WORKING PAPER

Submitted for:

The ASEAN International Relations Student

Conference (AIRSC)

held by Budi Luhur University

Jakarta, October, 26-30, 2008

Human Security in the New ASEAN:

Securitization of Agenda

and Norm Internalization

ANGGALIA PUTRI PERMATASARI

Department of International Relations

Padjadjaran University

Bandung-Indonesia

October 2008

Abstract

The end of 2007 saw a critical point in the history of ASEAN. The signing of ASEAN Charter marked a point of departure in a way that it drives ASEAN to be a more rules-based organization focused more on the people. The people-centrism is a goal that coincides with increasing demand of paradigm shift in ASEAN’s conception of security. The state-centric nature of ASEAN’s security conception coupled by the perpetuation of non-interference norm was largely criticized on the ground that it allows ASEAN members to turn blind eye on gross human rights violations and political repression, to name a few, taking place the region. It is also seen as inadequate to address new security threats that besiege the most vulnerable groups in the region.

Human security is found among the new approaches to security seeking to move the focus away from national security to security of individuals. Although the concept itself is largely criticized, human security issues have gained more prominence in the region, thanks to civil-society organizations’ efforts in consistently pushing them into the organization’s agenda. Although still in the search of the best formula to balance state and human security, ASEAN has shown progress, however slow, in recognizing the need to move beyond its ‘old-faithful,’ albeit comprehensive, conception of security.

The main task of this paper is to examine the way through which human security agenda is finding a place in the regional security discourse by using securitization approach. Furthermore, it wishes to examine the state of human security in ASEAN’s security discourse in terms of norm internalization and the potential changes that may take place if the organization finally adheres to such norm. The first task is carried out by addressing the speech acts taking place in the discourse of ASEAN Regional Forum. The second task is handled by addressing the role of civil-society organizations in promoting human security in terms of norm internalization and the way ASEAN responds to it. Finally, the latest task is handled by using insights from normative institutionalism theory.

This paper contends that human security agenda has made its way to enter the regional security discourse, albeit not explicitly framed in human security terms. This means that securitization of human security agenda has been taking place, although not all the issues in the agenda get securitized. However, as a norm, human security continues to be denied internalization despite its success in reaching the norm cascade stage. Formal acceptance of and adherence to the norm is impeded by the ambivalence of member states trying to uphold the old established norms in order to preserve their own interests or avoid risking the organization’s cohesion and acting capacity. Following the inclusion of human security agenda in the regional security discourse, there are implications on the regional governance while the norm internalization, if eventually takes place, may result in change in member states’ behaviour. Regarding the Charter , the spirit of people-centrism has not been followed by ASEAN’s willingness to internalize human-centric norms while human-centric agenda continues to find its way in its security discourse.

Key words: securitization, human security, norm internalization, communicative action, speech act, security discourse

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Human Security in the New ASEAN:Securitization of Agenda and Norm Internalization

Anggalia Putri PermatasariStudent of Department of International Relations

Padjadjaran University

Introduction

Since November, 20, 2007, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has

retained the privilege of having a constitution, marked by the signing of the ASEAN

Charter on the 13th ASEAN Summit held in Singapore. It was historic in a sense that

ASEAN finally braced itself to adhere to one prime legally-binding agreement that gives it

a distinctive legal personality. The content and spirit of the Charter is no less remarkable,

especially in the light of strong criticisms spurted at the organization concerning its

efficacy in tackling new challenges emerging in the post-Cold War era. One crucial angle

of the criticisms points at ASEAN’s lack of political will and mechanism in dealing with

member states involved in human rights violation, especially in the wake of Myanmar ‘s

violent way of handling protesters in the country not so long ago. Even before that, most of

ASEAN member states were given bad credits for their human rights record.1 Although

one cannot argue that human rights concerns are the prime factors that pushed ASEAN

member states to craft the Charter in the way they did, it is hard to deny that it was

partially aimed to answer the critics conveying doubts on ASEAN’s efficacy and even

relevance.

One of the criticisms that the Charter might want to answer (although not

necessarily silence) is the statements made by various elements of international society,

especially civil-society organizations (CSOs) that ASEAN had ignored the people’s point

of view in its build-up and had been an elitist organization focusing mainly and solely on

nation-state’s or regime’s well-being at the expense of the people’s. In other words,

ASEAN has been criticized as being overly state-centric in its doctrines and mechanisms

of various sectors (notably in the sectors of politics, economy, and security), a condition

that might have served the organization well during the Cold War era but that is now seen

as obsolete, even dangerous. ASEAN’s state-centrism in security sector is striking because

it is inextricably linked to the fundamental norm that have been upholding the

1 For this notion, one can consult human right watch at http://www.humanrightswatch.com

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organization’s existence and guarding its cohesion for more than four decades, being the

norm of non-interference.

ASEAN’s approach to security was built upon principles born amid the Cold War

predicament. The notion of regional security could not be separated from and was in fact a

function of national or domestic security and stability. The region’s pursuit of domestic

and regional stability through economic development put the state as the dominant actor

and main referent object of security. Interstate relation within the region was given the

utmost consideration due its direct impact on regional stability. Therefore, national security

was seen primarily as a guarantor of regional security while state was seen as the provider

of security for its people. Following the logic, it was natural to assume that security of the

people in each member state was automatically secured when security of the state was

intact.

Nevertheless, the 1997 financial crisis that left the region shambling opened the

door to a possible rethinking of the regional security discourse. The fact that member states

of ASEAN were incapacitated to protect their people from economic disruptions, as a

function of their failure in saving the national economies, gave way to voices demanding a

shift of security focus from the state to the individuals. Adding to significance, voices

demanding ASEAN to change its way of ‘handling the business’ finally made their way to

be heard and seriously dealt with. Melly Caballero-Anthony in fact has marked the 1997

financial crisis as one tipping point where human security found the road smoother.2

However, she mentioned another tipping point that countermanded it, namely the 9/11

World Trade Organization terrorist attack which she claimed has turned regional security

discourse back to its state-centric nature.3

Human security has travelled a quite long journey since 1994 when United Nations

Development Programme (UNDP) first engaged in promoting the concept through its

annually-published Human Development Report, therefore formally popularized it.

However, ASEAN’s treatment of the paradigm continues to be in question, disregarding

the positive developments made by the organization in institutional terms. This paper

therefore seeks to examine the ways in which human security, divided for analytical

purpose into human security as an agenda and human security as a norm, is finding a place

in the regional security discourse and practice. It also whishes to inquire human security in

2 Melly Caballero-Anthony, “Revisioning Human Security in Southeast Asia,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 28 No 3 (2004), pp. 155-189.3 Ibid..

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terms of norm internalization and address the potential change following human security

inclusion in the regional security discourse. Concerning the first task, analysis will be

carried out by borrowing analytical power of securitization approach, with some caveats

that will be addressed later. The second task will be dealt with using the lens of normative

institutionalism focusing on norms’ life-cycle. The method used in the inquiry is mainly in

the form of document analysis, including analysis of formal documents (such as the

Charter), statements of ASEAN and ASEAN Regional Forum, speeches, remarks, and

statements made by ASEAN and domestic leaders.

For purposes of structure, the paper will be divided into five parts, beginning with

introduction, theoretical and conceptual framework consisting of human security,

securitization approach, and normative institutionalism, analysis comprising four sections:

(1) ASEAN’s approach to security, (2) the securitization of human security agenda (3)

human security in terms of norm internalization, and 4) the potential change, ending with

conclusion.

Theoretical and Conceptual Framework

Human Security

One can never bee too cautious in dealing with the concept of human security. Despite

its great appeal, the concept has been criticized as being too slippery, ambiguous, and

distracting the focus of security studies and analysis. Roland Paris once argued that:

“Human security is like sustainable development-everyone is for it, but few people have idea what it means. Existing definitions of human security tend to be extraordinarily expansive and vague...which provides policymakers with little guidance in the prioritization of competing policy goals and academic little sense of what, exactly, is being studied.4

However, human security paradigm continues to evolve in the study and practice of

security and has informed many policymaking agendas of governments and international

organizations. For example, human security has been a vocal point in Japan’s, Canada’s,

Norway’s, and Thailand’s foreign policy, despite different emphasis each country makes.5

The popularity of this concept is propelled by at least two factors, the first being the

emergence of the so called ‘new threats’ to security transcending the national barriers, e.g.

4 Roland Paris, “Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air,” International Security, Vol. 26 No. 2 (2001), pp. 87-102, quoted in Melly Caballero-Anthony, “Revisioning Human Security in Southeast Asia,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 28 No 3 (2004), pp. 155-189, see also http://www.humansecuritygateway.com . 5See for example Thailand’s Annual Security Outlook, Canada’s Foreign Policy Directions, and Japan Development Assistance.

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terrorist attacks, contagious diseases, organized transnational crimes, and ecological

dangers like climate change, global warming, ozone and natural resources depletion and

the rising incidence of civil wars and intra-state conflicts. The second factor is the

increased opportunity to tackle those new challenges through various institutional

mechanisms.6 In other words, amid the new threats besieging humans’ lives, why missing

opportunities and wasting potentials to act?

According to Amitav Acharya, human security “represents a powerful but

controversial attempts by sections of the academic and policy community to redefine and

broaden the meaning of security.”7 As many writers argue, the nature of security

conception and practice have changed a lot since the Cold War era.8 Traditionally, security

meant protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states from external military

threats, which was the essence of national security concept dominating security analysis

and policymaking during the Cold War period. 9

Since then, security studies have been expanded to include for example economic

and environmental concerns (in the 70s and 80s), but the main referent object of security

remained the state.10 However, immediately after the Cold War, there were attempts to roll

back the realm of security studies, as shown by Stephen Walt’s remark in 1991, “Security

studies should focus on threat, use, and control of military force,”11 although the urge

received little support.

The concept of human security challenges the state-centric notion of security by

focusing on the individual as the main referent object of security, therefore speaking of

security for the people, rather than of states or governments (regimes).12 Referring to the

concept of human security as contained in the 1994 Human Development Report, the scope

of human security includes seven areas:13

6 Sabina Alkire, "A Conceptual Framework for Human Security,” Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security, and Ethnicity (CRISE), Working Paper 2, London: University of Oxford, 2003,7 Amitav Acharya, “Human Security” in John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens (eds.), The Globalization of World Politics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), h. 492.8 For convincing arguments, consult for example John Baylis, “International and Global Security” in Ibid. and Anthony Burke, “What Security Makes Possible: Some Thoughts on Critical Security Studies,” (Canberra: Department of International Relations of Australian National University, 2007).9 Loc cit., h. 492.10 Ibid..11 Stephen Walt, “The Renaissance of Security Studies,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol 35 No.2 (1991), pp.211-39, quoted in Anthony Burke, “What Security Makes Possible: Some Thoughts on Critical Security Studies,” (Canberra: Department of International Relations of Australian National University, 2007).12 Op cit..13 UNDP, Human Development Report 1994, quoted from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_security

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Economic security — Economic security requires an assured basic income for

individuals, usually from productive and remunerative work or, as a last resort,

from a publicly financed safety net. Unemployment problems constitute an

important factor underlying political tensions and ethnic violence.

Food security — Food security requires that all people at all times have both

physical and economic access to basic food.

Health security — Health security aims to guarantee a minimum protection from

diseases and unhealthy lifestyles.

Environmental security — Environmental security aims to protect people from the

short- and long-term ravages of nature, man-made threats in nature, and

deterioration of the natural environment.

Personal security — Personal security aims to protect people from physical

violence, whether from the state or external states, from violent individuals and

sub-state actors, from domestic abuse, or from predatory adults.

Community security — Community security aims to protect people from the loss of

traditional relationships and values and from sectarian and ethnic violence.

Political security — Political security is concerned with whether people live in a

society that honors their basic human rights. According to a survey conducted by

Amnesty International, political repression, systematic torture, ill treatment or

disappearance was still practiced in 110 countries. Human rights violations are

most frequent during periods of political unrest. Along with repressing individuals

and groups, governments may try to exercise control over ideas and information.

Always having been a contested concept, there are many definitions of human

security, among them are the following:

“Human security can be said to have two main aspects. It means, first, safety from chronic threats as hunger, diseases, and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life-whether in homes, jobs, or in communities. Such threats can exist at all levels of national income and development.” (UNDP 1994)

“The concept of human security had better be confined to freedom from fear of man-made physical violence, also referred to as direct, personal violence...” (Sverre Lodgaard 2000)

“Human security may be defined as the preservation and protection of the life and dignity of human beings...human security can be ensured when the individual is confident of a life free of fear and free of want.” (Japanese Foreign Ministry Official 2002)

“Human security...must encompass economic development, social justice, environmental protection, democratization, disarmaments, and respect for human rights and the rule of law...” (Kofi Annan 2001)

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“The objective of human security is to safeguard the ‘vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment’”.” (UN Commission on Human Security 2003)

“Human security describes ‘a condition of existence’ which entails basic material needs, human dignity, including meaningful participation in the life of the community, and an active and substantive notion of democracy from the local to the global.” (Caroline Thomas 2000)14

The above definitions illustrate debates concerning human security. While the

UNDP 1994 report originally argued that human security requires attention to both

freedom from fear and freedom from want, divisions have gradually emerged over the

proper scope of that protection (e.g. over what threats individuals should be protected

from) and over the appropriate mechanisms for responding to these threats. Thus, two

camps of human security emerged:

Freedom from Fear — This school seeks to limit the practice of human security to

protecting individuals from violent conflicts while recognizing that these violent

threats are strongly associated with poverty, lack of state capacity and other forms

of inequities.15

Freedom from Want — The school advocates a holistic approach in achieving

human security and argues that the threat agenda should be broadened to include

hunger, disease and natural disasters because they are inseparable concepts in

addressing the root of human insecurity.16

The ambiguity of the term renders us with the need to be cautious in applying the

concept of human security in any inquiry. However, as David Bosold argued, human

security may not be a theoretically-informed, analytically-grounded policy approach, but

rather a political praxis that is constructed and reconstructed on the basis of daily

negotiation and personal encounters at the national and the global level, therefore requiring

us to use a more detailed analysis of language, discourse, and the underlying speech acts.17

As Buzan et al. (1998: 24) put it:

“the meaning of a concept lies in its usage and is not something we can define analytically or philosophically according to what would be ‘best’. The meaning lies not in what people

14 Caroline Thomas,.”Global Governance, Development and Human Security The Challenge of Poverty and Inequality,”.( London and Sterling: VA: Pluto Press, 2000). quoted from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_security15 Human Security Centre. “What is Human Security.,” http://www.humansecurityreport.info/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=24&itemid=5916 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 199417 David Bosold, “(Re-)Constructing Canada’s Human Security Agenda,” retrieved from http://www.staff.uni-marburg.de/~bosold/pdf/Reconstructing_HumanSecurity_Oslo.pdf

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consciously think the concept means but in how they implicitly use it in some ways and not others.”

Mindful of that, this paper adopts the broader conception of human security, also

known as the ‘freedom from want’ school. Furthermore, for analytical purposes, this paper

divides human security into two analytical categories. The first is human security as an

agenda, which means that when we talk about human security, we talk about a list of items

or issues pertaining to human security, such as concerns about human rights, political

repression, diseases, civil wars, extreme poverty, political participation, environmental

degradation, etc. The second is human security as a norm, meaning that the concept will

be treated as a socially-enforced set of rules constraining actions of actors.

Securitization

One of the most prominent new perspectives toward security is the so called

Copenhagen School. The school, pioneered by the work of Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver, and

Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (1998), has succeeded in

providing an alternative to the mainstream security conception in a way that it broadened

the terrain of security studies as to include at least five sectors of security (see Buzan,

People, States, and Fear), stressing the need to embrace societal security, and provided the

study with an analytical tool to examine how an issue is brought into security realm.

Securitization theory, developed by the Copenhagen School, is part of explorations

of the role of argument, action, and ethics. The Copenhagen School treats security as the

outcome of specific social process in which issues become treated as security issues

through speech acts. Speech acts do not simply convey information about existing security

situations, but they are acts of themselves: saying something is doing something.

Consequently, the actor moves an issue into a specific sphere by uttering 'security'. By

understanding security as a speech act, securitization is located with the realm of political

argument and discursive legitimation. Treating security as a speech act allows a significant

broadening of security agenda beyond the state and military security, but the narrow

understanding of speech act limits the analysis.18

The Copenhagen School thereby rejects security as something objectively “given,”

but rather regards it as a social process applicable to any perceived value, any chosen

18 Constructing Security through Communicative Action”http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p71040_index.html

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referent object. A referent object is thus what is considered to be existentially threatened

by the securitizing actor, traditionally the state. But anything can be made into a referent

object. Security is a social construct and must be analyzed as such.”19

Reaching understanding on securitization is considered to be a process of reaching

agreement among actors. Every new utterance of security is a test, as the definition of the

situation proposed by the speaker is confirmed, modified or placed in question. Since

agreement rests on common convictions, the speech act succeeds only if the partner

accepts the offer contained in it. Ultimately security rests, therefore, among the subjects,

not with the objects of the subjects. Because threats are not some 'real' phenomena that

exist out there, the foundation of security policy is not given by 'nature' but chosen by

decision-makers to end up on the security political agenda. 20

As mentioned earlier, the main argument of securitization theory is that security is a

speech act, that alone by uttering ‘security’ something is being done. “It is by labeling

something a security issue that it becomes one.”21 A securitizing actor by stating that a

particular referent object is threatened in its existence claims a right to extraordinary

measures to ensure the referent objects’ survival. The issue is then moved out of the sphere

of normal politics into the realm of emergency politics, where it can be dealt with swiftly

and without the normal (democratic) rules and regulations of policy making. For security

this means that it has no longer any given (pre-existing) meaning but that it can be

anything a securitizing actor says it is. Security is a social and intersubjective construction.

That is the meaning of security.

Buzan et al (1998:25) state that securitization can be studied the following way:

“The way to study securitization is to study discourse (speech) and political constellations (gathering): When does an argument with a particular rhetorical and semiotic structure achieve sufficient effects to make an audience tolerate violations of rules that would otherwise have to be obeyed? If by means of an argument about the priority and urgency of an existential threat the securitizing actor has managed to break free of procedures or rules he or she would otherwise be bound by, we are witnessing a case of securitization,”22

19 Karsten Friis, “From Liminars to Others: Securitization Through Myths,” Peace and Conflict Studies, A Journal of The Network of Peace and Conflict Studies (2000), retrieved from http://www.gmu.edu/academic/ijps/vol7_2.pdf,20 Ibid..21 Ole Wæver, Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen New Schools in Security Theory and the Origins: between Core and Periphery, ISA Conference Montreal March 2004, p.13, quoted in Rita Taureck, “Positive and Negative Securitization - Bringing Together Securitization Theory and Normative Critical Security Studies,” June 16, 17, 18 2005, retrieved from http://critical.libertysecurity.org/documents/Taureck.doc22 Erik Asplund, “A Two Level Approach to Securitization: An Analysis of Drug Trafficking in China and Russia”

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To limit ‘everything’ from becoming a security issue, a successful securitization

consists of three steps. These are: (1) identification of existential threats, (2) emergency

action and (3) effects on inter-unit relations by breaking free of rules.23 To present an issue

as an existential threat is to say that: “If we do not tackle this problem, everything else will

be irrelevant (because we will not be here or will not be free to deal with it in our own

way).”24 This first step towards a successful securitization is called a securitizing move. A

securitizing move is in theory an option open to any unit, because only once an actor has

convinced an audience (inter-unit relations) of its legitimate need to go beyond otherwise

binding rules and regulations (emergency mode) can we identify a case of securitization.

However, some argue that it does not have to be an emergency mode, but can settle with

the so called “special measures.”

In addition to the three steps required to securitize an issue, there is a model of

securitization based on the "medicalization of deviance" model in sociology, which

consists of five-stages as follow: 25

defining something as a security issue

prospecting, the equivalent being dusting off some old intelligence report (or data

back-up)

claims-making, the equivalent being some powerful interest group backing the idea

turf-battling, the equivalent being a politician using strong rhetoric

designating, the equivalent is the passing of authorization to use force (or commit

special resources).

Meanwhile, Balzacq (2005) has mentioned three faces of securitization:

identities -- the ways that individuals label themselves

norms -- rules that are socially enforced, whether written or unwritten

cultures -- the ways people classify, codify, and communicate their experiences26

In borrowing lens from the securitization theory, this paper wishes to stress two

points. The first is concerned with the securitizing actor. While in most of the literature

about securitization, the securitizing actor commonly refers to the state in the context of

23 Barry Buzan; Ole Wæver, Jaap de Wilde, Security - A New Framework for Analysis, (London: Lynne Rienner, 1998), p.6, quoted in Op cit..24 Ibid..25 “Securitization: What Makes Something A Security Threat,” retrieved from http://www.apsu.edu/oconnort/GSS2010/GSS2010lect01a.htm.26 T Balzacq, "The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience, and Context.,” European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 11 No. 2 (2005), pp.171-201, italics made by the author of this paper.

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national security, in this inquiry, it refers to the participants of ARF (which are states)

moving issues to be addressed in ARF meetings, but not in the context of national security

of the member states per se, but primarily in the context of regional security. The second

point concerns the issues in the ‘observation list’. They are picked from the broader

conception of human security as mentioned earlier.

Meanwhile, this paper recognizes that some writers argue that the Copenhagen

School’s conceptualization blocks the path to human security. 27 However, this paper

endorses Rita Floyd’s stance that such incompatibility does not necessarily exist if human

security is conceptualized as a securitizing move.28

Normative Institutionalism

Originating in the subfield of organization theory, normative institutionalism

redirects attention from rationality and means-ends efficiency to the role of norms and

values. Against the “logic of instrumentality” or “logic of consequences” it posits the

“logic of appropriateness.” The principal focus of normative institutionalism is on the ways

institutions constrain individual choice. With its ideational angle, normative

institutionalism conceives of institutional change in terms of learning (Peters, 1999: 33-

34), while at the same time reminding us that existing institutions tend to structure the field

of vision of those contemplating change (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 953).29

Analyses based on normative institutionalism are relatively rare in International

Relations. It has to do with the traditional understanding that in the international

environment “a logic of consequences is likely to be more compelling than a logic of

appropriateness because rules can be in conflict, hierarchical structures of authority are

absent, power asymmetries are high, and the benefits derived from pursuing instrumental

policies can be great” (Krasner, 1999b: 210).30

More recently, constructivists within IR have extended the basic logic of the English

school and pointed to the importance of international norms for state behavior in the

27 Roxanne Lynn Doty, “Immigration and the Politics of Security,” Security Studies, Vol 8, No.2/3 (1998-99): p.80 and Karen Fierke, Critical Approaches to International Security, (Cambridge: Polity, 2004), p.110.28 Rita Floyd, “Human Security and the Copenhagen School’s Securitization Approach: Conceptualizing Human Security as a Securitizing Move,” Human Security Journal, Vol. 5 (Winter 2007), http://www.peacecenter.sciences-po.fr/journal/issue5pdf/6.Floyd.pdf29 Christer Jönsson and Jonas Tallberg, “Institutional Theory in International Relations”30 Ibid..

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international as well as domestic arena (Finnemore, 1996; Checkel, 1997; Finnemore and

Sikkink, 1998).31

Many international norms that set standards for the appropriate behavior of states

originate as domestic norms and become international through the efforts of entrepreneurs

of different kinds, including nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and transnational

“advocacy networks” (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). The interplay between domestic and

international norms works the other way as well, as states “are socialized to accept new

norms, values and perceptions of interest” (Finnemore, 1996: 5). There is thus “a two-level

norm game occurring in which the domestic and the international norms tables are

increasingly linked” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 893).32

Furthermore, Finnemore and Sikkink developed the norm’s life cycle. The first stage

is ‘norm emergence’ whereby ‘norm entrepreneurs’ attempt to convince states to embrace

new norms. The second stage, ‘norm cascade,’ occurs where the socialized states which

become ‘norm leaders’ attempt to socialize other states to be ‘norm followers’. Finally, the

last stage, the ‘norm internalization’ may or may not occur. If it does take place, the new

norm will not be debated anymore and will be treated as the ‘standard of appropriateness’33

Discussion

ASEAN’s Approach to Security

When we talk about ASEAN’s security conception, we talk about the distinctive

nature of ASEAN’s security doctrines and practices. Melly Caballero-Anthony argued that

“Southeast Asia....has his own history of reconceptualizing security.”34There are three

important points about ASEAN’s security conception according to her, including:

Notion of ‘comprehensive security’. This notion is mentioned explicitly in formal

speeches of ASEAN leaders, for example in the speech of the former Secretary-

General of ASEAN,

“ASEAN has long recognized the need for a comprehensive approach to security. The 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation called it “national resilience” in political, economic, and

31 Ibid..32 Ibid..33 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,’ International Organization 52 (1998), 887-917. (p. 892), quoted in Kasira Cheeppensook, “The ASEAN Way on Human Security,” retrieved fromhttp://humansecurityconf.polsci.chula.ac.th/Documents/Presentations/Kasira.pdf34 Melly Caballero-Anthony, “Revisioning Human Security in Southeast Asia,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 28 No 3 (2004), p. 158.

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socio-cultural spheres.  The ASEAN Vision 2020 called it “total human development.”  Finally, our most recent guide, the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II, specifically stated that ASEAN ‘subscribes to the principle of comprehensive security as having broad political, economic, social and cultural aspects’.”35

Emphasis on economic development. Economic development was used as a major

means of instrument to bring about domestic stability.

Linkage between national resilience (domestic stability) and regional security. 36

The three points, according to Caballero-Anthony, reified the position of the state

as the primary unit of analysis where it is further legitimized by its role in bringing about

economic development and in shaping security doctrines. Consequently, the discourses on

security typically regard the state as the only security referent.37

Besides the doctrines, we can observe the ‘style’ of regional security practice in

ASEAN. Still referring to Caballero-Anthony, “ASEAN regional security approaches are

built upon norm-building, building trust and confidence, and developing cooperative

approaches with the like minded and non-like minded states to address non-traditional

threats of security.”38 The approach is seen as being low-key, stressing the habit of

dialogue, observance of regional norms, building of informal institutions and processes

oriented to prevent regional conflicts.

Therefore, we can say that the traditional conception of security in ASEAN has

been state-centric and centered around the concept of national, albeit comprehensive,

security. The conception has been challenged on the ground that it was seen impertinent to

the real security condition of the people in ASEAN. According to Acharya (2007), whether

going by the narrow (freedom from fear) or broad (free from want) conception, Southeast

Asia faces some of the most critical challenges of human insecurity in the world. He stated

that the region has witnessed “some of the worst violence of the twentieth century.” For

example, the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia killed about 1,7 million between 1975-79, anti-

Communist riot in Indonesia in the mid-60s claimed about 400.000 lives, US war in

Vietnam produced 250.000 South Vietnamese, 1,1 million North Vietnamese, and 60.000

American casualties, ethnic and separatist movements in East Timor and Aceh have

claimed 200.000 and more than 2000 lives, respectively, and ethnic separatism in

35 Welcome Remarks, H.E Ong Keng Yong, Secretary-General of ASEAN at theASEAN-UNESCO Concept Workshop on Human Security in Southeast AsiaJakarta, 26-27 October 2006, http://www.aseansec.org/36 Op cit..37 Ibid..38 Ibid., p. 162.

13

Myanmar claimed more than 600.000 lives, not mentioning challenges coming from

internal conflicts in Southern Thailand, Southern Philippines, and Myanmar.39 Recently,

the political stability of some of the member states were shaken down, as in the case of

Thailand’s coup d’ etat and changes in government regime, Indonesia’s perilous transition

to democracy, and Malaysia’s struggle amid the ethnic tensions in the country.

Southeast Asia is also prone to other threats to human security. Although absolute

poverty levels have declined, the prevalence of underweight children under 5 years age in

the region is the third highest in the world (28%) after sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia,

national HIV infection in Southeast Asia is the highest in Asia, while the outbreaks of

H5N1 avian influenza in the region are the largest and most severe on record. 40Human

insecurity in the region is exacerbated by the impact of the intensifying globalization and

regional economic integration.

In addition, Southeast Asia has also experienced a range of transnational threats in

recent years, including the Asian economic crisis of 1997 (and the shake-down of the

global economy just now), environmental problems (transboundary haze, Indian Ocean

Tsunami, and the the most recent Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar), human trafficking, drugs

trafficking, and many more.41 According to Caballero-Anthony, “Human security is the

concept that embodies the security concerns of societies in the region and where the most

vulnerable can find answers to articulate their security in their own terms without being

excluded and alienated.”42

Securitization of Human Security Agenda

As noted earlier in the section of theoretical and conceptual framework, security is a

speech act, therefore, by uttering ‘security,’ an actor is doing an action. In our case, by

referring a particular issue or issue area as something pertaining to regional security (or

national security), an actor is conducting the first stage of securitization, namely the

securitizing move in order to move such issue out of the “normal” political realm into the

security realm where special measures (or in extreme cases, emergency measures) can be

set up and legitimized.

39 Amitav Acharya, “Human Security” in John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens (eds.), The Globalization of World Politics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p.501.40 Ibid..41 Ibid..42 ? Melly Caballero-Anthony, “Revisioning Human Security in Southeast Asia,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 28 No 3 (2004), p. 158.

14

In the case of ASEAN, security matters were mainly relegated to discussions or

consultations, sometimes formal but mostly informal taking place among national

representatives at stake. The process had been carried out loosely on bilateral and or

multilateral basis with ASEAN acting as facilitator (in cases of good offices, mediation, or

merely as provider of space and time to meet and talk). However, as the institution

building took place in the organization, member states have been more reliant on security

mechanisms built within the ASEAN framework. The ARF mechanisms are the center of

the established regional security practices in the ASEAN. Therefore, we will briefly

address the nature and characteristics of the Forum.

ASEAN Regional Forum

The end of the Cold War had altered the configuration of international relations in

East Asia. The new environment presented historic opportunities for the relaxation of

tensions in the region through multilateral consultations, confidence building, and

eventually the prevention of conflict. Thus, the Twenty-Sixth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting

and Post Ministerial Conference, which were held in Singapore on 23-25 July 1993, agreed

to establish the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The inaugural meeting of the ARF was

held in Bangkok on 25 July 1994.43

Initially, the Forum participants included the ASEAN members, the other Southeast

Asian states that were not yet ASEAN members, ASEAN’s then seven dialogue partners,

Papua New Guinea, an ASEAN observer, and China and Russia, then still “consultative

partners” of ASEAN. India became a participant on becoming a dialogue partner in 1996.

Mongolia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea were admitted in 1999 and

2000.44

The objectives of the ARF are outlined in the First ARF Chairman's Statement

(1994), namely:

a. to foster constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of

common interest and concern; and

b. to make significant contributions to efforts towards confidence-building and

preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region.45

43 ASEAN Overview, retrieved from http://www.asean.org/44 ARF Establishment, retrieved from http://www.aseanregionalforum.org/45 ARF Objectives, retrieved from Ibid..

15

Since its establishment more than a decade ago, ARF claimed to have done more

than something good. On the tenth year of the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ARF

Ministers met in Phnom Penh on 18 June 2003 and declared that "despite the great

diversity of its membership, the forum had attained a record of achievements that have

contributed to the maintenance of peace, security and cooperation in the region." They

cited in particular:

The usefulness of the ARF as a venue for multilateral and bilateral dialogue and

consultations and the establishment of effective principles for dialogue and

cooperation, featuring decision-making by consensus, non-interference, incremental

progress and moving at a pace comfortable to all;

The willingness among ARF participants to discuss a wide range of security issues

in a multilateral setting;

The mutual confidence gradually built by cooperative activities;

The cultivation of habits of dialogue and consultation on political and security

issues;

The transparency promoted by such ARF measures as the exchange of information

relating to defense policy and the publication of defense white papers; and

The networking developed among national security, defense and military officials

of ARF participants.

Examining the issues in ARF’s agenda can shed light to the securitization taking

place in the region’s security conceptions and practices. We may not be able to trace the

entire process by looking only at the results. However, by looking at the issues moved and

sustained (or overruled) as issues pertaining to regional security, we may tell when a

securitization is taking place, when it is successfully done and when it is not.

Although the establishment of the ARF more or less coincided with the publication

of the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report, and although UNDP was in fact the

Forum’s one and only non-state dialogue partner, apparently there was no linkage of

security conception between the two. As noted in ARF concept paper, the key challenges

that had to be acknowledged are as following:

The significant shifts in power relations due to the periods of rapid economic

growth that can lead to conflict

The divergence among ARF participants concerning approaches to peace and

security

16

The territorial tensions and disputes among ARF participants46

As we can see above, the security concerns of ARF in the earlier period of its

existence were traditional in nature in which the state was reified as the only security

referent. ARF did not seem to ever consider human security issues as the key challenges to

regional peace and security. Therefore, we may say that there was no securitization of

human security agenda taking place or completed at the earlier period of ARF’s existence.

Even if some of the participants had tried to do the securitizing move by saying that a

particular issue pertained to regional security and should be addressed in ARF meetings,

the absence of such issue in the agenda means that the securitization stopped at the

securitizing move (stage one), where the actor identified something as an existential threat

requiring emergency or special measures.

The actor(s) might have done the process of defining, prospecting, claims-making,

and turf-battling (in terms of the model sketched out earlier) in the adoption of the agenda

session of ARF meetings, but failed to push that particular issue(s) to the agenda, therefore

left the securitization incomplete (it could not be called securitization at all because it was

incomplete). That was one possibility. Another possibility is that there had never been any

actor securitizing issues pertaining to human security agenda simply because they did not

consider them as security concerns.

One has to be careful in identifying a particular issue as pertaining to human

security agenda, especially because ASEAN has long had a conception of ‘comprehensive

security’ comprising non-traditional security concerns, e.g. economic security and

environmental security. However, the comprehensive notion of security is lacking the

people’s emphasis or focus, and is directed primarily towards securing the state or the

national entity, not individuals. Nevertheless, in the first section of this discussion, the

purpose is to show whether or not that ASEAN has witnessed securitization of issues

pertaining to human security, even although it does not embrace the whole assumptions in

human security as a perspective.

It is also important to note that not all the issues moved to ARF’s agenda are meant

to be security concerns because ARF is also meant to be a venue to discuss political issues

among its participants. In order not to confuse the two distinct realms (in fact, the

distinction of political and security realm is the basis of securitization approach!), we will

46 ASEAN Regional Forum: The Concept Paper, retrieved from http://www.asean.org/

17

stick to the rhetoric or speech act when an actor tried to make a motion to add the

particular issue to ARF’s agenda.

Having examined the initial spirit surrounding the earlier periods of ARF existence,

we will now move to the question whether or not securitization of human security agenda

ever takes place in the Forum’s discourse. First, let us take a look at the list of Track I

activities conducted by the Forum from the year of its establishment to the latest summit in

May, 2008. Several issues that could be the result of securitization process are the

followings:

Search, Rescue, and Disaster Relief Related Activities, including actions devoted to

tackle natural disasters and infectious diseases

Non-Traditional Security Issues, including tropical hygiene, infectious diseases,

transnational crimes, SARS, Avian Influenza, and narcotics control

Energy Security

Environmental Related Issues

Economic security

The above issues are those pertaining to human security agenda or at least having

human security dimension, but they are not necessarily security concerns (and therefore

not the result of securitizations). So, we have to examine the rhetoric, the labeling, the

naming. Three of them are obviously dragged out of the normal realm of politics to the

security realm; non-traditional security issues, energy security and economic security.

They are made security concerns while before such securitization took place, were

confined in the normal realm of politics. This process can be described as such: by uttering

‘energy security,’ one is doing the securitizing move; identifying the lack of energy supply

or access as an existential threat to the core values of a particular referent object. Once the

participants by consensus accept the term, therefore approve to the securitizing move, the

securitization is complete.

The same logic applies to economic security and non-traditional security issues.

Economic security is the first sector of human security mentioned in the 1994 UNDP’s

Human Development Report. The ARF participants have managed to pass the issue

through the selective process of agenda adoption, therefore the securitization can be said to

have taken place.

It is worth noting that there was not even one occasion when the term ‘human

security’ was announced or used in Track I activities. This shows an obvious evasion of

18

ARF participants to securitize the issues pertaining to individual insecurity for reasons that

will be addressed later. If human security ever entered the ARF agenda, it would mean so

much. As David Bosolf argues,

.”..invoking a notion, such as ‘human security,’ represents a ‘securitizing move’ in that human insecurity (as the opposite of human security) in its various aspects, issues and facets is presented as a threat which, eventually, becomes part of a discourse, hence a dialogical practice.”

Interestingly, the term “human security dimension” appears once in the list of ARF

Track II activities in the form of Workshop Group Meeting on Human Security Dimension

(13-15 November 2003). The Track II has served as think-thank group or epistemic

communities consisting of experts, government officials acting in personal capacity, and

non-governmental organizations (NGOs). However, the Track II can be said to be lacking

the authority and capability in completing the securitization (although by uttering ‘human

security,’ they are already doing the securitizing move).

We have investigated the securitization of human security agenda from ARF

participants Track I activities. Now we will take a look at recent concerns and issues of

ARF participants, they include territorial and jurisdictional disputes in the South China

Sea; self-determination for East Timor; nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia and South

Asia; weapons of mass destruction; and the impact of globalization.47 From the issues, we

may expect the self-determination for East Timor as containing high element of human

security. However, from the way it is described (remember, in a discourse, to utter

something is to act), it is not an issue in which human security gains primary attention. The

following statement will make it clear that the referent object was primarily the state

(Indonesia): .”..ASEAN has declared its position that a united, democratic and

economically prosperous Indonesia is basic to the maintenance of regional security. In this

context, the association emphasized its support for Indonesia’s territorial integrity.”

How about the issue of globalization impact? Quite a surprise, the description of the

issue includes the utterance of human security term shown in the following statement:

“The Seventh ARF also considered the economic, social and human components of security. It discussed both the positive effects and the repercussions of globalization, including greater economic interdependence among nations and the multiplication of security threats like transnational crime. ARF has reaffirmed the need for Southeast Asian countries to continue efforts, through dialogue and cooperation at national and international levels, in dealing with the economic, social and political impacts of globalization so as to ensure sustained economic and social development.”

47 ASEAN Overview (2000), retrieved from http://www.asean.org/

19

Restraining ourselves from exclaiming “Eureka!,” we finally find an explicit

utterance of human security (although in the form of “human component of security”) in a

formal statement of ASEAN. Therefore, it can be argued that there has not only been the

securitization of human security agenda as shown in the analysis of ARF Participants

Track I activities, but there has also been the securitizing move of individual’s insecurity

(in as many aspects as it may contain) as the term human security was invoked in the

region’s security discourse. However, it is worth noting that the ‘consideration of human

component of security’ as stated in ASEAN Overview was limited to economic realm,

especially economic impact of globalization. It is an imprudent move to say that the notion

of human security was fully welcomed at that moment (year 2000). The fact is, it was not.

The Other Mechanism: ASEAN Ministerial Meeting

In 2006, ASEAN-UNESCO held a workshop named ASEAN-UNESCO Concept

Workshop on Human Security in Southeast Asia to attempt to reach convergence on the

concept so it can be translated into policymaking. It is not clear whether the workshop

really amounted to something because in the latest ASEAN’s annual report (2007), there

has not been a single utterance of human security. Therefore, it is safe to assume that

human security as a whole (not only issues pertaining to human security agenda) has not

moved from the initial stage of securitization, namely securitizing move.

However, in the welcome remarks of the then Secretary-General of ASEAN, Ong

Keng Yong, we can see more clearly that the securitizing move has taken place. The

Secretary-General mentioned some of ASEAN activities and agreements pertaining to

human security, including:

Providing social protection that (a) address poverty, equity and health impacts of

economic growth; (b) promote environmental sustainability and sustainable natural

resource management that meets current and future needs; (c) promote social

governance that manages impacts of economic integration; and (d) preserve and

promote the region's cultural heritage and cultural identity.(in Vientiane Action

Programme)

ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime carrying out the ASEAN Plan

of Action to Combat Transnational Crime (the meeting has identified the following

threats to human security as follows: illicit drug trafficking; trafficking in persons;

arms smuggling; terrorism; and various forms of economic crimes

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The Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (disaster relief)

The Regional Framework for the Control and Eradication of Highly Pathogenic

Avian Influenza (public health)

The ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution

Addressing the social impact of regional integration and globalization, working

towards narrowing the development gaps not only among ASEAN Members

Countries, but also at the national levels,  one set of measures being contained in

the ASEAN Action Plan on Rural Development and Poverty Eradication. 

Once the term “human security” was uttered by the Secretary General and used in

the ministerial meeting, it became part of the discourse of ASEAN’ security conception.

Human Security in Terms of Norm Internalization

For constructivists, the importance of norms in any institution is beyond doubt.

Norms can influence identities and shape the definition of interests. They can therefore

structure behaviour. Because norms are socially enforced, after being set up, they need to

be internalized.

Meanwhile, the change in ASEAN security norms could be accounted for by

examining how ASEAN multilateral diplomacy works. The formal channel, i.e.

interactions among official representatives of governments, is known as ‘Track I’

diplomacy. Other dialogues taking place outside Track I, involving experts and

governments’ officials participating in their private capacities (although there are also

NGOs), are referred to as ‘Track II’. ‘Track III’ referred to non-governmental sectors and

independent academics with different agendas from what propelled by Track I and Track

II.48

Track I and Track II agendas are often similar due to the reliance of the latter on the

former in terms of financial and political support.49 Therefore, it is not surprising that

comprehensive security, which regards the state as a referent of security, prevails

48 William D. Davidson and Joseph V. Montville, ‘Foreign Policy According to Freud,’ Foreign Policy 45 (1981-1982), 145-157; Joann F. Aviel, ‘The Growing Role of NGOs in ASEAN,’ Asia-Pacific Review 6 (1999), 78-92, quoted in Kasira Cheeppensook, “The ASEAN Way on Human Security,” retrieved fromhttp://humansecurityconf.polsci.chula.ac.th/Documents/Presentations/Kasira.pdf49 Mely Caballero-Anthony, ‘Revisioning Human Security in Southeast Asia,’ Asian Perspective, 28 (2004), 155-189; Herman Joseph S. Kraft, ‘The Autonomy Dilemma of Track Two Diplomacy inSoutheast Asia,’ Security Dialogue 31 (2000): 343-356, quoted in Ibid..

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throughout Track I and Track II dialogue, despite the slight move towards human security

recently. On the other hand, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and scholars

constituting Track III diplomacy have been trying to incorporate ‘traditionally non-security

concerns in the Asia-Pacific into the security discourse’.50

Now we will examine the state human security in the ASEAN in terms of norm

internalization using insights from normative institutionalism, especially the norm’s life

cycle developed by Finnemore and Sikkink.

Norm Emergence

As pointed out by several writers addressing the question of human security in

ASEAN51 (which are quite abundant), the emergence of human security norm owes to the

efforts of civil-society organizations (CSOs) acting as “norms entrepreneurs.” They have

been trying to socialize human security norm by engaging with ASEAN’s security

discourse through the so called Track III diplomacy. In the attempt to raise people’s sense

of belonging towards ASEAN, ASEAN leaders somehow intensified the organization’s

contact with transnational advocacy network,52 consisting not only of those CSOs

associated with it (the Track II)53, but also those holding critical stance towards the

organization, for example CSOs under ASEAN People’s Assembly (APA), Focus on

Global South, Alternative ASEAN Network on Burma, etc.

Melly Caballero-Anthony mentioned that “Civil-Society Organizations have been

playing that pivotal in framing human security through their transnational work in

promoting human rights and human development”54 Furthermore, she argued that the

Track III diplomacy can play the following roles:

Framing on debates and getting issues on the agenda

Encouraging discursive commitments from states and other policy

Causing procedural change at international and domestic level

Affecting policy50 Herman Joseph S. Kraft, ‘Human Security and ASEAN Mechanisms,’ in The Quest for Human Security: The Next Phase of ASEAN?, ed. by Pranee Thiparat (Bangkok: Institute of Security andInternational Studies, 2001), pp. 135-147 (p. 138), quoted in Ibid..51 See for example Melly Caballero-Anthony, “Revisioning Human Security in Southeast Asia,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 28 No 3 (2004), pp. 155-189 and Kasira Cheeppensook, “The ASEAN Way on Human Security”52 See ASEAN Annual Report 200753 See the annexes in ASEAN Charter54 Melly Caballero-Anthony, “Revisioning Human Security in Southeast Asia,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 28 No 3 (2004), pp. 155-189 (158).

22

And influencing behaviour changes in target actors

Concerning the ASEAN Charter, pressures from various CSOs demanding to be

engaged in the drafting process were great since the intention was formally tabled at the

11th ASEAN Summit held in December 2005 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia It was seen as a

critical moment since many promises had been given during the Charter’s contemplation

and because it was intended to articulate principles and objectives, give legal personality to

the grouping, and shape its key processes and institutions, therefore playing important role

in norms-making. There was even an expectation of the removal of the non-interference

policy central to the organization since its establishment55, although the proposal finally

faltered.

The Charter was considered unsatisfactory by many critical civil-society

organizations in Track III expecting a relaxed approach of ASEAN to the non-interference

norm and a more institutionalized commitment to human rights. Pessimists doubt the

efficacy of the Charter since the wording are rather loose and because there are several

subtle contradictions. Some question the probability that it will be enforced at all.

However, optimists argue that it was a nice result of compromise stressing that if the

wording had not been loose, it would not have been signed at all. To illustrate some doubts

about the delivery of the Charter’s promises, below will be presented an analysis of the

Charter from one CSOs member, Solidarity for Asian Peoples' Advocacies (SAPA)

Working Group on ASEAN. The SAPA WG on ASEAN is a common platform for

collective action on ASEAN advocacy. The WG-ASEAN is meant to promote the

multiplicity of perspectives, strategies and forms employed by its individual members, as it

strives for specific unities in ASEAN-related advocacy and action. Presently, the SAPA

WG on ASEAN has more than 100 CSOs, national and regional organizations, as

members.56

SAPA’s Analysis

The Solidarity for Asian Peoples' Advocacies (SAPA) Working Group on ASEAN

tried to engage in the ASEAN Charter building process. SAPA WG on ASEAN made three

formal submissions to the Eminent Persons Group (EPG); on the Political-Security Pillar

(EPG consultation, Ubud, Bali/April 2006), on the Economic Pillar (EPG consultation,

55 http://www.wikipedia.org/ASEAN_Charter/56 http://www.asiasapa.org

23

Singapore/June 2006), and on the Socio-Cultural Pillar and Institutional Mechanisms

(Meeting with Ambassador Rosario Manalo, Special Adviser to Mr. Fidel V. Ramos, EPG

Member for the Philippines, Manila/November 2006). The WG also participated in the

only regional consultation held by the High Level Task Force (HLTF) on the drafting of

the ASEAN Charter in March 2007 in Manila, and reiterated the main points of its

submissions.

Aside from the regional consultations that the SAPA WG tried to intervene in, the

different network members also initiated national processes in 2006 and 2007 to help

introduce ASEAN to civil society and inform them of the Charter that was being drafted.

When the Charter content finally leaked to media in November 2007, SAPA-WG on

ASEAN announced that it was a “disappointment...falls short of what is needed to establish

a ‘people-centered’ and ‘people-empowered’ ASEAN. It succeeds in codifying past

ASEAN agreements, and consolidating the legal framework that would define the

Association. However, it fails to put people at the center, much less empower them.”57 The

points of criticism concerning people-centric norms by SAPA are among the followings:

There are no clear spaces created or procedures established to institutionalize the

role of citizens and civil society organizations in regional community-building

The market-oriented language of the Charter expresses its bias for the economic

project in the region, without recognition that this may be in conflict with the social

and economic justice that the Charter is also supposed to uphold

The centrality of redistribution and economic solidarity to the goals of poverty

eradication, social justice and lasting peace, is not acknowledged

The Charter is gender blind and does not recognize the primacy of the regional

environment.

The landmark inclusion of human rights in the Preamble and in the statement of

Principles is belied by the lack of detail in the long-awaited human rights body.

SAPA’s criticisms reflect the norms pertaining to human security that they are

trying to uphold through their engagement with the ASEAN, such as the empowerment of

civil society, the centrality of social and economic justice (contrary to the prioritization of

liberal values by the Charter), the importance of gender equality, and of course, human 57 Solidarity for Asian Peoples' Advocacies (SAPA) Working Group on ASEAN Analysis of the ASEAN Charter, retrieved from http://www.focusweb.org/analysis-of-the-asean-charter.html?Itemid=94

24

rights. The norms have been incorporated by the Charter, maybe in a result of perilous

compromise, but in a way seen as still prioritizing the centrality of the state.

Norm Cascade

After a norm or norms emerged from the “norms entrepreneurs” as discussed

above, it is to be seen whether the socialization process still continues, marked by the

emergence of “norms leaders” in the socialized object, in this case being ASEAN.

According to Cheeppensook, “Thailand was persuaded successfully during the norm

emergence stage.... Thailand then acted as a norm leader, and tried to convince other

member states to follow the same path.”58

Thailand’s conception of security has explicitly embraced the term “human

security.” In its annual security outlooks, it states that“In the political and security sense...

countries of the region have to enhance linkages and cooperation and pay greater attention

to human security focusing on the grassroots”59. It also states, .”..security is comprehensive

in the sense that today it encompasses not only political, military , economic and social

aspects, but has also come to embrace the people aspect- or human security -as well.”60

Thailand is the only country in ASEAN that joined the human security network

(HSN). HSN is a group of like-minded countries that maintains dialogue on questions

pertaining to human security at the level of Foreign Ministers.61 The country is also notable

for having proposed an alternative for ASEAN’s non-interference norm, immediately after

the 1997 financial crisis. In 1998, Thailand proposed the notion of “flexible engagement”

to allow for a more relaxed approach of the organization in discussing sensitive matters

pertaining to domestic affairs of each country. Flexible engagement is not a proposal for

human security per se, although it calls for more “frank” discussion within ASEAN about

sensitive political, economic and social issues, including human rights problems in

troubled states like Burma. But this approach has aroused opposition from other AESAN

members, notably Vietnam and Myanmar62 until it was finally dismissed.

58 Kasira Cheeppensook, “The ASEAN Way on Human Security,” retrieved fromhttp://humansecurityconf.polsci.chula.ac.th/Documents/Presentations/Kasira.pdf59 Thailand, Annual Security Outlook 2000, retrieved from http://www.aseanregionalforum.org60 Thailand, Annual Security Outlook 2001, retrieved from http://www.aseanregionalforum.org61 See ‘The Human Security Network’ (2005), quoted in Kasira Cheeppensook, “The ASEAN Way on Human Security,” retrieved fromhttp://humansecurityconf.polsci.chula.ac.th/Documents/Presentations/Kasira.pdf62 Arabinda Acharya, “Human Security in Asia:Conceptual Ambiguities and Common Understandings,” retrieved from http://www.yorku.ca/robarts/archives/chandigarth/pdf/acharya_delhi.pdf

25

In addition to Thailand, recently, Indonesia has also stated the importance of human

security to be embraced in the regional security discourse as shown in the statement of

Indonesia’s President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono below:

“Today the concept of security extends to what is called “human security.” This means that we have a common obligation to protect the physical integrity and the dignity of the human being, whether alone or part of a group, against all attackers—be they terrorists, common criminals, the Avian Flu virus or a tsunami.  The human being must be protected even when— perhaps especially when— the assailant is the state, which is supposed to protect him. These are the new realities—the pressures and challenges of our time. And if we are going to have an ASEAN that is a “community of caring societies,” then it must care not only about the livelihood and the social amenities but also about the fundamental rights of the human being. Moreover, if an ASEAN Security Community is to be one of the pillars of the ASEAN Community, then it must be a pillar that the human being can lean on when her formally mandated protector becomes her attacker.”63

While Indonesia previously tended to counter any effort to challenge the

established norms, under SBY administration upholding progressive foreign policy, it can

be said as assuming the “norms leader” position, together with Thailand.

Norm Internalization

Some writers argued that human security norm in ASEAN has been in the “norms

cascade” stage, but the “norms internalization” process remains in question. Once the

norms internalization takes place, there will be no more debate about the particular norms,

and they will be accepted as the appropriate standard of behaviour. Therefore, the logic of

appropriateness upheld by normative institutionalists applies. In the case of human security

in ASEAN, it is quite obvious to see that such process has not been taking place. As human

security entered the Track III and Track II lexicon, even mentioned once or twice in the

Track I activities, it is still treated as a foreign norm. The debate surrounding whether or

not human security is compatible with the established norms of ASEAN still continues.

Arguments against human security as a norm centers on the principle of people-

centrality disregarding national barriers and national sovereignty. The “people’s

sovereignty” notion is seen as being incompatible with the sovereignty and non-

interference norms (the latter is derived from the former) that have been the sacred norms

of ASEAN’s build-up reified in the principles section of the Charter as shown below:

Article 2 (Principles):

63 Keynote Speech by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono at the ASEAN Forum: Rethinking ASEAN Towards the ASEAN Community 2015, Jakarta, 7 August 2007, retrieved from http://www.asean.org

26

(a) respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national

identity of all ASEAN Member States;

(e) non-interference in the internal affairs of ASEAN Member States;64

The established norms are also reified in the ASEAN Security Community’s

principles as shown below:

“ The ASEAN Security Community shall abide by the UN Charter and other principles of international law and uphold ASEAN’s principles of non-interference, consensus-based decision-making, national and regional resilience, respect for national sovereignty, the renunciation of the threat or the use of force, and peaceful settlement of differences and disputes.”

However, there are voices stressing the compatibility of human security concerns and

agenda with ASEAN’s principles, as voiced by M. C. Abad, Jr. below:65

“The human security approach becomes incompatible with regional security when it challenges certain patterns of resource allocation that favour military security and obsession with defending national frontiers. It becomes objectionable when it threatens power structures that entrench the dominance of a few. Human security is incompatible with regional security when the concerns and priorities of regional civil society are not shared by the political and bureaucratic elites. They are incompatible when regional alliance building of the civil society is threatening the narrow and self-serving interpretation of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states. Incompatibility arises when greed, corruption and the threat or use of force characterize national and regional governance.”

The incompatibility of human security and regional security as described in a

sarcastic tone above only exists when the regional’s arrangement is meant to be hostile to

the people of ASEAN, which is of course impertinent, at least if taken at face value.

There is, however, a possibility of engagement (even in a form of troubled

engagement) of human security and regional security norm if the member states of

ASEAN manage to reach an understanding in the meaning and limitation of the former

concept to search for its compatibility with the existing norms, as argued by Acharya:

.”..the extent to which a new idea like human security could find acceptance in the region

depends very much on how it resonates with existing ideas and practices concerning

security.”66

Potential to Change

64 ASEAN Charter65 M. C. Abad, Jr., “The Challenge of Balancing State Security with Human Security,” http://www.aseansec.org/14259.htm

66 Quoted in Kasira Cheeppensook, “The ASEAN Way on Human Security,” retrieved fromhttp://humansecurityconf.polsci.chula.ac.th/Documents/Presentations/Kasira.pdf

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It is too far to assume that ASEAN will replace the old-faithful established norms

in its security discourse with human security norm in the near future. However, the latter

has assumed position in the periphery of the regional security discourse and there is a

potential change following such tendency. According to normative institutionalism,

institutions constrain individual choice. It conceives institutional change in terms of

learning. The admission of human security concerns will bear implications on the process

of defining the interests of ASEAN and the member states. It will also bear implication on

the regional governance as argued by Abad:

“To pursue human security means to: (a) Enhance the capability of regional organizations to advance universal values effectively and with greater autonomy from its dominant members and local interest groups, (b) Create a much stronger and more focused campaign within global civil society make regional institutions accountable to public by adopting democratic decision-making processes, (c) Frame regional cooperation in terms of global human security agenda.”67

SWOT Analysis

At face value, the admission of human security as a norm (as opposed to human

security as agenda which can be more easily compromised) seems to be detrimental to

ASEAN integration because it is rather (in order not to say very) controversial. The most

controversial aspect of the human security approach is its inclusion of political factors,

such as human rights and liberal democratic governance.68 To risk simplifying the matter,

below is presented a raw SWOT analysis concerning the admission of human security in

the regional security discourse (since norm internalization has not been taking place, and

human security is still in the stage of securitizing move, the SWOT analysis will not be

directed to ASEAN’s potential integration)

STRENGTH

• ASEAN' desire and efforts to be a people-centric organization

• ASEAN's inclusion of human security dimensions in its principles, agenda, and

mechanisms (not only in the security, but also in the economic and socio-cultural

pillars)

• Transition of its member states towards embracing more people-centric norms (in

their respective domestic realm)

WEAKNESSES

67 Loc cit.. 68 Ibid..

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The dominance of member states in shaping ASEAN’s interests

The dependence of ASEAN institutionalization on its members’ consensus

THREATS

The divergence of member states concerning the scope of human security (also

threat to ASEAN cohesion)

The controversial nature of human security concept with the inclusion of political

dimensions of human security (also threat to ASEAN cohesion)

The perceived incompatibility of human security norm with the established norms

of ASEAN, mainly state’s sovereignty and norm-interference

OPPORTUNITIES

The supportive global environment in the promotion of human security

The emergence of norms leaders among the member states of ASEAN (Thailand

and Indonesia)

The continuous efforts of CSOs in the Track III and increasing socialization in the

Track II

Conclusion

In the discussion section, we tried to answer the following questions: How has

ASEAN approached security? Has securitization of human security agenda been taking

place in ASEAN’s security discourse? How is the state of human security in ASEAN in

terms of norm internalization? What are the potential changes of embracing human

security in the regional security discourse?

The data gathered in this inquiry shows that there has been securitization of human

security agenda in ASEAN’s regional security discourse, meaning that issues pertaining to

human security or having human security dimensions are taken into the regional security

discourse, as shown in the ARF’s agenda and activities. This is to say that human security

as an agenda has managed to enter the regional security discourse, albeit still in the

periphery.

For the second question pertaining to internalization of human security as a norm,

the data shows that such process has not been taking place. In the norms’ life-cycle, human

security norm has only managed to reach the second stage, namely norm cascade due to the

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lack of consensus among the member states and regional leaders concerning the definition

and implications of the inclusion of human security as a norm and to the perceived

incompatibility of such process with the established norms in ASEAN’s security discourse.

The norm emergence owes to the CSOs efforts in promoting human security agenda and

norm while the norm cascade is primarily done by the socialized member states, namely

Thailand and recently, Indonesia.

Finally, the admission of human security agenda in the regional security discourse

will bear implication on regional governance and the behaviour of ASEAN’s member

states, including the need to further engage CSOs in ASEAN’s activities and decision-

making process and granting more independence to the organization. Meanwhile, change

in behaviour of the member states may be encouraged in the context of learning in which

the norm of human security acts as the appropriate standard of behaviour that shape their

interests.

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