An Analysis of Technology Entrepreneurship in the Modern Russian Economy exploring SEZ, Technoparks, and the Skolkovo Program

J.Q. Trelewicz

The “Skolkovo” Foundation for Development of the Centre for Elaboration and Commercialization of New Technologies Krasnopresnenskaya nab., 12, Moscow, 123610 Russian Federation

JTrelewicz@sk.ru, http://www.sk.ru/

Abstract

The Russian government has initiated various programs over the last two decades to stimulate the development and commercialization of new technologies in the country. Each subsequent program was intended to address the requirements of its current economic context and to learn from the lessons of previous programs, the most recent of these efforts being the “Skolkovo” program. In this paper we examine the context, successes, and challenges encountered by each of the significant, previous programs in Russia for technical economic development, discussing how the Skolkovo program for supporting entrepreneurs and start-ups builds on this experience for growing innovative technology business and generating intellectual property. The paper is presented in the form of brief case studies, research results concerning relevant technology centers in other countries, summarizing best practices in the context of the current Russian economy. We use this background to discuss why the Skolkovo program is expected to bring significant growth to the Russian innovation-technology sector of the economy, as well as what challenges face the program.

Introduction and overview The importance of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) for

economic growth is well established, its role being of particular importance for economies in the process of restructuring. However, attracting FDI into a country is a non-trivial exercise, requiring lowering barriers for the operation of foreign firms, including investment and repatriation of profits, protection of intellectual property, and support for international business practices. Many countries establish Special Economic Zones (SEZ), allowing the liberalization of policies and the lowering of taxes and tariffs in a limited area of the country, to attract FDI to targeted geographical regions and for targeted development directions.

SEZs are often, but not always, coincident with a physical location in the form of a technical business park (technopark) program designed to concentrate high-growth and innovative companies in one geographical area. In some sense technopark and SEZ programs are always created in reaction to an economic crisis [1]. As such, the characteristics of technopark and SEZ programs differ by country, region, and economic context of the time of their establishment. For the purposes of this paper, we discuss SEZ and technopark programs together.

Beginning in the mid-1990s during economic restructuring and continuing into the current decade, Russia has launched several programs intended to drive economic development in the technology and manufacturing sectors. These projects have been undertaken to reduce the dependence of the

Russian economy on natural resources and their corresponding price volatility, as well as to sustain the value chain of education and research, which has been a traditional strength of Russia from USSR times. The development programs include the establishment of SEZ, State-level support for commercialization of applied research in strategic sectors, and special venture funds for technology businesses. The fruits of many of these projects are still in operation, several with significant success and continued growth (as discussed below in the section “Development Programs”), although some of the programs have been restructured or have experienced challenges in the face of national and global economy downturns. Furthermore, the fast pace of growth and maturation of the Russian economy since the 1990s has changed the economic and policy context for some of these past programs.

In 2010, on the wave of the current global economy downturn, a legislative project [2] was approved to establish the “Skolkovo” program, including an Innovation City (SEZ and technopark), a program for support of entrepreneurs in the technology and applied research sector (the Skolkovo Foundation), and a world-class technology university (the Skolkovo Institute of Technology, or SkTech). These pieces fit together in the whole program, each with different, but inseparable roles.

In this paper we discuss past global and Russian programs for developing the technology sector, discussing the degree to which their various contexts relate to the current Russian economic situation. From this study are discussed best practices that are incorporated into the Skolkovo program, reasoning why the Skolkovo program is expected to bring significant growth to the Russian innovation-technology sector of the economy.

Technoparks and SEZs in the Global Context The word “technopark” in the modern sense implies a

special zone for technology-based businesses, where required infrastructure is provided to some degree, as well as a comfortable working environment resulting from the colocation of a number of high-technology businesses. The ecological cleanliness resulting from focused “office” work may be implied, but is not an inseparable part of the concept.

Despite the differing requirements, economic pains, political context, and other features of technopark and SEZ programs, all successful programs to some degree follow the same pattern of development [1]:

1. “Concentration of resources” – This is the initial phase, in which the various drivers of innovation (research institutions, universities, and high-tech companies) are brought together physically and/or

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with policy, designed to lower barriers for communication between the various players.

2. “Formation of the innovative ecosystem” – This is the first active development phase, where community is grown between the various players. Key elements in this phase include the physical and social environment for encouraging collaboration, as well as policies designed to ensure the continued participation of the various parties.

3. “Breakthrough” – This is the phase of market growth, the first real measurable phase of operation of the development program. Difficulties in this phase include weaning participants from direct government support (such as tax incentives), as well as beginning the move to self-sufficiency in the innovative ecosystem, so that new players are attracted to replace those that exit.

4. “Mature development” – This is the stable phase of operation, in which the innovative ecosystem shows itself to be self-sufficient.

The “Mature development” phase does not necessarily imply the exit of the State in a support role. For example, the Montpellier technical development program is a successful example of such a program with permanent role of the State in the operation of real-estate and planning [3].

Technoparks that fail to follow the above 4-step model suffer varying degrees of problems. For example, the technical development program of Austin, Texas continues to struggle, currently entering a downturn, because the program originally focused on attracting large corporations to the park, rather than on creating an environment for startups. Large corporations play an important role in the steady-state operation of technoparks; however, they are usually drawn to technoparks because of the new ideas and sources of people that allow for “near-sourcing” (i.e., outsourcing to neighboring companies) and acquisitions. Large corporations were not drawn in numbers to Austin because of the absence of this environment. In contrast, Research Triangle Park in North Carolina, which also focused on large corporations to the detriment of the startup environment, has shown a degree of stable success because of its strong educational-research ecosystem – three strong universities make the points of the “Triangle” in the park’s name. [4]

However, a balance between large corporations and startups is required. If the Finnish experience can be generalized, Finnish technopark programs have found that only 4% of successful technology startups grow from the commercialization of projects in universities and research institutions. The other 96% spin off from existing, private companies, who tend to have a commercialization cycle half the time of that of universities and research institutions. [1]

Most of the American and European technopark programs are industrial complexes, either in “greenfield” areas, or in existing cities. The local success of these models may well depend on culture and other factors. For example, one of the more successful Japanese programs, the Tsukuba research center and its Kumamoto project with test laboratories, is a complex technopark structure, much like the Skolkovo plan. The territory includes a university zone, a residential zone, and industrial zones.

A Technopark’s Value Proposition For any significant development project, attracting

participants is an unavoidable part of the business model. “Build it and they will come” is a risky strategy in practice.

An attractor for startups is business incubator activities, which may be offered before the stage of registering the legal entity (as is done in some technoparks in Europe) to assist researchers in finding technologies to commercialize, or after registration, and focused on business models. In either case, in order to be effective, coaching must be individualized, as collaboration between experienced business managers and entrepreneurs, rather than offered as courses or training. [1]

The reputation of the technopark itself may also be an attractor to participants, both to Multi-National Corporations (MNCs) and startups. The technopark may build its reputation on participating universities and research institutes, on the reputation of its biggest (MNC) residents, or on other factors, such as the quality of resident selection. An established high quality of residents can help to attract investment by offering pre-vetted companies for investors.

Asian Experience “BRIC” countries (and high-growth, transition-economy

countries in general) have established successful technoparks in the “modern” sense for the last several decades. For example, Shenzhen, once a customs point between China and Hong Kong, was established as an SEZ in 1979 and has grown rapidly since then, including both factories and office parks. The technopark in Thiruvananthapuram (Trivandrum), Kerala, India, was established as India’s first technopark in 1990, since becoming India’s largest [5].

Because of the weaker role of research and educational institutions in many of the Asian countries at the beginning of their technical growth programs, the programs focused primarily on the “absorption” of existing technologies and the creation of a services industry from foreign outsourcing, attempting to use this as a stimulator for local research and education. [6] However the role of absorptive capacity in stimulating R&D should not be underestimated, given the sharp rise in recent years of USA patents granted to inventors in India and China, allowing them to overtake the EU12 [7].

A number of countries are beginning to trend away from technology absorption as a strategy. Singapore for one is attempting to move out of the technology absorption model, based on the attraction of MNCs to open local operations in the country on very favorable terms, since the model creates jobs but sets a limit to the development of innovation, since the innovation is always imported. In an attempt to grow the startup sector, the country has launched a number of programs to attract diaspora and foreign specialists to the country in return for university education scholarships. [8]

China is also working to build its own innovation ecosystem, moving from copy technologies to “own brand”. This is the new focus for the Zhongguancun Science Park, which is not a separate territory, but integrated into Beijing, including the original Haidan Subpark, 9 science subparks, and 17 university science parks. The challenge that Zhongguancun meets in attracting investment and building startups is in mentality, where all participants “want to be CEO”. Specifically, a successful startup requires a team

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approach, between technology, business, and investment managers. [1]

A very different Chinese program is the Hong Kong Science and Technology Parks Corporation (HKSTP). HKSTP is a public corporation; i.e., 100% government controlled, while employees are not civil servants. State control does not hinder their operation, since profitability and business principles were built into their original charter – the project does not even have a State budget. HKSTP does not offer tax benefits, since Hong Kong already offers low taxes. However, the budget structure of HKSTP also creates its chief challenge – the HKSTP management suggests that innovative technologies require State support. Venture capital rarely reaches startups (in Hong Kong), since Hong Kong as an historical financial center has many low-risk, mature investment opportunities. Investment is also hindered by the limited size of the Hong Kong labor and local sales market. As a result, HKSTP is forced to focus on attracting specific research projects from MNCs. [1]

Korea does not have a problem with creating innovative startups, but with supporting them to the transition to large companies. Historically, most small companies work under contract with a single chaebol, which mitigates early-stage problems with market and investment. However, in the long-term this model hinders innovation, since the small companies cannot afford to defocus on their single client in order to develop new or diverse technologies. The Daedeok program is trying to create a new innovative environment to address this problem, focused on the commercialization of pure research. This State organization (transitioning to non-State operation in 2012) is faced with the traditional weakness of ties between Korean universities, businesses, and research institutions. [9]

Challenges of all Technoparks Since a technopark is a long-term development program, it

cannot succeed without a viable business model. As discussed above, the “mature development” stable-state operation of the technopark requires self-sufficiency and stability. Since State funding tends to be highly cyclical and inextricably tied to election cycles, this means that the technopark must aim to reduce its reliability on State funding over time, although this does not necessarily require a removal of the role of the State, as discussed above for Montpellier and various Asian programs. Furthermore, because of the importance of the State’s role in promoting basic research, it may not be desirable to remove the State entirely from the funding model.

The governance model of the technopark is also a challenging area for balance. A technopark may appear on the surface to be a real-estate project, especially since in the long-term, about 70% of the technopark’s income will come from rent and about 20% from provided services. [1] However, excessive focus on the office-park model reduces focus on those aspects that attract residents to the park, as noted above. On the other hand, a park that becomes simply a model for distributing State support will struggle in the transition to self-sufficiency.

Overview of Russian Programs for Technical Economic Growth

This section discusses highlights of past Russian programs for economic development, many of which continue to play

important roles. The coverage of this section is not meant to be comprehensive, but to show a foundation for the discussion of the Skolkovo program.

Technoparks and Scientific Cities The concept of a “science city” is not new to Russia. For

example, Akademgorodok (lit., “academic town”) near Novosibirsk was established in 1957 by the initiative of Academician Lavrentiev of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The area contains research institutes, university, housing, entertainment, stores, and significant other resources needed for work and living. This area continues to grow today (cf. Akadempark below). Similar science cities were built (e.g., near Tomsk 1972), as well as repurposed (e.g., Zelenograd from a manufacturing to a high-technology city in 1962). At the time of inception, these sites were intended for focused development of high-technology and pure research, but have evolved to include entrepreneurial activity in modern times.

The Russian state has launched several SEZ programs since the 1990s, the most recent of which being the law on SEZ of 2005 [10]. This law created two types of zones, manufacturing (for which were selected regions outside of Lipetsk and Elbuga in Tatarstan) and high-technology development (for which were selected Zelenograd, Dubna, St. Petersburg, and Tomsk). The program included tax and customs breaks, as well as financial guarantees and special credit conditions. However, in contrast to the science cities noted above, housing was not permitted to be built on the sites of the SEZ. The law also ended the special economic status of other SEZ and Free Economic Zones across the country, with the exception of the zones in Magadan and Kaliningrad.

It is interesting to note that some regional technopark programs followed the Federal program. For example, Akadempark near Novosibirsk was a candidate for the 2005 SEZ program [11], but was not chosen for federal status. The regional government and the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences took over support the technopark [12], which at the time of this writing includes a functioning business incubator, various prototyping and workshops, and a partially-built second phase, much of which has already been rented.

Development Programs It is important to note that the Russian programs have

historically and currently focused on the creation of new R&D and new value, rather than on the “absorption” of existing technology. This is in contrast to many of the Asian programs.

The Skolkovo program also benefits from collaboration with and the experience of economic development programs that are not tied to physical locations, as are technoparks and science cities. The programs mentioned in this section are not only examples, but also partner with the Skolkovo Foundation to varying degrees.

The Russian Venture Company (RVC), founded in 2006, is a State fund of funds (i.e., providing State funding to stimulate investment funds in high-technology businesses) and a development institute for growing the innovation economy of the Russian Federation with headquarters in Moscow. Funding is provided by RVC to Russian companies and to those with foreign participation. RVC was created to stimulate the growth of private-sector venture capital in

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Russia, which has traditionally grown slowly and invested very conservatively, as well as suffering from economic turndowns [13]. In some sense the Russian venture capital environment is comparable to that of Hong Kong: there is no lack of investment capital, but with numerous mature and low-risk investments available (in Hong Kong from the financial sector and in Russia in the energy and mineral sectors) relatively little money is invested in startups. In 2011 alone, work of RVC and related activities resulted in the formation of about 15 new venture funds in Russia with collective capital more than 30 billion rubles (1 billion dollars) [14].

RosNano is a Russian company (previously a State corporation), founded in 2007 for developing nanotechnology, as a strategic technology direction for the Russian economy. Their daughter company, RusNano USA Inc., works with USA and Canadian firms on commercialization and market linkage for nanotechnology solutions. Recent achievements of the company include attracting foreign investment into 4 commercialization projects participating in a joint program between RosNano, Isis Enterprises (Oxford University’s commercialization office), and the Tomsk regional government. [15]

RosNano’s role in the development of entrepreneurship and innovative commercial projects is complementary to that of Skolkovo’s, in that RosNano focuses on later-stage projects, whereas the Skolkovo Foundation supports R&D activities that are required to fill this pipeline [16]. This two-stage approach has the advantage of allowing the Skolkovo program to focus on the initial, commercialization phases of development, with a focus on technology and applied research, while RosNano’s model focuses more on the business model of startups, including market aspects of the technology and concrete growth prospects.

Overview of the Skolkovo Program The Skolkovo program, launched in 2010 by Federal law

[2], consists of three related, but legally independent entities: the Innovation City (including SEZ/technopark, as well as housing – in contrast to the SEZ law of 2005, schooling, and other resources for Russian and foreign residents), an educational program (including SkTech to be housed in the Innovation City, as well as other, educational programs at the university and post-graduate levels), and the Skolkovo Foundation. The Skolkovo Foundation supports the Innovation City in that it determines the companies that become residents of the technopark, as well as distributing various-stage grants to residents. The independent governance of each of these entities is designed to address the conflict between different foci of a technopark project (e.g., real estate, innovation, etc.) as outlined above.

The entities of the Skolkovo program are State-controlled, launched with State funding, but structured as non-profit entities. In this sense the reader will see parallels with HKSTP and other Asian programs. On the other hand, the strong research and educational history of Russian institutions contrasts with context from a number of the Asian projects, such as in China and Singapore. As well, the potential size of the Russian and neighboring markets (several of whom enjoy preferential trade and customs agreements with Russian

Federation) suggest a limit to the parallels with Singapore and Hong Kong.

The Skolkovo Foundation is structured around five “clusters”, each of which corresponds to a subset of the strategic, technological development directions, as determined by the law on Skolkovo: information technologies, biomedical technologies, energy-efficient technologies, space and telecommunications technologies, and nuclear technologies. Legal entities registered in Russian Federation, whether of Russian origin or not, are eligible to apply for residency status, and subsequently for grants. In order to strengthen the projects with diverse experience and views, foreign “participation” in the companies is strongly encouraged, including foreign researchers in the work team, foreign work experience among Russian participants, foreign investment, and other types of partnerships.

The Skolkovo program, at a high level, is designed around a number of the key elements of successful technopark programs from other countries. Firstly, the role of strong educational and research institutions is critical in supporting the innovative ecosystem [1]. SkTech is not just a new university being created to support the program, but a complex project with some of Russia’s strongest technical universities (Lomonosov Moscow State University and others) as founding members and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) as a partner. The participation of existing, leading universities ensures continuity and leverage of existing, strong technical educational programs, as well as imbuing the new university with the educational structures necessary for the innovative ecosystem. While leveraging the strong history of the founding members, the creation of a new curriculum with a strong, entrepreneurial focus directly addresses the natural inertia of these members, who have in some cases hundreds of years of history in their educational structures. The entrepreneurial focus of the technical curriculum also addresses one of the key findings of the Foreign Investment Advisory Council (FIAC) – that Russia needs to develop a pipeline of “commercial scientists” for future economic growth; informally, “the kids need to know how to monetize this stuff”. [17]

Secondly, noting the challenges of transition to steady-state operation, tax incentives to residents are relatively short-lived: a resident company receives tax breaks and enjoys residency status for up to ten years, after which they are expected to be self-sufficient without such support.

The third aspect addresses what some have identified as a past shortcoming of Russian investment in applied science, that although science development is world-class, it is often not connected strongly enough to market needs, nor commercialized and patented sufficiently [6]. This is important, given that Russia spends more on R&D per each generated USA patent than most EU15 countries [7]. Skolkovo provides direct assistance on managing intellectual property (IP), including patent guidance, as well as evaluating the business plans of all participants and grant-recipients for market and IP potential. In fact, more than 2/3 of current Skolkovo residents cite IP assistance as important to their success [18].

As noted above, the reputation of the technopark is an important factor to its success, since a strong reputation will

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attract startups, MNCs, and investors. Skolkovo works to establish this reputation both by PR and communications, as well as by the quality of the screening process for residents. Residents are screened by panels of independent experts from around the world, whose conclusions determine which companies receive resident status and form a central part of decision on grant distribution. Reputation must also be supported by transparency in order to promote trust in the fairness of the process. Communicating transparency and international-standard business practices, as underlined by OECD analysis [19], is on a larger scale important to attracting FDI to the country in general. Half of the current Skolkovo residents believe that Skolkovo does a good or excellent job in communicating and information supply [18].

Challenges Ahead This section discusses challenges facing the Skolkovo

program, as summarized in the following table: Challenge Term Comments Parallel development of technopark, education, housing

Near and long

Using best practices from past projects, Russian and foreign

Governance structure Long 3 independent legal entities Balance startups and MNCs

Near Managing the “one process for all” aspect of the law

Attracting investment Long Quality of selection; Collaboration with RosNano, RVC, and other funds

Complications in realizing tax incentives

Near Education of tax inspectors, assistance to residents

Complication of receiving State grants

Near Important for transparency and compliance; will eventually be balanced by private investment

A significant challenge that was raised by Dr. Chin-Tay Shih, Chairman of the Institute for Information Industry in Taipei [20] is “trying to do everything at once”; i.e., building a technopark, innovation development program, scientific city, and world-class research university in parallel. Without question the Skolkovo program is ambitious, but several historical parallels and data points support the possibility of success of such a program:

• As mentioned above, the science city has been developed successfully in Russia in the past. Even though the Akademgorodok model was originally constructed under socialism, where the State had much greater control over investment and participation, these development projects have proven to be adaptable to market needs. Furthermore, the Tsukuba research center in Japan has shown the feasibility of such a model in modern context.

• Although Skolkovo is being built as a “greenfield” project, the settlement is located at the very edge of urban Moscow (just outside of the “MKAD” circle road), so that existing transportation and other infrastructure extend to the edge or even into the settlement. This positions Skolkovo between those

technopark projects built as new settlements, and those created in existing urban centers.

• As noted already above, SkTech is being developed with leading Russian universities as founding members, as well as in collaboration with MIT. This allows the university to draw from existing networks of people and practice.

However, the complexity of the program underlines the importance of the organizational independence of the three entities of Skolkovo, allowing each to be given separate, relevant strategic and measurement models.

As noted above, the role of large, high-tech companies is key in the steady-state operation of any technopark, not the least of which is their role as “consumers” of startups, realized in terms of a level of continuing investment. Skolkovo has already shown progress in this area, attracting a number of MNCs to partnership agreements. However, the law on Skolkovo, as the 2005 law on SEZs, does not differentiate between MNCs and startups in terms of requirements and vetting process for residency and receipt of grants. Although this does enforce a level of fairness and transparency by bringing all participants of Skolkovo through the same requirements for benefitting from taxpayer revenues, it also means that MNCs must pass the same expert review process as startups, with the risk of being denied participation if their proposed projects are not aligned with the goals of the technopark. Maintaining this balance requires close and careful work with potential MNC partners.

Attracting investment in startups is a challenge faced by development programs in many countries, and already discussed above. Complementing the focus of RVC, Skolkovo collaborates with Russian and foreign venture funds on its investment board, both in terms of investment and project expertise. Although RVC has shown significant growth stimulus for the nascent Russian venture capital sector [13], the support for entrepreneurship and new, innovative enterprise in Russia lags behind expectations for a country of Russia’s size and investment in R&D. A key piece of development is ensuring a pipeline of high-quality, innovative projects to attract local and foreign venture capital [7]. However, it is too early to conclude the degree to which the Skolkovo-RosNano-RVC ecosystem will be able to stimulate the Russian venture capital sector, as well as to attract significant global venture capital into Russian startups.

Skolkovo’s residents have also identified some challenges within the structure of the program itself [18], which to a large degree stems from the economic and political context of the program in Russian Federation. Although most Skolkovo residents have identified tax incentives as being a key attractant for them to the program, 1 in 7 complains about complications in realizing the tax benefits, especially in VAT reduction – apparently tax inspectors are slow to apply the exceptions provided to residents of Skolkovo. Investment is impacted as a result, since high taxes reduce the funding that can be returned to investors. About half of Skolkovo residents additionally require assistance in obtaining equipment and materials, especially from overseas, since imported equipment and materials are prohibitively expensive in Russia.

The same study showed that 82% of Skolkovo residents cite insufficient funding as their chief barrier to development,

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but feel that the current Skolkovo grant system is too complicated: grant requirements are eased for projects with co-investors, but finding an angel investor for a first-stage project is very difficult. On the other hand, the documentation requirements for grants, including the quarterly reports required by grant recipients, increases transparency and reporting, for both State and other investment into the companies, which was identified by OECD [19] as an opportunity for improvement in Russian business. Such documentation allows careful monitoring of progress of the recipients, as well as enforcing compliance to regulations. Open reporting also builds trust in the market, which is critical to attracting additional FDI.

Conclusions The Skolkovo program has been shown in light of the

progression of Russian technology development programs, as well as in the context of technopark programs in other countries. The strongest parallels appear to be with some of the Asian development programs, although with local differences, such as the solidity of the educational and research infrastructure of the country.

It appears that the largest challenges ahead will be faced in the transition to the “Breakthrough” phase of technopark development, where the role of State investment and incentives needs to be partially displaced by private investment. The work that Skolkovo does now in building trust, reputation, and transparency will be irreplaceable supports for this phase.

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11. “The Novosibirsk SEZ seeks residents, and the TechnoPark program is 80% ready (Новосибирская особая экономическая зона ищет резидентов, а проект технопарка готов на 80%)”, Information Agency Regnum, 19 July 2005.

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14. Kalysheva E., “Igor Agamirzyan: the Share of Foreign Investors on the Russian Market is Growing (Игорь Агамирзян: Доля зарубежных инвесторов на российском рынке растет)”, Russian Business Gazette, n.832, 24 Jan. 2012.

15. “Tomsk Companies Found Investors in the Framework of a Project with RosNano’s Participation (Компании Томска нашли инвесторов в рамках проекта с участием Роснано)”, RIA Novosti, 16 Apr. 2012.

16. “RosNano + Skolkovo = synergistic effect («Роснано» + «Сколково» = синергетический эффект)”, Nanotechnology News Network, 17 Mar. 2011.

17. Russia’s Modernization and Innovation from the Perspective of Foreign Investors, FIAC white paper, High Tech & Telecom Working Group, Moscow, Oct. 2010.

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19. OECD Investment Policy Reviews: Russian Federation 2008, OECD Publishing (London, 2008).

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