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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 6TH DAY OF JULY, 2018
BEFORE
THE HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE K. N. PHANEENDRA
CRL.P. NO.1387/2011
BETWEEN
R PARIMALA BAI
W/O B S KRISHNAN AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS
CHIEF SUPERVISOR
METHODS DEPARTMENT ARICRAFT DIVISION, HAL
BANGALORE COMPLEX BANGALORE-560 017 ... PETITIONER
(BY SRI. VINAY T. R. ADV. FOR
SRI. C. V. SUDHINDRA, ADV.)
AND
BHASKAR NARASIMHAIAH S/O LATE R SAMPATH
AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS R/AT NO.34, SHIVANADA NAGAR
5TH CROSS, BANGALORE-560 079 ... RESPONDENT
(BY SRI. PRASHANTH U. T. ADV.)
THIS CRL.P IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482 CR.P.C
PRAYING TO QUASH THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS IN
C.C.NO.22036/09 FOR THE OFFENCES P/U/S 138 OF N.I.
ACT ON THE FILE OF THE XVI ACMM, BENGALURU.
THIS CRL.P COMING ON FOR HEARING THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:
®
2
ORDER
Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner as well
as the learned counsel for the respondent. Perused the
records.
2. The petitioner has sought for quashing of the
entire proceedings in CC No.22036/2009 registered
against her for the offence punishable under Section
138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act [hereinafter
referred to ‘Act’ for short].
3. The sole ground that has been taken before this
court seeking quashing of the above said proceedings is
that - a prima facie meaningful reading and
understanding of the complaint itself filed by the
respondent – complainant before the Trial Court reveals
that, there is no allegation in the complaint that there
exists a legally recoverable debt from the accused. In
the absence of such existence of the legally recoverable
debt, Section 138 of the Act itself is not attracted.
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4. In this regard, the learned counsel for the
petitioner has drawn my attention to the entire
paragraphs in the complaint averments to demonstrate
that there was no legally recoverable debt even
according to the complaint averments. When such being
the case, there cannot be any presumption under
Negotiable Instruments Act particularly u/s.139 of the
Act. When presumption u/s.139 of Negotiable
Instruments Act cannot be raised in favour of the
complainant and if it is not shown exfacie on the face of
the complaint averments, that there exists any legally
recoverable debt, then ingredients of Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act are not attracted.
Therefore, on that ground, the complaint itself is liable
to be quashed.
5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent
submitted that, on meaningful reading and
understanding of the complaint averments, there creates
some doubt whether the accused has only acted as a
commission agent for the purpose of getting job for the
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son of the complainant and in such an eventuality,
presumption u/s.139 of the Act has to be raised and it is
a matter of fact whether there exists any legally
recoverable debt or not. Therefore, on that ground, the
proceedings cannot be quashed. The parties have to
establish their case and the defence taken by the
accused during the course of trial. Therefore, that
ground is not tenable and the proceedings cannot be
quashed.
6. On the above said rival contentions of the
learned counsels, it is just and necessary for this court
to ascertain whether the ingredients of Section 138 of
the Act are available to the complainant in order to
continue the prosecution against the accused. Section
138 of the Act says that –
“Where any cheque drawn by a person on
an account maintained by him with a banker
for payment of any amount of money to
another person from out of that account for
the discharge, in whole or in part, of any
debt or other liability, is returned by the
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bank unpaid, either because of the amount
of money standing to the credit of that
account is insufficient to honour the cheque
or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be
paid from that account by an agreement
made with that bank, such person shall be
deemed to have committed an offence and
shall, without prejudice to any other
provisions of this Act, be punished with
imprisonment for [a term which may be
extended to two years], or with fine which
may extend to twice the amount of the
cheque, or with both.”
The rest of the provision may not be necessary so far as
this case is concerned.
7. In this context, Section 139 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act also comes into play. Section 139 of
the Act says that –
“139. Presumption in favour of
holder – It shall be presumed, unless the
contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque
received the cheque of the nature referred to
in Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or
in part, of any debt or other liability.]
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Therefore, here, the debt or other liability has to be
understood as existence of legally recoverable debt or
liability so far as the accused is concerned.
8. In this context, the learned counsel for the
petitioner has relied upon various provisions under the
Indian Contract Act. The first one is Section 23 of the
Indian Contract Act, which reads thus:
“23. What consideration and objects
are lawful, and what not - The
consideration or object of an agreement is
lawful, unless – it is forbidden by law; or is of
such a nature that, if permitted, it would
defeat the provisions of any law; or is
fraudulent; or involves or implies, injury to the
person or property of another; or the Court
regards it as immoral, or opposed to public
policy. In each of these cases, the
consideration or object of an agreement is said
to be unlawful. Every agreement of which the
object or consideration is unlawful is void.”
The illustration given at Item (f) in fact, is almost similar
to the factual aspects of this case, which says that –
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“A promises to obtain for B an
employment in the public service and B
promises to pay 1,000/- rupees to A. The
agreement is void, as the consideration for it
is unlawful.”
9. The learned counsel for the petitioner in this
regard also relied upon the decision reported in AIR
1979 Madras 42, between N.V.P. Pandian, and M.M.
Roy, wherein, the Madras High Court has held thus –
“Section 23 - Public Policy - Amount
paid for the purpose of securing seat in
Medical College and not as loan –
Agreement, if against public policy –
Amount, if refundable.”
The Madras High Court also stress on the maxim in pari
delicto potior est condition possidentis is founded on the
principles of public policy, which will not assist a plaintiff
who has paid over money or handed over property in
pursuance of an illegal or immoral contract, to recover it
back, for the Courts will not assist an illegal transaction
in any respect.
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10. In another ruling reported in 2007 CRL.LJ
2262, in a case between Virender Singh and Laxmi
Narain another, wherein the Delhi High Court
considering Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872,
with reference to Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, at Head Note C Held as under:
“Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881, - Dishonor of cheque
- Legally enforceable debt or liability -
Complainant paid sum of Rs.80,000/- to
accused for purpose of securing job for his
nephew - As job was not made available to
complainant’s nephew, he requested accused
to return said amount – Dishonour of cheque
issued by petitioner towards said amount –
Agreement between petitioner and
complainant for securing job is void,
consideration therein being unlawful – Parties
being in pari delicto, therefore, said sum of
Rs.80,000/- cannot be recovered – Thus,
there did not exist any legally enforceable
debt or liability for discharge of which it could
be said that cheque in question was issued –
Consequently, S. 138 would not be
attracted.”
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11. In another ruling of the Hon'ble Apex Court
reported in AIR 1974 SC 1892 between Kuju
Collieries Ltd., Vs. Jharkhand Mines Ltd., and
others wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court referring to
Section 65 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, held that -
Agreement void ab initio – Mining lease contrary to
mineral regulations and void – Parties in pari delicto –
Section 65 does not apply – Nor does Section 70 or 72.
12. Looking to the above said legal aspect, the
court has to consider whether in this particular case, on
facts, any legally recoverable debt was in existence or
not.
13. In this context, the learned counsel for the
respondent also equally refuting the argument of the
learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon some
of the decisions which are necessary to be considered by
this court.
14. In a decision reported in (2002) 2 SCC 642
between A.V. Murthy and. B.S. Nagabasavanna
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wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that –
“Dishonour of cheque – Revisional court, held, erred in
quashing the complaint proceedings on the ground that
the debt or liability was barred by limitation and
therefore, there was no legally enforceable debt or
liability as against the drawer – The plea of non-
existence of such a debt or liability could be agitated as
a defence before the trial Court.” Therefore,
quashment is not proper.
15. In another ruling reported in 2012 (2) DCR
93 of Calcutta High Court between Bejoy Prayers
and State of West Bengal & Others, Calcutta High
Court has held that - The complaint for dishonor of
cheque - Sought quashing of, Legality – Held – whether
there is any legally recoverable debt or not, that is a
pure question of facts and non existence of legally
enforceable debt or not, that is a pure question of facts
and essentially the defence of the accused which cannot
be gone into while exercising the revisional jurisdiction.
Therefore, the petition was dismissed.
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16. The learned counsel also relied upon another
ruling reported in 2014(9) SCALE 3 between S.
Natarajan and Sama Dharman, wherein the Hon'ble
Apex Court has also laid down certain principles where
issuance of cheque itself is a promise to pay time barred
debt and referred to Sections 4 and 6 of the NI Act – For
the purpose of invoking Section 138 read with 142 of
the Negotiable Instruments Act, the cheque in question
must be issued in respect of legally enforceable debt or
other liability – Court observed that the presumption
mandated by Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments
Act includes a presumption that there exists a legally
enforceable debt or other liability. The Court has further
observed that Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments
Act is an example of a reverse onus clause that has
been included in furtherance of the legislative objective
of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments.
This Court clarified that the reverse onus clauses usually
impose an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive
burden.
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17. On the basis of the above said rulings, the
learned counsel for the respondent contended that the
existence or non existence of a legally recoverable debt
is a matter of fact that has to be established during the
course of the trial. Therefore, he tried to convince this
court that petition is not maintainable and the same is
liable to be dismissed.
18. On careful perusal of the above said decisions,
it is crystal clear that in order to attract Section 138 of
the Negotiable Instruments Act, the ingredients of
Section 138 have to be established primarily by the
complainant by pleading in the complaint with regard to
the existence of any legally recoverable debt or liability
on the part of the accused. Even a semblance of doubt
is raised with regard to the existence or non existence of
legally recoverable debt, then also it should be
established during the course of trial by means of
pleading the facts and leading evidence. It is the
defence taken up by the accused that there was no
legally enforceable debt, and further that, it is not only
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the defence, but also the court has to examine whether
on complete reading of the complaint itself whether any
offence u/s.138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is
constituted or not. It is a very well recognized principle
of criminal jurisprudence that, if on plain and meaningful
reading of the complaint or the FIR, the allegations
made in the complaint or in the FIR do not constitute
any offence or under any penal law for the time being in
force, the continuation of such prosecution amounts to
abuse of process of law. Therefore, the court has to
examine without reference to the defence of the accused
on the basis of the complaint itself whether there existed
ingredients of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments
Act. Even in order to take cognizance and issuance of
process against the accused, such exercise has to be
done, to nip the case at the bud to avoid un-necessarily
accused facing the trial.
19. Now, coming to the factual aspects of this case.
It is clear from the complaint averments that it is the
case of the complainant that, the complainant has a son
14
by name B. Sharath, the accused and complainant were
known to each other since long. The complainant met
the accused and in fact the accused had assured to
provide a job to his son in HAL factory. In this context,
the accused had requested the complainant to pay an
amount of Rs.10 lakhs and he demanded the same for
the purpose of providing a job to the son of the
complainant. In this context, it is stated that, on
various occasions, the complainant has paid some
amounts to him. As the accused could not get the job to
the son of the complainant, the complainant approached
the accused. Then the accused again demanded for
further amount for making payment to the Officers. As
per the demand, the complainant paid amount to him.
In total, lot of amount has been paid to the accused for
the purpose of securing job to the son of the
complainant. As the accused was not able to secure the
job in HAL to the complainant’s son, the complainant
demanded for repayment of the money. In that context,
it is said that on 1.5.2009, the accused issued a cheque
bearing No.262871 for a sum of Rs.10 lakhs and on
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presentation of the said cheque it came to be
dishonoured on the ground of ‘funds insufficient’.
After complying the other provisions of Section 138 of
the Negotiable Instruments, it appears the complaint
came to be lodged.
20. It is seen that, there are absolutely no
allegations whatsoever that the accused has taken this
money as a loan or a debt or as a liability at any point of
time. It is clear cut case of the complainant that, he
has paid money for the purpose of securing job for his
son, even without examining whether the accused has
got any authority to provide job to his son or not and
what is the procedure that is required to be followed by
the HAL factory for the purpose of selecting any
candidate for the purpose of providing any job.
Therefore, without examining anything, the complainant
himself has entered into a void contract with the
accused and paid money as against the public policy for
illegal purpose.
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21. As could be seen from the rulings cited by the
learned counsel for the petitioner and the provision of
Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, it is crystal clear
that if on the basis of a void contract and particularly if
the consideration is illegal, and consideration is for
immoral or illegal purposes or which is against the public
policy, then the whole transaction becomes void, the
consideration paid in such contract becomes an illegal
consideration and when it is said it is legal or unlawful
consideration, it can not be at any stretch of imagination
called as a legally recoverable debt.
22. Now, coming to the submission made by the
learned counsel for the respondent with the help of the
above said decisions cited, the cases have been
considered with regard to the averments made in the
complaint and the complainant has specifically stated
with regard to the existence of the legally recoverable
debt in the complaint. On the other hand, it is only the
defence taken up by the accused that there exists no
legally recoverable debt. Therefore, in that context, the
17
courts have held that it requires evidence and the
defence taken by the accused has to be established
during the course of full dressed trial.
23. Another point which has been raised in those
decisions is with regard to the debt which is barred by
limitation. If the debt is barred by limitation but if it
cannot be outrightly said that it is an illegal transaction
or it is an illegal consideration, then even if the debt is
time barred, if the accused is willing to pay that amount,
there is no bar for the complainant to receive that
amount. Therefore, the illegal consideration or time
barred debt stands on a different footing and illegal
consideration is only barred from recovery. Therefore,
the said ruling cited by the learned counsel is not
presently helpful to the complainant herein.
24. So far as Section 139 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act is concerned, of course there is a
presumption under law. Initially the court has to draw
presumption in favour of the complainant if on plain
reading of the complaint, the court is of the opinion that
18
the complainant has pleaded that there existed a legally
recoverable debt and in support of that contention. The
presumption has to be raised in favour of the
complainant regarding existence of legally recoverable
debt. But, if an illegal consideration is relied upon by
the complainant himself, then such presumption u/s.139
of the Negotiable Instruments Act, cannot be raised at
the initial stages also. It all depends upon the facts and
circumstances of each case on the basis of the pleadings
of the parties.
25. Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act
mandates that, there should be an existence of legally
recoverable debt and in order to attract Section 138 of
the Negotiable Instruments Act, the party has to plead
with regard to the existence of legally recoverable debt.
If he pleads with regard to the existence of the legally
recoverable debt u/s.138 of the Act, then only
presumption u/s.139 of the Act can be raised in favour
of the complainant. If the complainant himself does not
plead the existence of legally recoverable debt, then
19
there is no question of raising any initial presumption in
favour of the complainant. Therefore, even considering
the provisions of Section 139 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, there is no question of accused
rebutting the presumption unless the presumption is
raised in favour of the complainant. If the court for any
reason comes to the conclusion that the ingredients of
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, are not
made out, the court cannot take cognizance of such
matter, and for the purpose of calling the accused to
appear before the court and contest the proceedings.
26. Under the above said facts and circumstances
of the case and also the decisions relied upon by the
parties, in my opinion, it is a fit case based on the
factual aspects and legal aspects, to quash the
complaint.
27. The learned Magistrate in fact at the time of
taking cognizance of the private complaint has to
examine meticulously the contents of the complaint. It
is more than several times made clear that when ever a
20
complaint is filed, the learned Magistrate has to look into
the complaint, he should not mechanically take
cognizance or refer the matter to the police for
investigation. The learned Magistrate has to look into
the complaint averments for the purpose of ascertaining
whether the court has got jurisdiction to try that matter.
Secondly, the contents of the complaint even
meaningfully understood allegations made therein
constitute any offence. Only for those offences, where
the allegations constitute offence the Magistrate is
entitled to take cognizance and proceed with the matter.
Otherwise, the issuance of summons to the accused
virtually violates the constitutional right of liberty, which
is guaranteed to the citizens of the country. Therefore,
under the facts and circumstances of the case, and the
legal aspects as discussed above, I am of the opinion
the Petition deserves to be allowed and the proceedings
before the court below deserves to be quashed. Hence,
the following:
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ORDER
The Petition is allowed. Consequently, all further
proceedings in CC No.22036/2009 for the offence
punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act pending on the file of the 16th ACMM,
Bengaluru are hereby quashed.
Sd/- JUDGE
PL*