ICoCo Cohesion Integration and Openness, From Multi to Inter Culturalism

8/19/2019 ICoCo Cohesion Integration and Openness, From Multi to Inter Culturalism

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Cohesion, Integration

and Openness:From ‘Multi’ to ‘Inter’ Culturalism


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Cohesion, Integration and Openness:From ‘Multi’ to ‘Inter’ Culturalism

Contents

1. Introduction

2. Globalisation and ‘Super Diversity’

The Dimensions of Globalisation

Cohesion and solidarity -the ‘paradox of diversity’

3. The ‘Failure’ of Multiculturalism

Early and ‘defensive’ forms of multiculturalism Progressive MulticulturalismMulticulturalism and ‘race’ Far Right and Populist AppealThe adaptation of multiculturalism

4. The Contribution of Community Cohesion

Conceptual and practical developmentCohesion, Interaction and Intercultural dialogue

5. Segregation, Integration and Openness

The Domains of Segregation and IntegrationSpatial Segregation and IntegrationFunctional Segregation, Integration and OpennessSocial and cultural segregation and integrationValues and segregation and integration

6. Interculturalism: Conceptualisation and Development

The Concept of InterculturalismInterculturality and Intercultural Dialogue (ICD)

Interculturalism and DifferenceInterculturalism and internationalismThe interculturalism perspective


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1. Introduction

We cannot stop the process of globalisation: the World is more inter-connected than ever before. Indeed, the pace of change will probablyaccelerate as economic and social networks become more intertwined and

interdependent. But change will not be easy and tensions and conflicts areinevitable as many cultures, faiths, value systems and global forces interactand come to terms with each other. There is, however, only one direction oftravel and our urgent need is to find ways in which we can make the transitionas easy as possible and allow different peoples to learn to live with eachother. The British Council, along with other organisations, academics andpolicy makers are developing new paradigms to assist this process of change.

Globalisation will ensure that the World – and almost every country – willbecome more multicultural. That is to say, that each coun try will find that its’population is increasingly made up of more people from different cultures,

nationalities, faiths and ethnic backgrounds. The ease of travel, the openingup of labour and financial markets means that this is inevitable. But this alsomeans that the policies of multiculturalism which many governments haveused to mediate these changes will no longer be appropriate. The concept of‘interculturalism’ will replace that of multiculturalism and cohesion andintegration programmes will have to be expanded to help develop positiverelations between communities.

This is of course, a challenge for communities and the way ordinary peoplelive their lives. However, it is also a challenge for Governments, which havebeen slow to recognise the fluidity of population change and the impact of

transnational and diaspora influences and have hardly begun to consider theimplications for the notion of national solidarity and governance. Governmentsinevitably cling to the idea of national sovereignty and maintain the pretencethat they still command all activities within their borders – this is fundamentalto their contract with the people that vote for them. Any suggestion of the lossof sovereignty is quickly contested and, rather than reflecting the process ofglobalisation, Governments find it difficult to acknowledge the limits of theirinfluence over their citizens and are not prepared to argue for the ceding oftheir power to international agencies.

One of the consequences of this is that the ideal of a more integratedinternational community, in which ideas and cultures may bridge nationalboundaries to create a World in which we are more at ease with each other, isseldom advanced as a desirable political objective as it undermines the powerbase of the separate political elites. Whilst people are themselves increasinglycrossing borders, inter-marrying, building new virtual networks, and creatingreal and tangible personal relationships at all levels, they are often fearfulabout the impact on their communities and collective identity. ‘Identity politics’ often holds back the transition, rather than supporting and inspiring a new andinter-connected World. ‘Interculturalism’ can replace multiculturalism anddevelop as a new positive model to enable us to learn live together, but this

will require significant changes in policy and practice – and will depend upon anew vision for a globalised and super diverse world.


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2. Globalisation and ‘Super Diversity’

There is little clarity about what the term ‘globalisation’ actually means, but itits origins lay in the process of enabling financial and investment markets tooperate internationally, largely as a result of deregulation and improved

communications. The term has been in regular use since the 1960s, thoughits origins are much older and the extent and nature of international trade hasdeveloped over the centuries. The technological developments incommunications, together with the opening up of financial markets hasthough, dramatically speeded up the process of change, to the extent that it isnow often presented as a threat to local markets and democratic localsystems. The anti-globalisation movement has recently succeeded in givingthe idea much more political salience, though the opposition to the apparentcontinued march of globalisation has, ironically, generated a movement whichSen1 describes as ‘the most globalised moral movement in the world today,’

It is beyond the scope of this paper to chart the continual and inexorable riseof globalisation in business, finance and other terms. It is however, intendedto give some consideration to the consequent impact on human relations.

In the first place it is clear that one of the most evident results of globalisationis that populations have become far more mobile and willing and able to re-locate in search of better employment prospects and a higher standard ofliving, or because of other short or longer term considerations. In 2010 therewere 214 million international migrants and if they continue to grow in numberat the same pace there will be over 400 million by 20502.

Secondly, the migrant community is also increasingly diverse and thisinevitably leads to much greater diversity within nation states, particularly inthe Western economies, which are often the target countries for migration.The extent of population movement is such that all western economies arenow characterised by ‘super’ or ‘hyper’ diversity with cities, like London,Stockholm, Toronto, New York and Amsterdam with over 300 languagegroups. This has re-defined our notion of multiculturalism which hadpreviously been seen as countries coming to terms with their colonial pastsand, in particular, those overwhelmingly White nations attempting to acceptand integrate Black and Asian minorities from their former colonies.Multiculturalism is now much more complex and community relations are

multi-faceted, no longer simply revolving around majority/minority visibledistinctions.

Thirdly, the impact of the diversity resulting from global patterns of migrationand the rise and importance of diasporas means that the homogeneity anddistinctiveness of national and regional identities is seen to be under threat asexternal influences become more accessible and prevalent. The Far Right inmany countries are increasingly exploiting these concerns to build substantialpopular support (see later sections).

1 Sen, A., (2006). Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny. (New York: W.W. Norton)

2 International Organisation for Migration (2010). World Migration Report 2010 . Geneva: IOM


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Fourthly, globalisation challenges - and possibly disempowers - local andnational democratic processes, with the ability to transcend national bordersand regulatory mechanisms, with global companies possessing moreeconomic power than many governments and beyond specific and nationaldemocratic controls.

Minorities are often the visible expression of these changes and whilst theirmovement and growth is often seen as the cause of changing to social andcultural patterns, it is simply the consequence of that change. This makesthem highly vulnerable.

The Dimensions of Globalisation

The principal dimensions of globalisation primarily revolve around businessand commerce, with companies now able to exploit the increasing openness

of markets. International trade is certainly more global than ever before, withmulti-national companies not only trading across the globe, but establishingthemselves as employers and with supply chains in many countries. Thereare now a wide range of global brands, which are instantly recognisable inhundreds of countries and are more distinctive – and economically larger -than many nation states. As markets have become global, so too has themovement of financial capital and the interdependence of economies isclearly undeniable, as the recent banking crisis has shown. However, themovement of people has clearly followed decisions to invest (and disinvest)across borders and has increasingly determined the mobility of labour andpopulation settlement patterns.

Technological change has dramatically reduced the cost of all forms ofinternational communication. The use and availability of the internet, satellitebased news and information services and telephony have aided thedevelopment of international trade and the growth of companies acrossnational boundaries, however, the reduced cost of travel has made the flow ofmigrants on a mass scale possible. This has also supported wider patterns oftourism, a market in international education and the development of newsocial and cultural exchange. Together with the more recent development of‘social media, the new communication networks have enabled people todevelop new frames of reference which transcend national boundaries, or re-

affirm heritage and diaspora linkages. There are signs that these arecompeting with national networks and changing our notion of personal andcollective identity.

The ease of travel, communications and the development of internationaleducation has enhanced the ability of diasporas to form and sustainthemselves, often irrespective of the freedoms, cultures and norms of thecountries in which their members live. Diasporas transcend nationalboundaries and inevitably foster shared historical perspectives, beliefs andvalues which will not necessarily match those of any one nation. The co-existence of diaspora identities and the many nation states in which they are

found often gives r ise to the phenomenon of hybrid identities, such as ‘BritishMuslim’ or ‘Black British’. Indeed, many people now claim multiple identities,generally a mixture of faith, nationality, ethnicity and place of residence.


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The impact of tourism should also not be underestimated and has becomemuch more extensive, both in scale and in terms of the nature of theexperience. For example, there are around 25 million tourists visiting the UKeach year and around 70 million tourist visits from the UK to other countries.Some of these are simply for a short break, with little interaction with thepeople and cultures of the host country. However, even in these cases, it isinevitable that social and cultural bonds develop. At the other end of the scale,tourism becomes life changing. For example, around 700,000 UK residentsare now permanent ‘tourists’ in Spain with many more in other countries.Some 3.5 million British people have a second home in another country.There are also many other forms of tourism which also promote deeperexperiences, perhaps as part of a language study course or to learn about thewildlife or other educational purpose. Again, it is inevitable that some of these‘exchanges’ lead to more permanent relationships and transnationalconnections.

Similarly, education is now a global business with millions of studentscrossing national boundaries each year for the purposes of study. In addition,Western universities are setting up subsidiary centres in many othercountries, which permit greater access and two-way study opportunities.International education centres and courses also contribute to the exchangeof ideas across national boundaries, with nation states having far less controlover the form and content.

Political systems have adjusted to the extent that there is some agreement onthe need to develop regulatory systems that transcend national boundaries

and a number of institutions have been set up to facilitate this. However, theimpact on democratic traditions and the suggestion that globalisation createsa sense of powerlessness in the face of corporate power is a key issue thathas to be explored. Similarly, the impact on identity and cultural and socialnetworks, which develop in many new ways as a consequence of all of theabove and may potentially at least, become more influential than thetraditional forms of relationships which have been dependent upon intra-national familial and parochial cultural networks.

Serious political attention, however, is only now beginning to be given to thesocial impacts of globalisation. For example, a new influential group of Labour

Party intellectuals have recently published3 a review of current political issuesand commented that:

‘Customary patterns of social life and the flourishing of persons havebeen threatened, as well as transformed, by unmediated forms ofglobalisation, industrial decline and the commodification of non-marketspheres of life. The free rein given to markets has led to high levels ofinequality, the exploitative use of cheap migrant labour in a desperateattempt to fuel economic growth, and a pervasive sense of insecurity.To ensure the social and economic security of the British peopleLabour will need to recover its role as defender of society, and bring

capital under national and global democratic control’.

3 Glasman, M., et al (eds) (2011) The Labour Tradition and the Politics of Paradox. (Oxford

and London: The Oxford London Seminars)


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The left leaning Institute of Public Relations (IPPR) have also recentlyannounced a major research programme on the Future of Globalisationheaded by former business secretary Lord Mandelson and aims to re-examine who benefits from globalisation and how a more even distribution ofthe benefits both between countries and within countries can be encouraged.

The impact of globalisation on the way we live our lives, how we think ofourselves and how relate to the new ‘others’ in our more cosmopolitan realand virtual worlds, are perhaps the unintended consequences of theglobalisation of markets, but may emerge as the most profound andchallenging dimensions of the process.

Cohesion and Solidarity - the ‘paradox of diversity’

As a result of globalisation, societies are becoming more and moremulticultural – or ‘super diverse’ - often despite the many attempts by nationstates to resist migration and to create higher hurdles for migrants in order toprotect the integrity of their borders. Political leaders cling to the hope that notonly can they control their borders, against the tide of globalisation, but alsothat they can remain as the most significant influence over the daily lives oftheir citizens, with the electorate continuing to support them and be influencedby them. This is an ever more difficult challenge as the nature of internationalcommunications is now such that people can access many new channels ofinformation and develop much broader frames of reference. The level ofturnout in most elections has fallen across Western democracies and ‘identity

politics’ based upon spurious ideas about ‘difference’, may be one way inwhich political leaders seek to retain their relevance and influence.

In respect of migration, many national leaders are, themselves, caught insomething of a bind as they generally continue to promise and promoteeconomic growth and know that inward migration is often the easiest andquickest way of achieving this, as migrants are generally more work readyand work willing – and have a lower labour cost. They will also fill gaps in thelabour market and undertake tasks which are unattractive to host populations,for example in agriculture and social care, and are more flexible on socialcosts, for example in respect of housing. Nevertheless, many host

communities object to increasing the population through migration, oftenprecisely because of the advantages that they have to employers, and areconstantly demanding limits, or even a complete halt, to inward migration.Extreme Far Right parties, which are enjoying rising levels of support acrossEurope, go still further and demand the repatriation of migrants, includingthose born in the countries to which their parents or grand parents migrated toand in which they are citizens. The continuing debate over diversity andmulticulturalism has led to a widespread populist view that multiculturalismhas ‘failed’.

Globalisation has brought many benefits and opened up both commercial and

social and cultural opportunities on a very large scale and these can only goon increasing. However, it has created an era of super diversity in which newrelationships between peoples of different background have developed and


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are constantly changing. Multiculturalism as we now know it is very differentfrom its early form and the impact upon personal and collective identity andthe forms of governance and mediating tensions has been profound. Whilst itis clear that most people are now exposed to diversity in all aspects of theirdaily lives – either in our local communities, schools and workplaces, orindirectly through television, social networks and other media - there appearsto be something of a ‘paradox of diversity’4. The more diverse societies havebecome and the more people have exposed to difference and becomeaccustomed to it, the more they seem to retreat into their own identity,embrace identity politics and support separatist ideologies. This may be, inpart, due to the lack of engagement with difference, a rather wary detachmentwhich makes us more determined to cling to our own community’s certainties.The concept of ‘contact theory’, which has been reinvigorated through therecent programmes of community cohesion and are discussed in latersections, suggest that meaningful engagement with others does enable us tochange our attitudes and behaviours towards others.

However, living alongside each other, but in separate spheres in what Sen5 has called ‘plural monoculturalism’ and where cultures may ‘pass each otherlike ships in the night’, and reflected to a greater or lesser extent in all westerndemocracies, is not sufficient. In such circumstances, any sense of a sharedsociety, in which common experiences can take place and an understandingof each others needs and attributes can develop, is very unlikely. Rather,stereotypes and prejudices can flourish and irrational fears can emerge withthe possibility of a demonization of the ‘other’. It is this analysis of ‘parallellives’, following the riots in English northern towns in 2001, which gave birth tothe programme of community cohesion6 and was reinforced in 2007 by a

similar study.7

There are, however, relatively few ways in which ‘solidarity’ can be measured.It is often based upon a number of objective indicators, such as the incidenceand nature of hate crime and the level of inequalities, or the perception ofpeople themselves about how they feel about ‘others’ and how well theyrelate to them8. Robert Putnam, however, has looked at this through the lensof ‘social capital’ a term which has been around for many years, but madeespecially salient through his seminal work Bowling Alone9 and especially hismore recent work10 that demonstrated that social capital was inversely relatedto diversity ‘immigr ation and ethnic diversity challenge social solidarity and

inhibit social capital’ or to, more graphically expressed:

4 Cantle, T. (2011) How Should We Respond to the Far Right? Parliamentary Affairs

(forthcoming)5 Sen, A., (2006). Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny. (New York: W.W. Norton)

6 Cantle, T. (2001) Community Cohesion: A Report of the independent Review Team(London: Home Office).

7 Commission on Integration and Cohesion (CIC) (2007) Our Shared Future (London: CIC).

8 See for example, Home Office et al . (2004a) Building a Picture of Community Cohesion

(London: Home Office).9 Putnam, R.D. (2000) Bowling Alone: the Collapse and Revival of American Community

(New York: Simon & Schuster). 10

Putnam, R.D. (2007) ‘E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty FirstCentury’. The 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture, Scandinavian Political Studies Journal


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‘inhabitants of diverse communities tend to withdraw from collectivelife, to distrust their neighbours, regardless of the colour of their skin, towithdraw even from close friends, to expect the worst from theircommunity and its leaders, to volunteer less, give less to charity andwork on community projects less often, to register to vote less, toagitate for social reform more, but have less faith that they can actuallymake a difference, and to huddle unhappily in front of the television.Note that this pattern encompasses attitudes and behavior, bridgingand bonding social capital, public and private connections. Diversity, atleast in the short run, seems to bring out the turtle in all of us’.

Putnam did not suggest that this situation would remain indefinitely, however,and that in the medium to longer term:

‘successful immigrant societies create new forms of social solidarityand dampen the negative effects of diversity by constructing new, more

encompassing identities. Thus, the central challenge for modern,diversifying societies is to create a new, broader sense of ‘we’’.

This is indeed the challenge and, as yet, there is little by way of vision andestablished policy and practice to make this into a reality.

Similarly, the World seems more prone to ethnic and faith conflict with over 70per cent of conflicts having an ethnic or faith dimension11, in fact, there areindications of a rising number of divisions and more ardent separatistmovements, where people no longer feel able to even share the same land orgovernment. Around 20 nations have been created in recent years, which

stem partly from the break up of constructed federations in the Balkans andEastern Europe, but is true of other areas too, for example in Sudan, whichhas recently divided. More divisions are possibly on the way with states likeBelgium becoming virtually ungovernable as a single entity and secessionistsmovements in Quebec, Scotland, Catalonia and many other places, as strongas ever. Where we might have expected more collaboration across bordersand the separate identities of regions and states to give way to common orglobalised identities, the opposite seems to be true. Indeed, old ideals ofinternationalism, often inspired by progressives, particularly following the lastWorld War, also seem to be on the wane.

Sen argues that conflict and violence are sustained today, no less than thepast, by the illusion of a unique identity12. He agrees that, the world isincreasingly divided between religions (or 'cultures' or 'civilizations'), whichignore the relevance of other ways in which people see themselves throughclass, gender, profession, language, literature, science, music, morals orpolitics. He challenges ‘the appalling effects of the minaturisation of people’and the denial of the real possibilities of reasoned choices.Younge believes that the elevation of identity is caused by the erosion ofdemocracy which he sees as inherent in globalisation13. He believes that

11

Baldwin, C., Chapman, C and Gray, Z. (2007) Minority Rights: The Key to ConflictPrevention (London: Minority Rights Group International). 12

Sen, A., (2006). Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny. (New York: W.W. Norton)13

Younge, G., (2010). Who Are We – and should it matter in the 21st century? (Glasgow:

Viking)


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globalisation undermines the democracy and sovereignty of the nation stateand turns individuals into a ‘universal tribe of consumers’ who are‘economically interdependent but isolated and impotent as citizens’. Younge’sargument is compelling, especially in the context of the many examples heprovides, from the creation of the Euro, the globalisation of brands whichreduce local corporate markers, and the recent financial crisis, enabling him toconclude that with this loss of control and access to democratic levers, themore we retreat into separate identities or tribes. Younge also quotes DavidHooson14 from his Geography and National Identity in support of hisargument:

‘The urge to express one’s identity and to have it recognised tangiblyby others, is increasingly contagious and has to be recognised as anelemental force even in the shrunken, apparently homogenizing high-tech world of the end of the twentieth century’.

The sense of collective identity has changed profoundly in all Westernsocieties, but it is inevitably interpreted and understood in different ways byminority and majority groups. This is reflected in the changing nature ofpersonal identities, with the separate components shaped by increasingdiversity in terms of faith, present locality and ethnicity – as well as anapparently declining sense of nationality. In Britain, a recent SearchlightEducational Trust report15 found that whilst many ethnic groups sawthemselves in a similar way ‘Asian’ and ‘Black’ groups differed significantlyfrom ‘White’ groups in certain respects – see Table 1 below.

The three components of ‘country’ – nationality, country of birth and domicilewere most important for White groups (67%) compared to Asian (46%) andBlack (21%) and minorities were also more likely to regard religion andethnicity as the most important element of their identity.

Table 1. Most important element of identity. UK 2011

Asian White Black*

Nationality 16% 37% 10%

Country where you were born 15% 25% 6%

Your village/town/city 8% 16% 11%

Religion 24% 6% 16%

Your estate/neighbourhood/community 4% 5% 11%

Ethnicity 17% 6% 40%

Country you live in now 15% 5% 5%

This view is also supported by the UK’s community cohesion programmes

(see Section 4 below), where despite the stated desire of the Government to

14Hooson D. ed., (1994) Geography and National Identity (Oxford: Blackwell)15

Searchlight Educational Trust (2011). Fear and Hope Project Report . (London: SET)


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reinforce national values and identities, it is local campaigns around a ‘senseof belonging’ which have proved to be most efficacious.

The impact of diversity upon personal identities is particularly profound, withindividuals often able to draw upon their heritage, faith, language and newnational identity to create hybrid or multiple identities. It should be presumedthat the variation within ethnic groups, such as those set out in Table 1 above,will be as great as those variations between them.

Identity is increasingly complex and, as well as the now routine hyphenatingof nationality, faith and ethnicity, the consequence of people from differentidentity groups sharing the same society has also led to the growth of ‘mixedrace’ or multiple identities. This group is constantly growing and in Britain, thefastest growing minority is ‘mixed race’. However, this group is not actuallyrecognised as such in policy terms, there is no funding, representation,support, nor champion. This is partly for practical reasons, as the boundaries

of the mixed race group are necessarily blurred and cover many differentcombinations of Black, Asian, White and other ethnicities and anycombination of faith and nationality. But it also suggests an overtone of racialpurity, whereby ‘pure breeds’ in ethnic or religious terms are recognised withleaders chosen to represent their particular constituency of interest, whereas‘our mongrel selves’16 have no particular identity, nor recognition. This is alsoa function of the ambivalence towards inter-marriage, which still face manyreligious and cultural barriers in nearly all majority and minority communitiesand may be regarded with hostility and shame.

Hyphenated identities also arise from the mixing of the characteristics of

nationality, country of origin, religion and ethnicity, for example ‘Black-British’,‘British-Muslim’ or ‘British-Chinese’, rather than as a result of inter-marriage.Without the cultural bars inherent in the notion of ‘mixed race’, these forms ofhyphenated identities may have some success in seeking and gaining statefinancial support and recognition, though the huge number of potentialpermutations makes this increasingly less likely. All types of hyphenatedidentity also run the risk of simply replacing the limited notion of a singleidentity with a multiple identity which is just as limited. As Brah17 points out,identity is a process and not a fixed category (though that is how many wouldlike to regard it).

In the face of this broader diversity and changing patterns of identity,Governmental responses have been ambivalent. For the most part, they haveattempted to reinforce their view of national identity through such measuresas the teaching of national history and promoting national citizenship andidentity. On the other hand, by remaining steadfastly nationalistic andpromoting the integrity of national borders and governance, eschewing anysuggestion of the erosion of sovereignty and by attempting to deny the

16 Slattery, B., (2003)"Our Mongrel Selves: Pluralism, Identity and the Nation", in Ysolde

Gendreau, ed. Community of Right/Rights of the Community (Montreal: Editions Themis,2003).17

Brah, A., (2007).’Non-binarized identities of similarity and difference’. In M. Wetherell, M.Lafleche and R. Berkeley, eds Identity, ethnic diversity and community cohesion. (London:Sage)


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interdependence brought by globalisation they appear to lag behind thecurrent reality of their communities. This theme is developed in latter sections.

Whilst it is clear that diversity does have an impact on social solidarity, in theshort term it is less clear whether this is transitional and whether the sense ofalienation and the loss of democratic power can be re-balanced in the longerterm. Can the institutions of government themselves adapt, will the newphenomenon of social media create new transnational relationships whichtranscend traditional power structures?

3. The ‘Failure’ of Multiculturalism

The notion of the ‘failure of multiculturalism’ has conf used rather than assisteda debate about how we learn to live together in an increasinglyinterdependent and interconnected world. ‘Multiculturalism’ simply describes

the modern reality of most countries in that they contain a large number ofmigrant groups at various stages of permanent settlement and are from manydifferent countries and indigenous peoples. In this sense it cannot be said tohave failed. The reference to ‘failure’ is based upon the perception that thepolicies of multiculturalism have been an inadequate response to this changeand, as a consequence, the presence of people from many differentbackgrounds now pose a threat to social stability and solidarity. Thisargument might be advanced on the basis of both the objective reality – significant levels of inequality, racism and community tensions – and thesubjective reality – continued emotional resistance to diversity and a desire tohalt or reverse the trend, are suggestive of failure. In particular, they have

been based upon a view that these policies promoted separatism.

The more recent suggestions of ’failure’, however, relate to the currentpolitical and international context and specifically refer to the relationship ofMuslim communities within Western democracies. The UK Prime Minister 18 recently focussed his suggested failure of ‘state multiculturalism’ almostentirely on the Muslim community and this formed the major part of hisspeech. The Chancellor of Germany, Angela Merkel, in referring to the ‘utterfailure’ of multiculturalism in Germany19 also set her remarks in the context ofvarious reports and comments by political colleagues on the view that ‘peoplefrom different cultures, like Turkey and Arab countries find it harder to

integrate’. Nicholas Sarkozy, the French President, also remarked upon thefailure of multiculturalism20.

A recent report by the Council of Europe recognised this current debate inlaunching its own report Living Together 21 and only felt able to provide arange of principles and policy guidelines rather than a conceptual framework:

We are of course well aware of this debate, but find that the term“multiculturalism” is used in so many different ways, meaning different

18

Cameron D, Speech to the Munich Conference, 5th

February 2011.19 Merkel A, Speech to Potsdam Conference, 17

th October 2010.

20 Nicolas Sarkozy, interviewed on Paroles de Français (TF1),11 February 2011.

21 Council Of Europe (2008) Living Together – Combining Diversity and Freedom in 21

st

Century Europe (www.coe.int)


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things to different people and in different countries – is it an ideology? aset of policies? a social reality? – that in the end it confuses more thanit clarifies. We have therefore decided to avoid using this term andinstead to concentrate on identifying policies and approaches that willenable European societies to combine diversity and freedom.

Nevertheless, this rather prosaic approach, which is explored later, has alsobegun to shape a new way to ensure that diverse groups share a commonsociety.

Early and ‘defensive’ forms of multiculturalism

Early forms of multiculturalism were inevitably ‘defensive’. The focus was onprotecting minorities from racism and discrimination and positive actionprogrammes to begin to provide those communities with some semblance of

equal opportunities. However, this approach depended upon a significantdegree of separation as a means of avoiding contact and conflict. Positiveaction programmes did narrow inequalities, but ironically also had the effect ofreinforcing differences and promoting separate development. Further, thisprocess gave effect to Britain’s commitment to protecting the heritage ofminorities and its rejection of assimilation, based upon an appreciation ofdiversity and a culture of tolerance and fair play.

Whilst migration has only recently developed on a mass scale, it is not newand has taken place over the centuries22 and consequently resulted in manycontroversies based on ‘race’. But the focus of the host community’s hostility

changes over time. For example, it was focussed upon the Jewish communityprior to the first World War in Britain, concerns about the Irish minoritiesstretch back still further, but have almost disappeared in the last 20 years ago.The relationship with the Black Caribbean community has also been difficult,they experienced a high level of racism at least up to the 1970s and were thecentre of riots in the 1980s, but appeared to have become almost universallyaccepted in recent times. By contrast, the Muslim community has becomedemonised since 2001, but within a period of super diversity in whichrelationships are formed not only by reference to migrant populations but alsowithin diaspora and transnational frames of reference.

The idea of multiculturalism only emerged with post war migration, which wasboth on a different scale to previous migratory episodes, but was also muchmore ‘visible’ and clearly determined by ‘race’. Britain’s journey tomulticulturalism in this period has not been an easy one. Like many otherEuropean countries, the influx of minorities provoked resentment and hostility.Like migrants before them, the new wave of predominantly Caribbean andSouth Asian people in the 1950s and 1960s found themselves pushed intomanual occupations, linked to poor housing, often clustered around thoseemployers which provided low skilled and low paid employment.

The new migrants were received with great suspicion and, in many cases,

hostility. The fact that migrants were needed to fuel the post war re-

22

For an excellent exposition of migration, see Robert Winder’s Bloody Foreigners: the storyof immigration to Britain, 2004. (Little, Brown: London)


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construction effort and provide essential public services did little to assuagethe resentment of the majority, who had been nurtured on the idea thatBritons were a superior ‘race’ and that ‘coloureds’ – a term used in officialreports at that time, as well as in popular discourse - were, by definition,inferior. Demands to limit migration were often repeated and manyadministrative restrictions were agreed in response. Even though anti-discrimination legislation was eventually introduced in 1965, the atmosphereremained highly charged, perhaps culminating in Enoch Powell’s ‘rivers ofblood’ racist rallying call which gained some considerable popular support in1968. Not surprisingly, minorities built defensive support systems aroundthemselves and anti-racist supporters, often associated with the Left, werequickly rallied when any criticism of minorities began to emerge.

A defensive and protective policy based upon multicultural separatenessgained support from both sides of the political divide. The right opposedintegration and racial mixing in principle and the left feared that it would

precipitate further hostility and that the cultural heritage of minorities would beundermined in a wave of assimilation. There were nevertheless, attempts to‘promote good race relations’ - which were actually enshrined in legislation in1968, and remaining on the statute book until the present day – but thesewere never implemented with any real sense of purpose (for discussion of thelimited measures, see Cantle, 200523) and any discussion of the emergingmulticultural model appeared to provide an opportunity to excite even moreracist sentiment and to give greater oxygen to the far right. Demands forsocial justice were, however, impossible to ignore and during the late sixtiesan assertive ‘black’ political consciousness, with support from developmentsin the United States, began to gather steam. This gave rise to a number of

remedial programmes, often targeted at geographical areas andneighbourhoods where minority ethnic groups were concentrated. This wasalso supported by a range of equal opportunity policies, mainly aimed attackling discrimination in the workplace and key services like social housing.Positive action programmes, though more controversial, also gatheredground, for example, the introduction of Black-led housing associations fromthe late ‘eighties became one of the most well regarded investments in Blackand minority leadership in Europe. These initiatives had some success andsome of the values and ideals behind them were internalised and becomemore widely adopted as part of the ‘fair play’ associated with liberalmulticulturalism. However, they also inadvertently reinforced the notion of

special and preferential treatment which caused resentment from sections ofthe poorer majority community.

Given that in the immediate post war period racism and discrimination wererife, the policies of that time almost inevitably had to attempt to imposetolerance and equal opportunities through legal and regulatory frameworks;and to minimise conflict and tensions by avoiding contact between differentcommunities. It could be argued that the policies were right for the time, andthe ‘failure’ may simply have been to subsequently modify the approach andto take account of changing social, economic and political circumstances.

23 Cantle T., (2005) Community Cohesion: A New Framework for Race and Diversity.

(Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke)


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The failure to adjust policies in the UK, at least, may have been due to thebelief that whilst there had been a continual level of racism and xenophobiaover the years, this was far less overt and directly discriminatory in nature,supporting the view that cultural diversity had become more generallyaccepted. This appeared to be confirmed by the growing success of manypeople from minority backgrounds in just about every professional sphere andincreasing levels of inter-marriage and little by way of Far Right politicalorganisation within the majority community, nor riots or protests by theminority communities since the 1980s.

This view turned out to be somewhat complacent and was challenged by thecommunity cohesion reviews in 2001 (see section 4 below), which followedthe riots in a number of English northern towns. The reviews focussed on the‘parallel lives’ led by different communities and the failure to promoteinteraction between them and the consequent fear misunderstanding betweenthem. The reviews pointed out that, whilst there appeared to have been a lack

of real opposition to the then policies of multiculturalism, it was apparent thatthere had been little by way of positive support for them either and that thedeep seated resentment of minorities by the majority community had neverreally been dealt with and what was seen as an overbearing culture of‘political correctness’ had kept the hostility below the surface24. The reviewsalso suggested that the policies of multiculturalism up to that point had hadthe impact of institutionalising separation and had limited the opportunities forpeople from different backgrounds to learn about each other and to disconfirmstereotypes and myths.

It was not suggested that the previous policies had in any way set out to

encourage separateness. Indeed, most of the policy interventions werefocussed upon preventing discrimination and were essentially ‘defensive’ innature to provide protection to minorities who were faced with racism anddiscrimination and the hostility from the host White community who had not, orcould not, come to terms with the change.

Ranjit Sondhi has explained25 the essence of this ‘failure’:

“Concerned less with the complexities of integration, the practice ofmulticulturalism came to be centred largely on managing public orderand relations between majority and minority populations by allowing

ethnic cultures and practices to mediate the process. Minoritylanguages, religions and cultural practices were encouraged, andgradually the right to be equal was overshadowed by the right to bedifferent.

Such multicultural policies led, albeit unwittingly, to the creation ofculturally and spatially distinct communities fronted by self-styledcommunity leaders who traded in cultural, as opposed to social capital.The scale and depth of difference became the very currency by which

24

This approach is often the ‘knee jerk’ reaction to communal politics today, e.g. the furtheroutbreak of Scottish sectarianism in April 2011, resulted in an attempt to ban internet hatemessages, rather than deal with underlying causes of intolerance and conflict25

Sondhi, R (2009) Speech to the Awards for Bridging Cultures (ABCs) 1st December 2009.

London


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importance was judged and progress made. In other words, in thedistribution of goods and services, there was everything to be gainedfrom difference and non-mixing. The resulted in the tendency at theneighbourhood level to live in entirely separate ethnic worlds, a kind ofself-imposed apartheid, a cocooned existence in which wholegenerations could exist without ever having to get engaged in widersocial issues, or to read about and experience other peoples cultures,or even to have dinner with families other than those from one’s ownethnic, religious, cultural or linguistic background.

As a result, far from being a system that spoke to the whole of society,multiculturalism spoke only to each specific minority in isolation. Thisserved to maintain the exoticism and essentialism of minority cultureshindering a two way conversation with the majority culture. It was alsosilent on the question of what to do with the deprived anddisadvantaged sections of the indigenous community, driving its

members further away from the goal of tolerance and into the arms ofextremists”.

Sondhi makes a number of very important points here.

Firstly, that the ‘right to be equal was overshadowed by the right to bedifferent’. This does not imply any sympathy for assimilation and the loss ofheritage and distinctiveness of minorities, merely that all communities shouldbe able to develop commonalities with others, without losing their identity.Such a view is widely shared amongst commentators and apart from someextreme positions, is also shared across the political spectrum. The problem,

however, remains as to how this, almost universally agreed, principle is putinto practical effect. Hasan26 illustrates the depth of disagreement chastisingParekh for advancing ‘tendentiousness and specious arguments’ in TheFuture of Multi-Ethnic Britain Report27 and his book RethinkingMulticulturalism28 . Hasan is particularly critical of what he sees as Parekh’sdesire to put up a ‘do not disturb’ sign around minority cultures and paying lipservice to any real sense of critical engagement with other cultures whichwould enable them to adapt and change. Rather he sees Parekh wanting tocreate a special and separate place for minorities, in which ‘Western statesmust veer away from their public commitment to liberal universalism so as toaccommodate these minority cultures and faiths’.

In much the same way, Hasan also criticises Modood in his MulticulturalPolitics29 for trying to re-define secularism to accommodate Muslim demandsfor differential treatment. Indeed it is the case that Modood goes somewhatfurther in a later contribution to the debate30 arguing that we need a concept

26 Hasan, R., (2009) Multiculturalism, Some Inconvenient Truths. (Chippenham: Politico’s)

27 Parekh, B. (2000) The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (London: Profile Books) revised edition

2002.28

Parekh, B. (2000) Rethinking Multiculturalism: cultural Diversity and Political theory(Basingstoke: Palgrave)29

Modood, T., (2005) Multicultural Politics: Racism, Ethnicity and Muslims in Britain.(Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press)30

Modood, T., (2011) ‘Secularism and Democracy, some Responses to Ted Cantle andSunder Katwala’, in British Secularism and Religion, Eds Birt, Y., Hussain, D. and Siddiqui, A.(Leicestershire: Kube 2011)


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of political secularism and a secular state that ‘is mor e empirically based andsociologically apt in that it recognises where the power lies’. This, heexplains, should ‘destigmatise public religion’ and ‘pluralise the institutionalrecognition of religion’ – a concept of secularism which has little by way ofunderlying principle and is liable to change and contextualisation.

The ‘right to be different’ has political as well as cultural drivers. In this senseit can perhaps be characterised by the notion of identity politics (which isfurther discussed in later sections) and is played by both political andcommunity leaders who seek to heighten differences in order to create apolitical advantage for one group or another; or, is advanced by communitiesthemselves, who have been quick to learn that the recognition of differencecarries with it rewards in terms of representation and resources. Identitypolitics therefore militates against community collaboration and encouragescompetition and even conflict. This phenomenon was difficult, thoughmanageable, when the number of minorities was limited, but has become

extremely problematic in an era of super diversity.

Secondly, there has been a considerable debate about whether ‘selfsegregation’ really exists and whether any suggestion of this is tantamount to‘blaming minorities for the problems of multiculturalism. Certainly, thesuggestion that segregation is of a ‘voluntary’ nature does not fully recognisethat the ‘choices’ people make are in reality constrained by the institutionalframework, by structural and economic factors, as well as by the prejudice oflandlords, employers and local people and by the discriminatory activity ofhousing market institutions, such as estate agents31. Further, self-segregationis often the result of negative choices by people who only feel safe in an area

dominated by their community, or who have little chance of accessing facilitiesand services that cater for their needs outside such areas, as well as thosethat make a positive commitment to only live in an area made up of peoplewho are ‘like them’.

Ouseley, in his study of Bradford32, commented:

different ethnic groups are increasingly segregating themselves from eachother and retreating into ‘comfort zones’ made up of people like themselves.They only connect with each other on those occasions when they cannotavoid each other, such as in shops, on the streets, at work, when travelling

and, perversely, in Asian-owned restaurants by choice. Education inschools that are racially self-segregated is the most vivid reflection of thisstate of affairs.

and

self-segregation is driven by the fear of others, the need for safety fromharassment and violent crime and the belief that it is the only way to promote, retain and protect faith and cultural identity and affiliation.33

31 Phillips, D. (2005) ‘Housing Achievements, Diversity and Constraints’ in Housing, Race and

Community Cohesion, Harrison et al (Oxford: Chartered Institute of Housing). 32 Ouseley, H. (2001) Community Pride not Prejudice (Bradford: Bradford Vision). 33

Ibid p10


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Few studies have actually sought the views and preferences of the localcommunity themselves. However, Simpson et al 34 produced research which,whilst emphasising that many young Asian people wanted to live in mixedareas in two Northern towns in England, ‘clearly shows that White and Asianyoung adults identify and favour areas partly in terms of factors they associatewith racial composition’, but, again, whether this is on the basis of a free orconstrained choice is less clear.

Sondhi’s approach to the issue of self-segregation is mature and realistic. Herecognises that it does in fact occur, but that blame is not appropriate aschoices are constrained and contextualised; and that the phenomenon cantherefore be discussed dispassionately and openly.

A criticism of Sondhi’s approach (and that more generally of communitycohesion) is that it downplays economic disparities. This argument, supportedin particular by a body of academic opinion (see section 4 below), is based on

the view that tensions and conflicts between communities are almost entirelyattributable to poverty and deprivation and, were these to be somehowmagically wiped away people would apparently live in harmony. For some,this is based upon a classic Marxist position, but there are a number ofarguments which are often conflated and presented on a very simplistic basiswithout regard supporting evidence. In particular, this critique has failed torecognise:

That there is no evidential basis to assert that ‘poverty’ is responsiblefor poor community relations and that if poverty was eliminated, thenracism and hate crime would disappear. The difference between

relative deprivation and absolute poverty and whether differences aredue to competition over jobs and resources, or simply a function ofpeople being ‘poor’, needs to be examined. In some cases, theelement of competition is a key factor in differences, but the level ofhostility can vary from place to place and in different contexts, eventhough relative deprivation remains the same. The suggestion that it isattributable to absolute poverty is equally spurious, with the implicitsuggestion that poorer people are likely to be more racist, which isoften based upon no more than stereotypes about poorer people,rather than on evidence.

That ethnic (and all difference) is an independent variable from that of

class and socio-economic position and that the suggestion thatgovernments prefer to ignore the real problems of racism and focusinstead on the relations between groups in order to gloss overfundamental inequalities, again turns on the notion that all prejudiceand discrimination has an economic root – and that all Governmentsare simply duplicitous. The causation of prejudice and predictors ofcommunity cohesion are still relatively under-researched, but there arean increasing number of evidence based studies which clearly indicatethat they are, to a large extent, autonomous.

That there are fundamental differences of ideology and values thattranscend all levels of the social-economic scale. These can be

34 Simpson, L., Ahmed, S. and Phillips, D. (2007) Oldham and Rochdale: Race, Housing

and Community Cohesion (Manchester: University of Manchester).


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international, or diasporic, as much as local or national and completelyoutside the context of the socio-economic structure.

That ‘differences’ are not confined to ethnicity and also encompasssexual orientation, special needs and disabilities, faith and sects andother characteristics and therefore have deeply rooted socio-psychological roots which are not part of the economic structure. It isnot generally asserted that homophobic violence, inter-generationalconflict, or hate crimes against disabled people are simply due topoverty. Rather, it is accepted that prejudice and ignorance play astrong part.

That positive attitudes to difference and ‘otherness’ appear to berelated to exposure to people from different backgrounds and theopportunity to engage and interact with them is crucial. It should benoted that poorer people will, in general, have fewer suchopportunities, but there are many others who live and work in veryinsular environments, where difference is more likely to be seen in

negative stereotypical ways, based upon myths rather than realities.But this is a function of lack of opportunity and broader life chances,rather than poverty itself.

These arguments are explored in greater detail in later sections, but it isappropriate to point out at this stage that the programmes designed toimprove community relations have produced positive results and ‘contacttheory’ in particular is enjoying a period of renewed interest. None of this is todeny the impact of inequalities and deprivation in some instances. It wouldappear, however, that it is the perception of unfairness in the allocation ofresources, or access to jobs and services, that is more likely to trigger hostility

towards others – and it is of course more likely that poorer people will be moredependent upon resources allocated by the State and less self-reliant.Further, the political arguments, especially Far Right and anti-migrantsentiment, produces a more general hostility towards minorities, which isirrespective of economic position and the anti-migrant hostility is often sharedby existing minority and majority residents and now relies upon cultural, ratherthan racial, differentiation.

Progressive Multiculturalism

The earlier forms of multiculturalism have been built upon developed with aview to both avoiding the assimilationist tendencies of some Europeancountries, notably France and at the same time avoiding the reliance on theseparationist British model. The Canadian approach perhaps mostexemplifies this model (though this conception has been challenged by theFrench speaking provinces of Canada: see later sections).The CanadianGovernment35, who believe that, in 1971 they were the first in the World toadopt multiculturalism as an official policy, set out their vision in these terms:

‘….all citizens are equal. Multiculturalism ensures that all citizens cankeep their identities, can take pride in their ancestry and have a senseof belonging. Acceptance gives Canadians a feeling of security and

35 http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/multiculturalism/citizenship.asp


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self-confidence, making them more open to, and accepting of, diversecultures. The Canadian experience has shown that multiculturalismencourages racial and ethnic harmony and cross-culturalunderstanding.

Mutual respect helps develop common attitudes. New Canadians, noless than other Canadians, respect the political and legal process, andwant to address issues by legal and constitutional means.

Through multiculturalism, Canada recognizes the potential of allCanadians, encouraging them to integrate into their society and takean active part in its social, cultural, economic and political affairs.

All Canadians are guaranteed equality before the law and equality ofopportunity regardless of their origins. Canada’s laws and policiesrecognize Canada’s diversity by race, cultural heritage, ethnicity,

religion, ancestry and place of origin and guarantee to all men andwomen complete freedom of conscience, of thought, belief, opinionexpression, association and peaceful assembly. All of these rights, ourfreedom and our dignity, are guaranteed through our Canadiancitizenship, our Canadian Constitution, and our Charter of Rights andFreedoms.

….. As Canadians, they share the basic values of democracy with allother Canadians who came before them. At the same time, Canadiansare free to choose for themselves, without penalty, whether they wantto identify with their specific group or not. Their individual rights are

fully protected and they need not fear group pressures.’

It is also fair to say that the British approach has attempted to end theseparation in some spheres, especially in terms of service provision andfunctional terms. These ‘domains of segregation and integration’ (discussedin greater detail in Section 5) are rarely uniform across any country, or evenwithin particular cities and regions. For example, the domain of ‘spatialsegregation’ is most noticeable in the northern towns of England (betweenWhite and Asian communities) and in Northern Ireland (between Protestantand Catholics). Separation is less pronounced in English cities in the Midlandsand least pronounced in the South, especially London. Nevertheless, both the

Midlands and the South of England, including London, do have a number ofhighly segregated areas. The patterns of spatial segregation and integrationoften dictate much of the cross cultural contact in the other domains, perhapsespecially ‘social and cultural’ and ‘functional’ areas. So, for example, schoolsand the friendship patterns they provide along with local employmentarrangements, access to housing and recreational arrangements are oftenshaped by physical proximity. The British approach to equal opportunities andpositive action have had some impact in determining access to education andemployment in particular and closing the performance gap betweencommunities. This in turn, creates new forms of contact with others and on amore equal footing. Equality programmes therefore not only provide a greaterlevel of fairness by re-balancing opportunities, but also create many moreopportunities for contact which transcend high levels spatial separation.


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Progressive multiculturalism might also be thought of in relation to thepromotion of cultural distinctiveness with the development of commonality anda sense of belonging and inclusion. This is, of course, exactly the perspectivedeveloped under the banner of community cohesion, but there have beenother attempts to provide a middle way between separation and assimilation.The Communitarians36, for example, propose ‘over -arching’ values, within theconcept of ‘diversity within unity’ and many countries around the world arestruggling with the balance between the rights and distinctiveness ofminorities and core values, rights and responsibilities to which all citizensshould subscribe.

Multiculturalism and ‘Race’

Multiculturalism has been essentially about ‘race’. The context of the 1950sand 1960s made this inevitable and the panoply of measures introduced to

mediate the early problems were almost entirely based upon the notion ofracial difference. The principal legislation in the UK for example, was througha series of ‘race relations’ acts and the various commissions and regulatorswere built upon improving race relations and tackling discrimination on racialgrounds.

Over the years and especially since the tragedy of 9/11, the focus has shiftedto faith differences and, of course, especially in response to the supposedMuslim/Christian divide. Community cohesion programmes, however, weredeveloped to recognise all forms of difference, including those based onsocial class, age, disability and sexual orientation37.

Multicultural policies simply failed to recognise, and respond to, the change inscientific, political and popular understanding. The complete demolition of thepseudo-scientific proposition of the geneticists who had attempted to establishracial distinctions and a hierarchy of superiority and the subsequent relianceon ethnic difference, largely based upon visible characteristics; theemergence of faith distinctiveness, some of which had been defined as ‘racial’or ethnic differences; and the development of cultural markers which are oftenlinked to, but not dependent upon faith and ethnic communities. What societyunderstands as ‘difference’ is indeed part of a dynamic process. It issuggested that ‘interculturalism’ (see later sections) is able to recognise this

dynamic process and also responds to international components of‘difference’ and the wider impacts of globalisation

The supposed ‘failure’ of multiculturalism has, then, been widely supported,but for different reasons and perhaps unfairly, without recognition of the pastcontext it which it developed. The previous policies of multiculturalism areinappropriate for an era of super diversity and globalisation, but the reality isthat all countries will become more multicultural over time. A new conceptualframework – suggested here under the banner of ‘interculturalism’, supported

36

The Communitarian Network (2002) Diversity Within Unity: A Communitarian NetworkPosition Paper (Washington, DC: The Communitarian Network). 37

For a full discussion of the development, policy and practice of community cohesion seeCantle, T., (2001) Community Cohesion: A New Framework for Race And Diversity (Basingstoke: Palgrave)


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by policies of ‘openness’ can provide a way forward, though they will have toovercome considerable scepticism towards any form of ‘ism’ purporting totackle issues of race and identity.

It is also important to note that the nature of multicultural societies are verydifferent, even within Western style democracies. Bouchard38 identifies fourtypes of societies which all have a very different history and populationcomposition and have therefore developed different approaches to the‘management of ethnocultural diversity’. Bouchard’s typology is:

where the nation is composed of ethnocultural groups placed on equalfooting and with no recognition of a majority culture (the ‘nations’ of Australia and Anglophone Canada are included in this category)

a paradigm of homogeneity (commonly seen as the assimilationistmodel) which fundamentally asserts an ethnocultural similarity in publiclife (nations such as France Italy and Japan are included in his

examples) a bi - or multi - polarity set of societies composed of two or more

national groups or subgroups, sometimes officially recognized as suchand granted a kind of permanence. (Nation-states such as Malaysia,Bolivia, Belgium, Switzerland are included here)

a paradigm of duality, where diversity is conceived and managed as arelationship between minorities from a recent or distant period ofimmigration, and a cultural majority that could be described asfoundational. (Bouchard includes the French speaking province ofQuebec, alongside the Aboriginal communities)

paradigm is that of mixité. It is founded on the idea that, through

miscegenation, the ethnocultural diversity of a nation will beprogressively reduced, eventually creating a new culture separate fromits constituent elements. (Examples are primarily in Latin America,notably in Brazil and Mexico).

Notwithstanding Bouchard’s pre-occupation with French and English speakingCanada – and the differences between the two – it is the case thatmulticulturalism encompasses a range of notions of both ‘multi’ and of‘culture’. Multiculturalism will therefore be understood in many different waysaround the world and the policies and practices will also have very developedin many different ways.

Far Right and Populist Appeal

In terms of opposition to multiculturalism, however, a common bond seems tobe shared by the many national Far Right groups who are pre-occupied withrace and immigration and constantly trade on the supposed threat of ‘others’in both economic and social terms. The Far Right, in particular, now also try toengender a fear in the host community of a loss of identity and their way of

life, as a result of ‘being overrun’ by foreigners. Indeed, they have found thattheir former appeal, based on the supposed biological superiority of the white

38 Bouchard G, (2011) What is Interculturalism? McGill Law Journal


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‘race’ no longer resonates with the electorate and have now focussed on thecultural dimensions of difference.39

Far Right parties are growing and they have become a significant electoralforce in many European countries. In the UK, they have also grownsignificantly, though they have generally failed to achieve any significantelectoral success. Nevertheless, they gained more than 10 per cent of thevote in no fewer than 52 local authority areas in 2010 and overall, they wonaround 560,000 votes. Only a year earlier they had received 1 million votes astwo BNP candidates were propelled into the European parliament securingtheir one notable electoral achievement. Goodwin40 suggests that the BNPhas become the most successful extreme right in British history and points outthat since 2001, its support in general elections has grown 12-fold; support inlocal elections increased by a factor of 100 and membership by seven fold.

It is very clear that, despite some year on year ups and downs, their overall

trajectory has been rapidly upward for the last 10 years or so and, as theInstitute of Community Cohesion (iCoCo), which monitors Far Right activitiesas part of an ongoing concern for tackling community tensions, found in it’s2011 report, that they have succeeded in broadening their appeal, even withinrural and suburban areas41.

The consequence is that mainstream politicians frequently feel obliged to tryto head off support for the Far Right by at least appearing to listen to theconcerns of their electorate on these issues. New and tougher controls onmigration are periodically announced, particularly in the run up to electionsand politicians on the left and right have used emotive terms like ‘swamping’42

to suggest that they are in line with popular opinion, notwithstanding attacksfrom the left who claim that this only enhances Far Right support.

However, mainstream politicians have generally been very mistaken in theirbelief that the hostility towards ‘others’ is in some way confined to extremistsand they have failed to recognise that the resentment towards multiculturalpolicies in general and migration in particular, goes a lot deeper. In this sense,multiculturalism can also be said to have ‘failed’ because cultural diversity andmigration do not enjoy popular support – as evidenced by a recent Hope andFear Report (2011)43. This report, commissioned by the SearchlightEducational Trust, set out to explore the issues of English identity, faith and

race. With 5,054 respondents and 91 questions it is one of the largest andmost comprehensive surveys into attitude, identity and extremism in the UK todate.

39 Goodwin, M., (2011) New British Fascism – The Rise of the British National Party (London:

Routledge)40

ibid41

Institute of Community Cohesion (iCoCo) (2011) Far Right Electoral and other Activity: theChallenge for Community Cohesion. (Coventry: iCoCo)42

Margaret Thatcher famously used the word ‘swamping’ in 1978 and so too, did David

Blunkett, the then Labour Home Secretary in 2002. More recently David Cameron’s referenceto the ‘failure of multiculturalism’ was claimed as support for the English Defence League whowere mounting a protest on the day following his announcement at the Munich conference inFebruary 2011.43

Searchlight Education Trust (SET) (2011) Fear and HOPE. London: SET


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It concludes that:

‘ there is not a progressive majority in society and it reveals that thereis a deep resentment to immigration, as well as scepticism towardsmulticulturalism. There is a widespread fear of the ‘Other’, particularlyMuslims, and there is an appetite for a new right-wing political partythat has none of the fascist trappings of the British National Party or theviolence of the English Defence League. With a clear correlationbetween economic pessimism and negative views to immigration, thesituation is likely to get worse over the next few years’.

Copsey and Macklin (2011)44 have produced a timely review of the growth ofthe UK’s British National Party and as Neil Copsey’s introductory sectionpoints out, despite the obvious rise in electoral support for the BNP, academicresearch is only now beginning to catch up. But the BNP are only one part ofthe UK’s growing Right45, which has been boosted by the activities of the

United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) who also appeal to anti-migrantand xenophobic populism. They have grown as the ‘polite alternative’ to theBNP and are fast becoming ‘a powerful outlet for controversial far -right views’.UKIP garnered over 900,000 votes in the 2010 General Election46. Further,when the small but very vociferous, English Defence League (EDL) support isadded to this, the popular and street level impact of the Far Right as a wholebecomes even more significant.

Further, the SET Report47, referred to earlier demonstrated how limited thesupport for multiculturalism is at present. They identified what they call six‘identity tribes’ in modern British society. These are: ‘confident multiculturalists (found to be eight per cent of the population); ‘mainstream liberals’ (16%);‘identity ambivalents’ (28%); ‘cultural integrationists’ (24%); ‘latent hostiles’ (10%); and ‘active enmity’ (13%). Those identified as ‘identity ambivalents’ could easily be pushed further towards the Right, unless mainstream politicalparties tackle the social and economic insecurity which dominates theirattitudes. This Report therefore, somewhat alarmingly, suggests that only onequarter of the population are comfortable with our present model ofmulticulturalism.

Goodwin appears to confirm this rather depressing attitudinal picture48,

providing a really useful analysis of the opinion polling on migration and racerelated issues over the last 10 years or so. Over this period, the public havegenerally viewed the Government’s performance on immigration in a negativelight. The views have not been ambivalent with around 80% supportingsuggestions that ‘immigration is not under control’; that the Government is ‘notbeing open and honest’ about the scale of migration; and that immigration

44 Copsey, N and Macklin, G (2011) Eds. The British National Party Contemporary

Perspectives. London: Routledge 2011.45

Goodwin, M., Ford, R., Cutts, D., (2011) From Euroscepticism to Islamophobia: TheChanging Face of UKIP. University of Nottingham Research Briefing. (Nottingham: University

of Nottingham)46 ibid

47 Searchlight Education Trust (SET) (2011) Fear and HOPE. London: SET

48 Goodwin, M., (2011) New British Fascism – The Rise of the British National Party (London:

Routledge)


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policies are not sensible or credible. Even more worryingly, when opinion pollshave asked which political party have the best policies on immigration, themajority of those polled generally feel that it none of them do, or they don’tknow. These results suggest that the ground is wide open for the Right tocultivate.

The Far Right have, more evidently, gained an increased level of popularsupport across most of the remainder of Europe, including France,Switzerland, Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, Germany and Italy. And even the traditional liberal countries of Scandinavia have seen anunprecedented growth in Far Right support with parties in Norway, Finlandand Denmark growing to around 20% of electorate support and Sweden witharound 6% finding that this has been converted to a significant number ofseats due to their system of proportional representation. The recent tragicevents in Norway may at least mean a reconsideration of the real challengethey pose.

Messina (2010)49 seeks to distinguish the types of Far Right party with acomparative European perspective. He offers a distinction between ‘genericgroups’ that are exclusively obsessed by animus towards settled and newmigrants; ‘neo-fascist groups’ who are inspired by an over -arching ideology,embracing the core tenets of pre-Second World War fascism; the‘opportunistic right’ who are driven by a calculated desire to win votes ratherthan an obsessive race-centred ideology; the ‘new radical right’ who aspire togovern and have more formal membership and regular electoral activity and;the ‘ethno national right’ who are primarily single issue parties, placing ethno -nationalism centre stage, with anti-migrant appeals in second place. The BNP

are placed in the Neo-Fascist camp.

What they all share, however, is hostility towards settled and new migrantsand ‘fascism’s adaptation to the transformed historical conditions’ and thegrowth of ‘neo-populism’50, possibly inspired by France’s Front National . Thisexploited populist concerns about the threat to ‘Frenchness’ and the Frenchway of life. This seems to suggest that the Far Right understand the impact ofglobalisation better than centrist politicians. Marine Le Pen the new FrontNational leader sums this up as “now the real divide is between nationalismand globalisation”, and complains that “France’s sovereignty has been‘sucked dry by the EU”, with “cultural identity under attack through massive

immigration”.51

In common with all other Far Right parties Le Pen calls for ‘immigration to bestopped and cultural identities to be preserved’, as though it is possible to haltany, or one, aspect of the process of globalisation that has been gatheringpace for many decades. But her kind of political leadership also dependsupon appealing to one section of the population over another and building a

49 Messina, A. (2011) ‘Assessing the political relevance of anti-immigrant parties: the BNP in

comparative European perspective’ in Copsey, N and Macklin, G (2011) Eds. The British

National Party Contemporary Perspectives. London: Routledge 2011.50 Griffin, R. (2011) ‘Alien Influence? The international context of the BNP’s modernisation’ in

Copsey, N and Macklin, G (2011) Eds. The British National Party ContemporaryPerspectives. London: Routledge 2011.51

Marine Le Pen interviewed in the Guardian 22nd

March 2011.


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power base to represent their ‘difference’. Gary Younge is also asking someof these more profound questions, as in his book, Who Are We?52 He pointsout that when it comes to identity, the global and the parochial have asymbiotic relationship – the smaller the world becomes and the less controlwe have over it, the more likely we are to retreat into the local spheres wherewe might have influence.

As discussed in Section 2, there appears to be something of a ‘diversityparadox’ in that the more diver se societies and the more people becomeengaged with difference, whether in personal terms, or virtually, through themedia and communications, the more they seemed to embrace identitypolitics and support separatist ideologies. Moving from a multicultural modelto one based on interculturalism, therefore requires a change to the way inwhich societies conceive of identity and instrumentalise identity through policyand practice. This is developed in later sections.

The Adaptation of Multiculturalism

The early forms of multiculturalism were necessarily defensive, both to protectminorities from the hostility and racism they faced and to promote fairnessand social justice. Some elements therefore need to be retained. However, asboth majority and minority communities came to terms with living side by side,the early policies failed to adjust and to facilitate a shared society. The adventof community cohesion in the UK in 2001 began this process with a series ofprogressive measures to create engagement, whilst still retaining theprinciples of fairness and rights. Interculturalism will take this process still

further and respond to the challenges of globalisation and super diversity.

Table 2 (below) therefore indicates the way in which ideas aboutmulticulturalism have changed and need to respond to the impact ofglobalisation and migration. Each stage builds upon the other to reflect theincreasing complexity of our multicultural societies.

52 Younge, Gary (2010) Who Are We – And Should it Matter in the 21

st Century? (London:

Viking)


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Table: 2. Transferable Components of Multiculturalism and CommunityCohesion; and Interculturalism

Multiculturalism Community Cohesion Interculturalism

Support for distinctive culturalheritage

Anti- discriminationlegislation

Promotion of equalopportunities







Additional features:

Promotion of interaction andcross cultural contact andunderstanding; contestationof stereotypes

Promotion of ’belonging’ andvalues of diversity

Formal and informalcitizenship and cohesionlearning programmes


Promotion of Interaction andcross cultural contact andunderstanding; contestationof stereotypes

Promotion of ’belonging’ andvalues of diversity

Formal and informalcitizenship and cohesionlearning programmes


Promotion of fluid anddynamic identities

Development of cultural andreligious neutrality

Support for international andintercultural learning andcompetences

Withdrawal of state supportfor promotion of cultural andreligious identities

Support for Internationalcollaborative agencies andleadership

Horizontal, cross boundaryleadership and affiliation;new social media

The principal components of ‘defensive’ multiculturalism are common tocommunity cohesion and interculturalism. However, whilst the defensive form


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was perhaps an inevitable and appropriate response to the intolerant andracist attitudes and behaviours of the early stages of multicultural societies, itinevitable led to separation, ignorance and mistrust of the ‘other’. Anti-discrimination legislation and equal opportunities programmes were certainlyrequired to deal with the many injustices and unfairnesses experienced by

minorities (and by women, older people and those with disabilities), but mayhave also reinforced ideas of political correctness, rather than succeeding inchange underlying attitudes.

Community cohesion emerged to as a response to these weaknesses inmulticulturalism and, whilst building upon the various equality programmes,tried to change attitudes and behaviours by promoting interaction anddeveloping a sense of belonging, especially on a local basis, and by creatinga more positive picture of the nature and value of diversity. Interculturalism,however, recognises that super diversity can no longer be considered on asimple national or local basis and that the State must adjust the way it

mediates between many different groups and recognises the impact oftransnational and diasporic influences. Interculturalism (see Section 6)therefore builds upon previous phases, but actively develops dynamicidentities through the encouragement of broader networks, the learning aboutothers and collaborative styles of open leadership, which transcend insularpatterns of identity.

4. The Contribution of ‘Community Cohesion’

The concept of ‘community cohesion’ was established following a number ofriots and disturbances in England in 2001. It represented a fundamentalchallenge to the then multicultural model. It was unsurprisingly criticised by anumber of academics (see below) who were so used to what they saw attackson diversity and minority communities that they reacted with knee jerkopposition to any change in approach. Nevertheless, policy makers andpractitioners were much more favourably disposed and cohesion programmeswere introduced from 2002 onwards. Though they were initially on a limitedand piecemeal basis, they gradually developed across the UK and have nowalso become part of many ‘mainstream’ activities – for example as part of thestatutory duty in all schools in England53. Community cohesion programmes

have attempted to build understanding between different groups and to buildmutual trust and respect by breaking down stereotypes and misconceptionsabout the ‘other’. In some cases, there are clear and measurable impacts ofsuch programmes and generally measure attitudinal and behavioural changein the programme participants, or in the wider local community.

In addition to the small scale programmes focussed on divided communities,community cohesion was also developed at a city-wide or area level todevelop support a broader consensus in support of diversity. These oftenincluded high profile campaigns featuring people from a range of backgrounds

53 This duty was introduced by the Education and Inspections Act 2006 and became

operational in 2007.


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who ‘all belong’ and contribute to the economic and cultural life of the area.These campaigns were important in that they tried to present a new positivepicture of diversity and whilst recognising the value of cultural heritage anddistinctiveness, it placed a new emphasis on the commonalities betweengroups and thereby contributed to a less defensive and more progressive

form of multiculturalism. It is suggested that cohesion programmes will beequally necessary in the development of interculturality.

Conceptual and practical development

There have been at least three formal national definitions of the concept, eachbuilding upon the other over the six year period from 2002 to 2008, which areshown below. All refer, however, to the need for strong and positiverelationships between people from different backgrounds, tackling inequalitiesand developing a positive climate of opinion to support diversity. There are

also a large number of local definitions, which draw upon the formal nationaldefinitions but tend to add a local context. The three formal definitions are setout below.

The first was built directly on the Cantle54 and Denham55 reports, and wasconstructed by representatives of the co-authors of the Guidance onCommunity Cohesion, the Local Government Association, the then Office ofthe Deputy Prime Minister, the Commission of Racial Equality and the Inter-Faith Network.

Local Government Association56 (LGA)

‘ A cohesive community is one where:

There is common vision and a sense of belonging for all communities;

The diversity of people’s different backgrounds and circumstances areappreciated and positively valued;

Those from different backgrounds have similar life opportunities; and

Strong and positive relationships are being developed between peoplefrom different backgrounds in the workplace, in school

Documents

ICoCo Cohesion Integration and Openness, From Multi to Inter Culturalism