Inequitable Justice Mass Forfeiture

7/31/2019 Inequitable Justice Mass Forfeiture

1/18


2/18

How Federal

Equitable Sharing

Encourages Local Police and ProsecutorsTo Evade State Civil Forfeiture Law

For Financial Gain

By Dick M. Carpenter II, Ph.D., Larry Salzman and Lisa KnepperInstitute for Justice

October 2011


3/18

INEQUITABLEJUSTICE

Civilforfeitureisthegovernmentpower

totakepropertysuspectedofinvolvementinacrime.Unlikecriminalforfeitureusedtotaketheill-gottengainsofcriminalactivityafteracriminalconvictionwithcivilforfeiture,policecantakepropertywithoutsomuchaschargingtheownerwithanywrongdoing. Ownerscaughtupincivilforfeitureproceedingstypicallyhavefewlegalrights,whilepoliceandprosecutorsenjoyalltheadvantages.Worse,moststateandfederallawsawardthelawenforcementagencies

thattakethepropertyatleastacut,ifnotall,oftheproceeds.Tisdirectnancialincentiveandthelimitedsafeguardsforownerscombinetoencouragethetakingofproperty. Equitablesharingmakesthisbadsituationworse.Troughequitablesharing,policeandprosecutorscantakepropertyfromcitizensunderfederalcivilforfeiturelawinsteadoftheirownstatelaws.Fromtheperspectiveoflawenforcement,thisisagooddeal:Federallawmakescivilforfeiturebothrelativelyeasyandrewarding,withas

muchas80percentofproceedsreturnedtotheseizingagency. Tus,withequitablesharing,stateandlocallawenforcementcantakeandprotfrompropertytheymightnotbeabletounderstatelaw.Ifastateprovidesowners

greaterprotectionsorbarslawenforcement

fromdirectlybenetingfromforfeitures,agenciescansimplyturntofederallaw. RecentresearchpublishedintheJournalof Criminal Justiceshowsthisisexactlywhatagenciesdowhenfacedwithstricterandless

generousstateforfeiturelawstheyturntothefedsandkeeponpocketingforfeituremoney. Andtheproblemisgrowingworse.Between2000and2008,equitablesharingpaymentsfromtheU.S.DepartmentofJusticetostateandlocallawenforcementdoubledfromabout$200millionto$400million.Anddatafromtwostates,MassachusettsandCalifornia,indicatethattheseguresunderestimatethetrueextentofequitablesharingnationwide. Forfeiturereformisdesperatelyneeded

atalllevels.Butforstatereformstohavelastingeects,lawenforcementmustnotbeallowedtouseequitablesharingtodisregardstatelaw.Stateandlocallawenforcementshouldhavetofollowstatelaw.

With equitable sharing, state and local law enorcementcan take and proft rom property they might not be able tounder state law.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

hisreportexaminesafederallawenforcementpracticeknownasequitablesharing.Itenablesindeed,encouragesstateandlocalpoliceandprosecutorstocircumventthecivilforfeiturelawsoftheirstatesfornancialgain.


4/18

INEQUITABLEJUSTICE

TeU.S.DrugEnforcementAgency(DEA)andewksburypolicedepartment,however,haveotherplansfortheCaswellsproperty.Usingapowercalledcivilforfeiture,theyaimtotaketheentirepropertyworthmorethanamilliondollarsbecausesomeguestsstayingatthemotelhavebeenarrestedwithdrugs.Since1994,theCaswellshaverentedtheirroomsmorethan125,000times.Yet,becausedrugarrestshavetaken

placeonroughly30occasionsoverthose6,570days,thegovernmentsviewis:Temotelisours. Incredibly,thegovernmentdoesnotclaimthattheCaswellsareguiltyofanycrime.Indeed,theDEAandthelocalpolicehavenevermadeanallegationthattheCaswellshavebeeninvolvedinanyillegalactivityatthemoteloranywhereelseonlythattheyownthepropertyonwhichotherpeoplehavebeenarrestedforcrimes.1Inordinaryterms,theCaswellsareinnocent.Butwithcivilforfeiture,innocentmeanssomethingelseentirely. Civilforfeitureisthegovernmentpowertotakepropertysuspectedofinvolvementinacrime.Itisdierentfromcriminalforfeiture,whichisusedtotakethe

ill-gottengainsofcriminalactivityafteranindividualisactuallyconvictedofacrime.Withcivilforfeiture,policecantakepropertywithoutsomuchaschargingtheownerwithacrime. Ownerscantrytowintheirpropertybackbyraisinganinnocentownerdefense,butthesearedicultclaimstowin.ypically,ownersmustprovethattheydidnotknowoforconsenttotheuseoftheirpropertyaspart

ofcriminalactivityoreven,asunderfederallaw,thattheytookallactionpossibletopreventitsuseinanillegalmanner.Tisputsownersinthedicult,andoftenimpossible,positionofprovingwhattheydidnotknow. Tus,unlesstheCaswellsaresuccessfulinabattleagainsttheoverwhelmingresourcesoftheU.S.DepartmentofJustice(DOJ)toprovetheirinnocence,theywilllosetheirpropertywithoutcompensationandwithoutbeingconvictedoforevenchargedwithanywrongdoing.TisturnstheAmericanidealofinnocentuntilprovenguiltyonitshead. TeCaswellsplightshowstheproblemsthatstemnotonlyfromcivilforfeiturelaws,butalsofromafederal

Unless the Caswells are successful in a battle against the overwhelmingresources of the U.S. Department of Justice to prove their innocence, they willlose their propertywithout compensation and without being convicted of or evencharged with any wrongdoing.

INTRODUCTION

TeMotelCaswellisafamily-ownedbudgetmotelinewksbury,Mass.,30minutesoutsideofBoston.RussellandPatriciaCaswellhaveownedandoperated

themotelfornearly30years,sincetheytookovermanagementfromRussfatherinthe1980s.Teylivenextdoor,raisingtheirgrandsonandtendingtothebusiness.TeCaswellsexpectedthemotel,nowmortgage-free,toprovideanest-eggforretirement.


5/18

INEQUITABLEJUSTICE

programcalledequitablesharing.Withthisprogram,stateandlocallawenforcementcantakepropertyunderfederalcivilforfeiturelawinsteadofstatelaw.Becausefederallawmakesitrelativelyeasyofteneasierthanmanystatelawstoforfeitpropertyandreturnsagenerousshareoftheproceedstothelocalagency,equitablesharingenablesstateandlocallawenforcement

totakepropertytheymightnotbeabletounderstatelaw.Indeed,researchshowsthisisjustwhatagenciesnationwidedo. 2

AnditiswhathashappenedtotheCaswells.TeewksburypolicedonotstandtogetashareoftheproceedsofMotelCaswellunderMassachusettscivilforfeiturelaw,butratherunderfederallaw.Underanequitablesharingagreement,theDOJwillpayasmuchas80percentoftheproceedsfromthemoteldirectlytotheewksburypolice,leavingtheCaswellswithnothingbutthelossanddestructionoftheirlifeswork.NotonlyisitdoubtfulthattheewksburypolicecouldsuccessfullytaketheCaswellspropertyunderMassachusettslaw,butifthey

did,theywouldreceiveonly50percentoftheproceeds. EquitablesharingthusenableslawenforcementagenciestosidestepprotectionsinstatelawforpropertyownerssuchastheCaswells.TeInstituteforJusticehasjoinedwiththeCaswellsandtheirlocalcounselatSchlossberg,LLC,todefendtheirpropertyandarguesthattheCaswellsareinnocentownerswhosepropertyshouldnotbeforfeited. IJisalsochallengingtheequitablesharingprogramitself.IJarguesthatequitablesharingcreatesunconstitutionalincentivesforlocalagenciestocircumventstatelaw,violatingthe10 thAmendmenttotheU.S.Constitution.Whenfederallawpusheslocallaw

enforcementagenciestoadministerfederalforfeiturelawscontrarytostatepolicy,itdeprivesthecitizensofthosestatesandtheirlegislaturetheopportunitytoeectivelyreinincivilforfeitureabuse.

CIVIL FORFEITURE

AND INCENTIVES FOR ABUSE AlthoughitsuseiswidespreadthroughouttheUnitedStates,civilassetforfeitureisnotwidelyrecognizedorunderstood.Incivilforfeiturethegovernmentsuestheproperty,asifthepropertysomehowactedtoassistinthecommissionofacrime.Inthisway,thegovernmentcanseizepropertydespitetheinnocenceofitsowner.TatiswhycivilforfeiturecaseshaveunusualnamessuchasUnited States v. 434 Main Street, Tewksbury,MassachusettsthecaseinvolvingtheCaswells. Underfederallaw,federallawenforcementagencieskeepallofthepropertyandcurrencytheyseizefortheir

exclusiveuse.Tisdirectnancialincentivewasputintofederallawin1985.Beforethen,federalforfeitureproceedswenttothegeneralrevenuefundoftheUnitedStates,andCongressthendecidedhowsuchrevenuewouldbeappropriated.Before1985,forfeiturerevenuewasmodest.Aftertheprotincentivewasputintothelaw,forfeiturerevenueexplodedandithasbeengrowingeversince. AsFigure1shows,thevalueofassetsintheU.S.DepartmentofJusticesAssetForfeitureFund,thefederalgovernmentslargestforfeiturefund,topped$1billionforthersttimein2008.Itnowstandsatmorethan$1.6billion.

$0

$200,000,000

$400,000,000

$600,000,000

$800,000,000

$1,000,000,000

$1,200,000,000

$1,400,000,000

$1,600,000,000

$1,800,000,000

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Figure 1: Net Assets, Department of Justice Asset Forfeiture Fund, 2000-20103


6/18

INEQUITABLEJUSTICE

Followingthefederalgovernmentslead,moststatesalsoallowlawenforcementtokeepsomeorallforfeitureproceeds.Asshowninable1,lawenforcementreceives100percentofforfeitureproceedsin26states,whileanother16allowpoliceandprosecutorstokeepatleast50percent.Onlyeightstatesbartheretentionofforfeituremoniesbylawenforcement.4

Inaddition,thefederalgovernmentandmoststatesshifttheburdenofprooffromthegovernmenttotheownertoprovethatheorsheisinnocentofacrimeinforfeiturecases.Inotherwords,withcivilforfeiture,propertyownersareeectivelyguiltyuntilproveninnocent.Teincreasedburden(includingsubstantiallegalcosts)ofprovingonesinnocencecanresultinownersabandoningrightfulclaimstoseizedproperty.Andifownersdonotghtcivilforfeitureandthegovernmentwinsbydefault,lawenforcementagenciesaremorelikelytoengageinit. able2listsstatesaccordingtotheburdentheyplaceoninnocentowners.Inonlysixstatesmustgovernment

proveguilttoforfeitanytypeofproperty.In38states,ownersmustestablishtheirinnocence.Intheothersixstates,theburdendependsonthetypeofproperty. Stateandfederallawsalsomakecivilforfeitureharderonpropertyownersbyestablishingalowerstandardofproof underwhichthegovernmentcantaketheproperty.Testandardofproofinacriminalproceedingisbeyondareasonabledoubt.Tatis,thestatemustdemonstratetothejurythatevidenceshowsbeyondareasonabledoubttheaccusedindividualcommittedacrime.Tishighstandardexiststoprotecttherightsofinnocentindividualswhomightbeaccusedofacrime.

able3showsthestandardsofproofrequiredtoforfeitpropertyundercivilforfeiturelawsinall50states.Onlythreestatesdemandthatthegovernmentshowbeyondareasonabledoubtthatthepropertywaspartofacriminalact.Moststates,27,usealowerpreponderanceoftheevidencestandardbasically,thegovernmentmustshowitismorelikelythannotthatthepropertywasrelatedtocriminalconduct.Tisisalsothestandardinfederallaw.

Table 1: Proceeds Distributed to Law Enforcement Under State Civil Forfeiture Laws

0% Indiana,Maine,Maryland,Missouri,NorthCarolina,NorthDakota,Ohio,Vermont

50% Colorado,Wisconsin

60% Connecticut,NewYork

63% Oregon

65% California

75% Nebraska

80% Louisiana,Mississippi

85% Florida

90% Illinois,Minnesota,NewHampshire,RhodeIsland,exas

95% SouthCarolina

100% Alaska,Alabama,Arkansas,Arizona,Delaware,Georgia,Hawaii,Idaho,Iowa,Kansas,Kentucky,Massachusetts,Michigan,Montana,Nevada,NewJersey,NewMexico,Oklahoma,Pennsylvania,SouthDakota,ennessee,Utah,Virginia,Washington,WestVirginia,Wyoming

Table 2: Innocent Owner Burden in State Civil Forfeiture Laws

Owner

mustproveinnocence

Alaska,Arizona,Arkansas,Connecticut,Delaware,Georgia,Hawaii,Idaho,Illinois,Iowa,Louisiana,Maryland,Massachusetts,Minnesota,Mississippi,Missouri,Montana,Nebraska,Nevada,

NewHampshire,NewJersey,NewYork,NorthCarolina,NorthDakota,Ohio,Oklahoma,Pennsylvania,RhodeIsland,SouthCarolina,SouthDakota,ennessee,exas,Vermont,Virginia,Washington,WestVirginia,Wisconsin,Wyoming

Dependsonproperty

Alabama,Indiana,Kentucky,Maine,NewMexico,Utah

Governmentmustproveguilt

California,Colorado,Florida,Kansas,Michigan,Oregon


7/18

INEQUITABLEJUSTICE

Tesethreefeaturesofmoderncivilforfeiturelawencourageabusebymakingtheprocessrelativelyeasy

forlawenforcementanddicultforpropertyownerstodefendagainstandbyprovidingpoliceandprosecutorsadirectnancialincentivetopursueproperty.

FEDERAL EQUITABLE SHARING

Asbadasmoststateandfederallawsare,thefederalequitablesharingprogrammakesthingsevenworse.Equitablesharingisapolicybywhichthefederalgovernmentandlocallawenforcementagenciescansharetheproceedsofaforfeiturethatisprosecutedbythefederalgovernmentafterbeingbroughttoitsattentionby

alocalagency.UnderthefederalComprehensiveCrimeControlActof1984,stateandlocallawenforcementagenciesmayworktogethertoinitiatefederalforfeitureactionsaslongastheconductgivingrisetotheseizureisinviolationoffederallaw,suchaswhenaguestatamotelisarrestedforcertaindrugcrimes. Equitablesharingagreementscanbeusedtoprocessanddividetheproceedsofpropertyseizedduringjointoperationsinvolvingmultiplelawenforcementagencies.Tefederalgovernmenttakesovertheproperty,handlestheforfeiturecaseandthendistributestheproceedstoeachagencyaccordingtotheirroleinthejointeort.

Morecontroversially,thefederalgovernmentcanalsoadoptpropertyfromastateorlocalagencyforforfeiture.

Inadoptiveforfeitures,relativelylaxfederalstandardsapplyandstateandlocalagenciesreceive80percentofproceedsevenifstatelawisstricterandlessgenerous.Tus,evenifstatelawoersstrongprotectionstopropertyownersandbarslawenforcementfromkeepingwhattheyforfeit,stateandlocalagenciescanuseequitablesharingtocircumventthoserulesandtakeandkeeppropertyanyway. InMassachusetts,forinstance,stateandlocallawenforcementagentsarelimitedtoseizingpropertythatwas

usedinandforthebusinessofunlawfullymanufacturing,dispensing,ordistributingcontrolledsubstances.5Tiscontrastswiththefederallaw,inwhichfederalagentscanseizepropertythatmerelyfacilitatesadrugcrimeafar-reachingstandardthatcouldallowthegovernmenttoseizearentalcar,forinstance,ifitwasusedbysomeonewhohappenedtobecarryingdrugsonthem.AlthoughitisstillrelativelyeasytoseizepropertyinMassachusettsas

Table 3: Standard of Proof in State Civil Forfeiture Laws*

PrimaFacie/ProbableCauseAlabama,Alaska,Delaware,Illinois,Massachusetts,Missouri,Montana,RhodeIsland,SouthCarolina,Wyoming

ProbableCauseandPreponderanceoftheEvidence

Georgia,NorthDakota,SouthDakota,Washington

PreponderanceoftheEvidence

Arizona,Arkansas,Hawaii,Idaho,Indiana,Iowa,Kansas,Louisiana,Maine,Maryland,Michigan,Mississippi,NewHampshire,NewJersey,Oklahoma,Pennsylvania,ennessee,exas,Virginia,WestVirginia

PreponderanceoftheEvidenceandClearandConvincing

Kentucky,NewYork,Oregon

ClearandConvincingColorado,Connecticut,Florida,Minnesota,Nevada,NewMexico,Ohio,Utah,Vermont

ClearandConvincingandBeyondaReasonableDoubt

California

BeyondaReasonableDoubt Nebraska,NorthCarolina**,Wisconsin

*Mostcommonly,instateswithtwoforfeiturestandards,thehigheroneisfortheforfeitureofrealproperty.

**Statelaweectivelydoesnothavecivilforfeiture.

Moredifculttoforfeita

ssets

In adoptive oreitures, relatively lax ederal standards applyand state and local agencies receive 80 percent o proceedseven i state law is stricter and less generous.


8/18

INEQUITABLEJUSTICE

secureforfeiturefunds. Asshowninables1through3,Holcombandhiscolleaguescategorizedthecivilforfeiturelawsofall50

statesaccordingtoprotmotive,innocentownerburdenandstandardofproof. Fromtheperspectiveofstateandlocallawenforcement,federalcivilforfeiturelawisfairlyeasyandgenerouscomparedtomanystates.Federallawplacestheburdenofestablishinginnocenceonowners,setsthestandardofproofatpreponderanceoftheevidenceandthroughequitablesharingwillreturnasmuchas80percentofproceedstolawenforcement. Holcombandcolleaguesexaminedhowthese

threedimensionsofstatecivilforfeiturelawscorrelatewithequitablesharingpaymentstostateandlocallawenforcementagencies.7Teirresultsareclear:Agenciesinstateswherecivilforfeitureismoredicultandlessgenerousreceivemoreequitablesharingdollars.

comparedtosomestates,statelawplacesagreaterlimitonlawenforcementagenciesthanfederallaw. Further,underMassachusettslawpolicemaykeep

only50percentoftheproceedsofforfeitedproperty;theother50percentgoestoprosecutors.However,underanequitablesharingagreement,localpolicecanreceiveasmuchas80percentofproceeds.FortheewksburypoliceintheCaswellscase,thedierencecouldbehundredsofthousandsofdollars.

CIRCUMVENTING STATE LAW

TeCaswellscaseshowshowlocalpolicecantakeadvantageoffederalequitablesharingtosecureforfeitureproceedstheymightnotbeabletounderstatelaw.But

doesequitablesharingencouragestateandlocallawenforcementtoevadestatecivilforfeiturelaws?Teevidencesaysyes. Ina2011studypublishedintheJournal of CriminalJustice,researchersJeersonHolcomb,omislavKovandzicandMarianWilliamsexaminedtherelationshipbetweenstatecivilforfeiturelawsandequitablesharingreceiptsbystateandlocallawenforcement.6Teyfoundthatinstateswherecivilforfeitureismoredicultandlessrewarding,lawenforcementagenciestakeinmoreequitablesharingdollars.Inotherwords,policeandprosecutorsuseequitablesharingasaneasierandmoreprotablewayto

Under an equitable sharing agreement, local police can receive as much as 80 percent of proceeds.For the Tewksbury police in the Caswells case, the difference could be hundreds of thousands of dollars.

Research ound that in states where civil oreiture is more

difcult and less rewarding, law enorcement agencies takein more equitable sharing dollars. In other words, police andprosecutors use equitable sharing as an easier and moreproftable way to secure oreiture unds.


9/18

INEQUITABLEJUSTICE

First,theHolcombanalysisfoundthatallthree

aspectsofstatecivilforfeiturelawindependentlyimpactthesizeofequitablesharingpayments.

Prot motive:Agenciesinlessgenerousstatesuseequitablesharingmore.Figure2illustratesthiseectforanaverage-sizedlawenforcementagency,oneservingabout300,000people:Each25percentagepointdecreaseinagencyshareofforfeitureproceedsunderstatelawincreasesequitablesharingpaymentsunderfederallawby$6,000.

Tus,anaverage-sizedagencyinastatethatallotsnoforfeitureproceedstolawenforcementwouldbe

expectedtotakein$24,000moreinequitablesharingpaymentsthanasimilaragencyinastatewitha100percentprotmotive.Giventhatanaverage-sizedagencyreceivesabout$120,000inequitablesharingpaymentsannually,anadditional$24,000wouldrepresenta20percentincrease.

Innocent owner burden:Placingtheburdentoshowguiltonthegovernmentwhichistosay,makingforfeitureharderforlawenforcementleadstomoreequitablesharing.Anaverage-sizedagencyinapresumedinnocentstatewouldbeexpectedtotakein$12,840moreinequitablesharingpaymentsthanasimilaragencyinapresumedguiltystate.Tisrepresentsa10percentincreaseinequitablesharingforanaverage-sizedagency.

Standard of proof:Agenciesinstatesthatrequirehigherstandardsofproofforcivilforfeitureagain,makingforfeituremoredicultreceivemoreequitablesharingpayments.AsshowninFigure3,

raisingthestandardofproofbyonelevelisassociatedwithanincreaseinequitablesharingpaymentsof$5,370foranaverage-sizedagency,orabouta4.5percentincrease.

$0

$6,000

$12,000

$18,000

$24,000

75% 50% 25% 0%

Share of Forfeiture Proceeds Kept by Law Enforcement

Under State Law

Figure 2: Rise in Equitable Sharing Dollars for an Average-Sized Law Enforcement

Agency as Share of Forfeiture Proceeds Under State Law Declines from 100 Percent


10/18

INEQUITABLEJUSTICE

Notonlydoallthreeaspectsofstateforfeiturelawindependentlyaecttheequitablesharingactivityofstateandlocallawenforcement,theyalsoactinconcert.Inotherwords,Holcombandcolleaguesfoundthatmakingforfeituremoredicultandlessrewardingleadstogreateruseoffederallaw.Specically:

Whenstatessethigherstandardsofproofandprovidesmallersharesofproceedsmakingforfeiturebothharderandlessrewardingagenciesengageinmoreequitablesharing.

Iftheburdenofproofisonowners,raisingtheshareofproceedsreturnedtolawenforcementreducesuseofequitablesharing,asonewouldexpect.However,iftheburdenofproofisonthegovernment,makingforfeituremoredicult,agencieswillturnmoretoequitablesharingeven if the prot motive increasesunderstatelaw.Tissuggeststhatplacingtheburdenongovernmenttodemonstrateguiltisasignicant

impedimentforlawenforcement.

Raisingthestandardofproofleadstolargerincreasesinequitablesharingwhenownersarepresumedinnocentthanwhentheyarepresumedguilty.Tesetwoproceduralbarrierstoforfeitureworktogethertoencouragemoreequitablesharing.

Importantly,allofthesendingsheldtrueandevenbecamestrongerwhenHolcombandcolleaguescontrolledforvariousfactorsthatcouldmuddyresults,suchasdrugarrestsandviolentcrimerates.8Tismeans

thatagenciesarenotengaginginmoreequitablesharingbecausetheyfacealargerdrugorcrimeproblemthanotheragencies,butbecausetheyfacedierentincentivesunderstatelaw.aketwopolicedepartmentsalikeinsize,mission,crimeratesandsoon.Oneisinastatewitheasyandgenerousforfeiturelaws.Teotherisinastatethatmakesforfeituredicultandlessrewarding.Tesecond

willengageinmoreequitablesharingthantherst. TeHolcombresultsshowthatwhenmakingdecisionsabouthowtoconductforfeitures,stateandlocallawenforcementconsiderboththerelativeeaseoftheprocessandthepossibilityofnancialreward.Tisiscompellingevidencethatpursuitofprotisakeymotivatorincivilforfeiture.

TeHolcombresultsalsoaccordwithotherresearch.AnearlieranalysisofequitablesharingpaymentsandstatelawsbyKovandzicandJohnWorrallreachedasimilarconclusion.9AndastudybyCharlesKucheralsofoundthatstricterstatelawsareassociatedwithmoreequitablesharing,thoughitdidnotndastatisticallysignicanteectfromtheshareofproceedsreturnedtolawenforcement.10

Figure 3: Rise in Equitable Sharing Dollars for an Average-Sized LawEnforcement Agency as State Standard of Proof Becomes Stricter

When making decisions about how to conduct oreitures,state and local law enorcement consider both the relativeease o the process and the possibility o fnancial reward.

This is compelling evidence that pursuit o proft is a keymotivator in civil oreiture.


11/18

INEQUITABLEJUSTICE

IntheirJournal of Criminal Justicearticle,Holcomb,KovandzicandWilliamshighlightsomeoftheconcernstheirndingsraise:

Tedependencyofpoliceonpublicresourcesfortheiroperationsisanimportantcheckonpolicepower.Self-generatingrevenuesbythepolicethroughforfeiturepotentiallythreatenstheabilityofpopularlyelectedocialstoconstrainpoliceactivities.Perhapssuchconcernspartiallyexplainthedierencesinstatelaws.Ifthelegislatorsandthepublicwishedforforfeituretobeveryeasyandrewardingtolawenforcement,everystatewouldhavelowstandardsofproof,limitedinnocentownerprotections,andallproceedswouldgoexclusivelytothepolice.11

Ofcourse,noteverystatemakesforfeitureeasyand

rewarding.Butthroughfederalequitablesharing,stateandlocallawenforcementcancircumventstringentstatelawstosecureforfeituremoniesanyway.

GRADING THE STATES

A2010report,Policing for Prot: e Abuse of CivilAsset Forfeiture,12gradedstatelawsaccordingtohowwelltheyrespectpropertyrights.Lawsthatsethighstandardsforforfeitureandreturnsmallsharesornoshareofforfeitureproceedstolawenforcementearnedhighmarks.

Buttheselawgradestellonlyhalfthestory.AsHolcombandothershaveshown,agenciescananddouseequitablesharingtocircumventgoodlaws.SoPolicing for Protcreatedevasiongrades,essentiallyrankingthestatesaccordingtohowmuchtheyengageinequitablesharing,13andthencombinedlawandevasiongradesintoanalgradeforeachstate. able6ranksstatesaccordingtotheirevasiongrade,andalsonotestheirlawandnalgrades.Lookingatequitablesharingalone,theworststatesareCalifornia,Georgia,NewYork,Ohioandexas,allofwhichreceivedFevasiongrades.Florida,Illinois,Michigan,NorthCarolina,VirginiaandWestVirginiaarenotfarbehind

withevasiongradesofD.Bycontrast,Delaware,Idaho,Maine,NorthDakota,SouthDakotaandWyomingseerelativelylittleequitablesharing. Teevasionandlawgradesaregenerallyconsistentwithresearchndings:Stateswithstricterlawstendtoseemoreequitablesharing.Forexample,onlyeightstatesearnedlawgradesofBorbetter.Fiveofthosestatesearnedaverageorbelow-averageevasiongrades.NorthCarolinaandOhiostandoutasstateswithfairlystronglaws(gradedA-andB+),butverypoorevasiongrades(DandF). CaliforniaandNewYorkalsoshowedsharpdisparitiesbetweenstatelawgradesandequitablesharingactivities.

Table 6: State Forfeiture Grades, ranked by Evasion Grade

EvasionGrade LawGrade FinalGrade

Maine A B+ A-

NorthDakota A B B+

Idaho A D- C

SouthDakota A D- C

Delaware A F C

Wyoming A F C

Vermont B B+ B

Connecticut B C+ C+

Oregon B C C+

Louisiana B D C-

Minnesota B D C

RhodeIsland B D C-

Utah B D- C-

Alaska B F D+

Montana B F D+

SouthCarolina B F D+

Iowa C D- D

Maryland C B C+

Missouri C B C+

Colorado C C+ C

Nebraska C C C

Wisconsin C C C

Indiana C B+ C+

Mississippi C D D+

NewHampshire C D D+

Alabama C D- D

Arizona C D- DArkansas C D- D

Hawaii C D- D

Kansas C D- D

Kentucky C D- D

Nevada C D- D+

NewJersey C D- D

NewMexico C D- D+

Oklahoma C D- D

Pennsylvania C D- D

ennessee C D- D

Washington C D- D

Massachusetts C F DNorthCarolina D A- C+

Florida D D+ D

Illinois D D- D

Michigan D D- D-

Virginia D D- D-

WestVirginia D D- D-

Ohio F B+ C-

California F C+ D

NewYork F C- D

exas F D D-

Georgia F D- D-


12/18

INEQUITABLEJUSTICE

TeDOJsAssetForfeitureFundisthelargestfederalforfeiturefund,14anditsreportingonequitablesharingpaymentsprovidesaconsistentpictureofequitablesharingactivityacrosstimeandacrossstates.However,itisnottheonlysourceforequitablesharingfunding.StateandlocalagenciescanalsosecureequitablesharingrevenuefromtheDepartmentofreasury,otherfederalsources,othernon-federalagenciesandinterestincome.Tus,theDOJdataunderestimatetheextentofequitablesharingactivity.

Foramorecompletepictureofequitablesharingactivity,wemadeFreedomofInformationAct(FOIA)requestsoftheDOJforannualagency-levelequitablesharingreportsfortwosamplestates:MassachusettsandCalifornia.Eachyear,participatingagenciesmustsubmita

CaliforniaearnedaslightlyaboveaveragelawgradeofC+butisthemost-activestateforequitablesharing.NewYorkslawsearnedagradeofC-,poorbutbetterthan35states;thestateearnedanFforevasion. Attheoppositeendofthespectrum,sixstatesearnedgradesofFfortheirlawsalone.Tesearethestateswiththeworstlawsandthereforetheleastincentivetoparticipateinequitablesharing.Andinfact,veofthosestatesearnedaBorbetterevasiongrade,showingrelativelylittleequitablesharing.Massachusetts,theloneexception,receivedaCevasiongrade. AhandfulofstatesIllinois,Michigan,Virginia,

WestVirginia,GeorgiaandFloridahavebothbadstatelawsandconsiderableequitablesharingactivity.

EQUITABLE SHARING ON THE RISE

Stateandlocallawenforcementareusingequitablesharingmorethanever.Te Policing for ProtreportchartsthegrowthofequitablesharingpaymentsfromtheDOJsAssetsForfeitureFundtostateandlocallawenforcement.AsFigure4shows,thesepaymentsdoubledfromabout$200millionin2000to$400millionin2008.

$0

$50,000,000

$100,000,000

$150,000,000

$200,000,000

$250,000,000

$300,000,000

$350,000,000

$400,000,000

$450,000,000

FY 2000 FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008

Figure 4: Equitable Sharing Payments to States from the Department of Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund, 2000 to 2008

The Policing or Proftreport charts the growth o equitablesharing payments rom the DOJs Assets Foreiture Fund tostate and local law enorcement. These payments doubledrom about $200 million in 2000 to $400 million in 2008.


13/18

INEQUITABLEJUSTICE

reportinwhichtheyindicatehowmuchequitablesharingfundingtheyreceivedfromallsources,howmuchtheyspentandwhattypesofexpenditurestheymade.TesedataalsoshowequitablesharingontheriseandtheyrevealmorerevenuegeneratedthroughtheprogramthantheDOJdataalone. able4showsthetotalequitablesharingfundsreceivedbylawenforcementagenciesinMassachusettsandCaliforniafortheyearsforwhichwehaveagency-levelreports.15Fromthelowin2002,Massachusettsagencieshaveconsistently,albeitunevenly,takeningreateramountsofequitablesharingfunds,andfundsreceived

morethandoubledfrom2002to2010,asshowninFigure

Table 4: Equitable Sharing Funds Received by Law Enforcement Agencies in Massachusetts and California

Massachusetts California

2001 $5,109,275 NA

2002 $2,272,184 $31,048,184

2003 $3,518,571 $28,061,106

2004 $3,299,339 $34,501,468

2005 $8,023,267 $41,533,361

2006 $3,881,541 $47,774,115

2007 $5,189,510 $57,776,804

2008 $7,009,598 $117,556,365

2009 $5,356,407 $138,346,184

2010 $4,938,971 NA

otal $48,598,663 $496,597,587

AverageperYear $4,859,866 $62,074,698

5.Moreover,thesedatarevealmoreactivitythanDOJpaymentsalone.In2010,forinstance,Massachusettsagenciesreceived$2,375,152inequitablesharingpaymentsfromtheDOJ,16but$4,938,971fromallsources. ForCaliforniaagencies,equitablesharingreceiptshaveconsistentlygrownovertime,withaparticularlylargejumpbetween2007and2008,asshowninFigure6.From2002to2009,equitablesharingreceiptsmorethanquadrupledforCaliforniaagencies.AndaswithMassachusetts,datafromtheagency-levelreportsrevealmoreequitablesharingactivity:$59,308,447fromtheDOJin2009,17comparedto$138,346,184fromall

sources.

$0

$1,000,000

$2,000,000

$3,000,000

$4,000,000

$5,000,000

$6,000,000

$7,000,000

$8,000,000

$9,000,000

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Police

Sheriff

Task Force

Prosecutor

Other

Agency Total

Figure 5: Equitable Sharing Funds Received by Agency, 2001-2010, Massachusetts


14/18

INEQUITABLEJUSTICE

$0

$20,000,000

$40,000,000

$60,000,000

$80,000,000

$100,000,000

$120,000,000

$140,000,000

$160,000,000

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Total

Police

Sheriff

Task Force

Prosecutor

Other

Inthe10yearsfrom2001to2010,Massachusettslawenforcementagenciestookin$48.5millionthroughequitablesharing,asshowninable1.Overeightyears,from2002to2009,Californialawenforcementagenciestookin$496.5millionthroughequitablesharing.Massachusettsagencieshavetakeninanaverageof$4,859,866annually,whiletheannualaverageforCaliforniais$62,074,698.

Atrstglance,itappearsthatCaliforniapoliceandprosecutorsengageinagreatdealmoreequitablesharingthantheirMassachusettscounterparts.However,thedierencecouldsimplybeduetoCaliforniasmuchlargerpopulation.Terefore,tocomparethestatesmoredirectly,westandardizedthedatabyconvertingtheequitablesharingnumbersintopercapitareceipts,asshowninable5and

Figure 6: Equitable Sharing Funds Received by Agency, 2002-2009, California

Figure7.Wealsousedonlytheyears2002to2009,since2001and2010werenotavailableforCalifornia.Asthetotalsrowsindicate,CaliforniaalmostalwaystookingreateramountsofequitablesharingpercapitathanMassachusetts,theoneexceptionbeing2005.Inlateryears,CaliforniasnumberssubstantiallyoutpacedthoseinMassachusetts. Tistrendisalsopresentwhencomparingagencytypes,exceptforprosecutors.Inthecaseofthelatter,

MassachusettsprosecutorsconsistentlyreceivedmoreinequitablesharingreceiptspercapitathanthoseinCalifornia. Althoughthiscomparisonlooksatonlytwostates,itisconsistentwithnationalresearchndingssuchasthosebyHolcombandhiscolleagues,asCaliforniaplacesstricterstandardsonforfeitureandreturnsasmallershareofproceedstolawenforcementthanMassachusetts.

Table 5: Equitable Sharing Per Capita 2002-2009, Massachusetts and California

Massachusetts

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Police 0.26 0.44 0.28 0.89 0.50 0.61 0.71 0.55

Sheri 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04

askForce 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00

Prosecutor 0.08 0.08 0.20 0.30 0.06 0.16 0.33 0.23

Other 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

Total 0.35 0.55 0.51 1.25 0.60 0.80 1.08 0.81

California

Police 0.38 0.45 0.46 0.56 0.66 0.69 1.51 2.01

Sheri 0.31 0.2 0.26 0.22 0.27 0.35 0.62 0.62

askForce 0.13 0.06 0.11 0.30 0.19 0.37 0.72 0.62

Prosecutor 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.05 0.11 0.18

Other 0.03 0.05 0.11 0.05 0.10 0.11 0.24 0.31

Total 0.88 0.79 0.96 1.15 1.31 1.58 3.20 3.74


15/18

INEQUITABLEJUSTICE

CONCLUSION

Neitherthefederalgovernmentnormoststatesoertheircitizensmuchprotectionfromforfeitureabuse.Lowlegalstandardsforlawenforcement,combinedwithplacingtheburdentoprovetheirowninnocenceonpropertyowners,putpeoplecaughtupincivilforfeitureproceedingsataseriousdisadvantage.Tenancialincentivesbuiltintostateandfederallawsaddfueltotherebyencouragingpoliceandprosecutorstopursueproperty,evenattheexpenseofotherlawenforcementpriorities. Tefederalgovernmentsequitablesharingprogram

makesthisbadsituationworse.Itensuresthatevenifstatesraisethebarandlowerincentivesforcivilforfeiture,lawenforcementcancircumventtheselimits.Indeed,researchshowsthisisexactlywhatpoliceandprosecutorsdowhenfacedwithstricterandlessgenerousforfeiture

Figure 7: California Per Capita Equitable Sharing Outpaces Massachusetts

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Massachusetts

California

lawstheyturntothefedsandkeeponpocketingforfeituremoney. Tatiscompellingevidencenotonlyoftheproblemcreatedbyequitablesharing,butalsothatincentivesmattertolawenforcement.Whendecisionsaremadeaboutcivilforfeiture,theeaseoftheprocessandthepossibilityofnancialrewardarekeyfactors.Butallowinglawenforcementtoself-generaterevenueunderminesdemocraticcontrols,distortslawenforcementprioritiesandputsthepropertyofinnocentcitizensliketheCaswellsatrisk.

oprotectinnocentcitizensandensuretheimpartialadministrationofjustice,forfeiturereformisdesperatelyneededatalllevels.Butforstatereformstohavelastingeects,lawenforcementmustnotbeallowedtouseequitablesharingtodisregardstatelaw.


16/18

INEQUITABLEJUSTICE

ENDNOTES

1 SeeCompl.forForfeitureIn Rem,United States v. 434 Main Street,No.09-

11635-RGS(D.Mass.Sept.29,2009).2 Holcomb,J.E.,Kovandzic,.V.,&Williams,M.R.(2011).Civilasset

forfeiture,equitablesharing,andpolicingforprotintheUnitedStates.Journalof Criminal Justice, 39,273-285.

3 Williams,M.R.,Holcomb,J.E.,Kovandzic,.V.,&Bullock,S.(2010).Policingforprot:theabuseofcivilassetforfeiture.Arlington,VA:InstituteforJustice.

4 Dataforables1through3comefromHolcombetal.,2011,andWilliamsetal.,2010.

5 Mass.Ann.Stat.94c47(c)(3).

6 Holcombetal.,2011.TisarticleupdatesanearlieranalysisreportedinWilliams,etal.,2010.

7 Holcombandcolleaguesdrewonanationwidesampleof536lawenforcementagenciesandexaminedequitablesharingpaymentsfrom2000to2004,averagingpaymentsacrosstheve-yearperiodtosmoothoutanyatypicallylargeorsmallannualpayments.Teyalsodividedeachagencysve-yearaveragebythesizeofthepopulationitserves,arrivingatapercapitameasureofequitablesharingpayments,sothatthemeasureisnotskewedbylargeragencies.Forfurtherdetailsonmethods,seeHolcomb,etal.,2011.

8 Foralistofallcontrolvariablesandtheireectsontheanalysis,seeHolcomb,2011.

9 Worrall,J.,&Kovandzic,.(2008).Ispolicingforprot?Answersfromassetforfeiture.Criminology and Public Policy, 7,219-244.

10 Kucher,C.(2005). Asset forfeiture: State restrictions and equitable sharing.MastersTesis,UniversityofNewHampshire,Durham,NH.

11Holcombetal.,2011,p.283.

12Williams,etal.,2010.

13Tisgradewascreatedinamulti-stepprocess.First,athree-yearaverageofequitablesharingwascreatedusingdatafrom2005,2006and2007.Second,theequitablesharingtotalsforeachstatewereadjusted,orstandardized,bydividingeachstatesequitablesharingtotalbyitsaveragerateofdrugarrestsfor2005,2006and2007,takenfromtheFBIsUniformCrimeReport.(Drugarrestratereectsthenumberofdrugarrestsper1,000peopleinthepopulation.)Tird,becausetheadjustedequitablesharingdistribution

wasskewed,thedataweretransformedintonaturallogstonormalizethedistribution.Fourth,theloggeddataweretransformedintoz-scoresandgradesassignedwherez-scoresoflessthan-1.5=A,-1.5to-.5=B;-.5to.5=C;.5to

1.5=D;andgreaterthan1.5=F.

14Eachyearfrom2000to2008,theDOJsforfeiturefundcontainedroughlytwicetheassetsasthereasuryDepartmentsfund.SeeWilliamsetal.,2010,p.32.

15CaliforniaandMassachusettsdatawererequestedfromtheDOJatdierenttimesandfordierentpurposes,resultinginaslightlydierentcoverageof

years.

16U.S.DepartmentofJustice.(2010).Massachusetts.RetrievedJuly1,2011,fromhttp://www.justice.gov/jmd/afp/02fundreport/2010ar/states/massachusetts.htm.

17U.S.DepartmentofJustice.(2009).California.RetrievedJuly1,2011,fromhttp://www.justice.gov/jmd/afp/02fundreport/2009ar/states/california.htm.


17/18

INEQUITABLEJUSTICE

LISA KNEPPER

LisaKnepperisadirectorofstrategicresearchat

theInstituteforJustice,helpingtomanageandcreatepolicyandsocialscienceresearchonissuescentraltoIJsmissionschoolchoice,privatepropertyrights,economiclibertyandfreespeech. Previously,KnepperservedastheInstitutesDirectorofCommunications,securingnewscoverageinoutletsnationwide,includinge New York Times,e Wall StreetJournal,Newsweek,USA Today,CBSEvening NewsandNationalPublicRadio. BeforejoiningIJ,KnepperworkedatHillandKnowlton,servedasamediarelationsandpromotionsadviserforentertainmentandtechnologycompanies,

andwasaprogramcoordinatorattheInstituteforHumaneStudies.KneppergraduatedfromTeOhioStateUniversity,withadegreeinpoliticalscienceandeconomics.

DICK M. CARPENTER II, PH.D.

DickM.CarpenterIIservesasadirectorofstrategicresearchfortheInstituteforJustice.HeworkswithIJstaandattorneystodene,implementandmanagesocialscienceresearchrelatedtotheInstitutesmission. Asanexperiencedresearcher,Carpenterhaspresentedandpublishedonavarietyoftopicsrangingfromeducationalpolicytothedynamicsofpresidentialelections.Hisworkhasappearedinacademicjournals,suchasRegulation and Governance,Economic DevelopmentQuarterly,Independent Review,Urban Studies,Journal ofSpecial Education,e Forum,Education and Urban Society,Journal of School ChoiceandLeadership,andmagazines,suchasRegulation,Phi Delta Kappanandthe American School

Board Journal.Teresultsofhisresearchhavebeenquotedinnewspapers,includingtheWall Street Journal,Chronicle ofHigher Education,Denver Post,Education WeekandtheRockyMountain News. CarpentersresearchforIJhasresultedinreportssuchasDisclosure Costs: Unintended Consequences of CampaignFinance Reform,Designing Cartels: How Industry Insiders CutOut Competition,Victimizing the Vulnerable: e Demographicsof Eminent Domain AbuseandDoomsday No Way: EconomicTrendsand Post-Kelo Eminent Doman Reform. BeforeworkingwithIJ,Carpenterworkedasahighschoolteacher,elementaryschoolprincipal,publicpolicyanalystandprofessorattheUniversityofColorado,

ColoradoSprings.HeholdsaPh.D.fromtheUniversityofColorado.

LARRY SALZMAN

LarrySalzmanisastaattorneywiththeInstituteforJustice.HejoinedtheInstituteinApril2011andlitigatescutting-edgeconstitutionalcasesprotectingindividualrights,includingfreespeech,propertyrights,andeconomicliberties,infederalandstatecourts.HeisoriginallyfromSanDiego. Hiscommitmenttobothentrepreneurshipandlaw

isreectedinhiscareerpriortojoiningIJ.Salzmanco-foundedanecommercecompanywithhisfamilyin2000,whileattendinglawschoolatnight,andreturnedtothebusinessforseveralyearsasCEOuponitssalein2007.Duringtheinterim,hewasanattorneywithPacicLegalFoundation,inSacramento,Calif.,litigatingpropertyrightscasesinfederalandstatecourts,andservedasaclerktoJudgeBohdanA.FuteyontheU.S.CourtofFederalClaims. Salzmanreceivedhislawdegreein2002fromtheUniversityofSanDiego,wherehewasAssistantEditoroftheSan Diego Law Review.HereceivedanundergraduatedegreeinFinancefromArizonaStateUniversityin1993.

AUTHORS


18/18

Documents

Inequitable Justice Mass Forfeiture