In deeds mediation, questions are open; in politics, then, why are they closed? The de Borda Institute

In deeds mediation, questions are In deeds mediation, questions are open;open;

in politics, then, why are they closed?in politics, then, why are they closed?

The de Borda InstituteThe de Borda Institute

www.deborda.orgwww.deborda.org

MAJORITARIANISMMAJORITARIANISM

• ““Democracy rests upon the principles of majority Democracy rests upon the principles of majority rule.”rule.”

• ““Democracy works on the basis of a decision by the Democracy works on the basis of a decision by the majority.”majority.”

• ““Democracy is based on majority decision.”Democracy is based on majority decision.”

SWEDEN – 1955SWEDEN – 1955

Referendum: which side of the road Referendum: which side of the road shall we drive on?shall we drive on?

• RightRight 15.5%15.5%

• LeftLeft 82.9%82.9%

• BlankBlank 1.6% 1.6%

SELF-DETERMINATIONSELF-DETERMINATION

““All peoples have the right to self-All peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political they freely determine their political status…”status…”

Article 1.1, The International Covenant Article 1.1, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rightson Civil and Political Rights

DEMOCRATIC DICTATORS

PLACE Date AUTHOR ISSUE FOR T’OUT

FRANCE 1800 NAPOLEON BE CONSUL 99% 43%

CHILE 1818 O’HIGGINS BE SUPREMO 100% -

ITALY 1929 MUSSOLINI FASCISM 99% 96%

GERMANY 1936 HITLER FUHRER 98% 98%

AUSTRIA 1938 HITLER ANSCHLUSS 99% 99%

ROMANIA 1938 ANTONESCU POWER 99% -

IRAN 1963 SHAH REVOLUTION 99% 91%

HAITI 1964 DUVALIER FOR LIFE 99% -

CHILE 1980 PINOCHET POWER 68% 93%

THE QUESTION IS THE ANSWER

PLACE Date AUTHOR ISSUE FOR T’OUT

IRAN 1979 KHOMEINI ISLAMIC 96% 65%

SERBIA 1990 MILOSEVIC CONSTITUTE 97% -

CROATIA 1991 TUDJMAN INDEPENDENT 93% 84%

R.SRPSKA 1991 KARADZIC STAY IN FRY 98% 85%

NAGORNOKARABAKH

1991 - INDEPENDENT 99% 82%

IRAQ 1995 S. HUSSEIN HIMSELF 99.9 99.5

ZIMBABWE 2000 MUGABE CONSTITUTE 45% 25%

IRAQ 2002 S. HUSSEIN HIMSELF 100% 100%

PAKISTAN 2002 MUSHARRAF HIMSELF 98% 56%

CANADA – QUEBECCANADA – QUEBEC

THE ‘NEVER-END-UM’THE ‘NEVER-END-UM’

ForFor AgainstAgainst TurnoutTurnout

20.5.198020.5.1980 40.4%40.4% 59.6%59.6% 85.6%85.6%

26.10.199226.10.1992 42.4%42.4% 55.4%55.4% 82.8%82.8%

01.11.199501.11.1995 49.4%49.4% 50.6%50.6% 93.5%93.5%

NORTHERN IRELANDNORTHERN IRELAND

Border poll – 1972Border poll – 1972

Population: roughly Population: roughly 60% Protestant, 60% Protestant,

40% Catholic40% Catholic

TurnoutTurnout 59%59%

yesyes 97%97%

A MAJORITYOF THE WHOLE

A MAJORITYOF THE MINORITY

OF THE WHOLE

A MAJORITY OF THE MINORITY

OF THE MINORITY OF THE WHOLE

RUSSIAN DOLLSBIG SMALL TINY

UK IRELAND NORTHERN IRELAND

USSR GEORGIA ABHAZIA

“ “ SOUTH OSSETIA

“ AZERBAIJAN NAGORNO-KARABAKH

“ MOLDOVA TRANS-DNESTR

YUGOSLAVIA CROATIA KRAJINA

“ BOSNIA REPUBLIKA-SRPSKA

“ “ HERZEG-BOSNA

“ SERBIA KOSOVA

" " PRESHEVO VALLEY

INDONESIA TIMOR EAST TIMOR

SUDAN DARFUR ………

IRAQ KIRKUK ………

YUGOSLAVIA Turn

out % FOR

EFFECT

1990 KRAJ INA AUTONOMY 95% 99% Exacerbation

1990 SLOVENIA INDEPENDENCE 94% 89% BOYCOTT + WAR

1991 YUGOSLAVIA MAINTENANCE n/a n/a VETOED

1991 CROATIA INDEPENDENCE 84% 93% BOYCOTT + WAR

1991 MACEDONIA INDEPENDENCE 72% 95% BOYCOTT

1991 REPUBLIKA SRPSKA

STAY IN FRY 85% 98% UNCONSTI TUTIONAL

1991 KOSOVA INDEPENDENCE 87% 99% IGNORED BY EU WAR

1991 SANDŽAK AUTONOMY 79% 99% NOT RECOGNISED

1992 M’ NEGRO STAY IN FRY 52% 75% BOYCOTT

1992 BOSNIA INDEPENDENCE 63% 99% WAR

THE CAUCASUS

DATE ENCLAVE MOTION Turn out

% FOR

EFFECT

1999 NAGORNO-KARABAKH

INDEPENDENCE 82% 99% STALE-MATE

2006 -“- INDEPENDENT CONSTITUTION

87% 99%

1999 ABHAZIA INDEPENDENCE 97% 99% STALE-MATE

2007 S OSSETIA INDEPENDENCE >90% 99% STALE-MATE

RWANDARWANDA

““Rubanda Nyamwinshi”Rubanda Nyamwinshi”

the majority peoplethe majority people

POLL TAXPOLL TAX

Poll TaxPoll Tax ToryTory

Property TaxProperty Tax LabourLabour

Local Income TaxLocal Income Tax Lib-DemsLib-Dems

Land taxLand tax GreensGreens

The rates The rates (status quo)(status quo)

OLYMPICSOLYMPICS

• LondonLondon

• MadridMadrid

• MoscowMoscow

• New YorkNew York

• ParisParis

NORMAL DISTRIBUTION CURVENORMAL DISTRIBUTION CURVEDistribution.

Figure 1 -- Standard Normal Distribution

Table I A group of 2 may exercise a majority veto in a society of

3.

That group of 3 may then exercise a majority veto in a society of

5;

– ’’ – 5 – ’’ – 9;

– ’’ – 9 – ’’ – 17;

– ’’ – 17 – ’’ – 33;

– ’’ – 33 – ’’ – 65;

– ’’ – 65 – ’’ – 129;

– ’’ – 129 – ’’ – 257;

– ’’ – 257 – ’’ – 513;

and that group of 513 – ’’ – 1025.

TABLE 1

If a country wants to be independenT

then, if

a majority of the whole votes in favour, it may.

UK Yugo-slavia

but if a minority wants to opt out, and if

a majority of that minority – ” – Ireland Serbia

but if a minority of the minority

– ” – a majority of that minority of the minority

– ” – N Ireland Kosova

but if a minority of the minority of the minority

– ” – a majority of that minority of the minority of the minority

– ” – W Belfast NorthMitrovica

but if a minority of the minority of the minority of the minority

– ” – a majority of the minority of the minority of the minority of the minority

– ” –

but if …. – ” – …. – ” –

but if 17 – ” – 9 – ” –

but if 9 – ” – 5 – ” –

but if 5 – ” – 3 – ” –

but if 3 – ” – 2 – ” –

TABLE II

MAJORITARIANISMMAJORITARIANISM

“ “Democracy is based on majority Democracy is based on majority decision. It is the most important decision. It is the most important instrument for finding peaceful instrument for finding peaceful solutions to conflicts.”solutions to conflicts.”

UNESCO UNESCO

DECISION-MAKINGBC = Borda count MBC = modified Borda count

CLOSED QUESTIONS

OPEN QUESTIONS

Borda BC / MBC

All prefs

Condorcet (Copeland)

Approval Voting UN

AV or STV or IRV

Some prefs

Serial Vote* Sweden

Weighted Majority

SA

Comsociational Majority Belgium

2-round Voting* Norway

C O U N T 1st

prefs only

Simple Majority - UK

Twin Majority

Switzerland

Plurality New Zealand

1 of 2 options

1 of some options

1 or some of all

options

1, some or all of all options

1st preference only PREFERENTIAL

BINARY MULTI-OPTIONAL

* = a series of closed questions

V O T E R S ' C H O I C E

THE WILL OF THE PEOPLETHE WILL OF THE PEOPLE

ClosedClosed questions questions yes-or-noyes-or-nofor-or-againstfor-or-againstwin-or-losewin-or-lose(i.e., (i.e., somesome people) people)

OpenOpen - i.e., multi-option – questions - i.e., multi-option – questionsyes 1yes 1stst, (and 2, (and 2ndnd , and 3 , and 3rdrd …) …)win-winwin-win(i.e., (i.e., allall people). people).

A PLURAL DEMOCRACYA PLURAL DEMOCRACY

• Collective wisdom, or unanimityCollective wisdom, or unanimity

• Common consensusCommon consensus

• Best possible compromiseBest possible compromise

AVERAGE PREFERENCE SCOREAVERAGE PREFERENCE SCOREON A 5-OPTION BALLOTON A 5-OPTION BALLOT

IF EVERYONE GIVES A IF EVERYONE GIVES A CERTAIN OPTIONCERTAIN OPTION

THEIRTHEIR

THAT OPTION WILL GET AN THAT OPTION WILL GET AN AVERAGE PREFERENCE AVERAGE PREFERENCE

SCORE OF SCORE OF

11STST PREFERENCE PREFERENCE 1 (THE MAXIMUM)1 (THE MAXIMUM)

22NDND PREFERENCE PREFERENCE 22

33RDRD PREFERENCE PREFERENCE 3 (THE MEAN)3 (THE MEAN)

44THTH PREFERENCE PREFERENCE 44

55THTH PREFERENCE PREFERENCE 5 (THE MINIMUM)5 (THE MINIMUM)

A VOTERS’ PROFILEA VOTERS’ PROFILE

11STST 22NDND 33RDRD 44THTH 55THTH AverageAverage

PreferendePreferende

ScoreScore

AA

BB

CC 1515 -- -- -- -- 11

DD

EE




ScoreScore

AA

BB

CC 1515 -- -- -- -- 11

DD

EE -- -- -- -- 1515 55




ScoreScore

AA

BB

CC 1515 -- -- -- -- 11

DD -- -- 1515 -- -- 33

EE -- -- -- -- 1515 55




ScoreScore

AA -- 77 -- 88 -- c.3c.3

BB -- 88 -- 77 -- c.3c.3

CC 1515 -- -- -- -- 11

DD -- -- 1515 -- -- 33

EE -- -- -- -- 1515 55

A PLURAL DEMOCRACYA PLURAL DEMOCRACY

• Collective wisdom, or unanimityCollective wisdom, or unanimity1-1.51-1.5

• Common consensusCommon consensus 1.5-21.5-2

• Best possible compromiseBest possible compromise 2-2.52-2.5

LEVEL OF CONSENSUS LEVEL OF CONSENSUS ON A 5-OPTION BALLOTON A 5-OPTION BALLOT

IF OPTION IF OPTION DD, SAY , SAY GETS THE HIGHEST GETS THE HIGHEST

AVERGAE AVERGAE PREFERENCE SCORE PREFERENCE SCORE

OFOF

OPTION OPTION DD WILL WILL REPRESENT THEREPRESENT THE

1 – 1.51 – 1.5 UNANIMOUS UNANIMOUS VIEWPOINTVIEWPOINT

1.5 – 21.5 – 2 COMMON CONSENSUSCOMMON CONSENSUS

2 – 2.52 – 2.5 BEST POSSIBLE BEST POSSIBLE COMPROMISECOMPROMISE

CONSENSUS COEFFICIENTCONSENSUS COEFFICIENT

The consensus coefficient, C, of option The consensus coefficient, C, of option AA, is, is CCAA; ;

wherewhere S SAA is the MBC score of option A, is the MBC score of option A,

where V is the valid vote, and where V is the valid vote, and

where where nn is the number of options, is the number of options,

CCAA is given by: is given by:

CCAA = S = SAA / V. / V.nn

Borda countBorda count

A full voteA full vote == n, n-1 … 2, 1n, n-1 … 2, 1

Modified Borda CountModified Borda Count

A full vote A full vote = = n, n-1 … 2, 1n, n-1 … 2, 1

A partial voteA partial vote == m, m-1 … 2, 1m, m-1 … 2, 1

PARTIAL VOTING IN AN MBCPARTIAL VOTING IN AN MBC

He who votes for 1 option gives his favourite 1 pt.He who votes for 1 option gives his favourite 1 pt.



She who votes for 2 options gives her favourite 2 pts She who votes for 2 options gives her favourite 2 pts (and her 2(and her 2ndnd choice 1 pt). choice 1 pt).



She who votes for 2 options gives her favourite 2 pts She who votes for 2 options gives her favourite 2 pts (and her 2(and her 2ndnd choice 1 pt). choice 1 pt).

He who votes for 3 options gives his favourite 3 pts, He who votes for 3 options gives his favourite 3 pts, (his 2(his 2ndnd choice 2 pts and his 3 choice 2 pts and his 3rdrd choice 1 pt). choice 1 pt).


If you vote for:If you vote for:

Number of optionsNumber of options

11 22 33 44

your 1your 1STST pref gets: pref gets: 1 pt1 pt 2pts2pts 3 pts3 pts 4 pts4 ptsyour 2your 2NDND pref gets: pref gets: 1 pt1 pt 2pts2pts 3 pts3 pts

your 3your 3RDRD pref gets: pref gets: 1 pt1 pt 2pts2pts

your 4your 4THTH pref gets: pref gets: 1 pt1 pt

CLOSED OPEN

THRESHOLD THRESHOLD THRESHOLD THRESHOLD

HIGH LOW HIGH LOW HIGH LOW HIGH LOW

C

O

U

N

T

Allprefs

QBS + top-up

E L E C T O R A L S Y S T E M SE L E C T O R A L S Y S T E M S QBS

BC/MBC

Condorcet

someprefs

PR-STVIreland

PR-ListSwiss

Approval Voting

AVAustralia

2-roundFrance

Mixed FPP + PRCroatia

MMP - Germany

1st

prefsFPPUK

PR-listclosedIsrael

AMS FPP

PR-listHolland

Lebanon

1 party only 1 candidateof 1 party

1 or some candidates of 1 or some parties

1, some or all candidates of any or

all parties

V O T E R S ' C H O I C E

QBS - THE QUOTA BORDA SYSTEMQBS - THE QUOTA BORDA SYSTEM in a 4-seater constituencyin a 4-seater constituency

• All candidates gaining the quota are elected.All candidates gaining the quota are elected.

• All pairs of candidates gaining 2 quotas are All pairs of candidates gaining 2 quotas are elected.elected.

• ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

• All pairs gaining 1 quota elect 1 candidate, (the All pairs gaining 1 quota elect 1 candidate, (the one with the higher MBC score).one with the higher MBC score).

• All remaining seats go to those candidates with All remaining seats go to those candidates with the highest MBC scores.the highest MBC scores.

THE MATRIX VOTE

P R E F E R E N C E SPORT

FOLIOS 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th

PM

DEPUTY PM

MINISTER OF A

MINISTER OF B

MINISTER OF C

MINISTER OF D

Documents

In deeds mediation, questions are open; in politics, then, why are they closed? The de Borda Institute