Iceland: A postimperial sovereignty project

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Iceland: A postimperial sovereignty project

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DOI: 10.1177/0010836713514152cac.sagepub.com

Iceland: A postimperial sovereignty project

Eiríkur BergmannBifrost University, Iceland

AbstractThe historical links with imperial Denmark still have an impact on Iceland’s foreign policy and its approach to Europe in particular. This article examines the triangular relationship between Iceland, its former colonizers (Norway and Denmark) and the European Union (EU). Iceland’s political identity was carved out in the course of its independence struggle from Denmark (1830–1944), based on a fundamental belief in its formal sovereignty, which still dictates Icelandic foreign relations to a great extent. In order to uphold the standard of being considered a modern Nordic welfare state, however, Iceland has an economic need to participate in the EU’s internal market, resulting in the European Economic Area agreement. Iceland’s postimperial sovereignty games are mostly played within these boundaries. To understand its position within the European project, this paper analyses how, until the economic ‘Crash of 2008’, the national identity emerging out of the colonial experience has limited Iceland’s relationship with the EU.

KeywordsEuropean Union, Iceland, Nordic, postcolonialism, sovereignty

Introduction

As a republic that was first established in 1944, Iceland has struggled to find its place in the world. Ever since the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, Icelanders have debated their relationship to the post-WW II European institutions, but the island nation has hith-erto remained outside the European Union (EU). Iceland joined the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1970 and entered into the European Economic Area (EEA) in 1994. Ultimately, the entire Icelandic financial system had to collapse in 2008 before the new left-wing government applied for EU membership – becoming the very last of the ‘Nordic five’ to do so. Soon after the initial shock had calmed, opposition against mem-bership resumed, even surpassing previous levels. Opinion polls indicate increased opposition against the accession negotiations, with a clear majority calling for it to be

Corresponding author:Eiríkur Bergmann, Bifrost University, 311 Borgarnes, Iceland. Email: [email protected]

514152 CAC0010.1177/0010836713514152Cooperation and ConflictBergmannresearch-article2014

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34 Cooperation and Conflict 49(1)

cancelled and more than two-thirds saying they would refuse membership in a referen-dum (Capacent Callup, 2012).

To understand Iceland’s approach to European integration, it is important to note that even though Iceland formally remains outside of the EU it is still an active participant in European integration. The EEA brings Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein into the European Single Market, as they agree to adopt the EU regulatory framework. An exten-sive report for the Norwegian parliament estimates that Iceland and Norway already adopt around three-quarters of the EU’s legal acts (Europautredningen, 2012: 807). Without being a formal member of the EU, Iceland’s participation in the European pro-ject is thus extensive. In fact, Iceland can be argued in some ways to be more deeply involved in the European integration process than some of the EU’s official member states. To name a few examples, Denmark has many formal opt-outs from the same EU treaties that Iceland is subject to through the EEA, and the EU’s border regulation is applied in Iceland through the Schengen Agreement, whereas the UK and Ireland are exempted from that part of EU cooperation (Adler-Nissen, 2008).

Rationalist international relations (IR) scholars have explained the Icelandic hesi-tance to join the EU mainly with reference to the interests of the fisheries sector, which claims that the EU fisheries policy contradicts Icelandic economic interests (Ingebritsen, 1998). As argued here, this explanation underestimates the importance of Iceland’s strong national identity, created in the struggle for independence. Instead, this article argues that full understanding of Iceland’s relationship with the EU and its hesitant posi-tion with regards to the European integration process requires an understanding of its historical relations, the legacy of its colonial past and the rhetoric of the independence struggle – which still stands central in Icelandic political discourse. Directly resulting from the legacy of the independence struggle, debates on foreign relations have in fact become more vicious than almost any other political disputes in the country (see Bergmann, 2009b, 2011; Hermannsson, 2005; Ingimundarson, 1996).

This article analyses how postimperialism shapes Iceland’s relations with the EU by making for a series of distinct games played with the concept of sovereignty, in Icelandic domestic politics and foreign policy. To begin with, there is a brief review of the existing literature on Iceland and European integration before arguing how postcolonial theories can contribute further to understanding Iceland’s strained relationship with the EU. The theoretical discussion is followed by an historical account of Iceland’s political identity. The most extensive section of the article analyses the contemporary narratives on Europe against Iceland’s postcolonial identity created partly in the independence struggle.

In order to illustrate the continuity of particular identity figurations and how the post-colonial nationalist discourse transmits and translates into contemporary politics, exam-ples are provided of the discourses that politicians articulate in the main debating rounds on Europe since the republic was established; firstly on the EFTA (1970), secondly on the EEA agreement (1994) and thirdly on possible EU membership. As this analysis shows, the Icelandic debates on foreign policy are played out as language games condi-tioned by a – postcolonial – concept of sovereignty as only recently acquired and ever necessary to defend. When this language game leaves the domestic scene to be played in an international context, the value – to Iceland and the world – of this recently acquired Icelandic sovereignty is stressed. Hence, the article proceeds to reveal the impact of the



Bergmann 35

basic national identity discourse, including the postcolonial concept of sovereignty, on the rhetoric prevalent and commonly used in the context of Icelandic foreign relations in, firstly, the boom years leading up to the collapse of the financial system in autumn 2008 and, secondly, the debates that followed after the Crash, the Icesave dispute with the British and Dutch governments and International Monetary Fund (IMF) involvement. The postcolonial emphasis on never again surrendering to foreign authority is most often only underlying in contemporary political discourse, which often makes it difficult to identify specific examples. In times of crisis, however, this rhetoric becomes more explicit, as became evident in the Icesave dispute.

Before concluding, a final section discusses the games necessitated in practice by the concept of sovereignty identified in the debates. Specifically, the section analyses how Iceland manoeuvres within the European integration process and shows how Iceland’s postcolonial national identity brings forward a dual insistence: on being both formally sovereign as well as being recognized as an equal partner in Europe. This has developed into a dilemma for the national identity: one side emphasizing independence and thus avoiding EU membership, while the other is pushing Iceland forward to participate in the global economy, for example into the EU’s single market by entering into the EEA agreement.

Postcolonial analysis: creation of a political identity

Many different factors have been suggested to explain Iceland’s apparent Euro-scepticism. As already mentioned, it is commonly argued that fisheries-related interests have presented the main hindrance for Icelandic EU membership (Ingebritsen, 1998). Political scientists Gunnar Helgi Kristinsson and Baldur Thorhallsson (2004) claim that the close relationship between the political elite and fisheries industry has also factored into Iceland’s negative view on EU membership. Similarly, Magnús Árni Magnússon (2011) emphasizes these political constraints and agrees with Clive Archer and Ingrid Sogner (1998) when claiming that geo-political security factors are also in play, together with the lack of economic incentives after having joined the EEA. Thorhallsson finds that a range of other factors in combination with the fisheries factor is important, includ-ing Iceland’s status as a small state, special security links with the USA, effects of the Cod Wars, geographical isolation and an electoral system that favours rural areas (Thorhallsson, 2004).

Even though these factors contribute to explaining the position of various social and political groups in Iceland, the rationalist focus on interests can be questioned by refer-ring to the fact that until the collapse of the Icelandic economy in 2008, which followed the global financial crisis, there was never a majority in Parliament to put the fisheries issue to the test in EU accession negotiations. Were fisheries as such truly the main eco-nomic obstacle for the parliamentarians otherwise in favour of seeking membership, they should have been willing to test this in the accession negotiations in order to see if their concerns would be met with adequate opt-outs. Until the Crash of 2008, they were never willing to do so. Combined with the increased opposition the accession negotiations have faced in the wake of the crisis, this indicates that other factors might have contributed to Iceland’s EU policy. In this paper, I maintain that the fisheries situation represents more




than merely an economic argument: that it in fact represents a key element in Iceland’s post-independence identity.

Most students of Icelandic politics acknowledge the importance of the independ-ence struggle for the development of Iceland’s political identity (see Grímsson, 1978; Hálfdanarson, 2001; Hermannsson, 2005; Karlsson, 2000). Still, the importance of the national political identity, the shared discourse of independence as a continuous fight that developed through the independence struggle and has since been established as the common foundation of Icelandic politics, has not been seen as decisive for how Iceland relates to the EU. In fact, previous studies of Iceland’s approach to the EU have largely overlooked that which could be referred to as either ‘postcolonial’ or ‘postimperial’ identity. Kristinsson (1996), for example, only mentions in passing that ‘the word independence strikes a key note in Icelandic political rhetoric’ before returning to fish-eries and demographic factors when explaining Iceland’s EU relations. The interest-based rationalist approach neglects the political effect of Iceland’s postcolonial identity and the strong emphasis on formal sovereignty that was created in the independence struggle.

Postcolonial theories, on the other hand, emphasize the importance of analysing the impact of colonial contact on contemporary politics, the cultural legacy of colonialism, and thus critically exploring the past–present link. This article claims that such a per-spective is central to understanding Icelandic foreign relations in general, but particu-larly in relation to former and potential imperial powers, such as the EU. Iceland’s postcolonial national identity was created through that relationship. It is therefore not a temporary situation fading out over time after gaining independence, but rather a more enduring and constantly reconstructed and re-performed political identity.

Nevertheless, a few scholars studying Icelandic culture have emphasized the impor-tance of the colonial past. Prominent among them, Professor Kristín Loftsdóttir (2011), an anthropologist, analyses how the colonial experience was instrumental in shaping the Icelandic national identity. Since then, it has been ‘constantly remanufactured through various discourses and praxis’ (Loftsdóttir, 2011). By studying representations of the Viking image in Icelandic rhetoric, Ann-Sofie Nielsen Germaud (2010) examines the importance of the colonial past in Iceland’s contemporary discourse, concluding that the ‘Viking’ is a central yet changeable element in the modern collective Icelandic self-image. Referring to Claude Lévi-Stauss’ division of societies into ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ rela-tionships with the past, Germaud (2010) categorizes Iceland as a clearly ‘hot society’, ‘where history is an internalized generation that helps to contextualize the future through historically based cultural memory’. The discursive representation of the past is indeed continually present in Icelandic politics. Accordingly, it can be argued that the contem-porary political condition in Iceland is very much a result of its historical relationship with its neighbouring countries. This is in line with Andreas Huyssen’s (2001) claim that a framework for understanding the present is built on memories of past events. Importantly, he points out that this involves the successful marketing of these collective memories (Huyssen, 2003). Loftsdóttir (2010) stipulates that the Icelandic case indeed indicates how the relationships and identities of the late 19th and early 20th century colonial and imperial worlds are remembered in a particular way and thus continue to haunt the present.



Bergmann 37

While many scholars refer to the importance of the postcolonial relationship when analysing Iceland’s political identity, no broader study has previously been carried out on how it has affected participation in the European project.1 To study the impact of national identity on European integration policies in Iceland, we draw on the analytical strategy developed by Lene Hansen and Ole Wæver (2002). They show how national identities and their impact on European integration can be studied by analysing domestic political discourse to understand the room for manoeuvre available to governments in foreign policy (Hansen and Wæver, 2002). They suggest that such an analysis begin with the identification of the constellation of concepts articulating – and thereby giving meaning to – the concepts of state and nation in the particular national discourse of, in this case, Iceland. Wæver describes how the task is ‘to find small constellations of concepts that produce a nucleus of meaning from which much of national discourse can be generated’ (Wæver, 2002: 24). Different versions of ‘sovereignty’ are amongst these concepts in most modern, national discourses (Gad and Adler-Nissen, 2013) – and the claim advanced in this article is that the Icelandic version of the concept of sovereignty is particular in terms of being postcolonial.

Secondly, one may proceed to analyse if and how the idea of participation in European integration can fit within the boundaries of the nation’s political discourse. Hansen and Wæver’s (2002) framework suggests that when the idea of ‘Europe’ threatens the idea of ‘nation’ within the domestic debate, it becomes difficult to promote further participa-tion in European integration. Thus, the idea of the Icelandic nation and its sovereignty and how that idea fits with being an integral part of the supra-national European integra-tion process is as important – if not more so – than the interests of the leading economic sector, fisheries, when studying the relationship the nation has with Europe. Similarly, Iver B Neumann (2002) finds that the core concept in Norway’s relationship with Europe is that of ‘the people’ (folket, in Norwegian), which is tied to national patriotism. The European project is seen as tied to bureaucracy and the elite – and in this sense in opposition to the people. This is significantly contrary to Iceland, however, as the dis-tinction between the ordinary public and elite is not present in the debate. The corre-sponding Icelandic concept to folket is þjóðin, which incorporates both the common people and the elite.2

According to this framework, it is not the personal conviction of the participants (the players), that is most important, but rather the discourse they apply in the political debate to bring their arguments forward. In other words, how they manoeuvre within the domes-tic language games made possible and necessary by the concept of sovereignty under postcolonial conditions. To understand Iceland’s foreign policy and its policy on Europe, it is therefore necessary to frame the analysis within a historical context and map how Iceland’s nation and state building, which emerged out of the independence struggle, have an impact on contemporary foreign policy. A subsequent section examines if and how parliamentarians try to fit or contradict participation in European integration with the Icelandic nation’s political discourse, which does not immediately facilitate it. Before beginning the discourse analysis, a historical account is thus needed to provide an under-standing for the framework to which contemporary political discourse must relate to make sense.




The struggle over Iceland’s national identity

When studying contemporary Icelandic politics, the legacy of the more than century-long independence struggle in the 19th and early 20th centuries (1830–1944) becomes very clear.3 The struggle was fought with legal arguments rather than arms, that is, with words rather than violence. Parliament (the Alþingi) was ‘resurrected’ as an advisory body in Reykjavik in 1845, Iceland received its first constitution from the Danish King in 1874, home rule in 1904, sovereignty in 1918 (full internal independence and for the most part external control within a personal union with the Danish monarch as head of state) and full independence in 1944 – against the will of Denmark when it was still under Nazi occupation (for more, see Karlsson, 2000).

The struggle was led by a small group of Icelandic intellectuals in Copenhagen who, through reference to Iceland’s history of independent Vikings, developed a national myth4 that served to justify their special emphasis on sovereignty and independence. According to this myth, Iceland is a unique nation and it is the duty of all Icelanders to actively guard its sovereignty and independence. Hálfdanarson explains how Iceland’s hero of independence, Jón Sigurðsson, has since become the symbolic father of all Icelanders (2001: 96).5 Historian Páll Björnsson (2010) demonstrates that all camps in Icelandic politics – conservatives, communists, nationalists and liberals alike – refer to Jón Sigurðsson to advance and indeed to legitimize their argument.

The myth establishes a golden age from settlement in the year 874, peaking after the state-like formulation in 930 and ending when Iceland falls under foreign rule, first with the Old Treaty with Norway in 1262, then Danish rule in 1380, and finally with introduc-tion of Absolutism in 1662 (Hálfdanarson, 2001: 28). Iceland’s first history professor, Jón Jónsson Aðils (1869–1920), describes the golden age as a society superior to all oth-ers in which the unique and pure Icelandic language is the key to its soul. He claimed that Icelanders not only enjoyed the highest standard of living but that their culture was so rich that it ‘only compares to ancient Greece during the highest period of civilization’ (Jónsson, 1903). According to the myth, the Icelandic society starts to deteriorate after entering into the Old Treaty with the Norwegian King. A period of humiliation then fol-lows after falling under Danish rule. Jón Jónsson Aðils and his followers explain that however weak and humiliated, the Icelandic national spirit never dies; and at last, in the early 19th century, courageous and wise men finally rise up and reclaim the nation’s own worth and lift the national spirit by fighting for its independence (Bergmann, 2011: 35–38). As Germaud (2010) explains, the myth creates a U-shaped curve of history wherein the peaks in both distant past and in the end of the story place emphasis on autonomy and the avoidance of external influence.

Iceland’s independence movement clearly drew its ideas from international trends at the time, most importantly the Enlightenment and Romanticism. When the struggle for sovereignty and later full independence – Icelandic nationalism – was evolving, how-ever, its creators looked back 1000 years to the settlement republic for arguments and justifications for their claim rather than to current international developments (Hermannsson, 2005: 83). The emphasis was on drawing an unbroken link to the golden age rather than linking the independence struggle with the international ideological developments of the time. Iceland’s path to modernization and progress were therefore



Bergmann 39

seen through its own unique past rather than referring to an international trend (Hermannsson, 2005: 252–292).

In his landmark study, Hálfdanarson (2001: 36–39) claims that the sense of national-ism was also somewhat stronger than in most other European states at the time, based on a historical conviction that justified the full formal sovereignty and independence of the nation. The nation almost became a concrete natural fact in the Icelandic mind. A free and sovereign Icelandic nation state became an integral part of the national self-image. Icelandic nationalism was thus created and based on a romantic notion of the natural and pure, or at least special, separate nation. This notion became a vital force in the struggle for independence.

The external struggle for sovereignty was also fuelled by an interest in recognition as an equal partner in Europe. Birgir Hermannsson (2005: 125–127) demonstrates that the striving for independence was not only to gain authority over its own affairs but also a vehicle for promoting modernization in a country that had been one of the most back-ward in Europe for centuries. Formally, Iceland was not actually a Danish colony but rather a dependency, what in Denmark was called a bi-land. The Icelanders occupied an ambiguous position in the 19th century. Loftsdóttir (2011) explains how they were nei-ther represented as complete ‘savages’ nor seen as fully belonging to the group of ‘civi-lized’ peoples. This ambiguity was reflected in the Icelandic student protests in 1905 against being portrayed as colonial subjects in the Danish colonial exhibition in Copenhagen, as they did not want to be associated with colonized peoples from Greenland and Africa.

It should be stressed that the Icelandic national myth is hardly unique. Indeed, many nations base their nationhood on similar kinds of myth creation (see Smith, 2001). What is interesting in the Icelandic case, however, is that after gaining full independence, the independence struggle did not end. Rather, a new struggle started: the ever-lasting inde-pendence struggle. A new political idea was born: the notion that the fight for independ-ence is a constant, never-ending struggle (for more, see Bergmann, 2011). Accordingly, all Icelanders share a collective duty to guard its independence. In his landmark study on Icelandic politics, including Icelandic political identity (1978), Professor Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson, the political scientist who later became President of Iceland, claimed that this common understanding of Icelandic nationalism, created in the independence struggle, has since become one of the most important ideas in Icelandic political discourse.

The discourses on Europe

Politics in Iceland – like the Faeroe Islands and Greenland (cf. the Introduction to this issue) – revolve around a double axis: the traditional left–right axis and an internationalist–isolationist axis structured by the issue of Iceland’s sovereignty in relation to NATO and European cooperation. The party system consists of four main political parties. The left-of-centre Social Democratic Alliance (SDA), founded in 2000 after the merging of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the People’s Alliance (PA), is the only party that has consistently campaigned for EU membership. However, it is the right-of-centre Independence Party (IP) that has until recently been the most influential in Icelandic politics. The IP supported Iceland’s membership in EFTA and




the EEA, but then turned against EU membership. The leftist Left-Green Movement (LGM), also founded in 2000 by splinters from the PA and its predecessors, has cam-paigned against further participation in European integration. The small, central Progressive Party (PP) has been split over the European issue and for a long time in effect been without a clearly defined policy. After a recent leadership change, the party has turned ever more vigorously against EU membership.6

The membership debates

When debating EFTA membership in 1968–1969, Icelandic parliamentarians primarily based their arguments on the economy. The narrative of the independence struggle and conservative ideas regarding the nation and its sovereignty were always underlying, however, in effect forming a base for the economic arguments. Parliamentarians referred to what they called the undisputed distinctiveness of the nation, claiming, for example, that it was ‘only natural that our relationship with EFTA will be marked by that distinc-tiveness’ (Árnason, 1968). This understanding of uniqueness and distinctiveness was then used as an argument for the multiple opt-outs and special solutions that Iceland brought to the negotiating table. Those arguing against further participation in the European integration process feared a loss of identity in such a close relationship with the big nations of Europe. Directly tapping into the national myth, many parliamentari-ans referred to the so-called Old Treaty of 1262 and the introduction of Absolutism in Denmark in 1662 in their argument against integration with other nations (for more, see Bergmann, 2009b: 184–206).

In the parliamentary debates in 1989–1994 leading up to the EEA agreement, the sovereignty argument was no longer underlying but explicit. When referring to economic benefits, EEA advocates emphasized how the independence struggle was interested in progress and modernization to bring Iceland forward as an equal partner in Europe. Foreign Minister Hannibalsson (SDP) argued that the EEA would be Iceland’s ‘passport’ into the future and the key to economic prosperity. He referred to Jón Sigurðsson, the main hero of the independence struggle, to support the claim that the EEA was a continu-ation of the independence struggle and would push Iceland further into modernity (Hannibalsson, 1991; for more, see Bergmann, 2009b: 207–258).

The sovereignty argument was central to the No-camp discourse, which used it even more systematically and forcefully. They accused the Yes-camp of being unpatriotic, arguing that the EEA threatened Icelandic sovereignty, which would be lost to undemo-cratic institutions in Brussels. This would thus be tantamount to again falling under for-eign rule; and even though the agreement would bring economic benefits, it should be rejected solely on the grounds that it violated the Icelandic ‘sense of sovereignty’ (Ársælsson, 1992). Interestingly, however, the meaning of what sovereignty is – what it consists of – was hardly discussed. One PP parliamentarian emphasized protecting the purity of Iceland’s identity and language from being contaminated by excessively inti-mate foreign relations: ‘if we submit [to the EEA], we would of course instantly lose our language, culture and independence in a very short period of time’ (Pétursson, 1989). This supports Loftsdóttir’s (2010) claim that Icelanders continued to associate national identity with the purity of the nation and its language.



Bergmann 41

The importance of sovereignty dominated the debate on possible EU membership in the beginning of the 2000s (Bergmann, 2009b: 259–301). In the words of one IP parlia-mentarian, not only did the EU fisheries policy violate Iceland’s economic interests, it brought with it the ‘complete transfer of our nation’s sovereignty and authority’ (Guðfinnsson, 2000). The national heritage and unique culture were emphasized when debating the EU’s fisheries policy; that Icelanders should continue to develop a competi-tive society and strong economy on their own, claiming that it would be a massive step backwards for Iceland to lose its self-rule through EU membership. Iceland would be locked inside an unproductive trade block, trapped in an undemocratic bureaucracy. Then-Prime Minister Davíð Oddsson (IP) described the EU as being the most ‘undemo-cratic bureaucratic monstrosity man has ever created’ (quoted in Friðriksson, 2002b). On the other side of the left–right axis, the leader of the LGM similarly remained firmly within the boundaries of the postcolonial discourse when asserting that membership would mean ‘diminished independence and sovereignty, loss of distinctiveness’ (Sigfússon, 2000).

It was first after the collapse of the entire financial system and with the IP/SDA coali-tion ousted in the so-called Pots-and-Pans Revolution in January 2009 that the new left-wing government (SDA/LGM) applied for EU membership.7 The Yes-camp tapped into the postcolonial independence discourse by promoting the EU as a way forward to pro-tect and strengthen Iceland’s sovereignty rather than as a step away from independence – and with continual references to Jón Sigurðsson to advance their argument.

Campaigning against the EU, however, one IP parliamentarian remembered Iceland’s 65th anniversary of independence: ‘We were the poorest nation in Europe after 600 years of cooperation with nations to the South in Europe [the same ones] we would be joining now’ (Blöndal, 2009a). In line with the national myth, he explained that Iceland’s mis-fortunes and humiliation started after entering into the Old Treaty in 1262, and only with independence was Iceland able to develop into being amongst the richest. He concluded that EU membership would again mean Iceland becoming a ‘depopulated poor province in a huge European super-state’. One IP colleague said that Icelanders should never for-get that they are a unique nation, ‘tough and hardworking and with a soul that could never been broken by foreigners’. Another (PP) claimed that formal sovereignty ‘makes the nation what she is today’ (Þórhallsson, 2009); and yet another (LGM) that Iceland’s main independence hero, Jón Sigurðsson, ‘would turn in his grave if the EU application would go forward’ (Daðason, 2009); and another still (LGM) feared that the will of the nation would diminish after EU membership, concluding that ‘he who is glad when beaten to obey becomes a slave’ (Jónasson, 2009).

In all three debates on advancing further into European integration (EFTA, EEA, EU), the same tropes of the sovereignty argument are applied. When analysing this discourse, it becomes evident that fisheries, as central as they have been, are more than just an economic matter, as they also form an integral element in the Icelandic sov-ereignty discourse as developed in the independence struggle. The oft-used argument that Iceland cannot join the EU because of the Common Fisheries Policy is there-fore not a purely economic argument, but rather a pivotal aspect of Iceland’s post-independence identity. Complete control over the fishing zone is a symbol of the free and independent Icelandic nation. Further along these lines, it is framed as part




of the ever-lasting independence struggle to keep European vessels out of Iceland’s fishing waters (Bergmann, 2011: 221).

Identity politics in the boom years

At the beginning of the new millennium, Icelanders seemed to have found their own unique way to succeed in the world of globalized high finance, buying up banks and established companies around Europe – especially focusing on known landmarks on the high streets in London and Copenhagen. Tapping into the national myth rooted in the struggle for independence, a report on the image of Iceland commissioned by the PM’s office in 2008 attributed this perceived success to the ‘unique characteristics’ of the Icelandic nation, ‘which separates Icelanders from other nations’ (Ímynd Íslands: Styrkur, staða og stefna, 2008). This uniqueness of the Icelandic nation was said to stem from living in harmony with the harsh nature, which had created a special natural force out of the Icelandic nation. The report concludes that, on this basis, the core of Iceland’s image should be ‘power, freedom and peace’. Here, the internationalization of Iceland’s econ-omy is indeed interpreted through a romantic nationalist discourse. A report on the future of Iceland, commissioned by the Icelandic Chamber of Commerce in 2006, echoed his-tory professor Jón Jónsson Aðil’s positioning of Iceland at the top of civilization, as it suggested that Iceland should ‘no longer compare itself with the other Nordic states, as we overreach them in most fields’ (Ísland 2015, 2006). In 2007, the annual conference of the Icelandic Chamber of Commerce was held under the slogan ‘Iceland, best in the world’ (Viðskiptaráð Íslands, 2007).

In speeches given around the world, Icelandic President Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson leant credibility to the new business elite, which had gained control over the Icelandic economy after privatization and liberalization efforts by neoliberal governments in the 1990s. Already at the turn of the millennium, he was predicting ‘that the features of the new global economy are such as to allow us Icelanders to prosper as never before and give our global partners access to a highly rewarding cooperation’ (Grímsson, 2000). He explained that creativity was the backbone of the Icelandic heritage, ‘creativity which centuries ago produced the Icelandic sagas and the Edda Poems, unique literary achieve-ments in medieval Europe; and creativity is clearly what confers a competitive edge in the modern global economy and will do so even more in the knowledge-based industries and services of the 21st century’.

Loftsdóttir (2011) points out that Icelanders have long emphasized the purity of their ethnic origins, ‘combined with grand narratives of how they gained independence and became one of the richest nations in the world’. Tapping directly into the national myth, the President did not hesitate to explain Iceland’s postcolonial success with reference to the unique origins of the nation, thus linking the present to the past. He went on to explain how Icelandic creativity manifests itself not only in literature and the arts but also in the operation of modern companies. ‘Thousands of companies all over the coun-try demonstrate the fascinating combination of entrepreneurship and creativity which is so uniquely Icelandic’. He then described how ‘this spirit of our founding fathers and mothers, the spirit of exploration and discovery, has moulded the upbringing of the new generation, which is now creating in Iceland one of the most interesting modern societies



Bergmann 43

on earth, a society that is using technology to achieve one of the highest living standards in the world’. In early 2000, he concluded one speech by saying that it was in ‘this spirit that we have come to Los Angeles to share with you [the people of America] the excite-ment of our future’ (Grímsson, 2000).

The President’s nationalistic rhetoric only grew stronger in the years to follow. In a speech at the Walbrook Club in London five years later, he began by linking the success of the Icelandic businessmen to the Cod Wars between Iceland and the UK in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, reminding his audience that Iceland was the ‘only nation on earth to defeat the British Navy, not once but three times’ (Grímsson, 2005). With this unique track record in mind, he commented that ‘it is no wonder that young entre-preneurial Vikings have arrived in London full of confidence and ready to take on the world!’ (Grímsson, 2005). When explaining Iceland’s success story, he said that ‘our business culture, our approach, our way of thinking and our behaviour patterns, rooted in our traditions and national identity, have played a crucial role’. Combined, he said, these unique ‘qualities have given the Icelandic business community a competitive edge, enabling us to win where others either failed or did not dare to enter. Our entre-preneurs have thus been able to move faster and more effectively, to be more original and more flexible, more reliable but also more daring than many others’ (Grímsson, 2005).

Grímsson thus directly linked the contemporary Icelandic, so-called ‘Viking Capitalists’ with the original ninth-century Viking settlers, claiming that they held the same qualities and indeed the same spirit (Bergmann, 2009a). This is what Anthony D Smith (2001) refers to as ‘the myth of a common ancestry’. This discourse also bears evidence of the Viking image being used to refer to a time of political autonomy, as for example Germaud (2010) explains. While President Grímsson possibly went further than most, similar narratives were widely echoed during the boom years.

The post-crisis discourse

This rhetoric could be heard in the background of the defiant response foreigners received when criticism of the so-called Icelandic economic miracle (see Gissurason, 2004) began emerging in early 2006. Instead of responding to such criticism, the government and most others on the Icelandic political scene dismissed the warnings as malicious whining from envious foreigners (for more, see Bergmann, 2011: 239–255). The Icelandic gov-ernment responded by launching a defensive PR campaign in London, New York and Copenhagen. Minister of Commerce Sverrisdóttir (PP) stated that envy was at the root of critical Fitch ratings in 2006 and dismissed the concerns of a commercial Danish bank, Den Danske Bank, asking if Denmark’s self-image had been damaged by Iceland’s suc-cess (Sverrisdóttir, 2006).

On 8 October 2008, the UK government invoked the Anti-Terrorist Act to freeze Landsbanki assets in the UK and – for a while – all of the assets of the Icelandic state.8 The Icelandic state was put on the same list as sanctioned regimes such as Al-Qaeda, Burma, the Taliban, Zimbabwe and North Korea. Less than a week later, the entire finan-cial sector had collapsed in a series of events later known as The Crash. The Icelandic economic miracle was over. Iceland’s humiliation was completed when employees of the




Danish tabloid Ekstra Bladet started a sarcastic collection for poor Iceland outside of the main landmark properties owned by the Icelandic Viking Capitalists in Copenhagen.

Instantly, the dispute with the UK and Dutch governments over the Icesave deposits fell into not just the familiar trenches of nationalistic rhetoric but, as we shall see, distinc-tively postcolonial rhetoric. Tapping into the nationalist rhetoric, prominent figures claimed that Iceland had fallen victim to vicious foreigners who had brought Iceland to its knees through conspiracy. Commentators explained how Iceland had come under siege by the ‘central banks of the US, UK, Holland, Europe, Luxembourg and the Nordic states that joined hands to lock us in while the British FME launched attack on Landsbanki’ (Gunnarsson, 2009). Iceland was perceived to have fallen victim to a grand international conspiracy led by the EU and some of its member states. The country was forced into the hands of the IMF – where the British and Dutch were waiting to force Iceland to agree to an unjust agreement on the Icesave accounts. Many parliamentarians echoed this notion of a European-led conspiracy, some declaring that they would not accept anyone from the Nordic states as mediator between Iceland and the British and Dutch governments, as they had aligned with the EU against Iceland (e.g. Vísir, 2010). An agreement was reached in June 2009.9 The government was instantly accused of high treason by the opposition and pundits (e.g. Harðardóttir, 2009). The leader of the PP accused the PM of ‘humiliating the nation’ by ‘forcing her nation to pay the Icesave debt burden’ (Gunnlaugsson, 2009). Instead of protecting the nation, he claimed the government was working on behalf of the British and Dutch to attack Iceland.

The Icesave dispute was directly linked to the EU membership debate. After explain-ing how the EU had forced Iceland to agree to an unjust agreement, one parliamentarian (IP) argued that it was strange that any Icelander would like ‘to join this club that beats us’ (Blöndal, 2009b). Another (LGM) was offended by the fact that Iceland was applying for membership at the same time the large countries in the EU were ‘shamelessly forc-ing a nation like ours to surrender to their interests’ (Backman, 2009). Associating it as an historical enemy, the EU was repeatedly referred to as a club of former colonizers – contrary to Iceland, which had been colonized by one of its members, Denmark. One protest party MP, Hreyfingin, explained: ‘Iceland is an old colony and we are negotiat-ing with rooted colonizers who have not shielded their colonies in the past. Are we going too surrendered to becoming their colony?’ (Tryggvadóttir, 2009). Similarly, new IP leader Bjarni Benediktsson referred to the most historically important quote of Iceland’s independence struggle: ‘We all protest!’. Jón Sigurðsson voiced these words when protesting against the Danish authority after unilaterally closing Iceland’s consti-tutional Assembly in 1851. Benediktsson (2010) said that Iceland should now send the UK the same message. Another example is found on the blog of the anti-EU Organization for Research on the European Union, and on its Relations to Iceland, when emphasizing that the most powerful EU members, at least 10 of the EU-27 (amounting to two-thirds of the vote in the Council) are former colonizers, whom Iceland should stay away from (e.g. Organization for Research on the European Union, and on its Relations to Iceland, 2012).

After a long, drawn-out dispute, the Icesave agreement appeared to have become the most unpopular since the Old Treaty with Norway in 1262, when, according to the national myth, Iceland’s economy started to deteriorate after falling under foreign rule and entering into a period of humiliation after losing its independence. President



Bergmann 45

Grímsson refused to sign the bill, which subsequently was widely rejected in a national referendum – the first in the short history of the Icelandic republic (Jónsson, 2011). Exploiting Iceland’s desire to be recognized as an equal in the modern international sys-tem, President Grímsson explained how the referendum would have a global impact. Repeating history professor Jónsson Aðils turn-of-the-century references to ancient Athens and the US constitutional convention in Philadelphia, he insisted that the vote not only mattered for Icelanders, but that it ‘had changed people’s views around the world in the way that it was possible to develop democracy and bring direct power to the people in this new century’. He told of how people around the world were asking why they had not received the same rights that Icelanders enjoyed (Grímsson, 2010). When Iceland was vindicated of wrongdoing in the Icesave case in the EFTA court in 2013, many felt their sense of victimization to be justified (Bergmann, 2014), and the ruling served to further strengthen the opposition against EU membership (Capacent Callup, 2013).

Formal sovereignty

All of the domestic debates (on participation in European cooperation and the Icesave agreement), as well as the message conveyed to the outside world during the boom years, were structured by a basic national discourse articulated around the postcolonial concept of sovereignty as recently acquired and in constant need of defence.

In the debates on European cooperation, parliamentarians mainly used two sets of arguments: economic consequences for the fisheries industry and how ‘Europe’ fits with the idea of the Icelandic ‘nation’ and – as a central part of the national identity – with Iceland’s formal ‘sovereignty’. It is noteworthy that although the discourse does indeed revolve around protecting Iceland’s ‘formal’ sovereignty, the meaning of ‘real’ sover-eignty is hardly discussed. Hermannsson (2005) argues that even though Icelanders do agree on the importance of protecting their sovereignty, they have little common under-standing of its constellation and therefore refrain from debating it.

The importance of sovereignty claims based on Iceland’s national identity were thrust to the forefront in the debate on the EEA and continued throughout the debate on possi-ble EU membership. After the Crash of 2008 and leading up to the EU application in the summer of 2009, the debate was dominated in both camps by harsh nationalistic rhetoric, directly stemming from the independence struggle, for example with references to the uniqueness of the Icelandic nation.

The No-camp applied this discourse more directly, whereas the Yes-camp linked their economic argument to the part of the sovereignty discourse speaking to modernization and economic progress, arguing that further integration would promote growth and thus better ensure Iceland’s economic independence; for example, that gaining free access for fish to the Single Market was an indirect continuation of the independence struggle – the EEA thus helping to secure Iceland’s economic sovereignty. Conversely, the No-camp claimed that maintaining control over the fishing grounds was vital to guarding Iceland’s independence.

When digging into the discourse around the impact of EU membership on the inter-ests of Icelandic fisheries, however, we see how the fisheries argument is indeed fuelled by nationalistic rhetoric. In the independence struggle, the peasant was a symbol of the




independent Icelandic nation; however, with the increasing importance of fisheries, the seaman gradually took over as the representative of the sovereign Icelandic nation state. Icelanders fought the British in the so-called Cod Wars to gain control over the fishing resources surrounding the country. Since independence, the fishing industry has been the most important sector of the economy and the foundation of Iceland’s economic inde-pendence (Hermannsson, 2005). The nation and the seaman are then intertwined in fish-erman’s folksongs that represent the patriotic Icelander and have become de facto national anthems. In this respect, the fish in the sea and the fisherman are symbols of the independent Icelandic nation. This is especially interesting in this context, as the impor-tance of keeping control over the fisheries resources in some cases in the debate is, to a point at least, also an integral part of the independence struggle. The oft-used argument that Iceland cannot join the EU because of its Common Fisheries Policy is therefore not simply an economic argument, but also a vital aspect of Icelandic independence (Bergmann, 2011: 308–311). In this way, complete control over the fishing zone becomes a symbol of the free and independent Icelandic nation. The whole debate on Europe takes place within a language game constituted by a concept of postcolonial sovereignty.

Turning to the nationalistic rhetoric of the boom years, we see how a conception of a unique nation also echoes the national myth – which had developed special characteris-tics over centuries, but until recently been limited by its smallness and isolation. That interpretation explains how this uniquely talented nation, through increased globaliza-tion, would now almost inevitably lead Icelanders to greater success than other nations could hope to expect. The shift in the national rhetoric from the superiority discourse in the boom years to the theory of being under siege by ill-willed foreigners after the Crash of 2008 was quite rapid. On the surface, those two ideas might even seem to be opposed to one another. When analysing the harsh nationalistic rhetoric in the Icesave debate, however, it can be traced to the same origin as the one on the Icelandic economic miracle heard in the first decade of the new millennium: to Iceland’s postcolonial national iden-tity. The core of both ideas is found in the common national myth created during the struggle for independence in the 19th century, written down by Jón Jónsson Aðils in the beginning of the 20th century and kept alive and nourished by politicians of all ranks throughout time and then put into new perspectives by the likes of President Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson. As Jón Jónsson Aðils did more than a century ago when describing the old settlement society, President Grímsson links modern Iceland to ancient Greece. The strategy pursued in the sovereignty games – foreign and domestic – depended on the idea that Icelandic sovereignty is of value not just to Iceland but to the entire world.

The postcolonial identity emerges through the domestic language game with empha-sis on formal sovereignty, as it insulates Iceland against submission to foreign authority. This is what characterizes the rhetorical manoeuvring; by insisting on formal sover-eignty, Iceland strives for external recognition of being (at least) an equal partner with its neighbours. Accordingly, the rhetoric that clearly indicates the importance of this post-colonial national identity myth travels through all political shifts and historical turns and changing environments, assuming different forms at different times, as it can be utilized for different purposes. The President’s comment after the 2009 Icesave referendum offers a good example of how the nationalistic discourse in the boom years had survived the economic Crash of 2008.



Bergmann 47

Manoeuvring on the international scene

Upholding an identity of being at least an equal partner is a challenge, however, as Iceland’s international room for manoeuvre is clearly limited by its smallness. There is a prominent academic discourse on small states, and Iceland is included in this category (see Thorhallsson, 2000, 2004, 2010). This discourse plays a limited role in Icelandic debates, since it is at odds with the basic concept of sovereignty: Iceland needs to insist on being a regular state. Accepting its smallness is tantamount to accepting a potentially secondary status that threatens real sovereignty. As evident in the previous section, even though the smallness surely places limits on administrative capabilities to operate some of the duties of larger states, Iceland is primarily referred to as a fully functioning, mod-ern independent state. No alternative to sovereignty is ever advocated in Icelandic politi-cal discourse. To propose otherwise would be considered blasphemy, which no politician would dare.

Growing from a population of around 60,000 inhabitants in the mid-19th century to 330,000 at present, Iceland still borders on being a microstate. Consequently, Iceland can only operate a much smaller administration than most of its counterparts within EFTA and the EU. The entire Foreign Service has a staff of only roughly 100 diplomats (for more, see Íslenska utanríkisþjónustan í tölum og samanburði við önnur Evrópuríki, 2011). This produces a dilemma between discourse and practical constraints. Due to this systemic lack of resources, Iceland has been forced to prioritize much more actively on the specific policy areas upon which it can focus its limited efforts (Thorhallsson, 2000).

To compensate for its lack of size, Iceland relies on close cooperation with neighbours and even outsources some of its state duties, such as strategic security to Washington and part of its legislation to Brussels through the EEA. In this regard, the foreign services of neighbouring states, especially the other Nordics, most frequently Copenhagen and Oslo, become a strategic source of information and assistance. This is a strategic game played by a small administration to gain access to information and background analysis that requires greater manpower than Iceland has to spend.

The Icelandic cooperation with Norway is telling for how Iceland preserves its posi-tion in European integration. An image of Norden as a particularly cooperative region is widespread (cf. the introduction to the special issue). Moreover, the Nordic EU member states are increasingly bringing this cooperation inside the EU institutions (Naurin and Wallace, 2008). Outside the EU proper, however, Norway and Iceland share formal sta-tus as members of the EEA through EFTA. Despite both shared formal status and shared Nordic identity, however, the cooperation appears somewhat strained. This might have something to do with the size of diplomatic muscle – but the postcolonial identities of both countries also make a difference: popular discourse in Norway finds a need to pro-tect the sovereignty of its nation state against an elite conspiring with an empire (origi-nally, the Danish empire; more recently, the EU; cf. Neumann, 2002). In contrast, postcolonial identity discourse obliges Iceland to protect its sovereignty against not only the EU but also against excessive dependence on other Nordic capitals.

In interviews, both Icelandic diplomats and EC officials tell narratives about Icelandic diplomatic practice, which at least partly match the domestic discourse. While emphasiz-ing being on equal footing within the EEA, Icelandic diplomats complain that their




Norwegian partner, which Iceland is paired with in the EEA, is prone to acting alone when dealing with the EU; that the Norwegians were concerned with proving themselves as being good Europeans and thus inclined to give in to the demands of the EU rather than sticking firmly to the principles of the EEA. In contrast, Iceland does not feel the same need to gain such acceptance in Brussels.10

While the Icelandic diplomats emphasize their own special relationship with the EU on an equal footing,11 European Community (EC) officials noted that even though Iceland’s approach to the EU membership negotiations was professional, rational and pragmatic, the Icelandic diplomacy did not seem to acknowledge its limitations due to its smallness and, in effect, sought to behave like a much larger state and therefore spread its limited resources too thinly.12 As a result of this lack of prioritization, Iceland ran the risk of missing important opportunities when spending competences well beyond its core interests.

Commission officials did recognize Iceland as an at least formally equal counterpart negotiating without systemic assistance from a foreign metropole, noting however that while refusing an offer from EU member states to receive experts from abroad to assist its foreign service, Iceland remained keen and willing to seek advice from neighbouring states, especially the Nordics. It was also noted, however, that Icelandic representatives became especially weary of initiatives taken by Copenhagen, but that they seemed more open to accepting advice from Oslo, Stockholm, Helsinki and Berlin.

As evident in the previous section analysing Iceland’s postcolonial identity discourse, there is an important insistence in the Icelandic discourse not to be considered a micro-state, but indeed rather a fully functioning, modern, independent state with its own voice on the world stage (Bergmann, 2011). Similarly, despite bordering on being a microstate, the notion of a functional dependency on a metropole in Copenhagen or Oslo is for the most part absent in public discussions. This insistence also becomes evident in practical diplomatic relations. The colonial heritage therefore not only affects rhetoric in contem-porary politics but also how Iceland operates its foreign relations. Perhaps contradictory to this emphasis, however, Iceland does not hesitate to play on its smallness in interna-tional negotiations to advance its interests (Thorhallsson, 2000). In the Icesave dispute, for example, it was commonly claimed that directly because of its smallness Iceland should not be held accountable for failing to properly implement the EU’s directive on deposit guarantees. Furthermore, the Nordic states were widely expected to step in and protect Iceland, their smaller and weaker little brother, against foreign oppression (Bergmann, 2011: 239–242).

Conclusion

The colonial experience is still very present in contemporary Icelandic politics; it sets the conditions for the games that can be played with sovereignty in terms of rhetoric and praxis, both domestically and abroad. The national myth carved out in the independence struggle of the years 1830–1944 laid the foundation upon which the Icelandic republic still rests and sets the parameters around its political identity and for its relations to the outside world, including the EU. The postcolonial political identity places emphasis on formal sovereignty and insistence on being recognized as an equal partner in Europe,



Bergmann 49

rather than a microstate that relies on a larger metropole. Formal independence is seen as a prerequisite for a prosperous modern Iceland that enjoys external recognition. This postcolonial identity still characterizes the rhetoric used by Icelandic politicians when debating participation in European integration. It was also very present in the identity politics in the boom years, as well as in the debate over the Icesave deposit accounts after the Crash. When claiming that the root to Icelandic Euro-scepticism is found in eco-nomic interests around fisheries, rationalist theorists thus neglect the importance of Iceland’s postcolonial relations in contemporary politics, especially as regards Icelandic foreign relations.

A postcolonial approach has proven helpful to understanding how the colonial experi-ence continues to frame the discourse in Icelandic politics. In fact, Iceland’s relationship with the EU only makes sense when taking into account its colonial history and postco-lonial national identity, which emphasizes formal sovereignty. When analysing the role fisheries play for Icelandic opposition to the EU, for example, we see how it is fuelled by nationalistic rhetoric. The rhetoric of the independence struggle returns in a variety of guises in contemporary politics.

When analysing the Icelandic debates on Europe, emphasis on modernization and economic progress is clearly present. Economically, like others in Europe, Icelanders felt pressure to participate in the European project, which possibly explains the EEA mem-bership that brought Iceland into the European Single Market. Through the EEA, Iceland has agreed to transfer decision-making in significant fields of the economy to the European level.

At the same time, however, other forces are pulling in the opposite direction. The postcolonial political discourse, so deeply rooted in the independence struggle, has meant that Icelanders have hesitated to agree to the ‘formal’ transfer of sovereignty, which so clearly follows full membership of the EU. In this regard, participation in the EU’s supra-national institutions falls outside the framework of established political dis-course, which emphasizes a formally sovereign and independent Icelandic nation state, making it more difficult for Icelandic politicians to argue for full and formal membership of a supra-national organization such as the EU. For a brief period after the Crash of 2008, there was a majority in the Icelandic parliament for applying for membership, which resulted in an application in mid-2009. Since then, opinion polls indicate that most Icelanders are for cancelling the negotiations, and any accession agreement would be rejected in a national referendum.

It is within these boundaries that Icelandic postcolonial sovereignty games are cur-rently played: to uphold a modern Nordic welfare state recognized as an equal partner in Western culture, Iceland feels the need to participate in the European Single Market, thus accepting the EEA. Nevertheless, formally surrendering to supra-national EU insti-tutions challenges the boundaries of Iceland’s postcolonial political framework. This can also be described as a dilemma between economic interests and ideas on formal sovereignty – illustrating an interesting rift between the practical participation in European integration and the ideas of the free and sovereign Icelandic nation.

When Iceland handles this dilemma, the relations with the other Nordic countries play a significant role. Despite the heavy impact of the colonial past with imperial Denmark and Norway on contemporary political discourse, Iceland is consistently discursively




represented without a foreign metropole. The Nordic states are demonstratively pre-sented as equals but also decidedly serve as a point of reference for Iceland when posi-tioning itself in the world. In diplomatic practice, Iceland remains very dependent on close cooperation with – and even help from – its Nordic counterparts and other European states, such as Germany. In that regard, it is interesting that Iceland is reported to be rely-ing more heavily on Oslo than Copenhagen; to support their insistence on being recog-nized as equal, Iceland is keen on distancing itself from its most recent metropole. Any which way, this dependency on diplomatic assistance from neighbours is somewhat in tension with the Icelandic emphasis on being capable and self-sufficient.

Iceland is not like Greenland and the Faroe Islands. Iceland is a sovereign state, whereas Greenland and the Faroes are not; they are autonomies gesturing towards sover-eignty. Hence, the sovereignty games in and around Iceland are different from Greenlandic and Faroese sovereignty games. The sovereignty games played before for-mal sovereignty are not the same as those played beyond formal sovereignty – formal sovereignty makes a difference. However, so does postimperialism. In this sense, there are clear similarities with Greenland and the Faroes. Iceland’s history and sense of nation-hood is drawn back to the Middle Ages and feels quite ancient, whereas modern Icelandic society also has a very young aspect to it. As a newly independent republic, Iceland’s iden-tity has a juvenile side, as seen in the country’s efforts to be noticed in the world – espe-cially by the other Nordics, as became evident in the boom years when Icelandic businessmen bought up all of the high-profile properties they could get their inexperienced hands on in Scandinavia and the UK. Nordic capitals, such as Copenhagen and Stockholm, are long established. Others, such as Oslo and Helsinki, are less so, and each handles their memory of empire in their own way. Further down the (time)line, Reykjavik remains an unfinished project, and in that sense the Icelandic sovereignty project is still a work in progress. The need to progress in defending the newly won sovereignty sets strict limits on how Iceland may engage in international cooperation – in relation to the EU as such, but also in relation to other Nordic countries when engaging the EU. Hence, the imperial his-tory undermines the image of exemplary Nordic cooperation, even today.

Funding

The work was supported by the Danish National Research Foundation; the Carlsberg Foundation; the Augustinus Foundation; Stjerngren’s Foundation and Letterstedska Foundation. The paper has benefited from discussions at conferences generously hosted by the University of Copenhagen in 2009 and the University of Greenland in 2010.

Notes

1. The basic elements of such an analysis can be found in Bergmann (2009b, 2011). Here, how-ever, the postcolonial character of the discourse identifies was not explicated.

2. Kristinsson and Thorhallsson (2004) have shown that the elite were more Euro-sceptical than the general public in a particular period. However, recent opinion polls (see Capacent Gallup, 2012, 2013) do not support that. An elite–public distinction does not serve the purpose of the particulars of this article.

3. Publication of the journal Ármann á Alþingi in 1830 in Copenhagen, edited by Baldvin Einarsson, can be viewed as the starting point of the struggle. Further journals promoting



Bergmann 51

Icelandic self-rule followed, written by groups of Icelandic intellectuals in Copenhagen. Fjölnir (1835–1847), a journal edited by a group of romantic nationalists, and Ný félagsrit (1841–1873), led by Iceland‘s independence hero, Jón Sigurðsson, were the most influential.

4. The term myth is used here in the sense that the history of Iceland was creatively interpreted to fit the claim for Icelandic self-rule. For more, see Hermannsson (2005).

5. Icelandic historian Jón Sigurðsson (1811–1879), living in Copenhagen, gradually emerged as the leader of the struggle and has since become the national hero of Iceland. Out of the myth interpreting the history of Iceland’s settlement republic between 930 and 1262, he was instrumental in formulating the claim that Icelanders had a natural right, as a separate nation, to self-rule. Jón Sigurðsson became president of the Icelandic literary society in Copenhagen and later president of the resurrected Icelandic advisory parliament in Reykjavik in 1845. Even though he was never actually elected president of Iceland, he is still referred to as President Jón (Jón forseti). Iceland’s national day is on his birthday, 17 June. For more, see Friðriksson (2002, 2003).

6. This section provides examples of discourse used by parliamentarians when debating the Iceland–EU relationship. It is based on wide-scale research in which arguments in all of the debates in Alþingi on Iceland and European integration in the given periods are qualita-tively mapped into a two-dimensional scale: economic arguments versus arguments referring to an impact on Icelandic sovereignty, used both for and against further participation (for more, see Bergmann (2009, 2011)). Here, this rhetoric is analysed against Iceland’s post-colonial national identity, primarily by studying primary documents from the parliament (Alþingistíðindi, 1875–).

7. The PP had left a long-standing coalition with the IP in spring 2007. 8. ‘The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act’. 9. This agreement was refused by the Icelandic parliament and two new agreements were later

negotiated, with the President refusing to sign both of them and the public voting against them (the first in early 2010 and the second in early 2011).

10. Interviews with senior diplomats from the Icelandic Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 7 February 2011.

11. See Note 10.12. Interviews with EU officials, 12 September 2011.

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Author biography

Eirikur Bergmann is Professor of Politics and Director of Centre for European Studies at Bifröst University, Iceland. For more information see eirikurbergmann.com


http://www.visir.is/hreyfingin-vill-ekki-norraenan-sattasemjara/article/2010599294015


Documents

Iceland: A postimperial sovereignty project