Husserl, Heidegger And Transcendental Philosophy Another Look at the EB Article

8/3/2019 Husserl, Heidegger And Transcendental Philosophy Another Look at the EB Article

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International Phenomenological Society

Husserl, Heidegger, and Transcendental Philosophy: Another Look at the EncyclopaediaBritannica ArticleAuthor(s): Steven Galt CrowellSource: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 50, No. 3 (Mar., 1990), pp. 501-518Published by: International Phenomenological SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2108161

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Philosophyand Phenomenological esearchVol. L, No. 3, March I990

H u s s e r i , Heidegger, a n dTranscendental Philosophy:A n o t h e r L o o k a t t h e EncyclopaediaBritannica A r t i c l eSTEVEN GALT CROWELLRice University

Sometime in 19z7 Husserl began work on an article he had been asked tocontribute to the Encyclopaedia Britannica. Eventually, in the Four-teenth Edition of i929, "Phenomenology" was published over the name"E. Hu.," though this version was in fact a very free and much distorted

abridged translation by Christopher V. Salmon of Husserl's muchlonger text. Husserl's own final draft of the article' is of interest in itself asa rich, concise "introduction" to phenomenology, but for several decadesnow scholars have been drawn to "the Encyclopaedia Britannicaarticle"not so much as a text, but as an episode in the history of phenomenology.For Husserl's initial work on the article seems roughly to have coincidedwith the publication of Heidegger's Being and Time in February 19Z7.Husserl, who had long considered Heidegger to be his most promisingstudent and true heir of phenomenology, but who had recently beenexperiencing misgivings about the "unorthodox" direction of Heideg-ger's work, appears to have taken the occasion of the article as an oppor-tunity to measure the distance between himself and Heidegger and, if nec-essary, to attempt a reconciliation. Thus he invited Heidegger tocollaborate, and their mutual engagement yielded four drafts: Husserl'soriginal, a second draft with an introduction completely written by Hei-degger together with numerous marginal comments, a transitional thirddraft, and the final version which contained little traceof Heidegger's par-ticipation. The final version testifies to the collapse of the collaboration.

I "'Phenomenology',Edmund Husserl's Article for the EncyclopaediaBritannica(1927)," revised ranslation yRichardE.Palmer,n Husserl:ShorterWorks,ed.PeterMcCormickand FrederickElliston(Notre Dame: Universityof Notre Dame Press,I98I), pp. 21-35.

HUSSERL, HEIDEGGER, AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY 501


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Though Husserl did subsequently name Heidegger as his successor atFreiburg, he never again considered Heidegger his "student" and came,finally, to speak of him (together with Scheler) as "my antipodes."

Scholarly attention has focussed on the documents of this failed collab-oration (especially the original version and Heidegger's revisions of it) asevidence for the gulf which existed between Husserlian and Heideggerianconceptions of phenomenology, concluding from them that Heideggeraltogether rejected Husserl's "transcendental" phenomenology, with itscharacteristic doctrines of the "transcendental-phenomenological reduc-tion" and "transcendental constitution," in favor of a "phenomenolog-ical ontology" which would break free of Husserl's egological "idealism."But without denying the evident differences between Husserl and Heideg-ger, the texts at hand can be seen to support a very different conclusion,viz., that Heidegger's Being and Time "represents" (as Levinas hasclaimed) "the fruition and flowering of Husserlian phenomenology"'and that, Husserl's disappointment notwithstanding, the real issues con-cern not so much Heidegger's rejection, as his reinterpretation,of centralHusserlian notions.

This paper will begin to suggest how such a conclusion might bereached by focussing on the conception of transcendental philosophywhich emerges in Husserl's article, contrasting it with the conception oftranscendental philosophy evident in Heidegger's comments thereon, aconception indicative of his position during the period of Being andTime. At the outset it will be useful to recall the distinction between"prinzipientheoretisch" and "evidenztheoretisch" varieties of transcen-dental philosophy, a distinction recently emphasized by J. N. Mohantyand crucial for understanding the sense in which Husserl's phenomenol-ogy is "transcendental.".3 The former proceed by way of a certain kind ofargument which seeks to justify, on the basis of some principle or princi-ples, particular truth claims or categorial frameworks (quaestio juris).The latter, of which Husserl's philosophy is an example, proceed by wayof a certain kind of reflection which seeks to clarify, on the basis of anoriginal field of evidence, the meaning structures which make possible anytruth, indeed any intelligibility at all.

This distinction has not always been heeded by those who have under-taken an analysis of the relation between Husserlian and Heideggerianphenomenology. Thus, for example, commentators have interpretedthe

X "Dialogue With Emmanuel Levinas," in Face to Face With Levinas, ed. Richard A.Cohen (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986), p. I5.' J. N. Mohanty, The Possibilityof Transcendental hilosophy(Dordrecht:MartinusNijhoff, i985). See especially "The Destiny of Transcendental Philosophy," p. zI5.

502 STEVEN GALT CROWELL


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second, Heidegger-revised,raftof the EncyclopaediaBritannicaarticleas showing Heidegger's mplicitrejectionof Husserl'sdoctrineof consti-tution andso hisrejectionof Husserl's ranscendentalhilosophy.4But f,like Husserl's, Heidegger'sconceptionof phenomenology s "evidenz-theoretisch,"hentheissuecan be seento be not so mucharejection f thedoctrineof constitution,asadeepening f it. Inotherwords,thefault-linewhich runs between Husserl and Heideggershould not be seen asphenomenologyy:ranscendental hilosophyor ontology?" (as thoughHeidegger ejectedHusserl's ranscendentalurn n favor of realism)butrather "transcendental henomenology: pistemologyor ontology?" Itwould not be over the interpretation f phenomenologyper se that thetwo disagree,but over the interpretation f "transcendental,".e., theconceptionof whatreflectionon the phenomenological ield of evidenceaccomplishes.Support or this can be gleanedfrom another ook at thedraftsof the EncyclopaediaBritannicaarticle tself.What follows doesnot, however,presenta full accountof this episode. Its aim is simplytosuggest hewayin which thespecificcharacter f Heideggerianranscen-dentalontologycanbeseen to emerge romthe commonbasisof theHus-serlian/Heideggerianhenomenologyof evidence.5

1. The FirstDraft:Psychologyand TranscendentalPhilosophyIn the firstdraft Husserl begins with the natural attitudeof everydayexperienceand describeshow all "natural xperiencing"f thingsadmitsof a "phenomenologicalurn" ransformingt intoa "process f phenom-enologicalexperience" HusIX z37). Husserlargues hatsuchphenome-nologicalexperienceprovides hebasisfora purephenomenological sy-chologyby wayof areductiono the"experiencingf theexperienced" s

4 See for example Walter Biemel, "Husserl's Encyclopaedia Britannica Article and Hei-degger's Remarks Thereon" in Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals, ed. FrederickEllis-ton and Peter McCormick (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), pp.z86-303; James C. Morrison, "Husserland Heidegger:The Partingof the Ways" in Hei-degger's Existential Analytic, ed. Frederick Elliston (The Hague: Mouton Publishers,n.d.), pp. 47-59.For further details of the collaboration itself, and an account of the various drafts of thetext, see Biemel, "Husserl's Encyclopaedia BritannicaArticle," p. 303; HerbertSpiegel-berg, "On the Misfortunes of Edmund Husserl's Encyclopaedia Britannica Article'Phenomenology"' in McCormick and Elliston, Shorter Works, pp. I 8-zo; and HerbertSpiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, Third Revised and Enlarged Edition(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, i984), pp. 34z-44. The present essay concentrateson thefirst two drafts alone, both of which are found in Edmund Husserl, PhdnomenologischePsychologie, Husserliana Vol. IX, ed. Walter Biemel (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,i96z). References to these drafts will be to this volume and will be incorporated into thetext, abbreviated "Hus IX." All translations are my own.



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such. The initial phenomenological turn from the attitude of naturalworld-experience is thus a reflective one. Instead of living straightfor-wardly in our world experience as Weltkinder, we exercise a "universalphenomenological reflection" (Hus IX 239) whereby what is implicit insuch experience, viz., its intentional structure,can be made explicit. But ifphenomenology is to be distinguished from psychology as a reflectivepositive science of inner experience, Husserl must distinguish between apsychological phenomenological reflection and transcendental phenome-nological reflection. Hence Husserl introduces the notion of the"phenomenological reduction" as a move beyond psychology (Hus IX243). This move needs to be examined in more detail.

Reflection on experience in the natural attitude suggests the possibilityof a pure science of "subjectiveexperiencing" which would thematize theintentional structure of psychic life. Just as the science of physics abstractsfrom all those predicates of its objects which are seen to be bound up withthe experiencing of such objects, so Husserl thinks a pure psychology ispossible which abstracts from those predicates of its object, experience assuch, which would "go beyond" what belongs to that experiencing itself.But this is just to practice the epoche:To grasp he purelypsychicaln acogitoof thetypeperception equires.. thatthepsychol-ogist put outof playeveryposition-taking ithrespecto thetruebeingof theperceived ofthecogitatum),hathepracticen thisrespectanepochi andaccordinglymakeno naturaljudgment f perception,o whosemeaningndeedacontinual ssertion fobjectivebeingornonbeingbelongs (HusIX z43).Such an epoch6, or "phenomenological reduction" (Hus IX 245), leavesus with a field of phenomena, a field of pure psychic experience whichremains what it is in its descriptive features whatever the ontological sta-tus of the cogitata inscribed within it may prove to be.

What is really involved in such an epoche'?In carrying it out the psy-chologist "sets out of play every position-taking with regard to the truebeing of the perceived," he "makes no natural judgment of perception."Such descriptions at first only make explicit that we are dealing here witha reflective procedure, one in which the theoretical interest does notextend to questions having to do with the elements of the object as a natu-ral object. They express the truism that investigation of my experiencingof an object is not a sufficient evidential basis for ascribing ontic predi-cates to the ("physical") thing. The reduction in this sense merelyconfirms what belongs to the essence of reflection.To the extent that this is what the phenomenological reduction (orepochs) means, then Heidegger too "accepts"the reduction. Though Hei-degger does not explicitly invoke the epochse n Being and Time, this is



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only one exampleof severalcasesin thatwork wherephenomenologicalproceduresare in play without being acknowledgedas such.6Properlyunderstood,Heidegger'sontological phenomenologydoes not "take astand"regarding he factualpresenceof any particular bject;asontolo-gist Heidegger"makesno natural udgments f perception,"nor does hecompromise he phenomenologicalieldby presupposing ositiveorphy-sicalisticpremisesgoing beyond what shows itself in phenomenologicalexperience.To besure,hespeaksof phenomenology sawayof access otheBeingof things;butwhathemeansby "Being"sno moredrawn romthe naturalattitude as a non-phenomenological resupposition han isHusserl's"transcendental"onceptof being.On the contrary,Heideggertakes his point of departure rom a featurewhich Husserl himselffre-quentlyemphasizes, iz., thatin the reduction o pureexperiencenothingis lost from the descriptive ontent of what is experienced n the naturalattitude.To useHusserl's xample,a reflectivelyonsideredperceptionsstill perception-of-this-house;it includes the sense of perceptual"believing n" the house as "actuallyexisting" (wirklichDaseiendes).Under the epochethe house is taken in its full descriptivecontent "asmeaningcontent (perceptualmeaning)of the perceptualbelief"(HusIX243). The being-character f the perceptualobjectis itselfa descriptivefeatureof theexperiencing f theobjectforHusserl.And,Iwouldargue,for Heidegger too.7 To describe a "natural view of the world" is not tooccupysuch a view; to speakof Vorhandenseins not to predicaterealbeingof any particular ntity.Butthe reduction o thepurepsychical s still distinct rom a transcen-dentalphenomenology.Phenomenological sychologysets itselfthetaskof explicatinghe evidential evelsof constitution f intentionalobjectsbyexploring"the severalforms of synthesis . . throughwhich in generalconsciousnesswith consciousness omes to be a unityof consciousness"(HusIX244).WhenHusserlgoesonto charge hephenomenological sy-

6 On this point see ErnstTugendhat,Der Wahrheitsbegriffei Husserlund Heidegger(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1970), p. 263; and Carl Friedrich Gethmann, Verstehen undAuslegung (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag Herbert Grundmann, 1974), pp. 93-107 et pass.

7 To grant this, however, does not imply that such a "being-character" will be describedinthe same way by Husserl and Heidegger. It is well known, for example, that in Being andTime Heidegger revises Husserl's conception of the natural attitude in such a way that"what things are" for practical activity (their Zuhandensein) is not derivative - as it isfor Husserl - from "what they are" for theoretical consciousness (Vorhandensein). Suchrevisions, however, concern how things are "given" in a primary sense, and so remainwithin the phenomenological horizon of investigation into modes of givenness. They donot affect the "legitimacy" of the reduction as specified here; rather, they take aim at thepresuppostions about "Being" which Husserl imports into his conception of the naturalattitude itself. We will return to this issue below, note 8, and Part II.



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chologist with the task of seeking "the necessary structural system with-out which a synthesis of manifold perceptions as perception of one andthe same thing would be unthinkable," Heidegger notes "transcendentalquestions!" (Hus IX 24 5). But for Husserl such phenomenology is not yettranscendental. What more is required?

Husserl admits that transcendental phenomenology and phenomeno-logical psychology deal with "the 'same' phenomena and essentialinsights;" it is possible to move from one to the other through a mere Ein-stellungsanderung (Hus IX 247). The demand for such a "change of atti-tude" does not arise from the project of establishing a pure psychology,however, but from the idea of carrying out a "reform of philosophy to arigorous science" (Hus IX 247), which for Husserl was always equivalentto establishing philosophy on a firm epistemological foundation. So theEinstellungsdnderung is introduced as necessary for the "project of atheory of knowledge, a transcendental philosophy" (Hus IX 248).Toward the solution of this problem a phenomenological psychology cancontribute nothing since it finds itself caught in the "absurdityof the epis-temological circle" (Hus IX 249) - which Husserl in the second draftcalled the "transcendental circle" - namely, the attempt to ground thepossibility of knowledge on a basis which itself presupposes the (unexam-ined) validity of certain forms of knowledge. But what sort of mere"change of attitude" can prevent such circularity?In what sense are thephenomena of phenomenological psychology both mundane and tran-scendental?

Husserl introduces the Einstellungsanderung by recalling the discoveryof Descartes that "subjectiveconscious life in pure immanence is the placeof all meaning giving and positing of being, all verification of being" (HusIX z48). Inquiry into this "pure immanence" must provide the founda-tion, the sense, of all problems arising with regardto empirical and meta-physical modes of knowing. Phenomenological psychology has not yetrevealed this realm since it is still "positive science, it has the world as pre-given ground" (Hus IX 248). The sense of the reduction to the purely psy-chological still carriesthe sense of a reduction to a "worldly" given streamof conscious experiences, to an entity within the world. The subjectivityofphenomenological psychology is thus not yet in a position to address thetranscendental-epistemological question of the foundation of all worldlyknowledge, including its own. Husserl thus introduces the concept of a"fully universal phenomenological reduction (the transcendental)" (HusIX 249) which will overcome the remaining "naivete"of phenomenologi-cal psychology. Whereas the phenomenological reduction brackets thefacticity of the cogitata so as to focus on them as purely given intentional



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ment(anda formalsubject) o constructa transcendentaloundation orthe justificationof specifictruth claims. Centralto Husserl'sadvancebeyondsucha conceptionof transcendental hilosophy s his claimthat"meaning"s moreprimordialhan"truth" thattruth s itselfapartic-ular type or structureof meaning.Thus the genuine transcendentalprojectwouldnot be to justify ruthclaimsbutto clarify he "intentionalsense"of suchclaims,as well as that of all other "meaningunities"or"objectivities."uchaphilosophywillof coursemake ruthclaims,anditwillalsoseekto justify hem. However, twillnotbeconstructed sa spe-cial form of "meta-justification""transcendental rgument")whichwouldappeal o principles f justification nknown nothercognitivedis-ciplines.Clarificationfwhatitmeans o justifyatruthclaimpointsto therelationbetweenassertionandevidence,and this conceptionof evidencemustthenbe carriedoverto the reflexiveproblemof how the cognitiveclaims of transcendentalphilosophy are themselvesto be justified.'0Thus Husserl'sconceptionof a non-formal ranscendentalieldallowshim to speak of "transcendentalacts." HeideggerapprovinglycalledHusserl'sphilosophya "philosophical mpiricism.""Husserl's ranscendentalhilosophy s thusan investigation f thefieldof reflectionasa fieldof meaning-constitutionurified romalluncriticalpositing of being- "and in nothing else," continues Husserl, "consists itstranscendental idealism" (Hus IX 250). "Idealism"here refersto the factthat the intelligibility of the mundane (presupposed by all positiveinquiry) can be grasped only by recourse to the intentional structure ofconscious experience. Because it is upon this basis alone that any"meaning of being" can be clarified, "transcendental idealism" containswithin itself a "universal ontology," including the "apriori ontology" ofthe form of any "world" whatsoever (Hus IX 25 i). Transcendental ideal-ism is thus not a metaphysical idealism. Husserl claims that it is a rejectionof "every metaphysics which moves in empty formal constructions[Substruktionen]" (Hus IX 253), a sense which Heidegger also rejects as"carriedout in the natural attitude and always tailored to it in particularhistorical situations of life, with its merely factical possibilities of knowl-edge" (Hus IX 53). Against the tendency which such metaphysics has to

Cf. Tugendhat, op. cit., pp. ioi-o6, 173--77, i8o-8i, I89-93, and finally, I99: "Wennman das nicht festhalt, dass fur Husserl das transzendentale Ich lediglich den Sinn hat,letzte jeweilige Stattealler Geltung und Ausweisung zu sein, nicht aber ein letztes Prinzipeiner Begrundung, kann man dann auch nicht die Lehrevon dertranszendentale Konsti-tution verstehen."Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson(New York: Harper & Row, I96z), note x, p. 490.



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loseitself naporeticdichotomies including"ontologismandtranscen-dentalism" for whichdesperateormal dialectical rlogical)solutionsare sought,Husserldemandsphenomenologicalworkwhichprogresses"fromthe intuitivegivensto the abstractheights"(HusIX 253). In thiswayit canbeshownthat "transcendentaldealismcontainsnaturalreal-ismentirelywithinitself"(HusIX 254), thatthe "sense"of naturalreal-ism is itself constituted n evidentintentionalways.This sketch of Husserl'snotion of transcendental henomenologyaspresentedn the firstdraftsuggests hatHeidegger s in important espectscommitted o the ideaof phenomenologicaldealism.ForHeidegger,oo,"metaphysical" ichotomiesareto be admittedonly afterphenomeno-logicalreconstructionf theirsense,and he also findsno incompatibilitybetweena kind of phenomenologicaldealismand that realism whichalone can be at issue in the natural attitude.For Heidegger,too, the"transcendental"safieldof evidence mbeddedwithinmundanity atherthan a formal constructionof principlesdeducedto explain(or justify)mundanity.'2t is accessible olelythrougha reflectivenquiry, hroughrecourse o Verhaltungenf Dasein,andis concernednotwithbeingsperse, but with their"meaning."There s thusagoodsense nwhichHeideg-gercanbe said to adoptthe programof inquirynto "transcendentalon-stitution. 'i If there are neverthelessessentialdifferencesbetweenthetwo theymustbe discoveredurtherback, ntermsof theissuesandprob-lems which, broughtto this field by each, influencethe philosophicalsignificancet is takento have.These ssuesare alreadyquiteapparentnthe seconddraft of the article.

Ibid.,p. 50: "Inpointof fact,theissuehere s a kindof 'self-evidence' hichwe shouldlike to bringcloserto us . . ."WhenBiemel,"Husserl's ncyclopaedia Britannica Article,"p. 303, argues o the con-trary that "Heidegger . . . uses the expression 'transcendentalconstitution' . . . as afavor o Husserl" ndthat"Heideggerooksonthe constitution roblematicsan ideal-istic residuehatmustbe overcome," ne mightrightlyobject hat thesituationappearsto be morecomplicated.tis true hatHeidegger voids helanguage f "constitution"nhis writings,but the"thing tself"seems o beat workin thetranscendentalhilosophyof BeingandTime,at leastif constitution for Husserl) s not takento meancreation,and f the"evidenztheoretisch"haracterf theconstitution roblemskept nmind.Asfor "idealism," better erm orthe residueswhichHeideggereeks o overcomenHus-serlwouldseem o be "theoretism."nanycase, fBeingandTimeabandons"idealism"in anysense, t is not in favorof "realism."A fullinterpretationf theseissueswouldhave to takeintoaccountHeidegger'sxtensivecriticisms f Husserl n Historyof theConcept of Time, trans.TheodoreKisiel Bloomington:ndianaUniversity ress,985),pp. 1-134, a taskwhichI hope to carryout in anothercontext.



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2. The Second Draft: Ontology and Transcendental PhilosophyWhereas Husserl's first draft introduced transcendental phenomenologyindirectly, by way of the project of a pure psychology, Heidegger's intro-duction to the second draft begins with the question of philosophy's claimto be "fundamental science."'4 The "totality of beings," writes Heideg-ger, is parcelled out to the various positive sciences as "object domains"for their research. What then can be left for philosophy? Not the determi-nation of entities in their particular factual constitution, but rather thedetermination of entities as entities, "to understand them with respect totheir Being" (Hus IX z56).Next Heidegger notes that whereas the positive sciences pursue theirtask by immersing themselves in the object as theme, philosophicalinquiry has at every stage of its history sought "illumination of Being" byway of a reflective turn "from entities to consciousness." Is this an acci-dent? To see in it an essential necessity is the epoch-making contributionof phenomenology, which Heidegger defines asthe fundamentallarificationf the necessityof the recourse o consciousness,heradicaland explicitdetermination f the way and the lawsof thestages nthisrecourse,heprinci-pleddelimitation ndsystematic xploration f thefieldofpuresubjectivity hichdisclosesitself through his recourse.. (HusIX 256)In keeping with his conviction that the article should emphasize the tran-scendental nature of phenomenology from the outset, Heidegger writesthat this "pure subjectivity"can be called "transcendental" since in it "thebeing of all that is experienceable for the subject in varying ways, the'transcendent' in the widest sense, is constituted" (Hus IX 257).

To this point, in spite of the unfamiliar language of "Being"in which itis expressed, nothing in Heidegger's introduction would necessarilyconflict with Husserl's idea of phenomenology. The various objectdomains of the positive sciences (including psychology) all contain

14 Morrison,"HusserandHeidegger," p. 50-5 I, purportso locateafundamentalourceof the disagreement etweenHusserland Heideggern the latter's"ultimate ejection fthe possibility f a scientific hilosophy" ndclaims hat nthe seconddraftof the Ency-clopaedia Britannica article Husserl's "emphasison subjectivityand science" is"subordinatedo anontologicalproblematic" yHeidegger.However,what Heideggerrejects s not "scientific hilosophy" utratherHusserl's onception f what "scientific"means as appliedto philosophy.Materials or understandingHeidegger'sprotractedattempts, ulminatingn Beingand Time, o articulatehe peculiar ourcesof "rigor"nphilosophyas the Urwissenschaft re now availablen the Gesamtausgabe. speciallyinstructive s Vol. 56/57, Zur Bestimmungder Philosophie,ed. Bernd Heimbuchel(Frankfurt: ittorioKlostermann,987), but the theme s presentnvirtually llof Hei-degger's arly ecture ourses. fHeidegger ejected"scientific hilosophy" t all, it wasonly afterBeingand Time.



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"transcendent" objects in Husserl's sense and are "ontologically"grounded in the fundamental categories, regional ontologies, expressingthe "essential being" of such objects. These in turn are referred to tran-scendental subjectivity as the source of their ultimate clarification, a"referral"which takes place through reflection on the constitution of theintentional field of meaning. The issues separating Husserl and Heideggerdo not become visible until the interpretation of this intentional field,transcendental subjectivity, is explicitly addressed.

In Section IIwe findHusserl's revised presentation of the progress frompure psychology to transcendental phenomenology. Again Husserl'spoint is that the epistemological investigations of modern philosophy"continually presupposed the existential validity [Seinsgeltung] of theexperienced world" and so, falling into "transcendental psychologism,"did not recognize that the transcendental problem was to clarify thisworld's Seinsgeltung itself. Regarding the evidence of the world andworldly entities, the transcendental question is not that of whether it isvalid (ob es gilt) - this is the task of positive inquiry, which tests hypoth-eses and secures true propositions through positive criticism - but ratherthat of "what meaning [Sinn] and extent [Tragweite] such validity canhave" (Hus IX 265).

For Husserl it is "universally dominant naturalism" (Hus IX 267)which impedes recognition of transcendental subjectivity as a "field oftranscendental experience" (Hus IX 269). Overcoming naturalism ismade possible only by the "method of the transcendental-phenomenolog-ical reduction" (Hus IX 270) which "raises up the totality of the positiveto the philosophical level," bracketing the lingering naivete of that psy-chological reflection which posits the realm of subjective experience as anaturalentity, a bit of the world. With the reduction, however, a "cloud ofunintelligibility" spreads over the world as the "taken for granted realityand pre-given field of all our theoretical and practical activities" (Hus IX27 I). The world, whose reality before the reduction was never so much asquestioned, is now seen to be "constituted in whatever meaning it mayhave, and whatever existential validity is attributed to it, 'in ourselves',"i.e., in the "immanenceof our own perceiving, representing, thinking, val-uing, etc. life" (Hus IX 271).

The problem identified here, that of the "meaning genesis of theworld," is, as Heidegger notes, "the task of transcendental philosophyand must be identified as such at this point" (Hus IX 271). In a letter toHusserl, Heidegger emphasizes that what needs to be discussed is the pre-cise sort of unintelligibility which spreads over the taken for grantedworld under the reduction: "In which respect is such being [Seiendes]



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unintelligible? . . . [W]hat sort of higher claim to intelligibility is possibleand necessary" (Hus IX 6oz)? Husserl envisions a transcendentalclarification of the sense in which the world and all worldly objects areconstituted as "an sich seiend" (Hus IX 271) in order to gain insight intothe genuine sense of all epistemological problems concerning "knowledgeof what transcends consciousness." With his eyes on the same field of"transcendental experience" Heidegger envisions a clarification of theBeing of entities, a clarification of that which enables these entities "intruth" to be as they are encountered in the natural attitude, disclosedthrough phenomenological reflection on their constitution.

Even at this stage there is no necessary conflict between the Husserlianand Heideggerian projects. The Being of which Heidegger speaks is in nosense equivalent to the "posited being" bracketed by the reduction, theadmission of which leads to the absurdities of "transcendental psycholo-gism" attested in the traditional problem of proving the existence of theexternal world (Hus IX 265). Genuine difficulties do emerge, though, asHusserl continues his explication of the sense of the transcendental reduc-tion. If "the transcendental problem concerns the existential sense[Seinssinn]of a world in general," then the "decisivepoint" which distin-guishes the transcendental from the psychological-phenomenologicalreduction is the "universal inhibition" of "naturalexperience as the pre-given ground of possible judgments" (Hus IX 273). The world as some-thing "on hand for me" in the natural attitude is bracketed in order toreveal "pure subjectivity as source of meaning and validity" (Hus IX 273).Puresubjectivity is no longer "my ego as soul" - an idea which "alreadyin its own meaning presupposes an existing or possible world" (Hus IX274) -but rather "my ego" as transcendentally reduced "self-containedfield of experience with all its intentional correlates" (Hus IX 275). Withregard to the sense of this transcendentally reduced ego Heidegger posesthe decisive question: Is it not the case that "a world in general belongs tothe essence of the pure ego" (Hus IX 274)?

Before evaluating this question one must note an ambiguity in Hus-serl's concept of "world." On the one hand, Husserl tends to use the term"world" to mean "the totality of objects," i.e., in the sense of something"presentat hand" (if not as a whole) for the theorizing (and pre-theoreti-cal) subject."5Thus when the reduction is said to bracket the world, whatis meant is the naive assumption of its independent being-in-itself aspresent at hand. The "posited" being of the world is bracketed in order to

5See for exampleEdmundHusserl, deas Pertainingo a PurePhenomenology nd to aPhenomenological Philosophy, First Book, trans. FrederickKersten (The Hague: Mar-tinus Nijhoff, I983), p. 6.



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focus on the "positing" (including the "modes of givenness") in which it isposited. On this view it could seem that the transcendental ego must, asreduced, be wordless to the extent that world is equivalent to naivelyposited being.

However Husserl also sometimes speaks of the world as a non-objec-tive "horizon" of all positing, as the "transcendental phenomenon'world'," something which has a very different structurefrom any posi-ted entity. It is far from clear that the transcendental ego could be world-less in this sense. For if "nothing is lost" under the reduction, reduction topure subjectivityas intentional field must also include the "world" as purephenomenon.'7 Indeed it would seem that Husserl's claim to avoid theformal "epistemological subject" would demand that transcendental sub-jectivity have an apriori "content," a "world," as the horizon of constitut-ing activity. Heidegger indicates this to Husserl by reminding him of "ourTotnaubergconversation i92z6] on 'being-in-the-world' . . and itsessential difference from presence at hand 'within' such a world" (Hus IX274). Thus when Heidegger writes in his letter to Husserl that[w]eagree hatbeing dasSeiende]nthe senseofwhat-you all world' annotbe clarifiednits transcendentalonstitutionby recourse o being [Seiendes] f precisely he same sort(Hus IX 6oi),one must be careful to note just what such "agreement" means. For"world" in Husserl's sense here means all posited being which is merelypresent at hand, given as simply existing "in itself" in the naturalattitude.This is of course precisely not what Heidegger means by "world." Agree-ment consists in the fact that for both Husserl and Heidegger the being ofthe present at hand, its "constitution," must be clarifiedby recourse to thetranscendental dimension which, as reflectively disclosed, is precisely notpresent at hand within the natural attitude. But on Heidegger's view suchi6 EdmundHusserl,CartesianMeditations, rans.Dorion Cairns The Hague:Martinus

Nijhoff, 969), p. 95.17 This is not the place for a full examination f the consequencesf that thought-experi-

ment which Husserl, n Ideas I, p. IIo, proposesas "the annihilation f the worldofphysical hings."The intricacies f Husserl'sargument, ndits motivation, annot berepresented riefly.But even if it is conceivable hata reduction o pure chaos wouldleave behinda "residuum" f "mentalprocesses" thoughprocesseswhichwould nothaveunified"concatenationsf experience" s theircorrelates),t is farfromclear hatthesewouldbe mentalprocesses"ofanEgo"as Husserlclaims.If "Ego"meansmorethan"mental rocesses" asit does,forHusserl,both n Ideasand ntheEncyclopaediaBritannica rticle then it is likely that some phenomenologicalnalogueof Kant's"Refutation f Idealism" rgumento the effect hatego-identity equires bject-identity(thoughperhapsnot "physical bject dentity"nHusserl's ense)wouldcome ntoplayhere.Foran interesting iscussionof Husserl's hought-experiment,ee KarlAmeriks,"Husserl'sRealism,"PhilosophicalReview86 (I977), pp. 498-519.



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a transcendentalimensionwould in fact be "worldly" preciselyas the"transcendentalhenomenon"of world which therefore"belongs o theessenceof the pureego."In continuinghis letterHeideggervoicesa relatedpointof divergence.Evenif the constitutingdimension s not an entity presentat handthis does not implythat that whichmakesup the placeof the transcendentals not being[Seiendes] t all- rather t precisely aises heproblem:whatis themode of beingof thatbeing[Seinsart es Seienden]nwhich world'constitutes tself?That s the centralproblemof Being and Time (Hus IX 6oi).The ssuehereconcernshe meaningof the "limits" o phenomenology etby the transcendentaleduction.WhenHusserlargues hat the transitionfrom the psychological o the transcendentaltandpoint s effected "inone stroke"bya "universal heoreticalwill"which "spans he totalityofcurrentand habitual ife" (HusIX 274), Heideggerasks "Andthis willitself?"Heidegger's llipticalquestion ndicates he problemof the moti-vationforperforminghe transcendentaleduction.How is a will to thedisclosureof the transcendental ossible,giventhatfor Husserl herecanbe no motivationwithinthe naturalattitude ormoving o thepuretran-scendentalevel (forengaging n reflectivephilosophy)since,ex hypoth-esi, it is altogether oncealed rom "man," he subjectof thenaturalatti-tude?"8Heidegger, however, for whom "man" is never "merely presentat hand," never merelyan item in the world of the naturalattitude, tries tooffer an account of such motivation by interpreting the transcendental asa "'marvelous' existential possibility ['wundersame' Existenzm6glich-keit]" (Hus IX 275) of "the subject," man, already in the natural attitude.The ground and possibility of the "will" to transcendental reflection liesin the ontological constitution of the subject itself: Dasein is that being inwhose "veryBeing that Being is an issue for it." Dasein is "ontically dis-

8 Indeed, t isHusserl's wareness f thisproblemwhichaccounts or his attempt o moti-vate the transcendentaleductionhrough hedetourof phenomenologicalsychology:"Onessential roundswhichareeasyto understand, umanity ssuch,andeach ndivid-ual humanbeing, ives initiallyexclusively n the positive[Positivitdt],ndso the tran-scendental eduction s an alteration f theentire ormof life [Lebensform] hichgoesbeyond[hinfibersteigtJllprevious ife experience nd,on accountof its absolute or-eignness,s difficulto understandwith respect o itspossibilityand actuality"HusIX?76). Phenomenologicalsychology s supposed o serveas a "propaedeutic"o thereduction.But since what motivates t (a purescienceof the psycheas worldlyentityalongside pure cienceof thephysical) s altogether ifferentrom hatwhichmotivatesthe transcendental-philosophicaluestion f the"ground"f allworldlyknowledge,tishardto seehow such a propaedeuticouldbe of muchhelpunless he mundanebeingitself ("man")did not already"understand"ts "difference"romentitieswithin theworld, .e.,did not already insomesense)understandranscendentaleflection soneofits possibilities.



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tinctive in that it is ontological."'9 The psychological subject is notmerely a transcendententity; properly seen in its ontological constitution,it "is transcendental." Only so is it possible to account for the fact (whichHusserl continually emphasizes) that psychological reflection can be seenas transcendental experience through a simple, though decisive,"interpretive turn [Umdeutung]."

Yet for Husserl this Umdeutung meant that the question of ontology(regional or otherwise) had been left behind. If "being" is equivalent toworldly (posited) being, then recourse to the transcendental level of posit-ing is a departurefrom all questions of ontology. ForHusserl, the fact thatthe transcendental subject is "identical in content" with the psychologicalbut "freed from its 'seelischen' (worldly real) sense" (Hus IX 275) meansthat the question of the "existence" (=worldly existence) of such a subjectcan no longer have any meaning. But though Heidegger too distinguishesbetween "man" and Dasein (as the Being or transcendental constitutionof man) he insists, against Husserl, that transcendental subjectivity mustbe seen as an existential possibility of man:Is notthisact [thetranscendentaleduction] possibility f man,butpreciselybecausemanis never implyon hand;acomportment,.e.,a modeof being,which t secures oritselfandso neversimplybelongsto the positivityof what is on hand(HusIX 275)?What Heidegger argues against here is not the reduction per se, but theimplicit ontology in which Husserl locates the entity "man" - i.e., psy-chology, psycho-physiology of the present at hand. Husserl's regionalontological assumptions about "man" cloud his view of what reductionto the transcendental means. This issue comes to the fore at the end of thesecond draft where Husserl identifies the Umdeutung from phenomeno-logical psychology to transcendental phenomenology as the key to the"riddle of the Copernican Turn" of Kant. Here Heidegger notes that fol-lowing Husserl's own presentation the Umdeutung is simply a"supplemental development of the transcendentalproblematic which youfound incomplete in pure psychology so that ... now everything positivebecomes transcendentally problematic" (Hus IX 277). If so, then thenaive sense of the psychical with which psychology begins must itself beput into question. It will not be enough to identify it, as Husserl did, byanalogy with the physicist's reduction to the "purely physical." Inquiryinto transcendental constitution cannot avoid the quest for proper onto-logical categories of the psychical since, as Heidegger writes, "the focuson that which belongs purely to the soul has never grown out of consider-ation of the ontology of the full human being, i.e., not from a genuine per-

19 Heidegger,Beingand Time,p. 32.

HUSSERL, HEIDEGGER, AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY 5 I 5


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spectiveon psychology rather, t has emerged inceDescartesprimarilyfrom epistemologicalconsiderations" Hus IX 6oz). In other words,"that which belongs purely to the soul" has been misinterpretedoexclude the proper transcendentaldeterminationsof "world"(of the"soul"as being-in-the-world). his is not, asHusserl hought,anthropol-ogy; the specificallynaturalistic ense which Husserl gives to "humanbeing" plays no role in Heidegger's ranscendentalphenomenologicaldescriptions.It would appear, hen, that the essentialdifferencebetweenHusserlianand Heideggerian nterpretations f the meaningof transcendental he-nomenological eflectiondoes not concern he "legitimacy" f the reduc-tion, which both accept so far as it places into questionthe ontologicalpresuppositions f the naturalattitude.Rather, he issueturnson whetherthe phenomenological larificationof being (whichHusserlproposes)must be extended to the beingof the transcendentalubject tself. ForHusserl,who associatesbeing with "beingposited,"the questionof thebeingof the transcendentalubject, .e., thebeingof thefieldof positing/constituting cts,can haveno sense.ButHeideggerarguesquiteplausiblythat[t]hatwhichconstitutess not nothing,and thus it is somethingandin being[seiend-thoughto be surenot in thesenseof thepositive.Thequestionaboutthe mode of beingofthatwhichconstitutess not to be avoided.Theproblem fBeingsthusdirectedoward heconstituting nd the constituted like(HusIX 6o0).Indeed, ven on Husserl's wn terms here s somethingartificial bouthisrestriction f the questionof Being.For f, as Husserlargues nIdeasI, the"formal" enseof Etwasuberhaupts the basis of all ontology i.e., if"to be" (formally)means to be the "subjectof possibletrue predica-tions"" - then a transcendental phenomenology must leave open thepossibilityof an ontologyof transcendental ubjectivity, ince there canbe no denyingthat Husserl thinks truepropositionsconcerning uch asubjectarepossible.If it is argued,on the contrary, hat Husserldoes indeed envision anontology of the transcendental ubjectand in fact attributes o it an"absolutebeing,"' one mustagainrecallthat such "ontological" har-acteristics f the transcendentalubjectarisenot fromaninquiry nto themeaningof being perse (ontology),but fromepistemological onsider-ations whicheverywhere resupposehat themeaningof beingis simplygiven (as "posited"being).ThusHusserlmost often speaksof ontologyasa branchof formal ogic (which ncludes ormalapophanticsand formal20 Husserl,IdeasI, p. IO.

I Husserl, Ideas I, pp. iio et pass.

5I6 STEVEN GALT CROWELL


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ontology), hat is, asanobjectivediscipline oncernedwith what it is to bean objectin generaland with specific"regional"differentiations mongobjects.22 ucha discipline, houghin need of transcendental epistemo-logical) grounding, s not yet transcendental.Husserlwill even state that"in itself . . . ontology is not phenomenology.""3When, however, hespeaks of "another formal ontology,' which relatesto everything hatexists in any sense: to what exists as transcendentalubjectivityand toeverythingthat becomes constitutedin transcendental ubjectivity,""and helps himself (as in Ideas I) to the languageof "absolutebeing" ncharacterizingucha subject,he encounters ystematicproblems.For inorder o bring he subject nto view ontologically t must be "objectified"reflectively, .e., turned nto something"posited" or the reflectivegaze.But the transcendental ubjectwas glimpsed nitially hrough he reduc-tion of everythingpositive,i.e., as the positingor constitutingoriginofobjective meaning. The result is that Husserl can characterize he"absolutebeing" of the transcendental ubject only negativelyand, inparticular,with regardto its epistemologicalprivileges.As Heideggerputsit in a detailedcriticismof Husserlon justthispoint: "Husserl's ri-maryquestion s simplynot concernedwith thecharacter f thebeingofconsciousness.Rather,he is guided by the followingconcern:How canconsciousnessbecome the possible objectof an absolutescience?"2"orthis reason, Husserl's "ontological"determinationsof transcendentalsubjectivity"are not derivedby considering he intentional n its verybeing,but to the extent that it is placedunderscrutinyas apprehended,given, constituting,and ideating taken as an essence."" In short, byderiving he ontologicalcharacteristicsf "absolutebeing"fromepiste-mologicalconsiderations,Husserlcloses off the possibilityof a genuinephenomenological ontology based on unprejudicedrecourse to the"things hemselves.""7

EdmundHusserl,Formaland Transcendentalogic,trans.DorionCairns TheHague:MartinusNijhoff, i969), pp. I48f.

23 EdmundHusserl,Ideas Pertaining o a Pure Phenomenology nd PhenomenologicalPhilosophy,ThirdBook, trans.Ted E.KleinandWilliamE. Pohl(TheHague:MartinusNijhoff, i980), p. "17.

24 Husserl,Formaland Transcendentalogic, p. 271.25 Heidegger,Historyof the Conceptof Time,p. 107.z6 Ibid.,p. io6.27 Formoreon this ssue ee bid.,pp. 102-14. Of course,Heidegger'sriticisms f Husserl'sconceptionof the relationbetweenphenomenology nd ontology nvolveproblemsof

theirown,the investigationf whichdeserveseparatereatment.Theyarerecalledhereonlyto indicate hat he "partingf theways"betweenHusserl ndHeideggerouldverywell have been motivatedby immanent riticismof Husserl'sphenomenological ro-gram,rather hanby a wholesale ejection f its "transcendental"haracter. oran alter-

HUSSERL, HEIDEGGER, AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY 5I7


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Sowithregardo thephenomenologicalnvestigation f thedomainoftranscendentalubjectivityHeideggercanask "What s the character fthepositing nwhichtheabsoluteego is posited?To whatextent is therenopositivity posite4ness)oundhere?" HusIX6oz). Themodeof beingof theabsoluteego must tselfbecomea transcendentalroblem.Only socanit bephenomenologicallylarifiedhow thepureegobothisandisnot"thesame"as thefacticego (Hus IX 6oz). Thegrounduponwhichenti-ties areencounterablexplicitly n theirmeaning tructuremustitselfbeinquirednto asto itsSeinssinn.Atthesame ime,though hepointcannotbearguedhere,suchaninquirypreserves genuine enseanddirectionorHusserlian"constitutional"nvestigationswithinthe projected(funda-mental) ontology of Being and Time. A significantrapprochementbetweenHusserlandHeidegger,eavingneither otallyunrevised,here-fore becomesthinkable.

nativeto Heidegger's"epistemological"eadingof Husserl's"AbsoluteBeing,"seeRudolfBoehm,"DasAbsolutunddie Realitat," n VomGesichtspunkt erPhanome-nologie(TheHague:MartinusNijhoff, i968), pp. 72-105.

5i8 STEVEN GALT CROWELL

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