I.A. E X A M I N A T I O N OF THE Lankãvatãrasütra-THTIORY

I.A.1 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

9. The Lankãvatãrasütra is known as a text that has a very complicated textual history displaying a number of strata, heterogeneous and contra­dictory assertions in different contexts, controversial connections and identifications of concepts known from earlier, mutually exclusive, sources (cf. TAKASAKI1980,1982). In view of this general philological state of affairs, the assumption of some sort of proto-stage(s) preceding the textus receptus is a rather plausible, if not necessary, hypothesis. And it would agree with the common philological way of handling a text, if one would identify the earliest stage of LAS — as soon as it could be more or less clearly disentangled from the rest — as Mur-LAS".

Though TAKASAKI (1980) has produced some initial observations concerning earlier and later portions of LAS, at the present stage of research, it appears to be somewhat difficult to identify the designation "ur-LAS" with a specifically circumscribed textual body. Not to speak of a textual body that existed decades, or even centuries, prior to the first Chinese translation (in 443) of a text corresponding to Chapters II to VIII of the extant LAS.1 In other words, it is at this point still impossible to discuss whether Yogãcãra-Vijnãnavãda concepts do occur in an as yet only designatively p o s t u l a t e d 'ur-LAS'. B e f o r e serious attempts have been made to account for reasonable deliminations marking off the validity of the label 'ur', we cannot say what the earliest stratum included. On the contrary, a rather vital question for attempts of stratification has to be: if at all, under which conditions could any parts of LAS containing Y.-V. concepts belong to an early, let alone the e a r 1 i e s t (= 'ur'), stratum?

10. As already indicated,2 the term cittamãtra is not in itself indicative of the inception of the system of Yogäcãra-Vijnänaväda we are concerned with here. Hence, it would be quite acceptable without invalidating the Samdhi-nirmocana-thesis, if Nãgãrjuna had indeed somewhere expressed his acquaintance with this term. And, strictly seen, I am presently not even concerned with the question of whether Nãgãrjuna had, or may have had, any acquaintance at all with larger portions of an 'ur-texť nowadays found incorporated in the vulgate of LAS. But, as, in my view, n o o t h e r ãgama source produces the characteristic triple conceptual model of systematical Yogãcãra-Vijnãnavãda thought (i.e., three svabhãva/laksana [as correlated to

1 Then also known under the name of Sarvabuddhapravacanahrdaya.

2 Cf. above, Ex. 3.

24 LAS - theory: Ex. 7

three forms of nihsvabhãvatã ] - vijnaptimãtra(tã) - ãlayavijnãna) b e f o r e the Samdhinirmocanasütra, the b a s i s for Lindtner's assumption, which ascribes a historical priority to the Lankãvatãrasütra, needs to be investigated, [see Ex. 7]

The only "basis" I am aware of is a circular structure of argument produced by Lindtner: two texts ascribed by him to Nagarjuna contain Y.-V. concepts; and the o n l y scriptural authority (ãgama) that may have served as Nagarjuna's source is supposed to be LAS, since the only other scripture coming into question as containing the technical terminology concerned (i.e., Samdh) is certainly later. — On the other hand, LAS (as ur-LAS) is supposed to be an early ãgama predating Nagarjuna and to contain the problematic concepts, because already Nagarjuna quotes and paraphrases them at this early stage.

The quickest way to break out of this circle is to invalidate the ascription of the Acintyastava and the Bodhicittavivarana to Nagarjuna, the MMK-kãra.1

E x p l i c a t i o n

[Ex.7]

Presently I remain restricted to texts that contain Y.-V. terminology and have been ascribed to Nagarjuna.

But Lindtner quotes also from other works of Nagarjuna and refers to parallel passages in LAS. Though Lindtner's horizon for finding parallel passages is the whole of the extant LAS, the historical priority of the sütra is taken as given each time. As Lindtner has never investigated, nor even preliminarily proposed, the scope of his presumed "ur-LAS", the methodological premise of his procedure seems to take for granted that any parallel passages occurring both in Nagarjuna's works and in LAS must originally belong to an ur-LAS. This procedure amounts to what P. WILLIAMS (JIP 12 [1984]: 92) called "to beg the question".

LINDTNER (1982: 172f.; 1992: 259f.) has likewise accepted an anthology of sütra quotations, that is, the version of a Stttrasatnuccaya containing four quotations from LAS, as having been compiled by Nagarjuna. Of course, in the absence of any compelling internal criteria it is not difficult see that any Devadatta could have made such a compilation. But as already Candrakirti (cf. DE JONG 1979: 542) included this title in a list of works associated with Nagarjuna, there are other modern scholars who share this ascription (thus Lindtner's postulate that already Nagarjuna knew the LAS), notably Bhikkhu PÄSÄDIKA (cf., 1996: 14), the German editor of Nagarjuna's Sütrasamuccaya. A Critical Edition of the mDo kun las btus pa, Copenhagen 1989.

Unless otherwise specified, the use of the name Nagarjuna refers to the author of MMK.

LAS - theory: Ex. 7 25

It is noteworthy that the LAS passages in this anthology are quoted as stemming from the Lankãvatãrasütra, whereas Gunabhadra's earliest Chinese translation (443 CE) is "entitled or characterised as the Sarvabuddhapravacana-hrdayď (TAKASAKI1980:340). And also Vasubandhu did not yet identify the source of his quotation as Lankãvatãrasütra, when in his Vyãkhyãyukti (P 5562: 123b5ff.) nine verses are quoted that are found in the extant gãthã appendix to LAS (X.135-137 & 150-155). In contrast, quoting the Samdhinirmocanasutra in the preceding lines of the very same hermeneutical treatise, Vasubandhu has properly identified his source by name.

At the beginning of the 5th century, Yogãcära-Vijnänavãda specialists do not yet indicate any knowledge of the name Lankãvatãrasütra while handling materials from the textual corpus,1 which only subsequently will frequently be referred to by that name.2 On the other hand, ascribing the extant Sütrasamuccaya to him means that, several centuries earlier, already Nagarjuna is supposed to have known the sütra by that name and to have quoted it as an authoritative scripture (ãgama).

Within the framework of such historical constructions the respective roles of the Samdhinirmocanasutra and the Lankãvatãrasütra have likewise been reversed: compared with LAS, Samdh is now said to offer little that is original. According to LINDTNER 1997: 171, the concepts of both the three svabhãva and cittamãtra have merely been taken over by the Samdhinirmocana­sutra and just been given new names. He thinks (ibid.) that "the most original feature of SN is not its doctrine about laksanatraya and vijňaptimatraita), but rather its doctrine about the three kinds of nihsvabhãvatã\

Apparently taking Schmithausen's ãlayavijnãna theory already as hardcore fact — unlike Schmithausen himself, who regarded it as a plausible hypothesis (cf. Ãlayav. §§ 1.2; 3.0.1) — the notion of ãlayavijnãna has not even been regarded as worthy of consideration. In Lindtner's hands the historical significance of the Samdhinirmocanasutra has been diminished to little more than zero, i.e. to the single plagiaristic feature of trying "to assimilate the Madhyamaka doctrine of sünyatã to the Yogãcãra one of svabhãvatraya by introducing the new concept of the threefold nihsvabhãvatã" (ibid.).

The great disadvantage of Lindtner's historical, structural and terminological assessments is that it is consistently based on very superficial comparisons. As has already been observed by WILLIAMS (1984: 76), he "tends simply to assert an agreement of style, scope and doctrine, an assertion of agreement which tends in fact to equal one of no disagreement." Thereby "the criteria applied for judging authenticity are simply stated and the conclusions given. They are not themselves subjected to scritical scrutinity, explanation, debate or defence" (op. cit.: 75).

^f. also Ex. 29.

2 I.e., as the favourite ãgama (cf., e.g., KEIRA 1999: 186f.) of the Yogãcãra-Mãdhyamikas; on this school, see some of the notes below.

I.A.2 RECONSIDERING THE ASCRIPTION OF THE Acintyastava fs AUTHORSHIP TO NAGARJUNA

11. The version, which the name Acintyastava (ASt)1 hereby designates, is the textus receptus. But as the possibility of interpolation can never be excluded, let it be noted that, in a strict sense, we are only concerned with the verses 44-45.

The question is, (a) whether it is reasonable to assume that Nãgãrjuna has composed these, and (b) whether consequently their authorship may be taken as a testimony for the opinion that LAS already existed in his life-time in a form containing the relevant concepts:

[44:] hetupratyayasambhütã paratantrã ca samvrtih /

paratantra iti proktah paramãrthas tv akrtrimah //

[45:] svabhãvah prakrtis tattvam dravyam vastu sad ity api / nãsti vat kalpito bhãvo paratantras tu vidyate 11

Contextually, these two stanzas have naturally not — in view of the literary genre of stava — been introduced as the proposition of an opponent to be polemically refuted afterwards. What we find positively asserted in these verses is the acceptance of an ontological model describing t h r e e levels of phenomenological reality, most notably one that is called paratantra.

ASt 45cd is identical to LAS II.191ab (except that LAS has ca instead of tu). ASt 44 contrasts the conventional (samvrti) level of reality with the ultimate one (paramãrtha) and states that

"as the conventional, originating from causes and conditions, is relative, it is called the Relative (paratantra) — the Ultimate (paramãrtha), however, is uncreated".

1 The Acintyastava has been accepted by LlNDTNER (1982: 121) as belonging to the Catuhstava, its authenticity has been shortly discussed (op. cit.: 122 n. 149), and a critical edition together with a translation of this 'Song of Praise to the Inconceivable' is to be found op. cit.: 140ff. Additionally, a conspectus testium is at our disposal (p. 126). This conspectus indicates that the first work known to quote the Acintyastava is the Tattvasiddhi ascribed to a Santaraksita (while rejecting an ascription to the famous teacher of Kamalasila, STEINKELLNER 1999: 356ff. offers, apart from investigating its application of Dharmakirti's kãryãnumãna model, a short general characterization of this little work's interesting logical reflections about Tantric practices).

Though, in the course of providing a concise history of research, in the introduction to their edition and translation of Nãgãrjuna's Catuhstava TOLA/DRAGONETTI (1985: 5/1995: 105) bespeak their "cautious position" as regards the definitive association of Nãgãrjuna with ideas expounded in the hymns, this attitude is unfortunately wanting, at a most crucial moment (cf. next note). WILLIAMS (1984: 93) prudently remains reserved concerning an ascription of the Acintyastava to Nãgãrjuna.

LAS - theory: Acintyastava 27

ASt 45 distinguishes between the conceptually constructed (kalpita) level of reality and the level of the Relative (paratantra) by exposing anything that is being referred to, by no matter how deeply meaningful the words, as being just a constructed thing. Literally: "a conceptually constructed entity, be it even termed (ityapi) 'intrinsic nature', 'primary matter', 'true reality', the 'ontically real', the 'something-being-present', the 'authentically existent', it does not really exist at all — but the Relative is found."1

12. In order to evaluate the probability of Nãgãrjuna's authorship of a philosophical assertion as manifested in ASt 44-45, it is necessary to relate these two stanzas (being concerned with an ontological description) to a context of contrasting ontological positions. Does it fit into Nãgãrjuna's characteristic ontology as we know it from his other works? Does it accord with the ontology of classical Madhyamaka as reflected in the writings of acknowledged witnesses?

As the dominant features of the classical Madhyamaka ontology are rather well documented (cf. SEYFORT RUEGG 1981: 42ff.),2 I will at this point only try to draw its contours by recalling a few stanzas characteristically expressing this view, preceded by a contrastive impression of some, presently pertinent, points of the "Yogãcära-Vijnãnavãda" ontology.

Whereas in classical Madhyamaka3 the samvrti level of reality is accepted as it is perceived by ordinary people in terms of an existing external

1 LlNDTNER's (1982:155) translation connects 45ab to 44d and thereby produces a sense that is exactly opposite to the one originally intended by the author of ASt. — In this respect TOLA/DRAGONETTI1985 follow Lindtner, yet they add to the confusion by not recognizing the typical descriptive pattern in which the (pari)kalpita aspect is contrasted to the paratantra aspect. Though an almost exact parallel of ASt 45cd is found in LAS II.191ab, they prefer to change Lindtner's correct reading of ASt 45d into paratantro na_ vidy ate {op. cit.: 49 n. 191).

2 For a general description of Madhyamaka, cf. also J. MAY'S article "Chüdergan" in Hobogirin (V. fasc.) 1979: 470-493; in his article "Nãgãrjuna's Appeal" (JIP 22 [1994]: 299-378), R. P. HAYES offers useful reflections on various modern interpretations of Nãgãrjuna's thought (pp. 325-363); D. BURTON's controversial book Emptiness Appraised: A Critical Study of Nãgãrjuna's Philosophy (Surrey 1999) contains a recent bibliography on Nãgãrjuna; for subsequent aspects of Madhyamaka reasoning, cf. the one contained in DREYFUS/McCLINTOCK (ed.), The Svãtantrika-Prãsangika Distinction, Boston 2003.

3 By 'classical Madhyamaka' it is meant, roughly, that a philosophy based on the works of Nãgãrjuna and Ãryadeva has been transmitted through the most well-known commentaries of Buddhapãlita, Bhavya and Candraklrti in the sense that their epistemological and ontological presuppositions have traditionally been regarded as being approximately the same, in spite of differences in the presentation of certain details. These differences are most obviously connected with the gesture of expressing Madhyamaka thought in the sphere of philosophical intersubjectivity, and are primarily concerned with the didactic employment of logic. — On the other hand, the efforts of synthesizing Yogãcãra-Vijnãnavãda and Madhyamaka ontological positions into what becomes known as

28 LAS - theory: Acintyastava

world with the conventionally real existence of intersubjectively accepted values, it is characteristic for Yogãcãra-Vijnãnavãda to look upon the 'ordinary-world-as-it-is-liveď as if through the eyes of a "phenomenologisť. Assuming this perspective, Y.-V. scholars did not thematize the conventional level of reality from a conventional point of view, but they retained the "phenomenologically reduced" attitude (i.e., the "yogic" standpoint) as the standpoint from which they reflected the conventional reality. And reflected in this attitude, the conventional level of reality was seen to exist as something constituted qua being conceptually constructed, moreover as something that, ordinarily, existed in oblivion of the fact that it had its foundation in the ongoing activity of linguistically structured consciousness only, not in a separate and empirically real world. However, they likewise emphasized that, unlike the resultant constructed forms of reality, the cognitive structures of consciousness as such are efficiently real. That is, consciousness as a dynamic medium was invested with a real ontological status and designated as the so-called Relative (paratantra). Hereby, the Relative was conceived as corresponding to the constitutive dynamics unfolding — as observable by contemplative specialists capable of inducing the post-absorptive intuitive gaze (lokottarajnãnaprsthalabdha- jnãna- e.g., TrBh *45,1 Iff.) — between interdependently correlated, latent and actualized, levels of consciousness accounting for the fact that something making sense somehow comes to be present, rather than nothing at all.

Contrarily, as Nãgãrjuna's and his school's dialectics suggest, the Mãdhyamika emphasized a philosophical interest to keep the conventional level at its very surface as an intersubjectively useful, and in this sense valid, level of reality1 that stands, however, in utter contrast to the ultimate reality

Yogãcãra-Madhyamaka can, naturally, not be desescribed as pertaining to classical Madhyamaka (cf. also below, Ex. 8).

The expression "Yogãcãra-Madhyamaka" as a doxographical appellation (for a specific ontology) is attested since the beginning of the 9th century, that is, since the first generation of Tibetan translators and doxographers (cf. MlMAKI 1982: 40ff.; SCHERRER-SCHAUB 1991: n. 492). When Ye ses sde employed it in his IT a ha i khyad par (for an account of which, see SEYFORT-RUEGG in JA 269 [1981]: 207-229), he could of course not yet rely on any Tibetan tradition of doxographical exegesis (of which he is the initiator), but only on the skills of traditional exegesis his Indian informants provided him with. See also SEYFORT RUEGG 1981: 87-110 & 122 for an overview of Yogãcãra-Madhyamaka thought.

1 Notwithstanding the differences that manifested between them in the course of a competitive strife about the proper mode of defending the true principles of Nãgãrjuna's guidelines, both Bhavya and Candrakirti have insisted upon conceiving the conventional reality in a naive realistic sense and rejected the notion of conceiving this level as being ontologically constituted by consciousness (cf. below, § 16, note). While the factual position of Nãgãrjuna is somewhat less clear, it is evident that he still lacked the conceptual tools later introduced by Y.-V. thinkers.

YS 34 seems to represent the formulation in which Nãgãrjuna most articulatedly expressed himself in a manner that could be interpreted in the sense of reflecting something close to a "vijnãnavãda" attitude:

LAS - theory: Acintyastava 29

(paramãrtha).1 For him there is no ontological relationship between the levels, or any epistemological link that could bridge the gap between them — because there exists no gap between them at all, since these levels do not co­exist.2 Whenever one level is given, it can only be so in the complete absence

mahabhutadi vijňane proktam samavarudhyate I tajjnãne vigamam yadi nanu mithyã vikalpitam II

As explained, something like the [four] principal material elements etc. is comprised within consciousness. If, upon knowing that [to be so], it disappears, how could it not be [something that has been] falsely imagined?

Since later Yogãcãra-Mãdhyamikas could not find much else as explicit as this kãrikã in the whole opus of Nãgãrjuna, it is no wonder that they eagerly quoted it; that is, to somehow minimize the historical and hermeneutical distance between Nãgãrjuna's ontological reflections and theirs. This kãrikã has likewise become the subject of a masterly commentary in form of the longest note [n. 492], adumbrating its broader context, in SCHERRER-SCHAUB 1991: 253-259.

1 That is, in spite of the development of various exegetical differences, throughout the history of Madhyamaka, we find an insistence upon the validity of the Two Truths (cf. MMK XXIV. 8-9), the conventional (samvrti) and the ultimate (paramãrtha), whereby the conventional, in spite of its ontological and epistemological unreality, has been pragmatically valued as the only medium that is available for pointing to the ultimate: a paradigmatic formulation is MMK XXIV. 10:

vyavahãram anãsritya paramãrtho na dešyate I paramãrtham anãgamya nirvãnam nãdhigamyate II

Without relying upon the conventional discourse, the ultimate cannot be pointed out. Without arriving at the ultimate, Nirvana is not attained.

2 As most radically expounded by Nãgãrjuna at the beginning of his MMK (LI):

na svato nãpi parato na dvãbhyãm nãpy ahetutah I utpannãjãtu vidyante bhãvãh kva cana ke cana II

As neither from itself arisen, nor from something else, nor from both, nor even without any causal condition, are whatsoever entities anywhere ever found.

and hardly less radical, MMK XXV.24:

sarvopalambhopašamah prapaňcopašamah šivah I na kvačit kasyacit kašcit dharmo buddhena dešitah II Beatitude is the quiescence of all apperceptions, the quiescence of verbal proliferations. The Buddha has not taught any dharma to anybody anywhere at all.

See further also SCHERRER-SCHAUB (1991: 122n.65) for references to what she has designated as "logion qui regit l'enseignement des deux vérités".

30 LAS - theory: Acintyastava

of the other.1 Seen from the ultimate, nothing could be said about the conventional except that it does not at all exist apart from, and is essentially not different from, the ultimate.2

On the other hand, however clever one looks through empirical categories, it is of no use for "attaining" the authentic state of reality — on the

1 Cf., e.g., MAv VI.23 (as quoted in BCAP 361):

samyanmrsãdarsanalabdhabhãvam rüpadvayam bibhrati sarvabhãvãh I samyagdrsãm yo visayah sa tattvam mrsãdrsãm samvrtisatyam uktam II

All things do carry a double form—something that is obtained through the correct and through the false view. That perceptual locus, which is the one of those with correct sight,

is the true reality, that of those with false sight is what is called 'conventional truth'.

And, as quoted with appreciation by Candrakirti (PrasP 449):

anutpãdadharmah satatam tathãgatah sarve ca dharmãh sugatena sãdrsãh I nimittagrãhena tu bãlabuddhayo* 'satsu dharmesu caranti loke II

The Awakened is always one without any origination of dharmas — and all the dharmas are similar to the Awakened. However, by grasping for signs do those with infantile intellects roam about in the world, in unreal dharmas.**

* Cf. DE JONG 1978: 237. **For some preliminary reflections on the notion of dharma, see below, § 61, note.)

2 E.g., MMK XXV. 19-20:

na samsãrasya nirvãnãt kimcid asti visesanam I na nirvãnasya samsãrãt kimcid asti visesanam II nirvãnasya ca yã kotih kotih samsaranasya ca I na tayor antaram kimcit susuksmam api vidy ate II

No difference from Nirvana whatsoever obtains for transmigratory existence.

No difference from transmigratory existence whatsoever obtains for Nirvana.

That which is the extreme limit of Nirvana is the extreme limit of transmigratory existence, as well.

No gap between these two is found, howsoever infinitesimally tiny.

Cf. also MMK VII.16:

pratitya yad yad bhavati tat tac chãntam svabhãvatah I tasmãd utpadyamãnam ca sãntam utpattir eva ca II

Whatsoever develops in dependence [upon conditions], that is quiet in its essential nature. And therefore that which is in the process of arising is quite, as is also the very origination itself.

LAS - theory: Acintyastava 31

contrary, those spectacles conceal it all the more.1 It is consequently worse, if precisely those verbal tools that refer to the empty nature of empirical categories are reified into the spectacles of doctrine — in other words, if, instead of actualizing the possibility of a non-conceptual perception, the lack of such a realization is rather getting compensated by clinging to the dogmatic view (drsti : doxa) of an imagined emptiness.2 Therefore, on the

1 MAv VI. 28 (as quoted in BCAP 353):

mohah svabhãvãvaranãd dhi samvrtih satyam tayã khyãti yad eva krtrimam I jagãda tat samvrtisatyam ity asau munih padãrtham krtakam ca samvrtim II

The conventional is deludedness because of actually veiling the intrinsic nature [of things].* By means of such [a veiling] that indeed which is fabricated appears as true — the Sage has articulated that to be the conventional truth. And also the forged reference of [technical] terms is the conventional.

[* The "intrinsic nature of things" is their emptiness, whereas veiling (or conceiling) this nature happens by means of attributing/superimposing a non-existing specific characteristic to/upon that intrinsic nature, where this characteristic does not exist. That is, as Candrakirti says in the commentary: conventionality is constituted by the simultaneous combination of two aspects of deludedness: a purely negative one (i.e., ignorance as a lack of awareness of the true nature of things) and a positive one (i.e., the one having the nature of positively conceiling the vision of the true nature by way of projectively attributing a specific nature): ma rig pa dan duos po'i raň gi no bo yod pa ma yin pa sgro 'dogs par byed pa ran bžin mthon ba la sgrib pa'i bdag ňid can ni kun rdzob bo (MAvBh 107,6ff.)].

2 Cf. MMK XIII. 8: sünyatã sarvadrstinãm proktã nihsaranam jinaih I yesãm tu sünyatãdrstis tan asãdhyãn babhãsire II

The Buddhas have asserted emptiness as the getaway from all doxas. Those, however, for whom emptiness is a doxa did they pronounce as incurable.*

[* cf. KP § 64f.]

MMK XXIV. 14:

sarvam ca yujyate tasya sünyatã yasya yujyate I sarvam na yujyate tasya sünyam yasya na yujyate II

And everything is appropriate for someone for whom emptiness is appropriate. The whole is inappropriate for someone for whom the empty is not appropriate.

MMK XXIV. 11:

vinašayati durdrsta šunyata mandamedhasam I sarpo yathã durgrhfto vidyã vã dusprasãdhitã II