IMPORTANT MESSAGE ON PAGE 115 · Introduction A conference, attended by over 400 people, took place in the ... Leçons de la crise du CrØdit Lyonnais, par Nicola PESARESI, DG COMP-H-3

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Introduction

A conference, attended by over 400 people, took place in theBrussels� Metropole Hotel on the 14th and 15th September tocelebrate the 10th anniversary of the introduction of Europeanmerger control. Introducing the conference, Mr Romano Prodi,the President of the European Commission, took the opportunityto stress the importance that the Commission places on the role ofDG COMP in maintaining competitive markets around the globe.He described the Merger Regulation as not only one of theCommission�s �great success stories of the last decade� but alsoas �a cornerstone� of the Community�s competition policy andre-affirmed the Commission decision to increase the resourcesavailable to merger control as soon as possible.

The conference was organised by members of the Merger TaskForce in association with the International Bar Association (IBA),and attracted speakers of the highest calibre, including threeprevious Competition Commissioners, Peter Sutherland, LordBrittan and Karel Van Miert, senior representatives ofcompetition authorities in both Europe and the United States, toppractitioners and representatives from business. There was asimilar spread of people in the audience, includingrepresentatives from over 35 countries, including all MemberStates, the accession countries, and others, such as the US,Canada, Japan, Australia, Russia and South Korea.

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ISSN1025-2266

2000number 3October

Published three times a year by the Competition Directorate-General of the European Commission

ContentsArticles1 EC Merger control: 10th anniversary conference - 14/15 September

2000, by Alexander SCHAUB, Director-General of CompetitionDG, Carina JOERGENSEN, Ewoud SAKKERS, Neil MARSHALLand Karen WILLIAMS

5 The application of the guidelines on fines: an overview, by MiguelÁngel PEÑA CASTELLOT, DG COMP-A-1

Opinion and comments12 Crises bancaires : un bilan de l'application des règles de

concurrence en matière d'aides d'Etat. Leçons de la crise du CréditLyonnais, par Nicola PESARESI, DG COMP-H-3 et ChristopheDE LA ROCHEFORDIERE, DG COMP-C-1

27 Sabre contre Amadeus e.a.. : un dossier riche en enseignements,par Enrico Maria ARMANI, DG COMP-H-2

33 Positive Comity, by Stephen Ryan, DG COMP A-435 La cohérence entre la politique de concurrence et les fonds

structurels, par Nicoletta FALCONE et Paola ICARDI, DGCOMP-G-3

Anti-trust Rules39 Commission fines ADM, Ajinomoto, others in lysine cartel, by

Georg DE BRONETT, DG COMP-C-240 Commission prohibits discriminatory landing fees at Spanish

airports, by Oliver STEHMANN, DG COMP-D-244 Adoption of Regulation 823/2000 renewing the block exemption for

liner shipping consortia, by Charles WILLIAMS, DG COMP-D-248 The Commission persuades Saeco to implement an international

guarantee for its products and closes the complaint file, by RobertMATHIAK, DG COMP-F-1

49 Amende contre les Editions Nathan sur ses accords de distributionde matériel éducatif, par Manuel MARTÍNEZ-LÓPEZ, DG COMP-F-1

50 Judgement by the Court of First Instance of 6 July 2000 concerningCommission Decision 98/273//Volkswagen of 28 January 1998, byUlrich KRAUSE-HEIBER and Konrad SCHUMM, DG COMP-F-2

54 The Commission approves the co-operation agreement betweenGeneral Motors Corporation and Fiat SpA, by Alberta LASCHENAand Christophe DUSSART, DG COMP-F-2

56 The Commission's assessment of the participation of BSKYB in thepay-tv operator in Germany, by Andrew HOBBS, DG COMP-C-2

Mergers61 Merger Control: main developments between 1st May and 31st

August 2000, by Walter TRETTON, Neil MARSHALL and AnnaPAPAIOANNOU, DG COMP-B

State Aid75 Main developments between 1st June and 30th September 2000, by

Madeleine TILMANS, DG COMP-G-1International83 Séminaire euro-méditerranéen sur le droit et la politique de

concurrence à Casablanca (Maroc) les 18 et 19 juillet 2000, parJean-François PONS, Directeur Général adjoint

84 Accords euro-méditerranéens et concurrence : une réponse auxproblèmes de développement et de mondialisation - Casablanca,18-19 juillet 2000, par Jean-François PONS, Directeur Généraladjoint

Information Section87 Competition DG Staff list89 Documentation114 Coming Up115 IMPORTANT MESSAGE116 CASES COVERED IN THIS ISSUE

EC Merger Control: 10th anniversaryconference - 14/15 September 2000Alexander SCHAUB, Director-General ofCompetition DG,Carina JOERGENSEN, Ewoud SAKKERS,Neil MARSHALL and Karen WILLIAMS

! ! IMPORTANT MESSAGE ON PAGE 115 ! !

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Competition Policy Newsletter 2000 Number 3 October2

Over the two days of theconference, chaired by J WilliamRowley QC, Chairman of theIBA�s section on Business Law,and Colin Overbury, the firstDirector of the Merger TaskForce, the speakers andparticipants in the open sessionscovered a wide spectrum ofissues and not only provided anexcellent opportunity to take aretrospective look at theexperience gained during theregime�s first ten years, but alsoprovided a forum to highlightissues and challenges which theCommission needs to address forthe future. The conferencestarted with debate on theincreasingly global contextwithin which competitionauthorities exist, moved ontoseveral important contributionsexamining the Commission�ssubstantive developments, andended with an examination ofvarious procedural aspects ofhow the Merger regime currentlyoperates and how it could andshould operate. Mr Monti, whogave the conference�s closingaddress, welcomed the �richnessand depth� of all thecontributions from speakers andparticipants in the open sessionsalike.

Merger Control in anInternational Context

Globalisation continues to createmany challenges for mergercontrol authorities around theworld and the importance ofthese challenges was stressed byall the contributors. In thisopening session which wasmoderated by Sir Christopher

Bellamy (Head of the UKCompetition Tribunal) theDirector-General of DG COMP,Alexander Schaub, opened byhighlighting potential dangerswhich can arise from globalmergers in highly concentratedindustries and the growingnecessity for the Commission toanalyse these mergers from theperspective of oligopolistic aswell as single firm dominance.He also elaborated on thebilateral co-operation, inparticular with the USauthorities, which has evolvedsignificantly in recent years.This was a theme taken up byRobert Pitofsky, Chairman of theUS FTC, who stressed thebenefits of this close co-operation which has led toconsiderable convergencebetween authorities on bothsubstantive and proceduralmatters. In his address MarioSiragusa, a leading competitionlawyer, set out how bilateral co-operation should functionoptimally from the practitioner�spoint of view.

Joel Klein, Assistant Attorney-General of the US DoJ, agreedthat bilateral co-operation is anexcellent template but by itself isinsufficient to cope with presentand future challenges posed byglobal mergers. He thereforecalled for a Global CompetitionInitiative along the lines set outin the ICPAC recommendationsmade earlier this year. JacquesBougie, CEO of AlcanAluminium Ltd, gave weight tothe benefits that such aninitiative could bring byhighlighting the transactional

costs involved in filing globalmergers, and stressing that legaluncertainty is the �number oneenemy� of business.

In providing an investmentbank's perspective on this issue,Peter Sutherland, now Chairmanand Managing Director ofGoldman Sachs, also emphasisedthe need for legal certainty andfor strengthened co-operation onboth a bi-lateral and multi-lateralbasis. He also stated that,together with an independentcentral bank and a strongsecurities regulator, strong andindependent competition policyis one of the three criticalcomponents of a successfuleconomic model, and that in hisview, DG Competition has todate �amply fulfilled its part ofthe equation�.

Many of the challenges raised bythese contributors wereacknowledged by CommissionerMonti in his closing speech. Inparticular, he emphasised theimportance placed on the bi-lateral arrangements between theEU and the US and Canadawhich have formed the modelfor arrangements with the EU�sother trading partners andstressed that these will remain�fundamental� in the future. Atthe same time, theCommissioner welcomed JoelKlein�s call for a move towardsmulti-lateralism as a constructivestep to address the concernsraised by both business and thelegal community about thepotential for inconsistentdecisions across the globe, andthe spiralling costs incurred in

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Competition Policy Newsletter 2000 Number 3 October 3

making multi-national mergerfilings.

Recent developments in ECMerger Control Law

In the first afternoon session,moderated by PhilippeChappatte, Götz Drauz, Directorof the Merger Task Force,discussed the Commission�sassessment of dominance, and inparticular developments indealing with oligopolies, verticalmergers and potentialcompetition, all of which havebeen relevant in recent Phase IIcases. In relation to the first ofthese, Mr Drauz emphasisedhow the Commission has soughtto apply oligopoly theory in itsanalysis of oligopolisticsituations, in order to distinguishbetween �good� oligopolies,namely those markets whichmay have only a few players butwhich are intensely competitive,and �bad� oligopolies which willengender anti-competitiveoutcomes. Mr Drauz also statedthat it is the Commission�sintention to refine and furtherdevelop its policy in this difficultarea through individual casesand to enhance legal certaintythrough issuing a notice dealingwith the assessment ofoligopolistic dominance underthe ECMR.

In commenting on these issues,Frédéric Jenny, Vice-Presidentof the Conseil de la Concurrencein Paris, outlined the theoreticalperspective for assessingoligopolies, while JochenBurrichter, a leading competitionlawyer, raised the issue of the

extent to which other membersof an oligopoly should beinvolved in the administrativeprocedure of a notified merger.The session ended with a livelyopen discussion, including anumber of interesting questionsfrom the floor.

Remedies: Finding the RightCure

Barry Hawk was moderator forthe third main session of theconference which addressed theissue of remedies and thedifficulties faced in trying to findsolutions to particularcompetition problems in thecontext of merger investigations.Claude Rakovsky, Head of Unitin the Merger Task Force,described how the Commission�spractice is evolving. His talkcovered both procedural andsubstantive issues, the mostimportant of which are asfollows. First, when companiespropose remedies it is vital thatthey be designed to address thecompetition problems that havebeen identified. Second, theburden of proof rests with thecompanies proposing theremedies to provide proof thatthey will be effective. Mr Montitook this further, highlightingthat for the Commission toaccept remedies, it must bepersuaded that a purchaser willnot only need to be independentand viable, but that it will needto have the right incentives tocompete. Mr Monti also stressedthat since complexity leadsdirectly to uncertainty, thesolutions proposed cannot be

more complex than the problemsthey are designed to address.

Kevin Arquit, Chair of theAntitrust and Trade LawCommittee of the IBA, outlineddevelopments in the practice ofthe US authorities over the yearsand presented a criticalassessment on the findings of therecent FTC study on itsdivestiture process. JuanRodriguez, BP Amoco�sAntitrust Counsel, gave theacquirer�s perspective andhighlighted that companies needto anticipate from the outset thatremedial relief may be necessaryand to consider whatimplications this may have.Cornelis Canenbley discussedcertain problems in the contextof remedies. He described thepractice under German mergercontrol law and emphasised howimportant it is that mergerdecisions in the US and inEurope should be taken atapproximately the same time.Rachel Brandenburgerquestioned, in particular,whether it might not beappropriate to consider thepossibility to �stop the clock� toenable both the merging partiesand the Commission more timeto propose and discussappropriate remedies.

Lord Brittan closed the first dayand ex-Commissioner Karel vanMiert opened the second daywith personal accounts of theirtimes as Commissioners withresponsibility for Competitionpolicy and in particular mergercontrol. Lord Brittan wasCommissioner at the time the

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Merger Regulation was adoptedand first came into force, whileKarel Van Miert wasCommissioner from 1993 to1999.

Judicial Review

Guilliano Marenco, PrincipalAdviser of the Legal Service ofthe European Commission,explained the role of theEuropean Court of Justice in thedevelopment of EC mergercontrol in the very limitednumber of merger cases that hasbeen appealed so far. Kali &Salz is the only judgement wherea Commission�s decision hasactually been annulled.

The importance of this issue ofjudicial review was shown bythe number of times it wasraised, both by the speakers andfrom the floor. Mr Monti statedthat a properly functioningjudicial review system isessential to ensure that theCommission maintains a highlevel of quality in its decisions.He also expressed the view thatthe Court would have all theCommission�s support to debateany modifications of currentprocedures that the Court itselfconsiders necessary to improveits role.

The future of EC MergerControl

The final session provided aforum to present issues for theMerger Review, and wasmoderated by JacquesBourgeois. Paul Malric-Smith,Head of Unit in the Merger Task

Force, introduced the mainfindings of the Commission�s2000 report to the Council on theapplication of the thresholds inthe Merger Regulation whicheffectively act as the gateway tothe Commission�s �one-stop-shop� for examining mergers.

This was followed by a series ofshort presentations and a paneldiscussion on issues which couldform part of the Commission�sreview of the current mergerregime. Ulf Bőge, President ofthe Bundeskartellamt, encour-aged the Commission not tofocus on the thresholds issue, butrather to concentrate onimproving the referral processesbetween the Commission andMember States. These alreadyexist in the Merger Regulationunder Articles 9 and 22. AlecBurnside titled his contribution�Bumps in the level playingfield� which set out a critique ofthe procedural framework and itspractical consequences fornotifying parties. MorrisTabaksblat, President of theEuropean Round Table ofIndustrialists, expressed hisdesire for the Commission towiden its review to look not justat procedural issues, but alsosubstantive ones, such asdefining geographical markets.F. Enrique Gonzalez Diaz, Headof Unit in the Merger TaskForce, concluded the sessionwith a discussion of some non-threshold related issues whichcould be reviewed, for examplewhether the notion of aconcentration is sufficientlywide.

Mr Monti stressed that theReview would be all-encompassing and emphasisedthat, in order for the MergerReview to produce successfuland well-balanced solutions, theCommission will rely heavily onactive participation and co-operation from all the companiesand authorities concerned.

The main challenges for a newdecade of EC merger control

In a wide ranging speech thatcovered all of the issues raisedduring the conference, Mr Montiwent to considerable lengths toaddress the points raised by theprevious speakers. Many ofthese have been highlightedabove. In addition, he stated thatthe breadth and depth of thediscussions showed how muchthe regime has matured in recentyears. The Commissioneremphasised that he believes theEC merger regime is widelyrespected and that he asCompetition Commissioner iscommitted to ensure that thiswill continue into the future.

Conclusion

The conference provided anexcellent opportunity not just totake a retrospective look at thefirst ten years of EC mergercontrol, but also to look to thefuture. The quality of thecontributions from the variousspeakers and other participantshas produced a number ofinitiatives and ideas that will beexplored by the Commissionover the forthcoming months.

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Section IIntroduction

After 2½ years of application ofthe Guidelines on fines1, and 14cases2 where fines have been 1 Guidelines on the method of setting

fines imposed pursuant to Article 15(2) of Regulation N° 17 and Article65 (5) of the ECSC Treaty. OJ C9/3of 14.1.98.

2 Alloy surcharge. CommissionDecision of 21.1.98 relating to aproceeding pursuant to Article 65 ofthe ECSC Treaty. OJ L100/55 of1.4.98.Volkswagen. Commission Decisionof 28.1.98 relating to a proceedingpursuant to Article 81 (ex Article85) of the EC Treaty. OJ L124/60 of25.4.98.AAMS. Commission Decision of17.6.98 relating to a proceedingpursuant to Article 82 (ex Article86) of the EC Treaty. OJ L252/47 of12.9.98.TACA. Commission Decision of16.9.98 relating to a proceedingpursuant to Articles 81 and 82 (exArticles 85 and 86) of the ECTreaty. OJ L95/1 of 9.4.99British Sugar. Commission Decisionof 14.10.98 relating to a proceedingpursuant to Article 81 (ex Article85) of the EC Treaty. OJ L76/1 of22.3.99.Pre-insulated Pipes. CommissionDecision of 21.10.98 relating to aproceeding pursuant to Article 81(ex Article 85) of the EC Treaty. OJL24 of 30.1.99.Greek ferries. Commission decisionof 9.12.98 relating to a proceedingunder Article 81 (ex Aricle 85) ofthe EC Treaty. OJ L109/24 of27.4.98

imposed - including record fineson a single company(Volkswagen) and on a cartel(TACA), it is an appropriatetime to give a short overview ofall decisions adopted so far3 inorder to show how theGuidelines are being applied inpractice.

This article tries to do so in thefollowing way. Section II

Virgin�BA. Commission Decision of14.7.99 relating to a proceedingpursuant to Article 82 of the ECTreaty. OJ L30/1 of 4.2.00.World Cup 98. CommissionDecision of 20.7.99 relating to aproceeding pursuant to Article 82 ofthe EC Treaty. OJ L5/55 of 8.1.00FEG �TU. Commission decision of26.10.99 relating to a proceedingunder Article 81 of the EC Treaty.OJ L39/1 of 14.2.00.Seamless Steel Tubes. Commissiondecision of 8.12.99 relating to aproceeding under Article 81 of theEC Treaty (case IV/35.860). Not yetpublished.FETTCSA. Commission decision of16.5.00 relating to a proceedingunder Article 81 of the EC Treaty(case IV/34.018). Not yet published.Amino Acids. Commission decisionof 7.6.00 relating to a proceedingpursuant to Article 81 of the ECTreaty and Article 53 of the EEAAgreement (case Comp/36.545).Not yet published.Nathan � Bricolux. Commissiondecision of 5.7.00 relating to aproceeding pursuant to Article 81 ofthe EC Treaty (case Comp/36.516).Not yet published.

3 Mid-September 2000.

explains in some detail the stepsto be followed in a given case toset the level of fines inaccordance with the Guidelines.Section III lists conclusions inthe decisions adopted so far onthe assessment of the threeelements that define �gravity�and deals also briefly withduration. Section IV deals withaggravating and attenuatingcircumstances. Finally, SectionV examines how the excessiveduration of the Commission�sproceedings is being taken intoaccount in the calculation offines.

The description that follows ismore of a qualitative than aquantitative nature. Hence, finalamounts of fines are notincluded. In addition, this articledoes not discuss the elements onwhich the decision to impose afine in a given case is based (i.e.what makes the Commission gobeyond a declaratory negativedecision). Finally, this articlewill be followed by another onedealing with the application ofthe Leniency Notice4.

Section IIThe methodology of theGuidelines

The calculation of the fine in adecision follows several steps:

A. Gravity

First a starting amount is decidedon the basis of the overall 4 Commission Notice on the non-

imposition or reduction of fines incartel cases. OJ C207/4 of 18.7.96.

The application of the guidelines onfines: an overviewMiguel Ángel Peña Castellot, Comp-A-1

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gravity of the infringement. Thedetermination of the overallgravity depends on the nature ofthe infringement, the geographicmarket affected and the impactof the infringement on themarket. Three non-overlappingranges for likely startingamounts are defined in theGuidelines: Minor (€ 1 000 to€ 1 million), serious (€ 1 millionto € 20 million) and very serious(over € 20 million). In cartelcases involving firms of verydifferent sizes, the startingamount could be differentiatedtaking into account the relativesizes of the cartel members5.

Sometimes, in order to achieve asufficient degree of deterrence,the starting amount correspon-ding to a multi-product/multinational firm could beincreased. This has been done sofar by means of applying amultiplying factor to the startingamount for such a firm6.

5 In order to do so, a limited number

of groups are defined in accordancewith the distribution of turnovers inthe relevant market (usually: largefirms, medium firms, small firms).Firms are then put in one of thegroups. Finally a series ofweightings are first defined - largelyon the basis of the relationshipbetween the market share of thelargest company in the cartel and ameasure of market sharerepresentative of the firmsbelonging to a given group - andthen applied to each group.

6 This was first applied in the Pre-insulated pipes case, where ABB�sstarting amount was increased by250%.

B. Duration

Additional amounts are added tothe starting amount in view ofthe duration of the infringement.The Guidelines include threecategories of increases regardingthe duration (short, medium andlong duration). However, inmany cases so far, a 10%increase per year has been addedfor infringements that lastedmore than a year.

C. Basic amount

The addition of the startingamount and the increaseresulting from durationconstitutes the basic amount ofthe fine per company.

D. Aggravating and attenua-ting circumstances

The basic amount is then firstincreased should aggravatingcircumstances exist and thenreduced should attenuatingcircumstances exist7. In practice,a percentage increase, reflectingaggravating circumstances, isapplied to the basic amount.Then a percentage decrease,reflecting attenuating circums-tances, is deducted from theprevious amount. The result is anindividual modification to thebasic amount of the fine.

7 Whereas �gravity� and �duration�

refer to the infringement as a whole,�aggravating� and �attenuating�circumstances deal with the specificrole performed by each firmparticipating in the infringement.

E. Leniency

In cartel cases only8, thefollowing step is to apply, wherethere is active and continued co-operation by firms with theCommission in order to establishthe infringement, a furtherpercentage reduction inapplication of any of the sectionsof the Leniency Notice.

F. Excessive duration of theCommission�s proceedings

A further reduction (inaccordance with current practice€ 100 000 per firm) may beapplied where the proceedings ina case have exceeded a period oftime that could be consideredreasonable and the Commissionis responsible for that delay.

G. Adjustment to 10% tooverall turnover

This preliminary final amount islastly compared with the overallturnover of firms in order toverify whether the 10% upperthreshold in Article 15(2) ofRegulation 17 is not exceeded. Ifso, the amount is replaced bythat corresponding to 10% ofoverall turnover.

Section III Assessment of gravity andduration

This section summarises howgravity and duration have been

8 Active co-operation with the

Commission in other types of casescan be regarded as an attenuatingcircumstance where appropriate.

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assessed in negative decisionswith fines. The table shows casesordered by category of gravityand in chronological orderwithin the category.

The table does not include thecase World Cup 98 in which asymbolic fine of € 1000 wasimposed. In doing so theCommission recognised, amongother considerations, theimportance of securityconsiderations for the

organisation of very importantsport events. A symbolic finewas also imposed on Bricolux inthe Nathan-Bricolux case. Thereasons for doing so in the lattercase were as follows: the smallsize of Bricolux; its full co-operation with the Commission(including the submission ofpieces of evidence withoutwhich the infringement could nothave been established); thelimitation to one competingdistributor of the retaliatory

measures requested of Nathan;and the discretion of theCommission regarding symbolicfines.

The table does not mentionduration. As indicated above, inmany cases an increase of 10%per year has been applied inthose cases where the duration ofthe infringement exceeded oneyear.

Assessment of GravityCase Nature Market size Impact Overall Gravity

VW Particularly serious(obstruction of parallelexports and of crossdeliveries within thedealer network)

Italy, but alsoGermany and Austria

Significant Very serious

TACA-potentialcomp.

Very serious abuse Very serious Very serious Very serious

Pre-insulated Pipes Very serious (cartel) Substantial part of theEU

Evidence of listprice increases

Very serious

Seamless Steel tubes Very serious (cartelintended to jeopardisethe proper functioningof the single market)

Four Member States The specific impactof the infringementon the market hasbeen limited

Very serious

Amino Acids Very serious (pricefixing, quota allocationcartel)

EEA (actually world-wide)

The cartel had animpact

Very serious

Alloy surcharge Serious (concertedpractice)

Western Europe Deemed to beconsiderable

Serious

AAMS Very serious (abuse) Serious (Italy) Serious SeriousTACA-servicescontracts

Serious (abuse) Very serious (morethan 1 Member State)

Serious Serious

British Sugar Very serious (pricecartel)

Serious (UK) Serious.Commission unableto prove a veryserious impact

Serious

Greek ferries Very serious (pricefixing cartel)

Limited part of theEU (Adriatic searoutes)

Limited Serious

Virgin � BA Serious (abuse,exclusionary rebatescheme)

UK Assumed effects onUK economy.Ability of BA tomaintain marketshare despiteliberalisation

Serious

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FEG-TU Horizontal priceagreements andcollective exclusivedealing arrangement

The Netherlands (oreven some regionsonly)

Raised barriers toentry to the Dutchmarket

Serious

FETTCSA Serious (horizontalagreement not todiscount)

North Europe � FarEast sea routes

Agreement wasvery short lived.FETTCSAagreementabandoned in 1994

Serious

Nathan-Bricolux Serious (resale pricemaintenance andabsolute territorialprotection)

France and Frenchspeaking Belgium

Practice notsystematicallyimplemented.

Minor

Section IVAggravating and attenuatingcircumstances

This section describesaggravating and attenuatingcircumstances applied innegative decisions with finesadopted to date.

Following the entry into force ofthe Guidelines on fines,aggravating and/or attenuatingcircumstances have been appliedin the following cases: AlloySurcharges, Volkswagen, BritishSugar, Pre-insulated Pipes,Greek ferries, FEG-TU,Seamless Steel Tubes,FETTCSA, Amino Acids andNathan-Bricolux9.

9 Where possible, the percentages or

amounts applied will be mentioned.However, in several cases onlyglobal percentages by company arementioned in the decision, withoutfurther differentiation betweenconcrete aggravating or attenuatingcircumstances.

A. Aggravatingcircumstances

The following aggravatingcircumstances have been appliedin the above cases:

A.1 attempts to obstruct theCommission

This circumstance was firstapplied in the Pre-insulatedPipes case, and was part of theglobal 30% increase imposed onthe Henss firm.

In Greek Ferries, an increase of10% was imposed on Minoan forthe same reason.

A.2 role of leader/instigator/major player

In the Alloy Surcharge case, anincrease of 25% was imposed onUsinor in view of the fact that itplayed a major role in theconcerted action. It was thatcompany that made thecalculation of the surcharge andsent it - together with theconclusions of the meeting - toall producers involved.

In British Sugar, British Sugarwas subjected to an increase forbeing the instigator and drivingforce behind the infringement.This aggravating circumstance,together with the other twomentioned below, resulted in a75% increase to that firm's fine.In Pre-insulated Pipes, ABBwas found to be theinstigator/ring leader of thecartel. This aggravatingcircumstance, together with theother three mentioned below,resulted in a 50% increase to thatfirm's fine. In the same case,Henss also received an increasefor being the first lieutenant toABB in the enforcement of thecartel.

In Greek Ferries, Minoan alsoreceived a 25% increase forbeing the instigator of the cartel.Finally, in the Amino Acids caseboth ADM and Ajinomoto weresubjected to a 50% increase foracting as leaders of the lysinecartel.

A.3 retaliatory measures

Volkswagen received a 20%increase resulting from two

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aggravating circumstances. First,Volkswagen took advantage ofits power over its dealers toenforce the measures adopted toimpede sales of its cars in Italyto foreigners. Secondly,Volkswagen terminated severaldealership contracts andthreatened many other dealers.

Furthermore, part of the increaseof the original fine imposed onmost companies in the Pre-insulated Pipes case was due totheir active participation in theretaliatory measures and theboycott against Powerpipe.

A.4 other

This category has in fact beenused in three of the above cases:• The second aggravating

circumstance in Volkswagenwas the fact that the companydid not put an end to theinfringement despite twowarning letters sent by theCommission in 1995.

• In British Sugar, the fact thatBritish Sugar had violatedfirst Article 82 and thenArticle 81 in the same marketwas considered anaggravating circumstance.

• In addition, the fact thatBritish Sugar acted in amanner contrary to thewording in its complianceprogram resulting from theprevious Article 82 case,where the complianceprogram was considered anattenuating circumstance, wasconcluded to be a separateaggravating circumstance. Asindicated above, the threeaggravating circumstances

resulted in a 75% increase ofthe fine.

• In Pre-insulated Pipes, thedeliberate continuation of theinfringement after theinitiation of the Commissionproceedings was consideredan aggravating circumstancewhich resulted in a 20%increase for all participatingcompanies.

B. Attenuating circumstances

The following attenuatingcircumstances have been appliedin the cases mentioned above:

B.1 passive role/"follow myleader"

This circumstance was firstapplied in the Pre-insulatedPipes case. Each of Ke-Kelit andSigma received a 66% reductionof the fine for their minor role inthe cartel (together with the factthat their participation waslimited to countries - Austria andItaly respectively - where districtheating was of a very lowimportance).

It was also applied in GreekFerries where most companies(apart from the instigator and thetwo other most active membersof the cartel) benefited from a15% reduction for their passiverole.

In Amino Acids, Sewonbenefited from a 20% reductionof the increase that wouldotherwise have resulted from theduration of its involvement inthe lysine cartel. TheCommission accepted that from

a given point in time, the firmchanged its behaviour from anactive to a passive member ofthe cartel. That meant in practicethat the 40% increase resultingfrom duration was reduced to32%.

B.2 non-implementation inpractice

In the Pre-insulated Pipes case,KWH was granted a 20%reduction for not participating inthe retaliatory measures and theboycott against Powerpipe.

B.3 termination of theinfringement as soon asthe Commissionintervenes

This circumstance was used forthe first time in FETTCSA. Allthe shipping lines were granted a20% reduction for terminatingthe infringement as soon as theCommission sent a warningletter.

All companies participating inthe lysine cartel (Amino Acids)benefited from a 10% reductionfor the early termination of theinfringement.

In Nathan-Bricolux, Nathan wasgranted a reduction formodifying its distributionagreements just after it receivedthe statement of objections. Thiswas part of the 40% reductionthat the company was granted.

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B.4 existence of reasonabledoubts on whether theconduct is aninfringement

In Greek Ferries, all companieswere granted a 15% discount forthe confusion created by theGreek Government, which, fordomestic ferry routes withinGreece, had been promotingagreements similar to the cartelagreement (relating toItaly/Greece ferry services) thatwas prohibited in the decision.

B.5 effective co-operationwith the Commissionoutside the scope of theLeniency Notice

In the Nathan-Bricolux10 case,the Commission reduced the fineimposed on Nathan because thefirm co-operated with theCommission by providing, at theCommission�s request,fundamental pieces of evidencewithout which the infringementcould not have been established.The same co-operation wasprovided by Bricolux, and thatfactor was one of theconsiderations that led theCommission to impose asymbolic fine on that firm.

B.6 Other

ABB was allowed a € 5 millionreduction of its fine in view ofthe monetary compensation ithad already paid to Powerpipe.Furthermore, the criticalsituation of a particular sector 10 Fine imposed on Nathan. Bricolux

received a symbolic fine

has been used twice - in casesconcerning steel - since the entryinto force of the Guidelines:• In the Alloy Surcharge case,

the very critical situation ofthe stainless steel sectorjustified a reduction of thebasic amount of 10% to allother producers involved.

• In the Seamless steel tubescase, the Commissionacknowledged that the steelpipe and tube industry hadbeen in crisis for a long time.And that since 1991 inparticular, the situation in thesector had deteriorated,which, combined with thegrowing influx of imports,had resulted in capacityreductions and plant closures.These considerationswarranted a reduction of 10%in the basic amounts for allthe companies involved.

Section VThe excessive duration of theCommission�s proceedings

The long duration of theCommission�s proceedings is nota reason not to impose a fine,provided that the lapse of timedoes not exceed the limitationperiod for competitionproceedings laid down byCouncil Regulation 1988/74.11

Article 1 of the Regulationprovides that the Commission�spower to impose fines is subjectto a five-year limitation period inrespect of Articles 81(1) and 82of the Treaty. The period beginsto run on the day on which the

11 OJ L319, 19.11.1974, p.1.

infringement is committed or, inthe case of continuing orrepeated infringements, on theday on which it ends. It may,however, be interrupted orsuspended, pursuant to Article 2or 3 respectively of theRegulation. Under Article 2(3)of the Regulation, the limitationperiod shall expire at the lateston the day on which a periodequal to twice the limitationperiod has elapsed.

However, the long duration ofthe Commission�s proceedings,when such a delay is theresponsibility of theCommission, has been used toreduce fines. In the FEFCdecision of 1994, the firstdecision applying Regulation1017/68 to the members of aliner shipping conference, theCommission did consider theexcessive duration of theproceedings in that case as oneof the elements on which itbased the imposition of symbolicfines12 of ECU 10 000 for eachparticipant, despite the veryserious nature and long durationof the infringement in that case.Subsequently, it has become partof the established case-law of theCourt of Justice and of the Courtof First Instance that theCommission must act within areasonable time in adoptingdecisions following administra-

12 This amount cannot be considered

�symbolic� under the Guidelines,which now limit the �symbolic� fineto an amount of € 1,000.

➣ ARTICLES


tive proceedings relating tocompetition policy13.

Since the entry into force of theGuidelines, 0the long duration ofthe Commission�s proceedingshas been applied in two cases(FEG-TU and FETTCSA). Inboth cases, the firms involvedwere granted a reduction of€ 100 000 each.

Section VIConclusions

The fact that the Guidelines onfines are working in asatisfactory way to establish theamount of fines was recentlyconfirmed by the judgment of 6July 2000 by the Court of FirstInstance on the Volkswagencase, which basically supportedthe Commission findings andconclusions (leaving aside thefact that the Commission did notprovide enough evidence tosupport the alleged duration ofthe infringement). Thisjudgement was the first to dealwith fines set under theGuidelines. It is the first in aseries that are due in the next 12months.

13 See the judgments of the Court of

Justice in Case C-185/95 PBaustahlgewebe [1998] ECR I-8485and of the Court of First Instance inJoinedCases T-213/95 and T-18/96 SCK and FNK [1997] ECR II-1739,paragraph 56.

OPINION AND COMMENTSIn this section DG COMP officials outline developments in community competition procedures. It isimportant to recognise that the opinions put forward in this section are the personal views of the officialsconcerned. They have not been adopted or in any way approved by the Commission and should not berelied upon as a statement of the Commission�s or DG COMP�s views.


Introduction

Les années 1990 se caractérisentpar une modification profondepour le secteur bancaireeuropéen. A la suite del�adoption des directiveseuropéennes en matièrebancaire14 le cadre législatif etréglementaire des systèmesbancaires nationaux subit deschangements importants : lesséparations institutionnellesentre les établissements et lescontraintes opérationnellestombent progressivement, lesmarchés se décloisonnent, leprogrès technologique ouvre desnouvelles possibilitéscommerciales, les équilibresconsolidés et les positionsacquises sont bousculés, lespressions concurrentiellesaugmentent partout en Europe 14 Il s�agit d�un ensemble très large de

directives d�harmonisation. Les plusimportantes, pour ce qui nousconcerne, sont probablement lesdirectives n° 89/299 du 17 avril1989, sur les fonds propres desétablissements de crédit, n° 89/647du 18 décembre 1989 sur un ratio desolvabilité pour les établissementsde crédit, et n° 89/646 du 15décembre 1989, dite « deuxièmedirective de coordination ».

avec l�achèvement du marchéunique des capitaux.

L�exigence d�une restructurationde chaque banque et del�ensemble du secteur est rendueplus urgente par la criseéconomique du début des années1990. Le retard pris par certainsétablissements, notamment lesbanques publiques, dans leuradaptation au nouvelenvironnement bancaire, a desconséquences parfoisdramatiques. Certains Etatsmembres15, comme la France etl�Italie, vivent des crises aiguës,pour un ensemble de causes,notamment l�éclatement debulles spéculatives et l�influencedes pouvoirs publics sur lesecteur bancaire, impliquant uncertain laxisme de la gestion desétablissements bancaires publicsdû à la garantie implicite del�Etat, prêteur en dernier ressort.

La Commission, confrontée àces crises, doit alors créer unejurisprudence sur l�application

15 D�autres Etats membres, comme les

pays nordiques, ont vécu des crisesimportantes, mais avant leur entréedans l�union européenne.

de l�article 87 (anciennement 92)dans de telles situations.L�analyse qui suit retracebrièvement la ligne qu�aprogressivement définie laCommission dans le traitementde ces crises, principalementcelle du Crédit Lyonnais. Elle sefonde sur les décisions d�aidesd�Etat en matière bancaireadoptées par la Commissiondans la dernière décennie. Ils�agit d�une périodesuffisamment longue,caractérisée par une nombresignificatif de crises bancairesaccompagnées par des aidesd�Etat, nous permettant de tirerquelques enseignements utiles.Ce bilan ne saurait être exhaustifet ne traite que les aspects lesplus importants. D�autres aspectscomplexes ou spécifiques, telsque le caractère d�aides ou, lecas échéant, la compatibilité desmécanismes de fonds de garantiedes dépôts avec les règles dutraité, ne peuvent pas êtreexaminés dans le cadre de cetarticle et devront éventuellementpar la suite faire l�objetd�analyses séparées.

Les principales crises

La Commission a examiné sur lapériode 1990-1999 environ unedizaine de crises bancaires ayantreçu un support externe. Les casprincipaux sont repris dans letableau suivant:

Crises bancaires : un bilan del�application des règles deconcurrence en matière d�aides d�Etat.Leçons de la crise du Crédit Lyonnais

N. PESARESI � DG Comp H-3ET C. de LA ROCHEFORDIERE - DG Comp C-1

➣ OPINION AND COMMENTS


Tableau 1 : Cas principaux d�aides d�Etat examinés par la Commission (1990-1999).

Banque Date(1)

Total dubilan

(€ mln)

Aide(€ mln)

Forme du soutien

Banesto(ES)

19931994

42.000 Pas d�aide Augmentation de capital +prêtdu Fonds de garantie des dépôts

Comptoir des Entrepreneurs(FR)

19931995

10.000 2.300 Augmentation de capital etdéfaisance

Crédit Lyonnais I(FR)

19941995

6.800 Augmentation de capital etdéfaisance

Crédit Lyonnais II(FR)

19961996

300.000 600 Modification de la défaisance �extension des pertes de la

défaisanceCrédit Lyonnais III(FR)

19971998

8.100-14.900 Extension des pertes de ladéfaisance

GAN � CIC(FR)

19961997

100.000 3.600 Augmentation de capital etgarantie

Société Marseillaise de Crédit(FR)

19931998

3.500 1.000 Augmentations de capital

SDBO(FR)

19961998

3.000 35 Augmentation de capital

Crédit Foncier de France(FR)

19961999

58.000 2.400 Augmentation de capital etgarantie

Banco di Napoli(IT)

19961998

65.000 1.100-7.400 Augmentation de capital etdéfaisance

Banco di Sicilia � Sicilcassa(IT)

19971999

31.000 2.400 Augmentation de capital +couverture pertes de liquidation

(1) La première date est celle de la mise en place du plan d�aides, la seconde celle de la décision de la Commission.

La plupart des cas examinésconcernent des établissementspublics (Crédit Lyonnais,Société Marseillaise de Crédit,GAN, Comptoir desEntrepreneurs) ou tombant sousl�influence des pouvoirs publics(CFF, Banco di Napoli et Bancodi Sicilia). La Commission a étéégalement amenée à évaluer lesauvetage de la banque privéeBanesto par le Fonds de Garantiedes Dépôts espagnol, mais elle a

conclu que la banque n�avait pasreçu d�aides d�Etat16.

Dans un certain nombre de cas,concernant de facto toujours desbanques privées, l�institution endifficulté est laissée partir enfaillite17 ; dans d�autres cas18,

16 Communiqué de presse IP/94/1226

du 15 décembre, 1994.17 Voir par exemple Barings au

Royaume Uni et la Banque PallasStern en France.

18 Voir par exemple en Espagne lesauvetage de Banesto par le Fonds

celle-ci reçoit un soutien à desconditions acceptables pour uninvestisseur privé opérant dansune économie de marché19. Par

de Garantie des Dépôts. Ce casreprésente un point de comparaisonimportant pour la Commission,puisqu� il montre qu�il est possibled�éviter des crises bancairesmajeures sans avoir nécessairementrecours à des aides d�Etat.

19 La définition d�aide d�Etat impliqueque l�entreprise reçoit un soutienqu�un investisseur privé n�auraitjamais octroyé en raison de sesperspectives de rentabilité



contre, face aux crises bancaires,le recours aux aides d�Etat, poursauver des institutionsdéfaillantes et pour enaccompagner la restructurationest la solution la plus fréquentedans le cas de crises touchant desbanques publiques. Il n�esttoutefois pas toujours inévitable.Les cas tombant sous le coup del�article 87 du Traité neconcernent que des banquesauxquelles l�Etat octroie unavantage distorsif pour laconcurrence.

Dans de telles circonstances, lescritères appliqués par laCommission sont indiqués dansles lignes directrices sur les aidesau sauvetage et à larestructuration des entreprises endifficulté20. Il s�agit, notamment,d�assurer que l�aide soit limitéeau strict nécessaire, subordonnéeà la réalisation d�un plan derestructuration en mesured�assurer le retour à la viabilitédans un laps de tempsraisonnable, et à la fourniture decontreparties suffisantes pourcompenser les concurrents pourles distorsions causées par l�aide.

1.0.0.0. Le cas CréditLyonnais

Le cas du Crédit Lyonnais estemblématique non seulement parsa gravité, puisque l�aide à labanque, de plus de 100 milliardsde francs français, aura dépassé

insuffisante ou de ses risques tropélevés.

20 Voir JO C 368 du 23.12.1994 et,pour la dernière version, JO C 288 of09.10.1999.

tous les records en la matière dansla Communauté, mais aussi par lacomplexité du problème posé et lacombinaison d�aides de sauvetageet d�aides à la restructuration. Il a,plus que tout autre, contraint laCommission à mieux définir sapolitique en matière d�aides dansce secteur, notamment lors decrises bancaires brutales etimprévues. Aussi constate-t-on, àla lecture des décisions sur leCrédit Lyonnais adoptées par laCommission en 1995 et 1998,qu�elle fait une large part à desconsidérations à caractère généralsur les justifications possibles desinterventions publiques dans lescrises bancaires, leurs modalitéset leurs effets distorsifs pour lereste du secteur bancaire. Cesdécisions constituent à bien deségards des textes ayant valeur delignes directrices en matièred�aides au secteur bancaire, dansles cas de restructurations debanques en difficulté.

Le Crédit Lyonnais est, à la fin de1993, le premier groupe bancaireeuropéen en termes d�actif total(presque 2.000 milliards de FF). Ilcompte alors plus de 71.000employés, 900 agences en Europehors France et 800 dans le restedu monde. Son actionnairemajoritaire est l�Etat français,directement ou indirectement parl�intermédiaire du groupe publicThomson et de la Caisse desDépôts et Consignations.

A la suite de pertes importantesenregistrées en 1992 et en 1993,risquant de provoquer uneinsuffisance de fonds propres auregard des exigencesréglementaires prudentielles

européennes21, l�Etat décide dansun premier temps de procéder àune augmentation du capital de4,9 milliards de francs, effectivefin 1994, puis de prendre à sacharge les provisions pour risquesestimées à environ 42,7 milliardsde francs sur des actifsimmobiliers non performantstransférés dans une sociétéspécifique de cantonnement.Toutefois, la crise est à cetteépoque gravement sous estimée :elle n�est pas due seulement auxpertes très importantes de labanque sur ses actifs immobiliers,mais aussi aux pertesconsidérables générées par lesprises de participationshasardeuses prises par la banquedans tous les secteurs del�économie à la fin des années1980 et au tournant des années1990. De plus, l�activité de labanque en France, en raison de lalourdeur des frais généraux, n�estpas rentable et fait preuve de savulnérabilité face au retournementde conjoncture de 1992-1993, quiprovoque la première récessiondans l�hexagone depuis 1945.

Début 1995, il apparaît que lespertes ont été très sous-estimées,que les nouvelles provisionsnécessaires et les pertes quis�ensuivront mettent en péril lasolvabilité de la banque : enl�absence d�aides, il n�y auraitalors pas d�autre alternative que laliquidation de la banque, optionunanimement écartée par les

21 L�insuffisance des provisions

passées pour l�exercice 1992 faitaujourd�hui l�objet de procédurespour présentation de faux bilaninstruites par la justice française.



responsables des pouvoirs publicsfrançais. L�Etat met alors en placeun nouveau plan de redressement,avec la création d'une autrestructure spécifique dite dedéfaisance, composée d�une partd�une structure de cantonnement,le Consortium de Réalisation

(CDR), destinée à reprendre lesactifs compromis du CréditLyonnais, y inclus les actifsimmobiliers déjà mentionnés, etd�autre part d�une holding, laSPBI, ensuite transformée enl�Etablissement Public deFinancement et de Participation

(EPFR), chargée d�assurer lefinancement de la défaisance pardes fonds d�origine budgétaires.Ainsi, 190 milliards d'actifs« douteux » du Crédit Lyonnaissont sortis du bilan de la banqueavec 55 milliards de francs depassifs qui leur sont attachés.

O R G A N IG R A M M E D E L A S T R U C T U R E D E D E F A IS A N C E

R e c a p ita lis a t io n E T A T D o ta tio n s b u d g é ta ire s

P rê t 1 4 5 m illia rd s F R FE P F R

C R E D IT P rê t P e r te s1 4 5 M d s

L Y O N N A ISF ilia le à 1 0 0 %

C D R A p p o r t d 'a c tifs 1 9 0 M F c a n to n

D E F A IS A N C E

Pour lui permettre d'acheter lesactifs au Crédit Lyonnais, le CDRreçoit un �prêt participatif� de lapart de l'EPFR, qui à son tour serefinançe auprès du CréditLyonnais à travers un emprunt àconcurrence d'un montantmaximum de 145 milliards defrancs. Par le mécanisme du prêtparticipatif les pertes du CDRainsi que le coût du portage desactifs sont imputés à la charge del'EPFR, donc en dernier ressort del'Etat. En contrepartie il est alorsprévu que l'EPFR bénéficie duproduit d'une « clause de retour àmeilleure fortune » sur lesrésultats futurs de la banque. Le

tableau ci-dessus donne unereprésentation simplifiée duschéma de la défaisance.

La Commission conduit début1995 une première investigationsur les aides au Crédit Lyonnais.Les autorités françaises nient queleur intervention constitue uneaide d�Etat, parce que le plan enpermettrait l�autofinancement. LaCommission n�étant pas du mêmeavis, elle exige la présentationd�un plan de restructuration duCrédit Lyonnais. Les autoritésprésentent finalement un planportant sur plusieurs mesures derecentrage stratégique, de cession

de filiales, de réduction des coûts,de maîtrise et contrôle des risques.Ces mesures devaient permettreau Crédit Lyonnais d'afficher desrésultats positifs à partir de 1995et une rentabilité sur les fondspropres supérieure à 12% à la finde 1999. Vu l'importance descoûts du système pour l'Etatglobalement estimés à 45milliards de francs, laCommission exige une réductionavant fin 1998 d'au moins 35% dela présence commerciale de labanque à l'étranger. Les autoritésfrançaises s�y engagent, etprévoient en particulier uneréduction de la présence



commerciale du Crédit Lyonnaishors de France en Europe de 50%en termes de bilan.

Compte tenu de ces engagements,ce premier épisode de la crise seconclut sur une décision favorablede la Commission, qui décide22 le26 juillet 1995 d'approuver souscondition les aides octroyées parl'Etat français au Crédit Lyonnaisen 1994 et 1995 en lesconsidérant comme compatiblesavec le marché commun23. Ladécision de la Commission de1995 prévoit que si les coûts dusystème sont dépassés, il y auralieu de réexaminer l'importancede la réduction de la présencecommerciale du Crédit Lyonnais,disposition qui prendra par lasuite un caractère crucial. Afind�éviter des conflits d�intérêt dansla gestion des actifs cantonnés,elle impose une stricte séparationentre la gestion de la banque et duCDR, qui est alors une filiale à100% du Crédit Lyonnais, nonconsolidée dans les comptes de labanque parce que ses pertes sontimputées à l�Etat : cette coupurechirurgicale fera par la suitel�objet de nombreuses critiques enraison du manque de préparationdes nouvelles équipes du CDR etde la perte de mémoireinstitutionnelle sur les actifscantonnés qui résulte de cetteséparation.

22 J.O. L 308 du 21.12.1995, p. 92.23 Sur la base de l'article 87 (auparavant

article 92), paragraphe 3, lettre c) duTraité CE, et notamment avec leslignes directrices communautairespour les aides d'Etat au sauvetage et àla restructuration des entreprises endifficulté.

Dès l�année qui suit, leredressement de la banques�avère plus difficile que prévu,et les pertes très sous-estimées.Mi-septembre 1996, les autoritésfrançaises notifient « encatastrophe » à la Commissionde nouvelles aides d�urgence enfaveur du CL, pour un montantde presque 4 milliards de francsfrançais, en lui demandant de lesapprouver en quelques jourspour que la banque puisserapidement afficher des comptesbénéficiaires et ainsi rassurer lesmarchés financiers. Sans detelles aides, une nouvelledégradation de la notation de labanque par les agences de ratingsemble inévitable. Une telledégradation apparaît redoutableet peut provoquer rapidement ladéfiance des marchés etl�insolvabilité de la banque. Desconséquences négatives pourd�autres établissementsfinanciers français ne sont pas àexclure, et le spectre d�une crisesystémique est évoqué.

Les mesures envisagéesconsistent en un rehaussement dela rémunération du prêt duCrédit Lyonnais à l'EPFR et enl�abandon d�une partie du plande restructuration de 1995 quiprévoyait la souscription de 10milliards d�obligations coupon-zéro par l�EPFR. En fait, faceaux résultats moins bons queprévus sur les autres activités, lemécanisme de rémunération duprêt à l�EPFR fait peser sur leCrédit Lyonnais une charge netteimportante, d�un montant deplusieurs milliards de francs paran. Cette « punition de labanque » en vue de la faire

contribuer au coût du sauvetage,voulue par le ministère desfinances, et qui comporte unélément d�incertitude contingentà l�évolution des taux, apparaît aposteriori comme une erreurmajeure du plan de sauvetage dela banque de 1995.

Compte tenu des particularités dusecteur bancaire ainsi que lasituation du Crédit Lyonnais, laCommission décide dansl�urgence, le 25 septembre 1996,quelques jours après lanotification des aides desauvetage et sous une pressionunique dans des décisions de cetype, que les aides d�urgence enfaveur de la banque peuvent êtredéclarées compatibles avec lemarché commun car ellesrespectent les principesfondamentaux de l�encadrementpour les aides au sauvetage en cequ�elles n�ont d�autre effet que lemaintien du status quo ante 24.Bien que les procédures aient étérespectées, et la Commission sesoit assurée de l�avis formel duGouverneur de la Banque deFrance sur l�urgence, la nécessitéet la pertinence des mesuresd�urgence en faveur du CréditLyonnais, les conditions quasichaotiques dans lesquelles il fautprendre cette décision, sans queles autorités aient préalablementinformé la Commission alorsqu�elles étaient au courant depuisle printemps de la même année dela gravité de la situation,laisseront des traces : elles neseront pas sans conséquences surles suites de l�instruction de

24 J.O. C 390 du 24.12.1996, p. 7.



l�affaire Crédit Lyonnais à laCommission et justifient lafermeté et l�impatience croissantedu commissaire Van Miert surcette affaire.

Commence alors le troisième etdernier acte de l�affaire CréditLyonnais : en même tempsqu�elle approuve les mesures desauvetage, la Commission décidede rouvrir le dossier25 pourl�extension des mêmes mesuresau-delà de 1996, étant donné leureffet sur la restructuration duCrédit Lyonnais, en se réservantle droit d�examiner lacompatibilité de toute mesured�aide et de restructuration enfaveur du Crédit Lyonnais, ycompris celles qui avaient fondéla décision de 1995. Troisproblèmes majeurs sont alorsposés: l�évaluation des aides,l�analyse du nouveau plan deviabilité de l�entreprise et larecherche de contrepartiesadéquates face au montant desaides.

L�évaluation exacte des aides estdifficile dans le cadre de la miseen place d�un système dedéfaisance, qui par sa nature apour but de reporter la chargebudgétaire en étalant sur plusieursannées les moins-values et lespertes dont une partie n�est mêmepas chiffrable. De plus, alors quela procédure est en cours et que lenouveau plan de restructurationn�est toujours pas notifié à laCommission, on apprend auprintemps 1997 que les pertes duCDR, initialement prévues à 60 25 la procédure prévue à l�article 88

(auparavant article 93) du Traité

milliards de francs dans le plan de1995, seront finalement de l�ordrede 100 milliards de francs : d�unseul coup les aides font un bondde 40 milliards de francs, toutesles prévisions les plus pessimistessont dépassées, et ce alors qu�unprécédent ministre de l�économie,M. Alphandéry, avait annoncéque le sauvetage du CréditLyonnais ne coûterait « pas unsou » au contribuable.

La Commission arrive finalementen 1998 à la conclusion que lesaides supplémentaires en faveurdu Crédit Lyonnais ne peuventêtre estimées qu�à l�aide d�unetrès large fourchette, d�environ53-98 milliards de francs envaleur actualisée, qui s�ajoutentaux 45 milliards approuvés en1995 et aux 4 milliards approuvésen 1996. La largeur de cettefourchette est due au caractèreincertain du montant des pertesin fine à la charge du CDR, surlequel les autorités françaisesn�ont pas su prendre aucunengagement de plafonnement (lagarantie de l�Etat sur l�EPFR estillimitée). Elle a aussi pour laCommission un caractèreconservatoire pour éviter,comme en 1995, une sous-estimation, et faire en sorte quecette décision sur le CréditLyonnais soit bien la dernièrequ�elle ait à prendre. Lesestimations de la Commissionsont vivement contestées par lesautorités françaises, comme entémoigne le texte de ladécision26 de mai 1998. Uneestimation élevée à titre

26 Cf JO L 221 du 8.8.1998, section 7.

conservatoire (c�est le rôle de lavaleur supérieure de lafourchette retenue par laCommission) a toutefoisl�avantage de donner unesécurité juridique aux aidesaccordées à la banque. Sinonchaque dépassement du montantapprouvé implique ex post uneréouverture de la procédure. Unélément très important vienttoutefois réduire la valeur desaides estimée par laCommission : compte tenu duschéma très particulier de ladéfaisance qui alloue à l�EPFRles revenus prévisibles de laprivatisation de la banque, lavaleur de la participation del�Etat au sein du Crédit Lyonnaisest prise en déduction dumontant brut des aides.

En deuxième lieu, il faut dans lecourant du deuxième semestre1997 procéder à une évaluationparticulièrement attentive du plande restructuration et desperspectives de viabilité de labanque : les autorités françaisesont en effet, après de nombreusestergiversations, enfin notifié enjuillet 1997 le plan demandé enseptembre 1996 par laCommission. La Commissiondécide de s�appuyer dans sonanalyse sur les conseils d�unebanque d�affaires internationale,Lehman Brothers, qui est chargéed�examiner le plan derestructuration présenté par lesautorités françaises, en ce quiconcerne la viabilité de la banqueet les contreparties possibles auxaides. La banque d�affairesconfirme fin 1997 que leredressement du Crédit Lyonnaisest possible et fournit une



estimation révisée de la rentabilitéattendue de la banque comptetenu du plan d�aides. Sur cettebase, la Commission considérerapar la suite qu�une partie des aidespréconisées par les autoritésfrançaises n�est pas strictementnécessaire et a, par conséquent,limitera la « neutralisation »voulue par les autorités françaisesdes effets financiers liés au prêtdu Crédit Lyonnais à l�EPFR.

Finalement, la Commissionrecherche, face à des aides siimportantes, des contrepartiessignificatives � tout en s�assurantqu�elles ne mettent pas en périlla viabilité de l�entreprise �destinées à apporter auxconcurrents de l�entreprise aidéeune compensation atténuant leseffets distorsifs des aides. Ils�agira fin 1997 et début 1998 dupoint d�achoppement principald�un accord sur le nouveau plan.La Commission lors desdiscussions avec les autoritésfrançaises considère alors enpremière analyse que la totalitédes activités du Crédit Lyonnaisen Europe (hors de France), soit620 milliards de francs, doit êtrecédée ou fermée au titre detoutes les aides reçues par leCrédit Lyonnais. Ce montant,qui inclut les cessions de 310milliards de francs imposées auCrédit Lyonnais au titre de ladécision de 1995, se traduit parune réduction de plus du tiers dubilan du Crédit Lyonnais, telqu�il était évalué au 31 décembre1994. Il est finalement convenudans la décision du 20 mai 1998que, bien que l�essentiel duréseau européen de la banque dedétail doive être cédé, le Crédit

Lyonnais pourra cependantgarder ses activités de marché(Londres et Francfort) et sesactivités de gestion privée(Suisse et Luxembourg). A laplace, les autorités françaisesprennent des engagements decessions et fermetures en Franceet dans le reste du monde, pourun montant équivalent. Ceprocessus de réduction du bilande la banque est par la suitecomplètement mis en �uvredans les deux années qui suivent

Un effort supplémentaire de labanque sur son réseau en Franceest demandé en vue de libérerdes parts de marché pour lesconcurrents dans l�hexagone,plus particulièrement touchés parles distorsions de concurrenceprovoquées par les aides. Le plande restructuration présenté parles autorités françaises en juillet1997 impliquait une réduction à2.146 en l�an 2000 du nombredes points de vente de la banqueen France, soit une réduction de6,6% par rapport au nombre depoints de vente de 1996. LaCommission finit par obtenir uneréduction supplémentaire depresque 296 points de vente,correspondant à une réductiontotale du réseau d�agences duCrédit Lyonnais en France del�ordre de 20% par rapport auniveau de 1996.

Afin de maintenir un effet debridage sur le CL, plusieursmesures sont également prévues,notamment le plafonnement à3,2% par an de la croissance dubilan consolidé (à périmètreconstant) du CL entre la fin de

l�année 1998 et la fin de l�année200127.

Enfin, les autorités françaisess�engagent à privatiser labanque : la Commission n�a pasfait de la privatisation unpréalable aux discussions qu�ellea eues avec les autorités, maisconsidère dans sa décision demai 1998 qu�il s�agit d�unemesure importante pour mettrefin aux rapports incestueux entrela banque et les pouvoirs publics,s�étant traduits par une garantiede facto de toute le bilan de labanque aux frais de l�Etat etdonc des contribuables. A lasuite de la décision, la procédurede privatisation du CL est lancéedébut 1999. Les autoritésfrançaises annoncent le 27 mai1999 la composition du noyaudur : Crédit Agricole (10%),AGF (6%), AXA (5.5%),Commerzbank (4%), BBV(3.7%) Banca Intesa (2.7%). Leplacement sur le marchéd�environ 50% du capital estachevé début juillet 1999 avectrois mois d�avance sur la limiteprévue par les engagements de laFrance. La souscription du titrerencontre un grand succès, 3,4millions de particuliers s�étantportés acquéreurs. En 1999, labanque affiche un bénéfice netde 553 millions d�euro et un tauxde retour sur fonds propres de10%.

Ainsi prend fin la plus grandecrise bancaire de l�histoire de laCommunauté.

27 J.O. L 221 du 8.8.1998.



1.0.0.1. L�application auxbanques des règlessur les aides d�Etat

L�application aux établissementsde crédit du droit de concurrenceconcernant les aides d�Etat a étéau départ influencée par ce qui, àtort ou à raison, fait considérer lesecteur bancaire comme différentdes autres. Longuementréglementé dans chaque détail,peu exposé à la concurrenceinternationale, utilisé commeinstrument de politiqueéconomique, le secteur bancaireeuropéen n�a pas connu avant lesannées 1990 de crises majeuresayant un impact au niveaucommunautaire. L�article 87 duTraité a été par conséquentappliqué très rarement. Lalibéralisation des mouvementsdes capitaux, les nouvelles règlesprudentielles et les progrèstechnologiques ont eu pour effetd�augmenter considérablementl�impact distorsif sur laconcurrence d�une aide à unebanque, même de taille modeste.Les crises des années 1990 sontun test décisif pour la politiquede la Commission en matièred�aides d�Etat, mais aussi vis-à-vis du secteur bancaire. A cettefin, le Commissaire Van Miertdécide en 1994 de constituer ungroupe de « Sages », de troishauts dirigeants de banquescentrales, pour examiner lesproblèmes des crises bancaires,leur impact sur le systèmeéconomique et l�application desrègles de concurrence auxétablissement de crédit,notamment quand ils traversentune crise mettant en cause leursurvie. Les « Sages » soulignent

que les règles de concurrencetelles qu�elles sont appliquéespar la Commission dans d�autressecteurs peuvent s�appliquer auxétablissements de crédit, tout entenant compte des élémentsspécifiques de ce secteur etnotamment du risque d�un effetde contagion que la crise d�unebanque peut avoir pour les autresétablissements financiers. LaCommission, sur cette base,considère qu�en principe lesentreprises bancaires doivent êtreregardées comme des entreprisescomme les autres, et la politiquede concurrence à leur égardbanalisée. De ce point de vue lesdifférentes décisions individuellesprises par la Commission ont uncaractère didactique, car ellesexposent l�évolution de lapolitique de l�institution à l�égarddes crises bancaires et desméthodes envisagées pour lesrésoudre.

On notera d�abord que laCommission ne nie jamais lesparticularités du secteur bancaire,mais qu�elle considère que cesmêmes particularités ont pourconséquence d�augmenter leniveau distorsif des aides et doncde rendre plus important uneapplication stricte des règles deconcurrence. En effet, dans lesecteur bancaire les conséquencesd�un comportement fautif ou troprisqué d�un établissement ne semanifestent comptablementqu�après un certain laps detemps, laissant ainsi à la banque lapossibilité de poursuivre despolitiques hasardeuses pendant

une assez longue période28. Lesdistorsions sont plus aiguës du faitque la nature particulière d'uneinstitution financière de tailleimportante peut rendre uneliquidation plus difficile, voireimpossible (argument connucomme « too big to fail ») enraison des remous que créeraitune telle liquidation sur lesmarchés. L�asymétrie desconditions d�entrée et de sortie dusecteur bancaire qui en résulte estde nature à provoquer unencombrement artificiel dusecteur, avec des pressionsaccrues sur les marges et larentabilité des établissementssains.

Pour ces raisons, il est essentielque les aides à une banque endifficulté soient conditionnées àdes mesures de restructurationradicales, ayant pour but à la foisle redressement de l�entreprise etl�adaptation de son système de« corporate governance ». A cetégard il est nécessaire que lesactionnaires supportent lesconséquences financières de lacrise, qu�il y ait un changementdu management de l�entreprise, deson système de contrôle, et dansbien des cas de sa propriété. Enoutre, des contrepartiesparticulièrement importantes sontnécessaires pour compenser lesconcurrents des effets distorsifsaccrus des aides.

L�ampleur unique des pertesoccasionnées par le sauvetage du

28 On notera que le cycle des crises

bancaires est toujours décalé dequelques années par rapport au cycleéconomique général.



Crédit Lyonnais s�explique enpartie par la carence des moyensde contrôle de l�Etat actionnairesur l�entreprise et le retard aveclequel les premières mesuresimportantes de restructurationont été prises. Ainsi que laCommission l�a noté dans sadécision de 1998, cette carencede gouvernement d�entreprise aété accentuée par la « confusiondes rôles de l�Etat actionnaire,de l�Etat entrepreneur, de l�Etatprovidence et de l�Etatrégulateur, confusion qui aconduit l�Etat actionnaire àlaisser dégénérer une situationd�une gravité inédite, contraire àses intérêts patrimoniaux ».Dans le cas d�espèce, le soutienimplicite ou explicite de l�Etat aeu pour effet de permettre auCrédit Lyonnais de se lancerdans la politique hasardeuse et àentreprendre avec retard et sansla détermination nécessaire sonredressement. Une telleprotection est d�autant plus gravequ�elle se répercute en chaîne surle comportement des acteurs : ellelimite l�incitation normale pourles créanciers à contrôler lecomportement de leurs débiteurs,permettant ainsi auxétablissements de ne plus êtresoumis au contrôle et à la sanctionnormale des marchés et ayantpour conséquence �d'inciter à unemauvaise gestion desétablissements de crédit" 29.L�ampleur de la crise du Crédit

29 Comme affirmé par le Parlement

européen et le Conseil de l'Unioneuropéenne dans la directive94/19/CE (J.O. L 135 du 31.5.1994,p. 5) du 30 mai 1994, relative auxsystèmes de garantie des dépôts.

Lyonnais s�explique certes par laconvergence entre la crise del�immobilier, la crise deconjoncture de 1992-93 etl�apparition des pertes sur lesparticipations de la banque : mais,à la racine, elle est largementimputable à cet effet pervers oualéa moral (« moral hazard »). Lesagences de rating elles-mêmes onten permanence tenu compte de lagarantie implicite de l�Etat sur labanque pour ne pas dégraderencore plus sa notation, qui, si telavait été le cas, aurait étédéclassée en « speculativegrade », ce qui veut dire que leCrédit Lyonnais auraitimmédiatement fait face à unecrise d�illiquidité en raison de ladéfiance des marchés.

Il convient également desouligner que l�effet distorsif desaides sur la concurrence neconcerne pas seulement lapolitique passée del�établissement bénéficiaire desaides, mais peut également créerdes anticipations sur l�avenir. Larépétition de l�aide peut générerun réel laxisme et des attentesd�aides futures par le�management� de la banque, cequi peut produire de nouveauxeffets distorsifs sur laconcurrence : alors qu�il étaitévident que la restructuration duréseau du Crédit Lyonnais enFrance était très insuffisante, queses frais généraux étaientbeaucoup trop élevés pour larendre compétitive, et que desmesures beaucoup plus radicalesauraient été nécessaires, il sembleque personne ne doutait au sein dela banque en 1996, lors qu�il estapparu que des aides

supplémentaires seraient nécessai-res, que « l�Etat ferait sondevoir », et les faits ont donnéraison à de telles attentes. Avec lapeur d�un conflit social, il s�agitde l�explication principale del�attentisme du management de labanque face aux mesures quis�imposaient pour rétablirrapidement la rentabilité del�exploitation en France.

Toute solution durable pour lesystème bancaire public, enFrance comme en Italie, devaitdonc passer par une réforme dusystème d�ensemble degouvernement d�entreprise(�corporate governance�) desétablissements en crise et par unesolution au problème d�aléa moralprovoqué par le soutien en dernierressort de l�Etat. Dans la plupartdes cas, en France comme enItalie, la Commission a considéréque les engagements deprivatisation et de contractiondrastique de la taille desétablissements pris par leGouvernement apportaient unesolution durable aux déficiencesdu gouvernement d�entrepriseconstatées dans le passé.

Dans sa décision de mai 1998 surle Crédit Lyonnais, laCommission indique que lapolitique qu�elle préconise pour larésolution des crises bancairesvise à accroître la responsabilitédes dirigeants des banques,publiques comme privées. Pourcela, indique-t-elle, « il importenon seulement que les autoritésresponsables fassent clairement etpubliquement savoir que lesétablissements de crédit serontnormalement soumis aux



sanctions du marché et que lesbanques, pas plus que les autresentreprises, ne sont pas à l�abrid�une liquidation (�), mais aussique l�Etat actionnaire agisse enconséquence lors du traitementdes crises bancaires, et sansopérer de discrimination entre lesbanques publiques et les banquesprivées. Une telle politique doitêtre accompagnée de mesures deprotection des petits déposantspar des instruments tels que lesfonds de garantie des dépôts30.Elle requiert aussi des stratégiesd�accompagnement de processusde liquidation ordonnée desétablissements bancairesdéfaillants, visant à circonscrireles crises et à éviter leurpropagation au niveau du reste dusecteur financier et del�économie. La Commissionconsidère que les Etats membresdisposent d�instruments, tels queles garanties temporaires depassif, permettant d�encadrer detels processus de liquidationordonnée et permettant le caséchéant d�éviter le développementd�une crise systémique31 ».

Complémentarité des règles deconcurrence et de régulationprudentielle

En 1995, en présentant lesraisons de la premièrerecapitalisation du CréditLyonnais de fin 1994, lesautorités françaises avaient

30 La directive 94/14/CE sur les

systèmes de garantie des dépôtsprévoit que les Etats membresmettent en place de tels instruments,J.O. L135 du 31.5.1994, p. 5.

31 JO L221 du 8.8.1998, p 67.

souligné l�obligation derespecter la contrainteréglementaire de fonds proprespour justifier l�opération auregard des objectifs poursuivispar les politiques communau-taires : elles concluaient que lesrègles communautaires enmatière d�aides d�Etat nepouvaient aboutir à un résultatcontraire à une obligationrésultant de la régulationprudentielle du secteur imposéepar le droit bancairecommunautaire. En septembre1996, lors de la notification desaides d�urgence, les autorités ontde nouveau justifié l�opérationau regard de la réglementationprudentielle : sans ces aidesd�urgence, le CL n�aurait plusété en mesure de respecter lesobligations prudentiellesbancaires. Rappelons que ladirective du Conseil relative à unratio de solvabilité desétablissements de crédit32 aintroduit en droit communautaireles règles prudentielles définiesdans le cadre du travail initié parla Banque des RèglementsInternationaux et ayant abouti àla définition d�un ratioprudentiel, défini comme le ratiodes fonds propres sur les actifspondérés par leur niveau derisque. Ce ratio doit être de 8%au minimum. Les fonds propres« durs » (dits tier one) doiventeux être d�un minimum de 4%des actifs pondérés.

Cet argument, qui aboutissait àintroduire une contrainte 32 Directive 89/647/CEE du Conseil du

18 décembre 1989, JO L 336 du3.12.1989, p14.

exogène à la politique de laconcurrence en vue soit dedisqualifier le caractère d�aided�une opération d�injection defonds propres dans une banquesous-capitalisée, soit de ladéclarer ex-ante compatible avecle Traité avant tout examen desconditions prévues dansl�encadrement sur les aides ausauvetage et à la restructuration,a été écarté par la Commission.Dans la décision de 1998, ellerappelle qu�une injection defonds publics dans une banqueest une aide si, dans descirconstances similaires, uninvestisseur privé n�aurait pasjugé qu�un tel investissement luiapportait une perspective derémunération normale. Rien dansle droit de la concurrence ni dansle droit bancaire n�interdit demettre une banque enliquidation, si de tellesperspectives de rentabilitén�existent pas, même comptetenu des projets derestructuration de l�établissementconcerné. La Commission a notédans sa décision du 20 mai 1998que tel était également l�avis del�autorité de surveillancebancaire française, laCommission Bancaire, qui dansson rapport de 1995 avaitconsidéré qu�une restructurationordonnée du système bancairefrançais implique que lesétablissements de crédit, qui sontdes entreprises comme lesautres, et qui de ce fait nedoivent pas être à l�abri dessanctions du marché, puissentdisparaître33. 33 Commission bancaire, rapport 1995,

p.13.



Compte tenu de ces éléments, lacontrainte de fonds propresintroduite par la réglementationprudentielle bancaire européennedoit être envisagée uniquementdans l�hypothèse de la continuitéd�exploitation de l�entreprisebancaire bénéficiaire34, si salicence bancaire est maintenue,et sachant qu�une autrealternative, celle du retrait de lalicence et de la liquidation,demeure toujours possible. LaCommission en a déduit que lesautorités nationales ne sauraientopposer au respect de l�article 87du traité une contrainte issue dudroit prudentiel.

Il est intéressant de noter que ledébat sur les obligations derecapitalisation d�une banque endifficulté oppose aussi parfoisles autorités nationales et lesbanques privées : l�article 52 dela loi bancaire française du 24janvier 1994 autorise legouverneur de la Banque deFrance à inviter les actionnaireset sociétaires d�unétablissements de crédit à luifournir le soutien qui lui estnécessaire si la situation lejustifie. Dans au moins un casrécent les actionnaires privésd�une banque privée, laCompagnie du BTP, ont refuséde suivre l�invitation dugouverneur de la Banque deFrance à faire un nouvel apporten capital. La Cour d�Appel deParis a rendu un arrêt35 sur cetteaffaire, selon lequel l�article 52 34 Décision sur les aides au Crédit

Lyonnais du 20 mai 1998, JO 221du 8.8.98 p 62.

35 Arrêt du 13 janvier 1998.

de la Loi bancaire ne saurait êtreinterprété dans un sens coercitif.Ceci est conforme à l�interpré-tation de la Commission selonlequel l�appel à la solidarité desactionnaires � privés commepublics - ne saurait exclure queces derniers examinent le nouvelinvestissement sur la base de sarentabilité, compte tenu duniveau de risque qu�ils prennent,conformément à ce que fait toutinvestisseur en économie demarché. En aucun cas le soutienà une banque en crise ne doitêtre acquis par avance etconsidéré comme automatique.Si tel devait être le cas, de graveslacunes dans l�efficience dusystème bancaire risqueraientd�apparaître.

La Commission a finalementconsidéré dans sa décision sur leCrédit Lyonnais de 1998 que lapolitique communautaire deconcurrence et la réglementationprudentielle en matière bancairevisaient un objectif commun,celui du développement d�unsecteur bancaire concurrentiel etsain36. Ceci implique qu�encontrepartie des possibilitésd�entrée dans le secteur, desvoies de sortie soient aussiprévues. Sinon, les établis-sements non concurrentielsn�étant pas sanctionnés par lasortie du marché, une situationmalsaine de surcapacité risquede voir le jour. In fine, ce sonttoujours les consommateurs etles contribuables qui payent le

36 Décision sur les aides au Crédit

Lyonnais du 20 mai 1998, JO 221du 8.8.98 p 62.

prix de telles distorsions demarché.

Evaluation des outils existantsde la politique d�aide

Les aides au fonctionnementsont interdites et rien ne permetd�envisager leur compatibilitéavec le traité37. L�encadrementsur les aides au sauvetage et à larestructuration38 adopté par laCommission en 1994 prévoit uncertain nombre de critères laguidant dans son examen en vuede déclarer la compatibilité � oul�incompatibilité � de l�aide. Iln�est pas exagéré de dire que cetencadrement a connu un testcrucial avec les crises àrépétition du Crédit Lyonnais de1994 à 1998, ayant abouti auplus important cas d�aides d�Etatde l�histoire de la Communauté.A posteriori, sans son adoptionen 1994 il apparaît que laCommission aurait été trèsdémunie pour traiter avecrigueur et objectivité une tellecrise.

Ainsi que rappelé ci-dessus,l�encadrement prévoit que pourqu�une aide à la restructurationsoit déclarée compatible, ilconvient que l�entreprisebénéficiaire soit viable, que

37 Cfr. décision de la Commission sur

la Westdeutsche Landesbank(WestLB), JO L150 du 23.6.2000, p.1.

38 Lignes directrices communautairespour les aides d�Etat au sauvetage età la restructuration des entreprisesen difficulté, JO C368 du23.12.1994. Ces lignes directricesont été mises à jour en 1999, Cf. JOC288 du 9.10.1999.



l�aide soit limitée au strictnécessaire et que descontreparties permettent delimiter l�effet distorsif de l�aidesur la concurrence. La questionde la viabilité est essentielle : sicelle-ci n�est pas assurée, l�aiden�apporte qu�un traitementpalliatif mais n�a aucun effetcuratif. On est alors quasi certainde voir un nouveau plan d�aidesnécessaire au terme de quelquesannées. Ceci est contraire auprincipe �one time, last time�39

qui veut qu�en principe une aidene soit accordée qu�une seulefois. Autrement, l�aide à larestructuration se voit détournéede son objectif et devient uneaide au fonctionnement.

Au regard de l�expériencerécente, c�est sans doutel�articulation entre les deuxpremiers critères qui requiertl�évaluation la plus complexe dela part de la Commission. Enjuillet 1995, à la suite denombreuses hésitations, laCommission avait sur la base duplan de restructuration présentépar les autorités françaises, etdes informations dont elledisposait, conclu que l�aide auCrédit Lyonnais étaitproportionnée aux besoins del�entreprise et que la banque étaitviable. Pourtant, il a bien falluconstater en septembre 1996 lorsde la notification des aidesd�urgence que tel n�était pas lecas : la construction du plan derestructuration de 1995 s�est expost avérée fragile, la banque n�apas été en mesure de se 39 Renforcé dans la nouvelle version

de l�encadrement de 1999.

redresser, et sans les aidesd�urgence accordées par l�Etatpour 1995 (rétroactivement) et1996 elle aurait enregistré despertes la mettant encontravention avec laréglementation prudentiellebancaire. A terme, elle risquaitde perdre son agrément bancaireet de sortir du marché.

Il est difficile a posteriori dejuger s�il s�agit d�une erreurinitiale de diagnostic de la partde la Commission en 1995(influencée en cela par lesautorités françaises) ou biend�une mise en oeuvreinsatisfaisante du plan derestructuration : ainsi que l�a parla suite reconnu le président duCrédit Lyonnais, il apparaîttoutefois que dans les premièresannées de la crise la nouvelledirection de la banque a fait uneerreur de diagnostic en attribuantaux participations non bancaireset internationales du CréditLyonnais l�essentiel de sonattention et qu�elle a gravementsous-estimé l�ampleur desrestructurations nécessaires pouraméliorer la rentabilité du réseaubancaire du Crédit Lyonnais enFrance, très inefficace et peuperformant. Ce n�est qu�une foisqu�a été prise en compte cettedimension de la crise qu�uneperspective réelle de la jugulerest apparue.

De tels échecs d�un plan derestructuration approuvé par laCommission, surtout dans un casaussi important, sont coûteuxnon seulement pour le budget del�Etat Membre, principal maîtred�oeuvre de ce plan, mais aussi

pour la crédibilité de la politiquecommunautaire de concurrence.La leçon qu�en a retenu laCommission est que dans detelles situations particulièrementcomplexes, concernant desentreprises multinationales ayantde nombreux centres d�activitéde nature différente et descentaines de filiales, une contre-expertise est indispensable : pourcela, la Commission s�estappuyée en 1997-98 , lors del�examen du nouveau plan derestructuration du CréditLyonnais, sur une banqueconseil qui lui a soumis uneévaluation indépendante du plande restructuration présenté parles autorités, concluant à laviabilité de celle-ci. Cediagnostic semble confirmé parl�évolution favorable de lasituation de l�entreprise depuislors. La pratique de la DirectionGénérale de la Concurrence est àprésent de commanditersystématiquement de tellescontre-expertises lors de casd�un niveau de complexitéélevée. Quelle que soit ladifficulté de l�évaluation de laviabilité du plan soumis par lesautorités, ceci ne remet pas encause la pertinence de ce critèrequi s�avère être la pierre detouche pour l�évaluation tout casde ce type.

L�articulation prévue dans leslignes directrices entre les aidesau sauvetage et les aides à larestructuration a également étéfondamentale dans le traitementde la crise du Crédit Lyonnais àpartir de 1996. L�encadrementprévoit en effet que les aides desauvetage, provisoires (en



principe d�une durée de 6 moismaximum) soient suivies soitd�un plan de restructuration �pour lequel toute mesure d�aidesupplémentaire doit être notifiéeà la Commission � soit, si larestructuration apparaît impos-sible, la liquidation del�entreprise. Dans le cas duCrédit Lyonnais, la décision deseptembre 1996 s�est strictementlimitée à l�approbation des aidesde sauvetage et a stipulé quetoute mesure nouvelle d�aide à larestructuration devrait lui êtrenotifiée en même temps qu�unnouveau plan de restructuration.

L�exigence de contrepartiesimposées à l�entreprise aidée aégalement été confirmée commeun critère essentiel, seul enmesure vis-à-vis des concurrentsde l�entreprise bénéficiaired�assurer la crédibilité d�unedécision positive sur un montantimportant d�aides, qui est, ilconvient toujours de le rappeler,une exception faite àl�interdiction de principe prévuepar le traité. Nonobstant laviabilité de la banque, laCommission a dans un premiertemps, fin 1997, jugé trèsinsuffisant le niveau decontreparties présenté par lesautorités en vue d�atténuer leseffets distorsifs des aides. Cen�est que lorsque la Commissiona, en mai 1998, obtenu desengagements sur un montant trèssupérieur de contreparties (untotal de 645 milliards de francsde cessions ou fermeturesd�actifs en tenant compte desopérations de restructuration de1995 et 1998) qu�elle a in finedéclaré les aides compatibles

avec le traité. Tous ces critèresd�appréciation étaient ceuxprévus par les lignes directricessur les aides au sauvetage à larestructuration.

Dans l�ensemble, ces lignesdirectrices, conçues par laCommission à partir de sonexpérience en matière de grandesopérations de restructurationindustrielle, se sont donc avéréesadaptées au traitement d�unegrave crise bancaire. Elles ontrésisté à cette épreuve et fournile cadre indispensable àl�examen de la Commission, surla base de critères objectifs,publiés et ainsi connus àl�avance par l�ensemble desparties intéressées40.

1.0.0.2. Une évaluation pos-sible des distorsionsde concurrence

Par rapport aux décisionsantérieures en matière bancaire,une nouveauté a été introduitedans la décision sur le CréditLyonnais de mai 1998, et reprisedans les décisions postérieuresde la Commission en matièred�aides d�Etat apportées à desbanques sous forme de fondspropres ou de quasi-fondspropres (Crédit Foncier, SociétéMarseillaise de Crédit, Banco diNapoli, Banco di Sicilia) : pourla première fois la Commission aprocédé à une évaluation �

40 De légères adaptations ont été

apportées dans l�encadrement réviséde 1999 permettant de mieuxprendre en compte la spécificité dessituations d�aide au sauvetage debanques en difficulté.

indicative - de la distorsion deconcurrence introduite par lesaides.

En temps normal une telleévaluation est très difficile. Si unEtat Membre accorde une aide àune entreprise, la connaissanceque l�on a de la distorsion deconcurrence est plutôt intuitive �cet argent donne un avantage àl�entreprise qui lui permet deconcurrencer les autres présentessur les mêmes marchés. Pourcette raison, la plupart lesdécisions en matière d�aide neprévoient normalement pas laquantification de la distorsionprovoquée par l�aide. Certes, ilest possible d�examinerdifférents ratios : dans un secteurdonné il existe une relationmoyenne entre la capitalisationen fonds propres et le chiffred�affaires, de sorte qu�uneinjection en fonds propres de Xmillions d�euros permettra laréalisation d�un chiffre d�affairesde Y millions d�euros. Mais detels ratios de capitalisation, si ilspeuvent être pertinents dans desentreprises hautement capitalis-tiques (par exemple lasidérurgie) sont en revanchebeaucoup moins significatifsdans des secteurs de services àfaible intensité capitalistique etdonnent des indications trèsapproximatives.

Dans le secteur bancairetoutefois, la relation entre fondspropres et actif pondéré estréglementée par la contrainteprudentielle de solvabilitérappelée ci-dessus, de sorte quel�on sait parfaitement qu�uneaide de 1 million d�euros en



fonds propres permet à unebanque d�avoir un montantd�actifs pondérés à son bilan de12,5 à 25 millions d�euros (selonque l�on applique la contraintedu ratio « tier one » de 4% oucelle du ratio « tier one + tiertwo » de 8%). Le ratio desolvabilité peut se « travailler »par le numérateur mais aussi parle dénominateur : une banqueconnaissant une sous-capitalisation au regard desrègles prudentielles peutchercher à augmenter ses fondspropres (numérateur) oudiminuer ses actifs pondérés(dénominateur). Elle ne peut entout cas pas augmenter cesderniers tant que ses fondspropres sont insuffisants. Lacontrainte de solvabilité exercedonc un effet de bridage de lacroissance que souligne laCommission41 : les établisse-ments les moins performants nepeuvent pas développer destratégie de croissanceexpansive. Sans aides, uneentreprise bancaire non rentableet sous-capitalisée doit réduireson bilan et son activité, lacontrainte de solvabilité a uneffet « auto punitif ». Dans le casd�injections en capital ou demesures d�effet équivalentpouvant être déclaréescompatibles avec le traité, le rôledes contreparties sous forme decessions d�actifs est, dans un telcontexte, de limiter la distorsionde concurrence provoquée parles aides, ainsi estimée de façontrès indicative. Il s�agit là d�uneautre facette de la 41 Décision Crédit Lyonnais du 20 mai

1998, JO L221 du 8.8.98, p 72.

complémentarité déjà soulignéeentre la politique de concurrenceet les effets de la régulationprudentielle.

Cette évaluation indicative, entermes d�actifs pondérés au biland�une entreprise, justifie ex postla nature des contreparties déjàretenue en 1995, puis reprise en1998 dans le cas du CréditLyonnais : l�effort demandé à labanque avait été évalué entermes de diminution de bilan(par cession d�actifs). Ainsi, encontrepartie des aides reçues, labanque devait faire elle-mêmeune partie du chemin par uneffort de réduction de bilanqu�en vertu de la relationprécédemment soulignée unebanque non rentable doit faire sises fonds propres sontinsuffisants. Si l�on prend encompte les deux décisions de1995 et 1998, c�est à plus dutiers de ses actifs que le CL aurafinalement dû renoncer encontrepartie des aides colossalesreçues.

Pour déterminer les niveaux decontreparties nécessaires, laCommission n�a toutefois pas étéjusqu�à appliquer de façonmécanique cette relation entreaides et distrosions, sur la basedes distorsions potentielles tellesqu�évaluées ci-dessus. Dans lecas du Crédit Lyonnais c�étaitimpossible dans le cadre d�unedécision de compatibilité, lesdistorsions théoriques maximalescalculées par cette relation étantin fine supérieures au bilan del�entreprise. A l�inverse de sonapproche de la notion d�aidequ�elle considère comme

objective, la Cour de Justicelaisse à la Commission unemarge discrétionnaired�appréciation quant auxconditions permettant dedéclarer la compatibilité desaides avec l�intérêtcommunautaire, pourvu quecelle-ci motive clairement sadécision et ne fasse pas d�erreurmanifeste d�appréciation. Dansles dernières décisions enmatière d�aides à larestructuration de banques, laCommission n�a pas cherché àobtenir des contrepartiesstrictement égales aux niveauxestimés de distorsions deconcurrence. Il conviendrad�examiner à l�avenir, si denouveau cas comparablesvenaient à se présenter, si laCommission maintientl�approche empirique suivie dansles précédents cas, ou bien relèvele niveau d�exigences en matièrede contreparties exigibles pourque les aides puissent alors êtredéclarées compatibles (pourvuque les autres critères decompatibilité soient respectés).

1.0.0.3. Conclusion

Depuis la première décision dela Commission de 1995, on aassisté à une certainebanalisation de la manière dontles cas d�aides d�Etat auxbanques sont traités: ainsi quesouligné à plusieurs reprisesdans les décisions les plusrécentes, les banques sont desentreprises qui relèvent desrègles générales en matièred�aides, et en particulier del�encadrement sur les aides ausauvetage et à la restructuration.



Ceci d�autant plus, ainsi quesouligné ci-dessus, quel�encadrement sur ces aides,conçu bien avant ces crisesbancaires s�est avéré un outilefficace et permettant pourl�essentiel de traiter ces crises.Seuls quelques ajustementspourraient être envisagés,concernant principalement lesprocédures applicables auxrègles de sauvetage, en vued�adapter les procéduresexistantes à des situationsd�urgence. En revanche, il n�estpas question de déroger au droitgénéral et de créer unencadrement spécifique appli-cable au secteur bancaire. Nonseulement la nécessité d�un tel

encadrement n�est pas apparue,mais il pourrait même êtrenuisible au maintien de ladiscipline d�aides dans cesecteur.

Les dirigeants des entreprisesaidées ont appris au moins uneleçon : les aides s�obtiennent auprix d�une difficile cured�austérité, de plans derestructuration accompagnés dechangement du management, etd�une réduction de la taille del�entreprise. Le Crédit Lyonnaisest ainsi passé en cinq ans de lapremière à la quinzième ouvingtième place des entreprisesbancaires en Europe (suivant le

critère de taille retenu). Lesconséquences du laxisme despolitiques bancaires expansion-nistes et imprudentes sontsanctionnées. La récenteexpérience communautaire enmatière d�aides d�Etat dans lescas de crises bancaires montreainsi que l�approbation de l�aidene signifie pas pour autant qu�ilpeut être dérogé aux règles deconcurrence. Ainsi a été mis unelimite au phénomène de « moralhazard » qui veut les entreprisesinefficaces soient aidées et nonpas soumises aux règlesnormales du marché.



INTRODUCTION

Le 25 juillet 2000, la Commis-sion a annoncé qu'elle avaitdécidé de clore une enquête surAir France, concernant unediscrimination présumée àl'encontre de Sabre - un systèmeinformatisé de réservation (SIR)américain. Ce classement faisaitsuite à la signature, par lacompagnie aérienne française etSabre, d'une charte de bonneconduite garantissant à Sabre,ainsi qu'aux autres SIR, desconditions équivalentes à cellesconsenties au système Amadeus,dont Air France est copro-priétaire.42

L''affaire Sabre contre Amadeuse.a. présente un double intérêt.D'une part, elle crée unprécédent: il s'agit du premiercas concret de mise en �uvre dumécanisme de courtoisie activeavec l'autorité de concurrencedes Etats Unis d'Amérique.D'autre part elle clarifie la portéedes règles de concurrence àl'égard d'un secteur en pleineévolution tel que les SIR.


du 25.07.2000, consultable sur leserveur RAPID http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/welcome.htm

LA DEMANDE DE COURTOISIEACTIVE

L'origine de l'enquête remonte àune plainte que la Compagnieaérienne American Airlines avaitdéposé en juin 1996 auprès duDepartment of Justice of theUnited States of America (DoJ).American Airlines se plaignaitessentiellement du fait quequatre compagnies aérienneseuropéennes (Air France, Iberia,Lufthansa et SAS), toutes liéesau SIR Amadeus, favorisaient cedernier au détriment de Sabre,son propre SIR. AmericanAirlines leur reprochait notam-ment de ne pas fournir à Sabreune information sur les volsaussi complète et ponctuelle quecelle fournie à Amadeus, et dene pas lui faire profiter desmêmes possibilités techniques(par exemple de la confirmationen ligne des réservations).

En janvier 1997, le DoJ aformellement demandé à laCommission d'enquêter sur lesallégations de SABRE au titredes règles de concurrence del'Union Européenne. Il s'agissaitde la première application dumécanisme de la "courtoisieactive" prévu par l'accord decoopération UE - Etats Unis en

matière de concurrence43. Lacourtoisie active permet en effetaux autorités de la concurrenceaméricaines de demander à laCommission d'enquêter sur desactes anticoncurrentiels présu-més commis en Europe, etinversement (voir encadré).

L'enquête préliminaire n'a révéléaucune preuve de discriminationde la part d'Iberia, de Lufthansaet de SAS. La Commission adonc cessé d'enquêter sur cestrois compagnies. En revanche,sur la base des résultats de sespremières investigations, laCommission a décidé d'ouvrir laprocédure formelle à l'encontred'Air France et lui a adressé unecommunication des griefs.Comme indiqué en introduction,les parties ont ensuite signé unecharte de bonne conduite et laCommission a décidé de clorel'affaire (cf. infra).

Du point de vue juridique, lademande du DoJ a conduit laCommission à entamer uneinstruction d'office, dans le cadredes pouvoirs qui lui sontconférés par le règlement deprocédure n°17/6244. Ainsi, dupoint de vue des parties mises encause, le fait que l'affaire aittrouvé son origine dans cetinstrument nouveau ne s'est pastraduit par une altération desdroits découlant dudit règlement.

43 Décision du Conseil et de la

Commission du 10 avril 1995(95/145/CE, CECA) JO L 95 du27 avril 1995, p.47 et JO L 131 du15 juin 1995, p.38

44 JO 13 du 21.2.1962, p. 18

Sabre contre Amadeus e.a. : undossier riche en enseignements

ENRICO MARIA ARMANI, DG COMP-H-2



Le seul élément qui a distinguéle déroulement de cette affairepar rapport aux cas traités"habituellement" concerne leprocessus d'information, par laCommission, des autorités deconcurrence américaines. Con-formément aux dispositions del'accord bilatéral précité, laCommission a informé le DoJtout au long de la procédure dudéroulement de celle-ci. L'infor-mation a porté plus particulière-ment sur:� les mesures d'application

prises (par exemple, la com-munication des griefs à AirFrance);

� les principaux développe-ments survenus durantl'instruction (par exemple,l'arrêt de l'instruction desallégations contre les autresparties mises en cause) et

� sa décision finale (le clas-sement de l'affaire).

Ainsi, le 24 juillet 2000 laCommission a adopté unedécision autorisant le DirecteurGénéral de la Concurrence derépondre formellement à lademande du DoJ, conformémentà l'accord bilatéral précité45.

LES LEÇONS DE L'AFFAIREQUANT AU FOND

Classer une affaire sans suiterisque de faire passer soussilence l'analyse sous-jacente quiy a conduit. Or, dans le casprésent, l'instruction de la plainted'American Airlines a conduit laCommission à mener une ré- 45 Décision C(2000) 2160, non

publiée

flexion approfondie sur lefonctionnement du marché desSIR et sur les droits etobligations des différents acteurssur ce marché. Preuve en est ladurée de l'enquête, à savoir plusde trois ans.

Pour avoir quelques détails ausujet de cette réflexion, il estnéanmoins possible de se référerà la communication des griefsque la Commission a adressée àAir France en février 199946:l'approche de la Commission yest décrite explicitement en cequi concerne les griefs retenus,et résulte implicitement en ce quiconcerne les griefs ne l'ayant pasété.

Le présent article explique ci-après les principaux éléments duraisonnement sous-jacent à lacommunication des griefs de laCommission. Il convient toute-fois de rappeler qu'une commu-nication des griefs constitue uneappréciation préliminaire et nonune évaluation définitive de lapart de la Commission. Ainsi, lesprincipes suivants ne peuvent enaucun cas lier la Commission ouses services.

Obligation, pour une compa-gnie aérienne dominante, deneutralité vis à vis des SIR

A ce jour, la Commission aadopté une seule décision dans lesecteur des SIR au titre desrègles de concurrence: la déci-


du 15.03.199, consultable sur leserveur RAPID

sion London European vs Sabe-na47. Il y était question de droit,pour un transporteur, d'êtreaffiché dans un SIR dominant.Dans le cas présent, la situationest inversée puisque l'affaireconcerne les obligations aux-quelles est soumis un transpor-teur dominant vis à vis des SIR.

Dans sa communication desgriefs, la Commission a estiméqu'il convenait de distinguerdeux marchés:� le marché de l'offre, par les

compagnies aériennes, deservices aériens réguliers auxagents de voyage, en vue deleur distribution au "public",

� le marché de l'offre, auxagents de voyage, de servicesSIR (destinés à sonder lemarché et à effectuer desréservations).

Pour exercer ses activités demanière efficace, une agence devoyage s'équipera du SIR qui luipermettra d'offrir à ses clients lemeilleur service de transports(par exemple les prix les plusintéressants, la meilleure dispo-nibilité de places, etc�) et ce,pour le plus grand nombre decompagnies aériennes possibles(ou, en tout état de cause, pourles compagnies qui représententla plus grande partie de sonchiffre d'affaires).

Dans ce contexte, un trans-porteur en position dominante(sur le premier marché) quicommunique de meilleures 47 Décision du 4.11.1988, affaire

IV/32.318, JO L 317 du 24.11.1988p. 47



informations à son propre SIRqu'à d'autres affecte la con-currence sur le deuxième marché(par "meilleures informations" ilfaut entendre des tarifs plusexacts, plus exhaustifs, plusfiables,�). Il en va de même sice transporteur habilite unique-ment son propre SIR à desfonctions avancées comme lavérification de la disponibilité enligne, la pré-réservation desièges, etc�

Sous réserve de l'appréciation del'affectation du commerce entreEtats membres et en l'absence detoute autre justification, une tellepratique est contraire àl'article 82 CE dans le mesure oùce transporteur dominant opèreune discrimination entre SIR etutilise sa position dominante surun marché pour protéger ourenforcer la position de marchéde son propre SIR sur un autremarché.

Applicabilité des règles deconcurrence au secteur desSIR

Lors de l'instruction prélimi-naire, plusieurs compagniesaériennes ont invoqué la nonapplicabilité du Règlement deprocédure n°17/62 au secteur desSIR pour deux raisons. D'unepart parce que ce règlement nes'applique pas aux positionsdominantes sur le marché destransports48. D'autre part parceque, selon elles, le marché desSIR échapperait aux règles deconcurrence (articles 81 CE et 48 Règlement n°141/62, JO 124 du

28.11.1962, p. 2751

82 CE) en raison de l'existencedu code de conduite sur lesSIR49.

La première objection n'est paspertinente parce que le premiermarché en cause n'est pas unmarché de transport mais unmarché de distribution d'unservice de transports aériens(couvert par le champs d'applica-tion du règlement n°17/62).

La seconde objection n'est paspertinente non plus, parce qu'unenorme de législation secondaire(comme un Règlement duConseil) ne peut en aucun casaffecter l'applicabilité des règlesdu Traité. Il convient d'ailleursde remarquer que le code deconduite même stipule qu�ils�entend sans préjudice del�application des articles 81 et 82du traité (quatrième considérant).

49 Règlement (CE) nº 323/1999 du

Conseil du 8 février 1999 modifiantle règlement (CEE) nº 2299/89instaurant un code de conduite pourl'utilisation de systèmes informatisésde réservation (SIR).Le marché européen de laréservation informatisée est en effetrégi par un code de conduite qui apour objet d�assurer une concur-rence loyale entre les transporteursaériens et entre les systèmesinformatisés de réservation. Ildispose, entre autres, que lestransporteurs participants veillent àce que les données qu�ils décidentd�introduire dans un SIR soientexactes et ne soient pas moinscomplètes que celles destinées à toutautre SIR (où les "données"concernent les horaires, les tarifs, lesplaces disponibles etc�).

La procédure contre AirFrance

Dans le cas d'espèce, laCommission a estimé, dans sacommunication des griefs, qu'AirFrance était une compagnieaérienne dominante sur lemarché de la fourniture auxagences de voyages françaises deservices aériens en vue de leurdistribution au public. Elle lui acontesté les trois griefs àsuivants:� Le fait d'avoir, entre octobre

1993 et juin 1997, distribuéses tarifs non européens selonune procédure telle qu'Ama-deus recevait ces tarifs bienavant Sabre (avec une avancepouvant aller jusqu'à troisjours).

� Le fait d'avoir, entre 1992 etmai 1996, distribué ses tarifsintra européens non domes-tiques selon une procéduretelle que Sabre ne les recevaitpas en totalité et les recevaitavec un retard par rapport àAmadeus pouvant allerjusqu'à une semaine.

� Le fait de ne pas avoircommuniqué son tarif Fly andDrive à Sabre en 1997.

Chacun de ces trois élémentsconduisait au même résultat, àsavoir qu'Amadeus était pluscomplet que Sabre. Ainsi,chacun d'entre eux contribuait àrenforcer ou forger la perceptiondes agents de voyages françaisqu'Amadeus répondait mieux àleurs besoins que Sabre. Or, lorsde l'instruction préliminaire, laCommission n'a décelé aucunejustification objective aucomportement d'Air France, ce



qui l'a conduite à entamer laprocédure formelle contre lacompagnie aérienne française.

En réalité, il existait bien uncertain nombre de contraintestechniques et économiquesexpliquant les deux premierséléments: du point de vue d'AirFrance, la procédure choisiepour transmettre ses tarifs était laplus efficace. Toutefois, laCommission a également consta-té qu'Air France n'avait adoptéaucune mesure pour surmonterces contraintes, alors que detelles mesures existaient etqu'elles n'étaient pas dispropor-tionnées. Ainsi, la Commission aestimé que l'obligation deneutralité d'un transporteurdominant, tout en l'autorisant depoursuivre l'efficacité économi-que, lui impose de rechercher etde mettre en �uvre toute mesureraisonnable nécessaire à assurercette neutralité.

Le classement de la procédure

Avant même la conclusion de laprocédure formelle, cependant,Sabre et Air France ont signéune "charte de bonne conduite".Cette charte fait obligation auxparties de réserver un traitementéquitable aux différents SIR etaux différentes compagniesaériennes. Elle prévoit notam-ment l'engagement d'Air Francede transmettre ses tarifs par lebiais de vendeurs de tarifsindépendants uniquement, departiciper dans tous les SIR aumême niveau de connexion,d'habiliter tous les SIR auxmêmes fonctionnalités et depromouvoir Sabre aussi favora-

blement que n'importe quel autreSIR. Elle prévoit également desengagements réciproques enmatière d'échange régulierd'informations de même qu'unecoopération accrue en matièred'innovations techniques et demise au point de nouveauxproduits. De plus, Air Frances'est engagée à étendre à toutSIR qui en fasse la demande lesbénéfices de cette charte.

Prenant acte du contenu de lacharte de bonne conduite et suiteà une invitation en ce sens duplaignant, la Commission adécidé de ne pas poursuivre laprocédure jusqu'au stade de ladécision formelle et de classerl'affaire sans suite.

S'agissant d'une issue peuhabituelle pour une procédureayant atteint le stade de lacommunication des griefs, ilconvient de signaler que ceclassement a été motivé par lesspécificités du cas. En premierlieu, le fait que les infractionscontestées à Air France sonttoutes terminées depuis long-temps. Ensuite, le fait que leurimpact sur la positionconcurrentielle de Sabre sur lemarché pertinent a étévraisemblablement faible. Enfin,le fait que la charte de bonneconduite signée par les parties �y compris son application à tousles SIR - conjure tout risque derépétition de l'infraction pourl'avenir. Dans ce contexte, lavaleur ajoutée d'une décisionformelle aurait été vraisem-blablement faible par rapport auxressources nécessaires pour yarriver.

Le rejet des autres allégations

Outre les trois griefs retenuscontre Air France, la plainted'American Airlines comportaitun grand nombre d'autresallégations que la Commission aestimé ne pas devoir retenir dansle cadre de la communicationdes griefs. Certaines d'entreelles, parce que les faits n'avaientpas été correctement rapportéspar le plaignant; celles-ci neméritent pas d'être relatées ici.D'autres, en revanche, n'ont pasété retenues pour des raisons dedroit. Ces raisons méritentquelques explications parcequ'elles permettent de mieuxappréhender les limites desobligations qui découlent desrègles de concurrence dans uncas d'espèce.

Le droit pour une entreprise deprotéger ses intérêts commer-ciaux légitimes

American Airlines reprochaitaux compagnies aériennes viséespar la plainte d'avoir habilitéAmadeus (et pas Sabre) àeffectuer un certain nombre defonctions de réservationspéciales. Lors de l'instruction,ces compagnies ont confirméleur refus d'habiliter Sabre auxfonctions en cause, mais ontjustifié leur refus par le fait queles fonctions offertes par Sabrene présentaient pas le mêmedegré de protection des donnéesqu'Amadeus. Selon elles,habiliter Sabre à ces fonctionsaurait affecté leurs intérêtscommerciaux.



En principe, une disparité detraitement entre SIR constitueune violation de l'article 82 CE.Toutefois, l'enquête préliminairede la Commission a confirméque, à l'époque des faits, lesdifférences techniques entreSabre et Amadeus se traduisaienteffectivement par des différencesen matière de possibilités degestion et/ou de protection dedonnées sensibles.

Dès lors, la Commission aestimé que le refus descompagnies aériennes d'habiliterSabre à utiliser certainesfonctionnalités pouvait êtrejustifié objectivement tant queSabre n'aurait pas développé sonsystème informatique à unniveau qui offre les mêmesgaranties qu'Amadeus. En effet,les règles de concurrence del'Union Européenne ne peuventen aucun cas obliger uneentreprise à agir contre sespropres intérêts commerciauxlégitimes.

Dans le cas présent, laCommission a considéré comme"légitimes" les intérêts suivants:� la protection contre les

fraudes: American Airlines se plai-gnait du fait que ces compa-gnies aériennes autorisaientuniquement Amadeus à accé-der à leur base données inter-ne (par exemple pour modi-fier des réservations). Lescompagnies ont répondu que,au moment des faits, certainsagents équipés avec Sabreavaient utilisé cette fonctionpour se faire verser descommissions qui ne corres-

pondaient pas à la vente debillets. Or un tel risquen'existait pas avec Amadeusparce que celui-ci était équipéde dispositifs de protectioncontre les utilisations fraudu-leuses;

� la protection des secretsd'affaires: American Airlines se plai-gnait du fait que ces com-pagnies aériennes habilitaientAmadeus et pas Sabre à gérerles tarifs négociés (c'est à direréservés à des groupes res-treints d'utilisateurs) ou les"Frequent Flyer Passengers".Les compagnies ont réponduque, contrairement à Ama-deus, Sabre n'était pas enmesure, au moment des faits,de gérer ces tarifs ou cesdonnées de manière telle queces informations confiden-tielles ne soient pas divul-guées;

� la protection de la stratégie del'entreprise: American Airlines se plai-gnait du fait que ces com-pagnies aériennes habilitaientAmadeus à effectuer un plusgrand nombre de réservationssimultanées que Sabre. Deplus ces compagnies avaienthabilité uniquement Amadeusà la confirmation en ligne desréservations. Les compagniesont répondu que, au momentdes faits, Sabre n'était pas enmesure d'assurer le fonction-nement correct de leursRevenue Management Sys-tems (systèmes internes auxcompagnies aériennes visantà maximiser la recette pourun vol donné) et n'offrait pasles mêmes garanties qu'Ama-

deus en matière de préventionde surréservation.

La liberté pour une entreprise dechoisir ses propres standardsindustriels

American Airlines reprochaitaux compagnies aériennes viséespar la plainte d'avoir développécertaines fonctions ou bases dedonnées selon un standardcompatible avec Amadeus maisincompatible avec Sabre. Parexemple, Sabre ne pouvait paslire certaines données tarifairesou certaines pages d'informa-tions en raison du nombre decaractères par ligne ou de lignespar page.

La Commission a rejeté cetteallégation, considérant quel'élaboration des standards indus-triels est un facteur deconcurrence essentiel. Ainsi,aucune entreprise ne saurait êtretenue à adopter un standardparticulier (à moins que cetteobligation ne soit établie parl'autorité publique, dans un soucid'intérêt général).

En revanche, il importe qu'uneentreprise dominante accepte decommuniquer (et communiqueeffectivement) avec suffisam-ment de préavis les standardsqu'elle adopte de manière à ceque les tiers puissent s'y adapter.Ce principe a déjà été établi lorsdu règlement de l'affaire IBM50.

50 Cf. XIV° Rapport sur la politique de

concurrence, points 94 et suivants.



Ainsi, la Commission a exigéque la charte de bonne conduitesignée par Sabre et Air Franceprévoie explicitement, d'unepart, la liberté pour les partiesdans leur choix et le dévelop-pement des standards et, d'autrepart, l'obligation de commu-niquer ces standards.

Le coût des adaptations tech-niques

Un des corollaires du pointprécédent est de savoir qui, entrela compagnie aérienne et le SIR,doit assumer le coût desdéveloppements nécessaires àadapter les SIR aux systèmes descompagnies aériennes. En effet,certaines compagnies aériennesont été mises en cause parAmerican Airlines parce quecelles-ci refusaient de payer lesdéveloppements nécessaires àassurer la compatibilité de leursystème avec Sabre. A ce proposles compagnies mises en causeont invoqué que ces dévelop-pements coûtaient trop cher parrapport au bénéfice qu'elles enauraient retiré: les parts demarché de Sabre étant trèsfaibles dans les marchés enquestion, le coût des adaptationsn'aurait vraisemblablement pasété couvert par un juste retour.

La Commission a accepté lepoint de vue des compagniesaériennes. En effet, elle a estiméque c'est au SIR "demandeur" des'adapter aux standards (ou à lastructure du système informa-tique) de la compagnie aérienneet non l'inverse (l'obligation dutransporteur se limitant à com-muniquer ses standards). Le coût

des adaptations doit, en toutelogique, être supporté par le SIRà moins que la compagnieaérienne n'en décide autrementpour des raisons qui lui sontpropres.

Les contraintes propres audéveloppement des nouveauxproduits

American Airlines reprochaitaux compagnies aériennes viséespar la plainte d'avoir favoriséAmadeus dans ses programmesde développement de nouvellesfonctions. En pratique, AmericanAirlines soutenait que cescompagnies aériennes lançaientles nouvelles fonctionnalitéssystématiquement avec Amadeuset ne les introduisaient dansSabre que par la suite (donc enretard). Or, selon AmericanAirlines, les compagnies aérien-nes auraient l'obligation delancer toute nouvelle fonction enmême temps dans tous les SIR.

Tout en reconnaissant qu'unretard systématique dans l'intro-duction des nouvelles fonction-nalités peut nuire à l'image d'unSIR, la Commission n'a pasretenu l'idée d'American Airlinesque l'obligation de neutralité destransporteurs dominants leurimpose d'habiliter tous les SIR àtoutes les fonctionnalités aumême moment. En effet, unetelle obligation serait excessiveet ignorerait les contraintesintrinsèques à tout processus dedéveloppement technique.

Comme rappelé ci-dessus,l'existence de différents stan-dards et de logiques de systèmes

conduit à ce que l'introductiond'une nouvelle fonctionnalité(par exemple la possibilité deréserver un repas spécial pour uncertain passager) requiert desdéveloppements de deux types.En premier lieu, le dévelop-pement de la fonctionnalité enquestion entre la compagnieaérienne et son propre systèmeinformatique (qui, souvent,présente un degré decompatibilité élevé avec son SIRassocié). Ensuite, le dévelop-pement des adaptations néces-saires pour permettre cette mêmefonctionnalité sur les autres SIR.

Or la logique économique veutque ces développements soientmenés en série (l'un après l'autre)et non en parallèle (tous enmême temps). En conséquence,il est inévitable qu'un certainlaps de temps s'écoule entrel'introduction d'une fonction-nalité dans un SIR par rapport àun autre.

Une programmation en série desdéveloppements ne peut doncpas être interprétée commeindicative d'un abus de positiondominante (sauf, bien entendu,s'il devait s'avérer que ce laps detemps a été excessif ou que letransporteur dominant n'avait pasmis en �uvre les mesuresnécessaires afin de limiter celaps de temps à un délairaisonnable).

CONCLUSION

Le cas Sabre contre Amadeuse.a. nous suggère deuxconsidérations.



En premier lieu, l'impact que ceprécédent pourra avoir pourl'avenir. En effet, bien que cetteaffaire n'ait pas donné lieu à unedécision formelle de la part duCollège, elle a conduit lesservices de la Commission àprendre explicitement ouimplicitement position sur desthèmes liés aux technologies del'information. Nul doute qu'avecle développement du commerceélectronique, des thèmes analo-

gues risquent de se poser ànouveau. Il sera alors intéressantde voir si ces prises de positionpréliminaires seront confirméespar la suite.

En second lieu, le fait que cetteaffaire, couronnée de succès,constitue le premier cas concretde mise en �uvre du principe decourtoisie active prévue parl'accord bilatéral entre l'UnionEuropéenne et les Etats Unis

d'Amérique. Comme l'a déclaréle Commissaire Monti, l'issuesatisfaisante de cette enquête"démontre qu'une collaborationétroite entre l'UE et les États-Unis permet de mieux fairerespecter le droit de laconcurrence des deux côtés del'Atlantique", au profit desentreprises et des consom-mateurs.

1. What is positive comity?

International comity. The notionof comity, whereby onejurisdiction may take intoaccount the interests of anotherjurisdiction in the application ofits laws, is well-established ininternational law. In pursuit ofthis principle, a jurisdiction mayelect to exercise restraint ormoderation in its lawenforcement activity, out ofdeference to the importantinterests, and sometimesconflicting laws, of anotherjurisdiction. At least in the areaof competition law enforcement,two distinct forms of comity canbe distinguished: traditional andpositive comity.

Positive comity. Positive comityis the process by which one

jurisdiction, which believes thatits important interests are beingadversely affected by allegedlyanticompetitive conduct takingplace in the territory of anotherjurisdiction, may request that thelatter investigate and, ifwarranted, prosecute thebehaviour on the basis of itslaws. This would normally implythat the requesting jurisdictionwould then refrain from pursuingits own enforcement activitywith respect to the allegedlyanticompetitive conduct, at leastpending the outcome of therequested investigation.

Traditional (or "negative")comity distinguished. The notionof traditonal comity, on the otherhand, means that a jurisdictionshould normally pay heed to theimportant interests of other

jurisdictions in the application ofits competition laws. Inparticular, observance oftraditonal comity is intended toavoid any direct conflict betweencompetition law enforcementactivity in different jurisdictions.

2. Positive comity in the1991 and 1998 EU/USAgreements

Positive comity is provided forin the 1991 EU/US competitioncooperation agreement51, and inthe 1998 EU/US positive comityaccord52; the notion is also

51 Agreement between the

Government of the United Statesof America and the Commissionof the European Communitiesregarding the application of theircompetition laws, OJ L 95 of27.4.95, pp.47 - 50.

52 Agreement between theEuropean Communities and theGovernment of the United Statesof America on the application ofpositive comity principles in theenforcement of their competition

Positive Comity

Stephen Ryan, DG COMP A-4



enshrined in the 1995 OECDRecommendation on cooperationbetween member countries incompetition matters53, to whichboth the EU and US subscribe.The positive comity provisionsin the two agreements representa commitment on the part of theEuropean Union and the UnitedStates, where possible, tocooperate with respect toantitrust enforcement, rather thanto always seek to apply theircompetition laws extraterrito-rially. The provisions are alsoaimed at avoiding unnecessaryduplication of enforcementactivity on the two sides of theAtlantic, and at ensuring thatanticompetitive conduct isinvestigated by the authority bestplaced - notably in terms of fact-finding and the enforcement ofremedies - to do so.

The 1991 agreement providesthat "if a Party [the EU or US]believes that anticompetitiveactivities carried out on theterritory of the other Party areadversely affecting its importantinterests, the first Party maynotify the other Party and mayrequest that the other Party'scompetition authorities initiateappropriate enforcementactivities". The agreement goeson to provide that the"competition authorities of the

laws, OJ L 173, 18/06/1998, pp.26 � 31.

53 Revised Recommendation of theCouncil concerning Co-operation between MemberCountries on AnticompetitivePractices affecting InternationalTrade, 27 and 28.7.1995,C(95)130/FINAL.

notified Party will considerwhether or not to initiateenforcement activities, or toexpand ongoing enforcementactivities, with respect to theanticompetitive activities identi-fied in the notification".

The 1998 agreement furtherclarifies the procedure to befollowed with respect to apositive comity request (or"referral"). The agreementcreates a presumption that, whenanticompetitive activities areoccuring in the whole or in asubstantial part of the territory ofone of the parties (the EU or US)and are affecting the importantinterests of the other party, thelatter "will normally defer orsuspend its enforcementactivities in favour of" theformer, at least pending theoutcome of the requestedinvestigation. This shouldhappen particularly when theanticompetitive activities inquestion do not have "a direct,substantial and reasonablyforeseeable impact onconsumers" in the territory of theparty deferring or suspending itsactivities.

The 1998 agreement specifiesthat a positive comity requestcan only be made if the allegedlyanticompetitive activities are"impermissable under thecompetition laws" of therequested jurisdiction. At thesame time, the agreement makesit clear that such a request "maybe made regardless of whetherthe activities also violate theRequesting Party's competitionlaws".

The 1991 and 1998 agreementsboth provide that the jurisdictiondealing with a positive comityreferral should keep therequesting jurisdiction closelyinformed of any importantdevelopments in its enforcementproceedings, within theconstraints of its internal rulesprotecting the confidentiality ofinformation. The two agreementsalso make it clear that a positivecomity referral in no waydetracts from the prosecutorial orenforcement discretion of eitherjurisdiction's authorities.



1. La cohésion économiqueet sociale comme objectifde la Communautéeuropéenne.

L�existence de disparitésstructurelles profondes parmi lesrégions de l�Union européenne etla volonté de concilier unsystème d�organisation économi-que basé sur les forces demarché ainsi que sur la libertéd�opportunités et d�entreprise,avec l�engagement en faveur desvaleurs de solidarité interne etsoutien réciproques, ont pousséla Communauté à introduire dansle traité de Rome, avec l�Acteunique européen de 1986, unenouvelle exigence politique: «lacohésion économique etsociale», un corollaireindissociable de réalisation dumarché unique.

2. Les instruments de lacohésion économique etsociale : les fondsstructurels et la politiquede concurrence.

Les fonds structurels repré-sentent l�instrument principal dela politique régionale commu-nautaire, grâce auxquels l�Unioneuropéenne réalise la cohésionéconomique et sociale. Lesobjectifs poursuivis sont ledéveloppement et l�ajustementstructurel des régions en retardde développement, la recon-

version économique et socialedes zones ayant des difficultésstructurelles ainsi que l�ajuste-ment et la modernisation despolitiques et des systèmesd�éducation, formation etemploi54. Ils se traduisentconcrètement par la possibilitéde la part des Etats membresd�obtenir des subventionscommunautaires qui complètent,selon le principed�additionnalité, l�engagementfinancier des Etats membres.

Parallèlement aux FondsStructurels, la politique deconcurrence apporte unecontribution essentielle et directeau renforcement de la cohésionéconomique et sociale del�Union européenne. Son rôle semanifeste surtout à travers lapolitique des aides d�Etat,notamment aux articles 87 et 88du traité CE (ex articles 92 et93), et plus en particulier, àtravers les aides d�Etat à finalitérégionale. Les normes commu-nautaires en matière d�aides

54 Conformément à ce qui a été prévu

par l'Agenda 2000, les objectifs desfonds structurels pour la période2000-2006 (les Fonds structurels dela troisième génération) ont étéréduits de 7 à 3.Voir pour plus dedétails le Règlement N1260/1999 duConseil du 21 juin 1999 portantdispositions générales sur les Fondsstructurels (JO C 176 du 9.6.1998,p. 1).

d�Etat prévoient un mécanismequi interdit aux Etats membresd�octroyer des aides incompa-tibles avec le principe de libreconcurrence, exception faite,entre autre, des cas où lesdérogations prévues par l'article87. § 3 alinéas a) et c) sontd�application. Ces cas prévoientrespective-ment que l�aide seradestinée à «favoriser ledéveloppement économique derégions dans lesquelles le niveaude vie est anormalement bas oudans lesquelles sévit un gravesous-emploi» ou à «faciliter ledéveloppement de certainesactivités ou de certaines régionséconomiques quand ellesn�altèrent pas les conditions deséchanges dans une mesurecontraire à l�intérêt commun».

Le choix des régions éligiblesaux aides en question devientdonc un instrument pour unepoursuite correcte de lacohésion: l�objectif prioritaire dela cohésion demande en fait uncontrôle rigoureux sur les aidesdans les régions plus riches afinde garantir que l�impact desinterventions destinées audéveloppement des régionsmoins favorisées de laCommunauté ne soit pas annulépar des aides importantesoctroyées dans les régions lesplus favorisées55.

A cette fin la Commission aétabli un plafond d�intensitéd�aide des régions admises à ladérogation prévue par l�article 55 Voir à ce propos la XXIe Rapport

sur la politique de concurrence,1995, paragraphe 158.

La Cohérence entre la politique deconcurrence et les fonds structurelsNicoletta FALCONE et Paola ICARDI, DG COMP-G-1



87 § 3 alinéa a) du traité CE(régions en retard de dévelop-pement, aussi appelé «sous-développement absolu») diffé-rent de celui relatif aux régionsadmises à la dérogation prévuepar l�article 87 § 3 alinéa c)(régions développées, confron-tées à des problèmes dereconversion, aussi appelé«sous-développement relatif»).

En outre, toujours dans lecontexte de l�objectif decohésion, la concentrationgéographique des aides vise lamaximisation de leur efficacitééconomique et limite l�impactsur la concurrence.

3. La cohérence entre lapolitique de concurrenceet les fonds structurels

L�action de l�Union dans lecadre des objectifs régionaux desfonds structurels d�une part, et lapolitique de concurrence dans lecadre des aides régionales,d�autre part, constituent doncdeux éléments complémentaireset inséparables de la politique decohésion. L�efficacité de cesdeux politiques dépend engrande partie, de la cohérence deleur articulation, difficile àréaliser surtout à cause dunombre et de la diversité desprotagonistes ayant des compé-tences, des échéances et desobjectifs différents. La Commis-sion a en fait une compétenceexclusive en matière d�aidesd�Etat et partage avec les Etatsmembre et le Conseil lacompétence en matière depolitique structurelle.

Nombreux ont été lesinstruments utilisés par laCommission afin de coordonneret aligner ces deux politiques etde réaliser la cohérence entre lesdécisions adoptées dans le cadrede la politique de concurrence, etles décisions relatives auxrégions éligibles aux FondsStructurels. En particulier, dansune Communication de 199856,la Commission a défini lastratégie nécessaire pouraméliorer la coordination entre lapolitique en matière d�aidesd�Etat et les Fonds structurels.Un des éléments centraux decette stratégie vise l�augmen-tation de la cohérence entre lescartes relatives aux aidesnationales à finalité régionale etcelles relatives aux Objectifs 1 et2.

En premier lieu, afin d�améliorerla coordination entre ces deuxcartes, les Etats membres ont étéinvités à aligner la période devalidité de la carte des aidesrégionales sur le calendrierd�intervention des FondsStructurels57.

En deuxième lieu, laCommission a demandé auConseil d�appliquer rigoureu-sement le seuil de 75% du PIBpar habitant pour identifier lesrégions présentant des retards 56 Communication de la Commission

aux Etats membres sur la politiquerégionale et la politique deconcurrence (JO C 90 du 26.3.1998,p.3).

57 Voir le point 5.3 des Lignesdirectrics concernant les aides d'Etatà finalités régionale (JO C 74 du10.3.1998, p. 4).

dans le développement au titrede l�Objectif 1. Une telleapplication rigoureuse garantitune totale cohérence entre cesrégions et celles visées parl�article 87 § 3 alinéa a)58.

En troisième lieu, le Règlementsur les Fonds structurels reprendles objectifs formulés par laCommission dans laCommunication aux Etatsmembres sur la politiquerégionale et la politique deconcurrence, tout en demandantaux Etats membres de garantirun niveau élevé de cohérenceentre les propositions présentéesau titre de l�Objectif 2 et cellesau titre de l�article 87 § 3 alinéac)59. Sur la même ligne, le point3.10.5 des Lignes directricesconcernant les aides d�Etat àfinalité régionale60 avait déjàprévu à cet effet, la possibilitépour les Etats membres deproposer des zones éligibles à ladérogation 87 § 3 alinéa c) autitre de leur statut de zoneséligibles aux Fonds structurels,toujours dans le respect desconditions de compacité et depopulation minimale. Dans cecontexte, pour la période 2000-2006, plusieurs Etats membre,comme la France, l�Italie, laBelgique, le Royaume Uni,

58 Voir le Règlement N1260/1999 du

Conseil du 21 juin 1999 portantdispositions générales sur les Fondsstructurels, considérant n. 16 etarticle 3, paragraphe 1.

59 Voir le Règlement N1260/1999 duConseil du 21 juin 1999 portantdispositions générales sur les Fondsstructurels, considerant n. 16.

60 JO C74 du 10.03.1998, p.4.



l�Espagne, le Danemark et laSuède ont proposé des zoneséligibles à la dérogation 87 § 3alinéa c) au titre de leur statut dezones éligibles à l�Objectif 2.

Certaines disparités entre lesdeux politiques restent toutefoisprésentes. La couverturegéographique en termes depopulation éligible aux Fondsstructurels est différente de celleéligible aux aides à finalitérégionale, et ceci aussi bien dans

la période 1994-1999 que dans lapériode 2000-2006. Pour lapériode 1994-1999, 50,6% de lapopulation de l�Union étaientéligibles aux aides structurellescommunautaires, tandis queseulement 46,7% de lapopulation étaient classés au titrede l�article 87 § 3 alinéa a) et c).De même, pour la période 2000-2006, les estimations provisoiresindiquées dans le tableau ci-après montrent que lacorrespondance entre les zones

couvertes dans les deux cas n�esttoujours pas réalisée : même si lacouverture des Fonds structurelsest devenue globalementinférieure à celle des aidesd'Etat, certaines zones éligiblesaux Fonds continuent à ne pasêtre couvertes par des aidesd�Etat à finalité régionale (6,6%pour la période 1994-1999 et5,6% pour la période 2000-2006).

Tableau 61

Cohérence entre les zones "Fonds Structurels" et les zones "Aides d'Etat"

en % de la population de l'Union

Régions éligibles auxFonds Structurels

Régions non éligiblesaux Fonds Structurels

Totaux

1994-99 2000-06 1994-99 2000-06 1994-99 2000-06

Zones où des aidesrégionales nationalessont autorisées

44,0 35,8 2,7 6,9 46,7 42,7

Zones où des aidesrégionales nationalesne sont pasautorisées

6,6 5,6 46,7 51,7 53,3 57,3

Totaux 50,6 41,4 49,4 58,6 100,0 100,0

Sources: Eurostat, DGCOMP, calculs DGREGIO

Période 2000-2006: estimations basées sur une comparaison géographique au niveau NUTS5

61 Il s�agit d�estimations provisoires.

Par contre, le fait qu�un certainpourcentage de la populationvive dans des régions couvertespar des régimes d�aide à finalitérégionale sans être éligibles auxFonds structurels (2,7% pour la

période 1994-1999 et 6,9% pourla période 2000-2006) constitueune condition favorable à lacohérence entre la politique desaides régionales et lesinterventions des Fonds structu-

rels puisqu�elle garantit laflexibilité des choix des Etatsmembres en matière de politiquerégionale en mettant à leurdisposition une marge deman�uvre pour poursuivre des



politiques régionales qui leursont propres, au-delà des zonesdéfinies conjointement pourl�application de la politiquerégionale communautaire.

4. Conclusions

Grâce aux derniers instrumentslégislatifs disponibles, des nom-breux progrès ont eu lieu depuisque la politique régionale

communautaire a été lancée. Laconcentration des ressourcesdans les régions problématiqueset la cohérence des initiatives desolidarité en matière dedéveloppement de l�économierégionale deviennent les princi-pes clefs à la base de l�efficacitédes politiques de cohésion. Unetelle stratégie devient encoreplus importante si l�on considèreque la Communauté européenne

s�ouvrira à au moins sixnouveaux Etats dans le cours dela programmation 2000-2006.L�entrée des nouveaux paysaugmentera les disparités entermes de revenu et d�indicateurssocio-économiques et uneapplication rigoureuse desprincipes susmentionnés seraessentielle.

ANTI-TRUST RULESApplication of Articles 81 & 82 EC and 65 ECSCMain developments between 1st June and 30th September 2000


The Commission has finedArcher Daniels Midland,Ajinomoto and three othercompanies a total of almost 110million Euro for operation aglobal price-fixing cartel forlysine. The decision highlightsthe Commission�s determinationto fight cartels, the mostdamaging of all anti-competitivepractices.

Lysine is the most importantamino acid used in animalfoodstuffs for nutritionalpurposes. Amino acids arebuilding blocks of protein. Theycan be of vegetal or animalorigin (e.g. soybeanmeal offishmeal). They can also bemanufactured. The five cartelparticipants manufacture and sellsynthetic amino acids. Theavailability of synthetic aminoacids enables nutritionists tocompose protein diets the bettermeet the animal�s feedrequirements.

The Commission�s extensiveinvestigation found that ArcherDaniels Midland Co (USA),Ajinomoto Co (Japan), Cheil(Korea), Kyowa Hakko (Japan)and Sewon (Korea) fixed lysineprices world-wide, including inthe European Economic Area.They have also fixed sales quotafor that market and operated aninformation exchange in order to

underpin these quotas from atleast July 1990 to June 1995.

The Commission considers thatthe cartel represents a veryserious infringement of the ECcompetition rules and justifiesheavy fines. The leading playersin the cartel, Archer DanielsMidland and Ajinomoto arefined 47.3 million Euro and 28.3million Euro respectively. Theother three cartel participants,Cheil, Kyowa and Sewonreceive a fine of 12.2 million,13.2 million and 8.9 millionEuro respectively.

This case started in July 1996,shortly before several cartelparticipants were charged by theUS antitrust authorities withengaging in illegal conspiracy.In July 1996, Ajinomoto decidedto inform the Commission aboutthe existence of the cartelcovering a period from ArcherDaniels Midland�s entry into theEEA lysine market (June 1992)up to June 1995.

Ajinomoto�s decision came rightafter the Commission hadadopted its Leniency Notice onthe non-imposition or reductionof fines in cartel cases (O.J. C207 of 18 July 1996). ThisNotice sets out the conditionsunder which companies co-operating with the Commission

during its investigation into acartel may be exempted fromfines or granted reductions in thefines which would otherwisehave been imposed upon them.Three other cartel participantsstarted to co-operate with theCommission at a later stage.

Pursuant to the Leniency Notice,the Commission has granted fourco-operating companies signifi-cant reductions in the fines.

As said, Ajinomoto was the firstto come in an give decisiveevidence of the cartel. However,it was also a ring-leader in thecartel and failed to inform theCommission of an earlier periodof the cartel involving the thenthree Asian producersAjinomoto, Kyowa and Sewon(dating back to July 1990). TheNotice provides for a maximumreduction in the fine of 50% insuch a case. The Commissiontakes the view that it can grantthis maximum reduction toAjinomoto.

The Commission also grants a50 % reduction to Sewon. Thiscompany informed theCommission about the earlierperiod of the cartel while alsoproducing further evidence ofthe later cartel.

Cheil and Kyowa also providedthe Commission with evidenceconfirming the existence of theinfringements. They receivesmaller reductions of 30 % each.

Archer Daniels Midland did notco-operate with the Commissionduring the investigation.

Commission fines ADM, Ajinomoto,others in lysine cartelGeorg DE BRONETT, DG COMP-C-2

➣ ANTI-TRUST RULES


However, it did not contest thefacts set out in the Commission�sStatements of Objections. Forthis, the company receives a 10% reduction of the fine.

Competition CommissionerMario Monti said :

« This decision is rigorous andbalanced. On the one hand, theCommission needs to be toughon these sort of hardcore cartels.That is why heavy fines are inorder here. They must have adeterrent effect. On the otherhand, we do take the Leniency

Notice at heart. This is borne outby the significant reductions inthe fines for Ajinomoto andSewon, the two companies whoco-operate most with myservices. »

1. Introduction

The Commission has beenexamining landing fees atEuropean airports for anumber of years. On 28 June1995 it ruled that the systemof discounts operated at themain Brussels airportinfringed EU law.Subsequently most MemberStates fell in line with theCommission�s viewpoint andchanged their system oflanding fees. Most recently,the French, Irish and Swedishairport authorities agreed tocarry out the necessarychanges. Nevertheless, twofurther decisions were takenagainst the Portuguese andFinish airport authorities on10 February 199962. As one

62 While the Portuguese authorities

are challenging the Commis-sion�s decision in the European

further step in this procedure,on 26 July 2000, the EuropeanCommission adopted adecision against the system oflanding fees applied atSpanish airports which itfound to discriminate infavour of national airlines.

2. The Spanish system oflanding fees

The Spanish airport authority,AENA63, which is a publicenterprise, has been granted theexclusive right to administerthe airport infrastructure of all41 commercial airports on theSpanish territory. In return forthe services provided in

Court of Justice, the Finishauthorities have undertaken torespect the Commission�sdecision and change their systemof landing fees by January 2001.

63 AENA: Aeropuertos Españoles yNavegación Aérea

connection with the landingand take-off of planes a fee hasto be paid by the airlines. Thelanding fees as well as themodulations are set by loyaldecrees and by law.64 Threecategories of airports aredistinguished according to theimportance of their traffic65.Different landing fees areestablished for national flightsbased on the maximum take-off weight of the plane andbased on the category ofairports. For instance, the feefor an aircraft below 10 tonnesat a first category airportamounts to 694 pesetas/t. Foran airport in the third categoryit amounts to 521 pesetas/t.

The Spanish law furthermoredistinguishes between dome-

64 The royal decrees 1064/1991 and

1268/1994 as well as law41/1994

65 For instance, in the first categorybelong Madrid-Barajas, Palmade Mallorca, Barcelona, GranCanaria, Malaga, Tenerife-sur,Alicante, Lanzarote, and in thesecond category Fuerteventura,Bilbao, Santiago de compostela,Tenerife-norte, Menorca etc.

Commission prohibits discriminatorylanding fees at Spanish airportsOliver Stehmann, DG COMP-D-2



stic, intra-Community andextra-Community flights. Inthe case of an aircraft below 10tonnes at an airport of the firstcategory the fee amounts to940 pesetas/t. in the case ofextra-Community flights and751 pesetas/t. for intra-EEAflights. For every category ofairports and for every weightcategory of planes, landingfees are higher for intra-

Community flights than fordomestic flights. The highestfees are charged for extra-Community flights.

As a second measure, the lawgrants discounts according tothe number of landings permonth on a specific airport.For the first 50 landings nodiscounts are granted. For the51st to the 100th landing a

discount of about 9% isgranted. The discountsincrease further with thenumber of landings permonth. As can be seen fromthe following table, the mostimportant discounts are onlyavailable for airlines whichhave more than 200 landingsper month.

Number of operations per month Discount(%)

1-50 0

51-100 9 %

101-150 17 %

151-200 26 %

+200 35 %Discounts on landing fees at Spanish airports in the year 2000.

3. The relevant market

The product market

The relevant market is defined asthe market for services linked toaccess to airport infrastructurefor which a fee is payable. Morespecifically, such services arelinked to the exploitation andmaintenance of runways, the useof taxiways and aprons, andapproach guidance for civilaircraft. 66

66 This corresponds to the market

definition chosen in previousdecisions, as Brussels NationalAirport: Commission Decision95/364/EC of 28 June 1995, OJ L216, 12.9.1995, p. 8., and the twoCommission decisions of 10February 1999 on landing charges

The geographic market

The 41 airports administered byAENA are interchangeable onlyto a limited extent and each cantherefore be regarded as adistinct geographic market. Thedistances between the differentairports are considerable andeach has its own, well-definedcatchment area. Airlines runningdomestic or intra-EEA flights toand from Spain have no option,therefore, but to use the airportsadministered by AENA, alongwith the airport facility access

applied by the Finnish andPortuguese Civil AirportAuthorities: Commission Decision99/198/EC and 99/199/EC of 10February 1999, OJ L69/24,16.3.1999, p.26-27.

services provided in theseairports.67

4. The Commission�sAssessment

AENA is a public undertaking inthe sense of Article 86(1) of theEC Treaty and the relevant lawsand decrees fixing landing feesat Spanish airports are a statemeasure within the meaning of 67 The only international airport not

administered by AENA that couldserve the same geographic area, i.e.Lisbon, is several hundredkilometers away from Madrid andother Spanish airports and,moreover, it is not linked by anadequate road or rail infrastructure.Thus it does not constitute a realisticalternative.



Article 86(1). There is no doubtthat AENA, whose core activityis to provide airlines with accessservices to civil airport facilitiesin return for a fee, is, accordingto the definition of the Court, anundertaking within the meaningof Article 82 of the Treaty.

Dominant position

As the only means available to acarrier for providing air transportservices to a given town, airportshave a dominant position asregards a very high proportion oftheir traffic. The airline has nochoice and, as a result, theairport faces little risk that theairline would change the airportas a result of a lower fee offeredelsewhere. Thus, each of theAENA-managed airports is in adominant position as there isnormally only one commercialairport for each geographicmarket and given that high entrybarriers exist with regard to theconstruction of new airports.Since AENA has the exclusiveright to administer these airports,it holds a dominant position onthe market for aircraft landingand take-off services.

Substantial part of the commonmarket

In 1999, the AENA-administered airports had a totaltraffic of 63 million passengersof which intra-Communityflights account forapproximately 32 millionpassengers. These airportshandled more than 584 000tonnes of freight. AENA holds adominant position on the market

for aircraft landing and take-offservices on all the 41 airports forcommercial civil traffic in Spain.Together they cover the whole ofSpain, which is a substantial partof the common market.

Abuse of a dominant position

When assessing the abuse, theCommission looked at bothelements of the Spanish landingfees, i.e. the differentiationaccording to the origin of theflight and the discounts granted,separately.

(a) Discounts based on landingfrequency

Rebates as such are a normalbusiness practice if offered by acompany which is not dominant.They only may become aproblem if granted by adominant firm. The latter can usediscounts to distort competitionin the market. Article 82 requiresthat a dominant firm must treatits clients equally, as long as thetransactions are comparable.Hence, there must be anobjective justification for anydifference in treatment of itsvarious clients by an undertakingin a dominant position. In thecase of landing of planes, forinstance, such an objectivejustification could be economiesof scale in carrying out thelanding services, the aim toreduce traffic noise or aircongestion.

The effect of the discount systemis that airlines are treateddifferently in terms of the pricecharged for landing and take-off

services. Although the discountsoffered by AENA apply to allairlines, de facto, domesticairlines benefit considerablymore than foreign ones. Everylanding after the 200th qualifiesfor a discount of 35%, with nolimit on the number of landingsthereafter. Thus, airlines whichcarry out significantly more than200 landings a month, such asIberia, benefit from aproportionally higher overalldiscount. Only Spanish airlines,as Iberia, Binter Canarias,Spanair, Air Europa or AirNostrum benefit from the largestcategory of discounts. The otherairlines receive averagediscounts, in return forequivalent services provided byAENA, which are considerablysmaller. In 1999, Iberia alonereceived about 62% of alldiscounts on landing feesgranted by AENA.

In the Commission�s view, thereis no objective justification forthis difference in treatment. Theservices provided by AENA,such as approach control and useof apron areas, require the samework irrespective of theindividual airline. In the case oflanding and take-off serviceseconomies of scale do not exist.The services provided do notdepend on the individual ownerof the aircraft or whether theyare rendered to the first or the10th aircraft of the same airline.

With regard to the Canary Islands,Spain justified the discounts onthe grounds that this would fosterregional and cohesion policyobjectives. It would promote the



Islands as a tourist destination.These justifications were refutedin the Commission�s decision.The goal of promoting the CanaryIslands as a tourist destinationcould be achieved by non-discriminatory discountsaccessible to all airlines operatingservices to and from the CanaryIsland airports68.

Thus, the Commissionconcluded that by applying thediscounts as described above,AENA treats airlines differentlywithout objective justification. Itthereby imposed on some ofthem a competitivedisadvantage, which constitutesan abuse of dominant position inthe sense of Article 82(2)(c).

(b) The differentiation ofcharges according to typeof flight (domestic orinternational)

A similar reasoning applies tothe differentiation of tariffsdepending on whether it is adomestic or an intra-Communityflight. Also in this case the effect

68 In addition, it is not obvious that the

present system of landing feeswould in fact help developing theCanary Islands as a touristdestination. For Canary Islands, theintra-Community traffic is morethan twice as large as the intra-Spaintraffic. As pointed out above, thepresent discount system de factodiscriminates against (non-Spanish)European airlines. By imposinghigher cost on European airlines, thediscount system also generateshigher travelling cost for the CanaryIsland�s main source of tourists, i.e.European tourists from outsideSpain.

is to treat airlines differently forthe provision of equivalentlanding and take-off services.This places airlines operatingEEA services at a competitivedisadvantage in comparison toairlines providing domesticservices. The differentiation oflanding fees according to theorigin of the flight thereforeconstitutes another abuse of adominant position within themeaning of Article 82 (2)(c).

Effect on trade between theMember States

In line with previousjurisprudence69, the Commissionconcluded that, given the volumeof traffic between Spain, theCommunity and the EEA, thereis an appreciable effect of thediscussed measures on cross-border trade. Taken all airportstogether, in 1999 with 32 millionpassengers the traffic volumebetween Spain and otherMember States of theCommunity exceeds thedomestic traffic volume of 25million passengers, respectively.In the case of the Canary Islands,the intra-Community traffic ismore than twice as large as theintra-Spain traffic. Also thetraffic between Spain and EEA

69 In its judgement in the Corsica

Ferries case, the Court of Justicerecognised that discriminatorypractices which �affect undertakingsproviding transport servicesbetween two Member States, (�)may affect trade between MemberStates.� Case C-18/93 CorsicaFerries Italia Srl v. Corpo dei Pilotidel Porto di Genova [1994] ECR I-1783.

countries is substantial. In 1998there were about 871 thousandpassengers travelling on directflights between Norway andSpain.

5. Conclusions

As a result of the above, theCommission found that thesystem of discounts and differentlanding fees according to theorigin of the flight, asestablished in a royal decree bythe Spanish government,discriminates in favour ofnational airlines. There does notexist an objective justificationfor such discriminatorytreatment. Since it is enacted bythe Spanish State, the latter istherefore infringing Article 86(1) in conjunction with Article82 of the Treaty. As a result, theSpanish government has beengiven two months to report to theCommission on how it willabolish the criticised pricingscheme.



Commission Regulation (EC)No 823/2000 of 19 April 200070

contains a block exemption forliner shipping consortia valid forfive years. It renews the blockexemption contained inCommission Regulation (EC)No 870/9571 the five yearvalidity of which expired on 25April 2000. The new Regulationmakes some changes to theblock exemption; these aredescribed below.

CONCEPT AND IMPORTANCE OFCONSORTIA

A consortium is a grouping ofshipping lines which cooperateto provide a joint liner shippingservice. Consortia represent amethod of organisation of linermaritime transport which cameabout following the introductionof containers at the end of the1960s, which necessitated theconstruction of vessels of muchgreater size so as to realiseeconomies of scale and toimprove productivity. The sizeof the investment required toacquire and operate such vesselswas greater than the financialresources of the majority ofindividual shipowners. The 70 OJ L 100, 20.4.2000, p. 24. Press

release IP/00/404 of 25 April 2000.71 OJ L 89, 21.4.1995, p. 7.

development of containerservices therefore brought aboutthe need for cooperation betweenshipowners and for arationalisation of their activities.This cooperation has usuallytaken the form of consortia.

Although there is a progressiontowards consortia as thepredominant form of industrialorganisation in the sector, linerconferences, the traditional formof organisation for linershipping, continue to exist.Shipping lines within aconference agree commonfreight rates for sea transport.Council Regulation (EEC) No4056/8672 contains a blockexemption permitting such ratefixing by conferences. Mostconsortia operate withinconferences and their membersthus are operating under aconference tariff.

THE COUNCIL ENABLINGREGULATION

Council Regulation (EEC) No479/92 of 25 February 1992empowered the Commission togrant a block exemption for linershipping consortia.

72 OJ L 378, 31.12.1986, p. 4.

This favourable position isexplained by the advantagesbrought about by consortia. Ingeneral they help improve notonly the productivity but also thequality of liner transport servicesoffered to transport users byrationalising the activities of themember companies and by theeconomies of scale which theybring about.

THE FIRST BLOCK EXEMPTION:REGULATION 870/95

Commission Regulation 870/95of 20 April 1995 granted a blockexemption for a period of fiveyears.73 The objective of theRegulation was to create aframework which would giveshipping lines flexibility whilstensuring that shippers received afair share of the benefits. Inorder to take account of the widevariety of consortia, theCommission did not adopt theclassic system of lists ofprohibited �black� clauses andpermitted �white� clauses.Instead, the Regulation exemptsall agreements whose objectiveis the joint operation of linershipping services, provided theyfulfil the conditions andobligations set out in theRegulation.

Under Regulation 870/95, theCommission approved elevenconsortia under the oppositionprocedure, and in several othercases the Competition DG sentcomfort letters confirming that a 73 This period is laid down by Art. 2 of

Reg. 479/92.

Adoption of Regulation 823/2000renewing the block exemption for linershipping consortiaCharles WILLIAMS, DG COMP-D-2



notified agreement conformedwith the block exemption. TheCommission also approved,under the objections procedurelaid down in Article 12 ofRegulation 4056/86, fourconsortium arrangements thatfell outside of the blockexemption.

PROCEDURAL STEPS LEADINGTO THE ADOPTION OF THE NEWREGULATION

As a first step in preparing forthe expiry of Regulation 870/95,DGIV prepared a �Report onCommission Regulation870/95�.74 The Report explainedthe adoption of the Regulation,recorded points of interpretationthat had arisen in the course ofapplying the Regulation and setout some initial options for therenewal of the block exemption.

The Report was sent forcomment to the EuropeanShippers� Council (ESC), theEuropean CommunityShipowners� Association(ECSA) and the EuropeanMaritime Law Organisation(EMLO), as well being placedon the DGIV internet site. Fivesets of comments (includingfrom the ESC and ECSA) werereceived, and these wereconsidered when drawing up apreliminary draft Regulation.

As required by Articles 4 and 5of the enabling CouncilRegulation 479/92, the 74 Working Paper of DGIV, 28

January 1999, http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg04/entente/other.htm.

Commission consulted theMaritime Transport AdvisoryCommittee both before and afterthe preliminary draft Regulationwas published in the OfficialJournal of 31 December 199975

for third party comments.

Third party comments werereceived from ECSA (EuropeanCommunity Shipowners' Asso-ciations), CLECAT (EuropeanLiaison Committee of FreightForwarders, Europäisches Ver-bindungscomité des Speditions-und Lagereigewerbes, Comité deLiaison Européen desCommissionnaires et Auxiliairesde Transport), and BMLA(British Maritime LawAssociation). The commentswelcomed the renewal of theblock exemption, and madesuggestions for furtheramendments which areexplained below.

REGULATION 823/2000

The reasons for which the blockexemption was adopted in 1995are still valid. The application ofthe Regulation 870/95 workedwell in practice. TheCommission therefore decided torenew the block exemption byway of a new Regulation, largelyreplicating Regulation 870/95,valid for a further period of fiveyears. In particular, theCommission neither changed thedefinition of consortia that fallwithin the scope of the blockexemption, nor changed the listof exempted activities.

75 OJ C 379, 31.12.1999, p. 13.

Article 1 of Regulation823/200076 limits the scope ofthe Regulation to internationalliner services, thus excludingcabotage services operatingsolely within a single MemberState.

Article 2 of the Regulationcontains a broad definition ofconsortia. Article 3 contains anexhaustive list of exemptedactivities. The newRegulation includes amendmentsso as to clarify it in line with theCommission�s interpretation ofRegulation 870/95.Regulation 823/2000 thusprovides that:(1) the block exemption also

applies to consortiaoperating on more than onetrade (Article 1(1)), and themarket share thresholds arerequired to be met in respectof each market upon whichsuch a consortium operates(Articles 6 and 7);

(2) exclusivity clauses (that is,obligations on theconsortium members to useonly those vessels allocatedto the consortium service onthe trade route in questionand to refrain fromchartering slots on vesselsbelonging to third parties)and third party clauses (thatis, provisions restricting theability of the parties toassign, space charter or sub-space charter to othercarriers in the relevant tradeexcept with the prior

76 The order of Articles 1 and 2 of

Regulation 870/95 have beeninverted in the new Regulation.



consent of the other parties)are considered to beancillary activities and thusto be exempted (Article3(3)).

In the light of the commentsfrom third parties, the followingfurther changes were made:(1) in Article 3(2)(d), the

reference to "tonnage" poolswas amended to become areference to "cargo" pools.In this context, "tonnage"means a quantity of cargo,77

(2) in 3(3)(b), the exemptedform of third party clause isamended to become anobligation not to assign orcharter space to othervessel-operating carriers.This change is to avoid thatfreight forwarders and othernon vessel-operatingintermediaries are caught bya third party clause.

Article 4 is unchanged andprovides for the non-applicability of the blockexemption for any agreementwhich seeks to freeze the use ofa fixed percentage of capacity bymembers of the consortium.

The following four sets ofconditions and obligations areattached to the exemption so asto guarantee that the conditionsof Article 81(3) are fulfilled.

77 The quantity of cargo is for bulk

cargoes traditionally expressed as anumber of tonnes or tons, and forcontainerized cargoes normallyexpressed as a number of TEU(twenty foot equivalent units).

First, Article 5 (which isunchanged) lays down acondition that the consortium isin one or more of the threesituations described below:- there is effective price

competition between themembers of the conferencewithin which theconsortium operates (as aresult of independent rateaction),

- there exists within theconference within which theconsortium operates asufficient degree ofeffective competition interms of services providedbetween consortiummembers and otherconference members thatare not members of theconsortium,

- consortium members aresubject to effectivecompetition from non-consortium lines, whetheror not a conference operatesin the trade in question.

Second, Articles 6 and 7 laydown a condition relating to themarket shares held by aconsortium. There is a system ofthree different levels of marketshare. Any consortium withmarket shares on all marketsbelow 30% (if within aconference) or 35% (if operatingoutside a conference) isautomatically exempt if it fulfilsthe other conditions of theRegulation. If a consortium has amarket share above 30/35% onany market but below 50% on allmarkets, the consortium willbenefit from the blockexemption if it is notified to the

Commission and theCommission does not opposeexemption within six months. Aconsortium with a market shareabove 50% on any market maybe notified to benefit, ifappropriate, from an individualexemption.

The most important change thatRegulation 823/2000 made to theblock exemption as compared toRegulation 870/95 is to refer tomarket share thresholds in theplace of trade share thresholds(ie, the share of trade held by theconsortium between the pairs ofports that it actually serves)referred to in Regulation 870/95.Market share is the usualindication of market power usedin competition legislation. Thetrade share criterion was adoptedin the previous Regulationbecause shipping companies hadconsidered that market shareswould be difficult to calculate;experience had however shownthat shipping companies wereable to provide market shares.

Third, Article 8 (which isunchanged) lays down additionalconditions, so for example theconsortium must preserve theright of each individual line tooffer individual servicearrangements. Article 8(2)stipulates that the consortiumagreement must allow anindividual line to withdraw fromthe agreement following a six-month notice period. This servesto ensure that the trade is keptflexible and therefore ascompetitive as possible.



Fourth, Article 9 (which isunchanged) contains obligationsattaching to the exemption,notably that there shall be realand effective consultationsbetween the consortium and theshippers or other transportrepresentatives.

Article 10 is unchanged andcontains an exemption foragreements, between transportusers and consortia exemptedunder Article 3, which concernthe use of scheduled maritimetransport services.

Article 12 is unchanged andempowers the Commission towithdraw the block exemptionfrom any consortium exemptedunder the Regulation which is,nevertheless, found not tocomply with the requirements ofArticle 81(3) or which isprohibited by Article 82.

The following comments werealso made by third parties, butwere not taken up in Regulation823/2000:(1) a suggestion to reduce the

six-month period for theCommission to react underthe opposition procedure,

(2) in relation to the noticeperiods for withdrawal,suggestions:

� to lengthen the initialperiods of 18 months or 30months,

� to start the initial period notfrom the entry into force ofthe agreement, but from theday that a consortiumcommences operations orobtains Commissionapproval, whichever is thelater,

� to extend the notice periodfrom six months to twelvemonths, at least for highlyintegrated consortia.

The Commission considered thatthe existing provisions relatingto notice periods for withdrawaldraw an appropriate balancebetween two conflictingconsiderations. On the one hand,setting up a consortium servicerequires investments for which itis appropriate to allow an initialperiod that allows reasonableprotection to the consortiumservice. On the other hand, thepossibility of a partywithdrawing from a consortiumand becoming a competitorwithin a reasonable period is anelement of potential competition,and a factor ensuring flexibilityto allow services readily to adaptto meet changing marketconditions.

Eleven consortia were exemptedunder the opposition procedurefor a period until the expiry ofRegulation 870/95. Thatprocedure enabled theCommission to check that thoseconsortia were subject toeffective competition. There wasno indication that circumstanceshad changed such that thoseconsortia were no longer subjectto effective competition. In orderto avoid the burden of renewednotifications, Regulation823/2000 therefore provides thatsuch consortia continue to beexempted (Recital 27, Article13(2)); such agreements remainsubject to obligations (Article 9)and to the Commission�s powerto withdraw the exemption(Article 12);

It was also necessary to makeprovision for notifications thatexisted at the time whenRegulation 870/95 came to anend. Regulation 823/2000therefore provides that anotification made under theopposition procedure ofRegulation 870/85 and in respectof which the period of sixmonths had not expired whenRegulation 870/95 came to anend would automatically betreated under the oppositionprocedure of the new Regulation(Article 13(3)).



The Commission has addressedthe problem of territorialrestrictions of guarantees offeredby manufacturers on manyoccasions and has alwaysinsisted that, where amanufacturer offers a guaranteefor the products bearing histrademark, he has to make surethat the guarantee can beinvoked in his distributionnetwork in the whole EuropeanUnion. The Commission did soin several decisions concerningdistribution systems relating toconsumer goods78, andRegulation No. 1475/9579

concerning car distributioncontains a provision whichexplicitly makes the exemptiondependent on a Community-wide guarantee scheme80.

Territorial restrictions such as aclause under which the guaranteeis valid only in the Member Statewhere the relevant good hasbeen purchased and into which ithad been imported directly bythe official importer, act as a 78 See XVI. Report on Competition

Policy 1986, point 56, with furtherreferences.

79 OJ L 145 of 29 June 199580 See Article 5 (1) (1) (a) first

indent and Article 6 (1) (7).

disincentive for parallel tradebetween Member States anddiscourage consumers frombuying products in a MemberState other than the one in whichthey are resident. They are aform of territorial protection fordistributors and constitute anobstacle to the inter-penetrationof markets. Agreements relatingto the distribution of the relevantproducts which contain sucharrangements thus constitute arestriction of competition underArticle 81 (1) of the EC Treaty.The Court of Justice hasconfirmed this position81.

The case against Saeco, aleading manufacturer of coffeemachines, had been openedfollowing a complaint broughtby EK Großeinkauf, apurchasing co-operative based inGermany. EK buys bigquantities of coffee machinesfrom Saeco�s distributor inGermany and sells them to itsmembers in Germany andAustria. At the time, the

81 See Hasselblad (GB) Ltd. /

Commission, Case 86/82,judgement of 21 February 1984;SA ETA Fabriques d�Ébauches /SA DG Investment, Case 31/85,judgement of 10 December 1985.

guarantee certificates used forSaeco products contained aclause according to which awarranty was only granted in thecountry of purchase and underthe condition that the relevantmachine had been importeddirectly by the official importer.On that basis, the Austriandistributor refused to deal withwarranty claims for machineswhich had originally been soldby the German distributor, andboth the German and theAustrian distributors tried toprevent deliveries by EK toAustria referring to the limitedvalidity of the guarantee.

Following the complaint,however, Saeco decided tochange its guarantee system soas to make sure that customerswithin the EEA may invoke theguarantee regardless of the placeof purchase and of the MemberState to which it was exportedoriginally. On intervention bythe Commission, Saeco took allnecessary steps to ensure the fullimplementation of the newsystem, including the substi-tution of old guaranteecertificates by new certificates,so that consumers now havecertainty about their rights. Thisallowed the Commission to closethe case.

The Commission persuades Saeco toimplement an international guaranteefor its products and closes thecomplaint file

Robert MATHIAK, DG COMP-F-1



Le 5 juillet 2000, la Commissiona adopté une décisiond�infraction avec amendescontre l�entreprise françaiseEditions Nathan concernant sesaccords de distribution dansune procédure intéressant laFrance, la Belgique, l�Italie etla Suède.

Editions Nathan fabrique etdistribue du matériel éducatif etdes manuels scolaires,principalement en France. Lesaccords en cause concernentuniquement le matériel éducatifdestiné à la petite enfance, qu�unréseau de distributeursindépendants vend dans la quasitotalité des Etats membres. Cesproduits sont achetés commesupports pédagogiques par lescrèches, écoles maternelles ethôpitaux, un marché estimé àenviron 600 millions d�euros paran dans l�Union européenne.

L�enquête de la Commission,lancée à l�initiative des autoritésfrançaises, a révélé que cesaccords empêchaient lesdistributeurs de commercialiserles produits Nathan en dehors deleurs territoires exclusifs,protégeaient ces territoires contreles ventes d�autres distributeurs etrestreignaient leur liberté de fixerles niveaux de prix et conditionscommerciales de revente.

De tels accords visant àcloisonner les marchés entre EtatsMembres constituent uneviolation de l�article 81 du traitéCE. Ils portent préjudice auxétablissements scolaires quiauraient pu profiter de laconcurrence entre distributeurs dedifférent pays, y compris enFrance, où Nathan est l�un desleaders du marché. Cette pratiquea pénalisé les écoles et autrescollectivités étant donné que lesdistributeurs étrangers en étaientexclus. En dernier ressort, ce sontles contribuables et usagersparents d�enfants qui subissaientle préjudice.

Par delà la caractérisation del�infraction stricto sensu, cetteaffaire suscite deux remarquesprincipales : d�une part, elleréitère que la Commission netolérera pas des accords verticauxqui empêchent lesconsommateurs d�obtenir tous lesbénéfices découlant del�interpénétration économiquevoulue par les Traités. De telsaccords restrictifs sontexplicitement visés par la récenteréforme des règles applicablesaux accords de distribution, quiexclut du bénéfice de l�exemptionpar catégorie les restrictions

verticales a priori les plusdommageables82.

D�autre part, la Commission atoutefois tenu compte aussi dufait que la mise en �uvre desaccords illicites, par ailleurslimitée, a été prouvée uniquementen France et Belgique. Quoiquesignificatives, les parts demarchés dans les territoiresconcernés restaient inférieures à15%. L�infraction a été qualifiéecomme peu grave enconséquence. Par ailleurs,Editions Nathan et sondistributeur belge Bricolux SA,ont aussi activement coopérépendant la procédure. La forteréduction du montant de base del�amende en raison de lacoopération des parties, à savoir40%, souligne l�intérêt qu�ont lesentreprises, dans le respect desgaranties procédurales, àsimplifier l�instruction desaffaires les concernant.

82 Règlement de la Commission

(CE) 2790/99 du 22.12.1999,Lignes Directrices sur lesRestrictions Verticales, IP/00/520et site Internet DG Concurrence.

Amende contre les Editions Nathansur ses accords de distribution dematériel éducatifManuel MARTÍNEZ-LÓPEZ, DG COMP-F-1



History

By decision of 28.1.199883, theCommission had imposed arecord fine of € 102 million onVolkswagen AG, for havingcommitted a very seriousinfringement of Article 81lasting for more than 10 years.This fine was the highest everimposed by the Commission ona single undertaking forinfringement of competitionrules.

The Commission had found thatVolkswagen AG, in conjunctionwith its subsidiaries Audi AGand Autogerma SpA, theircommon importer for Italy, haddeveloped a strategy, byimplementing a set ofmeasures84, aimed at preventing

83 See Commission Press Release

IP/98/94 of 28 January 1998.84 The measures found by the

Commission, which were part of ageneral strategy, comprised arestrictive margin policy, arestrictive bonus policy, arestrictive supply of the Italianmarket, restrictions on cross-deliveries, termination of dealercontracts, and the obligationimposed on foreign endconsumers to sign a declaration to

customers from Germany andAustria in particular, frombuying new cars in Italy forimmediate re-export.85 Suchexports had become attractivefollowing the substantialdepreciation of the Italian Lire,which took place in 1992 and in1995. Block ExemptionRegulation No 1475/9586 allowsmanufacturers and/or theirimporters to prevent sales tonon-authorised resellers, butsanctions obstructions of sales toend consumers and authoriseddealers of other Member States.These provisions aim atpromoting intra-brand compe-tition within the distributionnetwork of a given make, andshall assure the right ofconsumers to buy a car in theMember State of their choice, intaking advantage of the benefitsof the Single Market.Volkswagen AG had appealedagainst this decision in April

sell the car only under certainconditions.

85 See also Commission PressRelease IP/00/725 of 6 July 2000concerning this judgement.

86 Commission Regulation (EC) No1475/95 concerning motor vehicledistribution and servicingagreements, OJ L 145, 29.6.1995.

1998 with the Court of FirstInstance (hereafter: Court).

MAIN FINDINGS IN THEJUDGEMENT OF THE COURT OFFIRST INSTANCE

By its detailed judgement of 6July 200087, the Court largelyconfirmed the Commissiondecision. It however reduced thefine to € 90 million.

Volkswagen based its appealessentially on five grounds.While two of them concernedpossible errors of fact or of lawin applying Article 81, theremaining three grounds weremost of a procedural nature andreferred to the principle of goodadministration, the obligation ofreasoning, and the right of beingheard. An additional groundaimed at a reduction of the fine,since Volkswagen consideredthe fine imposed by theCommission as excessive.

The first ground essentiallyconcerns the set of exportrestrictions establishing theinfringement of Article 81, asidentified by the Commission inits decision. The Courtconfirmed that Volkswagen hadapplied a restrictive bonuspolicy, by refusing bonuspayment for export sales in

87 See Press Release 50/2000 by the

Court of First Instance of 6 July2000 concerning case T-62/98Volkswagen AG vs. Commissionof the European Communities.Volkswagen has lodged an appealagainst the judgement of the CFIwith the European Court ofJustice.

Judgement by the Court of FirstInstance of 6 July 2000 concerningCommission Decision98/273/Volkswagen of 28 January 1998Ulrich KRAUSE-HEIBER andKonrad SCHUMM, DG COMP-F-2



excess of 15% of total sales88.As concerns the restrictivesupply policy, by whichVolkswagen aimed atdiscouraging dealers fromselling for export, the Courtconfirmed the Commission'sfindings, saying that a strategyaiming at obstructing re-exportsfrom Italy, and thus foreclosingthis market, had been applied byVolkswagen.89 As to thebehaviour of dealers towardsnon-resident customers inparticular, who were, through themeasures taken by Volkswagenand Autogerma, discouraged tosell to such clients, the Courtpointed in particular to thesubstantial number (more than60) of complaining letters fromconsumers, in particular Germanand Austrians, who representedevidence to the great difficultieswhich had existed with respectof buying a car in Italy.90

The Court however annulled thedecision in respect to twomeasures. Pursuant to the Court,the Commission could notsufficiently prove the existenceof a split-margin system, bywhich a fraction of the dealer'smargin earned from the sale of acar was withheld in case ofexport sale, and could notpresent sufficient evidence eitherthat the termination of dealercontracts were measures aimedat discouraging export sales toend consumers and otherVolkswagen dealers.

88 Pts. 49, 50, 59.89 Pts. 79, 88, 93.90 Pts. 105, 115, 116, 118.

As concerns Volkswagen'ssubmission, saying that themeasures undertaken only aimedat reducing the high number ofsales to non-authorised resellers,the Court rejected thisargument, by referring todocuments which clearly showthat re-exports in general,including sales to consumers ordealers of other Member States,were the subject of themeasures.91

Object and effect of arestriction of competitionwithin the reasoning of Article81

One important point of law tounderline is that the Courtconfirmed, by referring to itsexisting case law, that the effectsof the export restrictions in placeneed not to be established for theapplication of Article 81, if itcan be proved that the object ofthe measures is to restrictcompetition, something which isvery clear for measures aimingat limiting parallel export andthus at partitioning markets.92

The Court thus confirmed thatthe object of a measure isalready sufficient to establish aninfringement.93 Article 15 ofRegulation No 17 does notspecify either that the

91 Pts. 133 to 135.92 Pts. 178, 181.93 In the same sense: opinion of the

Advocate General Mischo,delivered on 18 May 2000, CaseC-283/98 P, Mo och Domsjö ABvs Commission of the EuropeanCommunities, and the case lawreferred to therein.

infringement has to be assessedby reference to the actual resultswhich occur on the market or tothe harm caused to purchasers ofthe relevant products.

The Court concluded94 that inthe present case the Commissionwas not obliged to examine theconcrete effects of the measureson competition within theCommon Market, given that itcould show that the agreement inquestion had as its object theprevention, restriction ordistortion of competition. Inaddition to that, the Courtstressed that, in any case, theexistence of a number ofconsumer complaints confirmedthat the measures had effects onthe market.

In conclusion, the Court foundthat the documents submitted bythe Commisson proved theexistence of measures aiming atforeclosing the Italian market fornew cars of the VW and Audibrands and establishing aninfringement of Article 81. Itpointed in particular to thestrong evidence submitted by theCommission, and the systematiccharacter of the infringement.95

Delimitation of the relevantmarket

The Court further confirmed theCommission decision, byholding that the delimitation ofthe relevant geographical marketwas not required in this case, and

94 Pts. 178, 179.95 Pts. 193, 195, 196.



is generally not required forestablishing an infringement ofArticle 81, and rejected this partof the second ground.96 Itpointed out that in a case ofapplication of Article 81, thisquestion does not play the samerole as in cases of application ofArticle 82, where a delimitationof the relevant market isnecessary. In a case concerningArticle 81, the relevant marketmay be defined in order todetermine whether the agreementin question was liable to affecttrade between Member Statesand had as its object or effect theprevention, restriction ordistortion of competition withinthe Common Market. TheCommission had foundsufficient evidence thatVolkswagen had committed suchinfringement. As theCommission was right inconcluding that the measuresresulted in the foreclosure of theItalian market, it followed thatoperations in all other MemberStates could be affected.Therefore, an explicitdelimitation of the relevantmarket was not necessary in thiscase.

Reasoning of the decision

Another ground of appeal whichreferred to insufficient reasoningof the decision, was rejected bythe Court, by explicitly pointingto the clear and unambigiousreasoning made in the decision,which has enabled bothVolkswagen to identify the

96 Pts. 230, 231, 341.

reasoning of the decision for itsdefence, and the Court to carryout its judicial review.

Furthermore, Volkswagenclaimed that the fine imposedwas excessive. In this context, ithas to be noted that the decisionagainst Volkswagen is the veryfirst decision based on theCommission Guidelines97

concerning the setting of fines,which is reviewed by the Court.Volkswagen argued that theGuidelines had been adoptedwith a view to the current caseagainst Volkswagen, and that theCommission had not explicitlyreferred to them. In respect tothe method explained in theseGuidelines, the Court foundhowever that the Commissionexplained in detail the methodapplied for calculating the fine.As to the gravity of theinfringement, the Court held thatthe abundant amount of evidenceproved the very seriousness ofthe infringement, as stated in thedecision. It is important tounderline that the Courtconfirmed that the arguments ofVolkswagen, referring to thelack of fiscal harmonisation ofthe Single Market for cars, andmonetary instabilities, could notjustify the non-respect ofcompetition rules or attenuatesuch infringement, even if such

97 Commission Guidelines on the

method of setting fines imposedpursuant to Article 15 (2) ofRegulation No 17 and Article 65(5) of the ECSC Treaty, OJ C 9,14.1.98, p.3.

situation may cause commercialdifficulties to undertakings.98

As part of the ground pertainingto good administration,Volkswagen had referred to theinformation policy conducted bythe Commission prior to theDecision. The Court held that theCommissioner and hisspokesperson had communicatedthe likely amount of the fine tocertain media before the formaladoption of the Decision on 28January 199899, and that by this,the Commission infringed theprinciple of good administrationand the presumption of"innocence" in its decision. TheCourt did not annul however thedecision since it was notestablished by concrete evidencethat the Advisory Committee ofthe Member States or theCollege of Commissionerswould have modified the amountof the fine or the content of thedecision should the divulgationof the information concerned nothave taken place.

Reduction of the fine

The Court reduced the amount ofthe fine from € 102 million to €90 million. It found first that theCommission did not establishwith sufficient evidence two ofthe measures applied byVolkswagen, and that secondlythe duration of the infringement(three years) was much shorterthan established by theCommission (more than ten

98 Pts. 334, 336.99 Pts. 258 to 268.



years). It is important tounderline that the Court didhowever not apply a reductionproportional to the shorterduration of the infringement.Instead, it took into account theparticular gravity and theintensity of the measures insetting the fine at € 90 million.Therefore, it could be deductedfrom the judgement that theCourt considered a higheramount for the gravity of theinfringement than the oneimposed by the Commission.

The Court also concluded thatthe initial amount fixed by theCommission could not beconsidered as particularly high,given that it represents arelatively low percentage inrespect to Volkswagen's turnover(0.25% of 1997 turnover in theMember States primarilyaffected by the infringement(Italy, Germany, Austria) and/or0.5% of EU turnover.

IMPLICATIONS OF THEJUDGEMENT FORCOMPETITION POLICY

The judgement by the Court ofFirst Instance confirms thelegitimacy of the active policy ofenforcement of the Commissionin pursuing infringements ofArticle 81 in motor vehicledistribution, which hamper therights of consumers to benefitfrom the Single Market. Thisright is also clearly expressed inthe current block exemptionregulation concerning motor

vehicle distribution.100 Thetreatment of other pending casesagainst other car manufacturerswill no doubt take into accountthe various considerations of thisjudgement, which clearly heldthat the measures used byVolkswagen to limit exports toconsumers from other MemberStates are to be considered asrestriction of competition bytheir object and as a very seriousinfringement of Article 81.

It also confirms that theCommission is rightly entitled toimpose fines of importantamount for such infringementsince the amount of € 90 millionwas considered appropriate foran infringement of that typelasting three years. Thisindicates that the Court considersthat fines for such infringementshould be fixed at a level whichhas a sufficiently dissuasiveeffect.

100 Commission Regulation (EC) No

1475/95, OJ L 145, 29.6.1995,Article 5 (2) d) and Article 6 (1)(7).



On 16 August 2000, theCommission cleared the co-operation agreement betweenGeneral Motors and Fiat in theareas of powertrains 101, joint-purchase of car componentsand some other joint activities,such as the organisation offinancial services directed totheir dealers and consumers, inEurope and Latin America102.

The Alliance involves GeneralMotors taking a 20% equity stakein Fiat Auto Holdings BV, a newholding that controls Fiat Group�sauto and light commercial vehicleoperations. In return, Fiatreceives approximately 5% ofGeneral Motors�s common stock.Notwithstanding this financiallink, the two car manufacturerswill continue to compete world-wide in the design of vehiclecomponents not linked topowertrains as well as in theassembly, distribution, branding,marketing and sale of cars. TheAlliance excludes Fiat�s Ferrari

101 The powertrain of a motor vehicle

includes engine, clutch,transmission, universal joints,drive shaft, differential gear, andaxle shaft.

102 See press release n. IP/00/932,Commission approves co-operation agreement betweenGeneral Motors and Fiat.

and Maserati luxury sports caroperations 103.

The co-operation agreementbetween the two carmanufacturers represents thelatest significant episode in theconsolidation trend by which carmanufacturers seek scaleeconomies and growth inemerging markets. For thisreason, the evaluation of thenotified agreement also took intoaccount the particular context ofthe automotive industry, which isclose to maturity and ischaracterised by an increasinglyconcentrated structure with fewlarge suppliers104. 103 A Carlsberg publication,

containing a summary of theagreement, was made in theOfficial Journal on 20 June 2000,in order to give third interestedparties the possibility ofsubmitting their comments on thesaid operation (OJ C170/8, 20June 2000).

104 See, for example, BMW/Rover(Commission Decision M.416,14.3.1994), Ford/Mazda(Commission Decision M.741,24.5.1996), Toyota/Daihatsu(Commission Decision M.1326,6.11.1998), Daimler-Benz/Chrysler (M.1204,22.7.1998), Renault/Nissan(Commission Decision M.1519,12.5.1999), Ford/Volvo(Commission Decision M.1452,26.3.1999) and GM/Saab

At the heart of the Alliance, isthe creation of a Powertrainjoint venture to be located inTurin, Italy, and of aPurchasing joint venture, whichis based in Rüsselsheim inGermany. These two jointventures will have an initialterm of 10 years. Each partywill contribute to the jointventures all of its European andLatin American powertrain andpurchasing assets. The activitycarried out by these two newentities together accounts for animportant part of the cost of anew vehicle.

The Powertrain joint venturewill, on an exclusive basis,design and produce a broadrange of diesel and gasolineengines and transmissions. BothGeneral Motors and Fiat willcontinue to develop their brandrequirements individually.

The Purchasing joint venturewill manage, on an exclusivebasis, orders for purchases ofparts for incorporation intovehicles manufactured by theParties as well as parts fordistribution to the aftermarket.

The Alliance was treated underarticle 81 of the Treaty since itwas considered to fall outsidethe scope of council regulation4064/89 as GM and Fiat remainindependent companies.

The Powertrain joint ventureand the Purchasing joint venturewere considered to be two

(Commission Decision M.1847,28.2.2000).

The Commission approves the co-operation agreement between GeneralMotors Corporation and Fiat SpAAlberta LASCHENA and Christophe DUSSART,DG COMP-F-2



structural co-operative jointventures, as they combine partof the existing activities of theparent companies in the area ofthe production of powertrainand purchases on a long termbasis105. Nevertheless, the jointventures do not perform, on alasting basis, all the functions ofautonomous economic entities,remaining largely dependent onFiat and General Motors, andtherefore were not consideredfull function joint ventureswithin the meaning of Article3(2) of Council Regula-tion 4064/89 106. They weretherefore treated underRegulation 17/62 within a two-months deadline since theywere considered as structuraljoint ventures 107.

The major effects of theAlliance were registered on themarkets for the procurement ofparts and supplies for theautomotive industry. In thismarket, General Motors andFiat, following the conclusionof the agreement, became thefirst purchaser.

The Alliance also has effects onthe markets for the production

105 Note concerning the assessment of

co-operative joint venturepursuant to article 85 of the ECTreaty (93/C 43/02 point 3).

106 Commission notice on the conceptof full-function joint venturesunder Council Regulation (EEC)4064/89 on the control ofconcentration betweenundertakings (98/C 66/01, point13 and ss.).

107 Commission�s decision of 23December 1992.

and supply of cars and lightcommercial vehicles (LCVs).These markets are close tomaturity, and are characterisedby an increasingly concentratedstructure with few largesuppliers and large symmetricstructure. The positions of carmanufacturers are not destinedto change permanently. Barriersto entry are quite high and entryin the relevant market is notfrequent.

The agreement was found to berestrictive of competition withinthe meaning of article 81 (1) ofthe Treaty in the mentionedmarkets. It was considered thata co-operation agreementconsisting of the establishmentof joint ventures could restrictcompetition between parentcompanies to the extent thatthey are already actual orpotential competitors. In thepresent case, both GeneralMotors and Fiat are in theposition to fulfil individually thetasks assigned to the jointventures and they forfeit theircapabilities to do so by thecreation of the jointventures108. This agreementcame under article 81 (1), sinceit also involved firms withmarket power and it was likelyto cause foreclosure problemsvis-à-vis third parties 109.

108 Note concerning the assessment of

co-operative joint venturepursuant to article 85 (now article81) of the EC Treaty (93/C 43/02).

109 Draft guidelines on theapplicability of article 81 (1) tohorizontal cooperation (OJC118/14 of 27 April 2000).

General Motors and Fiat aredirect competitors in themarkets for the production ofpassenger cars and LCVs sincethey individually produce motorvehicles to be supplied via theirnational importers to dealersand final consumers. Throughthe Powertrain joint venture,they co-ordinate their activitiesin the development andproduction of powertrains on anexclusive basis. Therefore, theagreement does not aim atunifying their efforts tocompete in domains in which atthe moment they are not active.

Through the establishment ofthe Purchasing joint venture,Fiat and General Motors willcoordinate on an exclusive basistheir respective activities in themarket for the purchase ofvehicles� components and othersupplies. The joint purchasingby General Motors and Fiat ofpart of their component supplyshould reinforce their buyingpower towards their suppliers.

The restriction of competitionwas considered as appreciablyaffecting trade betweenMember States owing to specialcharacteristics of the relevantmarkets described under point4. (maturity, barriers to entry,concentrated structure) andbecause the important positionof General Motors and Fiat onthe said markets.

It was however consideredpossible to issue a comfort lettersince it appears that theAlliance fulfils the fourconditions of Article 81 (3) EC



Treaty. It seems that thePowertrain joint venture helpsto improve the development andthe manufacture of powertrains,while allowing each parentcompany to concentrate itsindividual efforts in powertraincustomisation. Moreover,components and parts accountfor a considerable share of thecost of a new car and theincrease in the two companies�bargaining power could resultin substantial savings whichwould be passed on to theconsumer in terms of bettersafety standards and lowerprices.

Competition does not seem tobe eliminated in respect of asubstantial part of the productsin questions since on therelevant markets, General

Motors and Fiat are subject tocompetition from other carmanufacturers, of similardimension and economicstrength.

In the end, what can we learnfrom the co-operationagreement between GeneralMotors and Fiat?

The two car manufacturers,through the Alliance, aim atachieving standardisation in�low-touch� component andplatform areas that do notdifferentiate cars in consumers�eyes. Each party will continueto differentiate its products interms of design, performanceand brand image. For thisreason, General Motors and Fiatwill continue to customise theirengines individually and will

distinguish vehicle characte-ristics and components in thoseareas influencing customers�perception.

While other competitors havedecided to merge in order toliberate resources to bettercompete, General Motors andFiat have chosen a new and�leaner� solution, which willallow them to co-operate in the�upstream� activities and tofocus their individual efforts onmore customers orientedactivities. The future is likely tosee more agreements of this kindbetween car manufacturers. Thispossibility is open to the carindustry, provided that theconditions set out in article 81(3)are met.

On 22 December 1999, BritishSky Broadcasting plc (�BSkyB�)notified its acquisition of 24% ofKirchPayTV GmbH & Co.KGaA (�KirchPayTV�). Thenotification was judgedincomplete and was finallycompleted on 7 February 2000.During its investigation the

Commission identified a numberof competition concerns, whichwere eliminated by the partiessubmitting commitments inphase I of the merger controlprocedure. The Decision of 21March 2000 bound the parties inrelation to pay-TV and digitalinteractive television services in

Germany and established anarbitration process for theimplementation of thecommitments.

BSkyB operates pay-TV in theUK, together with interests indigital interactive television andtechnical services for pay-TV.BSkyB had no German interests,but it is 40% owned by NewsCorporation, who controls asmall German TV channel andthe German rights for the UEFAChampions League. Althoughnot a party to the concentration,News acknowledged that it hadsufficient influence over BSkyBto be taken into account for thepurposes of Article 2, following

THE COMMISSION�S ASSESSMENTOF THE PARTICIPATION OF BSKYB INTHE PAY-TV OPERATOR INGERMANYAndrew HOBBS, DG COMP-C-2



the Kesko Oy v Commissionjudgement110.

KirchPayTV operatesGermany�s only pay-TV serviceand is wholly owned by theholding company ofKirchGruppe. KirchGruppe isalso active in the fields ofcommercial television, trade ofbroadcasting rights and technicalservices for pay-TV. It ownsBetaResearch, which developedthe conditional access systemused by KirchPayTV, i.e. it isincluded in the d-box decoder.

The relevant markets

Three relevant markets wereidentified: a) pay-TV, which hasbeen well established in previousdecisions involving Germany111;b) digital interactive televisionservices, which is an embryonicmarket in Germany and followsthe market identified in theBIB/Open Decision.112 WithBSkyB�s experience in this fieldKirch could move ahead with itsstated aim to provide a platformon which others could offerservices like shopping, banking,games etc via the TV; and, c) the

110 Case T-22/97 Kesko Oy v

Commission, 15/12/99,paragraphs 137-140.

111 See Commission Decision94/922/EC, MSG Media Service(OJ L 364, 31.12.1994, p. 1) andCommission Decision1999/153/EC,Bertelsmann/Kirch/Premiere (OJL 53, 27.2.1999, p. 1).

112 See Commission Decision1999/781/EC, British InteractiveBroadcasting/Open (OJ L 312,6.12.1999, p. 1), paragraph 11.

acquisition of broadcastingrights, in particular for films andsporting events, which hadpreviously been identified by theCommission.113 This is a vitalneighbouring market for pay-TV, as film and sport contentpersuade potential subscribers topay for receiving televisionservices. Although mostbroadcasting rights are acquiredon a national basis, some sportsrights with a pan-Europeaninterest from the viewers�perspective are acquired for thewhole of Europe and re-sold percountry. This raised the questionof whether there is separategeographic market for pan-European sports rights, but itwas not necessary to preciselydefine the market in this case.

Dominance

Pay-TV

KirchPayTV has a virtualmonopoly on the German pay-TV market, although with a lossmaking business. BSkyB adds avery successful pay-TVcompany, with experience ofdigital interactive TV servicesand deep pockets. The questionwas therefore whether thisstrengthened the position ofKirch, by providing it with abadly needed influx of financialresources and know-how. Thequestion of whether BSkyB wasbeing eliminated as a potentialcompetitor in Germany alsoneeded to be examined. 113 See Commission Decision

1999/242/EC, TPS (OJ L 90,2.4.1999, p. 6), paragraph 34.

On the first point, it appeared tothe Commission that the lossmaking Kirch pay-TV neededaccess to development funds,which it had failed to raise on theopen market. Without these,given the significant costsinvolved, there were seriousdoubts as to its future. BSkyBbrought both money andcommercial know-how to use iteffectively. In the absence ofsuch funds it could be arguedthat barriers to entry would belowered as there would be anincreasing demand for new digitalservices and Kirch would nolonger be able to buy up all thesignificant pay-TV rights. Thisled to serious doubts as theconcentration reinforcesKirchPayTV�s dominant positionon the market for pay-TV inGermany.

At first glance BSkyB wouldseem to be a potential competitor.It was successful in the UK, it hadtechnical know-how, the Germanmarket had large potential growth,via News International it hadaccess to Twentieth Century Foxand the German pay-TV rights forthe UEFA Champions League, aswell as six broadcasting licensesfor thematic channels. However,the Commission concluded thatneither BSkyB nor any othercompany is likely to enter theGerman pay-TV market in themedium term for a number ofreasons.

Firstly the more than 30channels available in the Germanfree TV market reduce theincentive for viewers tosubscribe to pay-TV as well.



This effect is demonstrated bythe success of pay-TV in the UKand France, compared to itsfailure to get enough subscribersto break even.

The second point relates toKirch�s control over the decoderinfrastructure and technologyused in Germany. Almost everydecoder in Germany is a d-boxand Deutsche Telekom, who hasthe preponderant share of thecable network market, usesexclusively Kirch�s d-boxdecoders on the pay-TV platformoperated by its subsidiaryMediaServices Gesellschaft(MSG)114. Any potential entrantwould therefore depend on itsdirect competitor, Kirch, fortechnical services or develop analternative platform. Given thesituation on the cable network analternative would have to besatellite based, which wouldseverely limit the potentialaudience for the service due torestrictions on the use of dishes.In addition the new customerswould have to buy or rent thealternative decoder. Experiencein the UK has shown theoperator has to subsidise theequipment, resulting in anenormous cost to enter what isalready a loss making market.

The third barrier was lack ofaccess to content, as Kirch haslong term exclusive deals with

114 This took place prior to the current

sale by Deutsche Telekom ofmajority stakes in most of its cablenetworks. In fact the situation haschanged little as most purchasersstill have to use Kirch decoders.

all the film studios plus its ownextensive library and productionfacilities. It also owns the pay-TV rights to many leading sportsevents, thus reducingsignificantly the rights availableto a potential new entrant.Incidentally upon acquiring theUEFA pay-TV rights Newsoffered them to Kirch for fouryears, which undermines inindications of independent entry.

Finally BSkyB would needconsiderable financial resourcesto enter the market at a timewhen it is investing heavily inthe UK with upgrading of its newdigital pay-TV service and therollout of its platform for digitalinteractive television services. Itwas, therefore, concluded thatBSkyB was not, in the short tomedium term, a potential entrantinto the German pay-TV market.

Digital interactive televisionservices

The central concern of theCommission in this case was thedigital interactive televisionservices market, where noservices have been launched butKirch, Bertelsmann115, theGerman public servicebroadcaster ARD, UPC andPrimacom had all announcedlaunching plans. There are noindications that BSkyB intendedto independently enter thismarket in the short to mediumterm.

115 It is reported, that the Bertelsmann

group is now developing a servicewith Deutsche Telekom.

The costs of developing,installing, promoting andsubsidising consumer equipmenthave been shown by the UKexperience to be very high. Suchinvestments require correspon-ding opportunities for marketpenetration. No third party waslikely to make such aninvestment as the concentrationwould have enabledKirchPayTV to enter the marketbefore any other operator. Thisin turn would have extended thedominance of d-box decodersfrom the pay-TV market into thismarket, creating a dominantposition.

Without the injection of fundingfrom BSkyB, Kirch would nothave the financial resources ordeveloped the necessary know-how to enter this market in theimmediate future. BSkyB couldsupply both the know�how and,uniquely, the experience ofrunning digital interactivetelevision services gained in therunning of the BIB/Open jointventure.116 This would foreclosethe market to other potentialentrants by significantly raisingthe barriers to entry. Bycombining the only pay-TVoperation with digital interactiveservices provided through thesame box, Kirch could extend itsmonopoly in pay-TV into thisnew market. Due to theproprietary nature of thedecoder, third parties wouldhave to use a separate box orapply for a license to use the 116 In the meantime, BSkyB has

acquired a majority stake in theBIB/Open joint venture.



decoder technology. Thisapproach would expose the newentrant to delays and revealingvital information to a competitorto obtain the licence. Nor woulda new entrant be able to providepay-TV. Although DeutscheTelekom had announced that it isselling its cable assets, thestructure of the sale was notclear and it appeared that Kirch�sdecoders would continue to beused as the main servicetechnology. Thus serious doubtswith regard to the compatibilityof the operation were created inthis market.

The acquisition of broadcastingrights, in particular for films andsporting events

By virtue of its dominantposition in the pay-TV market,Kirch dominates the upstreambroadcasting rights market inGermany and is active as apurchaser of pan-Europeanrights to sporting events. BSkyBalso dominates the UK market,with the buyer power from itsposition in the pay-TV market.News International also controlsthe German pay-TV and free toair rights for ChampionsLeague football, and has bid forsome pan-European sports eventrights.

Third parties were concernedthat Kirch�s position gave it themeans and incentive to use itspower in related markets, tobenefit itself or BSkyB, such astying pay-TV and free TV rights.Yet Kirch was already in aposition to do that without theconcentration. Nor would joint

resources allow the parties tooutbid other bidders. Kirch hasno need to offer higher bids forGerman pay-TV rights as it isthe only bidder and has most ofthem in long term contracts. IfKirch and BSkyB buy togetherfor the UK and Germany theamount they have available tobid for the joint rights would besubstantially the same as theyhad separately. There is noindication that in buying thejoint rights they would offermore than they would offerseparately for the individualrights.

It was alleged that Kirch coulduse its power on the Germanmarket to strengthen BSkyB�sdominant position on the pay-TVmarket in the UK by making theacquisition of the rights forGermany conditional on BSkyBobtaining the rights for the UK.This did not seem practical asfilm and sports right are usuallylicensed on a long term andexclusive basis, making thechances of these contractsending at a similar time for twoor more territories low. Refusalon the part of film studios mayresult in them developing theirown film channels (as Sony andDisney have already started todo in Europe). Finally, the riskfor Kirch would seem to be highwhen the only benefit could havegained was through its 4%shareholding in Sky (which,subsequent to the Decision, ithas sold).

The same market raised an issueunder Article 2(4), namelywhether the parties would

engage in joint buying of pan-European sports events rights.Again this could be engaged inoutside the scope of theconcentration, motivated by adesire to cut costs. There was nocausality between the creation ofthe JV and any co-ordination ofthe competitive behaviour by theparents. It was concludedtherefore that there were noArticle 2(4) aspects in the case.

Interestingly the UK�sCompetition Commission,examining the similar concentra-tion involving BSkyB andVivendi (who own Canal Plus,the French pay-TV operator)came to the same conclusionswith regard to broadcastingrights.117

117 See the report of the Competition

Commission: �In relation to sportsrights, we consider that the mergersituation is unlikely to result inany significant enhancement ofthe position of BSkyB, which isalready a strong one. The keynational rights are unlikely to beaffected by collaboration, andthere is insufficient reason for usto expect that the merger situationwould materially impact onBSkyB�s acquisition of rights tointernational events if jointbidding occurred. Further, there isthe prospect that any anti-competitive effects ofcollaborative bidding could giverise to intervention from thenational or EC competitionauthorities. We do not, therefore,expect that the merger situationwould have an adverse effect onthe acquisition of sports rights inthe UK or on competition betweenpay-TV operators. For similarreasons, we do not expect themerger situation would have anadverse effect on the acquisitionof film rights.�



Commitments

Responding to the Commission�sserious doubts, the partiesoffered commitments coveringthe technological platform forpay-TV and interactive services,which were adopted as part ofthe Decision. They also offeredundertakings on issues relatingto broadcasting rights, but thesewere simply noted, as thebroadcasting rights issues did notraise serious doubts.

The technical commitments, andthe accompanying arbitrationprocedure, established a situationwhere third parties could eitheraccess the existing Kirchdecoder base or establish thereown decoders and require Kirchto provide its pay-TV services.The commitments weredeveloped in co-operation withthird parties that had raisedspecific problems.

The first set was aimed atallowing access to Kirch�stechnical platform by interestedthird parties. Kirch agreed tooffer technical services on a fair,reasonable and non-discriminatory basis to allowKirch decoders to receive thirdparty services. Separateaccounting is provided for suchservices. Sufficient informationto make full use of the servicesand to write applications tooperate on Kirch�s decoder,including provision forindependent testing of theapplication, was also providedfor.

Another set of undertakingsestablished Simulcryptarrangements to ensure theinteroperability between serviceproviders using different systemsfor conditional access, so thatthird party services can run onKirch�s decoder or vice versa.Kirch undertakes to supply itspay-TV services to third partydecoders via Simulcryptarrangements. In addition, Kirchhas to implement the MultimediaHome Platform (MHP), whichhas been standardised by theDigital Video Broadcastinggroup. The provision of theMHP will give third parties likeARD and Bertelsmann thepossibility to develop digitalinteractive applications andservices that can be run on thedecoder that Kirch uses for itspay-TV services.

Where a third party develops itsown technical platform anddecoders, Kirch licenses itstechnology and permits themanufacture of decoder boxescombining its decodertechnology with other decodersystems.

The technical commitmentscompensated for the influx ofresources and know-how,lowering barriers to entry on thepay-TV market and preventingKirchPayTV from leveraging itsdominance on this market intothe market for digital interactivetelevision services. Byeliminating the serious doubtswith regard to a creation orstrengthening of a dominant

position the concentration couldbe cleared.

In the arbitration procedure forthe implementation of thecommitments, the arbitrationrules of the �Deutsche Institutionfür Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit e.V.(DIS)� are applied. So far, nocase of arbitration has come tothe knowledge of theCommission. The arbitrationprocess does not affect thepowers of the Commission totake decisions in relation to thecommitments in accordance withArticle 8 of the MergerRegulation.

The Decision is the subject of anappeal for annulment before theCourt of First Instance byARD.118

118 T-158/00.

MERGERSApplication of Council Regulation 4064/89


I. Policy developments andfines

The report to the Council onturnover thresholds andreferral procedures:launching the review of theMR 119

This report required by the lastamendment to the MergerRegulation covers the periodbetween March 1998, when therevised Regulation came intoforce, and the end of 1999. The1997 revision of the Regulationintroduced secondary thresholdsto avoid multiple filings tonational competition authorities.However, it appears, on the basisof the survey carried out so far,that a significant number ofoperations with cross-bordereffects continue to fall outsidethe scope of the Regulation.120

119 The report was adopted on

28.06.2000.120 Of the total of 4,303 mergers,

acquisitions and joint ventures or'concentrations' that requiredclearance in the Member States ofthe European Union during thatperiod, no fewer than 294 caseswere notified to two nationalcompetition authorities, ratherthan to the Commission, becausethey did not meet the turnoverthresholds. Another 31 cases werenotified in three EU member

This indicates that some of themain aims of the Regulationhave not yet been fully achieved.The aims include the principlesof subsidiarity, as enshrined inthe one-stop shop, and levelplaying field. In the light ofthese principles, the Commissionbelieves that multiple filingcases have a Community interestand that the Commission, inprinciple should be better placedto deal with such cases. Thereport recognises the concern ofthe business community, forwhich multiple notifications aretantamount to legal uncertainty,increased efforts and costs. Atthe same time it is also clear thatmerger control forms animportant part of competitionpolicy in many Member States.It therefore believes thatfollowing a thoroughexamination is necessary,involving active participation byall interested parties, before anychanges to the currentjurisdictional rules could beproposed.

states and 39 in more than threeEU states. In comparison, theCommission received a total of494 notifications between March1998 and the end of 1999 ofwhich 45 were notified under thenew thresholds of art. 1(3) MR.

The 1997 revision alsointroduced modifications to themechanisms for referral of casesbetween the Member States andthe Commission (Articles 9 and22). The report indicates theviews of industry and theMember States on theeffectiveness of these provisions.In the review, the Commissionintends to assess the functioningof these rules, as well as tocollect objective informationconcerning the impact, if any, onthe costs that involved firmshave to bear in referral cases.

Finally, after ten years ofapplication of the MergerRegulation, it is felt to beappropriate to conduct aforward-looking inventory alsoof other legal and practicalaspects of the Merger Regulationin order to assess whether or notthe existing system is wellequipped to face the challengesof the foreseeable future. Thesechallenges will include externalfactors, such as the extension ofthe Community through theaccession of the applicantcountries and the continuing"merger boom", as well asinternal factors, such as themodernisation of Communityanti-trust rules. In the context ofthe further review, theCommission will have to rely oninformation provided bycompanies with experience frommerger control proceedings atthe Community level as well asthe Member States. Itencourages the activeparticipation of all interestedparties in this important debateabout the principles underlying

Merger Control: main developmentsbetween 1st May 2000 and 31st August2000Walter TRETTON, Neil MARSHALL and AnnaPAPAIOANNOU, DG COMP-B

➣ MERGERS


the Regulation. The EC MergerControl 10th AnniversaryConference121 has provided afirst opportunity to publiclydiscuss issues related to theMerger Review.

Notice on a simplifiedprocedure for certain cases

In parallel to launching themerger review, the Commissionadopted a Notice, which rendersmerger procedures more efficientalready within the presentlegislative framework. TheNotice is based on theexperience gained in theapplication of MergerRegulation, which has shownthat certain categories ofconcentrations do not normallyraise competition concerns.

The Commission Notice on asimplified procedure fortreatment of certainconcentrations under CouncilRegulation (EEC) No4064/89122 identifies threecategories of cases, which wouldqualify for a short-form decisionadopted by the Commission atthe end of the usual one monthreview. The Notice applies toconcentrations where:• two or more undertakings

acquire joint control over ajoint venture, provided thatthe joint venture has no, or

121 See special article on this

conference in this CompetitionPolicy Newsletter.

122 Seehttp://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/legislation/simplified_procedure/

negligible, actual orforeseen activities withinthe EEA territory (turnoverof less than 100 millioneuros and assets less than100 million euros in theEuropean Economic Area;

• none of the parties areengaged in businessactivities in the sameproduct and geographicalmarket (horizontalrelationships), or in aproduct market which isupstream or downstream ofa product market in whichany other party to theconcentration is engaged(vertical relationships); and

• two or more of the partiesare engaged in businessactivities in the sameproduct and geographicalmarket or upstream ordownstream market,provided that theircombined market share isnot 15% or more forhorizontal and 25% or morefor vertical relationships.

The short-form decision willcontain information about theparties, the nature of theconcentration and economicsectors concerned as well as astatement that the concentrationis declared compatible with thecommon market because it fallswithin one or more of thecategories contained in theNotice, with the applicablecategory(ies) being explicitlyidentified. As for all fullclearance decisions, theCommission will publish apublic version of the decision.There will be no press release,

but clearance will be announcedin the Commission's MiddayExpress.

The simplified procedure canreduce the administrative burdenon notifying parties. It will stillgive the Member States and thirdparties the same possibilities tocomment or intervene as underthe ordinary procedure. TheCommission may also, ifnecessary, at any time revert tothe ordinary investigativeprocedures. Application of thissimplified procedure started on1.9.2000.

For the first time Commissionimposed fines for failing tosupply information under theMerger Regulation: Mitsubishi

The Commission has imposedfines on Mitsubishi HeavyIndustries for failing to supplyinformation with regard to ajoint venture last year betweenKvaerner and Ahlström. This isthe first time the Commissionhas fined a company other than anotifying party in mergerproceedings. It is also the firsttime that a periodic penaltypayment has been imposed on anundertaking in such proceedings.

During the investigation into theAhlström/Kvaerner chemicalpulping joint venture, Mitsubishiwas requested to supplyinformation according to Article11(5) of the Merger Regulation,which obliges third parties toassist the Commission in mergerreviews to determine whether agiven deal may create adominant position. But despite

➣ MERGERS


repeated requests from theCommission, Mitsubishisupplied only incompleteinformation concerning itsactivities in the world-widemarket for recovery boilers, oneof the markets where theCommission had expressedconcerns. The Commissionconsidered Mitsubishi'sbehaviour a very seriousinfringement of EU law since theinformation requested wasnecessary for the properassessment of theAhlström/Kvaerner operation.

Under Article 14(1)(c) of theMerger Regulation, theCommission may impose finesbetween 1,000 and 50,000 euroson undertakings which,intentionally or negligently,supply incorrect information inresponse to the Commission'srequest for information or whichfail to supply information withinthe period fixed by a decisionpursuant to Article 11. Inaddition, under Article 15(1) ofthe Merger Regulation, theCommission may also imposeperiodic penalty payments of upto 25,000 euros per day of delaycalculated from the date when aformal request for informationwas taken. The Commissiondecided to impose both types offines on Mitsubishi. The firstfine, 50,000 euros, was forfailing to comply with theCommission decision, pursuantto Article 14(1)(c) of the MergerRegulation. The second fine wasa periodic penalty paymenttotalling 900,000 euros.

In adopting this decision, theCommission wanted to stress itsdetermination to enforce themerger control rules in theEuropean Union, whichpresupposes the supply ofcorrect information by bothmerging parties and competitorsrequested to assist it in its task.

II. Relevant Cases

Introductory remark : arecord number of cases

The second four-month period of2000 has seen a very sharpincrease of notifications underthe Merger Regulation (136notifications, which is up 46 %on the same period in 1999 andup 43 % on the first four-monthperiod of 2000). Seven phase IIproceedings were initiated123

and nine phase II proceedingswere closed, seven by decisionand two following withdrawal ofthe notifications. There was alsoa very high number of clearancesin phase I subject tocommitments (11 cases).

123 These were M.1879 � Boeing /

Hughes, M.1852 �TimeWarner/EMI, M.1845 �AOL/TimeWarner, M.1963-IndustriKapital/Perstorp, M.1940-Framatome/Siemen/COGEMA/JV, M.2060Bosch-Rexroth, M.1646�CGD/Partest/BCP/SairGroup/Portugalia(later withdrawn)

Decisions following anadditional four-month in-depthinvestigation (Decisionspursuant Art.8 MR)

MCI WorldCom / Sprint

The Commission decided toprohibit the merger between UStelecommunications firms MCIWorldCom Inc and Sprint Corpas it would have resulted in thecreation of a dominant positionin the market for top-leveluniversal Internet connectivity.In the course of the review, thecompanies proposed to divestSprint's Internet business but thiswas insufficient to resolve thecompetition concerns resultingfrom the merger.124

MCI WorldCom is the world'sleading provider of Internetconnectivity, with Sprint one ofits main competitors. An in-depth investigation by theCommission showed that themerger would, through thecombination of the mergingparties' extensive networks andlarge customer base, have led tothe creation of such a powerfulforce that both competitors andcustomers would have beendependent on the new company 124 The companies informed the

Commission of their intention towithdraw their notification of thedeal the day before the prohibitionwas adopted. But the Commissionfelt compelled to take a formaldecision as its review had come toan end and as it can only accept awithdrawal if the deal is no longerlegally binding. This was not thecase, as the companies had notformally cancelled their mergeragreement.

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to obtain universal Internetconnectivity. This would haveallowed the merged company tobehave independently of both itscompetitors and customers.

Following the Commission'sobjections, the companiesoffered to divest Sprint's Internetbusiness from Sprint's otheractivities. However, theCommission's investigationshowed that this proposal wasinsufficient as it would not re-establish, with enough certaintyas to its effect, immediate andeffective competition in themarket for top-level Internetconnectivity.

It was vital for the Commissionthat the divested business wouldbecome a strong, viablecompetitor that would preventthe merged WorldCom/Sprintfrom dominating Internetbackbone. The companies' offerfailed to guarantee this becauseSprint's Internet business iscompletely intertwined with itstraditional telecoms activities.125

The Commission also studied theimpact of the merger in themarket for the provision ofglobal telecommunicationsservices to multinationalcompanies where together withBritish Telecommunications'

125 When assessing the feasibility of

the proposed divestiture, theCommission also took intoaccount issues raised by Cable &Wireless after its purchase ofInternet MCI which was divestedfrom MCI's other activities to gainclearance of the WorldCom/MCImerger in 1998.

Concert alliance with AT&T themerged entity would appear tocontrol the majority of themarket. The Commission couldnot, however, show the absenceof competitive constraints fromactual competitors in this marketand that customers would not beable to countervail against anyparallel behaviour by the twoleading players. Therefore, theCommission concluded that acollective dominant positioncould not be established betweenthe merged entity and theConcert alliance.

Pursuant to the EU-USagreement of 1991 on antitrustco-operation, the Commissionhas examined the merger inparallel with the US Departmentof Justice although the twoauthorities have conductedindependent and separateinvestigations. This co-operationwill continue in future cases,especially if and when the twoauthorities identify commoncompetition concerns that mightrequire a jointly pursuedremedial action.

This was the 13th time theCommission had blocked amerger since 1990.

VEBA / VIAG

The merger between the Germangroups VEBA and VIAG ,together with the mergerbetween RWE and VEW, whichwas investigated at the sametime by the Bundeskartellamt,will change the face of theGerman power industry,especially at the level of the

interconnected grid. In itsoriginal form the merger ofVEBA and VIAG would haveresulted in a dominant duopolybetween VEBA/VIAG on oneside and RWE/VEW on theother on the market in the supplyof electricity from theinterconnected grid. After themerger PreussenElektra AG(VEBA) and Bayernwerk AG(VIAG) together withRWE/VEW would havecontrolled well over 80% of thismarket.

Numerous structural factorsmeant that, after the merger as itwas initially notified, asignificant degree of competitionbetween VEBA/VIAG and RWEcould no longer have beenexpected. There were a numberof factors that indicated thatparallel behaviour could result.These included the fact thatelectricity is a totallyhomogeneous product, which issold on a transparent market;that the companies had similarcost structures owing to asimilarly composed stock ofpower stations and also held anumber of jointly operated largepower stations; there werenumerous interrelationshipsbetween VEBA/VIAG andRWE; expected growth indemand is low, and that theproduct has a low priceelasticity.

Moreover, the duopolyVEBA/VIAG and RWE orRWE/VEW (1) would not havefaced any significantcompetition from outside. Inaddition to the extremely high

➣ MERGERS


market share of the duopoly,apart from EnBW no otherinterconnected power companywould have been independent ofthe duopolists. The duopolywould have controlled by far thegreatest part of installedgeneration capacity, almost allfree generation potential, and byfar the greatest part of thetransmission network inGermany. There are alsosignificant barriers to entry tothe market, in particular relatingto the creation of new capacityand imports.

In response to the Commission�sobjections VEBA/VIAGproposed that it should disposeof numerous holdings in othercompanies, and makeimprovements to the groundrules governing the market inelectricity. Similar undertakingshave been given to theBundeskartellamt by RWE/VEW. The commitments givenby VEBA/VIAG andRWE/VEW ensure that the mainlinks between the two big groupswill be severed, especially as aresult of the sale of theirholdings in the east Germaninterconnected companyVereinigte Energiewerke AG(VEAG) and the lignite producerLAUBAG. VEAG will thusbecome independent of the WestGerman interconnectedcompanies, and will have to betaken seriously as a competitor.VEAG will have a marketposition comparable to that ofVIAG before the merger, andwill become the third force onthe German market, the fourthone being the southern company

Energie Baden-Württemberg(EnBW). The sale of theseholdings will at the same timereduce the market positions ofVEBA/VIAG and RWE/VEW,to whom VEAG belonged untilnow.

Other links with RWE/VEW willbe cut by selling off shares inVEW held directly and indirectlyby VIAG, and shares in RhenagRheinische Energie AG held byVEBA. The position of theremaining interconnectedcompanies will be strengthened;either VEBA or VIAGpreviously had a stake in each ofthese with the exception ofEnBW. This applies to theHamburg electricity supplierHamburgische ElectricitätswerkeAG (HEW) and the Berlincompany Kraft und Licht AG(BEWAG).

VEBA/VIAG and RWE/VEWhave also undertaken not tocharge the transmission feeknown as the "T-component",payable where a supplier ofenergy between the northern andsouthern trading zones set up byAssociations Agreement II(Verbändevereinbarung II)cannot net out the quantities theysupply against equivalentquantities in the oppositedirection. This commitment willconsiderably improve the groundrules governing transmissionthrough the network operated bythese two leading interconnectedcompanies. Imports fromScandinavia will be appreciablysimplified, because VEBA willfree a portion of the capacityreserved for it in the Denmark

interconnector for use bycompetitors.

Other commitments have alsobeen given which meet theCommission's objections inrespect of two markets inhydrocyanic acid products.

Subsequent to thesecommitments, the Commissiondeclared the merger compatiblewith the common market andwith the EEA Agreement.

AstraZeneca / Novartis

In this operation, which will leadto the world�s leading cropprotection business, Astra-Zeneca, itself created through themerger between Astra AB andZeneca Group PLC in spring1999, and Novartis, resultingfrom the merger between Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz in December1996, will spin off and mergetheir activities in the area of cropprotection into a newlyincorporated company, SyngentaAG to which Novartis will alsotransfer its seeds business.

The deal posed concerns in ahigh number of crop protectionproducts, threatening to create orstrengthen dominant positions in39 markets including cerealfungicides and maize herbicides.In many of these markets theparties� combined market shareswould have been between 50 %and 75 %. The extensiveremedies package consisted ofdivestitures of products,representing total salesworldwide in excess of €250million this year, of out-

➣ MERGERS


licensing and the termination ofdistribution agreements.

Thanks to the bilateralagreement of 1991 on antitrustco-operation between theCommission and the UnitedStates of America, theCommission collaborated withthe Federal Trade Commission,enabling a common and, hence,effective solution to theproblems identified to be foundin the markets for cerealfungicides (world-widedivestiture of Novartis'strobilurin business) and maizeherbicides (world-widedivestiture of AstraZeneca'sacetochlor business).

Dow Chemical / UnionCarbide

The acquisition by DowChemical of Union Carbide(UCC), creating one of theworld�s largest producers ofplastics and chemicals, posedcompetition concerns in threeareas. The Commission foundthat without the remedies onwhich the adopted authorisationdecision is conditional, theconcentration would have led tothe creation or strengthening ofdominant positions in themarkets for C8 LLDPE resins,ethyleneamines and PEtechnology.

For C8 LLDPE the operationwould have resulted in acombined market share in excessof 80%, or five times larger thanthat of the nearest competitor.The merger with UCC wouldhave strengthened Dow�s

already dominant position on theWestern European marketthrough the addition of UCC�sshare in the Polimeri jointventure with Enichem. Toprevent the strengthening of thisposition, the parties undertook toeither cause Polimeri to sell itsItalian production plant thatproduces C8 LLDPE amongother products or to divest all offUCC's 50 % ownership interestin Polimeri itself, eitherundertaking removing theoverlap between the parties�activities.

Secondly, the Commissionfound that specific types ofethyleneamines form separateproduct markets and that therelevant geographic market isworldwide. For most individualethyleneamines the operationwould have resulted insignificant overlaps between theactivities of the parties andcombined world market sharesabove 60%.

To remedy these competitionconcerns, Dow undertook todivest its entire worldwideethyleneamine business(production plants, intellectualproperty rights, technology,customer contracts, personnel).It will also make up to half of thecapacity at its Terneuzen plant inthe Netherlands available to thenew owner of the ethyleneaminebusiness. This business can bephysically separated from otherDow Chemical businesses andthe new owner will not bedependent on Dow for rawmaterials.

Thirdly, the Commission foundthat the Dow/UCC deal wouldhave strengthened UCC'sdominant position on the marketfor gas phase PE technologypackages and/or on the moregeneral market for low pressurePE technology packages throughthe addition of Dow'smetallocene patent to Univation,UCC�s joint venture with Exxon,and would have weakened BPAmoco's position as Univation�smost important competitor as itwould cease having access to aproven metallocene technology.

To remedy the competitionconcerns, Dow agreed to offerinterested third parties openlicences to its backgroundmetallocene patents with regardto gas phase and slurryprocesses. Dow undertook not togrant licences to its backgroundmetallocene patents to Univationor to assign such patents toUnivation. Dow will also divestall of its assets dedicated to gasphase metallocene PEtechnology to BP. Together withother measures this will enableBP to offer effective competitionto the merged entity on themarket for gas phase technologypackages, including thepossibility to supply metallocenecatalysts.

Industri Kapital / Dyno

The acquisition of Norwegianchemicals and explosivescompany Dyno by venturecapital group Industri Kapital126

126 In cases of acquisitions by venture

capital groups, the Commission

➣ MERGERS


was approved following a four-month, in-depth inquiry, subjectto the divestiture by IndustriKapital of certain activities inthe resins sector and regardingplastic materials handlingsystems. The operation will leadto the creation of the largestresin producer worldwide with astrong presence in Europe andNorth America.

The Commission's investigationrevealed particular competitionproblems in two areas: informaldehyde and formaldehydebased resins in Finland, and inplastic materials handlingsystems in the Nordic area.

Neste and Dyno both have aformaldehyde and a resin plantin Finland whose maincustomers are the woodprocessing industry. Theaddition of their strong positionswould have led to a virtualmonopoly for the supply offormaldehyde in Finland and tothe creation of the largest resinproducer in Finland by far.Furthermore, the operationwould have created a linkbetween Arca and Polimoon,which are both active in plasticmaterials handling systems. Arcais by far the strongest operator inthe Nordic area and Polimoon isthe only substantial competitorto Arca in the Nordic Area.

In order to remove thecompetition concerns arising onthese markets, Industri Kapital

takes account of all other portfoliocompanies controlled by the groupin its competition analysis.

has proposed to divest theformaldehyde and resin plant ofDyno in Kitee, Finland. In theevent that this transaction doesnot take place within the timeperiod foreseen, Industri Kapitalwill divest the formaldehyde andresin plant of Neste in Hamina,Finland. Either divestment willremove the competition concernsidentified in the field offormaldehyde and formaldehydebased resins. Formaldehyde andresin customers in Finland willcontinue to have a choicebetween suppliers.

Industri Kapital also pledged tosell Dyno's shares in Polimoonto an independent purchaser or,alternatively, to divest itscomplete holding in Arca. Bothundertakings will remove thelink between Industri Kapital(Arca) and Polimoon in the fieldof materials handling systems.

By accepting alternativeundertakings the Commissionhas taken a novel approach.Alternative divestitureundertakings facilitate thedivestiture process and increasethe chances of finding a buyerfor a business to be divested. 127

127 The Commission is still

investigating the subsequentacquisition of the Swedishchemicals and flooring companyPerstorp by Industri Kapital. Inthis case the Commission foundserious competition concerns in anumber of chemicals markets andstarted an in depth investigationon 30 June 2000.

Alcoa / Reynolds

See article by DimitriGIOTAKOS in CompetitionPolicy Newsletter 2/2000.

Pirelli / BICC

The Commission cleared theacquisition by Pirelli Cavi eSistemi, the cable division ofItalian Pirelli Group, of BICCGeneral's power cableproduction plants in Italy and inBritain. BICC General willretain its plants in Spain andPortugal. The markets concernedby the operation are theproduction and sale of powercables to energy utilities. TheCommission identified separatemarkets for low and mediumvoltage power cables, used forthe distribution of electricity,and for high and extra-highvoltage cables, used for thetransmission of power.

The key issue was the definitionof the geographical market, moreprecisely whether competitionoperates at national or Europeanlevel. Prior to liberalisation, theelectricity market was marked bymonopoly suppliers purchasinglargely from domestic cablemanufacturers. But the gradualliberalisation of electricitymarkets combined with theEuropean Union's publicprocurement directives haschanged profoundly therelationship between powerutilities and cable manufacturers.Therefore, the Commission didnot rely just on past market databut took into account thechanges which have already

➣ MERGERS


occurred and which can beexpected to occur in theforeseeable future.

The investigation revealed thatmanufacturers in Europe are in aposition to supply their cables indifferent EU-Member Statessince product harmonisation isvery advanced and transportcosts are relatively low. Utilitycompanies are equally able tosource cables from foreignsuppliers. Besides Pirelli/BICC,there are at least four other largercable manufacturers (Alcatel,ABB, NKT and BICC General'sremaining production plants inSpain and Portugal) as well as anumber of smaller companies("fringe players" like Brugg andSagem), the entry of which couldbe induced by the strategicallocation of orders.Transmission grid operators buylarge quantities and have astrong bargaining position. Thismeans they could place largerparts of their supplies withalternative suppliers ifPirelli/BICC were to apply anti-competitive prices.

The Commission also examineda possible collective dominantposition of Pirelli together withAlcatel, the sector's number twoplayer, both for low and mediumand high and extra-high voltagepower cables, but found noconclusive evidence forconscious parallel behaviour.The companies' market sharesare asymmetric, the market ischaracterised by a low frequencyin tenders and by a low degree ofprice transparency. Furthermore,in the high and extra-high

voltage segment, cablemanufacturers have a strongincentive to compete due to thestructure of the bidding process,where utilities often award thewhole contract value to thelowest bidder. The markets formedium and low voltage powercables also do not lendthemselves to conscious parallelbehaviour, as there are a numberof smaller suppliers (the so-called "fringe firms") who couldbe used as alternative suppliers ifprices were to be increased bythe two leading firms. Thesesuppliers could also meet therequirements of regional utilities,which have a more limitedpurchasing power compared tothe national grid operators. Forthese reasons, the Commissionconcluded that the concentrationwould not lead to the creation orstrengthening of any dominantposition, either single orcollective, in respect of themarkets for the provision ofpower cables of low/medium andhigh/extra-high voltage to theenergy utilities.

The case clearly showed that theCommission, where appropriate,takes due account of theemergence of European markets.

Withdrawals in second phase

Two cases in this periodunderlined the importance of theCommission�s investigation incases where then no finaldecision is taken followingwithdrawals of the notification.

SairGroup / CGD / Partest /Portugália

The deal was abandoned afterthe Commission had opened anin-depth investigation into theproposed joint control ofPortuguese airline Portugália bySAirGroup , Caixa Geral deDepósitos, Partest and BancoComercial Português. It wouldhave led to the acquisition ofjoint control of Portugália by thePortuguese State (through CGDand Partest) and by SAirGroup.Given that the Portuguese Statealready controls other airlines,namely TAP (Portugal's flagcarrier) and SATA (a charterairline), the operation would alsohave created a link between TAPand SATA on the one hand, andPortugália on the other hand.The combination of TAP andPortugália would have led toconsiderable overlaps in 6routes, namely Lisbon-Barcelona, Lisbon-Lyon,Lisbon-Oporto, Lisbon-Faro,Oporto Barcelona, and Lisbon-Nice. Similarly, the operationwould have led to high overlapsin charter flights from Lisbonbetween SATA, TAP and PGA.There were therefore seriousrisks that the proposedtransaction could create adominant position on themarkets concerned.

Finally, the operation would alsohave created a link betweenSAirGroup and TAP, since itwould have created a jointventure between SAirGroup andthe Portuguese State (the ownerof TAP). This could haveaffected competition in other

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routes where SAirGroup andTAP are competing, especiallyin the routes betweenSwitzerland and Portugal, andbetween Belgium and Portugal.

Microsoft / Liberty Media /Telewest

Microsoft notified an operationin February whereby it wouldhave acquired joint control overTelewest, a British broadbandcable company, with LibertyMedia, a subsidiary of AT&TCorp. The Commission startedan in-depth probe into the dealover fears that it would reducecompetition in the digital cableindustry, in particular regardingthe supply of software for digitaltelevision set-top boxes in theUnited Kingdom.

The cable industry in the UK ishighly concentrated, the mainoperators being NTL andTelewest. There are already linksbetween NTL and Microsoft thatcould give Microsoft influenceover the technology decisions ofNTL. If Microsoft had acquiredjoint control over Telewest, itcould then have been able todetermine the technologydecisions of the emerging digitalcable industry in the UnitedKingdom. This could havesubstantially reduced thetechnological alternativesavailable to customers and led topotentially higher prices forhouseholds, which are expectedto embrace digital TV as themain means to access theInternet and e-commerce.

Digital TV is likely to becomethe most widespread means forconsumers to accessentertainment, education, newsand e-commerce as well asdigital TV programmes. Cableoperators will offer consumers afull range of advancedbroadband communicationsservices considered vital to thedeveloping Information Societyin Europe. In this emergingmarket, the Commissionconsiders it essential to preventthe creation of bottlenecks in anyof the areas of supply.

Following the Commission'sstatement of objections,expressed in a formal statementin May, Microsoft informed theCommission that while keepingits 23,7% in Telewest, it isbreaking all structural links withLiberty Media and giving up anyrights which would have given itdecisive influence over decisionsat Telewest. As a result of thismodification, Microsoftrelinquished legal control overTelewest and its interest in thecompany became a minority one.

Conditional clearances afterphase I (pursuant Articles6.1(b) and 6.2)

BASF / American Cyanamid

The acquisition of AmericanCyanamid, the crop protectionsubsidiary of American HomeProducts, will create the thirdlargest crop protection companyworldwide. The deal raisedserious competition concerns incertain herbicide and fungicidemarkets, but BASF proposed

undertakings which willguarantee healthy competitionand protect consumers' interests.

The transaction concerns theproduction, distribution and saleof crop protection products. Theparties have overlappingactivities in herbicides,fungicides, insecticides, soilfumigants and plant growthregulators. For all these productsthe geographic markets havebeen regarded as nationalbecause the sale of plantprotection products is stilldetermined by different nationaladministrative procedures withregard to registrations. Inaddition, competitors' marketshares and prices of competingproducts differ widely betweenMember States.

The commitments cover theproducts' trademarks forcommercialisation, access toregistration, know-how andsupply agreements entered withthe licensee for its needs withrespect to the supply of theproduct if so wished by thepurchaser.

These undertakings willeliminate the overlap ormaterially reduce the marketshares of the merged entity ineach of the markets wherecompetition concerns wereidentified by the Commission.

Glaxo Wellcome / SmithKlineBeecham and Pfizer /Warner-Lambert

Resulting from the mergerbetween Glaxo Wellcome and

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SmithKline Beecham, the newcompany, Glaxo SmithKline,will be the world's biggestpharmaceuticals firm with 7.3%of global sales. The deal raisedconcerns about creation of adominant position in severaltreatment areas, but the partiesoffered a comprehensivepackage of commitments.Serious doubts arose in a numberof key treatment areas for humanpharmaceuticals where the newentity would have achieved veryhigh market shares, up to almost100%, in three markets: anti-virals, excluding anti-HIV (J5B),topical anti-virals (D6D) andanti-emetics (A4A). Seriousdoubts arose also incephalosporins (J1D) in Spain.Moreover, the Commission'sinvestigation showed that theparties' position in the asthma(COPD) treatment area could befurther strengthened due to theirpipeline compounds. Theremedies which eliminated orsignificantly reduced the overlapcreated by the proposedoperation in these marketsconsisted of divestments bymeans of a licensing agreementand outlicensing.

The approval of the mergerbetween US-based pharmaceu-tical companies Pfizer Inc andWarner-Lambert Inc creatingone of the major globalpharmaceutical companies withtotal revenues of US $ 27.7billion was also made possibleafter the companies addressedthe Commission's competitionconcerns in a number oftreatment areas. There were threeproduct markets for human

pharmaceuticals where themerged entity, to be called PfizerInc, would have achieved veryhigh market shares. Those areanti-Alzheimer products (N7D)in Austria, Belgium, Finland,Greece, Luxembourg, Spain andSweden; calcium antagonists(C8A) in Austria; andantihelmintics, excludingschistomicides (P1B), inGermany and Austria. For eachof these products the partiescommitted to divesting of assetsand outlicensing removing theentire overlap.

European Aeronautic, Spaceand Defence Company (EADS)

The Commission conditionallyauthorised the proposed creationof EADS, to which Germancompany DaimlerChrysler AG,France's Lagardère SCA, theFrench State and the Spanishcompany Sociedad Estatal deParticipationes Industriales(SEPI) have contributed theiractivities in the aeronautic,telecommunications, space anddefence sectors.

As regards large commercialaircraft and defence markets theoperation did not appear to raiseconcerns. On the primecontractor level of largecommercial aircraft theconditions of competition remainunchanged as BAe Systemsmaintains its veto rights vis-à-visall strategic decisions at theEuropean Airbus consortium andthere is no indication that theoperation would create adominant position on theupstream equipment markets. In

defence programme markets theparties will remain subject to theimportant countervailing buyingpower of national Ministries ofDefence, and in defence exportmarkets competition appears totake place at worldwide levelwhere the parties will remainsubject to the competition fromlarger and especially USA-baseddefence contractors such asLockheed-Martin, Raytheon orBoeing.

By contrast, the contribution ofCASA's space activities raisedcompetition issues in twosatellite equipment markets:central tubes, around whichsatellites are assembled, andantenna reflectors, a componentof the antennas used primarily incommunication satellites forcommercial and military use.Aérospatiale-Matra Lanceurs("AML"), a subsidiary ofAérospatiale Matra, is the mainEuropean producer of theseproducts, with market shares inthe order of 70% in certainsegments, and there areindications that CASA is thenext best alternative to AML.There was, therefore, a risk thatthe operation would create adominant position in these twomarkets. Furthermore, theCommission also identifiedcompetition concerns in thesupply of militarycommunication satellites inFrance. This is because, in thismarket, i) competition isrestricted to Matra MarconiSpace, a subsidiary of Matra andMarconi, and Alcatel SpaceIndustries; ii) Alcatel SpaceIndustries procures central tubes

➣ MERGERS


and antenna reflectors from theparties; and (iii) in view of theconsequences of the transactionin central tubes and antennareflectors, there were risks thatAlcatel Space will not be able tocompetitively source theseproducts any longer. It wastherefore feared that the mergedentity would be in a position toforeclose the market to AlcatelSpace Industries and thereforebecome the only supplier of theFrench Ministry of Defence.

In order to remove thosecompetition concerns, the partiesoffered commitments consistingin the divestment byAérospatiale-Matra Lanceurs oftwo packages which will enabletheir purchaser(s) toindependently and viably design,manufacture and sell antennareflectors and central tubes forsatellites. This divestmentpackage included the relevantintellectual property rights, thetransfer of employees or, at thepurchaser's option, the provisionof technical assistance anddedicated tools.

France Telecom / Orange

After the Commission hadapproved Vodafone Airtouch'sacquisition of Germany'sMannesmann in April, subject tothe divestment of Orange, so asto remove competition concernsarising from overlaps in theBelgian and United Kingdommarkets for mobile telecommu-nication services FranceTelecom subsequently agreed tobuy Orange. This newtransaction gave rise to

horizontal overlaps in the marketfor mobile telecommunicationservices in Belgium, whereFrance Telecom is present via itssubsidiary Mobistar and Orangealso has a joint venture withKPN, called KPN Orange. Thisoverlap would have given FranceTelecom a combined marketshare of over 30% on theBelgian mobile phone market.The deal would have led to theabsorption of the third mobileoperator in Belgium leavingProximus and Mobistar as theonly two competitors on themarket. To prevent the creationof a duopoly on the Belgianmarket, France Telecom/Orangeoffered to divest their interest inthe KPN Orange joint venture toan independent third party.

Vodafone / Vivendi / Canal+ :Vizzavi Internet portal jointventure

Regulatory clearance for thecreation of the Vizzavi Internetportal joint venture betweenVodafone, Vivendi and Canal+was made possible after thecompanies submittedcommitments to ensure rivalInternet portals would haveequal access to the parentcompanies' set top boxes andmobile handsets.The Commission's investigationconcluded that the joint venturewould have led to competitiveconcerns in the developingnational markets for TV-basedinternet portals and developingnational and pan-Europeanmarkets for mobile phone basedinternet portals. In order toaddress these competitive

concerns identified by theCommission, the partiesprovided undertakings to ensurethat the default portal could bechanged, should the consumer sowish. The undertakings willallow consumers to access thirdparty portals, to change thedefault portal themselves, or toauthorise a third party portaloperator to change the defaultsetting for them.

The decision ensures that thecurrent competitive model ofinternet services whereconsumers can choose theircontent provider independentlyof their access provider is carriedover into the developing marketsof Internet provision via mobilephones and televisions.

Siemens / Dematic / VDO /Sachs

This case which receivedconditional clearance in phase Iis to be seen in the context ofcase Bosch / Rexroth, in whichthe Commission initiated in-depth Phase II proceedings on29.08.2000. It will be discussedtogether with Bosch / Rexroth asubsequent issue of theCompetition Policy Newsletter.

Metsä-Serla / Modo Paperand SCA Packaging / MetsäCorrugated

The proposed acquisition byFinnish-based company Metsä-Serla Corp. of sole control ofSwedish-based company ModoPaper AB raised concerns aboutthe reduction of the number ofpaper merchants in Sweden to

➣ MERGERS


only two major players as aresult of the merger(the otherone, Papyrus Merchants, beingowned by Stora / Enso), butMetsä-Serla offered to sell itsbusiness Grafiskt Papper, thusre-establishing a healthycompetitive environment.

The operation by which theSwedish based company SCAPackaging, a wholly ownedsubsidiary of Svenska CellulosaAB, acquired sole control ofMetsä Corrugated currently partof the Finnish group Metsä Serlagave rise to competitionconcerns in Denmark where thenew combined company wouldhave had a very high marketshare for corrugated boxes. Inorder to solve these doubts, SCAmodified the originalconcentration by undertaking todispose of the Neopak business(ex Metsä) and two box makingoperations (ex SCA Packaging)to a viable competitor. TheCommission accordinglydeclared the operationcompatible with the commonmarket and the EEA Agreement.

Preussag / Thomson

The acquisition by Germancompany Preussag AG of UKtravel company Thomson TravelGroup Plc raised seriousconcerns about the creation of acollective dominant position inthe UK market for short-haulforeign package holidays.Preussag is a conglomerate withstrong interests in the travelsector through its ownership ofGerman travel company TUI andits joint control, together with

WestLB and the Carlson group,of UK travel company ThomasCook Holdings Ltd. The UKmarket is characterised by asignificant degree of verticalintegration. The main domesticoperators, including Thomsonand Thomas Cook, are active intour operating, travel agenciesand charter airline services, andhave extensive commercial linkswith each other. Preussagcommitted itself to divest itsinterest in Thomas Cook.German bank WestdeutscheLandesbank (WestLB), whichhas links with Preussag, will alsosell its stake in Thomas Cook.These undertakings alsomaintain competition in Ireland.

The Commission's decision toclear the operation subject to thesale of Thomas Cook isconsistent with its prohibition,last year, of the proposedacquisition by UK traveloperator Airtours of domesticrival First Choice on the groundsthat it would have left only threebig travel operators in the UKmarket, the merged entity plusThomson Travel and ThomasCook.

Rexam / American NationalCan

The proposed acquisition ofbeverage can producer AmericanNational Can by UK-basedRexam Plc, a consumerpackaging group raised someconcerns as to the creation ofdominant positions in tworegional geographic markets,namely in Northern and inSouthern Europe. Before the

merger, there were four majorbeverage cans producers in theEU: Rexam, American Can,Continental Can and CarnaudMetalBox.

In Northern Europe, the mergerwould have created a duopolybetween Rexam/ANC andContinental Can, which togetherwould have accounted for 80%of the market, with symmetricalmarket shares, cost structures,capacity and excess capacity.Anti-competitive co-ordinatedbehaviour would then havebecome possible in this marketwhich is characterised by a flatgrowth trend, producthomogeneity and transparency,the lack of technological changeand a capacity-constrained thirdsupplier.

In order to remedy theseconcerns, the merging partieshave proposed to divest two oftheir plants serving the NorthernEuropean market to anindependent third party. As aresult, the symmetry in capacityand in excess capacity will beeliminated and parallelbehaviour through tacit co-ordination between the twoleading suppliers will not besustainable in the long run.

In Southern Europe, where themerged entity would havebecome the dominant supplier,the companies have alsoproposed to divest one plant.This undertaking eliminated thecompetitive overlap and restoredthe situation prevailing beforethe merger in this geographicarea.

➣ MERGERS


Sara Lee / Courtaulds

The Commission conditionallyapproved the acquisition ofCourtaulds Textiles Plc by SaraLee. The deal would havecreated competition concernsinthe hosiery market in France,where the companies own thetwo largest brands, Dim andWell, giving them a combinedmarket share in value termsnearly nine times larger than itsclosest competitor (Le Bourget).Sara Lee's commitment to divestTextiles Well SA, i.e. the Wellbrand and the associatedmanufacturing site of Le Viganin France, removed this concern,and the merger was allowed toproceed on this basis

Nabisco / United Biscuits

This was the second time thisyear the Commission has had torule on a take-over bid involvingUB. It was a collective bidinvolving Finalrealm, theacquiring vehicle formed byNabisco, US investmentcompany Hicks, Muse, Tate andFurst (HMTF), venture capitalfirms Cinven and PAI and asubsidiary of Deutsche Bank.

The deal posed competitionproblems because of the additionof The Horizon BiscuitCompany Ltd, another biscuitmaker owned by HMTF. In theUK, the largest of the affectedmarkets, the combination of UBand Horizon would have createdconcerns as regards bothproducer-branded and retailer-branded biscuits. These concernswere resolved when the deal was

modified so as to excludeHorizon from the operation viathe sale of HMTF's minorityshareholding in Finalrealm to theother financial investorsinvolved in the deal.

The Commission carried out itsinvestigation in close liaisonwith the UK competitionauthorities.

Volvo / Renault VehiculesIndustriels128

With regard to the acquisition byVolvo of Renault VehiculesIndustriels ("RVI") one mainconcern was that following theprohibition of the proposedmerger between Volvo andScania, Volvo has remained asignificant shareholder in Scania.Similarly, RVI has, through theIrisbus joint venture, been linkedto Iveco (of the Fiat group) inthe production and sales ofbuses. However, in the contextof the RVI acquisition, theparties have committed toremove these links to Scania andIveco within a specifictimeframe. In addition, theparties have also undertaken toeliminate the overlap in bus

128 This decision, although taken on

1.9.2000 (one day after the end ofthe review period covered in thisarticle), is nevertheless includedhere as it is to be viewed in thecontext of the prohibition decisionin Case No. COMP/M.1672Volvo/Scania of15.03.2000.(Decision publishedon the Internet. See DanSjöblom�s article in CompetitionPolicy Newsletter 2/2000.)

activities in France created bythe operation.

In Finland, Volvo would havereached a combined marketshare of 55% for heavy trucks.However, RVI is primarilyactive through an extensive co-operation with Oy Sisu AB("Sisu"), a national truckproducer with which itestablished a joint venturecompany RS Hansa Auto OY("Hansa"). Following acommitment, RVI's share ofHansa will be sold within aspecific timeframe. Thisundertaking solves thecompetition concerns on theFinnish market for heavy trucks.The merged entity will remainsubject to effective competitionfrom several well-establishedcompetitors in all othermarkets.129

Article 9 referral

Interbrew/Bass

Between May and August, theCommission referred one case toa Member State under theArticle 9 procedures. This wasthe referral of the proposedacquisition by the Belgiancompany Interbrew SA of thebrewing and distribution assets

129 For example, in France, RVI has

been losing market share since1994. The main beneficiary of thishas been DAF, which has tripledits market share in that period. Atpresent all the other Europeantruck producers are present inFrance and achieve substantialsales ranging from 6 to 16%.

➣ MERGERS


currently owned by the Britishcompany Bass. Earlier in theyear, Interbrew had acquiredWhitbread�s brewing assets, andat the time the decision to referthe case was taken, the UKauthorities� investigation intothis acquisition was stillunderway. Both Interbrew andBass are therefore active in thesupply of beer in the UK.

In its request for the case to bereferred, the UK identified anumber of markets within theUK for the supply of beer inwhich the conditions for referralwere met. They considered thatthese markets were no largerthan national, and that thecombined strength of Interbrew

and Scottish and Newcastlecould give rise to the risk of aharmful duopolistic outcome.After undertaking its owninvestigation, the Commissionagreed with the UK�s analysis.

Two further facts led theCommission to exercise itsdiscretion to refer the case to theUK. Firstly, the UK authoritieswere already investigatingInterbrew�s acquisition ofWhitbread�s brewing interests.Secondly, the UK authoritieshave the benefit of a number ofrecent investigations into the UKbeer industry, the most recent ofwhich is the OFT�s review of theBeer Orders. The Commissiontherefore considered that the UK

is best-placed to carry out thenecessary further examination ofthe case. The UK now has untilJanuary 2001 to conclude itsinvestigation.

The referral to the UKauthorities only related to thoseparts of the deal which affectedthe UK beer sector. Separately,the Commission cleared thoseparts of the deal which relate tothe supply of beer outside theUK, and to the supply ofFlavoured Alcoholic Beveragesboth in the UK and elsewhere asno competition considerationsarose as a result of the merger inthose markets.

STATE AID


Prolongation of theCommunity Framework forState aid in the motor vehicleindustry until the end of 2001.

Background

The Commission introduced aCommunity framework for Stateaid to the motor vehicle industryin 1989, with the twofold aim ofincreasing the transparency ofaid flows and imposing strictdiscipline in the granting of suchaid in order to reduce distortionsof competition in theCommunity industry to aminimum. Various features ofthe industry, such as its majorsignificance from anemployment, trade andtechnological development pointof view, but also the emergenceof overcapacity, made such aframework essential.

Since 1989, successiveframeworks have beenpublished. The currentframework130 came into force on1 January 1998 for a period ofthree years. It foresees that, atthe end of that period, theCommission should decidewhether to extend it, in particularin the light of the experiencewith the application of themultisectoral framework.

130 OJ C 279, 15.9.1997, p. 1.

Aid under the motor vehicleframework

Scope of the framework

The Community framework forState aid to the motor vehicleindustry applies to projects,involving the development,manufacture and assembly of�motor vehicles, �engines� and�modules and subsystems� eitherdirect by a manufacturer or,under certain circumstances, bya first-tier component supplier.

All aid which public authoritiesplan to grant under authorisedaid schemes must be notified ifeither the nominal amount of thetotal investment costs reaches €50 million or if the total grossaid of the project amounts to atleast € 5 million. All aid grantedad hoc outside an approvedscheme as well as any rescue andrestructuring aid must be notifiedin advance unless it complieswith the thresholds and rules ofthe Commission notice on the deminimis rule for state aid131 (€100000 over 3 years).

The framework does not onlyapply to projects within theCommunity. It follows from theEurope Agreements, that thestate aid authorities in the CEEC

131 OJ C68, 6.3.1996

should apply the framework aswell when assessing an aidproject in this sector.

Notified aid measures in themotor vehicle sector mainlyinvolve regional aid. From allcases notified under the presentframework between 1998 and2000, 15 projects involvedregional aid, whereas one projectinvolved training aid, oneinvolved environmental aid andone involved R&D aid.

Regional aid

The motor vehicle industry maybenefit from regional aid toassist new plants and theextension of existing ones in theassisted areas of the Community,thus making a contribution toregional development. Howeverthe Commission has to comparethe advantages from thestandpoint of regionaldevelopment with anyunfavourable consequences forthe sector as a whole. Thepurpose of the comparison is toensure that other factorsaffecting the Community, suchas respect for fair competitionand overcapacity, are also takeninto consideration.

Before the Commission canauthorise regional aid in favourof a car manufacturer, it has toconduct an analysis, whichconcentrates on the followingissues:� Necessity of the aid: The aid

recipient must clearly provethat it has an economicallyviable alternative location forits project. The existence of a

Main developments between 1st Juneand 30th September 2000

Madeleine TILMANS, DG COMP-G-01

➣ STATE AID


viable alternative defines the�mobility� of the project. Ifthere were no other industrialsite, whether new or inexistence, capable ofreceiving the investment inquestion within the group, theundertaking would becompelled to carry out itsproject in the sole plantavailable, even in the absenceof aid. In such a case regionalaid is not necessary.Therefore, no regional aidmay be authorised for aproject that is notgeographically mobile. Inaddition, regional aidintended for modernisationand rationalisation, which isgenerally not mobile, is notauthorised in the motorvehicle industry.

� Eligibility of the costs: TheCommission determineswhether or not costs relatingto the mobile aspects of aproject are eligible under theregional scheme applicable inthe assisted area concerned.

� Proportionality of the aid: Toassess whether proposed aidis in proportion to theregional problems it isintended to help resolve, theCommission uses a cost-benefit analysis. A cost-benefit analysis compares thecosts which an investorwould bear in order to carryout the project in the regionin question with those itwould bear for an identicalproject in a differentlocation, which makes itpossible to determine thespecific handicaps of theassisted region concerned.

The Commission authorisesregional aid within the limitof the regional handicapsresulting from the investmentin the comparator plant.

� Analysis of the effects on theindustry and on competition:The Commission finallystudies the effects oncompetition of everyinvestment project, looking inparticular at variations inproduction capacity at grouplevel on the relevant market.For instance, if capacities areincreased, the allowable aidintensity is reduced. In anycase, the aid may not exceedthe regional ceiling in theassisted region concerned.

Other aid

Rescue and restructuring aid tothe car sector is assessed underthe guidelines on State aid forrescuing and restructuring firmsin difficulty (OJ, C288,09.10.1999). The Commissionusually requires a reduction ininstalled capacity in proportionto the aid intensity. Rescue andrestructuring aid that leads to acapacity increase will beprohibited.

R&D aid will be assessed underthe Community framework forstate aid for research anddevelopment (OJ, C45,17.02.1996), aid forenvironmental protection andenergy saving under theCommunity guidelines on Stateaid for environmental protection(OJ C72, 10.03.1994) and aid tovocational training underCommunity framework for

training aid (OJ C343,11.11.1998). In addition,investment aid for innovationmay be authorised in dulyjustified cases, as an incentive toindustrial or technological risktaking.

No aid, however, may be grantedto companies in the motorvehicle industry formodernisation or rationalisation,as this would present a very highrisk of distortion of competitionand should normally be financedfrom the company�s own funds.In addition, no new operating aidwill be authorised by theCommission, even in assistedareas.

Possible future options

The Commission has beenconsidering different options forassessing state aid in the motorvehicle sector, particularly in thelight of the existing multisectoralframework on regional aid orlarge investment projects.132

This framework aims atreducing, for large scaleinvestment projects, thecompetition distorting effects ofregional state aid by loweringthe permissible aid ceilingcompared with the maximum aidintensity authorised in the regionconcerned. This extent of thereduction depends on the capital-labour ratio of the project, thedegree of competition in the

132 Multisectoral framework on

regional aid for large investmentprojects (OJ C 107, 7.4.1998,p. 7).

➣ STATE AID


relevant market and the impacton regional development.

The multisectoral frameworkwas adopted by the Commissionwith a view to the broaderobjective of ultimately replacingthe various existing sectoralrules on state aid by a singleapproach to regional state aid,regardless of the sector involved.The multisectoral frameworkbecame applicable from1 September 1998 for an initialtrial period of three years andforesees that the Commission,before the end of the this period,will carry out a thorough reviewof the utility and scope of theframework, which will inter aliaconsider the question of whetherit should be renewed, revised orabolished.

The Commission has inparticular identified thefollowing possibilities whenconsidering the future state aidrules in the motor vehicle sector:(i) ending the specific rules for

control of aid to theindustry, while adapting themultisectoral framework asappropriate (e.g. as regardsnotification thresholds; aidceilings);

(ii) revising/renewing theexisting framework for aperiod to be determined.

Extension of the presentframework until 31.12.2001133

In view of the fact that anassessment of the functioning of

133 OJ C 258/6, 09.09.2000

the multisectoral framework isnot foreseen until the end of itsperiod of validity in August2001, the Commissionconsidered that an extension ofthe current motor vehicleframework of one year would beappropriate. The Commissiontook the view that there was noneed to alter profoundly the wayin which the Commissionscrutinises motor industry stateaid cases during this extensionperiod.

At its meeting on 31 May, theCommission accordinglydecided to extend the presentCommunity framework for stateaid to the motor vehicle industryby a period of one year, subjectto a few technical adjustments tobring the framework up to date.At the same meeting, theCommission decided to propose,in the form of an appropriatemeasure within the meaning ofArticle 88(1) of the EC Treaty,that the Member States complywith the rules of the frameworkresulting from the extension. TheCommission asked Memberstates to agree to this proposal.

United Kigdom - TheCommission authorizes aid forprivate investors participatingin the creation of the HighTechnology Fund which isaimed at encourage riskcapital investments for earlystage enterprises in hightechnology sectors.

On 12 July, the EuropeanCommission authorised thecreation by the UK authorities ofa fund to encourage risk capitalinvestments in early stageenterprises in high technologysectors. Under the measure, theUK authorities will contribute 20million pounds sterling (€31million) to the fund which willalso include other investors. Theother investors will participateon more favourable terms thanthe authorities, which brings themeasure within the definition ofstate aid. The fund will thentake minority stakes in venturecapital funds focussed on earlystage high technologycompanies, on the same terms asother investors. The measureincludes several features which,taken together, allowed theCommission to decide that themeasure would not undulydistort competition. Inparticular, the UK took stepswhich should ensure that the aidand the distortion of competitionare the minimum necessary toachieve the objective.

Following an analysis of whyinstitutional investors were notmaking investments in this typeof fund, the UK launched anopen call for tender for theselection of a fund manager. The

➣ STATE AID


fund manager, who will operateindependently, will have animportant incentive to optimisethe performance of the fund.Because the UK HighTechnology Fund�s investmentsin individual funds will be onidentical terms to those of otherinvestors, they can be held torespect the �market economyinvestor principle�. Theinvestment decisions of thesefunds will be taken oncommercial terms and can alsobe held to respect the principle.The Commission normallyconsiders that such investmentsdo not represent state aid to therecipient of the funds.

Nouvelles Décisions sur lescartes des aides à finalitérégionale pour la période 2000-2006.

Le processus d'examen etd'approbation des "cartes"notifiées par les Etats membrespour l'octroi d'aides à finalitérégionale s'est terminé enseptembre par l'adoption de lacarte pour la Belgique et unedécision positive en ce quiconcerne les aspects de la "carte"italienne qui avaient fait l'objetd'une procédure au titre del'article 88 § 2 du traité CE. Aucours des quatre derniers mois,la Commission a approuvé lesprojets de cartes qui lui avaientété soumis par la Belgique, leLuxembourg, les Pays-Bas et leRoyaume-Uni. Quant à l'Italie etau Portugal, leurs cartesrespectives sont désormais

entièrement approuvées par laCommission qui avait déjàprécédemment donné son accorden ce qui concerne les zonesrelatives à la dérogation prévue àl'article 87 § 3 a) du traité CE.

Belgique, Luxembourg et Pays-Bas

On 12 July, 19 July and 20September, the Commissionaproved the regional aid map forthe period 2000-2006 forLuxembourg and for Belgiumrespectively. These mapsdetermine the regions eligible foraid under the derogationforeseen under Article 87(3)(c)of the EC Treaty. The Dutchregional aid map covers 15% ofthe total population of thecountry. In Luxembourg, 32.0%of the national population iscovered, in Belgium 30.9%.

Each of the three map is definedusing NUTS V as the basicgeographical unit. TheCommission accepted thejustification for the use of NUTSV provided by the respectivenational authorities. Moreover,the Commission was satisfiedthat the population coverage ofthe regional aid map was inlinewith its coverage of economicavtivities and that each of theregions proposed was compact,as required by the regional aidguidelines134.

The average regional aidintensity ceiling established inthe three nw aid maps is lowerthan the average ceiling 134 OJ C 74, 10.03.1998, p. 9.

applicable prior to 1 January2000 in each of the threeMember States. In Luxembourg,the aid intensity ceiling for largeenterprises is reduced to 10%nge. In the Netherlands andBelgium the average aidintensity for large enterprises islimited to 16.0% nge and 15.6%nge respectively.

Par ailleurs, en ce qui concernele Luxembourg, le 19 juillet, laCommission a égalementautorisé la mise en applicationdu régime d'aides régionales àl'investissement projeté par lesautorités luxembourgeoises aprèsavoir conclu qu'il s'inscrivaitdans les limites de la "carte"qu'elle avait approuvée et qu'ilrespectait les prescriptions deslignes directrices pour les aides àfinalité régionale.

Portugal

En décembre 1999, laCommission avait décidéd�ouvrir la procédure prévue àl�article 88 § 2 du traité CE àl�égard de la proposition qui luiavait été soumise par lesautorités portugaises en ce quiconcerne la région NUTS II«Lisboa e Vale do Tejo», qui estune «région 87 § 3 a) sortante»et qui devient éligible aubénéfice de l�article 87 § 3 c). Lepoint 5.7 des lignes directricesconcernant les aides d�Etat àfinalité régionale prévoit pour leszones perdant leur statut de"zone 87 § 3 a)", la possibilitéd'autoriser une périodetransitoire de 4 ans maximumpour l'adaptation des intensitésd'aides maximales dont elles

➣ STATE AID


avaient bénéficié jusqu�au31.12.1999, une certainelimitation de la couvertureterritoriale devant cependant êtrerespectée. Or, la notificationportugaise proposait de fairebénéficier de ladite période detransition l�entièreté de cetterégion alors qu'elle représente33,4% de la populationnationale, de ladite. Cela nepouvait pas être justifié auregard des lignes directrices etétait donc incompatible avec lemarché commun.

Dans le cadre de la procédureformelle d�examen, les autoritésportugaises ont procédé à unemodification de leur notificationoriginale, ce qui a permis à laCommission d�approuver, le 28juin dernier, cette partie de lacarte portugaise. En particulier,selon leur nouvelle proposition,seules les quatre régions deniveau III de la NUTS «Lezíriado Tejo», «Médio Tejo»,«Oeste» et «Península deSetúbal», qui représentent 14,9%de la population nationale etdont le PIB par habitant se situeentre 55% et 58% de la moyennecommunautaire, bénéficieront dela période de transitionsusmentionnée. En revanche, larégion «Grande Lisbonne»(18,5% de la population) en estexclue.

Puisque la Commission avaitdéjà décidé, en décembre 1999,que toutes les autres régionsportugaises étaient admissiblesau titre de l�article 87 § 3 a) duTraité, les deux décisionsforment ensemble la carte des

aides régionales applicable auPortugal.

Royaume-Uni

Le 26 juillet, la Commission adécidé d'approuver la "carte" desaides à finalité régionale que leRoyaume-Uni lui avait notifiéeen mai dernier pour la période2000-2006. En application decelle-ci, 28,7 % de la populationde la Grande-Bretagne et latotalité de celle d'Irlande duNord vivent dans des régionséligibles au bénéfice d'aides àfinalité régionale. Les tauxd'aides autorisés vont de 10 à35 % en équivalent-subventionnet, à l'exception de l'Irlande duNord où ils peuvent atteindre40 %.

Italy - The Commissiondecides to authorize aninvestment aid to the firm"Villa Romana s.r.l." for thebuilding of a hotel complexnear Pompei.

�Villa Romana� is a hotelfacilities project. The aid wasnotified in the context of the�contratto d�area [territorialcontract] Torrese-Stabiese�(Campania)135, under theconditions laid down in theMultisectoral Framework for

135 The latter is based on the

protocol of agreementconcluded between theemployers� organisation andthe trade unions.

large investment projects inassisted areas. It consists ofinvestment aid granted in theform of a non-reimboursablegrant amounting to 38,39 millionEuros, to be disbursed over 3years. The aid intensity, ascalculated according to the fourfactors laid down in theMultisectoral Framework, is56,67% NGE, which had to belowered to the regional ceilingfor Campania which - for anSME such as �Villa Romanas.r.l.� - is 50,38% NGE.

The hotel complex will be builtnear the archaelogical site ofPompei-Ercolano and have acapacity of 838 beds (438rooms). The project will createaround 480 new jobs, bothdirectly (219) and indirectly(262).

On the basis of the evidencesupplied by the Italianauthorities, the Commissiondecided to consider theprovinces of Naples and Salernoas the relevant geographicmarket.

The relevant product market is�Hotels and motels, withrestaurant� (NACE Code 55.11).The project aims at filling theexisting gap in the supply of �4-stars +� hotel category in theinterested area. The hotel lookssignificant by its size, but itwould just allow to intercept62% of the excess demand in therelevant geographic market.

Over the years from 1994 to1997, Campania witnessed asteady increase in the presence

➣ STATE AID


of both foreign tourists(+10,18% on average) anddomestic (+2,98%) visitors. Thistrend is likely to continue oreven accelerate in the years1999-2000. Moreover, there is asituation of permanent trafficcongestion between Pompei andthe Penisola Sorrentina � whichprevents a 100% substitutabilitybetween adjacent hotel clusters.On the other hand, the supply ofbedrooms of a comfort level inthe area is extremely limited.

Therefore, the new 4-stars hotelis not likely to affect the intra-EU exchanges to an extentwhich is incompatible with thecompetition conditions in theinternal market, as its impact islikely to be limited to the localtourist basin, which has at itscore the archaëlogical site ofPompei-Ercolano, the Vesuvianarea and the Penisola Sorrentina.The Commission hasaccordingly decided to raise noobjections to the aid in question.

Sweden - Commissionapproves State aid to improvethe indoor environment inbuildings for reasons of publichealth

On 12 July 2000 theCommission decided to close theArticle 88(2) procedure with apositive decision in respect of anaid scheme intended to reducethe presence of allergenicsubstances or other materials thatconstitute health hazards inbuildings.

The measure is an amendment toan environmental investment aidscheme that runs until the end of2001. The new aid may forexample be granted for theconversion of insufficientventilation systems orelimination of excessivehumidity or mould and radon.Conversions that do not havehealth or environmental effects,such as changing the plan of thebuilding are not eligible for aid,nor are measures carried out dueto legal requirements (unlessthey go further than required).About SEK 50 million (about 6million Euro) are expected to beused for the new grants.

The Commission initially haddoubts with regard to theCommunity objective on thebasis of which to accept the aid.It therefore opened the procedureunder Article 88(2) of the ECTreaty. The investigation led tothe conclusion that theCommunity guidelines on Stateaid for environmental protection,on which the original approvalof the scheme was based, couldnot be applied on this measure.As the scheme will contribute toimproving public health ingeneral, including the health andsafety of workers, theCommission closed theprocedure with a positivedecision based on the provisionsof the Treaty on the health andsafety of workers as well aspublic health and environmentalprotection in general (Articles137, 152 and 174 of the ECTreaty, respectively), which arerecognised Communityobjectives.

Portugal - La Commissionouvre la procédure au titre del'article 88 § 2 du traité CE àl'égard du régime d'aidesfinancières et fiscales existantdans la zone franche deMadère étant donné que lesmesures utiles destinées à lerendre compatible avec lesréglementations communau-taires n'ont toujours pas étémises en application par lesautorités portugaises.

La Commission a autorisé en1987, pour une période initialede trois ans, un régime d�aidesfinancières et fiscales dans lazone franche de Madère. Uneprolongation de ce régime pourdes périodes additionnelles derespectivement trois et cinq ans aensuite été autorisée par laCommission à deux reprises.Selon la dernière décision de laCommission y relative, des aidesau fonctionnement pourraientêtre accordées aux entreprisesindustrielles, financières et deservices qui s�installeraient dansla zone franche jusqu�au31.12.2000. En particulier, cesentreprises pourraient bénéficierd�une exonération totaled�impôts directs jusqu�à fin2011, date à partir de laquellecette exonération deviendraitpartielle.

Entre-temps, suite à l�adoptiondes lignes directrices concernantles aides d�Etat à finalitérégionale, la Commission aproposé à tous les Etats membresde modifier les régimes d�aides àfinalité régionale existants quiseraient encore en vigueur le 1erjanvier 2000 afin de les rendre

➣ STATE AID


compatibles avec les dispositionsdes lignes directrices à partir decette date. Or, ces lignesdirectrices consacrent le principede l�interdiction des aides aufonctionnement, tout enadmettant des exceptions dansles régions bénéficiant de ladérogation prévue à l'article87 § 3 a) du Traité, à conditionqu'elles soient justifiées enfonction de leur contribution audéveloppement régional et queleur niveau soit proportionnelaux handicaps qu'elles visent àpallier. En outre, ces aides aufonctionnement doivent êtrelimitées dans le temps etdégressives.

Bien qu'elles aient accepté lesmesures utiles qui leur ont étéproposées par la Commission,les autorités portugaises n�onttoujours pas apporté au régimeen cause toutes les modificationsnécessaires pour le rendrecompatible avec les lignesdirectrices concernant les aidesd�Etat à finalité régionale. Parconséquent, la Commission adécidé d�ouvrir la procédured'examen prévue à l�article 88§2du Traité à son encontre.

United Kingdom - Commissioninvestigates aid involved in theViridian Growth Fund, aventure capital fund located inNorthern Ireland.

On 26 July, the Commissiondecided to open the Article 88(2)EC procedure regarding aidinvolved in a new venture capital

fund in Northern Ireland calledthe Viridian Growth Fund. Theenquiry will enable theCommission to determinewhether the aid is compatiblewith the common market.

The UK authorities had notifiedto the Commission an aidscheme linked to the setting upand operations of the ViridianGrowth Fund LP in September1999. Additional informationwas supplied in January, Marchand June 2000.

The Fund will have capital in atotal of £10 million. The purposeof the ₤ 10 million Fund is toaddress perceived gaps in theprovision of venture capital tosmall and medium-sizedenterprises in Northern Ireland.Partners in the Fund are theDepartment of Enterprise Trade& Investment (DETI - ₤ 3.34million), the EuropeanInvestment Bank (₤ 3.33million), the electricity supplierViridian Group Plc (₤ 2 million)and a number of pension funds(₤ 1.33 million).

There are important differencesin the terms of investmentbetween DETI and the otherinvestors. Finance is graduallydrawn down into the fund over aperiod of five years. In the firstpart of this period finance ismainly provided by the DETI,thereafter, with the public sectorcommitment fully invested, theremaining drawdowns comefrom the other investors. Monieswill be initially returned to theprivate investors, until they haverealised a full return of their

investment plus a return of 10%a year. It is only thereafter thatany further realisations from theportfolio will be made to thepublic sector.

At this stage the Commissionconsiders that the proposedscheme involves aid to theprivate investors of the Fund andto the recipient SMEs that fallsunder Article 87(1) EC andArticle 61(1) of the EEAAgreement in so far as it maydistort competition and affecttrade between Member States.The Commission is alsoconsidering whether the limitedpartnership, which is the vehiclefor the Fund�s operation, shouldalso be considered to be anundertaking which is abeneficiary of the aid.

The Commission has assessedwhether one of the exemptionsprovided for in Article 87 ECcan apply to the aid.

It notes, first, that the aid toSMEs involved does not, on thebasis of the information at hand,meet the conditions set out in theCommunity guidelines on Stateaid for small and medium-sizedenterprises (OJ C 213,23.7.1996, p.4), the Guidelinesfor national regional aid (OJ C74, 10.3.1998, p. 9) or in anyother of the Commission�scommunications and frame-works, and may assimilate to so-called operating aid.

Operating aid can only beallowed in regions qualifying foran exemption under Article87(3)(a) EC, and if the aid is

➣ STATE AID


progressively reduced andlimited in time.

These conditions do not seem tobe met in this case, as NorthernIreland does not qualify as anexemption under Article 87(3)(a)EC and the aid scheme does notseem to provide for the aid to beprogressively reduced.

Second, the different terms forpublic and private invested

monies in the Fund constitutestate aid to the private investorsof the Fund, which cannot befound compatible under any ofthe communications andframeworks which theCommission has adopted, andwhich can also not bedetermined to be the minimumnecessary to achieve itsobjective. Furthermore, thescheme may distort competitionbetween venture capital funds.

Because the Commission at thisstage nourishes serious doubts asto the compatibility of thescheme with the commonmarket, it is obliged to initiateinvestigations pursuant to Article88(2) of the Treaty. Under thisprocedure all interested partieswill have the opportunity tocomment. The Commission willthereafter take a final decision.

INTERNATIONAL


Le Gouvernement marocain aorganisé les 18 et 19 juillet 2000,avec le concours de laCNUCED, un séminaireparticulièrement intéressantdestiné:

� d'une part à présenter à uneassistance marocaine, maisaussi à des représentantsd'autres pays de laMéditerranée et d'Europe, laloi marocaine instituant laliberté des prix et laprotection de la concurrence,qui entrera en vigueur en2001 et qui découlenotamment des accords euro-méditerranéens;

� d'autre part à débattre desconditions dans lesquelles laconcurrence doit trouver saplace dans les pays endéveloppement et face à lamondialisation, en particulieren s'appuyant sur lacoopération internationale.

La discussion sur la nouvelle loimarocaine, qui a été présentéepar M. Alhami, Ministre desAffaires générales, a étéparticulièrement riche. Lesintervenants ont dans l'ensemblesalué les progrès que cette loiapporte à l'économie et auxconsommateurs marocains,notamment à travers la création

du Conseil de la Concurrence,qui sera une autoritéindépendante. Plusieursreprésentants d'entreprises ou deconsommateurs ont souhaité quele rôle de ce Conseil(formellement instanceconsultative) puisse être renforcédans la pratique, notamment àtravers un suivi aussisystématique que possible par leGouvernement des avis duConseil. De nombreuxparticipants (y comprisd'autorités de concurrenceétrangères) ont aussi souhaitéque la saisine du Conseil, qui nepeut être effectuée que parl'administration, soit fréquente etque l'administration luitransmette les plaintes que lesentreprises et les associations deconsommateurs déposeraientauprès d'elles.

Le second thème "concurrence,développement et mondiali-sation" a été développé dans desdiscussions où sont notammentintervenus MM. Brusick(CNUCED), Gallot (Ministèrefrançais de l'Economie, desFinances et du Budget),Anderson (OMC), Pons(Commission européenne),Heimler (Autorita Garante) etMme Knoll (Bundeskartellamt)

et M. Kheimany (BanqueMondiale).

Les conclusions de cesdiscussions peuvent êtrerésumées ainsi:

� il est dans l'intérêt des PVD(et en particulier de leursconsommateurs) d'avoir undroit protégeant laconcurrence;

� ce droit peut être adapté àleur situation, notammentcouvrir des zoneséconomiques regroupantplusieurs pays et sedévelopper de façonprogressive;

� la coopération entre autoritésnationales de concurrencedoit s'intensifier en bilatéral(y compris par de l'assistancetechnique vers les PVD),mais aussi en multilatéral vial'OMC.

Séminaire euro-méditerranéen sur ledroit et la politique de concurrence àCasablanca (Maroc) les 18 et 19 juillet2000Jean-François PONS, Directeur Général adjoint

➣ INTERNATIONAL


*CONCURRENCE ET DEVELOP-PEMENT

1) La politique de concur-rence n'est pas faite quepour les pays développés

• Les tendancesanticoncurren-tielles(ententes, abus deposition dominante,tentatives demonopolisation) existentpartout.

• Laisser ces tendancessans les combattreaboutirait à pénaliser lesconsommateurs, lesPME, l'innovation,l'économie nationale (ycompris l'emploi).

• Les évolutions récentesdans les anciens payscommunistes, comme enAsie du sud-est,témoignent qu'uneabsence de concurrenceinterne aboutit à une

* Cette présentation a été faite à

titre personnel et ne saurait doncengager la Commissioneuropéenne.

sclérose économique ouà des crises.

2) La politique de concur-rence dans les pays endéveloppement doit êtreadaptée

• Les priorités doivent êtrela répression desententes les plus graves(cartels de prix),répartitions de marchéainsi que les abus deposition dominante etéviter les concentrationséconomiques excessives(notamment au momentdes privatisations oudémonopolisations).

• Les secteurs à surveillersont avant tout ceux liésà l'import/export (ex.cartel transport maritimeAfrique de l'Ouest) parceque fort impact pour cespays, ainsi que celui desbiens de consommation,car les consommateursdoivent adhérer etsoutenir cette politiqueainsi que les PME.

• Exceptions/limites:l'exemple le plus courantest celui des services

publics, mais lesexceptions à laconcurrence doivent êtretoujours justifiées ettransparentes, y comprissur leur coût.

• Les zones économiquespour un développementharmonieux de laconcurrence doivent êtred'une certaine taille, cequi doit inciter à lacréation de zonesregroupant plusieurspays (dont le Marchécommun européen a étél'exemple historique leplus significatif).

CONCURRENCE ET MONDIALI-SATION

1) La tendance à lamondialisation de nom-breux secteurs industrielset de services signifie queles problèmes deconcurrence prennent defaçon croissante unedimension mondiale.

Les comportements anti-concurrentiels qui prennentplace en dehors d'un pays,par exemple un cartel ainsique les opérationsstructurelles impliquant desentreprises étrangères(illustrées par la vagueactuelle des grandes fusionset des alliances stratégiquesmondiales) peuvent avoir unimpact important sur laconcurrence au sein de cepays. La mise en oeuvred'une politique deconcurrence efficace dans lemonde et la coopération

Accords euro-méditerranéens etconcurrence : une réponse auxproblèmes de développement et demondialisation - Casablanca, 18-19juillet 2000Jean-François PONS, Directeur Général adjoint

➣ INTERNATIONAL


entre autorités deconcurrence sont devenuesnécessaires afin de faireface à ces nouveaux défis.

2) La Commission euro-péenne a pris plusieursinitiatives ces dernièresannées pour développer lacoopération bilatérale avecses principaux partenairescommerciaux, tout enprésentant des propositionspour une nouvelle approchemultilatérale, dans la lignedu rapport Van Miert de1996. Aujourd'hui, laCommission est engagéedans une coopérationbilatérale active avec lesautorités de concurrence desEtats-Unis, elle s'impliquedans les progrès d'unepolitique de concurrencedans les pays candidats àl'élargissement de l'unioneuropéenne et dans lesautres pays voisins etpartenaires de l'Europe.Enfin, l'union a proposé ledéveloppement des règlesde concurrence au sein del'OMC, visant à faireprogresser la politique deconcurrence partout dans lemonde et la coopérationentre autorités deconcurrence.

3) Pour un pays comme leMaroc, le développementd'une politique deconcurrence et lacoopération avec d'autresautorités de concurrencepermettent de ne pas subirdes comportementsanticoncurrentiels venant de

l'extérieur, ni des décisionsunilatérales d'autresgouvernements. Ellesdevraient faciliter aussil'accueil d'investissementsétrangers concurrentiels etbénéfiques.

CONCURRENCE ET ACCORDSEURO-MEDITERRANEENS

L'introduction de règles deconcurrence dans les accordseuro-méditerranéens est uneréponse aux questions relativesau développement et à lamondialisation qui viennentd'être évoquées.

1) Les accords euro-méditerranéens, signés parl'union européenne avec lesautres pays riverains de laMéditerranée, ont pour butde resserrer les lienséconomiques et politiques,de favoriser les échanges debiens et de services et desoutenir le développementdes pays partenaires.L'accord avec le Maroc aété signé le 26 février 1996.Ces accords s'accompagnentd'un effort financier sansprécédent de la part del'union européenne(programmes MEDA) etd'une réduction progressivedes barrières au commerce.

2) Les règles de concurrencefigurant dans ces accords

Les pays signatairess'engagent à appliquer desrègles inspirées de celles del'union européenne:

• Lutte contre les accordsanticoncurrentiels entreentreprises et contrel'abus de positiondominante;

• Lutte contre les aidespubliques qui faussent laconcurrence en faveur decertaines entreprises ouproduction.

Les parties s'engagent àlutter contre ces pratiquesdès lors qu'elles sontsusceptibles d'affecter leséchanges entre laCommunauté et le Marocet qu'elles ne peuvent êtreexemptées sur la base descritères découlant desarticles 81, 86 et 87 duTraité d'Amsterdam/an-ciens articles 85, 86 et 92du Traité de Rome.

Le conseil d'associationadopte les réglementationsnécessaires à la mise enoeuvre de ces articles, quivont s'appliquer dès ledébut de 2001.

3) L'application des règlesde concurrence conver-gentes autour de laMéditerranée

• Vise à faciliter ledéveloppement deséchanges et à simplifierla vie des entreprises, etainsi à permettre ledéveloppement des paysdu sud dans un marchéélargi.

• Va nécessiter une plusgrande coopération entre

➣ INTERNATIONAL


autorités de concurrence,ce qui présente lameilleure réponse auxrisques posés par lamondialisation.

C'est un grand chantier,mais qui devrait se traduirepar des bénéfices pour lesconsommateurs, les entre-prises (et particulière-mentles PME), l'innovation etfinalement la croissanceéconomique et la créationd'emplois.

LA POLITIQUE DE CONCUR-RENCE AU MAROC

L'adoption de la loi n° 06/99 surla liberté des prix et de laconcurrence s'inscritparfaitement dans le cadre desaccords euro-méditerranéens.

Elle s'inspire de principesproches de ceux du Traité del'union européenne et des règlesde concurrence définies dans cesaccords. Certains pourraientregretter que l'autorité

indépendante créée par cette loi,le Conseil de la Concurrence :

• ne soit qu'une instanceconsultative,

• ne puisse être saisiedirectement par lesentreprises ou les consom-mateurs.

Mais, le plus important à monsens pour les autoritésmarocaines en charge de laconcurrence, le Gouvernement etle Conseil de la Concurrence,c'est de réussir la mise en �uvrede cette loi et de passer avecsuccès l'examen de crédibilitéqui s'attache à toute nouvelleautorité dans un domaine aussiimportant. Pour réussir cetexamen, il me semble que :

• le Gouvernement devratransmettre systématiquementau Conseil les plaintes qu'ilrecevra des entreprises et desconsommateurs ;

• le Conseil devra rendre desavis forts et publics auGouvernement, notamment

en recommandant desdécisions avec amendeslorsque cela sera nécessaire ;

• le Gouvernement devras'efforcer de suivre aussisystématiquement quepossible les avis du conseil.

Par ailleurs, je rappelle que leGouvernement doit aussiorganiser un système et desrègles de contrôle des aidesd'Etat, en application des accordseuro-méditerranéens, dès lorsque ces aides ont un impact surles échanges entre le Maroc etl'union européenne.

Pour sa part, la Commissioneuropéenne est prête à apporterson concours à la mise en �uvrede cette loi (ainsi qu'au contrôledes aides d'Etat) et, dans lalimite de ses possibilités, àdévelopper une coopération, quenous espérons fructueuse avecles autorités en charge de laconcurrence.

INFORMATION SECTION


COMPETITION DG staff listTélécopieur central : 295 01 28

Directeur général Alexander SCHAUB 2952387/2954576

Directeur général adjoint Jean-François PONS 2994423/2962284plus particulièrement chargé des Directions C et DDirecteur général adjoint Gianfranco ROCCA 2951152/2951139plus particulièrement chargé des Directions E et F

Conseiller pour les réformes . . .

Conseiller auditeur John TEMPLE LANG 2955571Conseiller auditeur Helmut SCHRÖTER 2951196/2960246

Assistants du Directeur général Henrik MØRCH 2950766/2967532Bernhard FRIESS 2956038

directement rattachés au Directeur général :1. Personnel, Budget, Administration, Information Irène SOUKA 2957206/29502102. Questions informatiques Javier Juan PUIG SAQUES 2951305

DIRECTION APolitique de concurrence, Coordination, Affaires Internationales et relations avec les autres Institutions Kirtikumar MEHTA 2957389/2995470Conseiller Juan RIVIÈRE MARTI 2951146/2960699Conseiller Georgios ROUNIS 2953404

1. Politique générale de la concurrence,aspects économiques et juridiques Bernd LANGEHEINE 2991855/2965019Chef adjoint d'unité . . . .

2. Projets législatifs et règlementaires ;relations avec les Etats membres Emil PAULIS 2965033/2955894Chef adjoint d'unité Paolo CESARINI 2951286

3. Politique et coordination des Aides d'Etat Robert HANKIN 29597734. Affaires internationales Yves DEVELENNES 2951590/2966861

Chef adjoint d'unité . . . .

DIRECTION BTask Force "Contrôle des opérations Götz DRAUZ 2958681/2952965de concentration entre entreprises"Conseiller Giacomo GIACOMELLO 2951268

Télécopieur du Greffe Concentrations 2964301/29672441. Unité opérationnelle I Claude RAKOVSKY 2955389/29623682. Unité opérationnelle II Francisco Enrique GONZALEZ DIAZ a.i. 29650443. Unité opérationnelle III Wolfgang MEDERER 29535844. Unité opérationnelle IV Paul MALRIC SMITH

DIRECTION CInformation, communication, multimédias . . .Conseiller Herbert UNGERER 29686231. Télécommunications et Postes,

Coordination Société d'information Pierre BUIGUES 2994387- Cas relevant de l'Article 81/82 Suzanna SCHIFF 2957657/2951069- Directives de libéralisation, cas article 86 Christian HOCEPIED 2960427/2958316

2. Médias, éditions musicales Anne-Margrete WACHTMEISTER 2953895/29639043. Industries de l'information, électronique de divertissement Cecilio MADERO VILLAREJO 2960949/2965303

➣ INFORMATION SECTION


DIRECTION DServices Enzo MOAVERO MILANESI 2953427/2951490

1. Services financiers (banques, assurances) Serge DURANDE 2957243/29518022. Transports et infrastructures des transports Jürgen MENSCHING 2952224/2966946

Chef adjoint d�unité Joos STRAGIER 29524823. Commerce et autres services Lowri EVANS 2965029/2965036

DIRECTION ECartels, industries de base et énergie Angel TRADACETE 2952462/2950900

1. Cartels Georg DE BRONNET 2959268Chef adjoint d'unité Julian JOSHUA 2955519

2. Industries de base Nicola ANNECCHINO 2961870/29564223. Energie, eau et acier Michael ALBERS 2961874/2995483

DIRECTION FIndustries des biens d'équipementet de consommation Sven NORBERG 2952178/2965550

1. Industries mécaniques et électriques et industries diverses Fin LOMHOLT 2955619/2957439Chef adjoint d'unité Carmelo MORELLO 2955132

2. Automobiles et autres moyens de transport Eric VAN GINDERACHTER 2954427/2950479et construction mécanique connexe

3. Produits agricoles et alimentaires, produits pharmaceutiques Luc GYSELEN 2961523/2963781

DIRECTION G Aides d'Etat I Loretta DORMAL-MARINO 2958603/2992627Conseiller . . .

1. Aides à finalité régionale Wouter PIEKE 2959824/2955900Chef adjoint d'unité Klaus-Otto JUNGINGER-DITTEL 2960376/2965071Chef adjoint d'unité . . .

2. Aides horizontales Jean-Louis COLSON 2960995/29625263. Transparence, contrôle, fiscalité directe des entreprises Reinhard WALTHER 2958434/2955410

DIRECTION HAides d�Etat II Humbert DRABBE 2950060/2952701

1. Acier, métaux non ferreux, mines, constructionnavale, automobiles et fibres synthétiques Maria REHBINDER 2990007/2963603Chef adjoint d'unité . . .

2. Textiles, papier, industrie chimique, pharmaceutique et Jorma PIHLATIE 2953607/2960821électronique, construction mécanique et autressecteurs manufacturiersChef adjoint d'unité . . .

3. Entreprises publiques et services Ronald FELTKAMP 2954283/2967987

Task Force �Aides dans les nouveaux Länder Conrado TROMP 29602862960286



SPEECHES AND ARTICLES

L'application des règles deconcurrence à l'offre de lignes detélécommunications louées dans laCommunauté européenne - Jean-François PONS - Audition publiqueenquête de secteur "lignes louées" -Bruxelles - 22.09.2000Increasing competition in leasedlines - the benefits for Europe'sbusinesses and consumers - MarioMONTI - TelecommunicationsSector Inquiry on Leased LinesPublic Hearing - Brussels -22.09.2000Competition and informationtechnologies - Mario MONTI -"Barriers in Cyberspace" -Kangaroo Group - Brussels -18.09.2000The main challenges for a newdecade of EC Merger Control -Mario MONTI - EC Merger Control10th Anniversary Conference -Brussels - 15.09.2000Competition and Media - MarioMONTI - University of Nijenrode -Nijenrode - 12.09.2000 Cartels Why and How? Whyshould we be concerned withcartels and collusive behaviour? -Mario MONTI - 3rd NordicCompetition Policy Conference -Stockholm - 11.09.2000Internet and its effects oncompetition - Bernardo URRUTIAGARRO - Universidad

Internacional Menendez Pelayo(UIMP) - Barcelona - 10.07.2000Il programma della Commissioneper un'economia europeacompetitiva e creatrice dioccupazione - Mario MONTI -Convegno del CNEL - Roma -10.07.2000European Competition Policy fortoday and tomorrow - MarioMONTI - Conference jointly hostedby the Brookings Institution, theAntitrust Section of the AmericanBar Association, and the District ofColumbia Bar Association -Washington - 26.06.2000 Cooperation between competitionauthorities - a vision for the future- Mario MONTI - The JapanFoundation Conference -Washington DC - 23.06.2000Access issues under EU regulationand anti-trust law - The case oftelecommunications and Internetmarkets - Herbert UNGERER - TheJapan Foundation Conference -Washington - 23.06.2000Competition Law Reform - MarioMONTI - CBI Conference onCompetition Law Reform - London- 12.06.2000European Competition Day -Concluding Remarks - AlexanderSCHAUB - European CompetitionDay - Lisbon - 09.06.2000Concurrence dans les professionslibérales : quels avantages pour lesconsommateurs ? - Maria JoséBICHO - European CompetitionDay - Lisbon - 09.06.2000

How does European competitionpolicy contributes to the creation ofa single market for car distributionwhich will benefit consumers - EricVAN GINDERACHTER -European Competition Day - Lisbon- 09.06.2000European competition policy andthe citizen - Mario MONTI -European Competition Day - Lisbon- 09.06.2000Competition Day for EuropeanCitizens - Alexander SCHAUB -Portuguese DGCC's magazine -Lisbon - 01.06.2000Competition Policy Reform - MarioMONTI - UNICE Conference onCompetition Policy Reform -Brussels - 11.05.2000

COMMUNITY PUBLICATIONS ONCOMPETITION

Except if otherwise indicated, thesepublications are available throughthe Office for Official Publicationsof the European Communities or itssales offices (see last page).Use Catalogue number to order.A lot of those publications are alsoavailable on DG Competition website:http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/index_en.html

LEGISLATION

Competition law in the EuropeanCommunities-Volume IA-Rulesapplicable to undertakingsSituation at 30 june 1994; thispublication contains the text of alllegislative acts relevant to Articles85, 86 and 90.Catalogue No: CM-29-93-A01-xx-C(xx=language code: ES, DA, DE,EL, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT).

Competition law in the EuropeanCommunities-Addendum to

Documentation�This section contains details of recent speeches or articles givenby Community Officials that may be of interest. Copies of theseare available from Competition DG�s home page on the WorldWide Web. Future issues of the newsletter will contain details ofconferences on competition policy which have been brought to ourattention. Organisers of conferences that wish to make use of thisfacility should refer to page 1 for the address of Competition DG�sInformation Officer.



Volume IA-Rules applicable toundertakingsSituation at 1 March 1995.Catalogue No: CM-88-95-436-xx-C(xx=language code: ES, DA, DE,EL, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT).

Competition law in the EuropeanCommunities-Volume IIA-Rulesapplicable to State aidSituation at 30 June 1998; thispublication contains the text of alllegislative acts relevant to Articles42, 77, 90, 92 to 94.Catalogue No: PD-15-98-875-xx-C(xx=language code: ES, DA, DE;EL, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT, SV, FI)

Competition law in the EC-Volume II B-Explanation of rulesapplicable to state aidSituation at December 1996Catalogue No: CM-03-97-296-xx-C(xx=language code= ES, DA, DE,EL, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT, FI, SV)

Competition law in the EuropeanCommunities-Volume IIIA-Rulesin the international field-Situation at 31 December 1996(Edition 1997)Catalogue No: CM-89-95-858-xx-C(xx= language code: ES, DA, DE,EL, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT, FI, SV)

Merger control law in theEuropean Union-Situation inMarch 1998Catalogue No: CV-15-98-899-xx-C(xx=language code: ES, DA, DE,EL, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT, FI, SV)

Brochure concerning thecompetition rules applicable toundertakings as contained in theEEA agreement and theirimplementation by the ECCommission and the EFTAsurveillance authority.Catalogue No: CV-77-92-118-EN-C

OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

Competition policy in Europe andthe citizenCatalogue No: KD-28-00-397-xx-C(xx=language code: FR, IT, SV etPT; the other versions will beavailable later).

Application of EC State aid lawby the member state courtsCatalogue No: CM-20-99-365-EN-C

Dealing with the Commission(Edition 1997)-Notifications,complaints, inspections and fact-finding, powers under Articles 85and 86 of the EEC TreatyCatalogue No: CV-95-96-552-xx-C(xx= ES, DA, DE, EN, FR, IT, NL,PT, FI,SV)

Green paper on vertical restraintsin EC competition policy -COM(96) 721- (Ed. 1997)Catalogue No: CB-CO-96-742-xx-C(xx= ES DA DE GR EN FR IT NLPT SV FI)

Final report of the multimodalgroup - Presented toCommissioner Van Miert by SirBryan Carsberg, Chairman of theGroup (Ed. 1997).Catalogue No: CV-11-98-803-EN-C

The institutional framework forthe regulation oftelecommunications and theapplication of EC competitionrules - Final Report (ForresterNorall & Sutton).Catalogue No: CM-94-96-590-EN-C

Competition aspects of accesspricing-Report to the EuropeanCommissionDecember 1995 (M. Cave, P.Crowther, L. Hancher).Catalogue No: CM-94-96-582-EN-C

Community Competition Policy inthe Telecommunications Sector

(Vol. I: July 1995; Vol. II: March1997)-volume II B a compediumprepared by DG IV-C-1; itcontains Directives under art 90,Decisions under Regulation 17and under the Merger Regulationas well as relevant Judgements ofthe Court of Justice. - Copies available through DGCOMP-C-1 (tel. +322-2968623,2968622, fax +322-2969819).

Brochure explicative sur lesmodalités d'application duRèglement (CE) Nø 1475/95 de laCommission concernant certainescatégories d' accords dedistribution et de service de venteet d'après vente de véhiculesautomobiles - Copies availablethrough DG COMP-F-2 (tel. +322-2951880, 2950479, fax. +322-2969800) EN, FR, DE

COMPETITION DECISIONS

Recueil des décisions de laCommission en matière d'aidesd'Etat -Article 93, paragraphe 2(Décisions finales négatives)-1964-1995Catalogue No: CM-96-96-465-xx-C[xx=FR, NL, DE et IT (1964-1995);EN et DA (73-95); EL (81-95); (ESet PT (86-95); FI et SV (95)]

Reports of Commission Decisionsrelating to competition -Articles85, 86 and 90 of the EC Treaty.-94/98Catalogue No: CV-90-95-946-xx-C(xx=language code= ES, DA, DE,EL, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT, FI, SV)

Reports of Commission Decisionsrelating to competition -Articles85, 86 and 90 of the EC Treaty.-93/94Catalogue No: CV-90-95-946-xx-C(xx=ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT)





Reports of Commission Decisionsrelating to competition -Articles85, 86 and 90 of the EC Treaty.-86/88Catalogue No: CM-80-93-290-xx-C(xx=ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT)

Reports of Commission Decisionsrelating to competition -Articles85, 86 and 90 of the EC Treaty.-81/85Catalogue No: CM-79-93-792-xx-C(xx=DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT, NL.)

Reports of Commission Decisionsrelating to competition -Articles85, 86 and 90 of the EC Treaty.-73/80Catalogue No: CM-76-92-988-xx-C(xx=DA, DE, EN, FR, IT, NL.)

Recueil des décisions de laCommission en matièrre deconcurrence - Articles 85, 86 et 90du traité CEE-64/72Catalogue No: CM-76-92-996-xx-C(xx=DE, FR, IT, NL.)

COMPETITION REPORTS

European Communitycompetition policy 1999 (xx=ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT, FI, SV ). Copies available

through Cellule Information DGCOMP.

XXVIII Report on CompetitionPolicy 1998Catalogue No: CV-20-99-785-xx-C(xx= ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT, FI, SV)

European Community onCompetition Policy 1998Catalogue No: CV-20-99-301-xx-C(xx= ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT, FI SV

XXVII Report on CompetitionPolicy 1997Catalogue No: CM-12-98-506-xx-C

European Community onCompetition Policy 1997Catalogue No: Cv-12-98-263-XX-C(xx= FR, ES, EN, DE, NL, IT, PT,SV, DA, FI)

XXVI Report on CompetitionPolicy 1996Catalogue No: CM-04-97-242-xx-C

European CommunityCompetition Policy 1996Catalogue No: CM-03-97-967-xx-C(xx= ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT,FI, SV)

XXV Report on CompetitionPolicy 1995Catalogue No: CM-94-96-429-xx-C

European CommunityCompetition Policy 1995Catalogue No: CM-94-96-421-xx-C(xx= ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT, FI, SV)

XXIV Report on competitionpolicy 1994Catalogue No: CM-90-95-283-xx-C(xx= language code: ES, DA, DE,EL, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT, FI, SV)

XXIIIe Report on competitionpolicy 1993Catalogue No: CM-82-94-650-xx-C(xx=ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT)

XXIIe Report on competitionpolicy 1992Catalogue No: CM-76-93-689-xx-C(xx=ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT

XXIe Report on competitionpolicy 1991Catalogue No: CM-73-92-247-xx-C(xx= ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT)

Fifth survey on State aid in theEuropean Union in themanufacturing and certain othersectorsCatalogue No: CV-06-97-901-xx-C(xx= ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT, FI, SV )

Sixt survey on State aid in theEuropean Union in themanufacturing and certain othersectorsCatalogue No: CV-18-98-704-xx-C

Septième rapport sur les aidesd'Etat dans le secteur desproduits manufacturés et certainsautres secteurs de l'Unioneuropéenne [COM (1999) 148final]Catalogue No: CB-CO-99-153-xx-C(xx= ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT, SV, FI )

OTHER DOCUMENTS andSTUDIES

Buyer power and its impact oncompetition in the food retaildistribution sector of theEuropean UnionCat. No: CV-25-99-649-EN-C



The application of articles 85 &86 of the EC Treaty by nationalcourts in the Member StatesCat. No: CV-06-97-812-xx-C (xx=FR, DE, EN, NL, IT, ES, PT)

Examination of current andfuture excess capacity in theEuropean automobyle industry -Ed. 1997Cat. No: CV-06-97-036-EN-C

Video : Fair Competition inEurope-Examination of currentCat. No: CV-ZV-97-002-xx-V (xx=ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT, NL,PT, FI, SV)

Communication de laCommission: Les servicesd'intérêt général en Europe (Ed.1996)Cat. No: CM-98-96-897-xx-C xx=DE, NL, GR, SV

Study of exchange of confidentialinformation agreements andtreaties between the US andMember States of EU in areas ofsecurities, criminal, tax andcustoms (Ed.1996)Cat. No: CM-98-96-865-EN-C

Survey of the Member StateNational Laws governing verticaldistribution agreements (Ed.1996)Cat. No: CM-95-96-996-EN-C

Services de télécomunication enEurope: statistiques en bref,Commerce, services et transports,1/1996Cat. No: CA-NP-96-001-xx-Cxx=EN, FR, DE

Report by the group of experts oncompetition policy in the newtrade order [COM(96)284 fin.]Cat. No: CM-92-95-853-EN-C

New industrial economics andexperiences from European

merger control: New lessonsabout collective dominance ? (Ed.1995)Cat. No: CM-89-95-737-EN-C

Proceedings of the EuropeanCompetition Forum (coéditionwith J. Wiley) -Ed. 1996Cat. No: CV-88-95-985-EN-C

Competition Aspects ofInterconnection Agreements inthe Telecommunications Sector(Ed. 1995)Cat. No: CM-90-95-801-EN-C

Proceedings of the 2nd EU/JapanSeminar on competition (Ed.1995)Cat. No: CV-87-95-321- EN-C.

Bierlieferungsverträge in denneuen EU-MitgliedstaatenÖsterreich, Schweden undFinnland - Ed. 1996Cat. No: CV-01-96-074-DE-C DE

Surveys of the Member States'powers to investigate and sanctionviolations of national competitionlaws (Ed. 1995)Cat. No: CM-90- 95-089-EN-C

Statistiques audiovisuelles: rapport1995Cat. No: CA-99-56-948-EN-C

Information exchanges amongfirms and their impact oncompetition (Ed. 1995)Cat. No: CV-89-95-026-EN-C

Impact of EC funded R&Dprogrammes on human resourcedevelopment and long termcompetitiveness (Ed. 1995)Cat. No: CG-NA-15-920-EN-C

Competition policy in the newtrade order: strengtheninginternational cooperation andrules (Ed. 1995)Cat. No: CM-91-95-124-EN-C

Forum consultatif de lacomptabilité: subventionspubliques (Ed. 1995)Cat. No: C 184 94 735 FR C

Les investissements dans lesindustries du charbon et de l'acierde la Communauté: Rapport surl'enquête 1993 (Ed. 1995)Cat. No: CM 83 94 2963 A C

Study on the impact ofliberalization of inward crossborder mail on the provision ofthe universal postal service andthe options for progressiveliberalization (Ed. 1995) Finalreport,Cat. No: CV-89-95-018-EN-C

Meeting universal serviceobligations in a competitivetelecommunications sector (Ed.1994)Cat. No: CV-83-94-757-EN-C

Competition and integration:Community merger control policy(Ed. 1994)Cat. No: CM-AR-94-057-EN-C

Growth, competitiveness, employ-ment: The challenges and waysforward into the 21st century:White paper (Ed. 1994)Cat. No: CM 82 94 529 xx C(xx=ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT)

Growth, competitiveness, employ-ment: The challenges and waysforward into the 21st century:White paper (Ed. 1993)-Volume 2Part CCat. No: CM-NF-93-0629 A C

The geographical dimension ofcompetition in the Europeansingle market (Ed. 1993)Cat. No: CV-78-93-136-EN-C



International transport by air,1993Cat. No: CA-28-96-001-xx-Cxx=EN, FR, DE

Les investissements dans lesindustries du charbon et de l'acierde la Communauté: Enquête 1992(Ed. 1993) - 9 languagesCat. No: CM 76 93 6733 A C

EG Wettbewerbsrecht undZulieferbeziehungen derAutomobilindustrie (Ed. 1992)Cat. No: CV-73-92-788-DE-C

Green Paper on the developmentof the single market for postalservices, 9 languagesCat. No: CD-NA-14- 858-EN-C

PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIALJOURNAL1st June 2000 to30st September 2000

ARTICLES 85, 86 (RESTRICTIONSAND DISTORTIONS OF COMPETITIOBY UNDERTAKINGS)

23.09.2000C 273 2000/C 273-0011Judgment of the Court of FirstInstance of 6 July 2000 in CaseT-62/98: Volkswagen AG vCommission of the EuropeanCommunities (Competition -Distribution of motor vehicles -Partitioning of the market -Article 85 of the EC Treaty(now Article 81 EC) -Regulation (EEC) No 123/85 -Disclosure to the press -Business secrets - Goodadministration - Fines - Gravityof the infringement)C 273 2000/C 273-0001Judgment of the Court (FourthChamber) of 8 June 2000 inCase C-258/98 (reference for a

preliminary ruling from thePretore di Firenze): criminalproceedings against GiovanniCarra and Others (Dominantposition - Public undertakings -Placement of workforce -Statutory monopoly)C 273 2000/C 273-0012 Orderof the President of the Court ofFirst Instance of 28 June 2000in Case T-191/98 R II, ChoYang Shipping Co. Ltd vCommission of the EuropeanCommunities (Competition -Payment of fine - Bankguarantee - Urgency - Balanceof interests)

21.09.2000L 237 2000/L 237-0060Decision of the EEA JointCommittee No 49/2000 of 31May 2000 amending AnnexXIV (Competition) to the EEAAgreement

06.09.2000C 255 2000/C 255-0008Notification of a joint venture(Case COMP/E-3/37.732)C 255 2000/C 255-0007Notification of a joint venture(Case COMP/E-2/37.949)

12.08.2000C 233 2000/C 233-0011 Orderof the Court (Fourth Chamber)of 11 May 2000 in Case C-428/9 P: Deutsche Post AG vInternational Express CarriersConference (IECC),Commission of the EuropeanCommunities, La Poste, UnitedKingdom of Great Britain andNorthern Ireland and The PostOffice (Appeal - Competition -Abuse of a dominant position -Postal services - Remail)

11.08.2000C 231 2000/C 231-0005Commission notice pursuant toArticle 19(3) of CouncilRegulation No 17 concerningcase COMP/37.462 - IdentrusC 231 2000/C 231-0002 Noticepursuant to Article 19(3) of

Council Regulation No 17 -Case COMP/37.557 - Eurex

09.08.2000C 227 2000/C 227-0016Notification of CooperationAgreements (CaseCOMP/37.920 - "3G PatentPlatform")C 227 2000/C 227-0006 Noticepublished under Article 19(3)of Council Regulation No 17 -Case 34.950 - Eco-Emballages

08.08.2000C 225 2000/C 225E-0027Written question P-1845/99 byUmberto Bossi to theCommissionSubject: Products of protecteddesignation of origin (PDI) andprotected geographicalindication (PGI) - privatecertification bodies - freedomof competition

01.08.2000L 195 2000/L 195-0049Commission Decision of 29June 2000 relating to aproceeding pursuant to Article81 of the EC Treaty (CasesIV/36.456/F3 - Inntrepreneurand IV/36.492/F3 - Spring)(notified under documentnumber C(2000) 1591)

29.07.2000C 217 2000/C 217-0035 Noticepursuant to Article 19(3) ofCouncil Regulation No 17concerning Case COMP/36.841- Unisource (Review of theCommission Decision of29.10.1997)

26.07.2000L 187 2000/L 187-0047Commission Decision of 24January 1999 relating to aproceeding under Article 81 ofthe EC Treaty and Article 53 ofthe EEA Agreement (CaseIV.F.1/36.718. CECED)(notified under documentnumber C(1999) 5064)



13.07.2000L 174 2000/L 174-0055Decision of the EEA JointCommittee No 44/2000 of 19May 2000 amending Protocol21 to the EEA Agreement, onthe implementation ofcompetition rules applicable toundertakings

11.07.2000C 193 2000/C 193-0007 Noticepursuant to Article 5 ofRegulation (EEC) No 3975/87of 14 December 1987concerning case IV/37.730 -Austrian AirlinesÖsterreichische LuftverkehrsAG/Deutsche Lufthansa AGC 193 2000/C 193-0008 Noticepursuant to Article 5 ofRegulation (EEC) No 3975/87of 14 December 1987concerning case IV/37.749 -Austrian AirlinesÖsterreichische LuftverkehrsAG and Scandinavian AirlinesSystem

24.06.2000L 151 2000/L 151-0018Commission Decision of 10May 2000 relating to aproceeding pursuant to Article81 of the EC Treaty (CaseIV/32.150 - Eurovision)(notified under documentnumber C(2000) 1171)C 176 2000/C 176-0002Judgment of the Court of 11April 2000 in Joined Cases C-51/96 and C-191/97 (referencesfor a preliminary ruling fromthe Tribunal de PremièreInstance de Namur): ChristelleDeliège v Ligue Francophonede Judo et DisciplinesAssociées ASBL and Others(Freedom to provide services -Competition rules applicable toundertakings - Judokas - Sportsrules providing for nationalquotas and national federations'selection procedures for

participation in internationaltournaments)

20.06.2000C 170 2000/C 170-0008Notification of a CooperationAgreement (CaseCOMP/37.889 - FiatSpA/General MotorsCorporation)C 170 2000/C 170E-0134Written question P-1989/99 byNorbert Glanteto theCommissionSubject: Commission measuresto prepare a decision on price-fixing for booksC 170 2000/C 170E-0137Written question E-2013/99 byAntonio Tajani and Enrico Ferrito the CommissionSubject: Breach of the rules oncompetition and on the freedomto supply services by Italianlegislation on public and privatehealth careC 170 2000/C 170E-0136Written question E-1995/99 byPaul Rübig to the CommissionSubject: Guidelines on verticalrestraints

10.06.2000C 163 2000/C 163-0003Judgment of the Court (FifthChamber) of 30 March 2000 inCase C-266/97 P: CoöperatieveVereniging De VerenigdeBloemenveilingen AalsmeerBA (VBA) v Vereniging vanGroothandelaren inBloemkwekerijproducten(VGB), Florimex BV (Appeal -Competition - Closure ofprocedure on a complaint in theabsence of a response by thecomplainants within the time-limit notified to them -Compatibility with Article85(1) of the Treaty of a feelevied on suppliers who haveconcluded agreements relatingto the delivery of floriculturalproducts to undertakingsestablished on the premises of a

cooperative auction society -Compatibility with Article85(1) of the EC Treaty of anexclusive purchase obligationaccepted by certain wholesalersreselling such products toretailers in a specific tradingarea forming part of the samepremises - Discrimination -Effect on trade betweenMember States - Assessment byreference to a body of rulestaken as a whole - Lack ofappreciable effect)C 163 2000/C 163-0003Judgment of the Court (FifthChamber) of 30 March 2000 inCase C-265/97 P: CoöperatieveVereniging De VerenigdeBloemenveilingen AalsmeerBA (VBA) v Florimex BV andOthers (Appeal - Competition -Decision rejecting a complaint -Compatibility with Article 2 ofRegulation No 26 of a feecharged to external suppliers onfloricultural products suppliedto wholesalers established onthe premises of a cooperativesociety of auctioneers -Statement of reasons)C 162 2000/C 162-0025 Noticepursuant to Article 19(3) ofCouncil Regulation No 17concerning an application fornegative clearance orexemption under Article 81(3)of the EC Treaty (CasesCOMP/34.657 - Sammelreversand COMP/35.245 to 35.251 -Einzelreverse)

CONTROL OF CONCENTRATIONS /MERGER PROCEDURE

27.09.2000C 275 2000/C 275-0009 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1744 - UPM-Kymmene/StoraEnso/Metsäliitto/JV)



C 275 2000/C 275-0008 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2123 - BancoComercial Português/Banco deSabadell/Ibersecurities)Candidate case for simplifiedprocedureC 275 2000/C 275-0007Initiation of proceedings (CaseCOMP/M.2033 -Metso/Svedala)C 275 2000/C 275-0009 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.2012 -CGNU/Aseval)

26.09.2000C 274 2000/C 274-0010 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1951 - BT/JapanTelecom/VodafoneAirtouch/JV)C 274 2000/C 274-0009 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2101 - GeneralMills/Pillsbury/Diageo)C 274 2000/C 274-0008 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2072 - PhilipMorris/Nabisco)C 274 2000/C 274-0007 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2134 -Avnet/Veba Electronics)C 274 2000/C 274-0006 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2132 -Compart/Falck)

22.09.2000C 271 2000/C 271-0006 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2137 -SLDE/NTL/MSCP/Noos)C 271 2000/C 271-0007 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2061 - Airbus)C 271 2000/C 271-0009 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.2023 -Brambles/Ermewa/JV)

C 271 2000/C 271-0008 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2162 -Mopla/Deutsche Bank/Trevira)Candidate case for simplifiedprocedure

21.09.2000C 270 2000/C 270-0003 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.2025 - GECapital/BTSP/MEPC)C 270 2000/C 270-0003 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1867 -Volvo/Telia/Ericsson - WirelessCar)C 270 2000/C 270-0002 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2154 -C3D/Rhône/Go-Ahead)

20.09.2000C 269 2000/C 269-0007 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1819 -Rheinbraun/OMV/Cokowi (seealso ECSC.1320))C 269 2000/C 269-0006 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2070 -TietoEnator/EDB BusinessPartner/JV) Candidate case forsimplified procedure

19.09.2000C 267 2000/C 267-0004 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2158 - CréditSuisse Group/Donaldson,Lufkin & Jenrette)C 267 2000/C 267-0005 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2135 -NCR/4Front) Candidate casefor simplified procedureC 267 2000/C 267-0003 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.2037 - BNPParibas/PHH)

16.09.2000C 266 2000/C 266-0013 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.2000 - WPPGroup/Young & Rubicam)C 266 2000/C 266-0014 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1937 - SkandiaLife/Diligentia)

15.09.2000C 265 2000/C 265-0011 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2121 -Thyssen KruppWerkstoffe/Röhm) Candidatecase for simplified procedureC 265 2000/C 265-0012 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2127 -DaimlerChrysler/DetroitDiesel)C 265 2000/C 265-0013 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2096 -Bayer/DeutscheTelekom/Infraserv/JV)C 265 2000/C 265-0015 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1952 -RWE/Iberdrola/TarragonaPower JV)C 265 2000/C 265-0010 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2039 -HVB/Commerzbank/DB/Dresdner/JV Trust Center) Candidatecase for simplified procedureC 265 2000/C 265-0014 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2151 -Atos/Origin) Candidate case forsimplified procedure

14.09.2000C 264 2000/C 264-0005 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2146 - SHVHoldings/NPM Capital)Candidate case for simplifiedprocedure



13.09.2000C 262 2000/C 262-0005 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/JV.46 -Blackstone/CDPQ/KabelNordrhein-Westfalen)C 262 2000/C 262-0005 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1901 - CapGemini/Ernst & Young)

12.09.2000C 261 2000/C 261-0006 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.2016 - FranceTelecom/Orange)C 261 2000/C 261-0003 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2110 -Deutsche Bank/SEI/JV)C 261 2000/C 261-0004Renotification of a previouslynotified concentration (CaseCOMP/M.2050 -Vivendi/Canal+/Seagram)C 261 2000/C 261-0002 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2116 -Flextronics/Italdata)C 261 2000/C 261-0006 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1949 - WesternPower Distribution(WPD)/Hyder)C 261 2000/C 261-0005 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2115 -Carrefour/GB)

09.09.2000C 258 2000/C 258-0010 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2153 -BHP/Mitsubishi/QCT)Candidate case for simplifiedprocedureC 258 2000/C 258-0011 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1817 -Bellsouth/Vodafone (E-Plus))

C 258 2000/C 258-0011 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1996 -SCA/Graninge/JV)C 258 2000/C 258-0012Inapplicability of the regulationto a notified operation (CaseCOMP/M.1821 -Bellsouth/VRT (E-Plus))

08.09.2000C 257 2000/C 257-0004 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1933 -Citigroup/Flender)

07.09.2000C 256 2000/C 256-0007 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.2020 - Metsä-Serla/Modo)C 256 2000/C 256-0005 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2147 -VNU/Hearst/Stratosfera)C 256 2000/C 256-0006 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1853 -EDF/ENBW)C 256 2000/C 256-0007 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1916 - RTLNewmedia/Primus-Online)

06.09.2000C 255 2000/C 255-0005 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2118 -Telenor/Procuritas/ISAB/JV)C 255 2000/C 255-0006 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2084 -CSM/European BakerySupplies Business (Unilever))C 255 2000/C 255-0009 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1926 -Telefonica/Tyco/JV)C 255 2000/C 255-0010 Non-opposition to a notified

concentration (CaseCOMP/M.1938 - BT/Telfort)C 255 2000/C 255-0009 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1880 - MinnesotaMining andManufacturing/Quante)

05.09.2000C 254 2000/C 254-0005 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2107 - TXUGermany/Stadtwerke Kiel)C 254 2000/C 254-0004 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/ECSC.1329 -Corus/Wuppermann/JV)C 254 2000/C 254-0003 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2094 - HT-Troplast/Kömmerling)C 254 2000/C 254-0002 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2136 -Schroder Ventures/Memec)C 254 2000/C 254-0006 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.2027 - DeutscheBank/SAP/JV)

02.09.2000C 252 2000/C 252-0020 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2138 -SAP/Siemens/JV)C 252 2000/C 252-0021Corrigendum to notice of non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1564 - Astrolink) (OJC 237 of 19.8.2000)

01.09.2000C 251 2000/C 251-0003 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.2034 -Hagemeyer/WF Electrical)C 251 2000/C 251-0002 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2133 -Hicks/Bear Stearns/JohnsManville)



C 251 2000/C 251-0003Withdrawal of notification of aconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.2067 - ABB/UMOE)

31.08.2000C 250 2000/C 250-0004 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2130 -Belgacom/TeleDanmark/T-Mobile International/BenNederland Holding)C 250 2000/C 250-0004 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.2062 - RioTinto/North)C 250 2000/C 250-0003 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.2029 - Tate &Lyle/Amylum)C 250 2000/C 250-0003 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.2028 -ABB/Bilfinger/MVVEnergie/JV)

30.08.2000C 249 2000/C 249-0007 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2128 - ABBLummus/Engelhard/Equistar/Novolen)C 249 2000/C 249-0006 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2082 -PSA/Vivendi/Wappi!)

26.08.2000C 246 2000/C 246-0005 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2131 -BCP/Interamerican/NovaBank/JV)

25.08.2000C 244 2000/C 244-0014 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2069 -Alstom/Fiat Ferroviaria)C 244 2000/C 244-0013 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2074 -Tyco/Mallinckrodt)

24.08.2000C 242 2000/C 242-0003 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1990 -Unilever/Bestfoods)

23.08.2000C 239 2000/C 239-0012Initiation of proceedings (CaseCOMP/M.1940 -Framatome/Siemens/Cogema/JV)

22.08.2000C 238 2000/C 238-0011 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2097 -SCA/Metsä Tissue)C 238 2000/C 238-0010 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2104 -Messer/Carlyle/Eutectic andCastolin)C 238 2000/C 238-0009 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.2008 - AOM/AirLiberté/Air Littoral)C 238 2000/C 238-0009 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1925 - Scottish &Newcastle/Groupe Danone)C 238 2000/C 238-0008 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1936 - SiemensBusiness Services/LufthansaSystems/Synavion)C 238 2000/C 238-0008 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1975 - DeutscheBank/Eurobank/LamdaDevelopment/JV)

19.08.2000C 237 2000/C 237-0007 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1947 - ABN AmroLease Holding/Dial Group)C 237 2000/C 237-0005 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1970 - Johnson &

Johnson/Mercury AssetManagement/Agora HealthcareServices JV)C 237 2000/C 237-0006 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1966 -Phillips/Chevron/JV)C 237 2000/C 237-0004 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2113 -Cinven/McKechnie)C 237 2000/C 237-0005 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1564 - Astrolink)C 237 2000/C 237-0006 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1972 -Granada/Compass)

18.08.2000C 236 2000/C 236-0003 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1997 -Schroders/Liberty InternationalPension)C 236 2000/C 236-0003 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1968 -Solectron/Nortel)

17.08.2000C 235 2000/C 235-0005 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1973 -Telecom Italia/Endesa/UniónFenosa)C 235 2000/C 235-0006 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1943 -Telefónica/Endemol)C 235 2000/C 235-0006 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1812 -Telefónica/Terra/Amadeus)C 235 2000/C 235-0007Withdrawal of notification of aconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1646 -



CGD/Partest/BCP/SAirGroup/Portugalia)

15.08.2000C 234 2000/C 234-0006 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.2002 -Preussag/Thomson)C 234 2000/C 234-0002 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2120 - ToyotaMotor Corporation/Toyota GB)C 234 2000/C 234-0003 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2122 -BAT/Cap Gemini/Ciberion)C 234 2000/C 234-0004 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2076 -Ifil/Alpitour)C 234 2000/C 234-0005 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2087 - Feuvert/Carrefour/AutocenterDelauto)C 234 2000/C 234-0006 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1954 - ACS/SoneraVivendi/Xfera)

12.08.2000C 232 2000/C 232-0011 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/JV.51 -Bertelsmann/Mondadori/BOLItalia)C 232 2000/C 232-0012 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2114 -Sanpaolo/Schroders/Omega/CEG)C 232 2000/C 232-0013 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2033 -Metso/Svedala)C 232 2000/C 232-0010 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2045 -Salzgitter/Mannesmann-Röhrenwerke, ECSC.1336 -Mannesmann-Röhrenwerke)

11.08.2000C 231 2000/C 231-0009Renotification of a previouslynotified concentration (CaseCOMP/M.1783 - ZFGotha/GrazianoTrasmissioni/JV)C 231 2000/C 231-0010 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2075 -Newhouse/Jupiter/Scudder/M& G/JV)

10.08.2000C 229 2000/C 229-0003 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1913 -Lufthansa/Menzies/LGS/JV)C 229 2000/C 229-0004 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1987 -BASF/Bayer/Hoechst/DyStar)C 229 2000/C 229-0005 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2119 -E.ON/ACP/Schmalbach-Lubeca)C 229 2000/C 229-0006 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2099 -Hutchison/NTT DoCoMo/KPNMobile/JV)

08.08.2000C 225 2000/C 225-0023 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2086 -Deutsche Bank/HamburgischeImmobilien Handlung/DLI)C 225 2000/C 225-0020 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1951 -BT/Japan Telecom/VodafoneAirTouch/JV)C 225 2000/C 225-0021 Priornotification of a concentration(Cases COMP/ECSC.1340 andCOMP/M.2071 - Riva/Acciaio)C 225 2000/C 225-0022 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2057 -Randstad/VNU/JV)C 225 2000/C 225-0019 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2077 -

Clayton, Dubilier &Rice/Italtel)

05.08.2000C 224 2000/C 224-0022 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2015 -Totalfina/Saarberg/MMH)

04.08.2000C 223 2000/C 223-0004 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2095 -Sextant/Diehl)

03.08.2000C 221 2000/C 221-0006 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2035 -Doughty Hanson/Ranks HovisMcDougall)C 221 2000/C 221-0005 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1915 - PostOffice/TNT Group/SingaporePost)C 221 2000/C 221-0004 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2093 -Airtours/Frosch Touristic(FTI))

02.08.2000C 220 2000/C 220-0007 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2021 -Snecma/Labinal)C 220 2000/C 220-0006 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1980 -Volvo/Renault VI)

29.07.2000C 217 2000/C 217-0030 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2063 -Sei/Mitsubishi Electric)C 217 2000/C 217-0030 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1952 - RWEEnergie/Iberdrola/TarragonaPower)C 217 2000/C 217-0031 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2091 - HSBCPrivate EquityInvestments/BBA FrictionMaterials)



C 217 2000/C 217-0032Commission notice on asimplified procedure fortreatment of certainconcentrations under CouncilRegulation (EEC) No 4064/89C 217 2000/C 217-0029 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2000 -WPP/Young & Rubicam)

28.07.2000C 216 2000/C 216-0007 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2011 - ArlaFoods Hellas SA/DeltaSelections SA)C 216 2000/C 216-0006 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2078 - UBSCapital/Heiploeg ShellfishInternational)

25.07.2000C 212 2000/C 212-0017 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2056 - SoneraSystems/ICL Invia/Data-Info/JV)C 212 2000/C 212-0015 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/JV.45 -Bertelsmann/KooperativaFörbundet/BOL Nordic)C 212 2000/C 212-0016 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1922 -Bosch/Siemens/Atecs)

22.07.2000C 210 2000/C 210-0006 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2059 -Siemens/Dematic/Sachs/VDO)C 210 2000/C 210-0009 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1575 - ThyssenKrupp/VDM Evidal/KMESchmöle)C 210 2000/C 210-0008 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2050 -Vivendi/Canal+/Seagram)

C 210 2000/C 210-0009 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1878 -Pfizer/Warner-Lambert)C 210 2000/C 210-0007 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2060 -Bosch/Rexroth)

21.07.2000C 209 2000/C 209-0006 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1998 -Ford/Landrover)

19.07.2000C 205 2000/C 205-0009 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2016 - FranceTélécom/Orange)C 205 2000/C 205-0010 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1926 -Telefónica/Tyco/JV)C 205 2000/C 205-0008 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2032 - SCAPackaging/Metsä Corrugated)

18.07.2000C 203 2000/C 203-0006Renotification of a previouslynotified concentration (CaseCOMP/M.2052 - IndustriKapital/Alfa Laval Holding)C 203 2000/C 203-0007 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1940 -Framatome/Siemens/Cogema/JV)

15.07.2000C 202 2000/C 202-0007 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1979 -CDC/Banco Urquijo)C 202 2000/C 202-0005 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1946 -Bellsouth/SBC/JV)C 202 2000/C 202-0006 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2029 - Tate &Lyle/Amylum)

14.07.2000C 201 2000/C 201-0006 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2047 -Bayerische Hypo- undVereinsbank/IXOS/Mannesmann/memIQ)

13.07.2000C 198 2000/C 198-0005 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2054 -Secil/Holderbank/Cimpor)C 198 2000/C 198-0004 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2037 - BNP-Paribas/PHH)C 198 2000/C 198-0006 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1969 -UTC/Honeywell/i2/MyAircraft.com)C 198 2000/C 198-0007 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2051 - NordicCapital/HIAG/Nybron/Bauwerk)C 198 2000/C 198-0008 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1989 -Winterthur/Colonial)C 198 2000/C 198-0003 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2067 -ABB/UMOE)

12.07.2000C 196 2000/C 196-0010 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1898 - TUIGroup/GTT Holding)C 196 2000/C 196-0010Withdrawal of notification of aconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1991 -Trelleborg/Icopal)C 196 2000/C 196-0009 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2044 -Interbrew/Bass)C 196 2000/C 196-0008 Priornotification of a concentration



(Case COMP/M.2053 -Telenor/BellSouth/Sonofon)C 196 2000/C 196-0007 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2062 - RioTinto/North)

11.07.2000C 193 2000/C 193-0011 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2046 -Valeo/Robert Bosch/JV)C 193 2000/C 193-0010 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2023 -Brambles/Ermewa/JV)C 193 2000/C 193-0011 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2046 -Valeo/Robert Bosch/JV)C 193 2000/C 193-0010 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2023 -Brambles/Ermewa/JV)

08.07.2000C 190 2000/C 190-0013 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/JV.50 - CallahanInvest/Kabel Baden-Württemberg)C 190 2000/C 190-0015 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1814 -Bayer/Röhm/Makroform)C 190 2000/C 190-0014 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2036 -Valeo/Labinal)

07.07.2000C 188 2000/C 188-0005 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1954 -ACS/Sonera/Vivendi/Xfera)C 188 2000/C 188-0004Renotification of a previouslynotified concentration (CaseCOMP/M.1819/ECSC.1320 -Rheinbraun/OMV/Cokowi)C 188 2000/C 188-0003 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2025 - GECapital/BTPS/MEPC)

C 188 2000/C 188-0002 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1994 -Andersen Consulting/BT/JV)

06.07.2000C 187 2000/C 187-0008 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1907 -WOCO/Michelin)C 187 2000/C 187-0008 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1944 - HSBC/CCF)

05.07.2000C 186 2000/C 186-0007 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2052 - IndustriKapital/Alfa Laval Holding)C 186 2000/C 186-0006 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2008 -AOM/Air Liberté/Air Littoral)

04.07.2000C 185 2000/C 185-0005 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2028 -ABB/Bilfinger/MVVEnergie/JV)

01.07.2000C 184 2000/C 184-0029 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1982 -Telia/Oracle/Drutt)C 184 2000/C 184-0028 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1884 - Mondi/Frantschach/AssiDomän)

30.06.2000C 183 2000/C 183-0009 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1805 -Ferrovie delloStato/SchweizerischeBundesbahnen/JV)C 183 2000/C 183-0008 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1875 -Reuters/Equant - ProjectProton)C 183 2000/C 183-0008 Non-opposition to a notified

concentration (CaseCOMP/M.1960 -Carrefour/Marinopoulos)C 183 2000/C 183-0007 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2020 - MetsäSerla/Modo)

29.06.2000C 182 2000/C 182-0005 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1870 -ZF/Brembo/DFI)C 182 2000/C 182-0005Initiation of proceedings (CaseCOMP/M.1845 - AOL/TimeWarner)

28.06.2000C 180 2000/C 180-0008 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1993 -Rhodia/Raisio/JV)C 180 2000/C 180-0010 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/ECSC.1331 -Anglo American/Shell Coal)C 180 2000/C 180-0011 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2012 -CGNU/Aseval)C 180 2000/C 180-0009 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1949 -Western PowerDistribution/Hyder)C 180 2000/C 180-0010Initiation of proceedings (CaseCOMP/M.1852 - TimeWarner/EMI)

27.06.2000C 177 2000/C 177-0010Initiation of proceedings (CaseCOMP/M.1646 -CGD/Partest/BCP/Sairgroup/Portugalia)C 177 2000/C 177-0009 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2034 -Hagemayer (UK) Limited/WFElectrical plc)

24.06.2000C 175 2000/C 175-0022 Priornotification of a concentration



(Case COMP/M.1949 -Western PowerDistribution/Hyder)C 175 2000/C 175-0021 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2027 -Deutsche Bank/SAP/JV)

22.06.2000C 173 2000/C 173-0003 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1847 - GM/SAAB)C 173 2000/C 173-0003 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1854 - EmersonElectric/Ericsson EnergySystems)

21.06.2000C 171 2000/C 171-0006 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1799 - BSCH/BancoTotta Y CPP/A.Champalimaud)C 171 2000/C 171-0006 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1629 - KnorrBremse/Mannesmann)

20.06.2000C 170 2000/C 170-0005 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1943 -Telefónica/Endemol)C 170 2000/C 170E-0131Written question E-1956/99 byGerhard Hager to theCommissionSubject: Amendment ofEuropean competition lawC 170 2000/C 170-0007 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/JV.32 -Granaria/Ültje/Intersnack/MayHolding)C 170 2000/C 170-0007 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1885 - BabcockBorsig/VA Technologie/Pipe-Tec)

C 170 2000/C 170-0006 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1846 - GlaxoWellcome/SmithklineBeecham)C 170 2000/C 170-0006 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1895 - OceanGroup/Exel (NFC))C 170 2000/C 170E-0142Written question P-2070/99 byConcepció Ferrer to theCommissionSubject: Situation in theEuropean distribution sectorfollowing the merger ofPromodes and Carrefour

17.06.2000C 169 2000/C 169-0007 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1908 -Alcatel/Newbridge Networks)C 169 2000/C 169-0007 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1780 -LVMH/Prada/Fendi)C 169 2000/C 169-0008 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1959 -Meritor/Arvin)C 169 2000/C 169-0010 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1925 - Scottish& Newcastle/Groupe Danone)C 169 2000/C 169-0009 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1839 -Halbergerhütte/Bopp &Reuther/Muffenrohr)C 169 2000/C 169-0008 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2026 - ClearChannel Communications/SFXEntertainment)

16.06.2000C 167 2000/C 167-0007 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1964 - Planet

Internet/Fortis Bank/Mine.beJV)C 167 2000/C 167-0006 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1936 -Siemens BusinessServices/LufthansaSystems/Synavion)C 167 2000/C 167-0006 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2002 -Preussag/Thomson)

15.06.2000C 165 2000/C 165-0010 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/JV.48 -Vodafone/Vivendi/Canal+)C 165 2000/C 165-0009 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1939 - Rexam(PLM)/American National Can)

14.06.2000C 164 2000/C 164-0005 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1684 -Carrefour/Promodès)C 164 2000/C 164-0004 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2024 -Ivensys/Baan)C 164 2000/C 164-0003 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1892 - SaraLee/Courtaulds)

10.06.2000C 162 2000/C 162-0030 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1996 -SCA/Graninge/JV)C 162 2000/C 162-0029 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1783 - ZFGotha/GrazianoTrasmissioni/JV)C 162 2000/C 162-0028 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1991 -Trelleborg/Icopal)

09.06.2000C 161 2000/C 161-0002 Priornotification of a concentration



(Case COMP/M.1972 -Granada/Compass)

08.06.2000C 159 2000/C 159-0004 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1900 -Solvay/Plastic Omnium)C 159 2000/C 159-0006 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1887 - Credit SuisseFirst Boston/Gala Group)C 159 2000/C 159-0005 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1877 -Boskalis/HBG)

07.06.2000C 157 2000/C 157-0003Initiation of proceedings (CaseCOMP/M.1879 -Boeing/Hughes)C 157 2000/C 157-0002 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2006 -Enron/MG)

06.06.2000C 155 2000/C 155-0007 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1978 -Telecom Italia/NewsTelevision/Stream)

01.06.2000C 153 2000/C 153-0005 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2003 -Carlyle/Gruppo Riello)C 153 2000/C 153-0003 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1859 -ENI/GALP)C 153 2000/C 153-0004 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1958 -Bertelsmann AG/GroupeBruxelles Lambert SA(GBL)/Pearson Television)C 153 2000/C 153-0006 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1998 -Ford/Land Rover)C 153 2000/C 153-0008 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case

COMP/JV.44 - Hitachi/NEC-DRAM/JV)C 153 2000/C 153-0007 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1997 -Schroders/Liberty InternationalPensions)

STATE AID

23.09.2000C 272 2000/C 272-0042Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88of the EC Treaty - Cases wherethe Commission raises noobjectionsC 272 2000/C 272-0040Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88of the EC Treaty - Cases wherethe Commission raises noobjectionsC 272 2000/C 272-0030 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) of the EC Treaty,concerning Case C 36/2000 (exNN 135/99) - aid in favour ofGraf von Henneberg PorzellanGmbH - GermanyC 272 2000/C 272-0022 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) of the EC Treaty,concerning Case C 4/2000 (exNN 53/99) - State aid in favourof manure processing projects -the Kingdom of the NetherlandsC 272 2000/C 272-0017 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) of the EC Treatyconcerning Case C 64/98 (exNN 95/97) - yearly grants toIstituto Poligrafico e Zeccadello StatoC 272 2000/C 272-0002 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) of the EC Treaty,concerning Case C 28/2000 (ex

NN 52/99) - Aid in favour ofHirschfelder Leinen und TextilGmbH (Hiltex), Saxony -GermanyC 272 2000/C 272-0044Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88of the EC Treaty - Cases wherethe Commission raises noobjections

22.09.2000L 238 2000/L 238-0050Commission Decision of 11April 2000 on the State aidimplemented by the FederalRepublic of Germany forSystem MicroelectronicInnovation GmbH,Frankfurt/Oder (Brandenburg)(notified under documentnumber C(2000) 1063)

16.09.2000C 266 2000/C 266-0028Corrigendum to theauthorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88of the EC Treaty Cases wherethe Commission raises noobjections (OJ C 258 of9.9.2000)C 266 2000/C 266-0009 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) of the EC Treaty,concerning aid/measure C46/2000 (ex N 563/1999) -Viridian Growth FundC 266 2000/C 266-0004Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88of the EC Treaty - Cases wherethe Commission raises noobjectionsC 266 2000/C 266-0002Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88of the EC Treaty - Cases wherethe Commission raises noobjections

12.09.2000L 230 2000/L 230-0013Decision No 2/2000 of the EU-Romania Association Council



of 17 July 2000 extending byfive years the period withinwhich any public aid granted byRomania will be assessedtaking into account the fact thatRomania is to be regarded as anarea identical to those areas ofthe Community described inArticle 87(3)(a) of the Treatyestablishing the EuropeanCommunity

09.09.2000L 229 2000/L 229-0044Commission Decision of 14March 2000 on State aidgranted by Germany to ElproAG and its successorcompanies (notified underdocument number C(2000)808)C 259 2000/C 259-0016Judgment of the Court of FirstInstance of 29 June 2000 inCase T-234/95: DSGDradenauer StahlgesellschaftmbH v Commission of theEuropean Communities (ECSC- Action for annulment - Stateaid - Meaning of aid - Criterionof the private investor -Economic unit - Amount of theaid - Misuse of powers)C 258 2000/C 258-0004Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88of the EC Treaty - Cases wherethe Commission raises noobjectionsC 258 2000/C 258-0002Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88of the EC Treaty - Cases wherethe Commission raises noobjectionsC 258 2000/C 258-0004Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88of the EC Treaty - Cases wherethe Commission raises noobjectionsC 258 2000/C 258-0005Amendments to the Guidelineson national regional aid

C 258 2000/C 258-0006 Noticeon the extension of the periodof validity of the Communityframework for State aid to themotor vehicle IndustryC 258 2000/C 258-0003Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88of the EC Treaty - Cases wherethe Commission raises noobjections

07.09.2000L 227 2000/L 227-0024Commission Decision of 2 June1999 concerning State aidgranted by Italy to Seleco SpA(notified under documentnumber C(1999) 1524)

02.09.2000C 252 2000/C 252-0021Corrigendum to authorisationfor State aid pursuant toArticles 87 and 88 of the ECTreaty (Cases where theCommission raises noobjections) (OJ C 232 of12.8.2000)C 252 2000/C 252-0002Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88of the EC Treaty - Cases wherethe Commission raises noobjections

22.08.2000L 211 2000/L 211-0007Commission Decision of 18January 2000 on the State aidgranted by Germany to LindeAG (notified under documentnumber C(2000) 64)

19.08.2000C 237 2000/C 237-0007Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88of the EC Treaty - Cases wherethe Commission raises noobjections

17.08.2000L 207 2000/L 207-0017Commission Decision of 22December 1999 on State aidwhich Italy plans to grant toFiat Auto SpA for its Mirafiori

Meccanica plant (Turin)(notified under documentnumber C(1999) 5211)

15.08.2000L 206 2000/L 206-0006Commission Decision of 8September 1999 on aid grantedby France to Stardust Marine(notified under documentnumber C(1999) 3148)

12.08.2000C 233 2000/C 233-0008Judgment of the Court of 23May 2000 in Case C-106/98 P:Comité d'entreprise de laSociété française de productionand Others v Commission ofthe European Communities(Appeal - Natural and legalpersons - Directly andindividually concerned by themeasure - State aid - Decisiondeclaring aid incompatible withthe common market - Tradeunions and works councils)C 233 2000/C 233-0003Judgment of the Court of 16May 2000 in Case C-83/98 P:French Republic v LadbrokeRacing Ltd and Commission ofthe European Communities(Appeal - Competition - Stateaid)C 232 2000/C 232-0002 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) of the EC Treaty,concerning Case C 33/98 -Spain: Aid involved in theprivatisation arrangements ofBabcock Wilcox España SA(BWE)C 232 2000/C 232-0007Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88of the EC Treaty - Cases wherethe Commission raises noobjectionsC 232 2000/C 232-0010Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88of the EC Treaty - Cases where



the Commission raises noobjectionsC 232 2000/C 232-0017Corrigendum to the Communityguidelines for State aid in theagriculture sector (OJ C 28 of1.2.2000)

08.08.2000C 225 2000/C 225E-0191Written question E-2681/99 byLuis Berenguer Fuster to theCommissionSubject: Statements by theSpanish government on theunresolved issue of state aid tothe electricity sectorC 225 2000/C 225E-0191Written question E-2682/99 byLuis Berenguer Fuster to theCommissionSubject: Decision on anunresolved case concerningstate aids

05.08.2000L 199 2000/L 199-0083Decision No 2/2000 of the EU-Lithuania Association Councilof 24 July 2000 extending byfive years the period withinwhich any public aid granted byLithuania will be assessedtaking into account the fact thatLithuania is to be regarded asan area identical to those areasof the Community described inArticle 87(3)(a) of the Treatyestablishing the EuropeanCommunityC 224 2000/C 224-0002Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88of the EC Treaty - Cases wherethe Commission raises noobjections

01.08.2000C 219 2000/C 219E-0057Written question E-1978/99 byUrsula Schleicher to theCommissionSubject: Draft Commissioncommunication on theapplication of Articles 92 and

93 of the EC Treaty to state aidin the form of loan guaranteesC 219 2000/C 219E-0144Written question P-2299/99 byHanja Maij-Weggen to theCommissionSubject: Tax arrangementswhich distort competitionwithin the EU

29.07.2000L 193 2000/L 193-0075Commission Directive2000/52/EC of 26 July 2000amending Directive80/723/EEC on thetransparency of financialrelations between MemberStates and public undertakingsL 193 2000/L 193-0079Commission Decision of 8 July1999 on aid granted by Franceto the Crédit Agricole group inconnection with the collectingand keeping of notaries'deposits in rural municipalities(notified under documentnumber C(1999) 2147)C 217 2000/C 217-0002Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88of the EC Treaty - Cases wherethe Commission raises noobjectionsC 217 2000/C 217-0003Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88of the EC Treaty - Cases wherethe Commission raises noobjectionsC 217 2000/C 217-0005 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) of the EC Treaty,concerning aid C 29/2000 (ex N457/99) - Ford GenkC 217 2000/C 217-0020 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) of the EC Treaty,concerning State measures C27/2000 (ex NN 84/98) - infavour of Deckel MahoSeebach GmbH - Germany

C 217 2000/C 217-0010 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) of the EC Treaty,concerning aid measure C19/2000 (ex NN 147/98) - Aidin favour of TechnischeGlaswerke Ilmenau GmbH -Germany

27.07.2000L 191 2000/L 191-0030Commission Decision of 29March 2000 on the aid schemeimplemented by Belgium underArticle 29ter of the EconomicExpansion Act of 30 December1970, as amended by theDecree of 25 June 1992(notified under documentnumber C(2000)1007)

22.07.2000C 211 2000/C 211-0018Judgment of the Court of FirstInstance of 15 June 2000 inJoined Cases T-298/97, T-312/97, T-313/97, T-315/97, T-600/97 to T-607/97, T-1/97, T-3/98 to T-6/98 and T-23/98:Alzetta Mauro and Others vCommission of the EuropeanCommunities (Transport ofgoods by road - State aid -Action for annulment - Whethertrade between Member Statesaffected and competitiondistorted - Conditions for aderogation from the prohibitionlaid down by Article 92(1) ofthe EC Treaty (now, afteramendment, Article 87(1) EC) -New aid or existing aid -Principle of the protection oflegitimate expectations -Principle of proportionality -Statement of reasons)C 211 2000/C 211-0017Judgment of the Court of FirstInstance of 13 June 2000 inJoined Cases T-204/97 and T-270/97: EPAC - Empresa para aAgroalimentação e Cereais SAv Commission of the EuropeanCommunities (Action for



annulment - State Aid - Article92(1) and (3) of the EC Treaty(now, after amendment, Article87(1) and (3) EC) - Meaning ofaid - State guarantee for thefinancing of a publicundertaking - Suspension of aid- No need to adjudicate)C 210 2000/C 210-0002Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88of the EC Treaty - Cases wherethe Commission raises noobjectionsC 210 2000/C 210-0003Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88of the EC Treaty - Cases wherethe Commission raises noobjections

18.07.2000C 203 2000/C 203E-0166 E-2353/99 by Raffaele Costa tothe CommissionSubject: State aid granted toRAI by ItalyC 203 2000/C 203E-0028 E-1701/99 by Raffaele Costa tothe CommissionSubject: State aid and the RAIaffairC 203 2000/C 203E-0111 E-2004/99 by Luis BerenguerFuster to the CommissionSubject: State aid to the TerraMítica theme park in Benidorm(Alicante) and its compatibilitywith the common marketC 203 2000/C 203E-0093 E-1942/99 by Isidoro SánchezGarcía to the CommissionSubject: Implementing specificmeasures for the ultraperipheralregions in the field of state aid

15.07.2000C 202 2000/C 202-0016Corrigendum to authorisationfor State aid pursuant toArticles 87 and 88 of the ECTreaty - Cases where theCommission raises noobjections (OJ C 184 of 1 July2000)

C 202 2000/C 202-0002Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88of the EC Treaty - Cases wherethe Commission raises noobjections

08.07.2000C 190 2000/C 190-0009 StateAid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article6(5) of Decision2496/96/ECSC, concerning aidC 24/2000 (ex N 215/99) -Voest Alpine Stahl Linz GmbH- investment aid for waterpurification facilitiesC 190 2000/C 190-0004 StateAid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) of the EC Treaty,concerning the measure C14/2000 (ex N 613/99)Netherlands - exemption frommineral levies under the manurelawC 190 2000/C 190-0003Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88of the EC Treaty - Cases wherethe Commission raises noobjectionsC 190 2000/C 190-0002Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88of the EC Treaty - Cases wherethe Commission raises noobjections

06.07.2000L 165 2000/L 165-0025Commission Decision of 16November 1999 on aid grantedby France to GoodingConsumer Electronics Ltd inconnection with the purchase ofthe former Grundig plant atCreutzwald (notified underdocument number C(1999)4230)L 165 2000/L 165-0018Commission Decision of 16November 1999 on aid whichFrance is planning to grant toCofidur to help it take over the

former Gooding (ex Grundig)plant at Creutzwald (notifiedunder document numberC(1999) 4229)

01.07.2000C 184 2000/C 184-0025Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88of the EC Treaty - Cases wherethe Commission raises noobjectionsC 184 2000/C 184-0024Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88of the EC Treaty - Cases wherethe Commission raises noobjectionsC 184 2000/C 184-0023Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88of the EC Treaty - Cases wherethe Commission raises noobjectionsC 184 2000/C 184-0020Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88of the EC Treaty - Cases wherethe Commission raises noobjectionsC 184 2000/C 184-0018Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88of the EC Treaty - Cases wherethe Commission raises noobjectionsC 184 2000/C 184-0010 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) of the EC Treaty,concerning measure C 15/2000(ex N 638/99) - Modifiedreduced social contributions aidschemeC 184 2000/C 184-0002 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article6(5) of Commission DecisionNo 2496/96/ECSC of 18December 1996 establishingCommunity rules for State aidto the steel industry, concerningaid C 25/2000 (ex N 145/99 andN 749/99) notified by Italy to



the ECSC steel companies,Lucchini SpA and SiderpotenzaSpAC 184 2000/C 184-0025Extension of the validity of theCommunity guidelines on stateaid for environmentalprotection

29.06.2000L 156 2000/L 156-0039Commission Decision of 29March 2000 on state aidimplemented by Germany infavour of Kvaerner WarnowWerft GmbH (1999) andamending Decision1999/675/EC (notified underdocument number C(2000)1008)

28.06.2000L 155 2000/L 155-0052Commission Decision of 22December 1999 on the aidscheme which France isplanning to implement infavour of the French port sector(notified under documentnumber C(1999) 5204)

24.06.2000C 176 2000/C 176-0020Judgment of the Court of FirstInstance of 10 May 2000 inCase T-46/97: SIC - SociedadeIndependente de ComunicaçãoSA v Commission of theEuropean Communities(Financing of public televisionchannels - Complaint - StateAid - Failure to open theprocedure under Article 93(2)of the EC Treaty (now Article88(2) EC) - Action forannulment)C 175 2000/C 175-0020Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88of the EC Treaty - Cases wherethe Commission raises noobjectionsC 175 2000/C 175-0019Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88of the EC Treaty - Cases where

the Commission raises noobjectionsC 175 2000/C 175-0011 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) of the EC Treatyconcerning aid measure C16/2000 (ex N 792/99) - Italianregional aid map for the period2000-2006 in ItalyC 175 2000/C 175-0006 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) of the EC Treaty,concerning aid C 22/2000 (ex N129/2000) - State aid in favourof Dutch manure transportcompanies

23.06.2000L 150 2000/L 150-0064Commission Decision of 22December 1999 on State aidimplemented by Germany infavour of EntstaubungstechnikMagdeburg GmbH (notifiedunder document numberC(1999) 5205)L 150 2000/L 150-0050Commission Decision of 25November 1999 on aid to firmsin Venice and Chioggia by wayof relief from social securitycontributions under Laws Nos30/1997 and 206/1995 (notifiedunder document numberC(1999) 4268)L 150 2000/L 150-0038Commission Decision of 20July 1999 on State aid to begranted by Germany to CBWChemie GmbH, Bitterfeld-Wolfen (notified underdocument number C(1999)3272)L 150 2000/L 150-0001Commission Decision of 8 July1999 on a measureimplemented by the FederalRepublic of Germany forWestdeutsche Landesbank -Girozentrale (WestLB)(notified under documentnumber C(1999) 2265)

20.06.2000C 170 2000/C 170E-0125Written question E-1925/99 byLuis Berenguer Fuster to theCommissionSubject: Inclusion of specificdata in the state aid proceedingsrelating to the Spanishelectricity sectorC 170 2000/C 170E-0073Written question E-1680/99 byKarl von Wogau to theCommissionSubject: Distortion ofcompetition resulting fromEuropean Union subsidiesC 170 2000/C 170E-0095Written question P-1889/99 byLuis Berenguer Fuster to theCommissionSubject: Possible conflict ofinterests in proceedings inrelation to state aidC 170 2000/C 170E-0095Written question E-1761/99 byLuis Berenguer Fuster to theCommissionSubject: Proceedings opened inrelation to state aid in theSpanish electricity sector

17.06.2000L 144 2000/L 144-0027Decision No 1/2000 of the EU-Bulgaria Association Councilof 28 February 2000 extendingby five years the period withinwhich any public aid granted byBulgaria will be assessed takinginto account the fact thatBulgaria is to be regarded as anarea identical to those areas ofthe Community described inArticle 87(3)(a) of the Treatyestablishing the EuropeanCommunityC 169 2000/C 169-0003Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88of the EC Treaty - Cases wherethe Commission raises noobjectionsC 169 2000/C 169-0002Authorisation for State aid



pursuant to Articles 87 and 88of the EC Treaty - Cases wherethe Commission raises noobjections

10.06.2000C 163 2000/C 163-0008 CaseC-61/00 P: Appeal brought on23 February 2000 byVolkswagen AG andVolkswagen Sachsen GmbHagainst the judgment deliveredon 15 December 1999 by theSecond Chamber (ExtendedComposition) of the Court ofFirst Instance of the EuropeanCommunities in Joined CasesT-132/96 and T-143/96between Freistaat Sachsen,Volkswagen AG andVolkswagen Sachsen GmbH, ofthe one part, and theCommission of the EuropeanCommunities of the other partC 163 2000/C 163-0007 CaseC-57/00 P: Appeal brought on23 February 2000 by FreistaatSachsen against the judgmentdelivered on 15 December 1999by the Second Chamber(Extended Composition) of theCourt of First Instance of theEuropean Communities inJoined Cases T-132/96 and T-143/96 between FreistaatSachsen, Volkswagen AG andVolkswagen Sachsen GmbH, ofthe one part, and theCommission of the EuropeanCommunities of the other partC 162 2000/C 162-0009 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) of the EC Treaty,concerning aid insert C 21/2000(ex NN 158/99) - Ojala-yhtymäOy - Investment in HaapajärviC 162 2000/C 162-0023Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88of the EC Treaty - Cases wherethe Commission raises noobjections

C 162 2000/C 162-0004 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) (ex-Article 93(2)) of theEC Treaty concerning a numberof aid measures C 71/98 (ex N693/97 and NN 130/98) - Italy -granted under the rules on therecovery and completion ofserviced small business areasdeveloped by Sirap SpA andthe instructions issued tomunicipalities for the allocationof plots and industrial buildingsC 162 2000/C 162-0022Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88of the EC Treaty - Cases wherethe Commission raises noobjectionsC 162 2000/C 162-0015 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) of the EC Treaty,concerning aid C 20/2000 (exNN 146/98) - Sniace SA -Spain08.06.2000L 137 2000/L 137-0028 EFTASurveillance AuthorityDecision No 275/99/COL of 17November 1999 introducingguidelines on State aid elementsin sales of land and buildingsby public authorities andamending for the 20th time theProcedural and SubstantiveRules in the field of State aidL 137 2000/L 137-0020 EFTASurveillance AuthorityDecision No 149/99/COL of 30June 1999 introducingguidelines on the application ofState aid rules to measuresrelating to direct businesstaxation and amending for the19th time the Procedural andSubstantive Rules in the field ofState aidL 137 2000/L 137-0011 EFTASurveillance AuthorityDecision No 113/99/COL of 4June 1999 introducing

guidelines on State aid fortraining and amending for the18th time the Procedural andSubstantive Rules in the field ofState aidL 137 2000/L 137-0001Commission Decision of 20July 1999 on aid granted byItaly to Sangalli ManfredoniaVetro (notified under documentnumber C (1999) 2895)L 135 2000/L 135-0036 EFTASurveillance AuthorityDecision No 276/99/COL of 17November 1999 including newguidelines on State aid toshipbuilding granted asdevelopment assistance to adeveloping country andamending for the twenty-firsttime the Procedural andSubstantive Rules in the Fieldof State aid

PRESS RELEASES1.6.2000 - 30.9.2000

All texts are available from theCommission's press releasedatabase RAPID at:http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start.Enter reference (e.g.: IP/00/544)in the "Reference" input box onthe research form to retrieve textof a press release. Press releaseson competition matters can beconsulted daily from DGCompetition's website at:http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg04/pressre.htm

Note: languages available vary fordifferent press releases.

ANTITRUST

IP/00/1064 Date: 2000-09-27Competition: Commission proposesregulation that extensively amendssystem for implementing Articles 81and 82 of the Treaty



IP/00/1043 Date: 2000-09-22 Theprices of telecoms leased lines arestill an obstacle to the creation of e-EuropeIP/00/1036 Date: 2000-09-21Commission opens an in-depthinvestigation into Metso'sacquisition of SvedalaIP/00/1030 Date: 2000-09-20Commission decides to reject wine-production scheme in FranceIP/00/1028 Date: 2000-09-20Commission imposes a 43 millionfine on Opel Nederland B.V. forobstruction of new car exports in theNetherlandsIP/00/1014 Date: 2000-09-15Triumph's export ban formotorcycles brought to an end uponCommission's interventionIP/00/971 Date: 2000-09-05Commission gives green light toCofunds Ltd, an on-linesupermarket for retail mutual fundsIP/00/874 Date: 2000-07-27Commission acts againstdiscriminatory landing fees atSpanish and Italian airportsIP/00/846 Date: 2000-07-26Commission takes Spain to Court ofJustice over failure to recover illegaltax credits to public shipyardsIP/00/835 Date: 2000-07-25Commission acts to preventdiscrimination between airlinecomputer reservation systemsIP/00/739 Date: 2000-07-18 EU andJapan reach mutual understandingon substantial elements of anenvisaged co-operation agreementin the competition fieldIP/00/784 Date: 2000-07-14Commission releases list of banks incartel investigationIP/00/781 Date: 2000-07-13 Carprices in the EU: price differentialsremain highIP/00/766 Date: 2000-07-12Commission adopts a draftCompetition Directive consolidatingexisting Directives on competitionin the telecommunications markets

IP/00/765 Date: 2000-07-12Commission asks incumbentoperators to provide information onlocal loop accessIP/00/763 Date: 2000-07-12Commission approves rules onseparation of accounts for publicservice providersIP/00/725 Date: 2000-07-06Commission decision of January1998 against Volkswagen isconfirmed by the European Court ofFirst InstanceIP/00/713 Date: 2000-07-05Commission takes action againstEditions Nathan to safeguardcompetition in educational materialIP/00/709 Date: 2000-07-05Commission to recover 350.8million euro worth of CAPexpenditure from Member StatesIP/00/704 Date: 2000-07-04Commission warns banks in fourcountries about euro-zone exchangechargesIP/00/698 Date: 2000-07-03Commission opens in-depthinvestigation into the acquisition ofPerstorp by Industri KapitalIP/00/684 Date: 2000-06-29Commission closes competitioncase after Saeco implementsinternational guarantee for itsproductsIP/00/651 Date: 2000-06-22 NewGerman system of fixed bookedprices does not violate EUcompetition rules as long as certainconditions are respectedIP/00/591 Date: 2000-06-08Commission approves ticketingarrangements for Euro 2000IP/00/590 Date: 2000-06-08 MarioMonti launches "Competition day"in Lisbon on 9 June

MERGERS

IP/00/1067 Date: 2000-09-27Commission clears Boeing'sacquisition of the satellite businessof Hughes Electronics

IP/00/1063 Date: 2000-09-27Commission opens in-depth probeinto the proposed acquisition ofMetsä Tissue by SCA Mölynlycke.IP/00/1058 Date: 2000-09-25Commission authorises jointventure between PSA and VivendiIP/00/1055 Date: 2000-09-25Commission clears acquisition ofjoint control of Bravida by Telenorand Procuritas Capital Partners.IP/00/1054 Date: 2000-09-25Commission authorises acquisitionby Schroder Ventures of Veba'sMemecIP/00/1053 Date: 2000-09-25Commission clears acquisition ofjoint control over Johns ManvilleIP/00/1052 Date: 2000-09-25Commission approves acquisition ofItaldata's hardware business byFlextronicsIP/00/1051 Date: 2000-09-25Commission clears Deutsche Bankand Enel acquisition of joint controlover Rio NuovoIP/00/1050 Date: 2000-09-25Commission clears Dutch mobiletelephony venture betweenBelgacom, Tele Danmark and T-MobileIP/00/1049 Date: 2000-09-25Commission clears purchase ofBASF's Novolen polypropylenetechnology businessIP/00/1020 Date: 2000-09-19Commission clears way forAlstom's takeover of FiatFerroviariaIP/00/1017 Date: 2000-09-18Commission clears NovaBankventure between Banco ComercialPortugues and InteramericanIP/00/1013 Date: 2000-09-15Commission clears Salzgitter buy ofsteel tubes makerMannesmannröhren-WerkeIP/00/1002 Date: 2000-09-13Commission clears joint buy ofEutectic by Messer Industrie andCarlyle Europe partnersIP/00/1001 Date: 2000-09-13Commission clears Unión Fenosa



stake in Spain's Cable i Televisió deCatalunya (Menta)IP/00/1000 Date: 2000-09-13Commission approves acquisition ofsole control in Italian tour operatorAlpitur by IfilIP/00/993 Date: 2000-09-12Commission clears takeover bySanpaolo IMI and MWCR Lux oftwo Italian manufacturersIP/00/992 Date: 2000-09-12Commission clears creation of jointventure Ciberion by BritishAmerican Ventures and Cap GeminiErnst & YoungIP/00/991 Date: 2000-09-12Commission clears Swedish jointventure, Drutt, between Telia ofSweden and Oracle of the USAIP/00/990 Date: 2000-09-12Commission approves acquisition ofMcKechnie by CinvenIP/00/989 Date: 2000-09-12Commission clears France's FeuVert stake in Spanish car repairerAutocenter DelautoIP/00/979 Date: 2000-09-06Commission authorises BASF totake stake in DyStarIP/00/972 Date: 2000-09-05Commission clears the acquisitionby Toyota Motor Corporation of itsUK distributor Toyota (GB) PLCIP/00/970 Date: 2000-09-05Commission authorises the creationof the joint venture BOL Italia byBertelsmann AG and MondadoriS.p.A.IP/00/969 Date: 2000-09-05Commission clears acquisition byClayton Dubilier & Rice of ItaltelIP/00/968 Date: 2000-09-05Commission clears creation of ajoint venture between BT, JapanTelecom and Vodafone in JapanIP/00/967 Date: 2000-09-05Commission authorises mergerbetween ZF Gotha and GrazianoTrassmissioniIP/00/962 Date: 2000-09-04Commission clears Volvo'sacquisition of Renault's truck

business subject to significantundertakingsIP/00/960 Date: 2000-09-01Commission clears joint venture ofTotalfina and SaarbergIP/00/957 Date: 2000-08-31Commission approvesNewMonday.com joint venturebetween Randstad and VNU (bothNL)IP/00/955 Date: 2000-08-30Commission gives Siemensconditional go-ahead to take controlof Mannesmann subsidiariesDematic, VDO and Sachs. Bosch'sacquisition of Rexroth is still underexaminationIP/00/954 Date: 2000-08-30Commission authorises jointventure between Sextant and DiehlIP/00/953 Date: 2000-08-30Commission authorises acquisitionby Riva (Italy) of Société des Aciersd'Armature pour le Béton (France)IP/00/952 Date: 2000-08-30Commission clears acquisition byMenzies (UK) of joint control ofLufthansa Ground Services (UK)IP/00/951 Date: 2000-08-30Commission approves full take-overof Frosch Touristik (FTI) byAirtours plc.IP/00/949 Date: 2000-08-28Commission approves joint venturebetween Deutsche Bank and theWarburg banking groupIP/00/948 Date: 2000-08-28Commission authorises SCAPackaging acquisition of MetsäCorrugated, subject to conditionsIP/00/947 Date: 2000-08-28Commission authorises Snecma'sacquisition of LabinalIP/00/945 Date: 2000-08-25Commission clears acquisition byDoughty Hanson & Co Limited ofRanks Hovis McDougall Group.IP/00/944 Date: 2000-08-25Commission clears joint venture ofE.ON and Allianz Capital PartnerIP/00/943 Date: 2000-08-25Commission clears acquisition ofYoung & Rubicam by WPP

IP/00/940 Date: 2000-08-23Commission refers Interbrew/Bassmerger to the UK competitionauthoritiesIP/00/939 Date: 2000-08-22Commission clears Sei andMitsubishi Electric Europe jointventure for provision of facilitymanagement services in Italy.IP/00/938 Date: 2000-08-22Commission clears acquisition byHSBC of sole control of part of theBBA Friction of the BBA Group,plc.IP/00/937 Date: 2000-08-22Commission authorises jointventure between Arla Foods Hellasand DeltaIP/00/936 Date: 2000-08-22Commission clears a joint venturebetween Sonera Systems and ICLInviaIP/00/935 Date: 2000-08-22Commission approves take-over ofHeiploeg Shellfish InternationalB.V. by UBS Capital B.V.IP/00/934 Date: 2000-08-22Commission approves joint ventureof RWE and IberdrolaIP/00/905 Date: 2000-08-02Commission clears acquisition byCallahan of a second DeutscheTelekom regional cable TV networkIP/00/904 Date: 2000-08-02Commission clears Rio Tintotakeover bid for Australia's NorthTXT: FRIP/00/903 Date: 2000-08-02Commission clears acquisition ofjoint control of COKOWI by OMVand RheinbraunIP/00/901 Date: 2000-08-01Commission clears mobiletelephony joint venture in Spain.IP/00/900 Date: 2000-08-01Commission authorises acquisitionof Assidomän paper and packagingcompanies by Mondi/FrantschachIP/00/896 Date: 2000-07-31Commission approves theVolbroker.com electronic brokeragejoint venture between six majorbanks



IP/00/895 Date: 2000-07-31Commission approves acquisition ofPHH Europe Companies by BNP-ParibasIP/00/894 Date: 2000-07-31Commission clears joint venturebetween Andersen Consulting andBritish TelecommunicationsIP/00/893 Date: 2000-07-31Commission authorises two Asianjoint ventures between Valeo andRobert Bosch GmbH.IP/00/884 Date: 2000-07-28Commission clears AOM buy of AirLiberté and TAT European AirlinesIP/00/883 Date: 2000-07-28Commission clears acquisition ofjoint control of UK real estatecompany MEPCIP/00/864 Date: 2000-07-27Commission clears Preussag'sacquisition of Thomson travelIP/00/844 Date: 2000-07-26Commission clears merger ofagrochemical businesses ofAstraZeneca and Novartis, subjectto substantial divestitures.IP/00/843 Date: 2000-07-26Commission clears joint venturebetween ABB, BILFINGER andMVV ENERGIEIP/00/825 Date: 2000-07-24Commission clears acquisition ofShell Coal Holdings by AngloAmericanIP/00/824 Date: 2000-07-24Commission authorises jointventure between Rhodia and RaisioIP/00/823 Date: 2000-07-24Commission clears acquisition byCGNU of Aseguradora Valencianain insurance sectorIP/00/821 Date: 2000-07-24Commission clears Vizzavi Internetportal venture between Vodafone,Vivendi and Canal+ subject toconditionsIP/00/814 Date: 2000-07-20Commission clears merger betweenbeverage cans producers Rexam andAmerican National Can, subject tocommitments

IP/00/808 Date: 2000-07-19European Commission approvesconditional funding forTrasmediterráneaIP/00/800 Date: 2000-07-19Commission clears Pirelli'sacquisition of BICC's power cablesplantsIP/00/795 Date: 2000-07-18Commission clears acquisition ofWF Electrical by HagemeyerIP/00/790 Date: 2000-07-17Commission clears purchase of SFXEntertainment by Clear ChannelCommunicationsIP/00/788 Date: 2000-07-14Commission clears Western PowerDistribution acquisition of HyderIP/00/783 Date: 2000-07-14Commission approves e-commercejoint venture between DeutscheBank and SAPIP/00/764 Date: 2000-07-12Commission fines Mitsubishi forfailing to supply information onKvaerner/Ahlström joint ventureIP/00/755 Date: 2000-07-12Commission clears Telefónica buyof EndemolIP/00/754 Date: 2000-07-12Commission clears acquisition ofDanone's beer businesses byScottish & NewcastleIP/00/753 Date: 2000-07-12Commission clears acquisition ofDyno by Industri Kapital subject tocommitmentsIP/00/743 Date: 2000-07-11Commission clears Belgian jointventure between Planet Internet andFortis BankIP/00/734 Date: 2000-07-10Commission clears Invensyspurchase of Dutch softwarecompany BaanIP/00/733 Date: 2000-07-07Microsoft gives up joint controlover Telewest as Commissionobjects to dealIP/00/730 Date: 2000-07-07Commission approves setting up ofSynavion by Siemens and Lufthansa

IP/00/724 Date: 2000-07-06Commission clears joint venturebetween Svenska Cellulosa andGraningeIP/00/712 Date: 2000-07-05Commission clears Germanconstruction joint venture betweenSaint Gobain and IWKAIP/00/711 Date: 2000-07-05Commission clears Enron's takeoverbid for metals trader MGIP/00/710 Date: 2000-07-05Commission clears merger betweenDutch dredgers BoskalisWestminster and Hollandse BetonGroepIP/00/697 Date: 2000-07-03Commission clears BASF'sacquisition of American Cyanamid,subject to conditionsIP/00/695 Date: 2000-06-30Commission clears joint control ofStream by Telecom Italia and NewsTelevisionIP/00/694 Date: 2000-06-30Commission clears merger betweenGranada and Compass GroupIP/00/693 Date: 2000-06-30Commission clears purchase ofLand Rover by FordIP/00/692 Date: 2000-06-30Commission clears ENI stake inPortuguese oil and gas companyGALPDocument Number: IP/00/691 Date:2000-06-30 Commission clears theacquisition of Pearson TV byBertelsmann and GBLIP/00/690 Date: 2000-06-30Commission clears joint venturebetween Phillips and ChevronIP/00/681 Date: 2000-06-29Commission clears Solvay's jointventure with Plastic OmniumIP/00/680 Date: 2000-06-29Commission clears purchase bySchroders of Liberty InternationalPensionsIP/00/671 Date: 2000-06-28Commission launches review ofMerger Regulation and simplifiesprocedure for unproblematicmergers



IP/00/668 Date: 2000-06-28Commission prohibits mergerbetween MCI WorldCom and SprintIP/00/667 Date: 2000-06-28Commission clears sale of Viag'sglass packaging and tubing unitIP/00/666 Date: 2000-06-28Commission clears Carlyle EuropePartners stake in heating equipmentmanufacturer Gruppo RielloIP/00/655 Date: 2000-06-23Commission clears merger betweenCanal+, Lagardère and LibertyMediaIP/00/654 Date: 2000-06-23Commission approves takeover ofRaab Karcher by Saint-GobainIP/00/650 Date: 2000-06-22 TheEuropean Commission hasapproved the acquisition by BritishTelecommunications plc (BT) ofcontrol of the whole of the Dutchundertaking Telfort Holding N.V("Telfort").IP/00/644 Date: 2000-06-21Commission clears the acquisitionby RTL Newmedia of a stake inPrimusPowerIP/00/642 Date: 2000-06-21Commission clears the acquisitionof Babcock's power transmissionequipment unit by CVCIP/00/637 Date: 2000-06-20Commission clears DeutscheTelekom's first sale of a regionalcable TV network in GermanyIP/00/634 Date: 2000-06-19Commission opens fullinvestigation into AOL/TimeWarner mergerIP/00/630 Date: 2000-06-16Commission clears the acquisitionby Toyoda Automatic Loom Worksof Sweden's BT IndustriesIP/00/629 Date: 2000-06-16Commission clears acquisition ofDial Group by ABN vehicle leasingsubsidiaryIP/00/628 Date: 2000-06-16Commission clears the acquisitionby Thomson-CSF of Racal

IP/00/627 Date: 2000-06-16Commission clears creation ofGreek real estate joint ventureIP/00/622 Date: 2000-06-15Commission approves telephonedirectory joint venture betweenTelenor Media and Viag InterkomIP/00/618 Date: 2000-06-15Commission opens full probe intoSwissair's acquisition of a stake inPortuguese airline PortugáliaIP/00/617 Date: 2000-06-14Commission opens fullinvestigation into TimeWarner/EMI mergerIP/00/613 Date: 2000-06-13Commission allows merger ofVEBA and VIAG subject tostringent conditionsIP/00/603 Date: 2000-06-13Commission clears the acquisitionof Colonial by Winterthur LifeIP/00/594 Date: 2000-06-09Commission clears Johnson &Johnson venture with MercuryAsset ManagementIP/00/589 Date: 2000-06-07Commission fines ADM,Ajinomoto, others in lysine cartelIP/00/574 Date: 2000-06-05Commission clears merger betweenArvin and Meritor

STATE AID

IP/00/1040 Date: 2000-09-21 Aidsin favour of tobacco producers inItalyIP/00/1039 Date: 2000-09-21Measures to compensate farmers foradverse climat events in ItalyIP/00/1033 Date: 2000-09-20 TheCommission authorises FF 26billion (4 billion) in State aid to theFrench coal industryIP/00/1027 Date: 2000-09-20Commission approves State aid inconnection with electricity reform inDenmarkIP/00/1026 Date: 2000-09-20Commission takes decisions onthree state aid cases in the motor

vehicle sector in the UnitedKingdomIP/00/1025 Date: 2000-09-20Commission opens investigationprocedure on State aid granted byFrance to Mines et Potassesd'AlsaceIP/00/1024 Date: 2000-09-20Commission brings its review ofregional aid in the Community to asuccessful conclusion with theapproval of the maps for Italy andBelgiumIP/00/1023 Date: 2000-09-20Commission revokes previousdecision ordering recovery of aidfrom SNIACE S.A., SpainIP/00/852 Date: 2000-07-26Commssion clears aid to glass jointventures in FranceIP/00/851 Date: 2000-07-26Commission clears aid for newMotorola plant in ScotlandIP/00/850 Date: 2000-07-26Commission investigatesrestructuring aid to German engine-makerIP/00/849 Date: 2000-07-26Commission approves UK regionalaid mapIP/00/848 Date: 2000-07-26 Stateaid - Commission investigatesventure capital fund in NorthernIrelandIP/00/847 Date: 2000-07-26Commission seeks partial recoveryof aid to German micro-electronicsgroup.IP/00/845 Date: 2000-07-26Commission relaxes its policy onstate aid in the outermost regionsIP/00/804 Date: 2000-07-19Commission investigates aid in amanagement contract betweenGerman Georgsmarienhütte andGröditzerIP/00/803 Date: 2000-07-19Commission approves Luxembourgregional aid map regionaldevelopment schemeIP/00/802 Date: 2000-07-19Commission investigates aid toIVECO



IP/00/801 Date: 2000-07-19Commission approves State aid toLenzing Lyocell, AustriaIP/00/770 Date: 2000-07-12Commission uses injunction toobtain details of aid to Italian portsIP/00/768 Date: 2000-07-12Commission approves investmentaid for new chemical plant at BASFSchwarzheide (Germany)IP/00/762 Date: 2000-07-12Commission approves SwedishState aid scheme to improveconditions in houses, schools andworkplacesIP/00/761 Date: 2000-07-12Commission takes partially negativedecision on state aid to FiatMirafioriIP/00/760 Date: 2000-07-12Commission opens state aidinvestigation into furtherrestructuring of public shipyards inSpain.IP/00/759 Date: 2000-07-12Commission decides to investigaterestructuring aid for two companiesof former Lintra holdingIP/00/758 Date: 2000-07-12Commission approves regional aidmap for the NetherlandsIP/00/757 Date: 2000-07-12Commission gives green light toinvestment aid scheme (Law 488)targeting less favoured regions ofItalyIP/00/756 Date: 2000-07-12Commission approves state aidcontained in UK's High TechnologyFund for early stage enterprisesIP/00/702 Date: 2000-07-03Yugoslavia financial sanctions:Commission adopts 'White List' ofcompanies excludedIP/00/676 Date: 2000-06-28Extension of the validity ofguidelines on state aid forenvironmental protectionIP/00/675 Date: 2000-06-28Commission declares the aidgranted to the steel companySalzgitter (Germany) illegal

IP/00/674 Date: 2000-06-28Commission launches investigationinto a financial and tax aid schemefor the Madeira free zone (Portugal)IP/00/672 Date: 2000-06-28 TheCommission approves the part ofthe regional aid map for the "Lisboae Vale do Tejo" region in PortugalIP/00/670 Date: 2000-06-28Commission approves a taxreduction scheme to promoteinvestment in MadeiraIP/00/669 Date: 2000-06-28Commission approves a Frenchtraining aid scheme.IP/00/661 Date: 2000-06-27Kosovo, Serbia, Montenegro :Commission approves humanitarianaid worth 61 million EuroIP/00/646 Date: 2000-06-21Commission decides that State aidin favour of ManufactureCorrézienne de Vêtements is notcompatible with the EC TreatyIP/00/645 Date: 2000-06-21Commission rules that State aid toGerman CD producer was illegaland must be recoveredIP/00/611 Date: 2000-06-13Commission approves aid schemeof French SME Development FundIP/00/610 Date: 2000-06-13Commission decides that no aid wasinvolved in the disposal of theremaining State participation in Kaliund Salz GmbHIP/00/609 Date: 2000-06-13Commission approves aid toWildauer Kurbelwelle (Germany)IP/00/608 Date: 2000-06-13Commission extends existinginvestigation on aid to BabcockWilcox España SA to include theaid elements involved in itsprivatisationIP/00/607 Date: 2000-06-13Commission approves State aidschemes for German shipbuildingfor year 2000IP/00/605 Date: 2000-06-13Commission investigates aid to Grafvon Henneberg Porzellan GmbH(Thüringen)

IP/00/604 Date: 2000-06-13Commission extends the period ofvalidity of the existing carframework State aid rules to theautomobile industry

COURT OF JUSTICE / COURTOF FIRST INSTANCE

DEVANT LE TRIBUNAL

Aff. T-92/00Diputación Foral de Alava /CommissionAnnulation de la décisionC(1999)5203 final de laCommission, du 22 décembre 1999,relative à l'aide accordée par lesautorités espagnoles à la sociétéRamondín S.A. dans la mesure oùcelle-ci déclare aides incompatiblesavec le marché commun lesavantages fiscaux octroyés par la«Diputación Foral de Alava»

Aff. T-98/00Linde AG / CommissionAnnulation de la décision de laCommission K(2000)64 def, du 18janvier 2000, déclarant aide d'Etatune partie de la subvention auxinvestissements accordée par lesautorités allemandes à Linde AG

Aff. T-103/00Ramondín SA et RamondínCápsulas SA / CommissionAnnulation de la décisionC(1999)5203 final de laCommission, du 22 décembre 1999,relative à l'aide accordée par lesautorités espagnoles aux sociétésRamondín S.A. et RamondínCápsulas S.A. dans la mesure oùcelle-ci déclare aides incompatiblesavec le marché commun lesavantages fiscaux octroyés par la«Diputación Foral de Àlava»



Aff. T-107/00Consorzio industrie fiammiferi(CIF) / CommissionAnnulation du rejet implicite de lademande visant à ce que laCommission réexamine la décisionrefusant de communiquer aurequérant certains documentstransmis à «l'Autorità Garante dellaConcorrenza» aux fins d'uneenquête relative à l'application desarticles 81 et 82 du traité CE menéepar ladite autorité

Aff. T-114/00Aktionsgemeinschaft Recht undEigentum eV / CommissionAnnulation de la décision de laCommission SG(2000)D/100623,du 22 décembre 1999, d'autoriser lesaides octroyées par les autoritésallemandes dans le cadre d'unprogramme d'acquisition de terresayant pour objectif la privatisationde terres et la restructuration del'agriculture dans les nouveauxLänder

Aff. T-124/00Federazione Associazioni ImpreseDistribuzione (FAIDFederdistribuzione) e.a. /CommissionAnnulation de la décision de laCommission 2000/128/CE, du 11mai 1999, concernant les régimesd'aide mis à exécution par l'Italieportant mesures pour l'emploi, en cequ'elle déclare incompatibles avec lemarché commun les aides accordéespour l'embauche de travailleurs pardes contrats de formation et detravail et les aides pour latransformation de contrats deformation et de travail en contrats àdurée indéterminée qui neremplissent pas certaines conditions

Aff. T-134/00Kvaerner Warnow Werft GmbH /CommissionAnnulation de la décision de laCommission C 46/99, du 15 février

2000, concernant une aide accordéepar les autorités allemandes à laKvaerner Warnow Werft GmbH

Aff. T-150/00Groupement Européen desProducteurs de Verre Plat /CommissionAnnulation de la décision de laCommission, du 20 juillet 1999,C(1999)2895 def, concernant l'aideaccordée par le gouvernementitalien en faveur de SangalliManfredonia Vetro dans le cadre dela construction d'une usine de verreplat à Manfredonia (Italieméridionale)

Aff. T-156/00Titan Cement Company SA /CommissionAnnulation de la décision2000/199/CE de la Commission, du17 mars 1999, concernant une aided'Etat accordée par la Grèce à lasociété Heracles General CementCompany

Aff. T-158/00Arbeitsgemeinschaft deröffentlich-rechtlichenRundfunkanstalten derBundesrepublik Deutschland(ARD) / CommissionAnnulation de la décision de laCommission, du 21 mars 2000,déclarant compatible avec le marchécommun et le fonctionnement del'accord EEE l'opération deconcentration visant à l'acquisitionpar BSkyB (British SkyBroadcasting Group plc) de 24pour-cent de KirchPayTV GmbH &Co. KGaA, sur base du règlement(CEE) n. 4064/89 du Conseil

Aff. T-165/00Consorzio industrie fiammiferi(CIF) / CommissionAnnulation de la décision du 7 avril2000, rejetant la demande visant àce que la Commission réexamine ladécision refusant de communiquer

au requérant certains documentstransmis à «l'Autorità Garante dellaConcorrenza» aux fins d'uneenquête relative à l'application desarticles 81 et 82 du traité CE menéepar ladite autorité

DEVANT LA COUR

Aff. C-113/00Espagne / CommissionAnnulation de la décisionC(2000)5207 final de laCommission concernant le régimed'aides de l'Espagne en faveur desproductions horticoles destinées à latransformation industrielle dans larégion Extremadura pendant lacampagne de 1997/1998

Aff. C-114/00Espagne / CommissionAnnulation de la décisionC(1999)5201 final de laCommission concernant le régimed'aides de l'Espagne au financementdes fonds de roulement pour lesecteur agricole de la régionExtremadura

Aff. C-137/00The Queen ex parte: MilkMarque Ltd et The Monopoliesand Mergers CommissionSecretary of State for Trade andIndustryThe Queenex parte: National Farmers'Union et The CompetitionCommissionSecretary of State for Trade andIndustryThe Director General of FairTradingDairy Industries Federation (DIF)Préjudicielle - High Court of Justice(Queen's Bench Division) -Interprétation des art. 38 à 46 dutraité CE (devenus art. 32 à 38 CE),du règlement n. 26 du Conseilportant application de certainesrègles de concurrence à la



production et au commerce desproduits agricoles et du règlement(CEE) n. 804/68 du Conseil, du 27juin 1968, portant organisationcommune des marchés dans lesecteur du lait et des produits laitiers- Possibilité pour les Etats membresd'appliquer des règles nationales deconcurrence aux producteurs de laitayant choisi de s'organiser encoopératives et disposant d'unpouvoir sur le marché

Aff. C-181/00Flightline Ltd et Secretário deEstado dos Transportes eComunicaçõesTransportes Aéreos PortuguesesSA (TAP)Préjudicielle - Supremo TribunalAdministrativo - Interprétation del'art. 4 du règlement (CEE) n.2408/92 du Conseil, du 23 juillet1992, concernant l'accès destransporteurs aérienscommunautaires aux liaisonsaériennes intracommunautaires -Imposition d'obligations de servicepublic sur les services aériensréguliers desservant une zonepériphérique (comme Madère et lesAçores) - Compatibilité avec lafaculté des Etats-membres derestreindre jusqu'au 1er avril 1997 lecabotage - Interprétation de l'art. 1,sous d), de la décision 94/698/CE de

la Commission, du 6 juillet 1994,concernant une augmentation decapital, des garanties de crédit etune exonération fiscale en faveur dela compagnie aérienne TAP -Autorisation d'une aide d'Etat à lacondition que Portugal acceptel'application de l'art. 4 du règlement(CEE) n. 2408/92 aux régionsautonomes de Madère et des Açoresdès le 1er janvier 1996

Aff. C-209/00Commission / AllemagneManquement d'Etat - Art. 189 dutraité CE (devenu art. 249 CE), al. 4- Décision K(99)2265 de laCommission, du 8 juillet 1999,concernant une mesure de laRépublique fédérale d'Allemagne enfaveur de la banque WestdeutscheLandesbank Girozentrale(«WestLB») - Absorption de la«Wohnungsbauförderungsanstaltdes Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen»par la WestLB - Rémunération del'augmentation des fonds propres enrésultant

Aff. C-218/00Cisal di Battistello Venanzio et C.Sas et Istituto nazionale perl'assicurazione contro gliinfortuni sul lavoro (INAIL) etLauro Cantieri Valsesia SpA

Préjudicielle - Tribunale Vincenza -Interprétation des art. 85 et suivantsdu traité CE (devenus art. 81 etsuivants CE) - Notion d'entreprise -Organisme public pour l'assuranceobligatoire des accidents du travailet des maladies professionnellesagissant en régime de monopolelégal - Organisme sans but lucratif -Organisme demandant le paiementde primes d'assurance à un artisanqui s'est déjà assuré, pour les mêmesrisques, auprès d'une compagnieprivée d'assurances

COMPETITION DG'S ADDRESSON THE WORLD WIDE WEB

http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/index_en.htm

COMING UP

Competition Policy Newsletter 2001Number 1 - February

XXIX Report on CompetitionPolicy 1999

Car prices in the EU - November2000



IMPORTANT MESSAGE TO DG COMPETITION'S CORRESPONDENTS

New Fax Numbers and Addresses for State aid and Antitrust correspondenceDG Competition is overhauling its mail administration system in the areas of antitrust and Stateaid control. In this context, the receipt of case-related documents (both fax transmissions andmail) will be centralised at one entry point for antitrust and one for State aid.All correspondents of DG Competition are requested to send competition case-related documentsonly to the following:State aid:

Faxes: +32-2-296.12.42.

Mail: Commission of the European Communities DG Competition State aid Registry Rue Joseph II / Jozef II-straat 70 B - 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

In all your correspondence, please specify the name of the case and the case number.

Antitrust:

Faxes: +32-2-295.01.28.

Mail: Commission of the European Communities DG Competition Antitrust Registry Rue Joseph II / Jozef II-straat 70 B - 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

In all your correspondence, please specify the name of the case and the case number.

It is essential that the correspondents use only the above fax numbers and/or addresses for anyofficial communication relating to competition cases. This will faciliate and accelerate thetreatment of your correspondence. Fax communications sent to other numbers/addresses mayinevitably be treated with delay.Please note that for merger-related correspondence everything remains the same, in particular thefax number: +32-2-296.43.01.Thank you for your cooperation.



Cases covered in this issueAnti-Trust Rules

39 ADM, Ajinomoto, Cheil, Kyowa Hakko, Sewon40 Spanish airports44 Block exemption for liner shipping consortia48 Saeco49 Editions Nathan50 Volkswagen54 General Motors / Fiat SpA56 BSkyB

Mergers

62 Mitsubishi63 MCI WorldCom/Sprint64 VEBA/VIAG65 AstraZeneca/Novartis66 Dow Chemical/Union Minière66 Industri Kapital/Dyno67 Alcoa/Reynolds67 Pirelli/BICC68 SairGroup/GCD/Partest/Portugália69 Microsoft/Liberty Media/Telewest69 BASF/American Cyanamid69 Glaxo Wellcome/SmithKline

Beecham and Pfizer/Warner-Lambert

70 EADS71 France Télécom/Orange71 Vodafone/Vivendi/Canal+71 Siemens/Dematic/VDO/Sachs71 Metsä-Serla/Modo Paper and SCA

Packaging/Metsä Corrugated72 Preussag/Thomson72 Rexam/American National Can73 Sara Lee/Courtaulds73 Nabisco/United Biscuits73 Volvo/Renault Vehicules Industriels73 Interbrew/Bass

State Aid

75 Motor vehicle77 United Kingdom78 Belgique, Luxembourg et Portugal78 Portugal79 Royaume-Uni79 Italy80 Sweden80 Portugal81 United Kingdom

International

84 Accords euro-méditerranéen et concurrence

Documents

IMPORTANT MESSAGE ON PAGE 115 · Introduction A conference, attended by over 400 people, took place in the ... Leçons de la crise du CrØdit Lyonnais, par Nicola PESARESI, DG COMP-H-3