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Apresentation of
Humanfactorsinship designandoperation:Challengesrelatedtodigitalizationandautomation
based onAPhDthesisby Vincentius RumawasDepartmentofMarineTechnology
@HFC– HumanFactorsinControlMeeting:Digitalizationandautonomy–ChallengesandopportunitiesrelatedtohumaninteractionsTrondheim,17– 18Oct2017
2
Backgroundofthepresentation
• Allmaterialsinthispresentationarebasedonaresearchcontractconductedin2008– 2012.
• Thetitle:HumanFactorsinShipDesignandOperation:ExperientialLearning
• TheresearchwasfullyfinancedbytheDepartmentofMarineTechnology,NTNU
• ThethesiswasdefendedinJan2016.• Fulltextisavailableat:
– http://hdl.handle.net/11250/2382315– http://hdl.handle.net/11250/2382316
• Selectedtopicsrelevanttodigitalization&automationarepresentedhere.
3
Introduction
Background of the research
• Fatalaccidents atsea
• Caused byhumanerrors and/orhuman‐related factors (mostly)
• Humanfactorswere barely aconsiderationwhen designingaship
Howshipsaredesignedandbuilt
Basic Ship Theory, Rawson & Tupper 2001
The Ship Design Process, Gale 2003 in Lamb (Ed)
The concept of design spiral represents the sequential and iterative aspects of the process that include: Conceptual design Preliminary design Contract design Detailed design
Ship design is a complex and multifaceted process, influenced by a number of actors. …
A successfully designed ship is the result of close and good cooperation between the designer, the customer, the yard and the equipment suppliers (Vossen et al 2013)
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Researchquestions
1. Arehumanfactors considered inship design?How…?
2. Isthere any effect of implementing HF?
a. towards the crew
b. towardsincidencesonboard
3. AretheexistingknowledgeofHFeffective/sufficient?
4. Whatfactorsinfluencesafety&crewperformanceatsea?
5. Whatare“HF”inshipdesignandoperation?
6. Howtotakeintoaccountthe“HF”inmajorriskassessment?
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Researchdesignandoutline
RQ1: Are HF considered in ship design? How?RQ1: Are HF considered in ship design? How?
RQ2: Is there any effect of …RQ2: Is there any effect of …
RQ3: Are the existing
knowledge of HF effective/sufficient?
RQ3: Are the existing
knowledge of HF effective/sufficient?
RQ4: What factors
influence safety & performance at sea?
RQ4: What factors
influence safety & performance at sea?
RQ5: What are “HF” in ship design & operation?
RQ5: What are “HF” in ship design & operation?
RQ6: How to account HF in major risk assessment?
RQ6: How to account HF in major risk assessment?
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Some definitions
• “humanfactors”:
– “Ergonomics(orhumanfactors)isthescientificdisciplineconcernedwiththeunderstandingofinteractions amonghumansandotherelementsofasystem,andtheprofessionthatappliestheory,principles,data,andothermethodstodesigninordertooptimizehumanwell‐beingandoverallsystemperformance”(IEA,2012)
– “humanfactors”isconcernedwiththetaskpeopleperformandtheenvironmenttheydoitin– fittingthejobtotheperson.Thetopicofhumanfactorsisdividedintoeightconsiderations:habitability,maintainability,workability,controllability,manoeuvrability,survivability,occupationalhealthandsafety(OHS)andsystemsafety(LR,2008).
NB: “humanfactors”≠“humanelement”(physiological,psychological),“humanerror”,“humanperformance”,“HSE”,“humanreliability”.
8
Theresearch
• RQ1:
AreHFconsidered inship design?How?
There are several ways toanswer this:
Askthe designer,the shipyard and/orthe shipowner,
orcheck the designspecification/contract
Check andreview the ship itself (see Study 2)
Askthe users (see Study 2andStudy 3)
Consult the existing rules,regulations andstandardsavailable (Study 1)
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Study 1.Literature study
Tocheckifhumanfactorsissuesaretakenintoaccountintheexistingstandards,asurveyofliteraturewasperformed.
Twoquestionsaretobeanswered:
What/whichpublicationscontainHF?
WhichaspectsofHFareaddressed/considered?
Results:
“AContentAnalysisofHumanFactorsintheDesignofMarineSystems”.TheInternationalConferenceonShipandOffshoreTechnology,11‐12Nov2010,Surabaya
“AContentAnalysisofHumanFactorsinShipsDesign”TheInternationalJournalofMaritimeEngineering,RINATransactionsPartA3,Vol156,Jul– Sep2014
RQ1.AreHFconsidered inship design?How?
10
Study 3.Qualitative study
Humanfactorsframework
derived from:Lloyd’s Register,2008,2009anddevelopedinRumawas &Asjbjørnslett 2010
Study 1.…Literature study
Results
• There are abundantdocuments coverHF• HFissues havebeen sufficiently
addressed.
• AllHFDIMENSIONS are covered• Mostmentioned: SYSTEM SAFETY
(highestfreq)• Mostextensively:HABITABILITY (COMFORT)
– Noise,vibration,indoor climate &lighting/illumination
• CONTROLLABILITY– Alarms,control centres,
workstations,control &switches
• Theleast covered:MAINTAINABILITY
• HFissues isdeveloping very fast
• Thedocuments are optional.
RQ1.AreHFconsidered inship design?How?
12
Study 2.Exploratory field study
Tocheck if the facts inreality isinaccordancewith the facts onpaper
Exploratory field surveyswere performed using qualitative approach,incl:
• Goonboard• Jointhetrips• Observations• Dointerviews• Discussions,focusgroup
NB: Rapportisimportant Actionresearch,participatory,asa‘naïveobservant’
RQ1.AreHFconsidered inship design?How?
13
Study 2.Exploratory …Before survey,some issues that were reported/found byother researchers onship designwere documented:
Accommodation facilities,crew expect adequate levels of privacy (Strong2000) Illumination problemson the bridge(Lutzhoft2005) Ergonomic issues;no legspace,incorrect height/orientation,must‐be‐fixed equipment
(Anderson&Lutzhoft2007,Grundevik2009) Problemwith access &personnel movement,incorrect control panel,console problem
(Dalpiaz etal2005).
Incidences&accidentsonOSVwerealsodocumented(Hansson2006,PSANorway2011):
• Personsqueezedbetweenmovingcontainers• Personhitintheheadbyamovinghook• Deckhandslip,fall,twistedafoot• Poorautopilotinterfacesystem*)• Collisionwithoffshoreinstallations*)
*)relatedtodigitalizationandautonomy
RQ1.AreHFconsidered inship design?How?
Collisioncasesrelatedtoautomation
07.032004*)FarSymphonyhadacoursetowardsthefacilityWestVenture.Enteringthesafetyzone,theautopilotwasengaged.Theofficeronthebridgedidnotrealizethattheautopilotwasengagedandcouldnotnavigatethevessel.Thisendedinacollision.
18.072007*)Grane wasidentifiedasatargetfortheautopilotonBourbonSurf.Themastermisjudgedtheship’sspeedanddistancetotheplatform.Hedidnotkeepaproperlookoutatthetime.itwastoolatetostopthevessel,buttheysucceededinreducingitsspeedfrom3m/sto1m/sbeforeithitGrane
06.06.2009*)WellstimulationvesselBigOrangeXVIIIwasapproachinginstallationEkofisk 2/4X.Thecaptainengagedtheautopilotandforgottoswitchitoff.Hecouldnotcontrolthevesselmanuallyasheintendedtodo.Insteadofslowingdown,thevesselstrucktheinstallationataspeedof9.5knots.
Analysis:Thecrewfailedtoseethattheautopilotwasengagedandmadeawrongdecisioninoperatingthevessel.
*)Petroleum Safety Authoritiy Norway. (2011). Risk of Collisions with Visiting Vessels Retrieved 10 Oct 2011, from http://www.ptil.no/news/risk‐of‐collisions‐with‐visiting‐vessels‐article7524‐79.html
Offshoresupplyvesselsin
NorwegianContinentalShelf
• Carrygoodsto&fromoffshoreplatforms:containers,bulk,fluid(tanker),supportplatformsinvariousways.
• Hitech• Developingveryfast• 12‐ 16crewonboard• 2‐ 3tripsperweekserving2‐ 6platformspertrip
• Crewrotation:4weekson4weeksoff
15
16
Issuesfoundonboardrelatedtodigitalizationandautomation
• Thecrewknowlessoftheirvessel,andmoredependentofthemanufacturers
• Nomore‘wheel’andenginetelegraphonthebridge
Mosttraditionalcontrolsarereplacedbyjoystick,trackball,mouse,keyboardandtouchscreen
Givenemergencysituation,crewinterventionbecomeslessstraightforwardandlessintuitive
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Problems:• Illumination• Systemreadiness,datavalidity• Operatingsystemrelatedproblems;updating,bugs
• Compatibilityissues• Softwareanddataexpirationdate
• Systemoverload,hang• Unresponsivesystem• Alargenumberofalarms• Limitedinternetbandwidth• Variationin‘electricityvoltage’
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• Controllability
‘toomuchinformationonascreen’
‘overabundantcommunication’
Issuesrelatedtodigitalizationandautomation
Onavessel,thereareanumberofconningdisplaysinstalledindifferentlocations.Theyshouldprovideconsistentinformationatalltime.
Thesetwopicturesweretakenalmostatthesametimeonavessel,showingtwoconningdisplays.
Noticeanythingwrong?
Study 2.…Exploratory
• Ergonomics issue related tohumaninteractions• Discrepancyofknowledge:
• specialfamiliarizationortrainingprogram
Criticalincidentsrelatedtodigitalizationandautonomy
DPfailureOneOSVwaslyingbesideaninstallationonDP.Insteadofholdingsteadyonthe specifiedspot,thevesselbegantomovetowardtheinstallation.Theofficertookoverthecontrols,shutdowntheDPsystem,andbackedtheshipawayfromthestructure.Onehosewasstillconnectedtotheinstallationandsnappedoff.Thesystemascertainedthatthevesselwasmorethan100mawayfromtheinstallation,whileinrealityitwasapproximately20maway.
Explanationfromthemanufacturer:
“…Wehavefoundtherootcauseforthis,andimplementedasolutionforit.Thisfailurewillnothappenagain.”
Interpretedasnon‐random,systematicerror
Overlookedscenarioduringdesign/development
Further exploration regarding the incident, according to the seafarers experience, “DP2 fails all the time”
Criticalincidentsaffectingautonomy
Blackout
OneOSVwaspreparingtomaneuverawayfromaninstallation.Tocruisetothenextinstallation,thebridgeaskedforasuddenincreaseofpowerthatthesystemwasunabletoaccommodate.
Atthetime,thesystemwasrunningonLNGfuelandattemptedtoautomaticallyswitchovertodiesel,buttheswitchoverfailed,andthesystemblackout.
Explanation:
Apparently,LNGfuelhasacharacteristicofwhichtheoperatorhadnotbeenmadeaware:
itislessresponsivetovariationsinthepowerrequirements
thedesignerandthemanufacturerwerenotawareofthischaracteristicofLNGfuel.
13.11.2006 A collision caused by blackout: Navion Hispania (tanker) blacked out, due to polluted fuel and a system malfunction. Hit Njord B at 1.2 m/s. Collision energy > 60 MJ.
Oneunresolvedissuerelatedtodigitalizationandautomation
OnoneOSV:ReleasingDPsystemfromautomaticmodetomanualmoderequiresaspecificresponseoftime.Withoutfullcontrol,thisdelaycanbecritical,especiallywhenthevesselislocatedclosetoaninstallation.Normallytheoperatorwillusethejoysticktobringthevesselawayfromtheinstallationbeforeswitchingtomanualmode.
OntheotherOSVThisdoesnotoccurbecausethetransitionoccursinstantaneously.
Expertfromaclassificationsocietystatedthatthetransferofcontrolbetweenmodesofoperationshouldbeimmediate.Adelayof10secondsisnotacceptableforthisvessel.
Thefactthatthevesselisapprovedtooperateandcarrytheassociatednotationcausesconfusion.
Study 2.Exploratory field study
Lessons learned
ModificationoftheautopilotsystemCurrently,theautopilotwillautomaticallydeactivatedwhenthecrewoperatesthejoystick(DNVNAUTOSV2012).
500msafetyzoneisimplemented.Aninstallationcannolongerbeidentifiedasatargetforautopilot(NWEA2006,updated2009)
PotentialcontributionofautomationonOSVoperation:
Smartlookout,enhancedautopilot ‘Smartrouting’~f(weather,fuelcons,t,etc.) Automaticpositioning/‘parking’ Maintenance:‘longdistancesetup,updates,ormaintenance’bythemanufacture Maintenanceschedule,‐ canbeperformedwhenthevesselatport Automaticemergencystop e‐(smart)checklist
• Increase bulwark height to avoid green water
• To secure tubular cargoes on deck, developed & installed:portable, automatic, movable stanchions
25
Lessonslearnedondeck
Lessons(triedtobe)learned,andfail
26
Tohelpdeckhandsconnectbulkhoseatsea,anautomaticbulkcargosecuring&transfer
systemwasdeveloped&installed,butfailtowork
27
Study 2.Qualitative study
Conclusions
HFhasbeenconsideredinOSVsdesign; Thecrewsingeneralaresatisfiedwiththeirvessel Thereisalwaysroomforimprovement HFconsiderationsonOSVswerehappeningduetogoodcommunicationsbetween
thecrew,shipowners,cargoownersanddifferentmanufacturers,includingtheshipyards.
Financialincentivesforresearchanddevelopmentalsoplaysanimportantrole.
Differentproblemsareexperiencedbydifferentvessels HFproblemsareunique(noise,motion,controllability,etc.) Someissuesremain(illumination,layout,space,stairs,access)
Bestsatisfying:Habitability&Workability Lowestsatisfying:Maintainability Fastestgrowingdimension:Controllability There isapotential of unknown riskinthe development of new
equipment/system.
RQ1.Howare humanfactors taken into account inship design?
28
Study 3.Quantitative study
Tocheckifthequalitativefindingsarevalid
Anexplanatory studyusing quantitativeapproachwas conducted
Results:HumanFactorsonOffshoreSupplyVesselsintheNorwegianSea– AnExplanatorySurvey
TransRINA,Vol158,PartA1,InternationalJournalofMaritimeEngineering,Jan‐Mar2016
RQ1.Howare HFtaken into account inship design?RQ2.Isthere any effect of HFconsideration toincidences on board?
Study 3.…Quantitative
RQ1.Howare HFtaken into account inship design?
• Humanfactors aresignificantly addressed.• Dimensionsof humanfactors are notrated
equally: OHSisrated morehighly Maintainability israted lower
There isanindication that humanfactorsrating varies asaresult of OSVdesign,but the finding isinconclusive(duetonumericalcorrection)
Study 3.…QuantitativeHow often do the people on board experience
the following:How often does the vessel experience the
following:
RQ2a.Isthere any significant effect of ship designtoincidences on board?
Study 3.Quantitative
• Habitability hasapositiveeffect on the frequency ofpersonnel becoming seasick,fatigue andexperiencingsleep disturbance.
• Maintainability hasanegativeeffect on thefrequency of fireorexplosion on board.
RQ2b.Isthere any significant effect of HFconsideration toincidences on board?
32
Study 4.Evaluationstudy
Tocheckiftheexistingknowledgeofhumanfactorsinshipdesignandoperationareeffective
Anevaluation studywas conducted,byperforming physical measurementson board,combined with some observations anddaily diaries filled inbytheseafarers after every watch
RQ3.Arethe existing knowledge of HFinship designeffective?
33
Study 4.Evaluationstudy
Conclusions:
Theexisting noise criteria donotreflect comfort Disturbing noises [impulsivenoise,high pitch noise,squeaking noise andhammering
noise]are notcovered norcaptured
Motioncriteria need toberevised forOSVoperations They are notrealistic;the criteria are too high (too lenient),
especially MIIandrollmotion.
TheMSI(McCauley etal,1976)isextremely conservative forseafarers population,needs tobeadjusted
Recommendations:
Standardsandcriteria bere‐examined within areasonable periodof time,especially incaseanincident occurs
RQ3.Arethe existing standardsof HFinship designeffective?
35
Study 6.Theoretical evaluation
Some issues were found when developing HFcheck listsandquestionnaires,indicating that the concept of HFisstilldeveloping
Atheoretical evaluationwas performed toevaluate ortoconfirm the concept of HFinship design&operation,using factor analysis
Report:HumanFactorsinShipDesignandOperations:APreliminarySurveyoftheTheoreticalConstructTransRINA,Vol158,PartA2,InternationalJournalofMaritimeEngineering,Apr‐Jun2016
RQ5.What are HFinship design(andoperation)?
36
Study 6.Theoretical evaluation
Controllability
Workability
Habitability
Cargo facilities
Reliability, Automation and Maintainability
RQ5.What are HFinship design(andoperation)?
37
Study 6.Theoretical evaluation
Reliability, operabilityand maintainability
Interfacing complexity
Ship handling and manoeuvrability
System & procedure
Deck working condition
ER & ECR
Habitability
RQ5.What are HFinship design(andoperation)?
38
Study 6.Theoretical evaluation
A model showinghuman factorsconsiderations in ship design and operation is presented as a result of the theoretical study
RQ5.What are HFinship design(andoperation)?
Study 7.Riskassessment model
RQ6.HowtoaccountHFinmajorriskassessment?
Markov model, adopted from Dhillon (2003)
Safety instrumented system (Rausand & Høyland, 2004
This research adopted the existing hardware reliability framework to develop a method for predicting the probability of accident by focusing on human factors
Human reliability analysis Control theory, Cognitive approach Implemented to several accident cases