Iacsp Shooter

Vol.14, No.3Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

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Palestinians p r a y a s

posters depicting Palestinian gunman

Ali Abu Dhaim hang in a tent near his house in the East

Jerusalem neighbourhood of Jabal Mukaber March 13, 2008. Abu Dhaim, who

killed eight Israelis in a seminary, has been buried in the dead of night, after a delay because of fears by

Israeli authorities that a public funeral might trigger protests and violence. REUTERS/Yiorgos Karahalis (JERUSALEM)

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Vol.14, No.3Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security InternationalVol.14, No.3Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

Adversary Background

Since the shooting attack, it is known that Israeli police have arrested eight people. Currently, it remains unclear whether the shooter had acted alone. The “Galilee Freedom Brigades,” an Israeli-Arab group, has claimed responsibility for the attack as a Hezbollah proxy. The mili-tary wing of the Hamas, Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, also claimed responsibility in a phone call to the news agency, Reuters Group, PLC and announced over mosque loudspeakers in the Gaza Strip. The attacker, Ala Abu Dhaim of East Jerusalem, engaged to be married, had not been known to law enforcement and had apparently worked as a driver for a number of private clients in the city. Recently, Abu Dhaim had become religious but he did not appear to have any affiliations with radical organizations. Target Identification

Abu Dhaim had a number of advantages that enabled him to identify his target and effec-tively gather thorough intelligence. Because he was a resident of Jerusalem, Abu Dhaim could move throughout the city with minimal delays at checkpoints established by Israeli authorities to identify adversaries entering into the city.

A terrorist infiltrated and attacked the Yeshivat Merkaz HaRav Kook in the Kiryat Moshe neighborhood near the entrance to Jerusalem on Thursday, 06 March 2008 at approximately 2045 local time. The attacker opened fire with an automatic weapon and discharged large amounts of ammunition on a study hall, killing eight people and wounding 11. At the time of the attack, the students were about to begin a party celebrating Jewish period of happiness prior to the holiday of Purim. Using deception and cover tactics, the adversary entered the facility and began firing at the students. The adversary was neutralized by security forces in the middle of his attack. The purpose of this paper is to discuss lessons learned by law enforcement and emergency medical services (EMS) when responding to an active shooter incident.

Inside the city, there are minimal checkpoints and roadblocks. Outside, the city is surrounded by checkpoints and roadblocks as well as the security fence intended to keep terrorists from penetrating local towns and cities. As a vehicle driver, Abu Dhaim may have trans-ported children to the targeted school (as well as other sites) on numerous occasions; thereby enabling him to identify potential targets. In Israel there is a tendency for drivers to use “minivan” vehicle services as an alternative form of transportation (similar to a taxi cab service). The vehicle that Abu Dhaim drove (Ford Transit) conformed to the environment (a vehicle com-mon for the transport of students) at all hours of the day and is a vehicle model widely seen throughout the city. Based on the terror operation, it is apparent the attacker did extensive surveillance on the location, and at all hours of the day and night, in order to tactically identify the ideal moment for assault. As a result of his planning and intelligence gathering, the terrorist was able to choose the time and day when there would be a large presence of students on location. Tacticsand Weaponry

The 26-year-old gunman had taken considerable time to plan his attack. Recent patterns of attacks inside Jerusalem included simultaneous assaults of an educational institution and a police checkpoint. Such at-tacks, utilizing all types of weapons, should be monitored in an attempt to identify future patterns and reasons for this type of assault as opposed to explosive devices and suicide bomber tactics. According to Israeli police, the gunman had packed weapons and ammunition inside a cardboard television box, allowing him to ad-vance to the target freely and without alerting suspicion. There were initial reports that students believed he was deliver-ing a package to the school. As the attacker advanced to the target, he was aware of the fact that, unlike most educational institutions in the country, there was no security presence at the entrance to the facility. Ultimately, he entered the school unchallenged. Attack Phase

Leaving his place of residence with the weapons (an AK-47, two handguns, ammunition, and a com-mando knife) the adversary advanced to the target unhindered. He was familiar with the route, did not require an escort to lead him to the site, and was

able to park the vehicle in the vicinity of the school. Based on Abu Dhaim’s knowledge of the school layout, it is likely that he was aware of the loca-tion of the students and systematically advanced floor-by-floor to the library. Upon approach to the library entrance, the attacker began his assault on students that were outside of the room.

Response Phase

The response by law enforcement and security forces was immediate. Initial reports, relayed to patrol units enroute to the scene, indicated that this was an incident of “firecrackers.” Immediately, it was reassessed by civilians on location as a terror related attack. Patrol, plain-clothes officers, and special tactical units were dispatched—operating under an active shooter response. The priority response for incoming police units to an active shooter scenario is to engage the shooter as fast as possible, pulling the fire away from civilians and toward the law enforcement officers. An off duty security officer

(R1), a neighbor of the school, was closest to the scene. Upon hearing the shots fired, he went to the school to engage the attacker. R1, familiar with ingress and egress points of the building, entered the school through a rear door and began sweeping the facility, listening for the sound of the gunfire. A student of the seminary, who left the library 10-15 minutes

Based on the terror operation, it is apparent the attacker did extensive surveillance on the location, and at all hours of the day and night, in order to tactically identify the ideal moment for assault. As a result of his planning and intelligence gathering, the terrorist was able to choose the time and day when there would be a large presence of students on location.


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prior to the attack (R2), heard the shots and decided to take a high ground position with his personal weapon. Lying on the balcony of the school, R2 awaited for an opportunity when the attacker would enter his line of site to employ le-thal force against the gunmen[JDP1]. The first arriving units included a plainclothes unit (R3) assigned to major crimes and the Central Com-mand of the National Police. This unit immediately entered the structure, as per police policy to ex-peditiously engage the attacker. The off duty security officer (R1) arriving from his home did not have any means to readily iden-tify himself upon entering the scene. As a result, the officer (R3) that entered the building passed a police duty hat to R1 for identification. The primary means of communication and coordination between R1 and R3 were relayed verbally, while R3 maintained communications via the EOC’s dedicated emergency channel. The terrorist was engaged initially by R2 from a distance. R1, from the hallway, eventually neu-tralized the gunman in coordination with R3 from the library study. In any terror related attack, Jeru-salem Police begin searching for additional attackers, secondary devices, and any accomplices flee-ing the scene. This includes the clearing of the entire building by special teams comprised of tacti-cal personnel and the bomb squad. It was initially believed there was at least one additional terrorist on location, resulting in a delay of medical evacuation by EMS. All additional threats were ruled out in approximately two hours. Medical Response

Approximately 50 EMS units re-sponded to the scene from the Jeru-salem area. First arriving units were met by fleeing students from the

building outside the main entrance. Evacuation under gunfire was begun by first arriving EMS units. This was an attempt to maintain the golden response rule of the evacua-tion of all non-ambulatory injured within 20 minutes. Jerusalem hos-pitals went on MCI (Mass Casualty Incident) alert status immediately upon notification of the shooting. Hospitals received timely updates as to the medical evacuation sta-tus by the Jerusalem Police EOC (Emergency Operations Center), as well as from the Incident Com-manders at the Unified Command established near the attack site. Interactions between police and EMS dealt with scene safety and suspicious items and individuals identified by EMS. Medical response was initiated by EMS and incident command was established with law enforcement personnel taking primary scene com-mand. The response was expedited by all agencies. The central EMS headquarters was minutes away and the system was supported by a rapid response of local volunteers. There was no delay in organizing teams to

enter the hostile environment or the need to acquire autho-

rization. Emergency medical personnel are acutely aware of the threats associated with the entrance in to a hos-tile scene until law enforcement can as-sure scene safety. Such awareness al-lows for the swift operational response by EMS personnel in the evacuat ion and rescue of the injured. Likewise, law enforcement uti-lizes the maximum amount of resources to secure the perim-eters with a series of over watches, patrol, checkpo in t s , and plainclothes units. Bomb squad units and tactical teams

operate with great speed and discretionary caution. Results

The quick response by law enforcement and security

personnel possibly prevented a much worse scenario resulting in more casualties. First ar-riving law enforcement units immediately engaged the at-tacker with the assistance of an off duty soldier and student already on location. The fear of possible secondary attack-e r s o r dev ices on loca t ion was handled by teams that are trained for clearing buildings under similar circumstances. Such teams include a tactical element followed by explosive ordinance technicians.

The established response plans as-sociated with all law enforcement and EMS responders addressed the need for neutralization of the threat (active shooter) and the immediate evacuation of the injured from the scene. Rescue of the non-ambula-tory injured by medical personnel is based on the need to remove the injured from the scene of potential secondary threats, while minimiz-ing the amount of time on location. This minimizes the amount of time needed to transfer the injured to a medical treatment facility. The

Israel National Police, under most mass casualty incidents, have been mandated to control overall command of such a scene. The establishment of an incident com-mand structure within the police department includes operational units, investigatory offices, ex-plosives experts, and intelligence units. Among the responsibilities for law enforcement personnel on the location of a terror attack (and at any other large incident) is the neutralization and rendering safe of any imminent threats and the establishment of secure perimeters for the first responders. Ingress and egress to the scene, as well as between the scene and the medical treatment facilities, are secured by highway and patrol units. Operating under these conditions, inter-agency training is a critical component to mitigation of the incident. Common inter-agency op-erating plans must be reviewed and exercised at the command and field levels in order to apply a measure of strategic response. Commanders must display a level of confidence to ensure all active emergency personnel are able to operate under clear guidelines for such a threat. An active shooter response needs to be aggressive, mission specific, and proactive to a situation where any delay only increases the adversary’s success. A tactical concept that all responders must understand is the need to engage the attacker in order to draw active gunfire away from civilians. Such a concept should include clear operational guidelines and policies, communications, which assist in mitigating injury to civilians and emergency personnel. When tactical decisions are made in an instantaneous fashion, immedi-ate goals are met and the system operates efficiently, with minimal loss and a quick return to normalcy for citizens.

Lessons Learned for American Law EnforcementTo effectively respond to an active shooter incident, law enforcement and EMS need to train and conduct field exercises in conjunction with other relevant agencies. The need for first responders to aggressively respond to an active shooter inci-dent requires that those responders and their respective agencies follow guidelines that address the tactics, tech-

...two terrorists dressed in security guard uniforms infiltrated a religious school in a small community south of Jerusalem. The terrorists, armed...were challenged immediately by civilians on location and who opened fire on the attackers. During the attack, the terrorists were able to stab two Israeli civilians, injuring them moderately. The civilians were able to thwart a terror attack that could have had similar results as the Jerusalem school massacre, by immediately interdicting with lethal force...

History has shown that during an active shooter incident it is a matter of seconds, not minutes, that will determine the number of lives lost or at risk.

Vol.14, No.3Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security InternationalVol.14, No.3Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

niques and procedures that support such a response. A case study, pointing to the need for enhanced training exercises is the Trolley Square Mall shooting that occurred in Salt Lake City, Utah on 12 February 2007. In this case, the aggressive actions of a lone off duty officer diverted the deadly actions of the active shooter away from civilians and towards himself. This action resulted in the saving of numerous civilian lives and assisted law enforcement by pinning down the shooter until a tactical response was organized. On 24 January 2008, at approxi-mately 2200 hours local time, two terrorists dressed in security guard uniforms infiltrated a religious school in a small community south of Jerusalem. The terrorists, armed with what appeared to be a firearm and sharp instruments, were chal-lenged immediately by civilians on location and who opened fire on the attackers. During the at-tack, the terrorists were able to stab two Israeli civilians, injuring them moderately. The civilians were able to thwart a terror attack that could have had similar results as the Jerusalem school massacre, by immediately interdicting with lethal force. History has shown that during an active shooter incident it is a matter of seconds, not minutes, that will determine the number of lives lost or at risk. Therefore, the current industry standard for patrol re-sponse to an active shooter incident should be re-examined. Most law enforcement agencies and tactical organizations have trained police personnel in rapid response to active shooter drills. These drills have been focused on a team concept (three to four person configurations). Some considerations of implementing a one or two officer team response have been discussed and even trained, but the lingering discus-sion of “officer safety” continues to surface. Many law enforcement agencies and tactical organizations have adopted the three to four team concept to maximize officer safety. This response was designed under the premise that in an active shooter incident the first responder at or on the scene is going to be a School Re-source Officer (SRO) or a patrol of-ficer. This was designed for officers who have less tactical training than SWAT team personnel and who need to deploy in a team configuration to maximize their own safety.

Officer safety has been and will continue to be a top priority for all law enforcement agencies and tactical organizations. However, the law enforcement community must weigh officer safety against the loss of civilian lives in an active shooter incident. The Columbine High School Massacre in April, 1999 forced law enforcement to re-evaluate its response protocols to the active shooter and new tactics have since evolved to address the issue. Now, after almost ten years of ad-dressing the tactical issues of active shooter incidents, law enforcement and the civilian communities must address the lessons learned from these incidents and re-evaluate their current tactics and procedures.

The law enforcement community should consider a more aggressive response to an active shooter inci-dent which may require a one or two person response team to engage the threat. This response may need to be carried out by a SRO, patrol officer, or an off duty officer. When seconds make the difference in saving lives, officers can no longer afford to wait minutes for back-up units to arrive. Law enforcement officers have a proud tradition and moral obligation that puts them at risk to save the lives of innocent civilians.

Discussion

The authors of this article recognize the inherent risk to police officers while implementing these tactics, but we believe that those risks can be minimized if officers adhere to the following basic tactical principles of “speed, surprise, and violence of action.” There are also some common sense actions that need to occur prior to officer response. Once the arriving officer has assessed the situation, formulated an action plan, steps must be taken to communicate their tactics to other responders. This can be accomplished by police radio, cell phone[JDP2] or through a third party (i.e. victim/witness). This action – identification of non-uniformed personnel – is especially critical for off-duty personnel and plain clothes officers.

In the assessment process, each officer should make an evaluation of the threat and their ability to neutralize the threat. The possibility of multiple suspects with automatic weapons should be assumed but should not prevent a rapid response by law enforcement.

In February, 1997 during the North Hollywood Shootout, the Los Angeles Police Department was clearly out-gunned by bank robbers Larry Phillips, Jr. and Emil Matasareanu. The aggressive actions of the patrol officers held the robbers at bay, preventing their escape, and eventually brought about their demise. Those actions saved innocent lives and improved critical response time for responding police assets. Through proper training and the issuing of necessary equipment (tactical rifles/shotguns w/slings, light systems for all weapons and mechanical breaching tools for patrol) law enforcement personnel will be able to respond immediately to such incidents like the North Hollywood Shootout, allowing them to save lives. By no means are we advocating that law enforcement agencies discard their current active shooter training programs. In fact, current poli-cies and procedures support the very tactics we are advocating. For example, when an officer responding to an active shooter incident moves towards the gunfire and the gunfire subsequently ceases, we do not advocate that the officer transition into a lone officer search mode. The officer should hold a position of cover nearest to the area where they last heard gunfire. The officer should request assistance at their location, and when assistance arrives, begin searching for the suspect. While waiting for assistance, if the suspect becomes active and engages in deadly behavior, the officer should move toward the gun fire and neutralize the threat. Likewise, if the active shooter takes a hostage and becomes barricaded in a position of advantage, the of-ficer should follow their department’s barricaded suspect protocol. If the situation were to become prolonged and as other officers arrive on location, the officer would then transition into a contact/rescue team configuration.

The following key recommendations are derived from the Yeshivat Merkaz HaRav Kook shooting incident:

Regular training sessions can assist in preparing for the proper response 1. and ease the coordination and collaboration of the responding agencies. Training should include techniques to identify plainclothes officers and off-duty officers operating in such an arena.Immediate response considerations need to address fleeing suspects 2. within the crowd of victims.Clear training, policies, and procedures need to address the engaging 3. of the attacker through the basic tactical principles of “speed, surprise and violence of action.”

Tactical movement of officers.•Police vs. police crossfire issues.•Appropriate weaponry and equipment to engage the threat.•

Tactical rifles/shotguns w/slings.•Light systems for all weapons.•Additional ammunition and magazines .•Mechanical breaching tools . •

Different response scenarios should be addressed both at the policy and 4. procedure stages as well as “going out” and testing the plan.Success is dependent upon a number of considerations which include 5. inter-agency cooperation between all of the relevant agencies at all levels of incident command. In addition, there is an inherent need to initiate an expedited dissemination of information to other security agencies assisting in the interdiction of the threat. Regular inter-agency training, with open dialogue and cooperation 6. between all agencies, clear planning, and effective communications using incident command. Command level ability to make strategic and tactical decisions based 7. on the needs of the district, and the specific incident.Planning must include clear guidelines for perimeter security, security 8. at other sensitive locations, as well as medical treatment facilities and the protection of staging points.Training and exercise objectives should include an evaluation of emer-9. gency communications between agencies for evacuation of personnel from unsafe scenes. Communication procedures should include the integration of plainclothes officers, off-duty officers, and other relevant agencies.

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