TOWARD A STRATEGY OF POSITIVE ENDS

Huba Wass de Czege

Antulio J. Echevarria II

September 2001

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ISBN 1-58487-070-2

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FOREWORD

Defense planners and strategists have recently proposed a variety of alternatives for America’s role in what many seeas a dramatically different international situation. Most ofthose proposals, though, continue with a Cold Warparadigm of trying to foresee what the next threat might beand how the United States might best prepare itself torespond to it. Consequently, the possibility of takingadvantage of the intrinsic dynamism of the new securityenvironment in order to create conditions that mightpromote positive ends—long-term peace, stability, andprosperity—has remained largely overlooked.

In this monograph, the authors, Brigadier General(Retired) Huba Wass de Czege and Lieutenant ColonelAntulio J. Echevarria II, make a case for a strategy aimed atachieving positive, rather than neutral or negative, ends.They first discuss the dynamic conditions of the newstrategic environment, then explore the options the UnitedStates has available for dealing with those conditions. Theoptions include (1) preventive defense, (2) neo-isolationism,and (3) a strategy that pursues positive ends. Only the last,the authors argue, deals with the new security environmentin a proactive way. It enables the United States to define itsvital interests in terms of conditions—such as peace,freedom, rule of law, and economic prosperity—rather thanas the containment or defeat of inimical state or nonstateactors. The basic approach of a strategy of positive endswould be to build and enlarge a circle of stakeholderscommitted to creating conditions for a profitable andenduring peace—thereby reducing the potential forcrises—and to preparing response mechanisms for copingsuccessfully when crises do occur.

As the authors show, a threat-based strategy has serious liabilities in an environment in which the next opponent orthe next crisis is nearly impossible to predict. The United

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States would do better, therefore, to pursue a strategy ofpositive ends, one that endeavors to maintain a dynamicand enduring peace.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.DirectorStrategic Studies Institute

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHESOF THE AUTHORS

ANTULIO J. ECHEVARRIA II is a U.S. Army lieutenantcolonel currently assigned as the Director of StrategicResearch at the Strategic Studies Institute. He graduatedfrom the U.S. Military Academy in 1981, was commissionedas an armor officer, and has held a variety of command andstaff assignments in Germany and Continental UnitedStates. Lieutenant Colonel Echevarria has also served as an assistant professor of European history at the U.S. MilitaryAcademy; Squadron S3 of 3/16 Cavalry; Chief of BN/TF andBde Doctrine at the U.S. Army Armor Center at Fort Knox;as an action officer at the Army After Next project at HQTRADOC, Ft. Monroe, VA; and as a speechwriter for theU.S. Army Chief of Staff. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army’s Command and General Staff College, and holds M.A. andPh.D. degrees in History from Princeton University.Lieutenant Colonel Echevarria has published articles in anumber of scholarly and professional journals to include theJournal of Military History, War in History, War & Society,Parameters, Joint Force Quarterly, Military Review, andAirpower Journal. His latest book is After Clausewitz:German Military Thinkers before the Great War, (Univer-sity Press of Kansas, 2001).

HUBA WASS DE CZEGE is a retired U.S. Army brigadiergeneral. During his career as an infantry officer, he servedtwo tours in Vietnam and gained staff experience at alllevels up to assistant division commander. General Wass De Czege was a principal designer of the operational conceptknown as AirLand Battle. He also was the founder and firstdirector of the Army’s School for Advanced Military Studieswhere he also taught applied military strategy. Afterretiring in 1993, General Wass De Czege became heavilyinvolved in the Army After Next Project and served onseveral Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

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advisory panels. He is a 1964 graduate of the U.S. MilitaryAcademy and holds an MPA from Harvard University.

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SUMMARY

While defense planners have recently proposed a variety of alternatives for America’s role in what many see as a NewWorld Coming, few of those proposals go beyond the ColdWar paradigm of threat-based strategic thinking. Thisparadigm focuses on deterring or defeating specific threats,rather than taking advantage of the intrinsic dynamism ofthe new security environment in order to create conditionsthat might promote long-term peace, stability, andprosperity.

America’s challenge today is to foster peace and stabilityin a dynamic world and to do so with strategic partners andallies willing and able to share the costs just as surely asthey reap the benefits. Hence, instead of a strategy orientedon prevention—a negative aim—the United States would do better to lead a 21st-century concert of nations towardcreating positive conditions, those that promote long-termpeace, stability, and prosperity. Such a strategy would, as amatter of course, preclude a number of threats—perhapseven the majority of them—from emerging in the first placeand would better position the United States to cope withunexpected emergencies.

New Global Challenges and Opportunities.

The forces of globalization are creating something of aJanus-faced future for the international community. At oneextreme, the future takes on the countenance of a stableworld in which national interests merge into the generalaim of promoting peace, stability, and economic prosperity.At the other extreme, the future assumes the face of a moredangerous and unpredictable world characterized byshifting power relationships, ad hoc security arrangements, and an ever-widening gap between haves and have-nots.

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The face of the future that comes into view willundoubtedly have features representing both extremes. The extent to which the United States and other powers work inconcert will make a difference in determining which aspectof Janus will become more prevalent. The United States canaddress the challenges of the new security environmentthrough any one of three broad strategic approaches:preventive defense, neo-isolationism, or a strategy aimed atpositive ends.

Preventive Defense. Preventive Defense aims atforestalling potential problems by deterring, containing,isolating, and defeating specific threats. Its success depends on developing the correct list of threats; and it generallyseeks to preserve or restore the status quo. It provides fordeterring —and defeating, if necessary—such potentialaggressors as Saddam Hussein in Iraq and Kim Jong Il inNorth Korea. However, a strategy of preventive defense,even if successful in deterring or defeating designatedthreats, could fail if other threats emerge that militaryforces are neither equipped nor trained to confront. It alsofalls short of providing a rationale for taking control ofevents that might shape the future or of building a broadmultinational basis for anticipating and addressing thetype of problems commonly associated with today’sstrategic environment.

Neo-isolationism. Neo-isolationism is sometimes calledstrategic independence or anti-interventionism. Under thisoption, the evolution of the international securityenvironment is left largely to itself. Neo-isolationismpursues a neutral end, since security interests are strictlydefined in terms of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happinessat home. Neo-isolationists tend to overvalue strategicdefenses of the homeland that promise to neutralize threatsfrom abroad. The principal weakness of a neo-isolationiststrategy is its lack of practicality. Isolation of any sort isbecoming difficult, if not impossible, to maintain in today’sglobal village. Ignoring the forces at work beyond U.S.borders is simply not an effective way of dealing with them.

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A Strategy of Positive Ends. A strategy of Positive Endsaims at building an international environment thatpromotes global peace, prosperity, freedom, economicstability, and the rule of law, and provides a multilateralbasis for crisis response. It differs from the other strategicapproaches discussed above in that it is oriented towardachieving a condition, rather than preparing to respond tospecific threats. In other words, its ends are positive, ratherthan negative or neutral. The basic approach would be tobuild and enlarge a circle of stakeholders committed toreducing the potential for crises and to prepare responsemechanisms for coping successfully when they do. Theprimary weakness of this strategy is that others canmisconstrue its goals as a form of Pax Americana,particularly if American leadership appears aggressive andhegemonic. A second weakness is that positive aimsgenerally require more energy and resources than donegative or neutral ones, which may mean that short-termcosts of this policy may be greater than people would expectto pay, at least when compared to other strategies.

These weaknesses notwithstanding, a strategy builtaround positive ends permits the United States to define itsvital interests in terms of conditions—such as peace,freedom, rule of law, and economic prosperity—rather thanas the containment or defeat of inimical state or non-stateactors.

On Ways and Means.

A coherent national strategy based on positive endsmust, of course, involve all elements of national power. Thepolitical and socio-cultural elements would help createconditions for long-term peace and stability bystrengthening democratic institutions worldwide, byadvancing human rights, and by responding tohumanitarian crises. The economic element of nationalpower would contribute to global prosperity by enhancingand guiding international financial institutions, by

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promoting open trading systems and global businessenterprises, and by providing for sustainable economicdevelopment worldwide. In broad terms, the militaryelement of national power must have the capability toconduct sustained peacetime engagement activities as wellas respond to two general types of crises (those withsignificant escalation potential and those without).

Peacetime engagement should lay the groundworknecessary to ensure such operations are not conducted offthe cuff, but reflect adequate planning, preparation, andconsensus building among allies and partners with regardto the desired strategic ends, ways, and means. Accordingly, the day-to-day work of military peacetime engagementshould become a high-priority effort for the U.S. defenseestablishment. The need to respond to two types of crisesmakes the value of an established multilateral responsemechanism clear, as well as the importance of a full-spectrum force, which can provide an array of responseoptions. Indeed, the nature of tomorrow’s opponents, thedestructive power of their weapons, and the environment inwhich they are likely to operate all underscore the need for abalanced force.

Despite the emergence of a new strategic environment,the legacies of the Cold War continue to influence U.S.strategic thinking. The problems associated with theStrategy Review are evidence of that. The defensecommunity continues to justify its strategic preferenceswith threat–based assessments, some of which are looselylabeled asymmetric. However, as has been shown, athreat-based strategy has serious liabilities in anenvironment in which the next opponent or the next crisis isnearly impossible to predict. Instead, the United Stateswould do well to pursue a strategy focused on positive ends,one that endeavors to maintain a dynamic and enduringpeace.

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TOWARD A STRATEGY OF POSITIVE ENDS

The emergence of a more dynamic and complex securityenvironment since the end of the Cold War has prompted acomprehensive reevaluation of America’s national securitystrategy. While defense planners have proposed a variety ofalternatives for America’s role in what many see as a NewWorld Coming, few of those proposals go beyond the ColdWar paradigm of threat-based strategic thinking. Althoughundeniably effective under certain conditions, thisparadigm has the distinct disadvantage of yielding theinitiative to outside forces. It focuses on deterring ordefeating specific threats, rather than taking advantage ofthe intrinsic dynamism of the new security environment inorder to create conditions that might promote long-termpeace, stability, and prosperity. It has the additionaldisadvantage—as reflected in today’s strategic dilemma—of placing defense planners in the position of having to make difficult resource choices in the absence of the underlyingrationale that a clear threat would provide. In short, thelogic of threat-based planning can lead to strategicparalysis, or—worse—a defense establishment organizedfor the wrong kind of threat.

America’s challenge today is to foster peace and stabilityin a dynamic world and to do so with strategic partners andallies willing and able to share the costs just as surely asthey reap the benefits. To be sure, deterring and defeatingthreats to U.S. security remain critical priorities. However,it is simply not possible to prepare for every contingency,especially since serious adversaries always try to strikewhere one is least prepared. Hence, instead of a strategyoriented on prevention—a negative aim—the United Stateswould do better to lead a 21st century concert of nationstoward creating positive conditions, those that promotelong-term peace, stability, and prosperity. Such a strategywould, as a matter of course, preclude a number of

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threats—perhaps even the majority of them—fromemerging in the first place and would better position theUnited States to cope with unexpected emergencies. Thismonograph describes the primary advantages of a nationalsecurity strategy oriented on positive ends.

New Global Challenges and Opportunities.

Most descriptions of the current and near-futurenational security environments indicate that the world isbecoming a more dangerous place.1 While changes in thecontemporary security environment might appear randomat first blush, closer analysis reveals that they reflect newglobal forces at work. Known collectively as globalization,these forces include the spread of information andinformation technologies, as well as the concomitant,ever-increasing propensity of the world’s populations toparticipate in economic and political processes.2

Globalization has begun to transform every aspect ofhuman affairs, from enhancing the real and virtual mobility of people and things to reforming the ways in whicheconomic and political interests are defined. Interests thatwere once local or special in other ways can now cut acrossnational boundaries to gain more publicity and support. Forexample, corporate interests mobilized via the WorldEconomic Forum and the International Chamber ofCommerce have influenced global policies that haveexpanded trade regimes, regulated markets, and partiallyredefined the roles of governments and internationalorganizations, including the United Nations. Similarly,special interest groups, such as Amnesty International,Greenpeace, Oxfam, and the International Committee ofthe Red Cross, have become powerful international forces in their own right. They have effectively promoted treaties tolimit global warming, to establish an international criminalcourt, and to outlaw antipersonnel mines. Othertransnational forces have challenged state sovereignty inthe area of human rights. The internationalization of

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justice, for example, recently brought about the arrest ofAugusto Pinochet, the former Chilean dictator, for humanrights violations committed decades earlier in his owncountry. This broad dispersion of the ability to influencepolitical agendas and outcomes has been both observed andencouraged by a number of the world’s leaders, includingthe secretary-general of the United Nations, thedirector-general of the World Trade Organization, and themanaging director of the International Monetary Fund.3

Yet, all is not good news. While economic globalizationhas brought greater prosperity to some parts of the world, ithas also contributed to the quick spread of an Asianeconomic flu to other regions. Even if this crisis has passed,recovery might take considerable time.4 Other evidencesuggests that, despite (or perhaps because of) economicglobalization, 70 percent of the world’s wealth continues totravel back and forth among 28 percent of the world’spopulation, thereby excluding developing and undevelopedcountries and exacerbating the gap between haves andhave-nots.5 Furthermore, growing prosperity does notpreclude economic conflict, as developments in Europe andAsia seem to indicate.6 Moreover, despite a decade’s worthof effort, a free market economy has failed to take hold inRussia owing to an ineffective government, a well-entrenched organized crime syndicate, and growingregional fragmentation, among other problems. Tensions inthe Middle East, where democracy has precious fewfootholds, have risen recently, threatening to erupt in abroader military and political crisis. While democracy hasmade rapid strides in Central and South America, economicchange has exacerbated social inequalities; and corruptionand narco-trafficking remain stubborn problems. In Africa,economic growth has been uneven and intrastate violencehas been extremely bloody.7

In other words, the forces of globalization are creatingsomething of a Janus-faced future for the internationalcommunity. At one extreme, the future takes on thecountenance of a stable world in which national interests

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merge into the general aim of promoting peace, stability,and economic prosperity. In this world, the rule of law andpluralistic political systems continue to spread, albeit withsome degree of friction, and the number of free-marketeconomies expands, distributing economic prosperity stillfurther, if unevenly, due to the influence of state laws,institutions, and bureaucracies. Indeed, within the lastdecade alone, globalization contributed to increasing thenumber of democracies in the world by 14 percent. Morethan half of the world’s population now lives underdemocratic rule.8 While the argument that democracies donot go to war against each other is based on a limited database, it is fair to say that democracies with established civilsocieties—where strong traditions exist concerning the ruleof law and citizens feel empowered to participate in thepolitical process—tend to define security problemssimilarly.9 Historically, they have demonstrated a greaterwillingness to cooperate in addressing the challenges posedby arms proliferation, terrorism, transnational crime, massmigrations, ethnic strife, and other security problems. Suchinclinations suggest a greater opportunity for creatingfavorable conditions for continued peace and prosperitythan one would find in a global environment dominated byautocratic regimes.

At the other extreme, the future assumes the face of amore dangerous and unpredictable world characterized byshifting power relationships, ad hoc security arrangements, and an ever-widening gap between haves and have-nots. Inthis future, a number of the world’s new democracies—lacking strong traditions for maintaining a balance ofpower—collapse after experiencing only transitorysuccesses; and transnational threats, such as internationalcrime syndicates, terrorist networks, and drug cartels,continue to grow in strength and influence, thriving amongautocratic, weak, or so-called failed states. Hence, underthese conditions, a greater number of autocratic regimes,perhaps allied with nefarious transnational actors, wouldlikely emerge. Since perennial sources of friction—ethnic

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rivalries, nationalism, religious-based antagonisms, andcompetition for scarce resources, including water—would go unresolved in such an environment, they would continue toprovoke serious crises, especially as the world’s populationincreases.

As the Vietnam conflict, the war in Afghanistan, and theKosovo crisis have shown, a state need not be a peercompetitor or even a major regional power to posesignificant security problems. Such states could well employ what diplomats and policymakers have rather loosely called asymmetric strategies, which—despite the confusioncreated by recent rhetoric—amount to little more than theexploitation of an Achilles’ heel.10 Even with moreconventional means, small states can prove difficultcontenders. The Kosovo crisis required the marshalling ofconsiderable political and military resources from NATO,for example. Yet, if supported by a larger state or a networkof transnational forces or armed with one or more weaponsof mass destruction, a small state like Serbia would havepresented much greater—perhaps even insuperable—challenges even for an alliance as large as NATO. Whether a manifestation of the clash of civilizations or the cominganarchy, therefore, this face of the future poses some noveland rather thorny challenges for the ends, ways, and meansof future strategy.11

The face of the future that comes into view willundoubtedly have features representing both extremes. The extent to which the United States and other powers work inconcert will make a difference in determining which aspectof Janus will become more prevalent. The United States canaddress the challenges of the new security environmentthrough any one of three broad strategic approaches:preventive defense, neo-isolationism, or a strategy aimed atpositive ends.

Preventive Defense. Preventive Defense aims atforestalling potential problems by deterring, containing,isolating, and defeating specific threats.12 This option

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essentially amounts to little more than a complex version ofthe threat-based strategy that characterized the Cold War.It orients on the more dangerous and unpredictable face ofJanus, pursuing a negative rather than a positive aim. Itssuccess depends on developing the correct list of threats; itgenerally seeks to preserve or restore the status quo.

The major advantages of this approach are that it hasthe momentum of current practice behind it and that it isviewed as defensive as opposed to aggressive or hegemonic.It provides for deterring—and defeating, if necessary—such potential aggressors as Saddam Hussein in Iraq and KimJong Il in North Korea. It also recognizes the need toestablish a regional balance of power in areas where thepotential for trouble exists, but where the lines of conflictare less clearly drawn, as in the Persian Gulf, the MiddleEast, and the Formosa Strait. Some advocates of thisapproach argue in favor of shifting U.S. defense focustoward the Pacific Rim, improving the defenses of thehomeland, and adjusting the current force-sizing metric to a redefined threat.

The principal weakness of this strategy, even if themetric is adjusted, is that it tends to focus too narrowly onan identifiable and predictable threat list. A purelythreat-based metric, such as that associated withcounter-aggression scenarios in Southwest and NortheastAsia, fails to account for the unique requirements of otherkinds of interventions, such as those encountered inGrenada, Panama, Haiti, Somalia, Libya, Bosnia, Kosovo,and elsewhere. While it is prudent not to disregard knownthreats, this approach depends too much on planning andjustifying resources in terms of predictable threats andcapabilities. It tends to assume that problems not includedin the list are not dangerous, or will not expand or escalateinto serious crises. Because the logic of the strategy is basedon a consensus regarding specific threats, responses tounforeseen crises will generally be inefficient and in somecases wholly ineffective. New strategic problems willrequire considerable time and debate to build support for

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action, which an adversary can use to its strategicadvantage. In other words, a strategy of preventive defense,even if successful in deterring or defeating designatedthreats, could fail if other threats emerge that militaryforces are neither equipped nor trained to confront. In short, it could put the nation on the path toward fighting thewrong kind of war against the wrong type of foe.

A second weakness is that this strategic approach, andthe threat-based metrics that underlie it, do not afford much in the way of strategic flexibility. The United States and itsglobal security partners have participated in a growingnumber of low-visibility peace operations that facilitateagreements among states and quasi-states, such as Ecuador and Peru, Israel and Egypt, East Timor and Indonesia, andthe Kosovar-Albanians and Kosovar-Serbs.13 They have also provided military support to long-standing arrangementswith other national and international agencies to monitorarms control arrangements; counter the drug trade; controlthe spread of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear,High-explosive/High-yield (CBRNE) weapons; monitorembargoes; and so on. They have responded to humanitar-ian crises, such as those in northern Iraq, Somalia, andRwanda, where military forces facilitated the work ofnational, international, private and other nongovernmental agencies. They have also had increasing occasion tofacilitate the evacuation of American citizens and othernoncombatants when hostilities break out unexpectedly.Finally, U.S. forces have been committed to exchanges andexercises that build a basis for cooperative action withregional friends and neighbors.

In essence, the logic underpinning the threat-basedpreventive defense approach wrongly assumes that forcescommitted to these activities are available for crisisresponse elsewhere. Hence, it tends to blur the distinctionbetween forces assigned to the daily work of shaping theinternational environment and those designated as a hedgeagainst strategic risk. Certain of these activities—such aspeacekeeping missions based on treaty requirements—

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must continue even during a crisis. Forces engaged in themcannot readily disengage. Any threat-based metric suffersfrom the same flawed logic.

In sum, preventive defense seeks to forestall potentialproblems by deterring, containing, isolating, and defeatingspecific threats to preserve or restore the status quo.However, it fails to provide a rationale for taking control ofevents that might shape the future. It also fails to build abroad multinational basis for responding to the type ofproblems commonly associated with today’s strategicenvironment.

Neo-isolationism. Neo-isolationism is sometimes calledstrategic independence or anti-interventionism. Under thisoption, the evolution of the international securityenvironment is left largely to itself. In other words, thisapproach would attempt to isolate the United States fromthe effects of the dangerous Janus face. Neo-isolationismpursues a neutral end, since security interests are strictlydefined in terms of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happinessat home. Resources spent on overseas engagement arereduced and greater risks are accepted in terms of crisisresponse. One rarely finds neo-isolationist strategiesproposed under that name. Instead, the approach typicallytakes the form of arguments against U.S. militaryinvolvement abroad and for extensive defenses at home.U.S. military involvement abroad—usually calledintervention—is seen as either ineffective or too expensive,or both.14 Neo-isolationists tend to overvalue strategicdefenses of the homeland that promise to neutralize threatsfrom abroad. They would, for example, favor establishingnational missile defenses at the expense of active crisisresponse and overseas engagement forces, and at the risk ofstability in external relations with key regional or globalpowers.

A Fortress America brand of this approach also exists,the true colors of which are sometimes partly obscured byvociferous calls for more military force structure and an

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overall increase in defense spending. Nonetheless, themissions this larger military force would perform—large-scale conventional wars rather than smaller scalecontingencies or operations other than war—reveal that the strategy’s true aim is to limit U.S. military involvement tothe big one, which in effect amounts to an overall strategicretreat since a large-scale conflict is unlikely in the nearterm. In short, this more extreme version amounts tobuilding a large defense establishment and then takingrefuge behind it.

The principal weakness of a neo-isolationist strategy isits lack of practicality.15 Isolation of any sort is becomingdifficult, if not impossible, to maintain in today’s globalvillage. Ignoring the forces at work beyond U.S. borders issimply not an effective way of dealing with them. As theworld becomes more economically interdependent, thepenalties for withdrawing and allowing stability to erodemay prove very costly, perhaps leading to a climate moreconducive to state adventurism, transnational crime, andinternational terrorism. Certainly, efforts to counter armsproliferation and curb mass migrations, both of whichrequire active measures, would suffer. The foundation forcooperative action in response to crises would also decay.Hence, responding to major crises might demand a largerexpenditure of resources in the long run than preventivemeasures would have required, thereby effectively negating any dividend gained from a strategic retreat. Finally, as inthe case of France in the 1930s, the decision to put resourcesinto a fortress or Maginot-Line type of strategy ultimatelymeans the foreclosure of certain strategic options, such asresponding to Hitler’s remilitarization of the Rhineland in1936, the annexation of Czechoslovak territory in 1938, orthe invasion of Poland in 1939.16 The strategic lesson from afar less complex time is that a great power ought to havebroad offensive and defensive options, and that alliesmatter.

A Strategy of Positive Ends. A strategy of positive endsaims at building an international environment that

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promotes global peace, prosperity, freedom, economicstability, and the rule of law, and provides a multilateralbasis for crisis response.17 This approach seeks to harnessthe forces behind one Janus countenance to counter thecomplex and unpredictable forces associated with the other.It differs from the other strategic approaches discussedabove in that it is oriented toward achieving a condition,rather than preparing to respond to specific threats. Inother words, its ends are positive, rather than negative orneutral. The basic approach would be to build and enlarge acircle of stakeholders committed to reducing the potentialfor crises and to prepare response mechanisms for copingsuccessfully when they do.

A strategy of positive ends would have two primaryobjectives. The first would include performing peacetime-engagement missions intended to prevent crises fromemerging. When crises do occur, stakeholders would workproactively to minimize the need for forceful intervention. Ifintervention becomes necessary, the United States andother stakeholder nations would take advantage of theregional climate of support that peacetime activities hadcreated to act rapidly and decisively to resolve the crisis.The regional balance of power that peacetime engagementwould aim to create by enlarging the circle of stakeholderswould also help prevent crises from escalating into majorconflicts. In addition, it would contribute to creating a basisfor a multilateral response, thereby easing the process ofcoalition building.

Second, when responding to a crisis, stakeholders wouldendeavor to create political, economic, and militaryconditions more stable than those of the status quo ante. For example, under a policy of positive ends, stakeholders would make a commitment to respond to humanitarian crises, toestablish and maintain political and economic stability, toprotect global infrastructures, to guarantee the safety ofcitizens, and to contain or channel the rise of so-called states of concern. However, the process of responding would also

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include identifying the root causes of the problem andcreating conditions that prevent the crisis from recurring.

Two ways exist to achieve the second aim. First,stakeholders can install a nonaggressive regime in place ofthe aggressive one, as was done in Germany and Japan after World War II. Or, if that is not possible because theaggressor can guarantee its survival by resorting to nuclearescalation, stakeholders can create a more stable regionalbalance of power by a combination of actions, such asbuilding up and reinforcing regional allies, installing averifiable arms control regime, and imposing variousnonmilitary sanctions as was done with Iraq at the end ofOperation DESERT STORM. Admittedly, the latter coursetends to add a long-term, day-to-day burden to themaintenance of the peace. Nonetheless, the new regionalbalance of power can serve to stabilize the area over the longterm.

The primary weakness of this strategy is that others canmisconstrue its goals as a form of Pax Americana,particularly if American leadership appears aggressive andhegemonic.18 Some parts of the world see the United Statesas the primary force behind the advancement of Westernvalues. They see such values as repugnant and evil and,hence, resist them.19 Each region has its special problems,and the United States must build partnerships and theconditions for peace and prosperity on a region-by-regionbasis. The United States and other stakeholders must,therefore, become more aware of and sensitive to the detailsof regional affairs. Otherwise, the approach will becomecounterproductive, with other states either resisting itsaims or stepping aside to allow the United States to take thelead and shoulder the burdens. Indeed, rather than creating a world of peace, stability, and economic prosperity, theUnited States could well find itself the target of one or moremultinational alliances or coalitions set on curbing, if notundermining, its influence. When it comes to practicalexecution, therefore, U.S. representatives abroad would dowell to follow the principal rule of the medical profession—

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first, do no harm—and to emphasize consensus-building.This emphasis on consensus does not, however, mean thatthe United States should never take the lead in regionalaffairs. On the contrary, it can and should do so wheneversuch action is in its interest.

A second weakness is that positive aims generallyrequire more energy and resources than do negative orneutral ones, which may mean that short-term costs of thispolicy may be greater than people would expect to pay, atleast when compared to other strategies. This could makenational consensus more difficult to achieve in the shortterm. While the constructive use of those resources mightwell reduce the frequency and scale of international crisesover the long run—and thus prove a worthwhile investment—the payoffs are not always readily apparent. It is difficult toprove that a particular strategic approach deterred orpreempted a major conflict. Methods for measuring theeffectiveness of peace operations, for example, are stillevolving. An inherent risk, therefore, is that the strategyrequires a willingness to make possibly large investmentsin the short term for results that might not manifestthemselves until the long term.

These weaknesses notwithstanding, a strategy builtaround positive ends permits the United States to define itsvital interests in terms of conditions—such as peace,freedom and democracy, rule of law, and economicprosperity—rather than as the containment or defeat ofinimical state or non-state actors. This approach alsoaccords well with the ongoing expansion of open marketeconomies and pluralistic governments. A positive strategyalso offers two intrinsic advantages. First, it tends togenerate momentum and support as it succeeds. Second, itpermits the United States to take the strategic initiative,allowing it not only to shape the peace, but to have a majorhand in setting the terms for conflict resolution.

Put simply, if the United States wants a world closer tothe first Janus face to materialize, it will have to become

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more actively engaged in the international system. It willhave to promote democratic principles, free-marketeconomies, and human rights, and assume an appropriateleadership role in multinational defense arrangements. Inshort, it will have to pursue a strategy of positive ends.

A prerequisite, of course, is to build consensus at homeand among key strategic allies and partners. Althoughmajor differences exist over the specific priorities ofAmerica’s national strategy, most policymakers do agreethat our strategic ends should be greater peace andprosperity and that the United States should remain apositive force in the world. A number of defense studies have stated that the United States will continue to play asignificant part in “shaping the international securityenvironment” and should actively embrace that role.20

Likewise, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice andforeign policy expert Robert B. Zoellick have stressed theneed to develop “a long term strategy to promote peace,security, and liberty” and to “affect the shape of the world tocome.”21 Foreign policy experts from outside theadministration have also come out in favor of a Global NewDeal that supports the concept of Engagement, but they also imply that it should have gone further.22 Thus, Democratsand Republicans alike seem to agree on the generalstrategic ends that the United States should pursue. Thereis, therefore, good reason to believe that a determined effortcould achieve consensus at home.

The next step would be to build consensus abroad and towiden the circle of stakeholders—those allies and reliablesecurity partners who share basic values in terms ofdemocratic principles, the rule of law, and free marketeconomies. Currently, stakeholders include such states asGreat Britain, Canada, Germany, France, Australia, NewZealand, and Japan. The list should also include G-7economic powers, European Union and North AmericanFree Trade Agreement members, and most NATO allies.Broadening this circle would mean eventually includingsuch states as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, South Africa, South

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Korea, Singapore, Thailand, and others. In addition, everyeffort should be made to add Indonesia, India, China, andRussia to the list of stakeholders.23

On Ways and Means.

A coherent national strategy based on positive endsmust, of course, involve all elements of national power. Thepolitical and socio-cultural elements would help createconditions for long-term peace and stability bystrengthening democratic institutions worldwide, byadvancing human rights, and by responding tohumanitarian crises. The economic element of nationalpower would contribute to global prosperity by enhancingand guiding international financial institutions, bypromoting open trading systems, and by providing forsustainable economic development worldwide. Arguably,these elements of national power would contribute the lion’s share to building conditions of greater peace and stability.

Yet, this strategy will also require certain elements ofmilitary power important enough to address here. In broadterms, the military element of national power must have the capability to conduct sustained peacetime engagementactivities as well as respond to two general types of crises(those with significant escalation potential and thosewithout). Collectively, these missions more closely reflectthe requirements of the new security environment thanthose of the Cold War.

Peacetime Engagement, which includes stability andsupport operations as well as coalition and alliancebuilding, contributes to the creation, improvement, andmaintenance of regional systems of collective response for(1) routinizing the methods and procedures addressingsmaller strategic problems, and (2) dealing more effectivelywith Type I crises (negligible escalation potential) and TypeII crises (significant escalation potential).

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Maintaining and shaping the peace through peacetimeengagement is a continuous strategic activity. It is alsolabor intensive. It requires regional street smarts anddisciplined troops on the ground.24 When a crisis erupts, it is generally not advisable or even practical to withdraw forcesalready carrying out peacetime engagement. For one thing,withdrawal may undermine the accomplishment oflong-term regional objectives or treaty violations—thereasons troops were positioned there in the first place.Secondly, such forces may not have the physical capabilityto respond quickly, due to the need to disengage from theirengagement duties. Even temporary substitution of U.S.forces in the region by allies or coalition partners will entailsome delay. In short, fulfillment of the national securitystrategy will require the commitment of U.S. forces atstrategic locations throughout the globe. Honoringcommitments, in turn, will require leaving a certainnumber of those forces in place, making them unavailablefor other missions, despite a reshuffling of priorities due toevents elsewhere.

The following stability and support operations fall under peacetime engagement activities:25

Stability Operations:

• Show of Force – long and short-term activities designed to reassure allies, deter known or potential threats, andgain increased influence.

• Arms Control – assisting in locating, seizing, anddestroying weapons and otherwise supporting arms controlregimes.

• Peace Operations – Peace Enforcement (PEO),Peacekeeping (PKO), and other operations supportingdiplomatic efforts to establish peace settlements, treaties,and accords.

• Noncombatant Evacuations – relocating threatenedcivilian noncombatants.

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• Humanitarian and Civic Assistance – plannedassistance conducted in conjunction with military training.

• Security Assistance – providing defense articles,military training, and other services to foreign nations.

• Support to Counter Drug Operations – assisting in thedetection, disruption, interdiction, and destruction of illicitdrugs.

• Combating Terrorism – offensive and defensivemeasures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism.

• Foreign Internal Defense – assisting legitimategovernments in freeing and protecting their societies fromsubversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.

• Support to Insurgencies – logistical and trainingsupport to insurgencies that oppose regimes hostile to theUnited States.

Support Operations:

• Domestic Support Operations – supporting efforts ofstate and local government organizations in an emergencysituation.

• Foreign Humanitarian Assistance – supporting effortsof foreign governments in an emergency situation.

Building Coalitions and Alliances, which also fallsunder peacetime engagement, includes collective securityexercises and other activities that facilitate team buildingamong strategic partners. In the new dynamic securityenvironment, regional coalitions and alliances will likelyincrease in strategic value. Indeed, many of the challengesreflected in the new strategic environment aretransnational in character and would, thus, require amultilateral approach for resolution. The United Statesmay well participate in a greater number of alliances, butnot necessarily as a leader or even as a dominant member.Alliances and coalitions can help lessen tensions, increase

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communication of intentions and capabilities, and raiseunderstanding among members. They can also contribute to distributing the benefits and costs of maintaining andshaping the peace. Even more important, they provide avaluable strategic mechanism for executing regional crisisresponse. Alliances, especially, can work towardestablishing and expanding zones of security comprised ofmultiple collective-security arrangements and arms controlagreements.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation inEurope (OSCE) is an example of just such a collectivesecurity arrangement. Its members—some 54states—share core values, institutions, and interests. TheOSCE has fielded dozens of advisor teams on missionsacross Europe and Central Asia to monitor and promoterespect for human rights and democratic processes,including free elections, free speech, and the rule of law.Similarly, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces inEurope (CFE), signed in November 1990 by NATO andseveral members of the Warsaw Pact, is an example of anarms control agreement that spans (or spanned) opposingalliances.26 Such collective security arrangements facilitatecrisis response by providing a ready framework forintelligence sharing, operational planning, access to basesand airfields, and logistical support.27

In addition, programs like the Partnership for Peace(PfP) initiative could serve as a model for future cooperativeendeavors.28 Such programs facilitate internationalcooperation by removing suspicions and by building a basisfor future teamwork. In order to ensure that such teamworkis built on a foundation of jointness, each branch of the U.S.military would have to commit resources in proportion tothe degree of integration required in wartime.

Accordingly, the day-to-day work of military peacetimeengagement should become a high-priority effort for theU.S. defense establishment. While such operations doindeed take away time and other resources necessary for

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preparing for war, they also build strategically valuablemilitary skills and capabilities that can enable and assistthe U.S. military’s capacity to wage war. In other words,military forces must have the capability to be proactiveduring peacetime, not just the capability to react to crises.Any military response to a crisis must come from anunderstanding of the conditions and forces that were atwork beforehand and those necessary to produce a morestable peace afterward. In particular, military actionsaimed at defeating and removing adversarial regimes willrequire a balanced—full dimensional—force and the United States would likely contribute a significant share of thatforce. Consequently, the defense establishment will have torethink what military forces can, or should, do in peacetime, as well as in war.

Crisis Response.

Even with successful peacetime engagement around theworld, unexpected situations are bound to develop that willrequire some form of crisis response. Such response willrequire a flexible basis that accepts the unpredictability ofcrises and prepares to address them accordingly. In generalterms, crisis response will fall under two categories. Type Icrises require forceful intervention, but the circumstancesare such that the risk of escalation to major war is notpresent. Since this category includes crises that arerelatively isolated politically, they can be resolved with asudden and overwhelming coup de main approach. Type Icrises tend to permit the use of decisive force even inconjunction with the pursuit of limited political objectives.Political ends can thus be stated in terms of absolutes, suchas “enforce . . .,” “gain control of . . .,” “defeat . . .,” or“reinstate. . . .” Operational details will, of course, varyaccording to political aims and other circumstances. If thepurpose is punitive, a quick strike using long-range,precision engagement munitions may suffice. On the otherhand, a more decisive aim will require full-dimensional,joint capabilities.

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Ideally, peacetime engagement will have laid thegroundwork necessary to ensure such operations are notconducted off the cuff, but reflect adequate planning,preparation, and consensus building among allies andpartners with regard to the desired strategic ends, ways,and means. If so, the principles underlying a traditionalcoup de main might apply: a sudden, violent application offorce that limits an adversary’s opportunities to react. TypeI crises typically include:

• Enforcing key elements of international law, especially critical arms control or environmental treaty obligations,international sanctions, or agreements with the weight ofinternational law (e.g., Iraq, 1998).

• Gaining control of transnational terrorist or criminalorganizations where circumstances are conducive tointervention (e.g., Afghanistan/Sudan, 1998; and Panama,1989-90).

• Defeating regular/irregular forces of governmentsengaged in crimes against humanity (e.g., Cambodia, 1978;Rwanda, 1994; Serbia, 1999).

• Reinstating legitimate governments illegally deposed(e.g., Haiti).

Type II crises, by comparison, are those with anapparent potential for vertical or lateral escalation.Typically, these crises involve actions—such as treatyviolations, major economic disruptions, or invasion of anally or a strategic partner—that directly challenge the vitalinterests of the United States and its allies. Such actionswill generally require a rapid military response, but will notnecessarily include the removal of the belligerent regime,especially if that regime possesses the means to launch aretaliatory strike using nuclear weapons. As such, they pose special challenges that require concerted allied efforts andrelatively large, well-balanced military forces from thestart. In such cases, the value of an established multilateralresponse mechanism becomes clear, as does the importance

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of a full-spectrum force, which can provide an array ofresponse options.

Since Type II crises have the potential to escalate,political and military leaders will want to exert more control over the introduction of force, bringing it into the theater instages and keeping the amount and type of forceappropriately aligned with political and military objectives.Such an approach may lead to longer, more deliberatecampaigns than those typical of Type I crises. Hence, toaddress Type II crises, the United States and its allies willneed the capability to fight and win deliberate campaigns.

Although conventional wisdom considers the likelihoodof such conflicts as low, it is irresponsible not to prepare forthem, particularly as history shows that authoritarianregimes can generally change policies faster thandemocracies can respond. Military response in such cases ismore akin to a strategic-level meeting engagement in whichone side carefully gages its actions at each stage of theconflict to produce a specific effect and to avoid suddenescalation. In other words, the political aims and militaryoptions chosen would depend upon the circumstances ofeach situation.

It is also important to point out that—regardless of thetype of mission—the operational environment in which U.S. forces must operate is changing. The U.S. military is morelikely to encounter conventional and unconventional forcesworking in an integrated fashion. The proliferation ofCBRNE in combination with the tools and effects of theglobal age will likely make the latter, especially, much moredangerous than hitherto. In addition, since the alreadyrapid pace of urbanization is expected to increase, thenumber of crisis response operations that take place inurban environments will probably multiply. Indeed, in anera in which even small powers might possess the capability to project certain kinds of power globally, especiallyCBRNE, the terms smaller-scale contingencies (SSCs) andmajor theater wars (MTWs) are no longer useful. Size and

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intensity have become misleading metrics. For example, the Kosovo conflict (1999), which was officially classified as aSSC, required as many aerospace assets as a typical MTW.29

It is equally unhelpful to use the terms conventional andunconventional when referring to military conflict. Theproliferation of CBRNE, the permeability of nationalborders, the increasing speed of physical travel, and theubiquity of internet communications will extend the reachof so-called unconventional forces. This extension, in turn,will probably make unconventional forces and forms ofconflict more frequent, thereby making the unconventionalmore conventional. In other words, future conflicts willlikely involve a greater integration of conventional andunconventional forces and approaches.

Indeed, the nature of tomorrow’s opponents, thedestructive power of their weapons, and the environment inwhich they are likely to operate all underscore the need for abalanced force. To be sure, allies and coalition partnerscould well contribute a large portion of the required landpower with the United States supplying the bulk of air, sea,space, and information systems. Yet, the U.S. military willprobably still have to contribute operationally significantland-power formations in order to provide technologicalovermatch, to demonstrate resolve, and to exert influenceover the pursuit of political aims. Operational significancevaries according to circumstances, but, in general, it meansassuming an appreciable share of the risk and committing aforce large enough to make a difference in the battlespace.Indeed, the continued proliferation of integratedsurveillance, missile, and cannon technologies will likelymultiply the advantages of the defense, requiring U.S.forces to possess a significant numerical and technologicalovermatch to prevail even against modest adversaries.

It is beyond the scope of this monograph to specify exactnumbers and types of forces needed for peacetimeengagement or response to Type I or Type II crises. Ingeneral terms, however, the U.S. Army’s regionalcommitment to a strategy of positive ends should consist of a

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baseline force comprised of a theater army, Army specialoperations forces, a forward-presence corps, and a corpsequivalent of reserve component forces for rotationalemployment. This baseline force would include active andreserve component forces. Active components, rounded outwith reserve component elements, would conduct the dailywork of peacetime engagement. Concurrently, a corpsequivalent of reserve component forces would conductlong-range planning for full integration into the recurringwork of peacetime engagement. As a rule of thumb, then,reserve forces would be allocated against the morepredictable requirements of the future, and active forcesagainst initial commitments and those most likely tochange. The defense community should also use acombination of historical data, regional political-militaryprojections, and wargaming analyses to help quantify forcerequirements. Budget decisions and the risks the politicalleadership is willing to accept will, of course, further definethe dimensions of the future force.

Despite the emergence of a new strategic environment,the legacies of the Cold War continue to influence U.S.strategic thinking. The problems associated with theStrategy Review are evidence of that. The defensecommunity continues to justify its strategic preferenceswith threat–based assessments, some of which are looselylabeled asymmetric. However, as has been shown, athreat-based strategy has serious liabilities in anenvironment in which the next opponent or the next crisis isnearly impossible to predict.

Instead, the United States would do well to pursue astrategy focused on positive ends, one that endeavors tomaintain a dynamic peace. Under such a strategy, theUnited States and its strategic partners and allies wouldconcentrate on coping with the many small problems thatarise daily and attempt to defuse them before they becomelarger crises. At the same time, they would actively buildthe necessary mechanisms to facilitate a decisive outcometo a larger crisis by maximizing the number of states

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interested in maintaining peace and stability. While theUnited States should not cease tracking and preparing forspecific threats, it can certainly do more to create andmaintain conditions that promote long-term peace andprosperity.

ENDNOTES

1. For a representative sample, see National Defense University,Strategic Assessment 1999: Priorities for a Turbulent World,Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1999; NewWorld Coming: American Security in the 21st Century: SupportingResearch & Analysis, Washington, DC: U.S. Commission on NationalSecurity/21st Century, 1999; Jacquelyn K. Davis and Michael J.Sweeney, Strategic Paradigms 2025: U.S. Security Planning for a NewEra, Washington, DC: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1999; SamJ. Tangredi, All Possible Wars? Toward a Consensus View of the FutureSecurity Environment, 2001-2025, Washington, DC: National DefenseUniversity, 2000; and Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue about the Future,http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/globaltrends 2015.

2. Perhaps the most popular definition of globalization is that ofThomas Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree, New York: Anchor,2000, p. 9; see also the IFPA-Fletcher Conference 2000, NationalStrategies and Capabilities for a Changing World, Final Report, p. 19,where he defines globalization as the dispersion and “democratization”of technology, information, and finance. The genuine extent andimplications of globalization have sparked a great deal of debate. SeeGlobal Transformation and the Third World, Robert O. Slater, Barry M.Schutz, and Steven R. Dorr, eds., Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993; GlobalTransformation: Challenges to the State System, Yoshikazu Sakamoto,ed., Tokyo, New York, Paris: United Nations University Press, 1994;and The Globalization Syndrome: Transformation and Resistance,James H. Mittelman, ed., Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.

3. Richard Faulk and Andrew Strauss, “Toward GlobalParliament,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 1, January/February 2001, pp. 212-220; as a counterpoint, Robert M. Dunn Jr., “Has the U.S. EconomyReally Been Globalized?” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 1, Winter2001, pp. 53-64, argues that the U.S. economy has remained largelyindependent. Bruce R. Scott, “Measuring Globalization,” Foreign Policy, January/February 2001, pp. 56-65, points out the difficulty ofmeasuring globalization at all.

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4. Stephen J. Blank, East Asia in Crisis: The Security Implicationsof the Collapse of Economic Institutions, Carlisle Barracks, PA:Strategic Studies Institute, 1999; but Hilton R. Root, “Asia’s Bad OldWays: Reforming Business by Reforming its Environment,” ForeignAffairs, Vol. 80, No. 2, March/April 2001, pp. 9-15, offers a moreoptimistic forecast of Asian recovery and further development.

5. Stephen J. Flanagan, Ellen L. Frost, and Richard L. Kugler,Challenges of the Global Century: Report of the Project on Globalizationand National Security, Washington, DC: Institute for NationalStrategic Studies, 2001, p. 9.

6. Bruce R. Scott, “The Great Divide in the Global Village,” ForeignAffairs, Vol. 80, No. 1, January/February 2001, pp. 160-177; and C. FredBergsten, “America’s Two-Front Economic Conflict,” Foreign Affairs,Vol. 80, No. 2, March/April 2001, pp. 16-27.

7. United States Institute of Peace, Special Report, “Peacekeepingin Africa,” February 13, 2001.

8. A National Security Strategy for a Global Age, The White House,December 2000, p. 2.

9. One of the most consistent proponents for the view that“established democracies do not go to war with other democracies”because they lack “adequate reasons” to fight one another is Donald M.Snow, World Politics in a New Century: The Shape of the Future, 3rd ed.,New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1999, p. 34. However, only a small number ofthe world’s democracies fit the description of “established”; and there isthe danger that, without considerable support, newer ones could go theway of Weimar’s Germany or Kerensky’s Russia. Moreover, thedestructiveness and aftermath of the American Civil War demonstratethat even established democracies can employ violent means in waysthat might directly or indirectly affect other societies.

10. Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr., The Revenge of the Melians:Asymmetric Threats and the Next QDR, Washington, DC: Institute forNational Strategic Studies, 2000, shows that tomorrow’s adversariescould develop such strategies to undermine the national will throughinformation warfare, even of a low-tech variety, and acts of terrorism,including attacks against the homeland. Vincent J. Goulding, Jr., “Backto the Future with Asymmetric Warfare,” Parameters, Vol. XXX, No. 4,Winter 2000-01, pp. 21-30, reminds us that such approaches have longbeen a part of how international competitors have dealt with each other.Steven Metz and Douglas Johnson, Asymmetry and U.S. MilitaryStrategy: Definition, Background, and Strategic Concepts, Carlisle, PA:

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Strategic Studies Institute, 2001, discuss various categories ofasymmetries and what America’s political and military leadershipshould do about them.

11. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and theRemaking of World Order, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996; andRobert Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of thePost-Cold War World, New York: Random House, 2000. Huntington isbalanced by Richard E. Rubenstein, “Challenging Huntington,” ForeignPolicy, No. 96, 1994, pp. 113-128. For more detail on transnationalthreats, see Carolyn W. Pumphrey, ed., Transnational Threats:Blending Law Enforcement and Military Strategies, Carlisle Barracks,PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2000.

12. For an example, see Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry,Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America, Washington,DC: Brookings, 1999.

13. The increase in U.N. peacekeeping operations since the end ofthe Cold War has been significant. By comparison, in 1990, the U.N. had5 peacekeeping operations involving about 10,000 troops, not countingKorea. In 1993, it had 24 such operations involving over 75,000 troops.Peacekeeping costs skyrocketed from $800 million to $4 billion duringthe same period. Lieutenant General Barry McCaffrey, “MilitarySupport for Peacekeeping Operations,” in Ethnic Conflict and RegionalInstability: Implications for U.S. Policy and Army Roles and Missions,Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and Richard H. Shultz, Jr., eds., CarlisleBarracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1994, p. 241.

14. A brand of this argument accepts that a certain amount ofpolitical and economic engagement is inevitable, or even desirable, butdraws the line at intervention, particularly military intervention,maintaining that military force is often not the most effective, efficient,or ethical means for protecting or advancing national interests. See TedGalen Carpenter, “The Case for U.S. Strategic Independence,” CatoForeign Policy Briefing, No. 16, January 16, 1992; Ivan Eland, “DoesU.S. Intervention Overseas Breed Terrorism? The Historical Record,”Cato Foreign Policy Briefing, No. 50, December 17, 1998; and Earl C.Ravenal, “‘Isolationism’ as the Denial of Intervention: What ForeignPolicy Is and Isn’t,” Cato Foreign Policy Briefing, No. 57, April 27, 2000,at http://www.cato.org/pubs/ fpbriefs/foreignbriefs.html. While thisview can provide a necessary corrective to a tendency to rely too heavilyon the military element of national power, it can go too far in the otherdirection, failing to integrate military power into a balanced nationalstrategy.

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15. Michèle A. Flournoy, Quadrennial Defense Review 2001Working Group, Washington, DC: National Defense University,November 2000, p. 25, dismisses neo-isolationism as an implausiblealternative for the future. That, however, does not preclude its adoptionas a form of “very selective” engagement, a policy that might enjoyconsiderable support since it has the potential to address the currentmismatch in strategic ends and resources by scaling down the ends.

16. Numerous works have attempted to explain France’s defeat in1940. Like Alistair Horne, To Lose a Battle: France 1940, Boston: Little,Brown, 1969, especially pp. 51-52, 70-73, 121-125, most point to a failure in strategy; some to faulty doctrine. In another interpretation, EugeniaC. Kiesling, Arming against Hitler: France and the Limits of MilitaryPlanning, Lawrenceville, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1996,maintains that France’s defeat was due less to flaws in strategy anddoctrine than to poor training and leadership, and lack of unit cohesion.Collectively, then, the answer seems to lie in the absence of anycongruence in France’s ends, ways, and means.

17. This approach differs from the previous administration’s policyof Engagement in that it calls for proactive involvement and seizing theinitiative in global security affairs.

18. A number of sources point out that this perception is alreadystrong. See Peter W. Rodman, Uneasy Giant: The Challenges toAmerican Predominance, Washington, DC: Nixon Center, 2000.

19. For example, Ming Zhang, “Public Images of the United States,”In the Eyes of the Dragon: China Views the World, Yong Deng andFei-Ling Wang, eds., New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999, pp.141-158, points out that a survey of China’s educated population showsthat most Chinese believe that the U.S. national goal is not globaldemocracy and universal human rights, but a USA federal empireuniting the world. When U.S. officials use the term “leadership,” theChinese people read “hegemony.” For other examples, see the specialsection “How the World Views America,” in the Wilson Quarterly,Spring 2001, pp. 45-80.

20. See Part I, New World Coming, p. 3; Part II, Seeking a NationalStrategy: A Concert for Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom,Washington, DC: U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century,April 15, 2000, pp. 11-12; and Part III, Building for Peace, briefingdelivered January 26, 2001; and http://www.nssg.gov. See alsoAmerica’s National Interests: A Report from the Commission onAmerica’s National Interests, 2000, Washington, DC: Belfer Center forScience and International Affairs, July 2001.

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21. Condoleezza Rice, “Promoting the National Interest” and Robert B. Zoellick, “A Republican Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs,January/February 2000, pp. 45-62, and 63-78; here 45 and 70,respectively.

22. W. Bowman Cutter, Joan Spero, and Laura D’Andrea Tyson,“New World, New Deal,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2000, pp. 80-98,here 98.

23. A state and its people have to desire to become stakeholders.When they do, they will become committed. States that do not, maycooperate when it suits them, and may complicate matters when it doesnot.

24. Colonel George F. Oliver, U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute,“Doing the Dirty Work—Peace Enforcement,” unpublished paper,details the requirements for peace enforcement, one aspect of peacetimeengagement, through an analysis of lessons learned from Somalia,Bosnia, Rwanda, Haiti, Kosovo, and East Timor.

25. See also Field Manual (FM)-3, DRAFT, The Army and the Role ofLand Power, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, pp. 1-15,1-16.

26. The CFE establishes equal East-West limits on five keycategories of conventional armaments—battle tanks, armored combatvehicles, artillery pieces, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters. Withthe collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, the CFE now has30 treaty parties. Department of Defense, Strengthening TransatlanticSecurity: A U.S. Strategy for the 21st Century, Washington, DC: Office ofAssistant Secretary of Defense, December 2000, pp. 40-41.

27. David C. Gompert, Richard L. Kruger, Martin Lubicki, Mind theGap: Promoting a Transatlantic Revolution in Military Affairs,Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1999, warns that theU.S. military’s rapid pursuit of a revolution in military affairs iscontributing to a dangerous (and growing) technological gap betweenthe United States and its NATO allies.

28. Introduced in January 1994 in order to expand and intensifypolitical and military cooperation among NATO and partner countries,PfP promotes civilian control of military forces, enables combinedoperations in NATO peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, andopens communications among PfP countries; www.nato.int/pfp/partners. htm, updated December 7, 2000.

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29. IFPA-Fletcher Conference 2000, National Strategies andCapabilities for a Changing World, Final Report, p. 94.

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U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. IvanyCommandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

DirectorProfessor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of ResearchDr. Steven Metz

AuthorBrigadier General (Retired) Huba Wass de Czege

Lieutenant Colonel Antulio J. Echevarria II

Director of PublicationsMs. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications AssistantMs. Rita A. Rummel

*****

CompositionMrs. Christine A. Williams