IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT …judgmenthck.kar.nic.in/judgmentsdsp/bitstream/123456789/24695/1/WP... · Brief facts of the case are that, following the Hindu Vedic rites, the

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®

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BANGALORE

DATED THIS THE 31ST DAY OF OCTOBER, 2014

B E F O R E

THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE A.N. VENUGOPALA GOWDA

WRIT PETITION NO.40037/2014 (GM-FC)

BETWEEN:

BHAVANA RAMAPRASAD

AGED ABOUT 23 YEARS, D/O. SRINIVASACHAR RAMAPRASAD,

W/O. YADUNANDAN PARTHASARATHY, R/AT NO.185/24, DEVANATHACHAR STREET,

5TH MAIN, CHAMARAJPET, BANGALORE -560 018.

... PETITIONER (BY SRI A. RAVISHANKAR, ADV.)

AND: YADUNANDAN PARTHASARATHY AGED ABOUT 26 YEARS,

S/O. R. PARTHASARATHY, R/AT 4265, 148TH AVE NE,

APT C207, BELLEVUE, WA-98007, USA.

REPRESENTED BY HIS POWER OF ATTORNEY HOLDER R. PARTHASARATHY,

S/O. RAJAGOPALAN S., C/O. RAGHUPATHY, NO.916, 1ST "A" MAIN ROAD,

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4TH CROSS, BSK 3RD STAGE, 3RD PHASE, 3RD BLOCK,

BANGALORE-560 085.

... RESPONDENT (BY SRI M.V.V. RAMANA, ADV.)

THIS PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227

OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO QUASH THE

ORDER DATED 06.08.2014 IN M.C.NO.1163/2014 AT ANNEXURE-B BY THE PRINCIPAL JUDGE, FAMILY COURT,

BANGALORE.

THIS PETITION COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING

THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:

ORDER

This writ petition was filed by the petitioner – wife,

being aggrieved by the order dated 06.08.2014 passed in

M.C.No.1163/2014, by the Prl. Judge, Family Court,

Bangalore. With consent of learned counsel on both sides,

the writ petition is taken up for final hearing.

2. Brief facts of the case are that, following the

Hindu Vedic rites, the marriage of the petitioner and the

respondent was solemnized on 27.06.2013, at Nijaguna

Kalyana Mantapa, Basavanagudi, Bangalore. The marriage

was also registered. The respondent – husband, through

his power of attorney holder, filed on 11.03.2014, in the

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Family Court, Bangalore, M.C.No.1163/2014, under

S.12(1)(c) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (for short, ‘the

H.M. Act’) to pass a declaratory decree that the marriage is

null and void ab-initio. Petitioner having entered

appearance on 18.06.2014, filed a memo on 23.07.2014,

to refer the case for mediation, by placing reliance on the

decision in AFCONS INFRASTRUCTURE LTD. AND ANOTHER Vs.

CHERIAN VARKEY CONSTRUCTION CO.(P) LTD. AND ORS.,

(2010) 8 SCC 24. The Family Court Judge, having briefly

noticed the facts of the case, passed the impugned order.

The relevant portion reads thus:

“When the prayer is to declare the marriage as null and

void ab initio such a matter cannot be referred to mediation.

The law cannot given in the hands of parties to decide by

themselves as to what is a nullity and what is a fraud the plea

that a party to a marriage certainly needs recording of

evidence and does not depending upon then say of the party.

Thus on facts it is not a proper case to exercise discretion

to refer to the mediation. With regarding to the Ruling cited

in para 18 it is held cases involving allegation of fraud coercion

are not suitable for ADR process. In para No.19(ii) it is held

that all case arises from disputes relating to matrimonial

causes may be referred to but in para No.19(v) it is suitable

clarified that the enumeration of suitable and categorization of

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cases is not intended to exhaustive or rigid. They are

illustrative which can be subjected to just exceptions of the

court exercising the discretion. Thus I am afraid to misapply

the said ruling and refer the matter to mediation.”

3. Sri A. Ravishankar, learned advocate, severely

criticised the impugned order and argued that the Judge of

the Family Court committed serious error in holding that

the case is not fit for reference to mediation. He

contended that the impugned order is a mindless order. He

submitted that the clear statutory mandate and the object

and purpose of S.9 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 (for

short ‘the Act’), has been negated, since there is virtual

encouragement of litigation between the estranged

spouses. He contended that the entire approach of the

Judge, to the case, is in utter breach of the relevant

statutory provisions. He submitted that the impugned

order suffers not only from procedural irregularities, but

also legal infirmities and is not a judicious order.

Submission of the learned advocate is that the impugned

order being in violation of the relevant provisions of the

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Act, H.M. Act & the Code of Civil Procedure (for short ‘the

Code’), is liable to be quashed.

4. Sri M.V.V. Ramana, learned advocate, on the

other hand, strenuously supported the impugned order.

He submitted that without even filing the counter and

placing on record the defence, if any, to the case, it is not

open to the petitioner, to demand as a matter of right,

reference of the matter to mediation. He submitted that

the conciliation or mediation, if found necessary, can take

place at a later stage. He argued that the Family Court did

not commit any error by refusing to refer the matter, at

this stage of the case, to mediation. He submitted that

with an intention to delay the decision of the case, a memo

seeking reference to mediation was filed and that there

being lack of bona fides, the impugned order was passed

and the same is justified.

5. Having regard to the rival contentions, the

point for consideration is, whether the Family Court has not

acted in a manner, which is required of it, having regard to the

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jurisdiction vested on it, under the Family Courts Act, 1984

and the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955?

6. In the 59th report, the Law Commission,

emphatically recommended that the court, in dealing with

the disputes concerning family, ought to adopt an

approach radically different from that adopted in ordinary

civil proceedings and that it should make reasonable

efforts for an amicable settlement, before the

commencement of trial. The same view was reiterated in

the 230th Report of the Law Commission. Despite the

amendment to the Code, it was felt that the matters

concerning family disputes were not being dealt with a

conciliatory approach. The State Governments were

expected to set up the Courts and family disputes were to

be dealt with by the specially constituted Courts.

7. The most important feature, the Preamble of

‘the Act’ is, “establishment of Family Courts with a view to

promote conciliation in, and secure speedy settlement of disputes

relating to marriage and family affairs and for matters connected

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therewith”. The preamble sufficiently indicates the

jurisdiction that is vested in the Family Court, under the

provisions of the Act, which was enacted for adopting a

human approach to the settlement of family disputes and

achieving socially desirable results. The primary purpose of

the Family Court is to promote conciliation and amicably

settle the matters relating to matrimonial and family

disputes, rather than adjudicate on the same.

8. S.3 of the Act enables the establishment of

Family Court by issue of a Notification by the State

Government after consultation with the High Court. S.4

enables the State Government with the concurrence of the

High Court, to appoint Judge to Family Court. S.6 is with

regard to providing Counsellors, Officers and other

employees to Family Courts. S.7 is with regard to the

jurisdiction of Family Court. S.8 is with regard to the

exclusion of jurisdiction and pending proceedings. S.9

refers to the duty of Family Court to assist and persuade

the parties to come to a settlement. S.10 makes the

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provision of the Code applicable to the proceedings before

a Family Court. S.11 is with regard to the proceedings to

be held in camera, if the Court so desires and shall be held

so, if either party so desires. S.12 is with regard to the

assistance of medical and welfare experts. S.13 is with

regard to the right to legal representation. Remaining

provisions of the Act, are not relevant for deciding this

petition.

9. The statutory provisions to be kept in view to

decide this petition are the following:

(i) S.9 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 which

reads as follows:

“9. Duty of Family Court to make efforts for

settlement.- (1) In every suit or proceeding, endeavour shall be

made by the Family Court in the first instance, where it is possible

to do so consistent with the nature and circumstances of the case,

to assist and persuade the parties in arriving at a settlement in

respect of the subject-matter of the suit or proceeding and for this

purpose a Family Court may, subject to any rules made by the

High Court, follow such procedure as it may deem fit.

(2) If, in any suit or proceeding, at any stage, it appears to

the Family Court that there is a reasonable possibility of a

settlement between the parties, the Family Court may adjourn the

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proceedings for such period as it thinks fit to enable attempts to

be made to effect such a settlement.

(3) The power conferred by sub-section (2) shall be in

addition to, and not in derogation of any other power of the Family

Court to adjourn the proceedings.”

(ii) Rule 7 of the Family Courts (Karnataka) Rules

1987, which reads as follows:

“Rule 7. Reconciliation.- (1) The Court shall make every

effort for brining about reconciliation or settlement between the

parties in the first instance in every case where it is possible to do

so consistent with the nature and circumstances of the case in

such manner as deem fit, with the help of counsellors nominated

by the Court”

(iii) S. 89 and Order XXXII-A of CPC, which read as follows:

“S.89. Settlement of disputes outside the Court.- (1) Where

it appears to the court that there exist elements of a settlement

which may be acceptable to the parties, the court shall formulate

the terms of settlement and give them to the parties for their

observations and after receiving the observations of the parties,

the court may reformulate the terms of a possible settlement and

refer the same for-

(a) arbitration;

(b) conciliation

(c) judicial settlement including settlement through Lok

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Adalat; or

(d) mediation.

(2) Where a dispute has been referred-

(a) to (c) ******

(d) for mediation, the court shall effect a compromise

between the parties and shall follow such procedure as may be

prescribed.

*** *** ***

Order XXXII-A

SUITS RELATING TO MATTERS CONCERNING THE FAMILY

1 . Application of the Order.— (1) The provisions of this

order shall apply to suits or proceedings relating to matters concerning the family.

(2) ***** (3) So much of this Order as relates to a matter provided

for by a special law in respect of any suit or proceeding shall not apply to that suit or proceeding.

2 . *****

3. Duty of Court to make efforts for settlement.— (1) In every suit or proceedings to which this Order applies, an endeavour shall be made by the Court in the first instance, where it is possible to do so consistent with the nature and circumstances of the case, to assist the parties in arriving at a settlement in respect of the subject-matter of the suit.

(2) If, in any such suit or proceeding, at any stage it appears to the Court that there is a reasonable possibility of a settlement between the parties, the Court may adjourn the proceeding for such period as it thinks fit to enable attempts to be made to effect such a settlement.

(3) The power conferred by sub-rule (2) shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, any other power of the Court to adjourn the proceedings.

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4. Assistance of welfare expert.— In every suit or proceeding to which this Order applies, it shall be open to the Court to secure the services of such person (preferably a woman where available), whether related to the parties or not, including a person professionally engaged in promoting the welfare of the family as the Court may think fit, for the purpose of assisting the Court in discharging the functions imposed by Rule 3 or this Order.

5. *****

6. *****

(iv) S.23 of The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 which

reads thus:

“S.23. Decree in proceedings.- (1) In any proceeding under this Act, whether defended or not, if the court is satisfied that - *****

(2) Before proceeding to grant any relief under this Act, it

shall be the duty of the court in the first instance, in every case where it is possible so to do consistently with the nature and circumstances of the case, to make every endeavour to bring about a reconciliation between the parties:

[Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall

apply to any proceeding wherein relief is sought on any of the grounds specified in clause (ii), clause (iii), clause (iv), clause (v), clause (vi) or clause (vii) of sub-section (1) of section 13.]

(3) For the purpose of aiding the court in bringing about

such reconciliation, the court may, if the parties so desire or if the court thinks it just and proper so to do, adjourn the proceedings for a reasonable period not exceeding fifteen days and refer the matter to any person named by the parties in this behalf or to any person nominated by the court if the parties fail to name any person, with directions to report to the court as to whether reconciliation can be and has been, effected and the court shall in disposing of the proceeding have due regard to the report.”

(underlined for emphasis)

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10. In BALWINDER KAUR Vs. HARDEEP SINGH, (1997)

11 SCC 701, Apex Court has held as follows:

“15….. A duty is also cast on the court in the first instance,

in every case where it is possible so to do consistently with the

nature and circumstances of the case, to make every

endeavour to bring about a reconciliation between the parties.

Under sub-section (3) of Section 23 of the Act, the court can

even refer the matter to any person named by the parties for

the purpose of reconciliation and to adjourn the matter for that

purpose. These objectives and principles govern all courts

trying matrimonial matters.”

(Italicised for emphasis)

11. In JAGRAJ SINGH Vs. BIRPAL KAUR, (2007) 2

SCC 564, Apex Court has held as follows:

“26. From the above case-law, in our judgment, it is clear

that a court is expected, nay, bound, to make all attempts and

endeavours of reconciliation. To us, sub-section (2) of Section

23 is a salutary provision exhibiting the intention of Parliament

requiring the Court “in the first instance” to make every


If in the light of the above intention and paramount

consideration of the legislature in enacting such provision, an

order is passed by a matrimonial court asking a party to the

proceeding (husband or wife) to remain personally present, it

cannot successfully be contended that the court has no such

power and in case a party to a proceeding does not remain

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present, at the most, the court can proceed to decide the case

ex parte against him/her. Upholding of such argument would

virtually make the benevolent provision nugatory, ineffective

and unworkable, defeating the laudable object of reconciliation

in matrimonial disputes. The contention of the learned counsel

for the appellant, therefore, cannot be upheld.”


12. In GAURAV NAGPAL Vs. SUMEDHA NAGPAL,

(2009) 1 SCC 42, with regard to the duty of Court to bring

about conciliation in divorce and judicial separation

proceedings, Apex Court made the following observations:

“58. …..It is a disturbing phenomenon that large number of

cases are flooding the courts relating to divorce or judicial

separation. An apprehension is gaining ground that the provisions

relating to divorce in the Hindu Marriage Act, 1950 (in short “the

Marriage Act”) have led to such a situation. In other words, the

feeling is that the statute is facilitating breaking of homes rather

than saving them. This may be too wide a view because actions

are suspect. But that does not make the section invalid. Actions

may be bad, but not the section. The provisions relating to divorce

categorise situations in which a decree for divorce can be sought

for. Merely because such a course is available to be adopted,

should not normally provide incentive to persons to seek divorce,

unless the marriage has irretrievably broken. Effort should be to

bring about conciliation to bridge the communication gap which

leads to such undesirable proceedings. People rushing to courts

for breaking up of marriage should come as a last resort, and

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unless it has an inevitable result, courts should try to bring

about conciliation. The emphasis should be on saving marriage and

not breaking it.”


13. In H.S.UMA Vs. G.K. SUMANTH ARYA, ILR 1993

KAR 1774, with regard to the duty of the Family Court, with

reference to Sub-section(1) of S.9 of the Act and Sub-

section(2) of S.23 of the H.M. Act, to make every effort for

reconciliation, with reference to the word “every

endeavour”, it was held as follows:

“7. ……..It may be noticed that in contra distinction to just

the word “endeavour” mentioned in Section 9(1) of the Family

Courts Act, in Section 23(2), a duty is cast on the Court in the

first instance to make every endeavour. The use of the word

“every” before the word “endeavour” in this Section assumes

great importance in respect of the duty cast on the Court

dealing with a proceeding under the Hindu Marriage Act to

bring about reconciliation.

**** **** ****

9. …….In this case we are entirely in agreement with the

contention advanced on behalf of the wife that the impugned

order is liable to be set aside solely on the ground that the

solemn duty cast on the lower Court under the Sections

referred to already has not been discharged by it.”


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14. In SMT. PADMAVATHI Vs. SRI M. SURESH BALLAL,

ILR 2012 KAR 3926, it was emphasized as follows:

“ 23…..Matrimonial matters must be considered by Courts

with human angle and sensitivity. Delicate issues affecting

conjugal rights have to be handled carefully. Sub-section (2) of

S.23 is a salutary provision exhibiting the intention of

Parliament requiring court ‘in the first instance’ to make every


Where the estrangement between the parties to the marriage

might seem to be acute, it is the duty of the court to make

every endeavour to bring the parties to reconciliation. The

failure to make such an endeavour deprives the court of the

jurisdiction to try and decide the case. If no endeavour had

been made by the court, it will undoubtedly be a serious

omission which has to be taken into account.

**** **** ****

25…… Then it should further indicate that he made

efforts to bring about further settlement. It is only when his

efforts to reconcile between the husband and wife fails, he

gets jurisdiction to proceed to pass an order of divorce.


15. S.9 of the Act, requires the Family Court, to

endeavour, in the first instance, where it is possible to do

so, consistent with the nature and circumstances of the

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case, to assist and persuade the parties in arriving at a

settlement in respect of the subject matter of the

proceeding and for that purpose, the Family Court may

follow the procedure under Rule 7 of Karnataka Family

Courts (Procedure) Rules, 1997, framed to give effect to

S.9.

16. A matrimonial case is not like other cases

before a Court. Annulment of marriage, not only affects

the parties and their families, but also the society, which

feels its reverberations. Endeavour should always be

made on preserving the institution of marriage, which is

the requirement of law, particularly keeping in view the

provisions made under S.9 of the Act and Sub-section (2)

of S.23 of the H.M. Act. In view of the said provisions, it is

obligatory on the part of Family Court, to endeavour, in

the first instance, to effect a reconciliation or settlement

between the parties to the family dispute.

17. In RELIANCE AIRPORT DEVELOPERS (P) LTD. VS.

AIRPORTS AUTHORITY OF INDIA AND OTHERS, 2006(10)

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SCC 1, in the matter of exercising discretion and the

parameters to be followed, Apex Court has held as follows:

“28. “Discretion” when applied to a court of justice, means

sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed by rule, not

by humour; it must not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful but legal

and regular.

**** **** ****

31. The word “discretion” standing single and unsupported

by circumstances signifies exercise of judgment, skill or wisdom as

distinguished from folly, unthinking or haste; evidently therefore a

discretion cannot be arbitrary but must be a result of judicial

thinking. The word in itself implies vigilant circumspection and

care, therefore, where the legislature concedes discretion it also

imposes a heavy responsibility.

**** **** ****

33. If a certain latitude or liberty accorded by statute or

rules to a judge as distinguished from a ministerial or

administrative official, in adjudicating on matters brought before

him, it is judicial discretion. It limits and regulates the exercise of

the discretion, and prevents it from being wholly absolute,

capricious, or exempt from review.

34. Such discretion is usually given on matters of

procedure or punishment, or costs of administration rather than

with reference to vested substantive rights. The matters which

should regulate the exercise of discretion have been stated by

eminent judges in somewhat different forms of words but with

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substantial identity. When a statute gives a judge a discretion,

what is meant is a judicial discretion, regulated according to the

known rules of law, and not the mere whim or caprice of the

person to whom it is given on the assumption that he is discreet

(per Willes J. in Lee v. Bude Rly. Co., (1871)6 CP 576 and in

Morgan v. Morgan, 1869 1 P & M 644).”


18. The impugned order, reproduced in para 2

supra, shows that the Family Court Judge has proceeded,

as if, he has discretion, in the matter of referring or

otherwise, of a case to mediation. There is absolute

misconception in saying so. The statutory provisions,

extracted in para 9 supra, cast duty on the Court, in the

first instance, to make every efforts for bringing about

reconciliation or settlement between the parties. There is

no discretion conferred, to bypass the said statutory

provisions, which are mandatory.

19. The Judge of the Family Court has failed to

notice that he was seized of a matrimonial dispute

between the estranged spouses. The paramount duty of

the Court should be to restore peace amongst the parties.

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To achieve the said object, the Court should encourage

and persuade the parties to reconcile, by referring them to

conciliation / mediation. Instead, the observations made

in the impugned order, extracted in para 2 supra, would

push the parties further into conflict and litigate in the

matter. In matrimonial cases, only as a last resort, the

Court ought to decide the case on its merit i.e., when all

the efforts made by the Court by encouraging and

persuading the parties to reconcile fail.

20. In AFCONS INFRASTRUCTURE (supra), it has

been observed that all cases arising from strained or

soured relationships including disputes relating to

matrimonial causes, maintenance, custody of children,

disputes relating to partition / division among family

members / coparceners / co-owners are normally suitable

for reference to ADR process. It has been observed that

the enumeration of ‘suitable’ and ‘unsuitable’ categorization

of cases is not intended to be ‘exhaustive or rigid’ and they

are ‘illustrative’ which can be subject to just exceptions or

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additions by the court exercising its jurisdiction under S.89

read with Rule 1A of Order X CPC requiring the Court to

direct the parties to opt for any of the five alternative dispute

resolution processes. It has been further observed that the

appropriate stage for considering a reference to ADR process

in a civil suit is on completion of pleadings whereas in

matrimonial disputes it is better to refer the parties to ADR on

completion of service of notice and before respondent submits

his / her pleadings.

21. In K. SRINIVAS RAO Vs. D.A. DEEPA, (2013) 5 SCC

226, while touching upon an issue, in the interests of victims

of matrimonial disputes, Apex Court has observed as

follows:

“31. ………In matrimonial disputes there is hardly any case

where one spouse is entirely at fault. But, then, before the

dispute assumes alarming proportions, someone must make efforts

to make parties see reason. In this case, if at the earliest stage,

before the Respondent-wife filed the complaint making indecent

allegation against her mother-in-law, she were to be counseled by

an independent and sensible elder or if the parties were sent to a

mediation centre or if they had access to a pre- litigation clinic,

perhaps the bitterness would not have escalated. Things would

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not have come to such a pass if, at the earliest, somebody had

mediated between the two…….

32. Quite often, the cause of the misunderstanding in a

matrimonial dispute is trivial and can be sorted. Mediation as a

method of alternative dispute resolution has got legal

recognition now. We have referred several matrimonial disputes to

mediation centres. Our experience shows that about 10 to 15% of

matrimonial disputes get settled in this Court through various

mediation centres. We, therefore, feel that at the earliest stage

i.e. when the dispute is taken up by the Family Court or by the

court of first instance for hearing, it must be referred to

mediation centres. Matrimonial disputes particularly those

relating to custody of child, maintenance, etc. are preeminently fit

for mediation. Section 9 of the Family Courts Act enjoins upon the

Family Court to make efforts to settle the matrimonial disputes

and in these efforts, Family Courts are assisted by Counsellors.

Even if the Counsellors fail in their efforts, the Family Courts

should direct the parties to mediation centres, where trained

mediators are appointed to mediate between the parties. Being

trained in the skill of mediation, they produce good results.”


22. On a careful reading of the impugned order, it

is clear that not only the relevant statutory provisions but

also the settled position of law, by catena of decisions,

including that of AFCONS INFRASTRUCTURE LTD., which was

brought to its notice, has not been appreciated. The

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impugned order, extracted in para 2 supra, is diametrically

opposite to the elucidation of law made in AFCONS

INFRASTRUCTURE LTD.

23. S.89 CPC enables the Court to refer the

subject matter of a case to either of the five Alternative

Disputes Resolution processes shown therein. Except,

Arbitration, the four other processes are non-adjudicatory

dispute resolution processes, wherein, there is no decision,

but there can only be a settlement by mutual consent of

the parties.

24. In the instant case, the Family Court has not

acted in a manner which is required of it, having regard to

the jurisdiction vested on it, under the Act, particularly

S.9, which casts a duty to assist and persuade the parties

to arrive at a settlement by referring them to alternative

dispute resolution processes of conciliation and / or

mediation. The Family Court Judge has not shown a human

approach which he is expected to have while dealing with

the matrimonial dispute, since, the marriage is an

23

institution of great social relevance. The impugned order

is against the spirit of the Act and also settled position of

law.

25. The number of litigations being on rise, for

small and trivial matters, people approach the Courts. The

judicial system is overburdened, causing delay in

adjudication of the disputes. Mediation Centres,

Arbitration and Conciliation Centres, were opened, by

keeping in view S.89 of CPC, to ease the burden of the

Courts. Earnest efforts have to be made to resolve the

disputes amongst the litigants by having recourse to

alternative dispute resolution processes, more particularly

the matrimonial dispute(s), by referring them to Mediation

Centre(s).

In view of the foregoing, Family Court having

committed the breach, the impugned order being illegal, is

quashed. The Family Court shall refer M.C.No.1163/2014,

to the Bangalore Mediation Centre and take up the case for

24

consideration, after receiving report from the Mediation

Centre. Ordered accordingly.

Registry shall send a copy of this order, for guidance,

to all the Family Courts in the State.

A copy of this Order be sent to the Director,

Bangalore Mediation Centre, who shall circulate copies of

the same amongst all the Mediation Centres in the State,

for information.

Sd/-

JUDGE

sac*

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT …judgmenthck.kar.nic.in/judgmentsdsp/bitstream/123456789/24695/1/WP... · Brief facts of the case are that, following the Hindu Vedic rites, the