 29.1 15.9 18.3 41.4 36.6External 93.8 92.9 73.7 90.0 79.7 73.6 48.0 54.4 70.1 70.5 57.0 61.5 70.9 84.1 81.7 58.6 63.4Total 32 56 76 70 79 53 50 57 67 105 86 104 835 164 202 174 295
Initiations by LAIA (81)d against ...Internal 18.2 20.0 23.5 10.7 6.9 13.6 31.3 16.7 16.3 12.7 23.6 22.4 18.3 21.7 10.0 22.6 19.5External 81.8 80.0 76.5 89.3 93.1 86.4 68.8 83.3 83.7 87.3 76.4 77.6 81.7 78.3 90.0 77.4 80.5Total 11 15 34 28 58 44 64 48 43 63 55 67 530 60 130 155 185
Initiations against LAIA by ...Internal 16.7 13.0 38.1 13.6 26.7 40.0 83.3 66.7 50.0 33.3 76.5 62.5 43.4 23.2 25.0 70.0 54.4External 83.3 87.0 61.9 86.4 73.3 60.0 16.7 33.3 50.0 66.7 23.5 37.5 56.6 76.8 75.0 30.0 45.6Total 12 23 21 22 15 15 24 12 14 27 17 24 226 56 52 50 68
A35
Table A31 continued
89-9
0
90-9
1
91-9
2
92-9
3
93-9
4
94-9
5
95-9
6
96-9
7
97-9
8
98-9
9
99-0
0
00-0
1
All
Yrs
89-9
2
92-9
5
95-9
8
98-0
1
Initiations by MERCOSUR (91)d against ...Internal 100 3.2 5.6 25.6 5.4 15.0 18.5 7.5 14.0 12.5 18.2 3.8 16.0 12.9External 100 100 96.8 94.4 74.4 94.6 85.0 81.5 92.5 86.0 87.5 81.8 96.2 84.0 87.1Total 2 9 4 31 18 43 37 20 27 40 57 288 11 53 100 124
Initiations against MERCOSUR by ...Internal 13.3 14.3 12.5 73.3 33.3 37.5 38.5 37.5 57.1 27.7 5.9 6.3 55.2 45.7External 100 86.7 100 100 85.7 87.5 26.7 66.7 62.5 61.5 62.5 42.9 72.3 94.1 93.8 44.8 54.3Total 8 15 11 17 7 8 15 6 8 13 8 14 130 34 32 29 35
Initiations by MSG (93)d against ...InternalExternalTotal
Initiations against MSG by ...InternalExternalTotal
Initiations by NAFTA (94)d against ...Internal 24.0 20.5 20.4 17.1 12.0 12.3 16.7 24.2 8.7 12.5 11.8 6.6 15.0 21.2 14.4 15.5 9.2External 76.0 79.5 79.6 82.9 88.0 87.7 83.3 75.8 91.3 87.5 88.2 93.4 85.0 78.8 85.6 84.5 90.8Total 50 78 103 129 92 57 24 33 46 72 34 122 840 231 278 103 228
Initiations against NAFTA by ...Internal 66.7 69.6 63.6 73.3 50.0 53.8 20.0 34.8 23.5 37.5 30.8 47.1 49.8 66.2 61.5 26.7 38.9External 33.3 30.4 36.4 26.7 50.0 46.2 80.0 65.2 76.5 62.5 69.2 52.9 50.2 33.8 38.5 73.3 61.1Total 18 23 33 30 22 13 20 23 17 24 13 17 253 74 65 60 54
Initiations by OCT (71)d ...InternalExternalTotal
Initiations against OCT by ...InternalExternalTotal
Initiations by PTN (73)d againstInternal 14.3 5.9 29.4 5.7 14.1 12.2 18.2 11.5 9.3 14.3 33.3 21.2 15.8 20.0 11.7 11.9 22.6External 85.7 94.1 70.6 94.3 85.9 87.8 81.8 88.5 90.7 85.7 66.7 78.8 84.2 80.0 88.3 88.1 77.4Total 14 17 34 35 78 41 22 61 43 49 42 33 469 65 154 126 124
Initiations against PTN by ...Internal 7.7 2.9 23.3 4.8 28.9 17.9 10.5 25.9 10.5 11.1 33.3 13.2 15.6 12.5 16.7 14.6 17.7External 92.3 97.1 76.7 95.2 71.1 82.1 89.5 74.1 89.5 88.9 66.7 86.8 84.4 87.5 83.3 85.4 82.3Total 26 35 43 42 38 28 38 27 38 63 42 53 473 104 108 103 158
A36
Table A31 continued
89-9
0
90-9
1
91-9
2
92-9
3
93-9
4
94-9
5
95-9
6
96-9
7
97-9
8
98-9
9
99-0
0
00-0
1
All
Yrs
89-9
2
92-9
5
95-9
8
98-0
1
Initiations by SAPTA (95)d against ...Internal 2.7 0.6 1.0External 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 97.3 99.4 100 100 100 99.0Total 5 3 1 9 5 20 11 38 27 37 156 5 13 36 102
Initiations against SAPTA by ...Internal 6.3 0.9 2.6External 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 93.8 99.1 100 100 100 97.4Total 3 6 10 7 16 4 5 10 13 11 11 16 112 19 27 28 38
Initiations by SPARTECA (81)d against ...InternalExternal 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100Total 23 52 89 65 47 15 17 23 40 22 24 25 442 164 127 80 71
Initiations against SPARTECA by ...InternalExternal 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100Total 2 3 2 1 2 3 5 2 20 2 5 3 10
Initiations by TRIPARTITE (68)d against ...Internal 3.2 0.6 0.9External 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 96.8 100 99.4 100 100 100 99.1Total 5 3 1 9 5 20 16 39 31 38 167 5 13 41 108
Initiations against TRIPARTITE by ...Internal 10.0 0.9 2.5External 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 90.0 100 99.1 100 100 100 97.5Total 6 11 8 10 8 4 6 11 13 14 10 16 117 25 22 30 40
Initiations by UEMOA/WAEMU (2000)d against ...InternalExternalTotal
Initiations against UEMOA/WAEMU by ...InternalExternal 100 100 100Total 2 2 2
Initiations by APEC (92)d against ...Internal 55.3 54.5 55.9 48.3 56.3 48.2 74.5 55.9 53.4 57.3 71.4 55.6 55.7 55.3 50.9 58.6 59.8External 44.7 45.5 44.1 51.7 43.8 51.8 25.5 44.1 46.6 42.7 28.6 44.4 44.3 44.7 49.1 41.4 40.2Total 76 132 195 201 144 83 55 93 118 110 84 162 1453 403 428 266 356
Initiations against APEC by ...Internal 85.7 88.9 80.1 80.8 58.7 42.1 48.8 46.4 52.5 40.9 43.2 53.3 58.0 83.8 61.8 49.4 46.1External 14.3 11.1 19.9 19.2 41.3 57.9 51.2 53.6 47.5 59.1 56.8 46.7 42.0 16.2 38.2 50.6 53.9Total 49 81 136 120 138 95 84 112 120 154 139 169 1397 266 353 316 462
aFor full name of RTA see Table ??; for member countries see corresponding appendix tables. – bInternal. – cExternal. – dYear established.
A37
Table A32: List of Abbreviations and Dates of Entry into Force
Abbreviation Declaration Date of entry into force
AFTA ASEAN Free Trade Area 28.01.1992
APEC Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 11.1998
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations 31.08.1977
BAFTA Baltic Free-Trade Area 01.04.1994
BANGKOK Bangkok Agreement 17.06.1976
CAN Andean Community 25.05.1988
CARICOM Caribbean Community and Common Market 01.08.1973
CACM Central American Common Market 12.10.1961
CEFTA Central European Free Trade Agreement 01.03.1993
CEMAC Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa 24.06.1999
CER Closer Trade Relations Trade Agreement 01.01.1983
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States 30.12.1994
COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 08.12.1994
EAC East African Cooperation 01.01.1994
EAEC Eurasian Economic Community 08.10.1997
EC European Community 01.01.1958
ECO Economic Cooperation Organization ??
EEA European Economic Area 01.01.1994
EFTA European Free Trade Association 03.05.1960
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council ??
GSTP General System of Trade Preferences among Developing Countries 19.04.1989
LAIA Latin American Integration Association 18.03.1981
MERCOSUR Southern Common Market 29.11.1991
MSG Melanesian Spearhead Group 22.07.1993
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement 01.01.(4)1994
OCT Overseas Countries and Territories 01.01.1971
PTN Protocol relating to Trade Negotiations among Developing Countries 11.02.1973
SAPTA South Asian Preferential Trade Arrangement 07.12.1995
SPARTECA South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement 01.01.1981
TRIPARTITE Tripartite Agreement 01.04.1968
UEMOA/WAEMU West African Economic and Monetary Union 01.01.2000
A38
