BREAKING FREE OF

HISTORY?

IMPRISONMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND

DR MICHELLE BUTLER

26TH

MARCH 2015

QUEEN’S UNIVERSITY BELFAST

ORGANISATIONAL

CHANGE MANAGEMENT

Understanding change by the rate of occurrence, how it came about and its scale is believed to be important for its successful or failure (By, 2005).

Perception that most change programmes do not succeed (Balogun, Hope & Bailey, 2004; Hughes, 2011; Isern & Pung, 2007).

Resistance to change cited as one of the reasons behind failed change programmes (Bovey & Hede, 2001; Erwin & Garman, 2010). BUT resistance can be positive as well as negative.

According to Erwin and Garman (2010) factors influencing change management engagement include:

- Individual factors (coping, psychological characteristics, threats and benefits analysis)

- Communication, understanding and participation

- Relationships with management

PRIOR TO REFORM

PRISON REFORM IN

NORTHERN IRELAND

Hillsborough Agreement (2010) required an independent prison service review.

Significant programme of change begun in 2011 (Prison Review Team, 2011a), 2011b.

Led to four year change programme called Strategic Efficiency & Effectiveness (SEE) Programme in 2011.

Proposed that NIPS would by 2015:

- Be well led and competently managed

- Have a fit, flexible, motivated, well trained, well rewarded staff

- Be compact and cost-effective

- Have the offender at the centre of its focus

- Reduce the risk of re-offending on release

- Be respected and valued by the community

PRISON REVIEW TEAM

The service remains a small and rather inward looking organisation, trapped by its own fraught history and wrestling with long standing difficulties (Pearson Review Team, 2009; p5).

NIPS had become a demoralised and dysfunctional service, resigned to bad press and routine criticism, and reacting to it by putting up defensive barriers, with little confidence that anything could, or in some cases should, change (Prison Review Team, 2009: p4)

The Troubles skewed the focus of the [prison] service. Security and control were paramount…there was a deliberate policy of prison officers not engaging with prisoners because of the risk of conditioning leading to damaging consequences. Recruitment was rapid, training rudimentary in matters other than basic security. Belfast prison and then the Maze dominated the system (Prison Review Team, 2009:4-5)

PRISON REVIEW TEAM

“Since 2005, those reports have produced over 1500 recommendations that have been accepted. But little has changed, and many hundreds of unachieved recommendations hang around the service like a dead weight, recorded in ever‐lengthening ‘action’ plans, many of which cannot be actioned without addressing more fundamental issues. As a consequence, monitoring and reviewing bodies are constantly frustrated, most prison staff are demoralised at the constant barrage of criticism, and many managers have reverted to a ‘can’t do’ mentality. Each failure to change has reinforced poor cultures and practice and further disheartened the managers and staff who want and are committed to a more positive approach.” (Prison Review Team, 2011: 29)

PRISON REVIEW TEAM

40 recommendations from the Prison Review Team (2011a,

2011b) with five high level recommendations:

Agreement on and ownership of vision and aims of the

system

Properly resourced change management programme,

including change manager, change management team and

oversight committee.

Measures to reinforce governance, accountability and

efficiency

Staff redundancy and development package

Focus on dynamic security and introduction of free

movement.

CONFLICT AND

PENAL REFORM

MacBride (1982) argued that the detention of political prisoners hinders penal reform as the priority of government is security and deterrence.

Butler (2015) suggests that while political imprisonment in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland may have distracted from and impeded penal reform, it could also sometimes promote change through political prisoners’ use of litigation (see McEvoy, 2001).

Nonetheless, there was a ‘wider culture of denial and compromise in the system as a whole’ (Prison Review Team, 2011a: 31) including senior civil servants and prison management, resulting in ‘problems being buried rather than faced’ (Prison Review Team, 2011b: 6).

The reform of the NIPS was not undertaken until AFTER devolution of justice powers to the NI Assembly.

REACTIONS TO

REFORM

Much achieved but more to do. 21 recommendations signed off by Oversight Committee with 16 referred for independent assessment (Justice Committee, 2014).

Redundancy and staff development package implemented, reducing cost per prisoner per year to £62,898 in 2013-2014 compared to £90,298 in 2006/2007 (NIPS, 2007, 2014).

Attempts to develop initiatives and improve regimes e.g. focus on families, drug free landings, restorative justice, secure college and step-down facilities amongst others.

Introduced freer movements and greater use of dynamic security and intelligence led searches.

Staff welcoming involvement in reintegration and rehabilitation.

REACTIONS TO

REFORM

However, implementation of the change programme exacerbated feelings of distrust and alienation for some through the perceived devaluing of older staff ‘jailcraft’.

Loss of experienced staff and replacement with inexperienced staff has been challenging.

47% of new recruits believed to be either on long-term sick leave or have resigned (McMahon, 2014).

Concerns remain about regime.

Issues around political prisoners continue.

NIPS staff continue to feel more undervalued, not informed, dissatisfied with management and handling of change programme compared to others working in the justice sector (DOJNI, 2014).

REACTIONS TO

REFORM

“It found an English solution to an Irish problem and it is not working …. People should have been working with the prison officers. …. I read that, and it made me really angry, because the people making comments such as that were from another jurisdiction. Let me be clear: new custody officers coming into the Prison Service are being intermingled with existing officers. They have worked very well together, and Sue McAllister recognises that. The same comment was made previously that we, the old officers, would contaminate the new ones. … The NIPS has to be commended for how it has done its job over the years. I was really angry that people would come here from another jurisdiction, without having a clue about the NIPS, and make comments such as that. I took offence at the comments too” (Committee for Justice, 2013: 13-14).

REACTIONS TO

REFORM

“There were significant tensions about the direction of travel, particularly that of the consultation. Our members are the ones who have to deliver the reform agenda … however … you cannot do that if you do not know what is going on. … there have been a number of significant changes in the past 12 months. … significantly more consultation, not just with the PGA but with governing governors and deputy governors … which has allowed us all to operate as a team, and generally in the one direction. Having said all that, I think that it is important to emphasise that the Prison Governors Association has some concerns. … we do not want the budgetary cuts to impact too much on a lot of the progress that has been and continues to be made, because that may do damage to regimes and staffing levels, which will lead to issues down the line. … We think that there should be, over time, more home-grown talent … which, for many years — I make no bones about it — did not happen. I hope that, in going forward, all the new unit managers, functional managers and governors will address that deficit, which is a crying shame. We should have our own talent. We, in Northern Ireland, are a very talented people, and we know our business. I think that more home-grown talent should be brought through. That is critical, because then you can take ownership. You live here. It is OK making decisions, but decisions — sometimes strange decisions — are easy made if you are not there to live with the consequences. It is very important that we make that point on behalf of the Prison Governors' Association” (Committee for Justice, 2014: 4-6).

WHERE ARE WE NOW?

By (2007) suggests such a context for the reform of NIPS may provide a more challenging environment within which to implement and sustain organisational change management and this seems to have been the case.

Factors believed to promote engagement with and reduce resistance to change management could have been considered more. For example:

More thought to the psychological characteristics of NIPS staff and prisoners and how they were likely to react to the reform programme, especially given the history of the Troubles.

Communication, understanding and participation could have been improved particularly as key individuals came from outside the jurisdiction, fuelling perceptions of NIPS staff as undervalued.

The need to build trust and confidence in management to drive the change agenda, develop and support staff needs to be improved.

Focus has primarily been on the prison and prison staff but the history of the Troubles also shapes people’s perceptions of NIPS, influencing how they behave when they enter prison. This potentially contributes to negative spirals and worse outcomes for some which needs to be addressed.

Could use of litigation to challenge prison practices be contributing to a more slowed pace of change and cautiousness?

So is NIPS breaking free of

its history?

Yes to a certain extent but legacy issues

remain.

QUESTIONS?

REFERENCES

Balogun, J. & Hope, H.V. (2004) Exploring Strategic Change. London: Prentice Hall.

Bovey, W.H. & Hede, A. (2001) ‘Resistance to organisational change: the role of defence mechanisms’, Journal of Managerial Psychology, 16(7): 534-548.

Butler, M. (2015) ‘Prisoners and Prison Life’ in D. Healy, C. Hamilton, Y. Daly & M. Butler (eds) Routledge Handbook of Irish Criminology. Abingdon: Routlege.

By, R.T. (2005) ‘Organisational change management: a critical review’, Journal of Change Management, 5(4): 369-380.

Committee for Justice (2014) Prison Reform Programme: Prison Governor Association’, Hansard 27th March 2014. Belfast: Northern Ireland Assembly.

Committee for Justice (2013) Prison Reform Programme: Prison Officers’ Association Briefing’, Hansard 6th June 2013. Belfast: Northern Ireland Assembly.

DOJNI (2014) Department of Justice Staff Attitudes 2013. Belfast: DOJNI.

Erwin, D.G. & Garman, A.N. (2010) ‘Resistance to organisational change: linking research and practice’, Leadership & Organization, 31(1): 39-56.

Hughes, M. (2011) ‘Do 70 per cent of all organizational change initiatives really fail?’, Journal of Change Management, 11(4): 451-464.

Isern, J., & Pung, A. (2007) ‘Harnessing energy to drive organizational change’, McKinsey Quarterly, 1, 16-19.

REFERENCES

Justice Committee (2014) Prison Review Oversight Group Justice Committee Summary Report December 2014. Belfast: DOJNI.

MacBridge, S. (1982) Crime and Punishment. Dublin: Ward River Press.

McEvoy, K. (2001) Paramilitary Imprisonment in Northern Ireland: Resistance, Management, and Release. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

McMahon (2014) Half of all Prison Recruits have already Quit or are on Long-Term Sick Leave. Available at http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/half-prison-service-recruits-already-4706998 (Accessed: 21st January 2015).

NIPS (2014) Annual Report and Accounts 2013-2014. Belfast: NIPS.

NIPS (2007) Annual Report and Accounts 2006-2007. Belfast: NIPS.

Prison Review Team (2011a) Review of the Northern Ireland Prison Service: Conditions, Managemetn and Oversight of all Prisons - Interim Report. Belfast: Prison Review Team.

Prison Review Team (2011b) Review of the Northern Ireland Prison Service: Conditions, Management and Oversight of all Prisons – Final Report. Belfast: Prison Review Team.