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In the House of Rimmon: British Aid tothe Soviet Union, June–September 1941Avram Lytton aa King's College LondonPublished online: 14 Nov 2013.

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Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 26:673–704, 2013Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLCISSN: 1351-8046 print/1556-3006 onlineDOI: 10.1080/13518046.2013.844538

In the House of Rimmon: British Aid to theSoviet Union, June–September 1941

AVRAM LYTTONKing’s College London

British efforts to aid the Soviet Union in the early months of thewar in the East are underexplored and simplified in the historiog-raphy of Allied supply to the Soviet Union during the Second WorldWar. In fact, British leaders recognized within weeks of the Germaninvasion that the Eastern Front was the most important front inthe war against Nazi Germany and that the Soviets were likely tocontinue to resist for a long time. Britain then became increas-ingly committed to supplying the Soviets with material aid. Despitethe difficulties involved, and Soviet uncooperativeness, British aidprior to the Moscow Supply Conference was substantial and rel-atively swift. The expansion of aid into a large-scale effort, laterestablished on a lend-lease basis, had its origins in the evolution ofBritish assessments and priorities over the summer of 1941.

INTRODUCTION

Until the German invasion of the Soviet Union and the advent of Britishaid to Russia, Anglo-Soviet relations had been a continual work in progress,climbing to something of a minor peak before falling into another valley.However, Hitler’s attack on the USSR in June 1941 raised the question of howfar to aid the Soviets, whom the British disliked and distrusted, and whoseability to resist German military might was widely questioned. Ultimately,Germany failed to destroy the Soviet Union in 1941 and it became therecipient of aid from the West. For many years, the consensus on the signif-icance of western aid followed the Soviet emphasis on the domestic origin

Avram Lytton graduated from the University of Calgary with BA and MA degrees in historyand is currently undertaking PhD research at King’s College London (War Studies). This, hisfirst journal article, is based on his MA thesis.

Address correspondence to Avram Lytton, 2347 Uxbridge Drive, NW, Calgary, ABT2N3Z8, Canada. E-mail: avraml@shaw.ca

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of most weapon systems (anywhere from 88–98 percent depending on thecategory).1 It has, however, become popular in recent years, even amongsome Russian historians, to rehabilitate the contribution of the Western Alliesto the Soviet war effort in certain areas, particularly motor transport andother logistical aspects.2 Such works, however, focus on the period of lend-lease following the Moscow supply conference of September/October 1941,or on the diplomacy and politics of the Anglo-American relationship with theSoviet Union. The earlier period remains neglected and foreign aid frequentlywritten off.3

Recently, however, Alexander Hill has argued that the British contri-bution of material to the Soviets in late 1941, specifically tanks in front ofMoscow, was significant.4 Somewhat earlier Joan Beaumont remarked thatwith such troubled relations between the two countries, ‘the wholehearted-ness with which Britain supported the Soviet Union straight after the Germanattack is remarkable.’5 Nonetheless, the Soviets were uncooperative, whilethe British slowly pondered material aid and decided that an invasion ofFrance was impossible.

This is generally how the literature on Anglo-Soviet relations definesthe early dynamic.6 How far British decision makers genuinely wishedto aid the Soviet Union is a matter of debate. Brian Farrell emphasizesthe centrality of the ‘wear down’ strategy in British strategic thinking,7

and that ‘Whitehall was intimidated by German combat power, contemp-tuous of Soviet capabilities, and predisposed to act cautiously.’8 DavidCarleton and Martin Kitchen, emphasize that British decision makers ini-tially viewed the German invasion of Russia as a temporary respite untilAmerica joined the war.9 Some, however, argue that some political figures,including Churchill, believed that the Soviets would be more ‘resilient’ than

1 Roger Munting, ‘Lend-Lease and the Soviet War Effort,’ Journal of Contemporary History, 19 (July,1984), p. 495.2 See for example V.F. Vorsin, ‘‘Motor Vehicle Transport Deliveries through ‘Lend-Lease,’ The Journalof Slavic Military Studies, 10 (1997), pp. 153–175.3 See for example Leon Martel, Lend-Lease, Loans, and the Coming of the Cold War: A Study of theImplementation of Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 1979), p. 38.4 Alexander Hill, ‘‘British Lend Lease Aid and the Soviet War Effort, June 1941–June 1942,’’ The Journalof Military History, 71, No. 3 (July, 2007), p.777.5 Joan Beaumont, Comrades in Arms: British Aid to Russia 1941–1945 (London: Davis-PoynterLimited, 1980), p. 10. Also see Victor Rothwell, Britain and the Cold War 1941–1947 (London: JonathanCape Ltd, 1982), pp. 80–82.6 See John Charmley, Churchill’s Grand Alliance The Anglo-American Special Relationship 1940–57(New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1995), and Brian P. Farrell, The Basis and Making of BritishGrand Strategy, 1940–1943. (New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1998).7 Brian P. Farrell, ‘Yes, Prime Minister: Barbarossa, Whipcord, and the Basis of British Grand Strategy,Autumn 1941,’ The Journal of Military History, 57 (Oct. 1993), pp. 600–601.8 Farrell, The Basis and Making . . . , p. 162.9 David Carleton, Churchill and the Soviet Union (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press,2000), pp. 85–86. Martin Kitchen, British Policy towards the Soviet Union during the Second World War(Hong Kong: The Macmillan Press Ltd. 1986), pp. 65–69.

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others expected, and prepared to supply Russia at some cost to the UnitedKingdom.10

The British decision to do everything possible to aid the Soviets evolvedduring the summer of 1941. The question of Soviet survival was critical forthe British in June/July 1941, as it was a necessary precondition for aid.When, in late July, Soviet survival seemed increasingly likely, aid began to bepromised at an increasing tempo. There remained political friction betweenBritain and Russia — as the Soviet Union was typically referred to by Britishpoliticians and hence will be used interchangeably with the Soviet Unionhere –11 but the dominant narrative was the growing quantity of aid thatwas being given to the Soviet Union by Britain and the United States andthe decreasing conditions attached to it. August saw aid evolve into a full-out effort to re-equip Russian armies by Great Britain and the United States,while September saw these efforts expanded and codified. This occurreddespite uncooperativeness from the Soviets, who failed to provide infor-mation that the British wanted in order to create a working relationship.The quantity of aid was limited by practical considerations, including theinadequacies of British resources and shipping. While British efforts dur-ing the summer did not yield dramatic results on the battlefield, they weresignificant given the material available to Great Britain and British needelsewhere.

INTELLIGENCE AND EARLY STEPS

British perceptions of Soviet military power informed opinions and predic-tions of Soviet survival and thus the earliest steps to aid the Soviet Union.Throughout most of the 1930s, the Red Army had led military innovation,being the first to introduce mass armored formations and parachute infantry.With Soviet heavy industrial capacity increasing, the USSR amassed a vastarsenal of military equipment. The rise of Nazi Germany encouraged theBritish to begin re-evaluating Soviet military capabilities, still seen in theearly 1930s as marred by traditional Russian inefficiency.12 Both GeneralWavell and the American military attaché in Moscow, Lieutenant ColonelFaymonville, observed Soviet maneuvers in 1936 and found the Red Army to

10 See Eliot A. Cohen, Churchill and Coalition Strategy in World War II , in Grand Strategies in Warand Peace, Paul Kennedy, ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991). 54 and John Daniel Langer,‘The Harriman-Beaverbrook Mission and the Debate over Unconditional Aid for the Soviet Union,’ Journalof Contemporary History, 14 (July, 1979), p. 465.11 Sir Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War Volume II (London: HerMajesty’s Stationery Office, 1971), p. 5.12 Keith Neilson, ‘Pursued by a Bear: British Estimates of Soviet Military Strength and Anglo-SovietRelations, 1922–1939,’ Canadian Journal of History, 28 (August 1993), p. 208.

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be well equipped and modern, though Wavell thought them unsophisticatedin their command and control and tactical doctrine.13

In 1937, however, the great purge quickly spread throughout the RedArmy, decimating the officer corps.14 On the eve of war, the Red Army wasled by often hopelessly unqualified ‘officers’ at all levels, a situation exacer-bated by its dramatic expansion in the late 1930s. The consequence of thiswas hardly lost on foreign observers.15 In June 1937, the British embassy inMoscow reported that the Red Army was paying a heavy cost in competence,initiative, and efficiency in exchange for ‘political reliability.’16 Faymonvillenoted that morale had ‘received a serious blow’ as either the army wasriddled with treason or the government was badly ‘misguided.’17 Britishobservers noted the ‘very poor show’ the Soviets made against the Japaneseat Lake Khasan in 1938,18 while the U.S. military attaché in Belgrade sub-sequently wrote that such ‘unsatisfactory’ performance damaged the RedArmy’s position as an ‘argument in support of Soviet politics.’19

British Military Intelligence painted a mixed picture of the Red Armyfollowing its invasions of Poland and the Baltic States. Observers notedthat most of the officers held to a low standard of training and appear-ance, although Soviet equipment was impressive. Transport and logisticswere weak although ‘one is left with the impression that the Russian geniusfor piecemeal improvisation will always carry them through to a strictly lim-ited extent.’ The offensive value of the Red Army was ‘low’ against Europeantroops, although ‘it would be foolish to belittle the defensive value of the RedArmy.’ Noting the success of Soviet mechanized forces against the Japaneseat Khalkin Gol, the paper reported that its strengths were its numbers andgood equipment. The army’s weaknesses were in leadership and administra-tion which rendered it ‘a somewhat amorphous mass’ which ‘may be capableof taking hard blows’ but less capable in ‘delivering them.’20 Analysis follow-ing the Finnish war of 1939/40 reasserted the endurance and staying powerof Soviet troops. Nonetheless, lack of initiative and rigidity were hallmarksof the officer corps as ‘the natural tendency of the Slav, when faced witha complex situation, is to do nothing.’ The Red Army also had ‘a child-like

13 James S. Herndon, British Perceptions of Soviet Military Capability, 1935–9, in The Fascist Challengeand the Policy of Appeasement, Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Lothar Kettenacker, eds. (London: GeorgeAllen & Unwin, 1983), pp. 302–303 and David M. Glantz, ‘‘Observing the Soviets: U.S. Army Attaches inEastern Europe during the 1930s’’ The Journal of Military History. 55 (April 1991), p. 165.14 For example, 91 percent of regimental commanders and most members of district staffs and chiefsof training schools were purged. David M. Glantz, Stumbling Colossus: the Red Army on the Eve of WorldWar (Lawrence, KS: Kansas University Press, 1998), pp. 29–30.15 See Hastings Lionel Ismay, The Memoirs of General the Lord Ismay (London: Heinemann, 1960),p. 224.16 Moscow to Foreign Office, June 18, 1937. FO 371/21104/N317717 Cited in Glantz, ‘Observing the Soviets . . . ,’ p. 178.18 Herndon, British Perceptions . . ., pp. 306–307.19 Cited in Glantz, ‘Observing the Soviets . . . .’ p. 181.20 ‘The Red Army.’ Military Intelligence memorandum, November 22, 1939. WO 193/642.

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faith’ in its huge quantity of tanks, which were used ‘in very large numbers,’irrespective of terrain.21

By spring 1941, when a showdown between Russia and Germanywas seen as imminent, these assessments remained relatively unaltered.On May 31, the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee (JIC) asserted that, despiteits shortcomings, the Red Army was ‘at their best in defense’ and had ‘vastterritories on which to fall back.’ In Finland, there was ‘little sign of a break inmorale in spite of failure and appalling discomfort,’ while early failures werepartly ‘due to the weather and the difficulties of the country.’22 Furthermore,the Finnish war ‘showed that the Russian soldier is still a fine fighter’and steps were likely being taken ‘to remove many of the defects in thearmy and air force’ which had been revealed.23 These comments challengeconventional views that poor performance in Finland dominated westernobservation of the Red Army. On June 16, the War Cabinet concluded thatit was impossible to ‘estimate the military efficiency of the Russian armedforces,’ although ‘the Army was in good heart.’24 British analysts put theRed Army at 3.5 million men and 18,000 tanks, backed by ‘a vast reserve oftrained man-power.’ These tanks were thought to be sound, though poorlymaintained. The sheer quantity of equipment would be ‘embarrassing’ ifthe Germans invaded.25 These figures were an underestimation. In fact, theRed Army fielded 5.7 million men26 and 23,700 tanks,27 thousands of whichwere competitive, or better, than models employed by Germany in 1941.The Germans, however, made an even greater underestimation of Sovietstrength28 and afforded little thought to mobilization potential.

By late May, the JIC agreed with Colonel Firebrace (military attachéin Moscow)29 that, while Germany could ‘quickly overrun the Ukraine andreach the Caucasian oilfields,’ such an attack would benefit the Soviet gov-ernment by ‘strengthening its hold’ on the rest of the country.30 As to howlong Soviet resistance would last, opinion either accepted what intelligenceindicated was German expectation (6–8 weeks),31 or else was simply aguess. Harold Nicolson, serving in the Ministry of Information, was told

21 ‘Notes on the Red Army 1940.’ War Office, March 1940. WO 287/135.22 Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, May 31, 1941. WO 208/1761.23 Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, June 9, 1941. FO 371/29483/N2906.24 War Cabinet Conclusions, June 16, 1941. CAB 65/22/26.25 Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, May 31, 1941. WO 208/1761.26 Glantz, Stumbling Colossus.., pp.11, 13.27 David M. Glantz. Colossus Reborn: The Red Army at War, 1941–1943 (Lawrence, KS: KansasUniversity Press, 2005), p. 247. Most of the Soviet tank park was not active in June 1941.28 Department of the Army, ‘The German Campaign in Russia: Planning and Operations (1940–1942),’Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 20-261a (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, March 1955),p. 42.29 Military Attaché Moscow to D.M.I., January 6, 1941. WO 208/1758.30 Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, May 23, 1941. FO 371/29483/N2893.31 ‘G.A.F. Intentions.’ Government Code and Cypher School Intelligence Summary, May 31, 1941. HW13/2.

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that 80 percent of War Office experts thought Russia would be ‘knockedout’ in 10 days.32 General Sir Alan Brooke, commander of the Home Forces,later claimed that most believed ‘Russia would not last long, possibly 3 or4 months, possibly slightly longer.’33 The War Cabinet floated the possibilitythat western Russian armies could retreat and continue the war from theEast,34 but Churchill probably summarized opinion among British decisionmakers when he told Dill that ‘I suppose they [the Russians] will be roundedup in hordes.’35

Several trends dominated the British perception of the Red Army fromthe late 1930s until June 1941. A number of factors devalued Soviet mili-tary power just as the German crisis reached its climax. British Intelligenceafforded the Soviet Union a strategic depth that the Germans did not byindicating the size and cohesion of Soviet forces, the territory they had tofall back on, and by emphasizing that an invasion would rally the popu-lation around the regime. British observers remained pessimistic about theefficacy of Russian resistance to a German invasion, but this probably owedmore to an overestimate of German capabilities following the French debaclethan an underestimate of Soviet powers of resistance. This intelligence pic-ture was painted in a period of shifting diplomatic winds for the concernedparties. However, the Chamberlain government did not desire confrontationwith Germany, and the diplomatic capitulation over Czechoslovakia discred-ited western governments in Soviet eyes. British approaches to the Sovietswere lackadaisical and interested more in dictating than in serious discussion.Chamberlain, echoing the most negative intelligence estimates, believed theRed Army to be incapable of offensive military operations, distrusted whathe perceived as nefarious Soviet motives, and valued Britain’s relationshipwith ‘the small states’ more.36 With collective security and internationalismdiscredited, and disinclined to serve the interests of the capitalist powers, theSoviets fell back on self-interest.

The German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 1939, and the sub-sequent dismemberment of Poland, shocked Great Britain and France. TheSoviet invasion of Finland at the end of November drew demand for inter-vention and further alienated the USSR from her would be allies. Worse yet,the new economic relations with the USSR gave Germany, otherwise underblockade, limited access to the vast resources of Eurasia. This crippled alliedstrategic plans, which rested on the notion of wearing Germany down via

32 Harold Nicolson, Diaries and Letters 1930–1964, Stanley Olson, ed. (London: William Collins Sons& Co Ltd. 1980), p. 213.33 Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, War Diaries 1939–1945, Alex Danchev and Daniel Todman, eds.(London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2001.), p. 166.34 War Cabinet Conclusions, June 16, 1941. CAB 65/22/26.35 Winston Churchill, The Second World War: The Grand Alliance (Boston: Bantam/Houghton Mifflin,1950), p. 313.36 Quoted in Michael Jabara Carley, 1939: The Alliance That Never Was and the Coming of World WarII . (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee. 1999), p. 108.

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blockade before landing a decisive blow. Oil from the Soviet Union andRomania was considered vital to the German war effort37 and so Britainand France began preparations for air attacks against Soviet oil installa-tions in the Caucasus.38 However, the British were reluctant for a myriadof reasons,39 and the collapse of France in May/June 1940 pre-empted theseplans anyway.

The defeat of France brought Winston Churchill to power and changedthe strategic equation. Churchill was pragmatic and refused to treat theSoviets as hostile neutrals. With the French army collapsing, Labor politicianSir Stafford Cripps was appointed ambassador to Moscow, a position leftvacant since the Finnish war. Described by Charmley as a ‘left-wing social-ist gad-fly,’40 Cripps, unlike Eden, did not think the Nazi-Soviet relationshipwould last.41 This appointment signaled a shift back toward engagementwith the USSR, though was hardly surprising given the situation. Still,many outstanding differences, like the future of British property in theBaltic States,42 plagued Anglo-Soviet relations. Meanwhile, analysts now heldthat the French collapse had upset Stalin’s plans to let the combatantsexhaust themselves, and so Germany now eclipsed Britain as a near-termthreat.43 However, events in Yugoslavia caught the Soviets flat footed, whileBritain, driven from Greece, failed to make an impression. Churchill diduse the opportunity to warn Stalin about German redeployments to south-ern Poland (derived from ULTRA intercepts) and told Cripps to insist tothe Soviets that ‘Hitler intends to attack them sooner or later,’ and waswilling to risk a two-front war in doing so.44 The British were growingfrustrated with Soviet inaction and believed, as Harold Nicolson noted,that Britain’s ‘only hope is that America and Russia will come in on ourside.’45

By May, the evidence that Germany was preparing for a confronta-tion with Russia was overwhelming. For complex reasons, Stalin ignoredthe excellent intelligence available to him on the imminence of a German

37 ‘German Oil Supplies,’ War Cabinet memorandum, March 28, 1940. CAB 66/6/38.38 See Ronald C. Cooke and Roy Conyers Nesbit, Target: Hitler’s Oil, Allied Attacks on German OilSupplies 1939–1945 (London: William Kimber & Co. Limited, 1985) and Patrick R Osborn, Operation Pike:Britain Versus the Soviet Union (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2000).39 In particular, the British did not believe ending limited Soviet shipments to Germany was worthwar. ‘Military Implications of Hostilities with Russia in 1940,’ Chiefs of Staff Committee memorandum,March 8, 1940. CAB 66/6/21.40 Charmley, Churchill’s Grand Alliance . . ., p. 25.41 Gabriel Gorodetsky, Ed. Stafford Cripps in Moscow 1940–1942: Diaries and Papers (London:Valentine Mitchell, 2007), pp. 23 – 25.42 See Sir Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War Volume 1 (London:Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1970), p. 476.43 ‘The Foreign Relations of U.S.S.R.’ Military Intelligence memorandum, 2 November 1940. WO193/642.44 Churchill to Cripps, April 4, 1941, quoted in Martin Gilbert, ed. The Churchill War Papers VolumeIII: The Ever Widening War 1941 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), pp. 447–448.45 Nicolson, Diaries and Letters . . . 203.

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invasion, but Britain did not. On 14 May an assessment of German move-ments concluded that ‘either the purpose is blackmail or it is war . . . Butthe quiet move, for instance, of a prisoner-of-war cage to Tarnow looksmore like business than bluff.’46 Churchill believed that Germany wouldaim to pressure concessions from the USSR rather than actually attack,though ‘at any rate, either war or a show-down is near.’47 Most observa-tions, rooted in British ideas of strategic attrition, centered on a German grabfor the key Soviet resource nodes in the Ukraine and Caucasus and thereforeunderestimated the true scope of German plans.48

Despite all the uncertainty, preparations were being made to aid theSoviets if Germany attacked and they resisted. An intercepted Japanese diplo-matic cable indicating an imminent German attack49 led Whitehall to drawplans for a military mission to Moscow.50 On June 15, Churchill told PresidentRoosevelt that defeat of Germany was the priority and therefore Britainwould ‘give all encouragement and any help we can spare to the Russians.’51

Recognizing that U.S. cooperation was critical, Washington was approachedabout providing economic assistance to the Soviets in the event of a Germanattack. Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles said that the United States hadno objection, in principle, to providing economic aid to the Soviets; ‘the diffi-culties were purely practical.’ Suitable items were in short supply and, giventhe possibility of Japanese action, the Americans wished to see ‘how the situ-ation might develop’ before making commitments.52 Meanwhile, the Ministryof Economic Warfare calculated the resources the Soviets would need if theUkraine and Caucasus were lost, and that oil and wheat could best be pro-cured from the United States.53 The day before Barbarossa launched, officialsfrom the MEW discussed sending British aircraft to Russia. They doubted theefficacy of Russian air power and floated the idea of sending British planesand navigators to Russian aerodromes to bomb Romanian oilfields.54

46 ‘G.A.F. Intentions.’ Government Code and Cypher School Intelligence Summary, May 31, 1941. HW13/2.47 Churchill to Smuts, May 16, 1941 and Churchill to Ismay, June 3, 1941, quoted in Gilbert, ed. TheChurchill War Papers . . ., pp. 676, 750.48 Napoleon’s campaign of 1812 was even cited in order to argue that Germany had no intentionof marching on Moscow. ‘The Opening Stages of the Russo-German War, 1941.’ Military Intelligencememorandum, November 1940. WO 208/1758.49 Berlin to Tokyo (diplomatic intercept), June 4 (marked June 18), 1941. HW 12/265.50 F.H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and OperationsVolume One. (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1979), pp. 478–479.51 Churchill to Roosevelt, June 15, 1941, quoted in Gilbert, ed. The Churchill War Papers . . .,pp. 806–807.52 Halifax to Foreign Office, June 15, 1941. FO 371/29482/N2831.53 Postan to Coote, June 16, 1941. FO 371/29482/N2831.54 Hugh Dalton, The Second World War Diary of Hugh Dalton 1940–45, Ben Pimlott, ed. (London:Jonathan Cape Ltd. 1986), p. 233.

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PRECONDITIONS AND FIRST AID

On Sunday, June 22, the German invasion began. That evening, Churchillgave a radio address to the nation which at once offered full support tothe Russian people and refused to apologize for past antipathy towardthe Soviet Government. Churchill expressed British solidarity with Russia’sstruggle and offered ‘any technical or economic assistance which is in ourpower, and which is likely to be of service.’55 The military mission, called‘30 Mission,’ departed Britain for the Soviet Union on June 25. It was headedby a veteran intelligence officer and former military attaché to Berlin,56

General Noel Mason-MacFarlane. It consisted of army, navy, and air ele-ments meant to coordinate with their Russian opposites, later joined by other‘experts’ when deemed useful. A Russian mission soon reached Londonunder General Golikov (Admiral Kharlamov became de facto head of themission on July 12).

MacFarlane, while professional and well-informed was, like many, ini-tially skeptical of Soviet powers of resistance. This was not helped by thescarcity of information on the scale and outcome of German operations.Even by July 3, the War Cabinet did not have definitive information as to theextent of German advances into Russia,57 though they believed the Sovietposition to be ‘very grave.’58 ULTRA provided some insight into Germanoperations through solutions of German traffic which often included infor-mation obtained through intercepts of Soviet signals. On June 28, Cadoganrecorded that ‘our secret news shows that Germans are not having it alltheir own way in Russia.’59 Of course, the British needed faith in the serious-ness of Russian resistance before they could justify any form of assistance.As Beaverbrook asked the Soviet ambassador, Ivan Maisky, ‘will you reallyfight? Won’t the same thing happen with you that happened in France?’60

An immediate goal of the military mission to Moscow, and of Britishefforts to aid the Soviets, was simply to encourage Russian resistance so thatthey would not collapse as the French had done the previous year. Thisincluded increased air operations, naval raids, and simulating operations inthe West.61 The Admiralty instructed the naval part of 30 Mission that ‘yourprimary task is the prolongation of Russian resistance’ and that, in the eventof Russian defeats, they were to ‘stimulate’ resistance from remaining Soviet

55 Quoted in Gilbert, ed. The Churchill War Papers . . ., pp. 837, 834.56 C.I.G.S. to Marshal S. Timoshenko (People’s Commissar of Defence), June 24, 1941. WO 216/124.57 War Cabinet Weekly Resume for June 26 – July 3. CAB 66/17/24.58 War Cabinet Conclusions, June 30, 1941. CAB 65/18/43.59 Alexander Cadogan, The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan 1938–1945, David Dilks, ed. (New York:G.P. Putnams’s Sons, 1972). p. 390.60 Ivan Maisky, Memoirs of a Soviet Ambassador, the War: 1939–43, trans. Andrew Rothstein(New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons. 1968), p. 162.61 ‘Action Arising out of German-Russian Conflict,’ aide memoire by the Joint Planning Staff, June 23,1941. WO 193/666.

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forces and to keep ships and equipment from falling into German hands.62

On July 3, MacFarlane wrote that ‘the extent to which we can keep them[the Soviets] encouraged will in my opinion have a most direct influence ontheir resistance. First and foremost they want to see us taking advantage ofwhat they consider to be German weakness in the West.’63 This pointed toa basic contradiction in the British position. Britain needed assurances ofRussian will to fight before it could consider substantial aid, but Russian willwas believed to rest, in part, on whether the British could intervene in someway. The Soviets were happy to encourage this belief if it made British aidmore likely. This struggle was at the heart of Anglo-Soviet relations over thesummer. Soviet opacity would leave the British to make this decision on theirown from what information was available.

With so few sources of information from this new front, the impressionsof MacFarlane and his officers certainly shaped views in Whitehall. Shortlyafter arriving in Moscow, MacFarlane met Marshal Timoshenko and GeneralZhukov (Defence Minister and Chief of the General Staff, respectively).Timoshenko was ‘almost boastfully confident that Russia was fully capable ofdealing with Germany’ and was disinterested in British aid. MacFarlane didnot believe that Timoshenko was acting, but thought he may be ‘living ina fool’s paradise.’64 Zhukov struck a different tone: ‘his request for materialand intelligence and his insistence on urgent replies were hardly consistentwith the Marshal’s optimism.’ Zhukov provided a shopping list of war mate-rials, including 6,000 aircraft, but showed little interest in British intelligence.MacFarlane believed he ‘was out for all he can get and that without some-thing with which to barter we shall achieve nothing.’ Intelligence seemed theonly immediate item with which to barter, and so it was ‘absolutely impera-tive that we be given as much hot operational news daily as possible.’65 Thefantastic nature of the Soviet requests, their blasé attitude toward offers ofassistance, and the conflicting impressions of the situation, gave Whitehalllittle reason to send substantial quantities of war material to Russia at thisearly date.

Intelligence sharing was an obvious initial step in cooperation asMacFarlane had indicated. The Mission requested information on Germanequipment and order of battle66 while the Foreign Office passed diplo-matic intelligence to the Soviets, as when they cabled Moscow on July 4 tosay that the Japanese had no intention of immediately participating in thewar.67 Intelligence obtained via ULTRA decrypts was a particular problem, as

62 ‘Instructions to the Naval Section of the British Liaison Mission to the U.S.S.R.’ June 24, 1941. ADM1/12671.63 MacFarlane to D.M.I., July 3, 1941. WO 32/15548.64 MacFarlane’s diary, June 28, 1941. WO 32/15548.65 MacFarlane (via Cripps) to Chiefs of Staff, June 28, 1941. FO 371/29485/N3277.66 Air Mission (Moscow) to Air Ministry, June 30, 1941. FO 371/29485/N3306.67 Foreign Office to Moscow, July 4, 1941. FO 371/29486/N3669.

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the Soviets could not be allowed to know that Britain read such high-levelGerman traffic lest the enemy be tipped off. Instead, the ‘gist’ of the materialwould be fed to the Russians folded into other information.68 Despite a lackof reciprocity from the Russians, the British frequently gave valuable intelli-gence to the Soviets, including warnings about compromised Soviet ciphers,the location of German headquarters and supply dumps, and German oper-ational planning and readiness.69 The British were quick to hand over theirinformation on the Japanese order of battle, but MacFarlane was frustratedby the slowness of the Soviet response70 and discounted the Russians everrevealing ‘their own dispositions or intentions.’71 Ultimately, as the officialhistory of British Intelligence during the war noted, there was ‘no effec-tive arrangements for the exchange of intelligence between the British andSoviet governments.’ Britain got more information about the Soviet orderof battle through decrypts of German signals than information freely givenby Soviet liaison personnel.72 Soon, Britain abandoned any efforts at coop-eration in cryptanalysis, though it did continue to pass on much disguisedULTRA material.

Meanwhile, On July 2 MacFarlane informed Whitehall that a travel-ling ‘Polish ex-officer’ observed that Soviet military deployments were goingsmoothly and had seen ‘a very large Russian tank concentration estimatedat about 1000 tanks near Dvinsk.’73 The German embassy in Ankara report-edly thought Soviet resistance was unexpectedly robust. The Russians were‘not surrendering but fighting till last. Germans admit own losses tanksand land troops very severe . . . Germans originally confident reachingMoscow three weeks and outline campaign in six to eight weeks. Nowtalk of minimum 3 months.’74 It was not yet clear whether Russia wouldsurvive the onslaught, but the Germans certainly had underestimated theirquarry. Meanwhile, the Foreign Office, which was better disposed towardthe Soviets than other departments,75 was becoming restless with Britishinaction. On July 7, Reginald ‘Rex’ Leeper, head of the Political IntelligenceDepartment, produced a memorandum in which he argued:

It has hitherto been assumed that Germany would gain a rapid victoryover Russia and on this assumption the future strategy of the war has

68 Note to the Prime Minister, July 17, 1941. HW 1/14.69 Signals Intelligence from Air Ministry to Military Mission Moscow, July 1941. HW 20/520.70 30 Mission war diary, August 29, 1941. WO 178/25.71 MacFarlane to C.I.G.S. August 31, 1941. WO 178/25.72 F.H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and OperationsVolume Two (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1981), pp. 41, 58.73 MacFarlane to Foreign Office, July 2, 1941. FO 371/29485/N3350. An advance copy of this reportwas sent to the Prime Minister.74 Military Attaché Ankara to Foreign Office, July 4, 1941. FO 371/29486/N3485.75 Eden set the tone for this. Victor Rothwell, Anthony Eden: A Political Biography 1931–57(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), pp. 60–61.

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been planned . . . . It may be, however, that our estimates of Russianresistance may have to be revised. German Blitz tactics are based onrapid victory, a policy of hit or miss. So far they have always hit andhit quickly. What happens if they miss and have to start all over again?Total warfare is successful against those who have not yet accepted itsfull implications, but in the case of Russia, a State as totalitarian as thatof Germany, the full implications have been accepted.

He warned that British efforts risked being overshadowed by the war inthe East, leading to disastrous political consequences. If Russia was seen asthe driving force behind Germany’s defeat, it would gain immense politicalcapital.76

The German reliance on rapid victory had already been readily noted.In January 1941, Military Intelligence had concluded that ‘a quick decisionwill be sought, since Germany knows she cannot support a war on twofronts nor can she afford to remain without Russian raw materials for anylength of time.’77 As Leeper indicated, if the initial German gambit failed,as it easily could in Russia, Germany risked becoming mired in a war ofattrition which would benefit the allied powers, who controlled most of theworld’s resources. On July 8, Eden, echoing Leeper, told Churchill and theWar Cabinet that it was possible the Russians would continue to resist and,if Britain was unable to stage a land operation of its own, it would losestanding internationally.78 Cadogan agreed,79 but General Sir Alan Brookewas surprised by Eden’s seeming ignorance of British military weakness; ‘ifthis is the best democracy can do it is high time we moved forward to someother form of government!’80 Clearly, there was a discrepancy between thepolitical and military viability of intervention. In the meantime, Great Britainand the Soviet Union signed a joint declaration on July 12 which precludeda separate peace and made a vague statement about cooperation against thecommon foe.

If the war did bog down into a contest over resources, then themost important of these was oil. By early 1941, the Ministry of EconomicWarfare emphasized dwindling German oil reserves. The possibility thatGermany might seize Soviet oil facilities in Caucasia prompted the revi-sion of plans from 1940 to bomb the Caucasian oilfields.81 In this event,

76 ‘Political Aspects of a German Defeat by Russia.’ Paper by R.A. Leeper, July 7, 1941 (minutes byHarvey, Cadogan and Eden, July 8, 1941). FO 371/29486/N3718.77 ‘The Strategy of the Red Army in a War against Germany.’ Military Intelligence memorandum,January 27, 1941. WO 208/1758.78 Eden to the Prime Minister, July 8, 1941. PREM 3/395/17.79 Cadogan, The Diaries . . . , pp. 390–91.80 Alanbrooke, War Diaries . . ., pp. 170–171.81 See ‘‘Action Arising out of German-Russian Conflict,’’ aide memoire by the Joint Planning Staff,June 23, 1941. WO 193/666 and Ronald C. Cooke and Roy Conyers Nesbit, Target: Hitler’s Oil . . .,pp. 59–60.

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Hugh Dalton wanted Britain to replace lost Russian oil supplies andequipment.82 Meanwhile, 30 Mission attempted to impress upon the Sovietsthe significance of German petrol vulnerability, but had the impressionthat they were unlikely ‘to make an adequate effort.’83 RAF officers from30 Mission were sent to coordinate with Soviet aviation and encouragetheir efforts by supplying detailed intelligence on Romanian oil targets.84

By July 22, however, the RAF team reported that the Soviets were notup to the task of bombing Romanian oil installations (despite grandioseSoviet claims).85 A bombing campaign against oil targets could exacer-bate German problems, but only Britain had the bombers to perform thismission.

30 Mission argued that sending British heavy bombers to Russia wouldshow ‘the flag in South Russia’ and encourage the Russians, who were usingtheir remaining aircraft to support their armies.86 However, this idea nevergained much traction owing to logistical difficulties, while some noted thatit would be more profitable to deploy resources immediately in the Westrather than transport aircraft and personnel to Russia.87 The final nail in thecoffin for this scheme came on August 13 when the COS indicated that,while three bomber squadrons could be redeployed from the Middle East,it would leave the region with insufficient bombers ‘to prevent the buildupof enemy strength in Libya.’ This was a very serious consideration becauseof the poor British position in North Africa at the time. The COS did suggestthat if the Russians survived, the issue could be revisited in the spring. In themeantime, it would be wrong to press the Soviets into attacking oil targetswhen the British weren’t prioritizing it themselves.88 All the parties con-cerned had different priorities. The MEW focused on the economic aspectsof the ‘wear-down’ strategy, 30 Mission on aiding and appeasing Russia, andthe service departments on strengthening their forces. Meanwhile the PrimeMinister and Foreign Office prioritized attacks on German civilian morale.89

The German fuel situation was unenviable, but the British failed to appreciatethat by curtailing other consumption, the Wehrmacht was able to maintainits mobility.90

82 ‘Denial of Oil to the Enemy.’ Memorandum by the Minister of Economic Warfare (Hugh Dalton),June 30, 1941. CAB 66/17/18.83 30 Mission to War Office, July 9, 1941. FO 371/29488/N4016.84 Cripps to Foreign Office, July 17, 1941. FO 371/29487/N3831.85 Cripps to Foreign Office, July 22, 1941. FO 371/29488/N4006.86 30 Mission to War Office, July 31, 1941. WO 193/666.87 Britman (Washington) to Air Ministry, July 17, 1941. AIR 20/3910.88 COS Committee, note by the Chief of Air Staff, August 13, 1941. WO 193/666.89 Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany 1939–1945:Volume 1: Preparation Parts 1, 2 and 3 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1961), p. 291.90 Adam Tooze, The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy (New York:Viking Penguin, 2007), pp. 493–494.

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Another key component of the British strategy of strategic attrition wasthe Royal Navy, though how it could be used to aid the Soviets was unclear.On June 24 the Admiralty concluded that operations in the far North wouldbe unproductive because of logistical issues, a shortage of warships, thethreat of air attack (for which the British could muster ‘no effective airdefense’), lack of coordination with Soviet forces, and because the Germanshad little presence at these ports.91 The situation soon changed. On July 5,the COS cabled MacFarlane saying that they were preparing for naval opera-tions in the Arctic.92 This change stemmed from the increasing recognition ofthe need to aid the Soviets in any way possible and also the direct input ofChurchill, who had greater influence and better relations with the Admiraltyand the RAF than the War Office.93 By July 10, the Navy was ‘studying’ thepossibility of sending aircraft and smaller warships to the North.94 To helpmake up for deficiencies in air defense, the Admiralty asked the War Officefor a mobile light AAA battery at a ‘very early date’ and for radio directionfinding equipment with personnel ‘for employment in early warning role.’95

Rear Admiral Vian was chosen to command efforts to aid the Sovietsin northern waters. Pound told him to dispatch a naval force to Murmansk,though its nature would depend on the facilities and defenses present.96

When Vian flew to Polyarny, the naval base north of Murmansk, he discov-ered that the port defenses were only promises, with ‘none being existent.’When asked whether their submarines could interdict German supply lines,the Soviet response was ‘no, they were insufficiently trained.’ He told theCOS that with 24 hours of daylight in the Kola Bay at this time of year, andno serious port defenses, surface ships could not be based there. However,‘we should send a submarine or two’ in order to ‘spur the Russian sub-mariners into activity.’97 Two British submarines were sent to Murmansk thefollowing month with the twin missions of interdicting German sea lines ofcommunication and encouraging greater ambition among the 16 Soviet sub-marines present.98 Though the idea of sending aircraft or large surface vesselsto Murmansk was rejected,99 Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff, didappreciate the political and psychological effects of a RAF presence.100 OnJuly 26, Churchill approved sending two squadrons of Hurricanes (40 aircraft

91 ‘Instructions to the Naval Section of the British Liaison Mission to the U.S.S.R.’ Appendix C: ‘Actionin Far North.’ June 24, 1941. ADM 1/12671.92 See C.O.S. to MacFarlane, COS Committee Annex. July 5, 1941. WO 193/666 and Admiralty toC-in-C Home Fleet, July 6, 1941. PREM 3/395/16.93 See Alex Danchev, ‘Dilly-Dally, or Having the Last Word: Field Marshal Sir John Dill and PrimeMinister Winston Churchill,’ Journal of Contemporary History, 22 (Jan. 1987).94 C.O.S. Committee minutes, July 10, 1941. WO 193/666.95 Admiralty to War Office and Air Ministry, July 12, 1941. WO 193/660.96 Sir Philip Vian, Action This Day (London: Frederick Muller Ltd. 1960), pp. 63–64.97 Vian, Action This Day . . ., pp. 66–67.98 ‘General Survey of the Situation.’ Memorandum by Captain R. Bevan, August 26, 1941. ADM199/606.99 ‘Report by Executive Planning Staff,’ July 9, 1941. WO 193/666.100 C.O.S. Committee minutes, July 24, 1941. WO 193/666.

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with pilots and ground equipment, etc.) to Murmansk.101 Russian officers andmechanics were attached to these squadrons in order to learn about Britishaircraft.102

Other avenues of direct naval action bore more immediate fruit.On July 15, Molotov suggested to Cripps that Spitzbergen and Bear Islandbe occupied, because of the ‘1500 Soviet workmen in coal mines all liablefor military service who could be mobilized there,’ an idea which Crippsthought a good one.103 All Soviet and Norwegian citizens were evacuatedon August 18 without opposition, though not completely without inci-dent, as some of the Canadian troops, allegedly led by the Russian Consul,liberated stores of vodka at Barentsburg.104 Meanwhile, the Royal Navy con-ducted operations against German shipping. On July 30, aircraft carriers HMSVictorious and Furious attacked targets around Petsamo and Kirkenes, losing12 torpedo aircraft and 4 fighters in the process.105 This was a substantial riskto and commitment of forces by an already stretched Royal Navy which hadto escort convoys across the Atlantic, keep the Mediterranean open, counterAxis surface ships, and deter Japan. However, it was reported that, withoutsubstantial reinforcement, German and Finnish forces lacked the strength totake Murmansk anyway.106

Initially, the War Office indicated that aid to Russia would be indirect— increased operations in order to relieve pressure on the Red Army.107

Portal suggested that raids, part of a dummy invasion effort, be launched onnorthern France.108 The Soviets repeatedly agitated for a British invasion ofFrance, though Maisky later claimed this was done simply to pressure theBritish for concessions on other issues.109 Such an operation was unfeasi-ble because an overstretched Britain lacked the resources, experience ,andspecial equipment needed to conduct an amphibious invasion. The bloodydebacle at Dieppe in August 1942 proved that this capability would be longin gestation. The COS did instruct the Joint Planning Staff to make prepara-tions for a campaign in Norway,110 but Britain was ill prepared for this, whileno small scale landing would unduly alarm the Germans. Continued Sovietresistance and resentment towards perceived British inaction, however, led

101 C.A.S. to Prime Minister, July 26, 1941. PREM 3/395/4.102 D.C.A.S. to Secretary of State, August 6, 1941. AIR 20/956 and V.C.A.S. to Prime Minister, August 28,1941. AIR 19/287.103 Cripps to Foreign Office, July 15, 1941. FO 371/29487/N3738.104 Vian, Action This Day . . . 71. AIDAC to Admiralty, August 29, 1941. FO 371/29489/N4879.105 War Cabinet Conclusions, July 31, 1941. CAB 65/19/12.106 Monthly report, R. Bevan (Polyarnoe), August 26, 1941. ADM 199/606.107 War Office to CinC Far East, June 29, 1941. WO 193/666.108 COS Committee minutes, June 23, 1941. WO 193/666.109 Ivan Maisky, Memoirs . . ., p.188.110 C.O.S. Committee, extract from minutes, July 26, 1941. WO 193/666.

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to a re-evaluation of raids in August,111 though the conclusion remained thesame.112

From the beginning there had been discussions about providing mate-rial aid. A list of materials needed by the Soviets, including 10,000 tons ofrubber, 500 tons of tin and 70,000 bales of wool, was presented to the COSCommittee, which agreed that these commodities should be shipped as soonas possible.113 On July 9, Golikov approached Eden about the supply of warmaterial. He indicated that they ‘were not short of this material, but . . . theirlosses had naturally been considerable,’114 before producing another mas-sive shopping list of military items.115 However, the COS concluded that anydecision on aid depended on ‘our estimate as to whether the Russians canhold out for more than a month or two’ and, as of yet, there was little reasonto think so.116

RE-ASSESSMENT

As the month of July wore on, however, it became increasingly clear that theUSSR might not collapse at all. Beaumont contends that Stalin’s appeal ofJuly 19 finally embarrassed Britain enough to begin committing to supply.117

Yet plenty of information and opinion encouraged the British in such direc-tions beyond accusations from Soviet leaders. From the start, the consistentconfidence of Soviet leaders calmed the fears of men like MacFarlane despitetheir understanding that the Soviets overstated their successes. While the AirMission thought Soviet officers were making wild claims, ‘it does not seem tobe play-acting.’118 On July 4, MacFarlane told Davidson that he thought theSoviet leadership was fully committed to the war: ‘if they are beaten or forcedto make a bad peace they are sunk.’119 On July 24, MacFarlane reported that‘the continued lack of evidence of disorganization and despondency’ wasencouraging.120 It was clear that the Kremlin had the will to fight.

Reporting throughout mid-July reinforced the growing perception thatAxis forces were encountering determined resistance. By July 17, the WarCabinet concluded that the Germans were well behind schedule and seemed

111 30 Mission to War Office, August 14, 1941. WO 178/25 and C.O.S. Committee, August 16, 1941.WO 193/666.112 C.O.S. Committee, August 25, 1941. WO 193/666.113 Appendix to 30 Mission Diary. WO 178/25.114 ‘Record of an Interview between the Foreign Secretary and the Members of the Soviet MilitaryMission.’ War Cabinet memorandum, July 9, 1941. CAB 66/17/29.115 Air Ministry memorandum, July 16, 1941. AIR 20/3910.116 ‘Co-operation with the Russians.’ COS Committee memo, July 9, 1941. WO 193/666.117 Beaumont, Comrades in Arms . . ., p. 30–31.118 Air Mission (Moscow) to Air Ministry, June 30, 1941. AIR 8/565.119 MacFarlane to D.M.I. July 4, 1941. WO 32/15548.120 Summary of MacFarlane to D.M.I., July 24, 1941. Forwarded to C.I.G.S. on July 31, 1941. WO32/15548.

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‘surprised by the degree of Soviet resistance, and disturbed by their ownheavy losses in men and materials.’121 The JIC thought that German lossesmight damage morale and ‘break the German home front sooner thanmaterial and military considerations might lead us to believe.’122 This wassignificant, as it placed Russian resistance beyond simply a distraction forGermany, but within the British strategic framework of attrition. Leeper’spaper from the previous week must have seemed increasingly prophetic.Soviet political will seemed to be holding firm and there was the growingsense that it was their ability to keep fighting that was a potential limiting fac-tor, not their desire to do so. The calculus for the War Cabinet was the depthof Russian resistance versus the German ability to sustain their offensives.As Cadogan wondered:

1. ‘Have the Russians got a strategic reserve? and2. Can German transport keep the pace going?’123

The reintroduction of dual command between military officers and com-missars was concerning, but quickly explained away because with millionsof men taking up arms, ‘the probability is that Stalin wants to ensure that thearmy does not get out of control politically.’124 The War Cabinet noted thatGerman breakthroughs were leaving behind ‘whole formations of Russianswho are offering serious resistance to the consolidation of the advance.’125

On July 30, MacFarlane reported that the Russians were ‘counter-attackingfrequently. Enemy has had very heavy casualties and his efforts appeardisjointed.’126 By late July, the German campaign was increasingly one offits and starts and attritional battles, with the operational goal of the inva-sion (destruction of the Red Army) nowhere near completion.127 The latestinformation indicated that the Germans believed they wouldn’t be able toeliminate the Red Army until September. However, given British understand-ing of Soviet strategic depth, there was now a real hope that they wouldsurvive until the winter.

In this context, British policy began to change. On July 23, Churchillemphasized to the COS ‘the tremendous fight which the Russians wereputting up. Every effort must be made on our part to assist and encour-age them.’ Churchill then rebuked the Chiefs, telling them that assistance

121 War Cabinet Weekly Resumé. July 10 to 17, 1941. CAB 66/17/39.122 J.I.C. memorandum for MacFarlane, July 17, 1941. FO 371/29487/N3959.123 July 14 entry. Cadogan, The Diaries . . ., p. 392.124 30 Mission to War Office, July 17, 1941. WO 178/25.125 War Cabinet Weekly Summary, July 17–24, 1941. CAB 66/18/2.126 30 Mission to War Office, July 30, 1941. WO 178/25.127 See David Stahel, Operation Barbarossa and Germany’s Defeat in the East (New York: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2009) and David M. Glantz, Barbarossa Derailed: The Battle for Smolensk 10 July –10 September 1941 Volume 1 (Solihull, UK: Helion & Company Limited, 2010).

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‘should be regarded as most urgent and should be handled in a sympatheticspirit by the Service Departments.’128 The COS were, understandably, con-cerned about the inadequacies of their own equipment inventories, but, asChurchill’s comments indicate, the hope of an enduring Eastern Front wasmore important. Numerous reports indicated that the German war machine,although still advancing into Russia, was being worn down by constant fight-ing and long marches. There was a corresponding shift in discussions towardexplaining Russian success and analyzing the material ability of the Sovietsto continue fighting. On July 31, MacFarlane told the Director of MilitaryIntelligence, General Davidson, that several factors were in the Soviet favor,including the quantity and quality of their equipment, the efficiency of theirmobilization, and the cohesion of their leadership. MacFarlane concludedthat ‘I think the German has been very much surprised by the Russian“come-back”’ To this, Davidson added ‘yes.’129

In order to establish how long the Soviets might be able to resist, andwhat assistance they might need, a broader examination of Soviet means ofresistance was necessary. On July 21, Military Intelligence estimated that theGerman invasion likely had ‘done much to restore that love of country alwayslatent in Russia.’ If the Germans did not advance past European Russia,the Soviet Government would probably retire to the East and continue thewar.130 On July 31, the JIC concluded that Stalin had no choice but to fightto the last and had planned for a long war. The regime could be maintained,for a time, east of the Volga, and the Soviets were preparing to expandthe substantial industries that existed there. However, Russia would dependupon ‘being able to supplement her own resources by keeping open lines ofsupply with the outside world.’ The JIC expected the Axis to have to maintain75–100 (mostly German) divisions in the East, depending on the seriousnessof continued resistance.131 At the very least, if Britain could help resourcethe Soviet war machine, the war in Russia would remain a significant drainon German resources, no matter the precise line reached by the end of theyear.

If it was becoming clear that British aid to the Soviets would not bea waste of scarce resources, the question remained: what to give and howto give it? Initially, Cripps had told Molotov that in terms of aid: ‘Economic— the maximum possible in view of limited means of transport. Militarily— advice and technical help. But we had no men or materials to spare.’132

Given shortages of British shipping and warships for escort, and the inad-equate air defenses at Soviet northern ports, the idea of shipping material

128 C.O.S. Committee Minutes, July 23, 1941. WO 193/666.129 MacFarlane to D.M.I. July 31, 1941. WO 32/15548.130 ‘The Joint British-Soviet Declaration and its Bearing on the Future Course of Military Operationsagainst Germany.’ Military Intelligence memorandum, July 14, 1941. WO 208/1777131 ‘The Effects of a Russian Collapse.’ J.I.C. memorandum, July 31, 1941. WO 208/1777.132 War Cabinet Conclusions, July 9, 1941. CAB 65/19/3.

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there was not attractive. The only other available routes were throughVladivostok and Persia. The supply of materials, however, was initially longon promise and short on substance. The Soviets found these delays incom-prehensible. On July 23, the Colonial Office warned that the Soviets wantedto send a representative to Singapore to oversee efforts (specifically rub-ber and tin shipments). The Cabinet supported this proposal so that theSoviets could witness the difficulties for themselves,133 and agreed to pull10,000–12,000 tons of rubber from British stocks for shipment to Russia.134

Other materials were already on their way to Russia, while ‘certain Russianexports have already been received here.’ 135

The First convoy (Dervish), carrying a mixed cargo of raw materialsand finished goods (including aircraft), reached Archangel on August 31.It consisted of six older merchant vessels and nine escorts, includingthree minesweepers meant to be stationed in northern Russia. A cover-ing force led by HMS Victorious was present to prevent interception bythe Kriegsmarine, while HMS Argus delivered the Hurricanes meant tohelp defend Murmansk. 136 Such escort was a substantial commitment ofresources. On September 18, the departure of shipments from the east coastof the United States was delayed because of a shortage of escorts.137 Indeed,the commitment of ships at all, even older ones, was onerous given theshortages of shipping across the board. On September 1, Churchill would askRoosevelt for the loan of 12 liners and 20 cargo ships (crewed by Americans)in order to transfer two additional British divisions to the Middle East.138

American support was crucial. Like the British, the Americans moved rel-atively quickly to supply aid to the Soviets, though Roosevelt desired a list ofspecific items.139 By July 22, the Americans had cleared some $21,940,000 ofindustrial equipment to be sent to the Soviet Union.140 However, Americandecision makers were no more inclined to bail a sinking ship than the British.As Secretary of War Henry Stimson recorded in his diary, some were ‘just hellbent to satisfy a passing impulse or emotion to help out some other nationthat is fighting on our side.’141 The arrival of Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt’slend-lease representative and diplomatic fixer in London and Moscow in

133 Secretary of State for the Colonies to Governor Sir S. Thomas, July 23, 1941. WO 193/921.134 War Cabinet Conclusions, July 28, 1941. CAB 65/19/11.135 War Cabinet economic warfare memorandum , report for July, by Hugh Dalton, August 21, 1941.CAB 68/8/52.136 Richard Woodman, The Arctic Convoys 1941–1945 (London: John Murray Ltd., 1994)., pp. 36–37.42.137 War Cabinet notes on Middle East reinforcements, September 18, 1941. PREM 3/281/11.138 Churchill to Roosevelt, September 1, 1941. Quoted in Gilbert, ed. The Churchill War Papers . . . ,p. 1146–1147.139 Quoted in Robert Huhn Jones, The Roads to Russia: United States Lend-Lease to the Soviet Union(Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1969), pp. 34–36.140 Raymond H. Dawson, The Decision to Aid Russia, 1941 (Chapel Hill: University of North CarolinaPress, 1959), pp. 129, 151–155.141 Quoted in Beaumont, Comrades in Arms . . ., p. 36.

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July helped to convince both American and British decision makers that theSoviet Union needed greater aid.

Hopkins was among a minority of American officials who believed that‘everything possible’ should be done to keep Russia in the war.142 Afterdiscussions in London, Hopkins proposed to Roosevelt that the UnitedStates step increase its supplies to Russia, including military equipment.143

In Moscow, Hopkins was frustrated by Soviet opacity,144 but unlike theBritish, he was little interested in reciprocity. Hopkins became convincedthat the Russian military situation was not as bad as thought,145 and agreedwith MacFarlane that ‘Russia must be kept going and that some very carefuland far-sighted planning is necessary as regards apportioning war materialbetween us, America and Russia.’146 Ismay credited Hopkins, through thereports of his conversations with Stalin, with convincing allied leaders that‘immediate aid to Russia on a gigantic scale was essential.’147

In the meantime, Britain and the United States increasingly coordi-nated their efforts at supply. The Americans were now offering food, andthe Russians had accepted an offer from the British for 3 million boots(500,000 already shipped).148 Aluminum presented a particular problem asthe Soviets would lose 3/4 of their aluminum factories to the Germans whilethe Americans were short themselves.149 This would, in part, be solved byshipments of aluminum from Canada, starting with 5,000 tons offered inSeptember.150 By comparison, the Soviets produced about 68,000 tons ofaluminum during all of 1941.151

The Atlantic Conference from August 9 to August 12, when Churchill andRoosevelt met off the coast of Newfoundland, was as important in the historyof supply to Russia as it was to the allied war effort as a whole. The twoworld leaders informed Stalin that Great Britain and the United States werecoordinating on supply to Russia, but also that Russian needs could ‘onlybe determined in the light of the full knowledge of the many factors whichmust be taken into consideration.’ A supply conference was needed in orderto plan the apportioning and delivery of supply.152 By this time, Churchill

142 Dawson, The Decision . . ., pp. 172–173.143 Foreign Office to New York, July 24, 1941. AIR 20/3910.144 Jones, The Roads to Russia . . ., p. 49.145 Langer. ‘The Harriman-Beaverbrook Mission . . . , ’ p. 468.146 MacFarlane to D.M.I. July 31, 1941. WO 32/15548.147 Ismay, The Memoirs . . ., p. 228.148 Washington to Foreign Office, August 10, Foreign Office to New York, August 11, 1941. AIR20/3910.149 The Western Allies would end up supplying perhaps 42 percentpercent of Russia’s aluminum and3/4 of its copper during the war. Munting, ‘Lend-Lease . . . , ’ pp. 499–500.150 Churchill to Cripps, September 9, 1941. Quoted in Gilbert, ed. The Churchill War Papers . . .,p.1184.151 Mark Harrison, Accounting for War: Soviet Production, Employment, and the Defence Burden,1940–1945 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 68.152 War Cabinet Atlantic Conference Telegrams, August 18, 1941. CAB 66/18/26.

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saw the Soviets as a ‘welcome guest at hungry table,’153 and he issued adirective that ‘the re-equipment of the Russian armies should be studiedat once upon the grand scale.’ He suggested that a conference be held inMoscow, with Beaverbrook leading the British delegation, in September, ‘bywhen it is hoped we shall know where the Russian front will lie for thewinter.’154 Churchill was wondering not whether Russia would still be in thewar, but where the front would stabilize.

AT THE HUNGRY TABLE

For the upcoming conference, Churchill gave instructions to Beaverbrookthat the British could afford to part with some items. Though limited byport and shipping limitations, ‘it is our duty and our interest to give theutmost possible aid to the Russians, even at serious sacrifices by ourselves.’However, aid was not expected to reach substantial levels until the mid-dle of 1942, and Churchill was clear that Britain should not be ‘bled whitein the process.’155 Unfortunately, American production was not matchingthe expansion of the U.S. armed forces. ‘Equipment was spread thin’ thatsummer.156 For the Soviets, expanding production of war material couldcome only by stripping the civilian sector.157 Hence, the provision of foodstuffs and other raw goods was of particular value, as was Britain’s deci-sion on August 16 to give the Soviets £10,000,000 in credit for civilianaid.158

Given the limitations of seaborne transportation to Russia, Persia becameincreasingly important. The Soviet Government had issued alarmist reportsto Britain about German agents in Persia,159 while Whitehall was alreadyirritated over increasing interference from the Persian Government in theactivities of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.160 The Persians were told toexpel the Germans or have it done for them,161 and when the responsewas deemed too lethargic, British and Soviet forces occupied Persia. Though

153 Churchill to Lord Privy Seal, August 12, 1941. CAB 66/18/26.154 Directive of August 11, 1941 by Winston S. Churchill and Churchill to Attlee, August 12, 1941.Quoted in Gilbert, ed. The Churchill War Papers . . ., pp.1053, 1061.155 Churchill to Lord Beaverbrook, August 30, 1941. Quoted in Gilbert, ed. The Churchill War Papers. . ., pp. 1136–1137.156 Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley. Global Logistics and Strategy 1940–1943 (Washington,D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History Department of the Army, 1955), p. 72.157 Mark Harrison, ‘‘Resource Mobilization for World War II: The U.S.A., U.K., U.S.S.R., and Germany,1938–1945,’’ The Economic History Review, New Series, 41 (May, 1988), p. 174.158 Graham Ross, The Foreign Office and the Kremlin: British Documents on Anglo-Soviet Relations1941–45 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p.14.159 Stalin gave Cripps an exaggerated warning about this on July 8. War Cabinet Conclusions, July 9,1941. CAB 65/19/3.160 War Cabinet Conclusions, July 31, 1941. CAB 65/19/12.161 Defence Committee minutes, August 1, 1941. PREM 3/286.

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there is debate as to British motivations for this operation,162 evidence sug-gests that safeguarding and expanding a line of communication to Russia waswhat drove the British to finally implement plans for invasion. On August 25,the War Cabinet thought that, however significant the oilfields were, ‘ourultimate object was to get a secure line of communication with Russia.’163

Two days later, Ismay noted the same,164 and when Churchill spoke tothe War Cabinet on September 4, it was ways of increasing through traf-fic to Russia that was highest on the agenda.165 Churchill, however, was notonly interested in Persian rail lines but also in ‘a great motor road, in themaking of which we hope to enlist American energies and organization.’166

In September, the Persian corridor could support only 6,000 tons monthlywhich, with American assistance in developing port facilities and railwaycapacity, increased to 60,000 tons by the spring of 1942.167 This effortrequired 30,000 U.S. Army service personnel and diversions of materialpreviously destined for Egypt.168

British aid in raw materials during this time was significant. In Augustalone, it included: 17,700 tons of rubber, 1,500 tons of tin, 5,000 tons of wool,5,750 tons of lead, one million pairs of boots, £90,000 worth of industrialdiamonds, 5,200 tons of jute and so on. Additionally, some 702,000 bar-rels of aviation fuel and 800 tons of tetraethyl lead were shipped fromBritish sources in August (mostly via Soviet tankers and cargo ships).169

Rubber was one item that Britain was in a position to supply in sub-stantial quantity. On August 29, Churchill told Beaverbrook that while theBritish and Americans had already sent 25,000 tons of rubber to Russia,another 25,000 tons should be sent immediately so as not to ‘underminetheir confidence in our will to help them.’170 To put this rubber commit-ment into context, in September, the British estimated that monthly worldrubber production was 125,000 — 135,000 tons, of which Britain and theCommonwealth needed 24,000 and the Americans 100,000 — leaving per-haps 6,000 tons per month for Russia unless the Americans were willing tocontribute more — which the British thought they should.171

162 Eshraghi argues that political imperatives and regional self-interest were more important, thoughthe issues were interrelated due to the threat of sabotage within Persia. See F. Eshraghi, ‘Anglo-SovietOccupation of Iran in August 1941.’ Middle Eastern Studies, 20 (Jan., 1984), pp. 27, 48.163 War Cabinet Conclusions, August 25, 1941. CAB 65/23/12.164 C.O.S. Committee minutes, August 17, 1941. PREM 3/237/12.165 War Cabinet Conclusions, September 4, 1941. CAB 65/23/13.166 Churchill to Stalin, September 18, 1941. PREM 3/395/3.167 Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley. Global Logistics . . ., p. 114.168 T. H. Vail Motter, The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chiefof Military History Department of the Army, 1952), pp. 7, 17.169 War Cabinet Economic Warfare Report for the month of August. September 19, 1941. CAB 68/8/57.170 Churchill to Beaverbrook, August 29, 1941. PREM 3/401/8.171 ‘Supplies to Russia.’ Report by the Raw Materials Sub-Committee, September 16, 1941. PREM3/401/10.

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The supply of war material was more complicated than that for rawmaterials. While Britain had small surpluses of items such as boots or rub-ber, it had none for weapon systems. British production of war materials wasslow to increase and fell well below anticipated levels; even ammunition pro-duction was below requirements.172 When, in late July, Maisky approachedthe Air Ministry for motor boat engines, he was told this was impossible asthere was such a shortage of suitable engines that even the Admiralty hadbeen turned down.173 The speed and quantity of assistance depended onthe cooperation offered by the Soviets as the British required informationon the Soviet situation, needs, existing stocks, maintenance practices, and soforth. As Lord Hankey stressed as early as June 23, Britain needed to first‘ascertain Russia’s principal military needs’ before supplying war material.174

This information was not forthcoming. On June 30, MacFarlane told Molotovthat ‘H.M.G. would be far more likely to come to a rapid decision if fullyinformed than if confronted only by vague statements.’175 Though there wassome improvement, MacFarlane still cabled London on July 7 to suggest thatthe Russian mission be squeezed for information, and that cooperation bemade on a reciprocal basis.176 As noted in an August 8 memorandum, ‘theRussians have so far failed to give us any information on which to assesstheir demands. We do not know their stocks, their production nor the stateof the equipment of their forces.’177 The obvious importance of the EasternFront eroded the principle of reciprocity. Information on Russian equipmentand deployments was never given. Essentially, the Soviets had called theBritish bluff.

It was not immediately clear that the Soviets needed equipment, asGolikov had admitted the Soviets possessed vast quantities of weapons, not-ing only their swift depletion. They did ask for aircraft, AAA, mines, bombs,and special equipment. By July 3, it was decided to send technical infor-mation immediately and, as soon as possible, a fully equipped night fighterspecimen. However, requests for aircraft could not be met as RAF operations‘are absorbing our entire output.’178 Harold Balfour, the Under Secretary ofState for Air, described British reasoning: ‘Not a rowing boat, a rifle or aTiger Moth could be spared without weakening and without grave risk.’179

The British took small steps anyway. On July 18, Portal asked whether someaircraft could be sent to Russia as a ‘gesture’ (these would be American

172 Memorandum on Gun and Mortar Ammunition, War Office and Ministry of Supply, February 1941.PREM 3/55.173 ‘Supply of Merlin Engines to the U.S.S.R. for Use in Motor Boats.’ Note by the V.C.A.S. circa July24–29, 1941. AIR 20/3910.174 Hankey to Prime Minister, June 23, 1941. PREM 3/395/16.175 30 Mission to War Office, June 30, 1941. WO 178/25.176 MacFarlane to C.I.G.S. July 7, 1941. WO 178/25.177 ‘Supplies to Russia.’ Memorandum, August 8, 1941. PREM 3/401/3.178 War Office to 30 Mission, July 3, 1941. WO 178/25.179 Harold Balfour, Wings over Westminster (London: Hutchinson & Co. Ltd. 1973), p. 167.

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aircraft).180 Examples of aircraft with full equipment were shipped to theSoviets in late July, while British pilots had already arrived to test flySoviet aircraft.181 The Soviets were particularly impressed with the Spitfire,182

but these were not forthcoming. Not only did the British need every onethey could get, but the airplane was considered ‘delicate’ compared to theHurricane or P-40 and would hold up well under Russian conditions (for thesame reason Spitfires had been deployed to the Middle East yet).183

Sending aircraft to Russia was difficult. It was noted in Washington onJuly 16, that it ‘would probably aid Russian morale but would be strategi-cally unsound.’ An increase in air operations in the west would be of greaterhelp. Also, the only modern aircraft available were P-40s currently earmarkedfor the Middle East where they were ‘urgently’ needed.184 Nonetheless, onJuly 24, the British promised 200 Tomahawks (the British name for theP-40), provisional upon the supply from the United States of spare parts,ammunition ,etc. The Russians were disappointed at these numbers, claim-ing their own losses were ‘immense’ (nearly 8,000 machines in three weeks),but were happier with the offer of technical equipment and schematics.185

The Tomahawk deal was made complicated when the Americans reportedthey had no spare parts or ammunition for the aircraft — equipment theBritish could not supply.186 In this context, and as aid to Russia becamemore appealing, Britain began to consider sending its own aircraft — specif-ically some 200 Hurricanes. On August 27, the COS concluded that theseaircraft ‘would pay a better dividend’ elsewhere, but the political need tosend them to Russia may be ‘overriding.’187 Churchill offered these aircraft,plus personnel and material support, two days later.188

The promise of these aircraft substantially weakened British efforts in theMediterranean and elsewhere. The RAF was attempting to build its strengthin the Middle East over the summer, increasing its numbers from 725 to1,000 planes by the end of August (versus around 800 Axis aircraft).189 Still,it was deemed that the necessary air superiority needed for offensive opera-tions would not be achieved until November.190 Competing needs and limitedresources led to painful prioritization even before the advent of aid to theSoviet Union. Of the 22 squadrons desired for the defense of Malaya, only

180 Note to V.C.A.S. July 19, 1941. AIR 20/3910.181 30 Mission to War Office, July 23, 1941. AIR 8/564.182 30 Mission to Air Ministry, August 17, 1941. AIR 8/564.183 Memorandum to Prime Minister from V.C.A.S., August 27, 1941. AIR 20/3910.184 Britman (Washington) to Air Ministry, July 16 and 17, 1941. AIR 20/3910.185 ‘Record of a Meeting Held in the Air Ministry between Representatives of the Soviet Mission andthe Vice Chief of the Air Staff on the 25th July, 1941.’ July 26, 1941. AIR 20/3910.186 War Cabinet Conclusions, August 4, 1941. CAB 65/19/13.187 Extract from C.O.S. Committee meeting, August 27, 1941. AIR 19/287.188 Churchill to Stalin, August 29, 1941. Quoted in Gilbert, ed. The Churchill War Papers . . ., p. 1127.189 J.M.A. Gwyer, Grand Strategy Volume III: June 1941 – August 1942 (Part 1) (London: Her Majesty’sStationery Office, 1964), p. 176.190 Defence Committee Meeting minutes, August 1, 1941. PREM 3/286.

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12 were made available and even then only with aircraft that were second-rate and worse.191 To Churchill, this was like choosing ‘whether your son oryour daughter should be killed.’192

Another area of aid was naval weapons, particularly for mine andanti-submarine warfare. Early on, the British shared the secrets of ASDIC.In July, two Soviet Naval officers arrived in England to be instructed in thetechnology.193 By late July, Britain already had sent 200 mines, 300 magnetsfor minesweepers and 1,000 depth charges and were ‘making arrangements’to supply another 800 parachute mines and 3,000 depth charges.194 Someof this equipment began to arrive in Archangel on August 1 with themine-laying cruiser HMS Adventure,195 including 100 magnetic mines withanother 1,000 ‘on the way.’196 The depth charges were of particular value,as the Northern Fleet’s stock stood at just 6,834 in June (27.8 percent ofrequirements).197

Even more than July, the month of August provided evidence of thelongevity and efficacy of Soviet resistance. The War Cabinet noted onAugust 4 that there were no signs of a Russian collapse,198 while 30 Missionreported that the Russians were ‘extremely confident. They claim that,within reason, loss of territory means nothing to them, provided they canmaintain the cohesion of their armies and inflict heavy casualties on theenemy in return.’199 Meanwhile, the Foreign Office, echoing contemporaryanalysis, informed Tokyo and Singapore that the Germans were nowanticipating prolonged Russian resistance.200 On August 15, MacFarlanewrote to Davidson and criticized how the two nations were ‘solemnly sittingdown to bargain a Rocket Bomb for A.I. Night Fighter equipment’201 whileneither would share information with the other. He went on to recommend‘that we should at once come as clean with the Russians who mean tofight as we did with the French who didn’t.’202 In hindsight, MacFarlane’sfrustrations were becoming moot, as the decision to begin full-scale supplyto Russia had, in effect, already been made.

The unwillingness to let MacFarlane visit the front, necessary in orderto establish the fighting value of Russia forces, also was a sore point, though

191 Gwyer, Grand Strategy . . ., p. 19.192 Churchill, The Grand Alliance, p.360.193 MacFarlane to D.M.I. Appendix C, September 20, 1941. WO 32/15548.194 Foreign Office to New York, July 26, 1941. AIR 20/956.195 Woodman, The Arctic Convoys . . ., p. 10.196 Colonel L.C. Hollis to the Prime Minister, August 27, 1941. PREM 3/395/17.197 Hill, ‘British Lend Lease Aid . . . ,’ p. 804–805.198 War Cabinet Conclusions, August 4, 1941. CAB 65/19/13.199 30 Mission Diary, August 8, 1941. WO 178/25.200 Foreign Office to Tokyo and Singapore, August 14, 1941. FO 371/29489/N4685.201 The Soviets had impressed the Mission by demonstrating a ‘rocket bomb.’ Some technical detailswere provided. See Collier to Air Ministry, August 12, 1941. AIR 40/2106.202 MacFarlane to D.M.I. (note of August 22 requests it be forwarded to CIGS), August 15, 1941. WO32/15548.

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he understood that the Soviets desired to show everything in the best pos-sible light.203 On August 6, he witnessed a rare moment of candor fromMarshal Timoshenko, who ‘said that if I went to visit a divisional headquar-ters, I might well find a free fight with German tanks in progress.’204 Twoweeks later, MacFarlane finally got his trip to the front. MacFarlane wasimpressed by the quantity of tanks, the high morale of the soldiers, theirhatred of the German invader, and their skill at concealment. MacFarlanenoted that he was being given a show, but ‘it can hardly apply outsidethe Divisional area with the short notice of my visit.’205 The Soviets mayhave staged the experience but it was perception in Whitehall that mat-tered and MacFarlane’s positive reporting helped shape that. On August 26,Hugh Dalton recorded Churchill as directing ‘jeers’ at those who predicteda swift Russian defeat. The Prime Minister believed German losses to be‘prodigious’206 and though Leningrad might fall, Moscow would not andthe Soviets would last the winter.207 Events in early September confirmedChurchill’s view. The Turkish Military Attaché in Moscow reported that it wasnow unlikely that the Germans could eliminate the Red Army ‘or even reach,before winter, the general line of Vologda-area west of Moscow-Rostov.’208

Meanwhile, Signals Intelligence revealed stubborn Soviet resistance, includ-ing German reports of civilians ‘in combat, using many petrol-bottles againsttanks’ and ‘undiminished enemy artillery and air activity.’209

By late August, some small bits of information indicated the Sovietsmight be running low of general war material. MacFarlane heard that ‘if aRussian soldier was wounded it was more important to get his weapons tothe rear for future use than to save the man. A callous statement which mayhowever indicate the tightness of the weapon situation.’210 Colonel Pika ofthe Czechoslovak military mission, argued that while the Russians may haveadequate reserves of trained manpower to continue the struggle, ‘it is per-haps high time that the delivery of tanks and anti-tank guns should start fromAmerica and England.’211 To this point, there had been little evidence that theSoviets were short of tanks. The British, however, were short. The German

203 30 Mission to War Office, July 9, 1941. FO 371/29487/N3794.204 30 Mission to War Office, August 6, 1941. WO 178/25.205 MacFarlane to D.M.I., August 21, 1941. WO 178/25.206 Churchill gave Soviet reports of huge German losses some credence. See Churchill to Edmonds,August 31, 1941. Gilbert, ed. The Churchill War Papers . . ., pp. 1144. 1101–1102. Estimate of GermanCasualties in Russia.’’ Memorandum by General Sir J.E. Edmonds, September 5, 1941. Edmonds toChurchill, September 11, 1941. PREM 3/395/17.207 August 26 entry, Hugh Dalton, The Second World War . . ., p. 274.208 Turkish Military Attaché Moscow to Angora (diplomatic intercept), September 6 (receivedSeptember 11), 1941. HW 12/268.209 Signals Intelligence passed to the Prime Minister, September 14 and September 15, 1941. HW 1/66.210 MacFarlane to D.M.I., August 28, 1941. WO 32/15548.211 Lockhart to Strang, August 28 (received September 1), 1941. FO 371/29490/N4945.

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preoccupation with Russia even allowed London to toy with the idea ofreinforcing North Africa with tanks rather than build up home forces.212

On September 4, Stalin thanked Churchill for the offer of another 200 air-craft, but stated that such a small number would not change the dynamic atthe front. The Soviet position had ‘deteriorated’ recently in the Ukraine andLeningrad. Because the Germans regarded the ‘danger in the west a bluff,’they were reinforcing their armies in the East. Hence, Britain must create asecond front in the Balkans or France and supply a monthly minimum of400 aircraft and 500 light and medium tanks or lose the Soviet Union asan active participant in the war.213 This was the most blunt statement yetsent directly from Stalin, though Cripps and MacFarlane had made similarstatements over the summer.

When the War Cabinet discussed a reply to Stalin, Churchill said ‘wewould not hesitate to sacrifice 50,000 men if we thought that by so doingwe would relieve the pressure on the Russians.’ Beaverbrook thought theBritish should supply half the requests, the Americans the other half (solong as it didn’t impede appropriations to Britain) as keeping the Russiansfighting was ‘an objective worthy of every ounce of our energy.’ Othersagreed.214 Cadogan did note, however, that ‘our evidence does not showimminent Russian break.’215 Had this been the case, it would surely havebeen a reason not to send aid. Rather, Stalin’s letter arrived when the Britishwere already thinking about substantially increasing aid as the forthcomingsupply conference proved. The issue of a second front was revisited, butwith the same conclusions as before.216

Churchill offered Stalin half of the monthly totals he asked for and toldhim that British assistance would come on the same basis as lend-lease.In addition, Churchill emphasized the growing rail capacity of Persia andthe strengthening British position in North Africa, predicting that ‘once theGerman-Italian forces in Libya have been destroyed, all these forces will beavailable to come into line on your southern flank.’217 Churchill wished tosend two British divisions to the Caucasus which, combined with bombers,might ‘long dispute the eastward advance of the Germans.’218 However,

212 War Office to G.O.C.-in-C. Middle East, July 15, 1941. PREM 3/291/1.213 Stalin to Churchill, September 4, 1941. Cited in Gilbert, ed. The Churchill War Papers . . .,pp. 1160–1162.214 War Cabinet Conclusions, September 5, 1941. CAB 65/23/14.215 Cadogan, The Diaries . . ., p. 404–405.216 ‘Helping Russia.’ Department of Plans memorandum, September 6, 1941. WO 193/666 and C.O.S.Committee, September 8, 1941. WO 193/666.217 Churchill to Stalin, September 5, 1941. Quoted in Gilbert, ed. The Churchill War Papers . . .,pp.1170–1171.218 Churchill to Roosevelt and Churchill to Portal, September 1, 1941. Quoted in Gilbert, ed. TheChurchill War Papers . . ., pp. 1146–1148.

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logistical problems, including lack of shipping,219 soon quashed these hopes.As Eden told Maisky, the limitations of the Persian Corridor did not allow forboth material aid to Russia and supply for a British expedition,220 and theCOS agreed that supply should take precedence.221 The idea of bolsteringthe Russian defense of Caucasia with a small British force continued to befloated for months, but went nowhere.222 In reality, any force that Britaincould muster to defend the Caucasus was too large to be sacrificed, but toosmall to matter and would monopolize the capacity of the Persia corridor.British forces earmarked for intervention in Caucasia were instead sent toNorth Africa, where they were needed.

At this time, the MEW estimated that perhaps 20 percent of Sovietwar capacity was lost if measured by a few key materials (such as steel),though was much lower if one excluded these bottlenecks. Further Germanadvances would, of course, raise this figure considerably. However, even ifthe Germans reached the Urals, if ‘production was strengthened and sup-plemented by imports from abroad,’ and ‘by evacuation from other parts ofRussia of materials,’ then much war production could be retained. A ‘prelim-inary estimate of imports from abroad’ which would be needed was alreadyunder investigation.223 This assessment reinforced the notion that the Sovietswere in it for the duration and given some material support, could sustaintheir resistance for some time. General Sikorski, the Polish Prime Minister inexile, told Churchill a week later that it was likely the Soviets would needhelp from abroad in order to re-equip their forces over the winter.224 TheJIC shared this conclusion and, given Luftwaffe commitments in the East,‘our own output of arms and munitions should increase.’ This would allowBritain to take the lead in arming the Soviet Union.225

On September 19, with the Moscow conference approaching, the WarCabinet discussed the new scale of commitments to Russia. Portal said thatthe proposals for aid to Russia would hurt the RAF, yet ‘he thought thatwe must carry them out.’ Sinclair suggested that ‘before making any greatlyincreased offers, we should find out the Russian situation. His opinion wasthat their output of aircraft was still very large.’ Similarly, Churchill ‘pointedout that the Russians had an immense army and presumably, had a very

219 Eden to Churchill, September 18, 1941, and Prime Minister’s minute/Foreign Office to Moscow,September 20, 1941. FO 371/29490/N5421.220 Eden to Cripps, September 19, 1941. FO 371/29490/N5501.221 Hollis to Churchill, September 29, 1941. PREM 3/395/3.222 According to Sir Alan Brooke, there weren’t forces available anyway. See C.O.S. CommitteeMinutes, December 1, 1941. WO 193/666.223 ‘The Economic Effects of the German Advance on Russian War Potential: Summary.’ M.E.W.memorandum compiled September 5–11, 1941. FO 371/29490/N5497.224 ‘An Estimate of the Present Economic and Military Situation of the USSR. and a Forecast ofIts Development in the Immediate Future.’ Memorandum for the Prime Minister by General Sikorski,September 17, 1941. FO 371/29490/N5445.225 Cavendish-Bentinck to Sargent, September 19, 1941. FO 371/29491/N5616.

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large output of army equipment. Anything we could offer would appearlike a drop in the ocean, though it might mean a great sacrifice on ourpart.’226 British decision makers essentially were correct when they estimatedBritish contributions small in comparison to Soviet production. This contra-dicts Kitchen’s characterization that the British ‘failed to see that the suppliesthey sent were only a drop in the bucket.’227

However, even small help could be vital. On September 20, the Britishliaison in Polyarny reported the Hurricanes ‘were very welcome and canteach the Russians our tricks’ and that the Russians ‘have good submarines,brave tough men, good engines and torpedoes’ but sorely lacked practicalexperience.228 The message was clear: the Russians were resisting but neededtutelage and some equipment. The British recognized the importance, bothpolitically and tangibly, of sending all the material aid that could be given,even at their own expense. As Langer points out, for the supply conferenceboth Churchill and Roosevelt ‘picked representatives who were more inter-ested in dispensing supplies than in trading statistics.’229 Even before theSupply Conference, aid had evolved from a position of reciprocity to one ofvirtually unconditional supply, despite the ignorance of the Russian position.Tanks were now being promised to Russia, despite the difficulty in findingenough suitable instructors and despite the fact that 30 Mission was still notallowed to visit Russian armored units or see the latest models of tanks, norhad it received any further information on the ‘rocket bomb.’230

On September 22, the British delegation left Scapa Flow for Russia andarrived there five days later. Local air defenses fired on the Russian air-craft ferrying members of the mission,231 prompting Beaverbrook to adviseChurchill not to send any more AAA to the Soviets.232 The allied missionsat the supply conference mainly were tasked with producing quantities ofequipment and material that was to be given to the Soviets. ‘Give and giveand give, with no expectation of any return’ said Averill Harriman.233 Realcoordination and information sharing was prevented by the same opacity thathad bedeviled relations over the summer. The Russian staff, as MacFarlaneput it, was ‘muzzled by the Kremlin,’ while diplomatic contacts ‘get nofurther than Molotov.’234 Ismay and Balfour found that discussions with

226 War Cabinet Defence Committee (operations) Minutes, September 19, 1941, PREM 3/401/7.227 Kitchen, British Policy . . ., p. 79.228 SBNO (liaison) Murmansk (Polyarnoe) to D.M.I. (signed by Sargent and Eden), September 20,1941. FO 371/29491/N5840.229 Langer. ‘The Harriman-Beaverbrook Mission . . . ,’, p. 468.230 MacFarlane to D.M.I., September 20, 1941. WO 32/15548 and Firebrace to D.M.I., September 23,1941. WO 32/15548.231 Ismay, The Memoirs . . ., p. 229.232 Kitchen, British Policy . . ., p. 76.233 Quoted by Standley (part of naval mission, former member of the Office of ProductionManagement) in William H. Standley and Arthur A. Ageton, Admiral Ambassador to Russia. (Chicago:Henry Regnery Company, 1955). p. 63.234 MacFarlane to D.M.I., September 20, 1941. WO 32/15548.

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Russian officials were frustrated by their unwillingness to provide even basicinformation on their forces, production, and equipment.235 Beaverbrook(who got on well with Stalin)236 intervened to clear things up with theKremlin, but Balfour resented the supply minister’s approach, comment-ing: ‘if you give them [the Soviets] anything for nothing they think you arefoolish and weak. Beaverbrook took all the cards out of my hand.’237 TheAmericans had their own troubles with the Soviets but, as General JamesBurns told Roosevelt, ‘friendship can best be achieved by a general policy ofgenerosity.’238 Firebrace, experiencing first-hand the way in which the Sovietsconnected cooperation with aid, called it ‘blackmail.’239

The Moscow Protocol promised generous aid. The British offered a totalof 153 items up to June 1942. These included 1,800 fighters, 2,250 tanks,1,800 Bren gun carriers, 100 ASDIC sets, 300 radio sets, 63,000 tons oflead, 27,000 tons of copper, several million hypodermic needles, 125,000 for-ceps, 2,196 amputation knives, and other materiel. The Soviets would sendsome raw materials to the British, including timber and animal skins. Spareparts were not adequately supplied, however, as the Russians did notallow 30 mission ‘to study their system of maintenance in the field.’240

Nonetheless, Beaverbrook reported, ‘I am satisfied that we have a faith-ful friend now. We cannot over-estimate their enthusiasm now that theybelieve our promises will be carried out.’241 Until the end of June 1942,British tank deliveries would equal approximately 9 percent of Soviet pro-duction for the same period.242 This was a tremendous commitment, sinceBritish forces were neither fully equipped nor the campaign in North Africabrought to a successful conclusion. In addition, American aid to Russia cameat the expense of supplies to Britain (exacerbated by the increasing Americanretention of equipment for their growing forces). Hence, by June 1942 Britainwas short 1,613 tanks and 1,800 aircraft from its quotas, preventing theformation of three armored divisions and many squadrons.243

Despite Soviet uncooperativeness, British officials returned from theMoscow conference convinced that Stalin’s government would keep fight-ing. In Balfour’s opinion, ‘Russia would never be beaten. Her productioneffort in men and material was so great that its very mass overcame the dis-advantages of a certain technical crudity . . . I felt that if Stalin had orderedmen and women to lie down in front of the advancing Germans until the

235 Ismay, The Memoirs . . ., p. 230.236 Kitchen, British Policy . . ., p.-77.237 Balfour, Wings over Westminster . . ., pp. 176–177, 188.238 Quoted in Langer. ‘The Harriman-Beaverbrook Mission . . . ,’ pp. 474–476.239 Firebrace to D.M.I., September 28, 1941. WO 32/15548.240 ‘Report on Fulfillment of the Moscow Protocol, October, 1941–June, 1942.’ September 17, 1942.PREM 3/401/7.241 Supply Mission to Foreign Office, October 2, 1941. AIR 19/287.242 Hill, ‘British Lend Lease Aid . . . , ’ p. 785.243 Beaumont, Comrades in Arms . . ., pp. 50–51.

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mass of human bones clogged the tracks of enemy armor they would havedone so.’244 Ismay, no friend of the Soviets, held that the Russians wouldfight ‘to the bitter end.’245 As dysfunctional as Anglo-Soviet relations couldbe, the Moscow Conference provided the final confirmation for Whitehallthat the Russian leadership was committed to fighting it out.

CONCLUSION

When it became clear that Germany was going to invade the USSR in June1941, the knee-jerk belief was that Germany would prevail, even thoughintelligence on the Soviet Union painted a more nuanced picture. In spiteof this, the British were making plans to aid the Soviets in case they wereattacked. Once the Soviet Union was invaded, it quickly became apparentthat the earlier analyses of some British officials were inaccurate. Consistentreporting over the weeks showed that neither the Red Army nor Sovietpolitical leadership was losing cohesion. In addition, the MEW concludedthat even if most of European Russia was lost, the Soviets would still havesubstantial war industry at their disposal, though they would need foreignaid in order to maintain it.

By late July, already committed to supplying raw materials, the Britishbegan promising the Soviets substantial war material that would retard theirown preparations and operations. Key decisions were made in August asChurchill, in consultation with the Americans, whose cooperation was essen-tial, broadened the issue of aid into a full-out supply effort to keep theRussian armies in the field. After the Atlantic Conference, it was agreed touse western resources to re-equip Russian armies on a large scale as it wasbecoming clear that the Russians would be short of some items without aconcerted allied reapportioning effort. There were also various plans made,some serious, to dispatch British naval and air assets to Russia in order toassist in her defense and bomb Romanian oil fields. However, logistical prob-lems, lack of air defense in the far north, and limited British resources meantthat these forces were greatly reduced.

All of these events happened relatively quickly. As Hankey observed, inorder to provide arms one needs a good idea of the receiver’s situation andtheir needs and ability to utilize equipment. The currency of all this is infor-mation, and the Soviets gave Britain little. That British aid was not speedierand more significant was partly because of the attitude and actions of theSoviets. In addition, British resources were stretched to near maximum inthe summer of 1941 and shipping was in short supply. The Soviets generallyfailed to appreciate these factors. This helped to shape the historiography of

244 Balfour, Wings over Westminster . . ., pp. 189.245 Ismay, The Memoirs . . ., pp. 234–235.

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the period and to form a narrative of British inaction and stinginess. Britainhad the political will to aid the Soviets from an early date, but lacked themeans. As Stahel notes, the USSR still out-produced Germany in every cat-egory of weapon in 1941, despite losing much of European Russia duringthe second half of the year.246 Given the inadequacy of British productionand the material lost in 1939–41, it was presumptuous of the Soviets, whohad spent years stockpiling vast quantities of military equipment, to expectsubstantial and immediate material aid.247 Supply must be considered bothin terms of the benefit to the recipient, and the cost to the provider. It was adrop in the bucket for the Russians, but it was life blood for Britain and herEmpire. The price would be paid in North Africa and in Asia.

September saw more of a continuation of trends established over thesummer than a sudden transition in British policy regarding supply to Russia.Indeed, the Moscow Conference, billed as the gathering that would deter-mine material need and allocation, saw the allies reaffirm what was alreadyin motion; large-scale supply of war material. The fact that aid was given,and given relatively quickly, speaks to the strategic and political importanceBritish leaders gave to the Eastern Front. The Soviet Union had becomethe foremost, to use Farrell’s phrase, ‘grinding agent,’248 within the contextof British ‘wear-down’ strategy. The summer of 1941 must be seen as aperiod in which British leaders assessed the war on the Eastern Front, andconcluded that all that could reasonably be done to help, must be done.The British were willing to sacrifice progress on their own priorities andone obstacle to supply, lack of information on Soviet forces and produc-tion, simply was dropped as a precondition for aid. The Soviets won thisignoble battle because they held the cards; the British needed them morethan they needed the British. Russia would almost certainly have survivedthe German onslaught without British aid, but it was valuable, particularlyin the form of raw materials, specialist items, and technical information.By September, the Soviets were getting everything that they could reason-ably hope for. Over the summer of 1941, British policy evolved from a phaseof reciprocity and reserve, to one of supply without pre-conditions beforethe Allied delegations even met in Moscow in September 1941.

246 Stahel, Operation Barbarossa . . ., pp.441–442.247 The COS told MacFarlane to explain this to the Soviets on August 20, see C.O.S. to MacFarlane,August 20, 1941. FO 371/29490/N4922.248 Farrell, ‘Yes, Prime Minister . . . ,’ p. 622.

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