Upload
gerardo-velez
View
219
Download
0
Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
7/28/2019 Huntington Articulo Ingles
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/huntington-articulo-ingles 1/29
The Clash of Civilizations?Author(s): Samuel P. HuntingtonSource: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Summer, 1993), pp. 22-49Published by: Council on Foreign Relations
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20045621 .
Accessed: 24/05/2013 20:09
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
.
Council on Foreign Relations is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Foreign
Affairs.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 132.248.9.8 on Fri, 24 May 2013 20:09:25 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/28/2019 Huntington Articulo Ingles
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/huntington-articulo-ingles 2/29
The Clash of Civilizations?
Samuel P.Huntington
THE NEXT PATTERN OF CONFLICT
World politics is entering a new phase, and intellectuals havenot hesitated to
proliferatevisions of what itwill be?the end of his
tory, the return of traditional rivalries between nation states, and the
decline of the nation state from theconflicting pulls
of tribalism and
globalism, among others. Each of these visions catches aspects of the
emerging reality. Yet they all miss a crucial, indeed a central, aspect
ofwhat global politics is likely to be in the coming years.It ismy hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this
new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic.
The great divisions among humankind and the dominatingsource of
conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the mostpowerful
actors inworld affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politicswill
occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash
of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between
civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.
Conflict between civilizations will be the latest
phase
in the evo
lution of conflict in the modern world. For acentury and a half after
the emergence of the modern international system with the Peace of
Westphalia,the conflicts of theWestern world were
largely among
Samuel P. Huntington is the Eaton Professor of the Science of
Government and Director of the John M. Olin Institute forStrategic
Studies at Harvard University. This article is the productof the Olin
Institute's project on "The Changing Security Environment and
American National Interests."
[22]
This content downloaded from 132.248.9.8 on Fri, 24 May 2013 20:09:25 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/28/2019 Huntington Articulo Ingles
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/huntington-articulo-ingles 3/29
The Clash ofCivilizations?
princes?emperors, absolute monarchs and constitutional monarchs
attemptingto
expand their bureaucracies, their armies, their mer
cantilist economicstrength and,
mostimportant,
theterritory they
ruled. In the process they created nation states, andbeginning with
the French Revolution theprincipal lines of conflict were between
nations rather than princes.In 1793, as R. R. Palmer put it, "The wars
ofkings
were over; the wars ofpeoples
hadbegun." This nineteenth
century pattern lasted until the end ofWorld War I.Then, as a result
of the Russian Revolution and the reactionagainst it, the conflict of
nationsyielded
to the conflict of ideologies, first among communism,
fascism-Nazism and liberal democracy, and then between communism and liberal
democracy. Duringthe Cold War, this latter conflict
became embodied in the struggle between the two superpowers, nei
ther of which was a nation state in the classical Europeansense and
each ofwhich defined its identity in terms of its ideology.These conflicts between princes, nation states and
ideologieswere
primarily conflicts within Western civilization, "Western civil wars,"asWilliam Lind has labeled them. This was as true of the ColdWar
as itwas of the world wars and the earlier wars of the seventeenth,
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.With the end of theColdWar,international politics
moves out of itsWestern phase, and its center
piece becomes the interaction between theWest and non-Western
civilizations and among non-Western civilizations. In thepolitics
of
civilizations, thepeoples and governments of non-Western civiliza
tions nolonger remain the objects of history
astargets ofWestern
colonialism butjoin
theWest asmoversand shapers
ofhistory.
THE NATURE OF CIVILIZATIONS
During the cold war the world was divided into the First,
Second and Third Worlds. Those divisions are nolonger relevant. It
is far moremeaningful
now to group countries not in terms of their
politicalor economic systems
or in terms of their level of economic
development but rather in terms of their culture and civilization.
What do we mean when we talk of a civilization? A civilization is
a cultural entity. Villages, regions, ethnic groups, nationalities, reli
FOREIGN AFFAIRS -Summer 1993 [23]
This content downloaded from 132.248.9.8 on Fri, 24 May 2013 20:09:25 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/28/2019 Huntington Articulo Ingles
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/huntington-articulo-ingles 4/29
Samuel P.Huntington
gious groups, all have distinct cultures at different levels of cultural
heterogeneity. The culture of avillage
in southern Italy may be dif
ferent from that of a
villagein northern
Italy,but both will share in a
common Italian culture that distinguishes them from German vil
lages. European communities, in turn, will share cultural features that
distinguishthem from Arab or Chinese communities. Arabs,
Chinese andWesterners, however, are notpart of any broader cul
tural entity. Theyconstitute civilizations. A civilization is thus the
highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural
identity people have short ofthat which distinguishes humans from
other species. It is defined both by common objective elements, suchas
language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the sub
jective self-identification ofpeople. People
have levels ofidentity:
a
resident of Rome may define himself with varying degrees of inten
sityas a Roman, an Italian, a Catholic, a Christian, a
European,a
Westerner. The civilization towhich he belongs is the broadest level
of identification with which he intensely identifies. People can and
do redefine their identities and, as a result, the composition and
boundaries of civilizations change.Civilizations may involve a
large number ofpeople,
aswith China
("a civilizationpretending
to be a state," as Lucian Pye put it), or a
very small number of people, such as theAnglophone
Caribbean. A
civilization may include several nation states, as is the case with
Western, Latin American and Arab civilizations, oronly one, as is the
case with Japanese civilization. Civilizations obviously blend and
overlap,and
mayinclude subcivilizations. Western civilization has
twomajor variants, European and North American, and Islam has its
Arab, Turkic and Malay subdivisions. Civilizations are nonetheless
meaningful entities, and while the lines between them are seldom
sharp, theyare real. Civilizations are
dynamic; they rise and fall; they
divide and merge. And, as any student of history knows, civilizations
disappearand are buried in the sands of time.
Westerners tend to think of nation states as theprincipal
actors in
global affairs. They have been that, however, for only a few centuries.
The broader reaches of human history have been the history of civi
[^4] FOREIGN AFFAIRS Volume^No^
This content downloaded from 132.248.9.8 on Fri, 24 May 2013 20:09:25 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/28/2019 Huntington Articulo Ingles
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/huntington-articulo-ingles 5/29
The Clash ofCivilizations?
lizations. InA Study ofHistory, Arnold Toynbee identified 21major
civilizations; only six of them exist in the contemporary world.
WHY CIVILIZATIONS WILL CLASH
Civilization identity will be increasingly important in the
future, and the world will be shapedin
largemeasure
by the interac
tions among seven oreight major civilizations. These include
Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox,
Latin American andpossibly African civilization. The most
impor
tant conflicts of the future will occur along the cultural fault lines sep
arating these civilizations from one another.
Why will this be the case?
First, differences among civilizations are notonly real; they
are
basic. Civilizations are differentiated from each other by history, Ian
guage, culture, tradition and, mostimportant,
religion. The people of different civilizations
have different views on the relations between
God and man, the individual and the group, the
citizen and the state, parents and children, hus
band and wife, aswell asdiffering
views of the
relative importance of rights andresponsibili
ties, liberty and authority, equality and hierar
chy. These differences are theproduct
of centuries.They
will not
soondisappear. They
are far more fundamental than differences
among political ideologiesand
political regimes.Differences do not
necessarilymean conflict, and conflict does not
necessarilymean vio
lence. Over the centuries, however, differences among civilizations
have generated the mostprolonged and the most violent conflicts.
Second, the world is becominga smaller place. The interactions
betweenpeoples
of different civilizations areincreasing; these
increasinginteractions
intensify civilization consciousness and
awareness of differences between civilizations and commonalities
within civilizations. North African immigration to France generates
hostility among Frenchmen and at the same time increasedreceptiv
ityto
immigration by "good" European Catholic Poles. Americans
FOREIGN AFFAIRS -Summer 1993 [25]
The conflicts of the
futurewill occur along
the cultural fault lines
separating civilizations.
This content downloaded from 132.248.9.8 on Fri, 24 May 2013 20:09:25 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/28/2019 Huntington Articulo Ingles
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/huntington-articulo-ingles 6/29
Samuel P.Huntington
react farmorenegatively
toJapanese investment than to
larger invest
ments from Canada and European countries. Similarly,as Donald
Horowitz haspointed out,
"An Ibomay
be ... an Owerri Ibo or an
Onitsha Ibo inwhat was the Eastern region of Nigeria. InLagos, he
issimply
an Ibo. In London, he is aNigerian. In New York, he is an
African." The interactions among peoplesof different civilizations
enhance the civilization-consciousness ofpeople that, in turn, invig
orates differences and animositiesstretching
orthought
to stretch
back deep into history.
Third, the processes of economic modernization and socialchange
throughout the world are separating people from longstanding localidentities.
Theyalso weaken the nation state as a source of identity.
Inmuch of theworld religion has moved in to fill this gap, often in
the form of movements that are labeled "fundamentalist." Such
movements are found inWesternChristianity, Judaism, Buddhism
and Hinduism, aswell as in Islam. In most countries and most reli
gions thepeople
active in fundamentalist movements are young, col
lege-educated, middle-class technicians, professionals and business
persons. The "unsecularization of the world," George Weigel has
remarked, "is one of the dominant social facts of life in the late twen
tieth century." The revival ofreligion,
"la revanche de Dieu," asGilles
Kepel labeled it, providesa basis for identity and commitment that
transcends national boundaries and unites civilizations.
Fourth, the growth of civilization-consciousness is enhanced by
the dual role of theWest. On the one hand, theWest is at apeak of
power.At the same
time, however,and
perhapsas a
result,a return
to the rootsphenomenon is occurring among non-Western civiliza
tions. Increasinglyone hears references to trends toward a
turning
inward and "Asianization" inJapan,
the end of the Nehrulegacy
and
the "Hinduization" of India, the failure ofWestern ideas of socialism
and nationalism and hence "re-Islamization" of theMiddle East, and
now a debate over Westernization versus Russianization in Boris
Yeltsin scountry. A West at the
peakof its power confronts non
Wests that increasingly have the desire, the will and the resources to
shapethe world in non-Western ways.
In the past, the elites of non-Western societies wereusually the
[26] FOREIGN AFFAIRS- Volumey2No.3
This content downloaded from 132.248.9.8 on Fri, 24 May 2013 20:09:25 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/28/2019 Huntington Articulo Ingles
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/huntington-articulo-ingles 7/29
The Clash ofCivilizations?
peoplewho were most involved with theWest, had been educated at
Oxford, the Sorbonne or Sandhurst, and had absorbed Western atti
tudes and values. At the same time, the populace in non-Westerncountries often remained deeply imbued with the indigenous culture.
Now, however, these relationshipsare
being reversed. A de
Westernization and indigenizationof elites is occurring
inmany non
Western countries at the same time thatWestern, usually American,
cultures, stylesand habits become more
popular among the mass of
thepeople.
Fifth, cultural characteristics and differences are less mutable and
hence less easily compromised and resolved than political and eco
nomic ones. In the former Soviet Union, communists can become
democrats, the rich can become poor and the poor rich, but Russians
cannot become Estonians and Az?ris cannot become Armenians. In
class and ideological conflicts, the key questionwas "Which side are
you on?" andpeople
could and did choose sides andchange
sides. In
conflicts between civilizations, the questionis "What are
you?" That
is a
given
that cannot be
changed.
And as we know, from Bosnia to
the Caucasus to the Sudan, the wrong answer to thatquestion
can
mean a bullet in the head. Even more thanethnicity, religion dis
criminates sharply and exclusively among people. A person can be
half-French and half-Arab and simultaneouslyeven a citizen of two
countries. It ismore difficult to be half-Catholic and half-Muslim.
Finally,economic
regionalism isincreasing. The proportions of
total trade that wereintraregional
rose between 1980 and 1989 from
51 percent to 59 percent in Europe, 33 percent to 37 percent in EastAsia, and 32 percent
to 36 percent inNorth America. The importanceof
regional economic blocs islikely
to continue to increase in the
future. On the one hand, successful economic regionalismwill rein
force civilization-consciousness. On the other hand, economic
regionalism may succeed only when it is rooted in a common civi
lization. TheEuropean Community
rests on the shared foundation
of European culture andWestern Christianity. The success of the
North American Free Trade Area depends on the convergence now
underway ofMexican, Canadian and American cultures.Japan,
in
contrast, faces difficulties increating
acomparable
economicentity
FOREIGN AFFAIRS Summer 1993 [27]
This content downloaded from 132.248.9.8 on Fri, 24 May 2013 20:09:25 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/28/2019 Huntington Articulo Ingles
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/huntington-articulo-ingles 8/29
Samuel PHuntington
in East Asia because Japanis a
society and civilization uniqueto itself.
However strong the trade and investment linksJapan may develop
with other East Asiancountries,
its cultural differences with those
countries inhibit andperhaps preclude
itspromoting regional
eco
nomicintegration like that in
Europe and North America.
Common culture, in contrast, isclearly facilitating the
rapid
expansion of the economic relations between thePeople
sRepublic of
China and Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and the overseas Chinese
communities in other Asian countries. With the Cold War over, cul
tural commonalitiesincreasingly
overcomeideological differences,
and mainland China and Taiwan move closer together. If cultural
commonalityis a
prerequisite for economicintegration, the
principalEast Asian economic bloc of the future is
likelyto be centered on
China. This bloc is, in fact, already cominginto existence. As
MurrayWeidenbaum has observed,
Despitethe current
Japanesedominance of the
region,the Chinese-based
economy of Asia israpidly emerging
as a newepicenter
forindustry,
com
merce and finance. This strategicarea contains substantial amounts of tech
nology and manufacturing capability (Taiwan), outstanding entrepreneurial,
marketingand services acumen
(Hong Kong),a fine communications net
work (Singapore),a tremendous pool of financial capital (all three), and very
largeendowments of land, resources and labor (mainland China).... From
Guangzhouto
Singapore, from KualaLumpur
toManila, this influential net
work?often based on extensions of the traditional clans?has been described
as the backbone of the East Asianeconomy.1
Culture and religion also form the basis of the Economic
Cooperation Organization,which
brings togetherten non-Arab
Muslim countries: Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tadjikistan, Uzbekistan andAfghan
istan. One impetusto the revival and
expansionof this organization,
founded originally in the 1960s byTurkey, Pakistan and Iran, is the
realization bythe leaders of several of these countries that they had
no chance of admission to theEuropean Community. Similarly,
Caricom, the Central American Common Market andMercosur rest
1MurrayWeidenbaum, Greater China: The Next Economic Superpower?, St. Louis:
Washington University Center for the Study of American Business, Contemporary
Issues, Series 57, February 1993, pp. 2-3.
[28]FOREIGN AFFAIRS Volume72N0.3
This content downloaded from 132.248.9.8 on Fri, 24 May 2013 20:09:25 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/28/2019 Huntington Articulo Ingles
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/huntington-articulo-ingles 9/29
The Clash ofCivilizations?
on common cultural foundations. Efforts to build a broader
Caribbean-Central American economicentity bridging the
Anglo
Latin divide, however, haveto
date failed.As people define their identity in ethnic and religious terms, they
arelikely
to see an "us" versus "them" relationexisting between them
selves andpeople
of different ethnicityor
religion. The end of ideo
logically defined states in EasternEurope
and the former Soviet
Unionpermits
traditional ethnic identities and animosities to come
to the fore. Differences in culture andreligion
create differences over
policy issues, rangingfrom human
rightsto
immigrationto trade and
commerce to the environment. Geographical propinquity gives rise
toconflicting territorial claims from Bosnia to Mindanao. Most
important, the efforts of theWest to promote its values of democra
cy and liberalism as universal values, to maintain its military pre
dominance and to advance its economic interests engender
countering responses from other civilizations. Decreasingly able to
mobilize support and form coalitions on the basis of ideology, gov
ernments and groups will increasingly attempt tomobilize supportby
appealingto common
religionand civilization identity.
The clash of civilizations thus occurs at two levels. At the micro
level, adjacent groups along the fault lines between civilizations
struggle, often violently,over the control of territory and each other.
At the macro-level, states from different civilizations compete for rel
ativemilitary and economic power, struggle
over the control of inter
national institutions and third parties, and competitively promote
their particular political and religious values.
THE FAULT LINES BETWEEN CIVILIZATIONS
The fault lines between civilizations arereplacing
thepolitical
and ideological boundaries of theColdWar as the flash points for cri
sis and bloodshed. The Cold War began when the Iron Curtain
divided Europe politically and ideologically. The Cold War ended
with the end of the Iron Curtain. As the ideological division of
Europe hasdisappeared, the cultural division of
Europebetween
WesternChristianity,
on the one hand, and OrthodoxChristianity
FOREIGN AFFAIRS Summer 1993 [29]
This content downloaded from 132.248.9.8 on Fri, 24 May 2013 20:09:25 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/28/2019 Huntington Articulo Ingles
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/huntington-articulo-ingles 10/29
Western
Christianitycirca icoo
Orthodox
Christianityand Islam
MILES c^SP^
Source:W. Wallace, THE TRANSFORMATION F
WESTERNEirROPE.ondon: Pinter, 1990.
Map by lb Ohlsson for FOREIGN FFAIRS.
Samuel P.Huntington
and Islam, on the other, hasreemerged.
The most significant dividing line in
Europe,as
William Wallace has suggested,may well be the eastern
boundary of
WesternChristianity
in the year 1500. This
line runsalong what are now the boundaries
between Finland and Russia and between
the Baltic states and Russia, cutsthrough
Belarus and Ukraine separating the more
Catholic western Ukraine from Orthodox
eastern Ukraine, swings westward separat
ing Transylvania from the rest of Romania,
and then goes through Yugoslavia almost
exactly along the line nowseparating
Croatia and Slovenia from the rest of
Yugoslavia. In the Balkans this line, of
course, coincides with the historic bound
ary between theHapsburg and Ottoman
empires. The peoplesto the north and west
of this line are Protestant or Catholic; theyshared the common
experiences of Euro
pean history?feudalism, the Renaissance,
the Reformation, theEnlightenment, the
French Revolution, the Industrial Revo
lution; theyare
generally economically bet
ter off than thepeoples
to theeast;
andthey
may now look forward toincreasing
involvement in a commonEuropean
econ
omy and to the consolidation of democrat
icpolitical systems. The peoples
to the east
and south of this line are Orthodox or
Muslim; they historically belonged to the
Ottoman or Tsarist empires and wereonly
lightly touched by the shaping events in therest of
Europe; theyare
generallyless
advanced economically; theyseem much
[30] FOREIGN AFFAIRS Volume 72N0.3
This content downloaded from 132.248.9.8 on Fri, 24 May 2013 20:09:25 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/28/2019 Huntington Articulo Ingles
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/huntington-articulo-ingles 11/29
The Clash ofCivilizations?
less likelyto
developstable democratic political systems. The Velvet
Curtain of culture has replaced the Iron Curtain of ideologyas the
mostsignificant dividing line
inEurope. As the
events inYugoslavia
show, it is notonly
a line of difference; it is also at times a line of
bloody conflict.
Conflict along the fault line between Western and Islamic civi
lizations has been goingon for 1,300 years. After the
foundingof
Islam, the Arab and Moorish surge west and north only ended at
Tours in 732. From the eleventh to the thirteenth century the
Crusaders attempted with temporarysuccess to
bring Christianity
and Christian rule to the Holy Land. From the fourteenth to the sev
enteenth century, the Ottoman Turks reversed the balance, extended
their sway over the Middle East and the Balkans, captured
Constantinople,and twice laid siege
toVienna. In the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries asOttoman power declined Britain, France,
and Italy established Western control over most of North Africa and
theMiddle East.
After World War II, theWest, in turn, beganto retreat; the colo
nial empires disappeared;first Arab nationalism and then Islamic
fundamentalism manifested themselves; the West became heavily
dependenton the Persian Gulf countries for its energy; the oil-rich
Muslim countries became money-rich and, when they wished to,
weapons-rich.Several wars occurred between Arabs and Israel (cre
ated by theWest). France foughta
bloody and ruthless war inAlgeria
for most of the 1950s; British and French forces invaded Egyptin
1956; American forceswent
into Lebanon in 1958; subsequentlyAmerican forces returned to Lebanon, attacked Libya, and engaged
in various militaryencounters with Iran; Arab and Islamic terrorists,
supported byat least three Middle Eastern governments, employed
the weapon of the weak and bombed Western planes and installations
and seized Western hostages. This warfare between Arabs and the
West culminated in 1990, when the United States sent amassive armyto the Persian Gulf to defend some Arab countries against aggression
by another. In its aftermath nato planning is increasingly directed to
potential threats and instability along its "southern tier."
This centuries-old military interaction between the West and
FOREIGN AFFAIRS Summer 1993 [31]
This content downloaded from 132.248.9.8 on Fri, 24 May 2013 20:09:25 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/28/2019 Huntington Articulo Ingles
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/huntington-articulo-ingles 12/29
Samuel P.Huntington
Islam isunlikely
to decline. It could become more virulent. The Gulf
War left some Arabs feeling proudthat Saddam Hussein had
attacked Israel and stoodup
to theWest. It also leftmany feeling
humiliated and resentful of the West's military presence in the
Persian Gulf, the West'soverwhelming military dominance, and
their apparent inabilityto
shapetheir own
destiny. Many Arab coun
tries, in addition to the oil exporters,are
reaching levels of economic
and socialdevelopment
where autocratic forms of government
become inappropriate and efforts to introducedemocracy become
stronger. Some openings in Arab political systems have already
occurred. The principal beneficiaries of these openings have been
Islamist movements. In the Arab world, in short,Western democra
cy strengthens anti-Western political forces. This may be apassing
phenomenon, but itsurely complicates relations between Islamic
countries and theWest.
Those relations are alsocomplicated by demography. The spec
tacularpopulation growth
in Arab countries, particularlyin North
Africa, has led to increased migrationtoWestern Europe. The move
ment within Western Europe toward minimizing internal bound
aries hassharpened political
sensitivities with respectto this
development.In
Italy, France and Germany, racism isincreasingly
open, andpolitical reactions and violence against Arab and Turkish
migrants have become more intense and morewidespread since 1990.
On both sides the interaction between Islam and theWest is seen
as a clash of civilizations. The West s "next confrontation," observes
M.J.Akbar,
an Indian Muslimauthor,
"isdefinitely going
to come
from theMuslim world. It is in the sweep of the Islamic nations from
theMaghreb
to Pakistan that the strugglefor a new world order will
begin." Bernard Lewis comes to a similar conclusion:
We arefacing
amood and amovement fartranscending
the level of issues and
policiesand the governments that pursue them. This is no less than a clash of
civilizations?theperhaps
irrational butsurely
historic reaction of an ancient
rivalagainst
ourJudeo-Christian heritage,
our secular present, and the world
wideexpansion
of both.2
2Bernard Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage," The Atlantic Monthly, vol. 266,
September 1990, p. 60; Time, June 15,1992, pp. 24-28.
[32]FOREIGN AFFAIRS Volumey2No.3
This content downloaded from 132.248.9.8 on Fri, 24 May 2013 20:09:25 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/28/2019 Huntington Articulo Ingles
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/huntington-articulo-ingles 13/29
The Clash ofCivilizations?
Historically,the other great antagonistic
interaction of Arab
Islamic civilization has been with the pagan, animist, and now
increasingly Christian black peoplesto
the south. In the past, this
antagonismwas
epitomized in the image of Arab slave dealers and
black slaves. It has been reflected in the on-going civil war in the
Sudan between Arabs and blacks, the fighting in Chad between
Libyan-supported insurgents and the government, the tensions
between Orthodox Christians and Muslims in the Horn of Africa,
and thepolitical conflicts, recurring
riots and communal violence
between Muslims and Christians inNigeria. The modernization of
Africa and the spread of Christianity are likely to enhance the prob
ability of violence along this fault line. Symptomatic of the inten
sification of this conflict was the Pope John Paul IPs speech in
Khartoum inFebruary 1993 attacking the actions of the Sudans
Islamist government against the Christian minority there.
On the northern border of Islam, conflict has increasingly erupt
ed between Orthodox andMuslimpeoples, including
the carnage of
Bosnia and
Sarajevo,
the
simmering
violence between Serb and
Albanian, the tenuous relations between Bulgarians and their
Turkish minority, the violence between Ossetians and Ingush, the
unremitting slaughterof each other by Armenians and Az?ris, the
tense relations between Russians and Muslims in Central Asia, and
the deployment of Russian troopsto
protect Russian interests in the
Caucasus and Central Asia. Religion reinforces the revival of ethnic
identities and restimulates Russian fears about the security of their
southern borders. This concern iswell captured by Archie Roosevelt:Much of Russian
historyconcerns the
strugglebetween the Slavs and the
Turkic peopleson their borders, which dates back to the foundation of the
Russian state more than a thousand years ago. In the Slavs*millennium-long
confrontation with their easternneighbors lies the
keyto an
understandingnot
onlyof Russian
history,but Russian character. To understand Russian
realitiestoday
one has to have aconcept of the great Turkic ethnic group that
haspreoccupied
Russiansthrough
the centuries.3
The conflict of civilizations isdeeply
rooted elsewhere in Asia.
The historic clash between Muslim and Hindu in the subcontinent
3Archie Roosevelt, For Lust ofKnowing, Boston: Little, Brown, 1988,pp. 332-333.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS -Summer1993 [33]
This content downloaded from 132.248.9.8 on Fri, 24 May 2013 20:09:25 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/28/2019 Huntington Articulo Ingles
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/huntington-articulo-ingles 14/29
Samuel P.Huntington
manifests itself now notonly
in therivalry between Pakistan and
India but also inintensifying religious strife within India between
increasinglymilitant Hindu
groupsand Indias substantial Muslim
minority. The destruction of theAyodhya mosque inDecember 1992
broughtto the fore the issue of whether India will remain a secular
democratic state or become aHindu one. In East Asia, China has
_outstanding
territorialdisputes
with most of its
neighbors.It has
pursueda ruthless policy
toward the Buddhist people ofTibet, and it is
pursuingan
increasinglyruthless
policytoward
itsTurkic-Muslim minority. With the ColdWar over, the
underlying differences between
China and th? United States have reasserted
themselves in areas such as humanrights,
trade
and weapons proliferation. These differences
areunlikely
to moderate. A "new cold war," Deng Xaioping report
edly asserted in 1991, is under way between China and America.
The samephrase
has beenapplied
to the increasingly difficult rela
tions between Japan and the United States. Here cultural difference
exacerbates economic conflict. Peopleon each side allege racism on
the other, but at least on the American side the antipathiesare not
racial but cultural. The basic values, attitudes, behavioral patterns of
the two societies could hardly be more different. The economic issues
between the United States and Europeare no less serious than those
between the United States and Japan, but they do not have the same
politicalsalience and emotional
intensitybecause the differences
between American culture and Europeanculture are so much less
than those between American civilization and Japanese civilization.
The interactions between civilizations vary greatlyin the extent to
which theyare
likelyto be characterized by
violence. Economic com
petition clearly predominatesbetween the American and
European
subcivilizations of theWest and between both of them and Japan. On
the Eurasian continent, however, theproliferation
of ethnic conflict,
epitomized at the extreme in "ethnic cleansing," has not been totallyrandom. It has been most
frequentand most violent between groups
belongingto different civilizations. In Eurasia the great historic fault
[34] FOREIGN AFFAIRS Volumey2No.3
he crescent-shaped
Islamic bloc, from the
bulge of Africa to
central Asia, has
bloody borders.
This content downloaded from 132.248.9.8 on Fri, 24 May 2013 20:09:25 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/28/2019 Huntington Articulo Ingles
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/huntington-articulo-ingles 15/29
The Clash ofCivilizations?
lines between civilizations are once more aflame. This isparticularly
truealong
the boundaries of thecrescent-shaped Islamic bloc of
nations from thebulge
of Africa to central Asia. Violence also occurs
between Muslims, on the one hand, and Orthodox Serbs in the
Balkans, Jews in Israel, Hindus in India, Buddhists in Burma and
Catholics in the Philippines. Islam has bloody borders.
civilization rallying: the kin-country syndrome
Groups or statesbelonging
to one civilization that become in
volved inwar with people from a different civilization naturally try to
rally support from other members of their own civilization. As the
post-Cold War world evolves, civilizationcommonality, what H. D.
S.Greenway has termed the "kin-country" syndrome,
isreplacing
political ideology and traditional balance of power considerations as
theprincipal basis for cooperation and coalitions. It can be seen
grad
ually emerging in thepost-Cold War conflicts in the Persian Gulf,
the Caucasus and Bosnia. None of these was a full-scale war between
civilizations, but each involved some elements of civilizational rally
ing, which seemed to become moreimportant
as the conflict contin
ued and which may providea foretaste of the future.
First, in the Gulf War one Arab state invaded another and then
foughta coalition of Arab, Western and other states. While
onlya
few Muslim governments overtly supported Saddam Hussein, many
Arab elites privately cheered him on, and he washighly popular
among largesections of the Arab
publics.Islamic
fundamentalistmovements
universally supported Iraq rather than the Western
backed governments of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.Forswearing Arab
nationalism, Saddam Hussein explicitly invoked an Islamic appeal.He and his supporters attempted
to define the war as awar between
civilizations. "It is not the world against Iraq,"as Safar Al-Hawali,
dean of Islamic Studies at the Umm Al-Qura UniversityinMecca,
put it in awidely circulated tape. "It is theWest
against Islam."
Ignoring the rivalry between Iran and Iraq, the chief Iranian religious
leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, called for aholy
waragainst the
West: "Thestruggle against American aggression, greed, plans and
FOREIGN AFFAIRS -Summer 1993 [35]
This content downloaded from 132.248.9.8 on Fri, 24 May 2013 20:09:25 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/28/2019 Huntington Articulo Ingles
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/huntington-articulo-ingles 16/29
Samuel P.Huntington
policies will be counted as ajihad, and anybody who is killed on that
pathis a
martyr." "This is awar," King Hussein of Jordan argued,
"againstall Arabs and allMuslims and not
against Iraqalone."
The rallying of substantial sections of Arab elites and publicsbehind Saddam Hussein caused those Arab governments in the anti
Iraq coalition to moderate their activities and temper theirpublic
statements. Arab governments opposedor distanced themselves from
subsequent Western efforts toapply pressure on
Iraq, includingenforcement of a
no-flyzone in the summer of 1992 and the bomb
ing ofIraq
inJanuary 1993. The Western-Soviet-Turkish-Arab anti
Iraq coalition of 1990 had by 1993 become a coalition of almost onlytheWest and Kuwait against Iraq.
Muslims contrasted Western actionsagainst Iraq with theWest's
failure toprotect Bosnians against Serbs and to
impose sanctions on
Israel forviolating U.N. resolutions. The West, they alleged,
was
usinga double standard. A world of
clashing civilizations, however,
isinevitably
aworld of double standards: people applyone standard
to their kin-countries and a different standard to others.
Second, the kin-country syndrome also appeared in conflicts in
the former Soviet Union. Armenian militarysuccesses in 1992 and
1993 stimulated Turkeyto become increasingly supportive of its reli
gious, ethnic and linguistic brethren inAzerbaijan. "We have a
Turkish nationfeeling the same sentiments as the Azerbaijanis," said
one Turkish official in 1992. "We are under pressure. Our newspapersare full of the photos of atrocities and are
askingus ifwe are still seri
ous aboutpursuing
our neutralpolicy. Maybe
we should show
Armenia that there's abig Turkey
in the region." President TurgutOzal
agreed, remarking that Turkey should at least "scare the
Armenians a little bit." Turkey, Ozal threatened again in 1993, would
"show itsfangs." Turkish Air Force
jetsflew reconnaissance
flights
alongthe Armenian border; Turkey suspended
foodshipments
and
airflights
to Armenia; and Turkeyand Iran announced they would
notaccept dismemberment of Azerbaijan.
In the last years of its exis
tence, the Soviet government supported Azerbaijan because its government was dominated by former communists. With the end of the
Soviet Union, however, political considerations gave way toreligious
[36] FOREIGN AFFAIRS Volume7<2No.3
This content downloaded from 132.248.9.8 on Fri, 24 May 2013 20:09:25 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/28/2019 Huntington Articulo Ingles
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/huntington-articulo-ingles 17/29
The Clash ofCivilizations?
ones. Russian troops foughton the side of the Armenians, and
Azerbaijanaccused the "Russian government of turning 180
degrees"toward
supportfor Christian Armenia.
Third, with respect to the fighting in the former Yugoslavia,Western publics manifested sympathy and support for the Bosnian
Muslims and the horrors they suffered at the hands of the Serbs.
Relatively little concern wasexpressed, however, over Croatian
attacks on Muslims andparticipation
in the dismemberment of
Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the early stages of the Yugoslav breakup,
Germany, in an unusual display ofdiplomatic
initiative and muscle,
induced the other n members of the European Community to followits lead in
recognizing Slovenia and Croatia. As a result of the popes
determination toprovide strong backing
to the two Catholic coun
tries, the Vatican extended recognitioneven before the
Communitydid. The United States followed the European lead.Thus the lead
ingactors inWestern civilization rallied behind their
coreligionists.
SubsequentlyCroatia was
reportedto be
receiving substantial quan
tities of arms from Central European and other Western countries.
Boris Yeltsin sgovernment,
on the other hand, attemptedto pursue
a
middle course that would besympathetic
to the Orthodox Serbs but
not alienate Russia from theWest. Russian conservative and nation
alist groups, however, including many legislators, attacked the government for not
beingmore
forthcomingin its support for the Serbs.
By early 1993 several hundred Russiansapparently
wereserving with
the Serbian forces, and reports circulated of Russian armsbeing sup
pliedto Serbia.
Islamic governments and groups, on the other hand, castigated the
West for notcoming
to the defense of the Bosnians. Iranian leaders
urged Muslims from all countries toprovide help
to Bosnia; in viola
tion of the U.N. armsembargo, Iran
supplied weapons and men for
the Bosnians; Iranian-supported Lebanese groups sentguerrillas
to
train and organize the Bosnian forces. In 1993 up to 4,000 Muslims
from over two dozen Islamic countries werereported
to befighting
in Bosnia. The governments of Saudi Arabia and other countries feltunder
increasing pressure from fundamentalist groups in their own
societies toprovide
morevigorous support for the Bosnians. By the
FOREIGN AFFAIRS -Summer 1993 [37]
This content downloaded from 132.248.9.8 on Fri, 24 May 2013 20:09:25 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/28/2019 Huntington Articulo Ingles
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/huntington-articulo-ingles 18/29
Samuel PHuntington
end of 1992, SaudiArabia had reportedly supplied substantial fund
ing for weapons and supplies for the Bosnians, whichsignificantly
increased their military capabilities vis-?-vis the Serbs.In the 1930s the
Spanish Civil War provoked intervention from
countries thatpolitically
were fascist, communist and democratic. In
the 1990s the Yugoslav conflict isprovoking intervention from coun
tries that areMuslim, Orthodox andWestern Christian. The parallel has not gone unnoticed. "The war in
Bosnia-Herzegovina has
become the emotional equivalent of thefight against fascism in the
Spanish Civil War," one Saudi editor observed. "Those who died
there are regarded asmartyrs who tried to save their fellow Muslims."
Conflicts and violence will also occur between states and groupswithin the same civilization. Such conflicts, however, are
likelyto be
less intense and lesslikely
toexpand than conflicts between civiliza
tions. Commonmembership
in a civilization reduces theprobability
of violence in situations where itmight otherwise occur. In 1991 and
1992 many peoplewere alarmed by the
possibilityof violent conflict
between Russia and Ukraine over
territory, particularlyCrimea, the
Black Sea fleet, nuclear weapons and economic issues. If civilization
is what counts, however, the likelihood of violence between
Ukrainians and Russians should be low.They
are two Slavic, pri
marily Orthodox peoples who have had closerelationships with each
other for centuries. As of early 1993, despite all the reasons for
conflict, the leaders of the two countries wereeffectively negotiating
and defusing the issues between the two countries. While there has
been serious fighting between Muslims and Christians elsewhere inthe former Soviet Union and much tension and some
fightingbetween Western and Orthodox Christians in the Baltic states, there
has beenvirtually
no violence between Russians and Ukrainians.
Civilization rallying todate has been limited, but ithas been grow
ing, and itclearly has the
potentialto
spread much further. As the
conflicts in the Persian Gulf, the Caucasus and Bosnia continued, the
positions of nations and thecleavages between them
increasingly
were along civilizational lines. Populist politicians, religious leaders
and the media have found it apotent
means of arousingmass
support
and ofpressuring hesitant governments. In the coming years, the
[38] FOREIGN AFFAIRS- Volumey2No.3
This content downloaded from 132.248.9.8 on Fri, 24 May 2013 20:09:25 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/28/2019 Huntington Articulo Ingles
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/huntington-articulo-ingles 19/29
The Clash ofCivilizations?
local conflicts mostlikely
to escalate into majorwars will be those, as
in Bosnia and the Caucasus, along the fault lines between civiliza
tions. Thenext
world war, if thereis
one, will beawar
betweenciv
ilizations.
THE WEST VERSUS THE REST
The west is now at anextraordinary peak of power in relation
to other civilizations. Its superpower opponent hasdisappeared
from
the map. Military conflict among Western states is unthinkable, and
Western military power is unrivaled. Apart from Japan, the West
faces no economicchallenge.
It dominates internationalpolitical
and
security institutions and withJapan
international economic institu
tions. Global political and security issues areeffectively settled by
a
directorate of the United States, Britain and France, world econom
ic issuesby
a directorate of the United States, Germany andJapan,
all of which maintain extraordinarily close relations with each other
to the exclusion of lesser and
largely
non-Western countries.
Decisions made at the U.N. Security Council or in the International
MonetaryFund that reflect the interests of theWest are
presentedto
the world asreflecting
the desires of the world community. The very
phrase "the world community" has become the euphemistic collec
tive noun(replacing "the FreeWorld") to give global legitimacy to
actionsreflecting
the interests of the United States and other Western
powers.4 Through the imf and other international economic institu
tions, theWest promotes its economic interests and imposeson
othernations the economic
policiesit thinks appropriate. In any poll of
non-Western peoples, the imfundoubtedly would win the support
of finance ministers and a few others, but getan
overwhelminglyunfavorable rating from just about everyone else, who would agree
4Almost invariablyWestern leaders claim theyare
actingon behalf of "theworld com
munity." One minor lapse occurred during the run-up to the Gulf War. In an interview
on "GoodMorning America," Dec. 21,1990, British Prime Minister JohnMajor referredto the actions "theWest" was
taking against Saddam Hussein. He quickly corrected him
self and subsequendy referred to "theworld community." He was, however, rightwhen
he erred.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS -Summer1993 [39]
This content downloaded from 132.248.9.8 on Fri, 24 May 2013 20:09:25 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/28/2019 Huntington Articulo Ingles
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/huntington-articulo-ingles 20/29
Samuel P.Huntington
withGeorgy
Arbatovs characterization of imf officials as "neo
Bolsheviks who love expropriating otherpeople
smoney, imposing
undemocratic and alien rules of economic andpolitical
conduct and
stiflingeconomic freedom."
Western domination of the U.N. Security Council and its deci
sions, tempered only by occasional abstentionby China, produced
U.N. legitimationof the West s use of force to drive
Iraqout of
Kuwait and its elimination of Iraqs
sophisticated weapons and capac
The
very phrase
"world
community" has
become aeuphemism to
give legitimacy to the
actions of theWest.
ityto
produce such weapons. It alsoproduced
the quite unprecedentedaction by the United
States, Britain and France in getting the
Security Council to demand thatLibya hand
over the Pan Am 103 bombing suspects and
then toimpose
sanctions when Libya refused.
After defeating the largestArab army, the
West did not hesitate to throw itsweight
around in the Arab world. The West in effect
isusing international institutions, military power and economic
resources to run the world inways that will maintain Western pre
dominance, protect Western interests and promote Western political
and economic values.
That at least is the way in which non-Westerners see the new
world, and there is asignificant element of truth in their view.
Differences in power and struggles for military, economic and insti
tutional powerare thus one source of conflict between theWest and
other civilizations. Differences inculture,
that is basic values and
beliefs, are a second source of conflict. V. S.Naipaul
has argued that
Western civilization is the "universal civilization" that "fits all men."
At asuperficial
level much ofWestern culture has indeedpermeated
the rest of the world. At a more basic level, however, Western con
cepts differ fundamentallyfrom those
prevalentin other civilizations.
Western ideas of individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human
rights, equality, liberty,the rule of law, democracy,
free markets, the
separation of church and state, often have little resonance in Islamic,
Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, Buddhist or Orthodox cultures.
Western efforts topropagate such ideas produce instead a reaction
[40]FOREIGN AFFAIRS Volumej2No.3
This content downloaded from 132.248.9.8 on Fri, 24 May 2013 20:09:25 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/28/2019 Huntington Articulo Ingles
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/huntington-articulo-ingles 21/29
The Clash ofCivilizations?
against"human rights imperialism"
and a reaffirmation ofindigenous
values, as can be seen in the support forreligious fundamentalism by
theyounger generation
in non-Western cultures. Thevery
notion
that there could be a "universal civilization" is aWestern idea, direct
lyat odds with the particularism
of most Asian societies and their
emphasison what
distinguishesone
peoplefrom another. Indeed, the
author of a review of ioocomparative studies of values in different
societies concluded that "the values that are mostimportant
in the
West are least important worldwide."5 In thepolitical realm, of
course, these differences are most manifest in the efforts of the
United States and other Western powers to induce other peoples to
adoptWestern ideas concerning democracy and human
rights.
Modern democratic government originatedin theWest. When it has
developedin non-Western societies it has usually been the
productof
Western colonialism orimposition.
The central axis of world politics in the future is likely to be, in
Kishore Mahbubani sphrase,
the conflict between "theWest and the
Rest" and the responses of non-Western civilizations toWestern
power and values.6 Those responses generally take one or a combina
tion of three forms. At one extreme, non-Western states can, like
Burma and North Korea, attempt to pursuea course of isolation, to
insulate their societies frompenetration
or"corruption" by
theWest,
and, in effect, to opt out ofparticipation
in theWestern-dominated
global community. The costs of this course, however, arehigh, and
few states have pursued it exclusively. A second alternative, the equiv
alent of "band-wagoning" in international relations theory, isto
attempt tojoin theWest and accept its values and institutions. The
third alternative is to attempt to "balance" theWest by developingeconomic and military power and
cooperatingwith other non
Western societies against theWest, while preserving indigenous val
ues and institutions; in short, to modernize but not toWesternize.
5HanyC. Triandis, The New York Times, Dec. 25,1990, p. 41, and "Cross-Cultural
Studies of Individualism and Collectivism," Nebraska Symposium onMotivation, vol.
37>?989, PP- 41-133
6KishoreMahbubani, "TheWest and the Rest," TheNational Interest, Summer 1992,
PP- 3-*3
FOREIGN AFFAIRS -Summer1993 [41]
This content downloaded from 132.248.9.8 on Fri, 24 May 2013 20:09:25 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/28/2019 Huntington Articulo Ingles
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/huntington-articulo-ingles 22/29
Samuel P.Huntington
THE TORN COUNTRIES
Inthe
future,as
people differentiate themselves by civilization,countries with large numbers of peoples of different civilizations,
such as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia,are candidates for dismem
berment. Some other countries have a fairdegree of cultural homo
geneity but are divided over whether theirsociety belongs
to one
civilization or another. These are torn countries. Their leaders typi
callywish to pursue
abandwagoning strategy and tomake their coun
tries members of theWest, but the history, culture and traditions of
their countries are non-Western. The most obvious and prototypicaltorn country is
Turkey. The late twentieth-century leaders ofTurkey
have followed in the Attat?rk tradition and defined Turkeyas amod
ern, secular,Western nation state.They allied Turkey with theWest
in nato and in the Gulf War; they applied formembership in the
European Community.At the same time, however, elements in
Turkish society havesupported
an Islamic revival and have argued
thatTurkey
is
basically
aMiddle Eastern Muslimsociety.
In addi
tion, while the elite of Turkey has defined Turkeyas aWestern soci
ety, the elite of theWest refuses to accept Turkeyas such.
Turkeywill
not become amember of the European Community, and the real rea
son, as President Ozal said, "is that we are Muslim and theyare
Christian and theydont say that." Having rejected Mecca, and then
being rejected by Brussels, where does Turkey look? Tashkent may be
the answer. The end of the Soviet Union gives Turkey the opportu
nity to become the leader of a revived Turkic civilization involvingseven countries from the borders of Greece to those of China.
Encouraged by theWest, Turkeyis
makingstrenuous efforts to carve
out this newidentity for itself.
During the past decade Mexico has assumed aposition somewhat
similar to that of Turkey. Just asTurkey abandoned its historic oppo
sition toEurope
andattempted
tojoin Europe,
Mexico hasstopped
defining itself by its opposition to the United States and is instead
attempting to imitate the United States and to join it in the NorthAmerican Free Trade Area. Mexican leaders are
engagedin the great
task of redefining Mexican identity and have introduced fiindamen
[42] FOREIGN AFFAIRS Volume72N0.3
This content downloaded from 132.248.9.8 on Fri, 24 May 2013 20:09:25 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/28/2019 Huntington Articulo Ingles
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/huntington-articulo-ingles 23/29
The Clash ofCivilizations?
tal economic reforms that eventually will lead to fundamental politi
cal change.In 1991 a
top adviser to President Carlos Salinas de
Gortari describedat
lengthtome all the
changesthe Salinas
government was
making. When he finished, I remarked: "That's most
impressive. It seems to me that basically you want tochange Mexico
from a Latin American country into aNorth American country." He
looked at me with surpriseand exclaimed: "Exactly! That's precisely
what we aretrying
to do, but of course we could never say sopub
licly."As his remark indicates, inMexico as inTurkey, significant
ele
ments in society resist the redefinition of their country's identity. In
Turkey, European-oriented leaders have to make gestures to Islam
(Ozal spilgrimage
toMecca); so alsoMexico's North American-ori
ented leaders have to make gesturesto those who hold Mexico to be
a Latin American country (Salinas' Ibero-American Guadalajara
summit).
Historically Turkey has been the mostprofoundly
torn country.
For the United States, Mexico is the most immediate torn country.
Globally the mostimportant
torn country isRussia. The questionof
whether Russia is part of theWest or the leader of a distinct Slavic
Orthodox civilization has been arecurring
one in Russian history.
That issue was obscured by the communist victory in Russia, which
importedaWestern
ideology, adaptedit to Russian conditions and
then challenged theWest in the name of that ideology.The domi
nance of communism shut off the historic debate over
Westernization versus Russification. With communism discredited
Russiansonce
again face that question.President Yeltsin is
adopting Western principles and goals and
seekingto make Russia a "normal" country and a
part of theWest.
Yet both the Russian elite and the Russian public aredivided on this
issue.Among the more moderate dissenters, Sergei Stankevich
argues that Russia should rejectthe "Atlanticist" course, which would
lead it "to becomeEuropean,
to become apart of the world economy
inrapid
andorganized fashion, to become the
eighthmember of the
Seven, and to put particular emphasis on Germany and the United
States as the two dominant members of the Atlantic alliance." While
also rejectingan
exclusively Eurasian policy, Stankevich nonetheless
FOREIGN AFFAIRS -Summer 1993 [43]
This content downloaded from 132.248.9.8 on Fri, 24 May 2013 20:09:25 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/28/2019 Huntington Articulo Ingles
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/huntington-articulo-ingles 24/29
Samuel PHuntington
argues that Russia should give priorityto the protection of Russians
in other countries, emphasize its Turkic and Muslim connections,
andpromote
"anappreciable
redistribution of ourresources,
our
options,our ties, and our interests in favor of Asia, of the eastern
direction." People of this persuasion criticize Yeltsin for subordinat
ing Russia's interests to those of theWest, for reducing Russian mil
itary strength, for failingto
support traditional friends such as Serbia,
and forpushing
economic andpolitical
reform inways injuriousto
the Russianpeople.
Indicative of this trend is the newpopularity
of
the ideas of Petr Savitsky, who in the 1920s argued that Russia was a
unique Eurasian civilization.7 More extreme dissidents voice muchmore
blatantly nationalist, anti-Western and anti-Semitic views, and
urge Russia toredevelop
its military strength and to establish closer
ties with China and Muslim countries. The people of Russia are as
divided as the elite. An opinion survey inEuropean Russia in the
spring of 1992 revealed that 40 percent of the public had positiveatti
tudes toward theWest and 36 percent had negative attitudes. As it
has been for much of its history, Russia in the early 1990s istruly
a
torncountry.
To redefine its civilization identity,a torn country must meet three
requirements. First, itspolitical
and economic elite has to be gener
ally supportive of and enthusiastic about this move. Second, its public has to be willing
toacquiesce
in the redefinition. Third, the
dominant groups in the recipient civilization have to bewilling
to
embrace the convert. All three requirementsin
large part exist with
respecttoMexico. The first two in
large partexist with
respectto
Turkey.It is not clear that any of them exist with respect
to Russia's
joining the West. The conflict between liberaldemocracy
and
Marxism-Leninism was between ideologies which, despitetheir
major differences, ostensiblyshared ultimate goals
of freedom, equal
ity and prosperity.A traditional, authoritarian, nationalist Russia
could have quite different goals. A Western democrat could carry on
an intellectual debate with a Soviet Marxist. It would be virtually
7Sergei Stankevich, "Russia in Search of Itself," TheNational Interest, Summer 1992,
pp. 47-51;Daniel Schneider, "A Russian Movement Rejects Western Tilt," Christian
Science Monitor, Feb. 5,1993, pp. 5-7.
[44]FOREIGN AFFAIRS -
Volume72N0.3
This content downloaded from 132.248.9.8 on Fri, 24 May 2013 20:09:25 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/28/2019 Huntington Articulo Ingles
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/huntington-articulo-ingles 25/29
The Clash ofCivilizations?
impossible for him to do that with a Russian traditionalist. If, as the
Russians stop behaving likeMarxists, they reject liberal democracyand
begin behavinglike Russians but not like
Westerners,the rela
tions between Russia and theWest could again become distant and
conflictual.8
THE CONFUCIAN-ISLAMIC CONNECTION
The obstacles to non-Western countries joining theWest vary
considerably. Theyare least for Latin American and East
European
countries. They are greater for the Orthodox countries of the formerSoviet Union.
Theyare still greater forMuslim, Confucian, Hindu
and Buddhist societies.Japan
has established aunique position for
itself as an associate member of theWest: it is in theWest in some
respects but clearlynot of theWest in
important dimensions. Those
countries that for reason of culture and power do not wish to, or can
not, join theWest compete with theWest by developing their own
economic, military and political power. They do this by promotingtheir internal
developmentand by cooperating with other non
Western countries. The mostprominent form of this cooperation is
the Confucian-Islamic connection that hasemerged
tochallenge
Western interests, values and power.
Almost withoutexception, Western countries are
reducingtheir
military power; under Yeltsin'sleadership
so also is Russia. China,
North Korea and several Middle Eastern states, however, are
significantly expandingtheir
military capabilities. Theyare
doingthis by the import of arms from Western and non-Western sources
and by thedevelopment of indigenous
arms industries. One result is
the emergence of what Charles Krauthammer has called"Weapon
8Owen Harries has pointedout that Australia is trying (unwisely in his view) to
become a torn country in reverse.Although it has been a fullmember not
only of the
West but also of theABC A military and intelligencecore of theWest, its current lead
ers are in effect proposing that it defect from theWest, redefine itself as anAsian coun
try and cultivate close tieswith its neighbors. Australia's future, they argue, iswith the
dynamiceconomies of East Asia. But, as I have
suggested,close economic
cooperation
normally requiresa common cultural base. In addition, none of the three conditions nec
essary for a torn country to join another civilization is likely to exist inAustralia's case.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS Summer 1993 [45]
This content downloaded from 132.248.9.8 on Fri, 24 May 2013 20:09:25 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/28/2019 Huntington Articulo Ingles
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/huntington-articulo-ingles 26/29
Samuel P.Huntington
States," and theWeapon States are not Western states. Another
result is the redefinition of arms control, which is aWestern concept
andaWestern goal. During
the Cold War theprimary purpose of
arms control was to establish a stablemilitary balance between the
United States and its allies and the Soviet Union and its allies. In the
post-Cold War world the primary objective of arms control is to pre
vent the development by non-Western societies of military capabilities that could threaten Western interests. The West attempts
to do
this through international agreements, economic pressure and con
trols on the transfer of arms and weapons technologies.
The conflict between theWest and the Confucian-Islamic states
focuses largely, althoughnot
exclusively,on nuclear, chemical and
biological weapons, ballistic missiles and other sophisticatedmeans
for delivering them, and the guidance, intelligence and other elec
troniccapabilities
forachieving
that goal. The West promotesnon
proliferation as a universal norm and nonproliferation treaties and
inspectionsas means of realizing that norm. It
also threatens avariety of sanctions
againstthose who promote thespread
ofsophisticated
weapons and proposessome benefits for those
who do not. The attention of theWest focus
es, naturally,on nations that are
actuallyor
potentially hostile to theWest.
The non-Western nations, on the other
hand, assert their right to acquire and to deploy
whatever weapons they think necessary for their security. They alsohave absorbed, to the full, the truth of the response of the Indian
defense minister when asked what lesson he learned from the Gulf
War: "Don't fight the United States unless you have nuclear
weapons." Nuclear weapons, chemical weapons and missiles are
viewed, probably erroneously,as the
potential equalizerof superior
Western conventional power. China, of course, alreadyhas nuclear
weapons; Pakistan and India have thecapability
todeploy them.
North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya and Algeria appear to be attemptingto
acquire them. A top Iranian official has declared that allMuslim
states should acquire nuclear weapons, and in 1988 thepresident
of
[46]FOREIGN AFFAIRS Volume72No.3
A Confucian-Islamicconnection has
emerged to challenge
estern interests,
values and power.
This content downloaded from 132.248.9.8 on Fri, 24 May 2013 20:09:25 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/28/2019 Huntington Articulo Ingles
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/huntington-articulo-ingles 27/29
The Clash ofCivilizations?
Iran reportedly issued a directive calling fordevelopment
of "offen
sive and defensive chemical, biological and radiological weapons."
Centrally importantto the
developmentof counter-West
militarycapabilities
is the sustained expansion of Chinas military power and
its means to createmilitary power. Buoyed by spectacular
economic
development, China israpidly increasing
its military spending and
vigorously moving forward with the modernization of its armed
forces. It ispurchasing weapons from the former Soviet states; it is
developing long-range missiles; in 1992 it tested aone-megaton
nuclear device. It isdeveloping power-projection capabilities, acquir
ing aerial refueling technology, and trying to purchase an aircraft car
rier. Itsmilitary buildup
and assertion of sovereigntyover the South
China Sea areprovoking
a multilateral regionalarms race in East
Asia. China is also amajor exporter of arms and weapons technolo
gy. It hasexported
materials toLibya and
Iraqthat could be used to
manufacture nuclear weapons and nerve gas. It has helped Algeriabuild a reactor suitable for nuclear weapons research and production.China has sold to Iran nuclear
technologythat American officials
believe could only be used to create weapons andapparently has
shipped components of300-mile-range
missiles to Pakistan. North
Korea has had a nuclear weapons program under way for some while
and has sold advanced missiles and missile technologyto
Syria and
Iran. The flow of weapons and weapons technologyis
generally from
East Asia to theMiddle East. There is, however, some movement in
the reverse direction; China has received Stinger missiles from
Pakistan.
A Confucian-Islamic military connection has thus come into
being, designedto
promote acquisition by its members of the
weapons and weapons technologies needed to counter the military
power of theWest. Itmay or may not last. At present, however, it is,
asDaveMcCurdy has said, "a renegades'
mutual support pact,run
bythe
proliferatorsand their backers." A new form of arms
competitionis thus
occurring between Islamic-Confucian states and theWest. In
an old-fashioned arms race, each side developed its own arms to balance or to achieve superiority against the other side. In this new form
of armscompetition,
one side isdeveloping
its arms and the other
FOREIGN AFFAIRS -Summer 1993 [47]
This content downloaded from 132.248.9.8 on Fri, 24 May 2013 20:09:25 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/28/2019 Huntington Articulo Ingles
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/huntington-articulo-ingles 28/29
Samuel PHuntington
side isattempting
not to balance but to limit and prevent that arms
build-upwhile at the same time
reducing its ownmilitary capabili
ties.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WEST
This article does not argue that civilization identities will
replace all other identities, that nation states will disappear, that each
civilization will become asingle coherent political entity, that groups
within a civilization will not conflict with and evenfight each other.
This paper does set forth the hypotheses that differences between civ
ilizations are real and important; civilization-consciousness is
increasing; conflict between civilizations willsupplant ideological
and other forms of conflict as the dominant globalform of conflict;
international relations, historicallya game played
out within Western
civilization, will increasingly be de-Westernized and become agame
inwhich non-Western civilizations are actors and notsimply objects;
successful political, security and economic international institutions
are morelikely
todevelop
within civilizations than across civiliza
tions; conflicts between groups in different civilizations will be more
frequent,more sustained and more violent than conflicts between
groups in the same civilization; violent conflicts between groups in
different civilizations are the mostlikely and most
dangeroussource
of escalation that could lead toglobal wars; the paramount axis of
world politicswill be the relations between "theWest and the Rest";
the elites in some torn non-Western countries willtry
to make their
countries part of theWest, but inmost cases face major obstacles to
accomplishing this; a central focus of conflict for the immediate
future will be between theWest and several Islamic-Confucian states.
This is not to advocate the desirability of conflicts between civi
lizations. It is to set forth descriptive hypothesesas towhat the future
maybe like. If these areplausible hypotheses, however, it is necessary
to consider theirimplications
forWestern policy.These implications
should be divided between short-term advantage and long-termaccommodation. In the short term it is
clearlyin the interest of the
West topromote greater cooperation and unity within its own civi
us] FOREIGN AFFAIRS- Volume72No.3
This content downloaded from 132.248.9.8 on Fri, 24 May 2013 20:09:25 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/28/2019 Huntington Articulo Ingles
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/huntington-articulo-ingles 29/29
The Clash ofCivilizations?
lization, particularly between itsEuropean and North American
components; toincorporate into the West societies in Eastern
Europeand Latin America whose cultures are close to those of the
West; to promote and maintain cooperative relations with Russia and
Japan;to prevent escalation of local inter-civilization conflicts into
major inter-civilization wars; to limit theexpansion of the
military
strengthof Confucian and Islamic states; to moderate the reduction
ofWesternmilitary capabilities
and maintain military superiority in
East and Southwest Asia; toexploit differences and conflicts among
Confucian and Islamic states; tosupport in other civilizations groups
sympathetic toWestern values and interests; to strengthen international institutions that reflect and legitimate Western interests and
values and topromote the involvement of non-Western states in
those institutions.
In thelonger
term other measures would be called for.Western
civilization is both Western and modern. Non-Western civilizations
haveattempted
to become modern withoutbecoming Western. To
date only Japan has fully succeeded in this quest. Non-Western civi
lizations will continue toattempt
toacquire the wealth, technology,
skills, machines and weapons that arepart of
being modern. Theywill also attempt to reconcile this
modernitywith their traditional
culture and values. Their economic andmilitary strength relative to
theWest will increase. Hence theWest willincreasingly have to
accommodate these non-Western modern civilizations whose power
approaches that of the West but whose values and interests differ
significantly from those of theWest. This will require theWest tomaintain the economic and military power necessary to protect its
interests in relation to these civilizations. Itwill also, however, requiretheWest to
developamore
profound understanding of the basic reli
gious andphilosophical assumptions underlying
other civilizations
and the ways inwhichpeople in those civilizations see their interests.
It willrequire
an effort toidentify elements of
commonality between
Western and other civilizations. For the relevant future, there will be
no universal civilization, but instead aworld of different civilizations,
each ofwhich will have to learn to coexistwith the others. ?
FOREIGN AFFAIRS Summer 1993 [49]