How We Know What We're Doing

volume9,no.11� october2009

How We Know

What We’re Doing

Sarah K. PaulBowdoin College

© 2009 SarahK.Paul<www.philosophersimprint.org/009011/>

Astheroadtohellteachesus,intendinganddoingarenotthesamething.Thatis,atleastnotforfalliblehumanagentslike ourselves. For a divine agent, perhaps, there is no gap

between intending and doing. If God intends to change theworldinsomeway, that fact ispresumablysufficient for thechange tobebroughtabout;thereisnothingfurtherHemustdo.Butforustobringtheworldintoconformancewithourintentions,wemustoftentakemeans—meansthatmayfail.AndwhilewemightassumethatGodneverprocrastinatesorforgetstodowhatheintends,wesublunarycreaturescannotsaythesame.Quitesimply,forus,merelyhavinganintentionfallsfarshortofensuringthatwewillgetitdone.

God’somnipotencehasalsobeensaidtoaffordhimaspecialwayofknowingabouttheworld,dubbed“practicalknowledge”byThom-asAquinas:Hecanknowhowtheworldis,orhowitwillbe,justbyforminganideaofitinHismindandbringingtheworldtoconformtothatidea.1HeisnotlimitedtoinvestigatingtheworldandonlythenformingbeliefsaboutwhatHefindsthere;Hecanobtainknowledgesimply by constituting the truth in a particularway. This notion ofpracticalknowledgeisopposedto“speculative”knowledge,whichisattainedbybringingone’smind into conformancewith the facts. Ifthereisanerrorinspeculativeknowledge,thefaultisinthejudgment;there isa factout there thathasnotbeenproperlyapprehended.Afailureofpracticalknowledge,incontrast,isafailuretobringthefactsintoconformancewithone’sideaofthem.AsAquinasconceivedofit,practicalknowledgeis“thecauseofwhatitunderstands,”andassuch,itenablestheknowertoremainastepaheadofthetruth,ratherthanastepbehind—adesirablepowertohave,indeed.

In spite of our patent lack of omnipotence, it has been thoughtbysomethatthroughourintentionalactions,wehumanagentscanalsohaveaspecialkindofknowledgeoftheworld.Therootofthisidea is a provocative claimof ElizabethAnscombe’s: thatwhenweactintentionally,weseemtoknowwhatwearedoingwithout�observa-tion.2Anscombeinitiallysuggeststhatwhenweactintentionally,we

1. Summa�Theologica,PartOne,Question14.

2. Anscombe(1963),13.

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thedescription—executionof intentions—whosecharacteristicswehavebeen investigating.”7 It is important tonote,however, that shedoesnotclaimthatthisknowledgeistheefficientcauseoftheactionitrepresents.

TheclaimthatourspecialknowledgeofouractionsispracticalinAquinas’ssenseandtheclaimthatitisnon-observationalarecustom-arilytakentogether.However,thetwoideasareclearlynotthesame;attheleast,abitofknowledgemightbenon-observationalwithoutinanysensebeingthecauseofwhatitrepresents.8Thus,togainclarityontheallegedconnectionbetweenactionandknowledge,Ithinkitisvitaltokeepthesetwoclaimsdistinct.Mychiefconcernwillbewiththelatter,whichIwillcallAnscombe’s“Non-ObservationalKnowledgeThesis”:thatifanagentisactingintentionally,hewillknowwithoutobservationwhatheisdoing,underthedescription(s)onwhichtheactionisintentional.Thenotionofpracticalknowledgewillalsoplayasignificantroleinthediscussion,however,andasecondobjectwillbetogetclearontherelationshipofnon-observationalknowledgetopracticalknowledge.

TherearetwomajorsortsofreactionsAnscombe’sNon-Observa-tionalKnowledgeThesishasprovokedinthephilosophicalliterature.Oneresponseisakindofskepticism,motivatedbythefactthatAns-combe’sformulationofthethesisisoverlystrongandeasilydefeatedbycounterexamples.DonaldDavidsontookthisskeptical line,hold-ingthatitissimplyamistaketosupposethatactingintentionallyen-tailsactingknowingly—non-observationallyorotherwise.Hepointedoutthatonemayaimatsomeoutcome,andendupbringingitaboutinthewayoneistryingto—sodoingitintentionally—whileremain-ing in doubt all thewhile that one is doing it.9Hiswell-known ex-ampleconcernsamanwhopressesdownheavilyonastackofcarbon-paperwiththeaimofmakingtencarboncopiesatonce,inthefaceofsubstantialdoubtthathiseffortswillsucceed.Butiftheydo,hewill

7. Anscombe(1963),88.

8. Forinstance,knowledgeoftheanswertoamathproblem.

9. Davidson(1978),91–92.

necessarilyknowwhatwearedoing;ifoneisnotawarethatoneisφ-ing, this suffices to show that one is notφ-ing intentionally.3 Butmorethanthis,sheclaimsthatthisknowledgeishadwithouttheneedtoobservewhatitiswearebringingabout.Whereasanagentmightbeabletodiscoverthatheisinadvertentlydrumminghisfingersonthetableonlybyhearingthenoiseheismaking,orbynoticingtheannoyedexpressionsonhiscolleagues’faces,hewillnotneedtoap-pealtosenseevidencetoknowthatheisdrummingintentionally(inordertoannoythem).Hewillbeabletoreportacorrectdescriptionofhisintentionalactionswithoutlookingtosee,andoftenatalevelofdescriptionthatfaroutstripstheobservationalevidenceprovidedbyhisbodilymovementsandtheirimmediateresults.4Forinstance,ourdrummingagentmightknowthatwhatheisdoingindrumminghisfingersispreventinghisrivalfromreceivingajobofferbysabotagingtheupcomingvote,aclaimthereissimplynotsufficientobservationalevidencetosupport.Mostintriguingly,Anscombeinsiststhataslongas thingsgowell,whatoneknowswithoutobservation iswhat�hap-pens—notmerelywhatoneistryingtodo,butwhat isactuallyhap-peningoutintheworld.5

Anscombe makes the further suggestion that this knowledgeofour intentionalactions ispractical rather thanspeculative, in thesense that a discrepancy betweenbelief and fact is a failure of per-formance,notofbelief—itisafailuretoperformtheactiononehadinmind,nota failure tohave thecorrectaction inmind.6ShecitesAquinasincharacterizingthisknowledgeas“thecauseofwhatitun-derstands,” in that “without it,what happens does not come under

3. Anscombe(1963),11.

4. This isnot tosay that there isnoobservational input to intentionalactionwhatever,butratherthatwhatweknowaboutwhatwearedoingoftengreat-lyexceedstheseinputs.

5. Shewrites,“Imyselfformerly,inconsideringtheseproblems,cameupwiththeformula:Idowhathappens.Thatistosay,whenthedescriptionofwhathappensistheverythingwhichIshouldsayIwasdoing,thenthereisnodistinctionbetweenmydoingandthething’shappening”(Anscombe1963,52–53,emphasisintheoriginal).

6. Anscombe(1963),56–57.



beonStrongCognitivism—theidentificationofintentionwithakindofbelief—sincebothVellemanandSetiyaappealtothissortofview.

TheStrongCognitiviststrategyforexplainingAnscombe’sinsightistonotethatifintentions(inaction)arebeliefsaboutwhatyouaredoing,andallintentionalactioninvolvesthepresenceofsomeinten-tion,thenallintentionalactionmustinvolvethepresenceofabeliefaboutwhatyouaredoing.11Aslongasoneissuccessfulinone’sinten-tion, thisbeliefwillbe true (bracketinghere thequestionofwhy itshouldcountasknowledge).Andsinceintentionsareformedoutofapreference forperformingagivenaction,rather thanonthebasisofevidencethatonewillperformit,theywillbebeliefsthatarenotgroundedinobservationorevidenceofanykind—asVellemanputsit,theywillamountto“spontaneous”knowledge,orknowledgethattheagent originates.12 Finally, according to StrongCognitivism, non-ob-servationalknowledgeofdoingwhatweintendisindeedpracticalinAquinas’ssense.Becausetheknowledgeisembodiedintheintentionitself,whichcausallybringsabouttheveryactionthatistherepresen-tationalcontentoftheintention-belief,theknowledgeturnsouttobethecauseofwhatitrepresents.Ineffect,theconcernthatDavidsonianskepticism isan inadequate response toAnscombe’spuzzlehas ledbothVellemanandSetiyatocashoutthepractical-knowledgeideabyarguingthatintentionsareakindofbelief.

MyviewisthatboththeskepticalandtheStrongCognitivistreac-tions to theNon-Observational Knowledge Thesis are extreme.Da-vidsonfocusesontheoverlyambitiousformulationoftheclaimandignoresthekerneloftruthintheinsightthatweusuallydoknowatleastsomethingaboutwhatwearedoingintentionally,andknowitwithouthavingtoobserveourselves.TheStrongCognitivistsrightlytakethiskerneloftruthseriously,butgotoofar inconcludingfromitthatintentionsmustbeakindofbelief.IwillarguethattherearereasonstodoubtthetruthofStrongCognitivism,aswellasitssuccessinaccountingwellforthefullextentofnon-observationalknowledge

11. SeeSetiya(2004),371–373.

12. Velleman(1989),p.24.

intentionallyhavemade ten carboncopiesatonce, thoughwithoutactuallybelievingintheprocessthathewasdoingso.Suchexamples,easily multiplied, convincingly demonstrate that non-observationalknowledgeisnotascoincidentalwithintentionalactionasAnscombewouldhaveit.Davidsonconcludedthataspecialkindofknowledgeisnotadistinguishing featureof intentionalactionafterall,andhiscausal-psychologicalapproachtounderstandingthedomainofactiontheory became dominant in Anglo-American philosophy in the de-cadesfollowingthepublicationofIntention.

More recently, however, there has been a resurgence of interestinnon-observationalknowledgeasan importantandrevealingphe-nomenon associatedwith agency. This trend is associatedwith thesecondsortofreactiontoAnscombe’sNon-ObservationalKnowledgeThesis—a brand of “cognitivism” about intention.10 TheCognitivistthoughtisthatifwetaketheconnectionbetweenintentionalactionandnon-observationalknowledgesufficientlyseriously,weshouldbeledtotheconclusionthatintendingmustbeconstitutivelytiedtobe-lief.Mostprominently,J.DavidVellemanandKieranSetiyahaveeachappealedtoversionsofwhatIwillcall“StrongCognitivist”theoriesofintentiontoexplainthespecialknowledgewehaveofwhatwedointentionally.This kindof theory identifies intendingwith a sortofbelieving,claimingthatanintentiontoφissomespecialkindofbeliefthatyouareφ-ingorwillφ.Icallthistypeofview“Strong”Cognitiv-ismtodistinguishitfromviewsonwhichintendingisacompositeatti-tudethatinvolvesthebeliefthatyouwilldowhatyouintend,butthatalsoinvolvessomefurther,separableconativecomponent;thelatterIcall“Weak”Cognitivism.IwillexplainthisdistinctionfurtherandsaymoreaboutWeakCognitivisminSection6,butfornowthefocuswill

10. ItshouldbenotedthatalthoughBratman(1991)alsoemploystheterm“cog-nitivism”inthecontextofdiscussingVelleman’stheoryofintention,hisuseof the term is slightlydifferent frommine.Bratmanuses the term to refertoaparticularstrategyofexplainingsomeofthenormsofpracticalreason-ingbyappealtotheclaimthatintentioninvolvesbelief,whereasIamusingithere to refer tobelief theoriesof intention themselves.Neitherof theseusesshouldbeconfusedwiththewaythetermisdeployedinthecontextofmetaethics.



byrejectingtheideathatthisknowledgeistheefficientcauseofwhatitunderstands.

1. Intentional action and non-observational knowledge

ThoughDavidson correctlypointsout thatAnscombe’s formulationof theNon-Observational Knowledge Thesis cannot be right, thereisclearlysomeimportantconnectionbetweenintentionalactionandknowledge that hasmade her observations so compelling tomany.Buthowtocapturethiskerneloftruth?Itcannotbethecasethatoneknows non-observationally of everything one ends up doing inten-tionally,butevenincarbon-copycases,thereisusuallysomethingtheagentknowsheisdoing.SetiyaattemptstoaccommodateDavidson’spoint by proposing a more modest formulation of the thesis: thatwhenanagentisactingintentionally,therewillbesomedescriptionoftheactionhedoesinthebeliefthatheisdoingit,evenifhedoesnotbelieveheisaccomplishinghisultimateaim.14Thecarbon-copierdoesnotbelieveheismakingtencarboncopiesatonce,forinstance,buthedoesbelieveheispressingdownveryhardonthepileofcarbonpa-per.Setiya’sformulationisweakerthanAnscombe’s,butitstillpositsanecessaryconnectionbetweenintentionalactionandbelief(againpreferringtoleaveasidethequestionofwhetherthebeliefcountsasknowledge), in thatanactionwillnotcountas intentionalunless itinvolvessomenon-observationalbeliefabouttheaction.15

IaminagreementwithAnscombeandSetiyathatnon-observation-alknowledge(oratleastbelief)isapervasivephenomenonamongac-tionsthatareintentional.16Itisworthquestioning,however,whethertheadverb‘intentionally’reallyworksinawaythatwillsupportthe

14. Setiya(2007),25.

15. Op.�cit.,25–26. Inhis formulationof theBeliefconditionhere,hedoesnotexplicitly characterize the belief as non-observational, but the precedingdiscussiononpage24makesitclearthatwhatisatissueisAnscombe’snon-observationalknowledgethesis.

16. Again, I ambracketing thecomplicatedquestionofwhen (if ever) thisbe-liefamountstoknowledge.Wedocommonlywanttospeakofknowledgeinstraightforwardcaseswheretheworldcooperateswiththeagent’sefforts,

ofagency—enoughtopromptustotrytoavoidthisroute.Todothis,amiddlecoursemustbefoundbetweenthesetwoextremes,neitherdismissingthesignificanceofnon-observationalknowledgeofinten-tionalactionnorembracingaStrongCognitivisttheoryofintention.Myaimhereistoshowhowthismiddlecoursecanbesteered.

Inthis,Iwilltosomeextentbefollowingapathsuggestedbyan-othercontemporaryofAnscombeandDavidson—H.P.Grice. Inhis1971BritishAcademyLecture,Gricesketchestheoutlinesofatheoryoftherelationshipbetweenintentionandbeliefthathasastructuresomehavecalled “inferential.”13ThereareaspectsofGrice’saccountthatareproblematic,butIthinkthegeneralinferentialschematiccanbeextractedanddevelopedinawaythatoccupiesthemiddlegroundIhavedescribed.Theobjectofthispaperistoshowhowsuchanin-ferential, neo-Gricean story about non-observational knowledge ofactionmightgo, and toargue forwhywe shouldbemoved in thisdirection.

The basic strategy is to push any groundless component of ourknowledgeofourownintentionalactionsbackintothehead,whilestillcapturingthesenseinwhichthatknowledgeisnon-observational.Theview Iwill proposeacknowledges thatwenormallyknownon-observationallywhatwearedoing,whileholdingthatthisknowledgeisnotspontaneous,butevidentiallybasedonourknowledgeofwhatweintendtobedoing.Withrespecttothelatter,Iwillsketchmyownpreferredaccountofhowweknowwhatweintend,butitisimportanttonotethattheInferentialTheoryofhowweknowwhatwe’redoingdoesnotdependonacceptingthisaccount;thetheoryiscompatiblewith different views regarding our knowledge of our intentions. Toreally nail down the details of the theory,more spacewould be re-quired than Ihavehere,but I think thecontourswillbeenough toreveal itsadvantageover theaforementionedextremes.What Iwillargue,inaway,isthatwecanaccountfornon-observationalknowl-edgeofactionwithoutabandoningacommonsenseviewofintention,

13. Forinstance,Setiya(2008)employsthisterminology.



andmightonlybeabletodiscoverthatheisdoingthembyobserva-tion(e.�g.,noticingthattheturnsignal ison).Or likewise,anexpertcabinetmakermaybecompletelyimmersedinhiscraft,andrespondwithout thought towhat is to be donewithout forming a belief ateachstepaboutwhatheisdoing.Thisisnoclearreasontodenythatthecraftspersonintentionallyexecutedthestepsinvolvedinmakingacabinet.

Idonottaketheseexamplestodemonstrateconclusivelythatin-tentionalactionneednotinvolvethepresenceofsomerelevantnon-observationalbelief.Myaimismerelytocastdoubtontheabilityoftheadverb‘intentionally’tosupporttheclaimthatintentionalactionis necessarily connectedwithnon-observational belief, and therebyon the constraint that our explanation of the Non-ObservationalKnowledgeThesismust account for all instancesof action that canbecharacterizedasintentional.Onemightrespondbyconcedingthatthe adverbial characterization of action as intentional cannot carrythatmuchweight,butmaintainingthatthereisasenseof“actingforareason”thatdoesrequirethatonebelieveoneissoacting.19Thismayberight,butitdoesnothelptoestablishthatitisanythingdeeperthanamereclassificatoryconvention.Thatis,thoughthedriveronautopi-lotflipshisturnsignalinresponsetoareason,itmaybetruethatwedonotcounthimasusingitforareasonunlesshebelievesheisusingit.Butsuchaclassificatorydecisionwouldnotnecessitateanon-infer-entialexplanationofthesourceofthebeliefinquestion,inthewaySetiyawouldhaveit.Itisconsistentwithsupposingthatbreakdownsoccurbetweenactinginresponsetoreasonsandbelievingoneisdo-ingso,butthatwechoosenottocallsuchbehavioractionforareason.

Ratherthanargueoverthelimitsoftheconceptofintentionalac-tion,Isuggestthatwebracketquestionsofclassificationasintentionalornotand focuson theunderlyingrelationshipsbetween intention,belief,andaction.Anscombe’sinsightiscompellingbecauseinpara-digmcasesofactionwecanallagreeareintentional,theagentusually

19. ThankstoSetiyaforpointingoutthispossiblemove.

claimof anecessary connectionbetween intentional action and anykindofknowledge—non-observationalorotherwise.Thesignificanceofthisquestionisthattheanswermaybearonthekindofexplana-tionthatcanbegiven.AsSetiyahasargued,ifbreakdownsbetweenactingintentionallyandbelievingoneissoactingareimpossible,thismightbethoughttoruleoutanyexplanationonwhichintentionalac-tionandbeliefareonlycontingentlytiedtogether.17Amerelycausal,inferentialconnectionwouldbeboundtobreakdownnowandagain,allowingforthepossibilityofactingintentionallywhilehavingnorel-evantbelief(letaloneknowledge)aboutwhatoneisdoing.

But is this impossible?Oneway toestablish thenecessityof theconnectionwouldbe todemonstrate thatanactioncountsas inten-tionalonlyiftheagenthasthenon-observationalbeliefthatheisper-formingit,orbelievesnon-observationallythatheisdoingsomethingwiththataim.Itdoesnotseemtomeclearthatthisisso.Weclassifyactionsasintentionalforavarietyofpurposes,andIthinktheadverbcanbesensitivetomultiplepropertiesofbehavior.18Forone,weuseittocapturethefactthatanepisodeofbehaviorhadagoal-directed,means-endstructureandexhibitedresponsiveness toreasons,andIthinkwesometimesclassifysuchbehaviorasintentionaleveniftheagent has no related non-observational belief aboutwhat he is do-ing.Intheclassicexampleofdrivinghomeonautopilot,forinstance,thedrivertakesacertainroutebecauseitisthebestwayhome,useshis turnsignal in theappropriateplaces for reasonsofsafety, raisesthegaragedoorinordertoparkhiscar,andsoforth.Toexpressthefact thathis turningandsignalingarepurposive,haveameans-endstructure,andareperformedinresponsetohisreasons,it isnaturaltosaythatheturnsandsignalsintentionally.Ifhisdrivingishabitualenough,however,hemayhavenobeliefthatheisdoingthesethings,

andmyinclinationistothinkourtheoryshouldpreservethispractice,butIwillnotargueforthishere.

17. Setiya(2008),395.

18. JoshuaKnobe’s researchon the applicationof the adverb ‘intentionally’ isrelevanthereandbearsthisclaimout,Ithink.SeeforinstanceKnobe(2003).



beliefsthatyouareherebyφ-ing/goingtoφ.22Thetwoagree,however,that theexplanationof theNon-ObservationalKnowledgeThesis isthat intentionsare cognitive attitudes that canbothembodyknowl-edgeandbringaboutwhattheyrepresent.23

Aninitialthingtoemphasizeaboutthiskindoftheoryisthepecu-liarityofbeliefsthatarestandardlyformedoutofapreferencefortheircomingtrue,andnotinresponsetosufficientpriorevidence.24Indeed,theyareconclusionsthatareoftenleapttointhefaceofevidenceren-dering the occurrence of the represented action highly improbable,sincepriortoformingtheintention-belief,theagentisquiteunlikelytoendupperformingthatparticularaction.InVelleman’sownwords,intending is a kind of “licensedwishful thinking”—licensed by theagent’sknowledgethatheisabletoφifheintendsto,togetherwithhisknowledgethatintention-beliefstendtobeself-fulfilling.25Setiyaprovidesanalternativeaccountoftheepistemicjustificationofinten-tion-beliefformation,arguingthatknowledgehowtoφentitlesonetoformtheintentiontoφ.26Onbothaccounts,however,thefactremainsthatofalltheactionsopentotheagent,eachofwhichheknowsheisabletodoandknowshowtodo,hemustjumptotheconclusionthathewilldoaparticularoneofthem,outofapreferenceforperformingthataction.

22. Setiya(2007),48.

23. SeeespeciallyVelleman(2004)andSetiya(2004,2007).AlthoughVelleman’sandSetiya’sviewsdifferwithrespecttohowtheagentismotivatedtoactonanintention-belief—Vellemanholdsthatintentionsareordinarypredictionsthattheagentismotivatedtofulfillbyapowerfulindependentdesireforself-understanding,whileSetiyaholdsthatintentionsareintrinsicallymotivatingstates—Ithinkitisacceptabletotreattheminkindformypurposeshere.Inthispaper,Idonotwishtochallengeeitheroftheirviewswithrespecttohowintention-beliefsaremotivatingoncetheyareinplace.TheirexplanationsoftheNon-ObservationalKnowledgeThesisaresufficientlysimilartoaddressjointly,andI take theworries Iwill raiseregarding intentionsasspontane-ouslyformeddoxasticcommitmentstoapplyequallytobothviews.

24.AsIargueinmoredetailinPaul(2009).

25. Velleman(1989),69.

26.Setiya(2008).

doeshavebeliefsaboutwhatheisdoing,andnotonthebasisofob-servinghimselfinaction.Iwillleaveitopenfornowwhetherthisnon-observationalknowledgeis“thecauseofwhatitrepresents,”thoughIwillreturntothisquestionlater.Thepervasivepresenceofnon-obser-vationalbeliefinintentionalactionisthekerneloftruththatDavidsonignores,andourtheoryofactionshouldaccountforthisphenomenon.

2. Strong cognitivist theories of intention

Onceweacknowledgetheneedtoexplainthepervasivenessofnon-observationalbelief incasesof intentionalaction,shouldwebe ledtoaStrongCognitivisttheoryofintention?VellemanandSetiyahavebotharguedthatinordertoaccountforwhy,asSetiyaputsit,“whenanagentactsforreasons,theremustbesomethingshedoesinthebe-liefthatsheisdoingit,”weshouldconcludethatintentionsthemselvesmustbeakindofbelief.20Recallthatthebasicideabehindthisstrategyisthatifallintentionalactioninvolvesanintention,andanintention(inaction)isakindofbeliefaboutwhatoneisdoing,then(success-ful)intentionalactioninvolvesfulfillingone’sbeliefaboutwhatoneisdoing—thusprovidingoneselfwithaspecialkindofknowledgeofone’sactions.Andbecausethisknowledgeisembodiedinone’sinten-tion,whichinturnisthecauseoftheaction,itclearlydoesnotdependuponobservationofthataction.

Butletusbeabitmorepreciseabouttheviewsonthetable.Ac-cordingtoVelleman,intentionsarespontaneous,self-fulfillingexpec-tationsofaction,formedinpartinordertohaveadvanceknowledgeofwhatwearedoingandwhyintheinstantwemovetoact.21Intentionsareordinarybeliefsonhisaccount,althoughtheyareformedoutofapreferenceforagivenactionratherthanonthebasisofantecedentev-idencefortheirtruth,thusmeritingthestatusof“spontaneous.”Setiyaalsoholdsthatintentionsareakindofbelief,butforhimtheyareadis-tinctivekindof“desire-likebelief”;theyareself-referential,motivating

20.Setiya(2007),28,emphasisintheoriginal.

21. Op.�cit.,chapters2–3.



getgason thewayhome,but think there isa significantpossibilitythatonewill forget anddrive straighthomewithout stopping.29Orperhaps one has a complicated action plan one believeswill possi-blysucceed—asix-yearplantogetintograduateschoolandgetone’sPh.D.—butthatoneisnotsufficientlycertainabouttocountasbeliev-ingonewillachievetheintendedaim.Theaspiringstudentrecogniz-esthattherearemanywaysherplancouldfail,andyetwestillwanttosaythatsheintendstogetherPh.D.,inlightoftherolethatgoalplaysinguidingheractionsovertheyears,generatingmeans-endreasoning,andherdispositiontotakealternativemeansiftheoriginalplanisn’tworking—transferringtoanotherinstitutionifshecannotfindanyonetoadviseher,forinstance.ButshemaynotfullybelieveshewillgetherPh.D.;shewouldnotbetagreatdealofmoneyonit.

Apossibleresponsetotheseexamples is to insist that ifonehasdoubtsaboutsucceedinginone’sultimateaim,thenonedoesnotac-tuallyintendit.Perhapswhatoneintendsismerelytotrytostopforgasortogetone’sPh.D.Thisisatemptingmove,butitisimportanttorecognizethatitispotentiallyintensionwiththestrategyofappealingtoStrongCognitivismtoexplainnon-observationalknowledge.Afterall, ifallone intends is to try togetgas, thentheStrongCognitivistwouldhave to say that theknowledgeembodied inone’s intentionis limited to the fact that one is trying; onewould have no specialknowledgeofwhatisactuallyhappening.ButAnscombe’sclaimwasthatwhenanactionisintentional,theagentwillhaveaspecialkindofknowledgeofwhathappens,andnotmerelyoftrying.30

Setiya’s strategy is to settle for aweak vindication of that claim,maintaining that if the agent doesnot believehe is bringing about

29.ThisscenarioandthefollowingoneareadaptationsofexamplesprovidedbyBratman(1987).

30.SetiyahimselfpointsoutthattoaccountfortheNon-ObservationalKnowl-edgeThesis,intendingtotryisnotenough:“DespitewhatDavidsonsuggests,itisnotenoughthatthecarbon-copierisintentionallytryingtomaketencop-ies,intheparadigmsenseof‘intentionalaction’thatinvolvesbelief.Heisandmustbedoingspecificthings—forinstance,pressinghardonthepaper—inthatparadigmsense”(2007,25).

Now,itisamatterofcontroversywhetherjumpingtowishful,self-fulfillingconclusionsmaybejustifiedinsomecases,27butthepracticecertainly deviates from the paradigm rules for rational believing. Iftherearesituationsinwhichwearelicensedtoformbeliefswithoutsufficient prior evidence, we would expect such cases to be excep-tional,ratherthanthebasisofourentirepracticallives.28Omnipotentagentsmayexperiencenobreakdownsbetweenintendinganddoing,butsurelywehumanagentsneedsufficientgroundstobelievewewillaccomplishouraim inanygivencase,beyondsomegeneralknowl-edge of ability and know-how.This is not a knock-down argumentagainsttheview,butI thinkthefactthatStrongCognitivismmakesintendingouttobeakindofwishfuljumping-to-conclusionsgivesusprima�faciegroundstohesitate—especiallygiventhatwearetalkingaboutanattitudethatissupposedtoamounttoknowledge.

StrongCognitivismdoesappeartoprovideanelegantexplanationoftheNon-ObservationalKnowledgeThesis.However,thisexplana-tionisonlyasplausibleas theclaimthat intentionsarebeliefs,andtherearegoodreasonstodoubtthatthisisso.Quitesimply,asmanypeoplehavepointedout,itseemsthatwecanintendthingswedonotbelievewewilldo.This isadifferentpoint thanDavidson’scarbon-copierexample,whichdemonstratesonlythatanactioncanbeinten-tionalwithouttheagentbelievingheisperformingit.Itispotentiallyconsistentwiththatpointthatintendingisbelieving,ifactionscanbeintentionalwithoutbeingintended.

Butevenintendedactionsseemnotnecessarilytoinvolvethebe-liefthatyouwilldowhatyouintend.Onemightintendtostopand

27.WilliamJames(1897)notoriouslyarguedthatitis.

28.Tobeclear,Vellemandoesnotagreethattheoreticalrationalityrequiresustohavesufficientevidenceforourbeliefspriortoformingthem,aslongasthebalanceofevidencesupportsthebeliefonceitisinplace.However,thefactremainsthatpriortoforminganintention,therearemanyactionsavail-abletotheagent,eachofwhichhewoulddoifheintendedit,andhemustjumptotheas-yet-unsupportedconclusionthathewilldoaparticularoneofthem.Againstthisclaim,seeLangton(2003).ForamoredetaileddiscussionofSetiya’sargument,seePaul(2009).



goingtoscratchthecarbytryingtoparkitinasmallspace,andIgoaheadandtrytoparkit, I intentionallybringitaboutthatthecarisscratched.34Andonthefaceof it, itseemstomethatweoftenhavenon-observational knowledge of bringing about the intentional butunintended sideeffectsofour intendedactions, knowledge that ap-pearsquitesimilartothatwehaveofdoingwhatweintend.35

Takethewell-knownexampleoftheStrategicBomberwhointendstobombtheenemy’smunitionsfactory,inordertounderminetheen-emy’swareffort.Uponreflection,herealizesthatbombingthefactorywill alsodamage anearby school andkill some schoolchildren.Hetakesthisfactseriouslyinhispracticaldeliberationaboutwhattodo,anddeeplyregretstheoutcomeofkillingthechildren,butultimatelydecidestoproceedwithdroppingthebombs.Hisdoesnothavetheintentiontokillthechildren;heisnoterrorist,andwouldnottrackthechildrenwithhisbombs if theyhappenedtomovesomewhereelse.Tohim,thisisanunfortunatesideeffectofpursuinghisintendedaim.Nonetheless,asheflieshisplanetowardthefactoryandtheschool,whathehasnon-observationalknowledgeofisnotlimitedtothefactthatheisonhiswaytobombthefactory;itseemstomethatheknowsinasimilarwaythatheisen�routetocausedamagetotheschoolandkillsomechildren.36

Whattosayaboutthis?Somemightwanttodenythatforeseensideeffectscountasbeingbroughtabout intentionally,butagain, the la-belingissueisbesidethepoint;whateverwecallthesedeeds,thenon-observationalknowledgewehaveofbringingthemaboutdemandsexplanation.ThisposesaspecialchallengetotheStrongCognitivist,

34. ToborrowanexamplefromHarman.

35. Anscombe(1963,42)actuallydeniesthatthebringingaboutofexpectedbutunintendedsideeffectsareintentionalactions,becausetheyfailhercriterionthatanintentionalactionmustbethekindofthingforwhichpracticalrea-sonscouldbeprofferedinanswertothequestion“Why?”Shedoesnotcon-siderthequestionofwhethertheagenthasnon-observationalknowledgeofthem,however.

36.Tobeclear,whattheStrategicBomberknowsisnotmerelythatsomechil-drenwilldie;heknowsthathe�is�bringing�aboutthedeathsofthechildren.

hisaim,hedoesnotintendit—heintendsonlytotry—buthemustfullyintendsomethingheisdoinginpursuitofthataim.Attheleast,hewillintendthebasicactionsinvolvedinhisactionplan,andhewillperformthosebasicactionsinthebeliefthatheisdoingso.31Howev-er,eventhismorequalifiedclaimseemstohaveitscounterexamples.Imaginesomeonewhohashadtheirarmtemporarilyparalyzed,andwhowastoldbythedoctorthattheparalyticwouldwearoffattimet.Havinggoodreasonatttobelieveitispossibleforhimtoraisehisarm,itseemsthathecanformtheintentiontoraisehisarmatt.Italsoseemspossible,though,thathedoesnotfullybelievehisarmwillgoup—indeed,itwouldplausiblybeepistemicallyirresponsibleforhimtobelieve this, givenhisonly tepid confidence thathewillbeableto.32Ithinkthistypeofexampleprovidesgoodreasontothinkthatanagentcanintendanactionφ,andevenperformitintentionally,with-outdoinganythinghefullybelieveshewilldo.AndthisgivesusgoodreasontoworryaboutthetruthofStrongCognitivism.

This last issuearisesbecause if intentionsarebeliefsaboutwhatyouwilldo,theStrongCognitivistmustfindawaytoconnectinten-tionsuptofurtheraimstheagentpursuesintentionallybutdoesnotfullybelievehewillaccomplish.Arelatedchallengefacedbythecog-nitivistaccountisthatithasnoobviouswaytoexplainanynon-obser-vationalknowledgeofintentionallybringingaboutanythingyouarenotactuallyaimingat.Butmanythinkwedothingsintentionallythatwedonotintend.33Forinstance,itiscommontothinkofsomeoftheexpectedsideeffectsofourintendedactionsasbeingbroughtaboutintentionally,thoughtheyarenotthemselvesintended.IfIknowIam

31. Setiya(2007),5–56.

32. BratmanpresentedanexampleofthisformincommentingonanearlierdraftofSetiya(2008)atthe2006WakeForestConferenceonAgencyandAction.ExampleswithacomparablestructurehavebeenemployedbyRobertAudi(1993)andbyVelleman(2004),but inbothcases tomakedifferentpointsthanIammakinghere.

33. Harman(1976)offersaninstructivediscussionofthisissue;forresearchonthecharacterizationofsomeforeseensideeffectsasintentionalinordinarylanguage,seeKnobe(2003).



wouldhavesignificantconsequencesforourunderstandingofthingslikemoralresponsibilityforsideeffects;wedothinkterrorbombingisonmorallyworsegroundthanthecausingofcollateraldamage,anditistheagent’sintentionweexploittodistinguishbetweenthesetwoactions. Ingeneral, thismove isahighlyconsequentialone,andac-countingfornon-observationalknowledgeofagencydoesnotseemtobetherightkindofreasontomakeit.

TheotheroptionIcanseefortheStrongCognitivistwouldbetoin-sistthatanyknowledgewehaveofbringingaboutforeseenbutunin-tendedsideeffectsisofafundamentallydifferentkindthanourknowl-edgeofdoingwhatweintend:thelatterispractical,buttheformerisordinary speculativeknowledge. I think thismovewouldgreatlydi-minishtheappealoftheview,butIwillwaituntilmypositiveproposalisonthetabletoarguethisfurther.Fornow,Ithinkthattakentogether,theoddityofmaking intending intowishful jumping-to-conclusions,the apparent possibility of intending actionswithout believing youwilldothem,ofactingintentionallywithouttherebeinganythingyoubelieve you are doing, and the challenge of accounting for non-ob-servational knowledge concerning intentionally-brought-about sideeffectscollectivelyprovidesufficientdifficultiesfortheStrongCogni-tiviststrategytomotivateustoconsideranalternativeapproach:thatnon-observationalknowledgeofactionisinfactinferential.

3. The Inferential Theory

The central idea behind the Inferential Theory is that our beliefsabout our intentional actions are not spontaneous, but evidence-based—based largely, I will argue, on our knowledge of what weintendtobedoing,whereintentionsarenotthemselvesbeliefs.Thisideahascommonlybeendismissedoutofhandonthegroundsofan-otherclaimofAnscombe’s:thatthespecialknowledgewehaveofourintentionalactionsisself-evidently“immediate.”38That is tosay, theagent’sbeliefaboutwhatheisdoingnotonlyseemsnottobeinferred

38.Anscombe(1963,12)comparesourspecialknowledgeofwhatwedointen-tionally to our knowledgeof the positionof our limbs (problematically, it

forif,ashesupposes,non-observationalknowledgeissimplyembod-ied inone’s intention—tobomb the factory—thensuchknowledgeofanythingbeyondwhatisintendedremainsunaccountedfor.37Onepossiblemovewouldbeforthemtodenythatthesideeffectsareun-intended;thatis,theycouldpackalltheforeseensideeffectsintowhatisintended.Thiswouldexplainhownon-observationalknowledgeofforeseensideeffectsispossible,butitwouldbeasteeppricetopayforthetheoryofintention.ItishighlycounterintuitivetosaythattheStrategicBomberintendstokillthechildren,giventhatthisoutcomeisneitherhisgoalnorameanstohisgoal,andthathelacksanydispo-sitiontotrackthatoutcomewithhiseffortsormeans-endreasoning.ThenaturalwaytocapturethedifferencebetweentheStrategicBomb-erandaTerrorBomber,partofwhosereasonforbombingthefactoryis inordertoterrorizetheenemybykillingsomechildren, is tosaythattheTerrorBomberintendstobombthefactoryandtokillthechil-dren,whiletheStrategicBomberintendstobombthefactorybutdoesnotintendtokillthechildren.Packingalltheforeseensideeffectsintowhatisintendedwouldhavetheeffectofdivorcingintentionfromtheagent’sgoals,whichseemstometorevisetheconceptofintentiontothepointoftalkingaboutadifferentattitudealtogether.Moreover,it

37.Wemustnotbedistractedbythefactthatkillingthechildrenisacausalup-shotofdroppingthebombs,whichrequiresthattheagentengageincause-and-effectreasoningtoknowofthisupshot.Thesamepointholdswithre-specttosideeffectsthatarenotcausallyrelatedtotheintendedaction,butratherare related invirtueofanabstract conventional structure.Considerasecondexample: IamintentionallysigningmynametoapieceofpaperthatIknowtobealetterofintenttoattendgraduateschoolatStanford,andI am signingmynamewith the intentionofbringing it about that I amaStanfordgraduatestudent.Intuitively,IknowwithoutobservationthatwhatIamdoingissigningmynameandtherebymakingmyselfaStanfordstudent.However,IalsoknowonthebasisofbackgroundknowledgethatStanfordstudentsareCardinals.But Idonot intend tobemakingmyselfaCardinalwithmysignature;perhapsitisquiteimportanttomethatIamadie-hardBerkeleyBear,andifIcouldachievemyobjectivewithoutbecomingaCar-dinal,Iwould.Butnevertheless,myactofsigningtheletterisalsoanactofmakingmyselfaCardinal,andjustasIknowwithoutobservationthatwhatIamdoingisbringingitaboutthatIamaStanfordstudent,IknowwithoutobservationthatIambringingitaboutthatIamaCardinal,thoughthelatterismerelyasideeffectofwhatIintend.



Second, if theevidentialbasis for thenon-observationalbelief istheagent’sintention,theobjectionthathisφ-ingcouldnotbeuptohimdoesnotgetofftheground.Wemustdistinguishbetweenbasingone’sintentiononsufficientevidencethatitscontentwillcomeaboutandbasingone’sbeliefon suchevidence.The former is incoherent,butthelatterneednotbe.Aslongaswearenotsupposingthattheintention is thebelief, then the intention canbebasedonpracticalreasonsintheordinaryway(inthenormalcase,at least),whilethebeliefcanbebased(inpart)ontheevidenceprovidedbytheintention.Thus,neither senseof “immediacy” commonlyattributed tonon-ob-servationalknowledgeofactionprecludesitfrombeingevidentiallybasedontheagent’sintentioninacting.

Astrongerobjectiontoinferentialtheoriesistheaforementionedclaimthatactingintentionallynecessarilyinvolvessomenon-observa-tional belief aboutwhat he is doing. The chargewas that an infer-entialprocess couldnot function so infallibly as topreserve suchanecessaryconnection,and that theexplanationmust thereforebeaconceptualone.However,IarguedinSection1thatitisnotclearthatall actions that canbeappropriatelycharacterizedas intentionaldoinvolveanon-observationalbelief—theadverbisnotsufficientlytiedtothemetaphysicsofagencytoguaranteethisconnection.Evenifoneisinclinedtothinkthatthereisareadingofintentionalactionoract-ing“forareason”thatdoesrequirenon-observationalbelief,thisdoesnotshowthatthebeliefcouldnotbeinferential;thepresenceofsuchabeliefmaysimplybeaconditiononourclassificationoftheactionas intentional or done for a reason. To rule this out,we need non-question-begginggroundsfor thinkingthere isarelevantdifferencebetweenthezoned-outdriverorzoned-incabinetmakerrespondingtotheirreasons,andtheirequivalentswhodothesethingsforreasons,otherthanthelackofbeliefintheformercases.Ouranswertothiswill

makesenseofthenotionofwillingistothinkofitastheagent’sintentioninacting.AgreatdealofworkhasbeendoneonintentionsinceAnscombewrotethis,makingthepossibilityofdrawingupontheseresourcestoexplainnon-observational knowledge of intentional actionmuchmore promisingthansheenvisioned.

fromobservationalevidence,butnottobebasedonpriorevidenceofanykind.Afterall,iftheagentbelieveshewillφonthebasisofsuf-ficientevidencethatheisgoingtoφ,wewouldnolongerthinkofhimasintendingtoφbutratheraspredictingthathewillφ.39Furthermore,theknowledgefeelstoustobeavailable“directly,”withouttheneedfor any sort of reflection.Anscombe goes so far as to say that non-observationalknowledgeisaspecialkindofknowledgethatrequiresnogroundswhatsoever.40 If theseclaimsare true, itwould ruleoutthepossibilityofthenon-observationalknowledgebeinggroundedinanythingpriortoitself.

Thislineofreasoningisunconvincing,however.First,merelynot-ingthatourknowledgeofwhatwearedoingseemstobedirectlyac-cessibleupon reflectiondoesnothing todemonstrate that it is non-inferential. Evidence-based information processing can take placerapidlyandautomaticallyatanon-consciouslevel,withoutthemind-ful entertainingof premisesor feelingof drawing a conclusion.Weare quite comfortablewith this idea in the contexts of information-processingsubsystemslikevisualperceptionorlanguageprocessing.Somemaybalkatcallingsuchnon-consciousinformation-processinganinference,butthatisagainalabelingissue;theessentialpointisthatthebeliefsresultingfromsuchaprocessarederivedfrompriorstatesthat(ideally)evidentiallysupportthosebeliefs.Recognizingthatev-idenced-basedprocessingofthistypeneednotpresent itself tocon-sciousnessassuchclearsthewayforthesuggestionthatnon-observa-tionalknowledgeofwhatwedointentionallyisbasedupon—butnotequivalentto—knowledgeofwhatweintendtobedoing.41

isgenerallyagreed), in that “nothingshows(theagent) thepositionofhislimbs;itisnotasthoughheweregoingbyatingleinhisknee….”

39.Cf.Grice(1971),266.

40.Anscombe(1963),50.

41. Anscombeconsidersandsummarilyrejectsatheoryinthisvein—thatwhatisknowntotheagentnon-observationallyiswhathewills,whileknowledgeoftheresultisbasedonevidenceintheordinaryway.Shecallsthisa“madaccount”,claimingtobeabletomakenosenseofthenotionof“willing”thatisindependentofwhattheagentactuallydoes.Butinfact,anaturalwayto



thingisintheagent’spowertodo,hewillbemotivatedtodothatthingandnothingelseincompatiblewithit.43Griceproposedthatanagentintendstoφjustincasehewillsthatheφandbelievesthathewillφasaresultofhiswillingit.ThetheoryiswhatIcallinferentialbecausetheagent’sbeliefthathewillφisevidentiallybasedonhisknowledgeofhiswill,plusthebackgroundknowledgeprovidedbyexperienceofwhatkindsofthingshewilldoifhewillshimselfto,andhisgroundsforthinkingnothingwillpreventhimfromφ-ingonthisoccasion.Hisknowledgeofhiswill,ontheotherhand,ispresumablynotaneviden-tialmatter(thoughGricedidnotattempttoexplainwhatkindofmat-teritis).Thisdual-componenttheoryofintentionisdesignedtoallowthattheagent’sbeliefthathewillφisjustifiedintheordinarywaybyhisexperientialevidencethathecanφatwill,whilepreservingtheintuitionthatwhetherornotheφ’sdependsuponwhetherhedecidesto(willsthathe)φ,andnotmerelyupontheoreticalevidencethatheisgoingtoendupφ-ing.

Theneo-GriceantheoryIshallproposedispenseswiththetechnicalnotionof“willing.”Thereisinsufficientreasontomakethisratherarti-ficialmoveifwesimplyrejectWeakCognitivisminstead.44Ifwethinkofintentionsasdistinctivelypractical,conativecommitmentsthatdonotconstitutivelyinvolvethebeliefthatonewilldowhatoneintends,thenwecanreplacetheroleofwillingintheGriceanstructurewithintending.IwanttoremainneutralbetweenspecificversionsofaDis-tinctivePracticalAttitude(DPA)viewofintention;theInferentialThe-oryshouldbemoreorlessequallyavailabletoDavidson,45Bratman,46AlfredMele(1992),andanyothersuchview.Forpresentpurposes,we

43. Grice(1971),277–278.

44. NotethatitisnaturalforWeakCognitiviststohaveaninferentialstoryaboutnon-observational knowledge, but inferentialists about non-observationalknowledgeneednotbeWeakCognitivists.

45. According toDavidson (1978, especially 98–102), intentions are a kind ofpro-attitude;theyareanall-outjudgmentthatacertainkindoffutureactionwouldbedesirable,giventherestofwhattheagentbelievesaboutthefuture.

46. Bratman (1987) thinks of intentions as practical attitudes defined by theirfunctional role as elements in plans of action, aiding in intra- and inter-

dependonthetheoryofactionweultimatelyaccept,andthisispartofwhatisatissueinhere.Iconcludethatthereisnoclearbasisonwhichtoruleoutinadvancethattheconnectionbetweenintentionalactionandnon-observationalbeliefcouldnotbeinferential.

Withtheseobjectionsoutoftheway,letusreturntoGrice.Grice’sformulationofthepuzzleofnon-observationalknowledgeisslightlydifferentfromAnscombe’s,Velleman’s,orSetiya’s.LikeVellemanandSetiya,Griceheldthatintendingtoφinvolvesbelievingthatyouwillφ,buthewasaWeakCognitivist—hedidnotthinkintentionsjustarebeliefs,buthethoughtthatbelievingonewillφispartofbeinginthestateofintendingtoφ.Hischiefreasonforhavingthisviewwasnottheneed toexplainnon-observationalknowledge,however,butbe-causehethoughttheassertionthatoneintendstoφ,madestrictlyandhonestly,impliesthatonebelievesonewillφ,andnotinawaythatispossibletocancel.Saying“IintendtogotothetheateronTuesday,butIdon’tbelieveIwillgo”merelysoundsconfused,ratherthanservingtocancelaninaccurateimplicature.ButasDavidsononcepointedout,Ithinkrightly,thisappealtolinguisticpracticeisnotagoodreasontoconcludethatintendingimpliesbelief;itcouldsimplybetheassertingthatimpliesbelieving,andnottheintending.42IagreewithDavidsonthatGrice’sreasonforbeingaWeakCognitivistisnotagoodone,andforsomeofthereasonscitedinSection2,IthinkevenWeakCognitiv-ismisbetteravoided.ButwecanstillagreewithGricethataninten-tiontoφisusuallyaccompaniedbyadoxasticcommitmenttoone’sφ-ing.

WhatisdistinctiveaboutGriceisthathewasnotpersuadedthatthisdoxasticcommitmentmustbeofaspecialgroundlessvariety,andsosetouttodiscoverwhatthejustificationforitcouldbe.Hissolutionisakindofdual-componenttheoryofintention,inwhichintentionsarethecombinationofabeliefandatechnicalnotionhedubs“will-ing.”AsIunderstandthenotion,willingissomethinglikeaconclusionaboutwhatwouldbethebestthingtodo,whereassumingthatthis

42. Davidson(1978),91.



casesofintentionalaction,theevidentialbasisfornon-observationalknowledgewillbeinplace,intheformofknowledgeofwhatwein-tendtobedoing.ThisiswhereGriceleavesoff;hedoesnotattempttoexplainknowledgeofone’swill.WhileIsuggestedearlierthatbreak-downsofbeliefarepossibleincaseswemightdescribeasintentional,non-observational knowledge is nonetheless a strikingly pervasivephenomenon;breakdownsaretheexceptionandnottherule.Iftheagent’sknowledgeofwhatheisdoingisinferential,wemustbesurethatthebasisoftheinferencewilldependablybeavailableintherel-evantcircumstances.Butourknowledgeofourownmindsisnotori-ouslyfallibleandpronetoerror.Weroutinelymisidentifythemotivesbehindourdecisions,48agonizeovertryingtofigureoutwhatitiswewant, spendyearsnotknowing thatwe’re really in love, and soon.Whyshouldweexpectourknowledgeofourintentionstobedepend-ableandaccurateenoughtoserveasthebasisfornon-observationalknowledgeofaction?

The Inferential Theory is compatible with different positive an-swerstothisquestion.Onemayinsertone’sfavoredtheoryofhowweknowwhatweintendhere,provideditdoestheworkofestablishingthatwegenerallyknowwhatweintendtobedoingwhenwegotoactintentionally.Thosewhoarewillingtotakeforgrantedthatweusu-allyknowwhatweintendwillnotseethisasaproblem,butotherswillfindthatassumptionunsatisfying.Iwillsketchmyownpreferredviewoftheconnectionhere,buttheoverallstructureoftheInferentialTheorydoesnotdependuponacceptingmyviewofwhywegener-allyshouldnotfailtoknowwhatweintendtobedoingwhenweactintentionally.

Onmyview,thekeyideaisthatintentionalactionandknowledgeofwhatoneintendsareconnected,bythementalactofmakingadeci-sionaboutwhattodo.Mostcasesofactionthatcountasintentionalwillinvolvesomethingtheagentdecidedondoing,andself-ascribinganintentiononthebasisofmakingadecisionaboutwhattodoisa

48.Cf.NisbettandWilson(1977).

canthinkofintentionsquitegenerallyintermsofthefunctionalrolethey play as settled objectives that shape further practical thinking,initiateandsustainaction,andatleastusuallyengagecertainnormsofpracticalrationality.47WhatiscommontoDPAviewsisthedenialthattheattitudethatplaysthisroleisitselfabelief,orevenentailsthebeliefthatonewilldowhatoneintends.Buttosucceedinbringingustoachieveourgoalsandtoaidinintra-andinter-personalcoordina-tionatatimeandovertime,ourintentionsmustbeintimatelytiedupwithourbeliefsaboutourselvesandabouttheworld.MyhypothesisisthatweachievethismoreorlessasGricesuggested,bytendingtobelieve,intheabsenceofevidencetothecontrary,thatwearedoingwhatweintendtobedoing.

Thebasicstructureoftheproposalisquasi-Griceaninthatwhattheagentknowsnon-evidentially iswhathe intendstobedoing,whileinsofarashehasabeliefaboutwhatheisactuallydoing,itiseviden-tiallybasedonhisknowledgeofwhatheintends,plushisevidenceforthinkingheisdoingwhatheintends.Ishallexplaineachofthesecomponentsinturn,andclarifywhyanevidence-basedbeliefcanstillcountasnon-observational.Attheendofthepaper,Iwilldiscussawayofextendingthebasicpicture,butfirstIwillfocusonexplainingthecorestrategy.

4. Knowing what we intend

A challenge for the Inferential Theory is to establish that in core

personal coordination over time, and subject to the norms that structurepracticalreasoning.

47. Talkof settledobjectivescanbe tracedback toHughMcCann (1991).Theterm is involved inadebatebetweenMcCannandBratmanoverwhetherthereisausefuldistinctionbetweenthestateofhavingasettledobjectiveandthestateofintending.Bratmanthinks,roughly,thatintendingishavingasettledobjectiveplusbeingsubjecttotherationalconstraintsofconsistencyandmeans-endcoherence,whileMcCannthinksthathavingasettledobjec-tive is already just intending, even if thatmeans that it sometimesmakessensetoviolatethoserationalconstraintswithone’sintentions.Insayingthatintending“atleastusuallyengagesrationalconstraints,”Imeantoavoidcom-ingdownoneithersideofthatissuehere.



cancallintothe“vastydeeps”ofhimselfforhiswilltobeacertainway,butitisnotalwaysthecasethatcallingwillmakeitso“whenthechipsaredown.”Thereareconstraintsonwhatonecanintendbydecidingon it;onemustbelieve it is inone’spower toperform theaction ifonedecidesto,andone’smotivationsmustbeat leastsomewhat inlinewithsoacting.Ontheotherhand,Idonotthinkit isageneralconstraintthatwemustdecidewhattodoinlightofwhatwetakeour-selvestohavesufficientpracticalreasontodo.51Wecommonlydecidetodothingsweknowtobeatoddswithourbestreasons,orwhenourreasonsareincommensurableorindeterminate,inlightofnoreasonwhatever.AsIamthinkingofit,then,theabilitytodecidewhattodoisnottobeidentifiedwithpracticaljudgment.

Becausemakingadecisionaboutwhattodoisawayofforminganintention—Iventuretosaythefundamentalway—wecanknowatanypointwhatweintendeitherbymakingadecisionaboutwhattodo,orbyrecallingapreviousdecision,andself-ascribinganintentiononthebasisofthatdecision.52Wetakeourselvestointendtheactionswehavedecidedon,andweareentitledtodoso.Weareentitledbe-causemakingadecision toφ isnormally sufficient for intending toφ,andbecausethisfactispartoftheveryconceptsofintentionanddecision.Athinkerwhopossessestheseconcepts,howeverimplicitly,willbedisposedandwillingtoascribetohimselfanintentiontoφonthebasisofhavingdecidedtoφ,whenthequestionofwhatheintendsarises.53Someonewhoknewhehaddecidedtoφ,butconsidereditaseriousopenquestionwhetherheintendedtoφ,wouldbemisapply-

51. Thisisincontrastwith,e.�g.,NishiShah’s(2008)argumentclaimingthattheexplicitdeliberativequestionofwhethertoφmustbesettledbyansweringthenormativequestionofwhetheroneoughttoφ.

52. Iamtakingforgrantedherethatdecisionsareconsciousmentalacts,andthatonenecessarilyknowsatthetimeofdecidingwhatitisonehasdecidedon.Theremaybefurtherquestionsabouthowexactlyoneknowsofamentalactthatitisadecision,butIsuggestthatknowledgeofaconsciousmentalactthathappensatatimeismuchlessproblematicthanknowledgethatoneisinadiachronicstatedefinedbycomplexdispositionalandnormativeroles.

53. I have been influenced here byChristopher Peacocke’s (2003) account ofconsciously-basedself-ascriptionofbelief.

fundamentalwayofknowingwhatweintend.NeitherclaimisoneIcanfullyargueforhere.49Withrespecttotheformerclaim,Ithinktherelationshipbetweenintentionalactionanddecisionisfairlyintuitive.Iftheagentneverdecidedtoperformacertainaction,ortodosome-thingwhichheforesawwould leadtoorconstitutethataction, thatfactwouldweighheavilyagainstitscountingasanintentionalactionofhis(thoughagain,thismaynotbeadecisiveconsideration).Thisiscertainlyanoversimplificationthatignoresborderlinecases,butthismuchseemsplausibletome:thecorecasesoffull-bloodedintentionalactionweareinterestedin,inwhichtheagentknowsfullwellwhatheisdoing,willbeonesinwhichsomerelevantdecisiontoacthasbeenmade.

Thesecondideaisthatwecanknowwhatweintendonthebasisofknowingwhatwehavedecidedtodo.Thisisbecausemakingadeci-siontoφisordinarilysufficientforcomingtointendtoφ.Thisclaimisalsonotespeciallycontroversial,butitisnotobvious.Decisionsareconscious,relativelydiscretementalacts,whereasintentionsarecom-plex, diachronic, heavily dispositionalmental states.Nevertheless, Isubmitthatweusuallycometobeinthestateofintendingby“makingupourminds”—bymakingadecisionaboutwhattodo—inawaywecannotnotsimplymakeupourmindswithrespecttowhatwewantorfeel.Weperformthementalactofmakingadecisioninordertosettlethequestionforourselvesofwhattodo,bycommittingourselvestoplanningonandaroundthataction,decidingwhatmeanstotake,de-cidingonnothingelseincompatiblewiththataction,andinitiatingtheactionwhenthetimecomes.Inotherwords,indecidingtoφ,weun-dertaketoshapeourthoughtinactioninjustthosewayscharacteristicofbeinginthestateofintendingtoφ.50

Not thatwecansimplydecideonanyactionatallandcountasintendingit.AsHarryFrankfurt(1999,101)haspointedout,anagent

49. Idoarguefortheseclaimsinmy(ms.).

50.Here Imakeabroadappeal toanalysesof the functional roleof intentionalongthelinesofBratman(1987),althoughIdonotmeananythingtodependontheprecisedetailsofthisrole.



are interdependent.But Ido think theconnection isordinarilysuffi-cientlytighttoexplainthepervasivenessofnon-observationalknowl-edgeofaction.

5. From knowledge of intention to knowledge of action

Whetherornotoneacceptstheforegoingpicture,letusnowsimplytakeforgrantedthatinmostcasesoffull-bloodedintentionalaction,weknowwhatweintendtobedoing.Thisismerelyknowledgeofthecontentofone’sownmind,anddoesnotyetamounttoknowledgeofwhatoneisactuallydoing.Thequestionnowathandconcernswhat,ifanything,theagentknowsbeyondhisownmindwhenheisactingintentionally.Theclaimoftheneo-GriceaninferentialmodelIampro-posingisthattheagentwilltendtobelieve,partlyonthebasisofhisintentiontoφ,thatheisinfactφ-ing.55Isay“partly”becauseinsofarasheisrational,hisbeliefthatheisφ-ingwillalsodependuponsev-eralotherepistemicfactors.Thefollowingisnotanexhaustivelistofthesefactors,butIwillsuggestsomeplausiblecandidates.Iwillthenexplainwhy theseevidence-basedbeliefsshouldnonethelesscountasnon-observationalintherelevantsense.56

55. Inthissection,Iwillmostlytalkabouttheagent’sforminganall-outbeliefaboutwhatheisdoing.Thisisanover-simplification;amoresophisticatedpicturewouldtalkintermsofdegreesofconfidence,allowingthatwewillsometimes experience anon-observational increase in confidence thatweare�φ-ingwhenweintendtobe,withoutfullybelievingthatweareφ-ing.

56. I shouldemphasize thatwhat Iamdescribingherewillnotnecessarilybetheagent’sactualthoughtprocessinanygiveninstanceofnon-observationalbeliefformation.Therearemanypiecesofbackgroundknowledgetheagentmusthaveinorderforhisinferencefromintentiontoactiontobejustified.Thisdoesnotmeanthatheactuallyrehearsesallofthesepremisesinagivencase;theseresourcesmustsimplybeavailabletohimtociteifpressed.Wemustthereforedistinguishbetweentheprojectofcharacterizingthesubter-raneanstructureof the inference,andtheprojectofdescribingtheagent’sactualthoughtpattern.Myfocushereisprimarilyontheformerproject,sincetheepistemicstatusof theagent’sbeliefdependsuponthisdeepstructureandnotjustupontheoftenabbreviatedexplicitreasoninghegoesthrough.Thus,ifthepictureIampresentingappearsexcessivelybaroque,recallthatthe agentwill not necessarily go through all the steps that constitute thestructureoftheinference.

ingtheconceptsofdecisionandintention—atleastintheabsenceofevidenceofanabnormalpsychologicalbreakdownbetweendecidingandputtinganintentioninplace.

Ihavenotreallyarguedforanyoftheseclaims,thoughIdoelse-where.Myobjecthereismerelytosketchapictureofhowone’sinten-tionalactionscouldbeconnectedwithknowledgeofone’sintentionsinsuchawayasrenderuncommonasituationinwhichanagentisactingintentionallybutdoesnotknowwhatheintendstobedoing.On thepicture I haveoffered, this situationwill be rarebecauseoftheroleofdecisioninintermediatingbetweenintentionalactionandknowledgeofone’sintentions.Iftheagentisactingintentionally,hewillusuallyhavedecidedatsomepointtoact,andhecanknowonthebasisofthatdecisionwhatheintendstobedoing.Itisnotthatwemustalwaysreferbacktotheoriginaldecisioninordertoknowofourintentions;weemployavarietyofshortcuts inkeeping trackofourgoals.Mostimportantly,weoftensimplykeeptrackofourreasonsforaction,orofhabitualpatternswehave,withoutreferringtoanythingmental.Mysuggestionisnotthatwemustalwayskeeptrackofourdecisionsinordertoknowwhatweintend,butratherthattheoptionistherewhenothershortcutsfail.Andifonedoesnotknowwhatoneintends,onemayalwayssimplydecideanew.

Thiscertainlyleavesroomforavarietyofbreakdowns—inknow-ingwhetheryouhavedecided,betweendecidingandself-ascribingan intention, and between deciding and knowingwhat you intendwhenyougotoact.AndIthinkthisisinfactwhatwefind;wedofindourselvesuncertainwhetherwehavereallydecidedtoφ,ormakingdecisionsthatleavenomark.Butwhenwefailtoknowwhatwehavedecided, itseemstomethatwealso lackknowledgeofwhatwein-tend,andinsofaraswefindourselvesacting,wedon’tknowwhatwearedoing.54Thepointisnottheseconnectionsareperfect,butratherthat theelementsofdecision, intention, self-knowledge, andaction

54. Thelattershouldbeespeciallyfamiliar,atleasttosomeagents:thephenom-enonofdeciding,say,togointothekitchentogetthescissors,andthenfind-ingoneselfpeeringintotherefrigeratorwithnoideawhatoneislookingfor.



whattodotocausethebullettohitthetarget,andnothavereasontobelievethatheislikelytobeprevented.Insofarasoneisrational,mostofthisbackgroundknowledgeofabilityandcircumstancewillbebroughttobearintheformingoftheintentionorplan,andsoshouldalreadybeinplaceastheintentionisexecuted.

Foreknowledgeofwhatonewilldointhefutureaddsadditionalcomplication.Tohaveit,onemusthavereasontobelieveonewillfol-lowthroughonone’sintention—thatonewillnotchangeone’smind.Thiswilldepend,foronething,onone’shistoryasanagent;ahighlystableagentcanconfidentlypredictthathewillfollowthroughonthisoccasion,whereasaflakyagentmaynotbeabletodoso.Thestrengthoftheagent’sreasonsasheseesthemmayalsoplayarole.Evenifonetendsingeneraltobequiteunreliable,onemighttakeoneselftohaveverystrongreasoninthiscasetoperformtheintendedaction,andsorationallypredicton thatbasis thatonewill follow throughon thisintention.58 In contrast, if one takesoneself tohaveonlyveryweakreason toperformtheaction,andnoespeciallystrongrecordof fol-lowingthroughonintentionswhenthestakesarelow,onehasmuchweakergroundstopredictonewillactonthatintention.Thekindofactionmayalsoberelevant.Onemightbeveryreliablewhenitcomestopaperdeadlines,butveryunreliableinmeetingsocialobligations.Knowing this, suchanagentwillbe inaposition tohave intention-basedforeknowledgethathewillsubmitapapertoaconferencenextTuesday,whilenotinapositiontoknowthathewillbeattendingapartylaterthatnight,thoughheknowshenowintendsbothofthesethings.Again,thislistisnotexhaustive,butitisindicativeofthecon-siderationsrelevantspecificallytoforeknowledgeofaction.

But knowledge of ability, conduciveness of circumstances, andone’shistoryasanagentarethingsoneknowsfromexperienceandobservation.Itistemptingtoconcludefromthisthatallweknownon-observationally iswhatwe intend tobedoing, and that anyknowl-edgeoftheresultsofouractionsisbasedonobservation.Thisview

58.Cf.Wilson(2000).

Onerelevantfactorwillbetheagent’sbackgroundbeliefinhisabil-itytoperformtheaction(s)heintends.Itwouldsurelybeanunlicensedleapoffaithforhimtobelievethatheisφ-ingjustbecauseheintendsto,ifhedoesn’talsohavegoodreasontobelievehecanφifheintendsto.Thiswillbeamatterofhisexperienceasanagent,comingtoknowwhathiscapabilitiesare.AsGriceputsthepoint,theagentwillknowfromexperiencethathecanraisehisarmatwillbutcannotraisehishairatwill.57Formostbasicactions,theagentwillknowwhetherornothecanperformthematwill—thoughperhapsifitisamovementhehasnotmadeforyears,hemaynotknowwhetherhecanstillper-formitifheintendsto.Butmostbasicactionsareperformedforthesakeofachievingsomefurtherend.Takeanagentraisinghisarminordertoaimhisrifleatthetargetandshootthebulls-eye.Hewillmostlikelybelievethatheisraisinghisarmandfiringtherifle,butwhetherornothebelievesnon-observationallythatheishittingthebulls-eyewilldependuponhisconfidencethathecanconsistentlyhititatwill.In general, the agent’s confidence thathe is doingwhathe intendswillvaryunderdifferentdescriptionsof theaction,andwillusuallydecreasethefurtherawayanactiondescriptiongetsfromhisbodilymovementsandthemoreitdependsuponacausalchainworkingoutinthewayheplans.

Asecondfactoroperantinthebackgroundofthebeliefformationwillbetheagent’sbackgroundknowledgeofhiscircumstancesasbe-ingconducivetohisφ-ing—oratleast,theabsenceofreasonstobe-lievehisφ-ingwillbeobstructed.Hewillnotbejustifiedinbelievingheisshootingthebulls-eyeifhehasreasontodoubtthathisgunisinworkingorder,or thathehasanunobstructedshot,andso forth.Whereanaction-typecountsassuchinvirtueofaconvention,hemustknowthattherelevantconventionappliesinthesecircumstances,andifhisaction-plandependsuponacausalchain,hisconfidencethatthiscausalchainwillsucceedshouldbereflectedinhisbelief.Ifhisinten-tionistohitthebulls-eyebyfiringthegunatit,hemustunderstand

57. Grice(1971),276.



distinguish between “telic” and “atelic” actions.62 Telic actions havebuiltintothematerminalpoint,atwhichtheactioniscomplete;thisisthecaseofwritingapaper,whichhasbuiltintoittheendpointofcompletingthepaper.Atelicactionshavenosuchendemicendpointandcanbecontinuedindefinitelyorbrokenoffatanypoint;thisisthecaseofwalkingandeating.

Therelevanceofthisdistinctiontothisdiscussionisthattelicandatelicprogressivesdifferwith respect to the logicaldeductions theylicense. Atelic actions described in the progressive tense entail thetruthofstatementsaboutthesameactioninthepast-tense,perfectiveaspect.Thatis,ifitistruethatJenisorhasbeenwalking,thenitisalsotruethatJenwalked/haswalked.Progressive-tensedescriptionsoftel-icactions,incontrast,donotentailthetruthofthepast-tenseperfec-tivedescription.Thetruthofthestatement‘Jeniscrossingthestreet’doesnotentailthatJencrossedthestreet;shemightturnaroundandgoback,orshemightgetrunoverbyatruck,withoutitsceasingtobetruethatshewascrossingthestreet.63

Isuggestthatbothofthesekindsofprogressive-tenseact-descrip-tionshelpusseewhytheagentneedn’tobservehimselfinactiontoknowwhatheisdoing,underthesedescriptions.Inthecaseofatelicprogressives, if theagent isorhasbeendoing thematall, it is truethathehasdonethem;thereisnofurthergoalhemustreachinordertocompletetheactionapartfrominitiatingit.Andinthecaseoftelicprogressives,theagentcancountassoactingevenifthegoaloftheactivity isneversuccessfullyachieved.AsAnscombeputs thepoint,amancanbe�doingsomethingwhichheneverthelessdoesnotdo(aswhenJengetskilledhalfwaythroughcrossingthestreet).64Andgiventhattheagentneednoteverachievesometerminalendpointinordertocountasdoingatelicaction,healsoneednothaveobservationalevidencethatheissucceedingtoknowheisdoingit.

Rather,Isuggest,thecentralconditionforhimtocountasdoing

62.§2.2

63.Telic and atelic act-descriptions are both opposed to stative descriptions,whichdonottaketheprogressiveformatall—e.�g.,“know”,“love”,“believe”.

64.Anscombe(1963),39.

wouldbewhatKevinFalveycalls the“two-factorthesis.”59Althoughthe two-factor thesisavoids themysteriousclaimthatwecanknowwhatishappeningintheworldwithoutlooking,itisalsoadisappoint-ingdeflationofAnscombe’s thesis.Shecontendsthat “whenthede-scriptionofwhathappensistheverythingwhichIshouldsayIwasdoing,thenthereisnodistinctionbetweenmydoingandthething’shappening.”60StrongCognitivismpurportstocapturetheforceofAns-combe’sfascinatingbutcrypticclaim,andfortheInferentialTheorytodothesame,ratherthanmerelyexplainingitaway,itneedstoclarifywhy it isnot simply the two-factor thesis. Inwhat sensedoeswhattheagentknowswithoutobservationextendbeyondhisownmindtowhatactuallyhappens?

Partoftheanswerissimplythattheexperienceandobservationonwhichtheagent’sbeliefispartlybasedisnotexperienceorobserva-tionof theparticularaction inquestion.Hehasbackgroundknowl-edgefromexperiencethathecanhitthetargetatwill,buthisbeliefdoesnotdependonwaitingtoseewherethebulletgoesonthisoc-casion.61Muchmoreinterestingly,though,thereisacertainfeatureofthekindofdescriptionsunderwhichweexpecttheagenttohavenon-observationalknowledgeofhisactions,suchthatknowingwhatyouintendtobedoingalsolargelyamountstoknowingwhatyouaredo-ing,underthatdescription.Thatis,manyactiondescriptionsfunctioninsuchawayastoapplytrulyinlargepartbecausethatdescriptioniswhattheagentintends.

The act-descriptions that have this characteristic are (in Englishat least) a subsetof those that take theprogressive form—“iswalk-ing,” “is writing a paper,” “is eating,” and so forth. Descriptions ofthisformdenoteactionsthatareinprogressandthattakeplaceoversomeamountoftime.Here,followingComrie(1976),wecanfurther

59. Falvey(2000),21

60.Anscombe(1973),52–53.

61. Thispointillustratesthedistinctionbetweennon-inferentialknowledgeandnon-observationalknowledge,sinceIwanttosaythattheagenthasinferen-tialbutnon-observationalknowledgeofwhatheisdoing,intheparadigmcase.



succeededassoonashehasbegun.Andin fact, theknowledgeweexpectagentstohaveoftheiractionstakespreciselythisprogressiveform,andconcernsthesekindsofactions.Theexamplesgivenintheliteraturestandardlyconcerntheagent’sknowledgeofwhatheisnow�doing—painting thewall yellow,writing theword ‘action’, pumpingwater,andsoforth.66

Thisisnocoincidence,forwewouldbemuchlessinclinedtotakeseriouslyanagentwhosenon-observationalbelieftakesadescriptionthat does entail success,without checking to see that he has reallypulleditoff.Wegrantthattheagentcanknowheiswritingtheword‘action’ontheboardat time twithout lookingtoseethat it isreallyhappening,becauseitcanbetruethatheiswritingitattevenifhismarkerfailsatt’.Contrastthiswiththeagent’sclaimthatheknowswithoutlooking,say,thatheisteachinghisstudentshowtospelltheword‘action’.Wewouldbemuchlesswillingtograntthatheknowsnon-observationally that he is doing this, for he cannot have beenteachinghisstudentstospell‘action’unlesshesucceedsingettingitdone.67However,aslongaswhattheagentbelievesheisdoingisde-scribedinsuchawaythatheneednotsucceedinordertobedoingit,heneedhavelittleornoevidencethatheissucceeding.This,then,isafurtherrespectinwhichtheInferentialTheorycanmaintainthattheagenthasnon-observationalknowledgeofwhathappensandnotjustofwhatheisaimingat.68

Insummary,wehavethecontoursofamodelonwhich,whenthe

66.ThefirstandthirdarefromAnscombe,andthesecondfromDavidson(1978).

67.Again,thisisnottosaythattheagent’snon-observationalknowledgeneverextends beyond this progressive-tense description; if he has sufficient evi-dence(theevidenceofexperiencethatheconsistentlysucceedsinteachinghisstudentstospellusingthismethod,perhaps),heislicensedtoinferthatthisisindeedwhatheisdoing.

68.Ofcourse,allIhavesaidhereisalsoavailabletotheStrongCognitivistandisnotmeanttodistinguishonetheoryfromtheother.Theoverallpointissim-plythatbothstoriescanacknowledgethatournon-observationalknowledgeextendsbeyondourownmindstowhatactuallyhappens—thoughonlytheInferentialTheorycanmaintain that thisknowledge isbasedonsufficientpriorevidenceintheordinaryway.

anactionofthissortisthatitiswhatheintendstobedoing.ForittobetruethatJeniswalkingtothephilosophydepartment(andnottothelibrary),thecentralconditionisthatsheiswalkingwiththeinten-tionofgettingtothedepartment.Therearesomeotherminimalcon-ditions thataredifficult tospecifyprecisely;perhapsshemusthavealready takena fewstepsandbelieve sheknowshow toget to thedepartment.Ontheotherhand,itcanbetruethatsheiswalkingtothedepartmentevenifsheissimplystandingataredlightatthetime,orifsheisactuallywalkinginthewrongdirection,aslongassheisdis-posedtocorrectherselfwhenshediscovershererror.AllobservableevidenceavailablemightfailtosupporttheclaimthatJeniswalkingtothedepartment,andyet—perhapswithinsomelimitsofplausibilityofsuccess—itcannonethelessbetruethatsheis,undertheprogres-sivedescription,ifsheintendstobedoingso.65

These features of many progressive-tense act-descriptions makeit possible for the agent’s knowledge of his intention to amount toknowledgeofwhatisactuallyhappening,givensomeminimalfurtherconditionsthatmarktheboundariesofpossibilityofsuccess.Insofaras the agent’s belief about his action takes this kind of description,thatbeliefcanbebasedonlittlemorethanhisknowledgeofhis in-tentioninactingandtheaforementionedbackgroundknowledgeofability, forheneednothaveevidencethatheisactuallysucceedinginhis intendedaim—unless it isanatelicact, inwhichcasehehas

65. Falvey(2000)makesasimilarpointaboutthe“broadness”and“openness”oftheprogressivetense.Tobeclear,thisisapointaboutthetruth-conditionsofact-descriptionsandnotdirectlyabouttheconceptofintention.However,onemightworrythatinourpracticeofdeferringtotheagent’sintention(de-feasibly)inapplyingprogressive-tenseact-descriptionstoanepisodeofbe-havior,wearethinkingofintentioninacertainway,andperhapsawaythatisincompatiblewithwhatIhavesaidhere.Iseenoreasontothinkthisisso.Ihavesuggestedthat1)intentionsaredistinctivelypracticalattitudes:theyarenotbeliefs,nordotheyentailthebeliefthatonewilldowhatoneintends;2)thatinsofarasanagenthasanon-observationalbeliefaboutwhatheisdo-ing,thatbeliefisevidentiallybasedonhisknowledgeofwhatheintendstobedoing;and3)intentionstendtocausetheinitiationoftheintendedaction.AsfarasIcansee,noneoftheseclaimsareincompatiblewiththeroleIhavesuggested intentions play as a defeasible truthmaker of progressive-tenseact-descriptions.



6. Three threads

Inthissection,Iwanttopickuponthreethreadsthatwereearlierleftdangling.Ileftpromissorynotesabout1)whethernon-observationalknowledgeof intentionalaction is in fact thecauseofwhat it repre-sents; 2) the place ofWeakCognitivist theories of intention in thelogicalspaceofthedebate;and3)thepuzzleaboutnon-observationalknowledgeofforeseenbutunintendedsideeffectsofintendedactions.Iwilldischargeeachofthesenotesinturn.

Non-observational�knowledge�—�the�cause�of�what�it�understands?AconsequenceoftheInferentialTheoryofnon-observationalknowl-edge is the rejectionof the interpretationofpracticalknowledgeasbeing theefficientcauseofwhat it represents.On thisaccount, thebeliefitselfdoesnotbringaboutitsobject;itisevidentiallybasedonthe agent’s intention in acting, which is (presumably) what bringsabout the believed-in action. To bemore precise, there are at leasttworolestheintentionplayswithrespecttothetruthoftheagent’sbeliefaboutwhatheisdoing.First, it istheintention(wepresume)thatbrings theagent to initiate the intendedactionandguideshimthroughtoitscompletion,inthesuccessfulcase.Secondly,becauseofthenatureofperformance-verbsexpressed in theprogressive tense,theagent’sintentionisapowerfuldeterminingfactorinwhetherhisbehaviorindeedcomesundertheintendeddescription(givenotherbackgroundconditions,asIhaveargued).Thus,accordingtotheIn-ferentialTheory, theagent’snon-observationalbeliefaboutwhatheisdoingisbasedonthecauseofitstruth,butisnotitselftheefficientcause.ThisisamajordifferencefromtheStrongCognitivistviewsofVellemanandSetiya.

Thereisawayinwhichitisstillaspecial,practicalkindofknowl-edge,however.Itisnotmerelyspeculative,formedinresponsetoan-tecedentevidenceabouthowtheworldis;rather,itistrackingtheef-fectofone’sownmindupontheworld.Thetruthofthebeliefdependsontheagent’schoicetomakeittrue,bycarryingouttheintentiononwhichthebeliefisbased,andnotonitsbeinganaccuratereflection

agentknowsthathe intendsnowtoφ,hewill tendtobelievehe isφ-ing,andnotonthebasisofobservationof theaction inquestion.Among the factors uponwhich this belief does depend, I have sug-gested,are:a)theagent’sconfidencethathehastheabilitiesrequiredbyhisplan;b)hisknowledgeofhiscircumstances,includinghisun-derstandingoftheapplicableconventions,theobtainingofthecondi-tionsnecessaryforhisactiontocountasφ-ing,andhisunderstandingofthecause-and-effectrelationshipshisplanwillbeexploiting;c)forforeknowledgeofaction,hishistoryasanagentwhoreliablyfollowsthroughonhis intentions, ingeneralandwith respect toactionsofthetypeinquestion;andd)hisunderstandingofthewaysomeactiondescriptionsapplypartlyinvirtueofhisintentioninacting.Thelastconsiderationinparticularmakesitpossibleforhimtoknowwhatisactuallyhappening,underacertaindescription,inknowingwhatheintendstobedoing.69

69.Onefurtherthingtheagentmightberequiredtoknowinordertohavenon-observationalknowledgeofwhatheisdoingisthathisintentioniswhatismovinghimtoact.Forinstance,DanielWegner(2002)arguesthatthefeel-ingofconsciouslywillingisnotthedirectcauseofouractions.Iftheagentdoesnotbelievehis intentionswillbeeffective inmovinghim,hisknowl-edgeofwhathe intends tobedoingcannot justifyabeliefaboutwhatheisactuallydoing.ThisisapointthatSetiyaandFalveydonotaddressatall.Vellemandoeshaveastoryaboutit,involvingtheagent’sunderstandingofbeingmotivated by the desire for self-understanding to fulfill his expecta-tionsofacting,oncehehasformedthem.AsIseeit,thisquestioniscompli-catedbytheneedtoremainneutralaboutissuesthatareproperlythedomainofempiricalscience—issuesaboutwhetherintentionsarephysicalstatesinthebrainthatcausebehavior,andsoforth.Itisimportantthatourabilitytohavenon-observational knowledgeof our intentional actionsdoesnot de-penduponthescienceturningoutinanyparticularway.WhatIthinkisthatthepresuppositionthatyourintentionswillbeeffectiveinmovingyoutoactisbuiltintotheveryconceptofapresent-directedintention,suchthatiftheagentascribestohimselfanintentionnowtoφ,hetherebypresupposesthatthisintentionwillmovehimtoφ.Someonewhoentertainedthethought“Iintendtoraisemyarmandvoteyes in justasecond,but Idon’tknowif Iwilleventrytoraisemyarm”wouldsimplynotbedeployingtheconceptofintentioninthecorrectway.Itseemstomethatwehaveadefaultepistemicwarranttopresupposethatourintentionswillmoveustoact,butIcannotargueforthishere.



isasopposedtotheStrongCognitivistideathatintentionsjustareakindofbelief—inSetiya’scase,abeliefthathasspecialmotivationalproperties,butnonethelessanattitudethatcannotbebrokendownintodistinct conative and cognitive components. I have focusedonStrongCognitivismbecausebothVellemanandSetiyaappealtothiskindofviewasawayofexplainingAnscombe’sNon-ObservationalKnowledgeThesis,butthismaystrikeusasanartifact;althoughthesetwopreferStrongCognitivisttheories,wouldn’tWeakCognitivismdojustaswell?Itmightseemthatallweneedforthiskindofexplanationtoworkisthatbelievingisapartofintending,andnotnecessarilytheentiretyofit.

Thereisasenseinwhichthislineofthoughtisontherighttrack,althoughIthinkultimatelymisguided.Exploringthisideaturnsouttoberevealingoftherelationshipbetweenthedifferentkindsofviewsonthetable.WeakCognitivistviewsclaimthatintentionsare“beliefsplus”—believingyouwillφplussomeothercomponent,presumablyconative.Oncewehavethisdual-componentstructure,therearetwopossibilities for this type of viewwith respect to non-observationalknowledgeofintentionalaction:aninferentialversionandanon-in-ferentialone.Eitherthebeliefcomponentisevidentiallybasedontheconativecomponent,atleastinpart,oritisnot.

Now,theinferentialversionofWeakCognitivismispreciselywhatGriceproposes.Onhisview,theconativecomponentiswilling,andthe belief component is evidentially based on one’s knowledge ofone’swill.Ihavearguedherethatthiskindofinferentialismisindeedaviablestrategyforexplainingnon-observationalknowledgeofinten-tionalaction,butthattheappealtowillingisunnecessary;intendingcanplaytheroleGriceaccordstowilling,andthebeliefcanbeeviden-tiallybasedontheagent’sintentionwithoutpurportingtobeapartoftheintentionitself.Asjustnoted,thiskindoftheorygivesuponAns-combe’sideathatthebeliefisthecauseofitsowntruth,butithasthe

intendingthatφconsistsindesiringthatφandbelievingthatonewillφforthereasonthathisdesirethatφwillmotivatehimtoactinsuchawaythatφ.

ofthewaythingsalreadystand.Thebeliefisnotthecauseofwhatitrepresents,buttheagentis,andIthinkinthissenseitstilldeservestobecharacterizedas“practical”.SinceIhavereservedtheterm‘practi-cal knowledge’ forAquinas’snotionof knowledge that itself causeswhatitrepresents,however,wemightinsteadcallourintention-basedknowledge“agential”knowledge—knowledgeweattainbybringingtheworldtoconformtoanideawehaveofit.

Theadvantageofdenyingthatnon-observationalbeliefsaboutouractionscausethetruthofwhattheyrepresent is that theInferentialTheory,unlikeStrongCognitivism,cantherebyavoidtheclaimthatin forming intentions,wemust jump toconclusions thatare insuffi-ciently supportedbyprior evidence.As Ihaveemphasized, at leastsomemayfinditunsettlingtothinkthatsuchdoxasticleapslieattheheartofhumanagency.Wearenotdivineagents;thereisagapforusbetweenintendinganddoing,andourbeliefsoughttobesensitivetothisgapwithouttherebypreventingusfromintendingatall.Byhold-ingthatagentialknowledge isevidentiallybasedonone’s intention,togetherwithone’sreasonstothinkthe intentionwillbesuccessful,the InferentialTheoryprecludes theneed toposit awidespreadex-ceptioninthecaseofintentionforjustifiedbelieving.Wecanexplainagentialknowledgewithasimple,familiarepistemicstructure,with-outtheneedtosupposethatthepracticalandthetheoreticalmustbefusedinsurprisingways.

Weak�CognitivismIn Section 2, I drew a distinction between Strong andWeakCogni-tivismaboutintention.IdefinedWeakCognitivismastheclaimthatintendingtoφpartlyinvolvesbelievingyouwillφ,butalsoconsistsinsomeotherseparablecomponent.GriceistheparadigmaticWeakCognitivist,sinceonhisview,intendingtoφisacombinationoftwoattitudes:willingthatφ,andbelievingthatonewillφasaresultofwill-ingit,wherewillingthatφcanoccurwithoutanysuchbelief.70This

70.WayneDavis(1984)alsohasaWeakCognitivistviewofintending,onwhich



non-observationalknowledgeofbringingabouttheexpectedbutun-intendedsideeffectsofone’sintendedactions.Asdiscussed,weseemto have a similar kind of non-observational knowledge of bringingabouttheseunintendedsideeffectstothatwehaveofperformingtheintendedactionitself.ItisnotclearwhattheStrongCognitivisttheo-rist couldorwouldwant tosayabout this, sinceaccording to them,what theagentknowsnon-observationally is limited towhat is em-bodiedinthecontentofhisintention.

IarguedinSection2thatexpandingintentionstoincludealloftheforeseensideeffectswouldbetooconsequentialamoveforatheoryofintentiontomakemerelyinordertoaccountforthefullextentofnon-observationalknowledge.72ThesecondoptionIseeavailabletotheStrongCognitivistwouldbetoinsistthatanyknowledgewehaveofbringingaboutunintendedsideeffectsisafundamentallydifferentkindofknowledgethanthatwehaveofourintendedactions—thatitistheoreticalor“speculative”ratherthanpractical.Thatis,theStrongCognitivistmightgesturetothe“foreseen”partof“foreseenbutunin-tendedconsequences”andresteasywithpointingoutthattheStrate-gicBombermaynotintendtobringaboutthedeathsofthechildren,buthealreadybelieveshewilldosoifhedropsthebombsonthefac-tory.Heknowspracticallythatheisbombingthefactory,butherea-sonshiswaytheoreticallytotheconclusionthatheistherebybringingaboutthedeathsofsomechildren.

This solution entails that knowledgeof bringing about expectedsideeffectsofourintendedactionshaspreciselythesameinferentialstructureIamproposingallofnon-observationalknowledgeofactionhas,inthatthechiefgroundsforthatknowledgewillbetheagent’sknowledgeofhis intention.Afterall,merelybelieving thatchildrendie if theyarehitwithbombs isnot thesameasbelieving thatone�is�bringing�aboutthedeathsofsomechildren—itisnotabeliefabout

72.AlthoughVellemanmaybeindependentlycommittedtothisclaim.Bratman(1991)criticizesVelleman’stheoryasbeing“promiscuous,”inthatitappearstotreatanythingtheagent foreseeshewillbringaboutaspartofwhatheintendstodo.

advantageofmaintainingthatitisjustifiedintheordinaryway,ratherthananexceptiontothestandardrulesofrationalbeliefformation.

There are no prominent defenders of a non-inferential brand ofWeakCognitivism,andI thinkthis isnocoincidence.Suchatheorywouldholdthatintentionsare“beliefsplus,”butwoulddenythattheconativecomponentplaysanyjustifyingroleintheagent’sbeliefthathewillφ.Thiswouldbequiteanoddview,sincethebeliefwouldbeneitherbasedonevidencenorself-fulfilling.Thatis,presumingthattheconativecomponentisnecessaryfortheagent’sφ-ingtooccur,thebeliefcomponentwouldnotbeindependentlysufficienttobringtheφ-ingabout,andyetitalsowouldnotbeevidentiallybasedonanec-essaryconditionforitstruth.71Thiswouldleavethebeliefquiteill-sup-portedindeed.Essentially,whatthisshowsisthatoncewemakethestepofpositingabeliefcomponentofintendingthatdoesnotrequiresufficientantecedentevidenceforitstruth,wearestronglypushedtogoallthewaytoStrongCognitivismandsaythatthebeliefisthein-tention,sothatitsjustificationcanbeclaimedtolieinitsself-fulfillingnature.

Thus,themiddlegroundWeakCognitivismmayappeartoofferbetweenStrongCognitivismandaninferentialmodelturnsouttobeanunhappyone.WeareeitherpushedinthedirectionofGrice’sdual-component inferentialism, which is subject to the same counterex-amplesagainstintentioninvolvingbeliefbywhichStrongCognitivisttheoriesarechallenged,orwearepushedallthewaybacktoStrongCognitivismitself.IhavearguedherethatanInferentialTheorythatavoidscognitivismaboutintentionaltogether,strongorweak,ispref-erabletoeitheroftheseoptions.

Foreseen�but�unintended�side�effects�The third strand I wish to resume here is the puzzle concerning

71. Thisdoesnotruleoutthebeliefcomponentoftheintentionbeingacauseoftheintendedaction,inconjunctionwiththepracticalcomponent.Suchaviewcouldnotappealtothebeliefasbeingself-justifying,however,sincethepractical componentwouldpresumablyalsobenecessary for thebelief tocometrue.



entailthatheintendsthewholepackage—thebomberdoesnotintendtokillthechildren,becauseheisnottrackingthisoutcomewithhisef-fortsormeans-endreasoning—butitdoesmeanthattheside-effectshe foreseesare included in theconclusionofhisdeliberation. Iwillcall thiswholepackagewhat theagent is “practicallycommitted” to,where this includesbothwhatheactually intendsand the foreseenconsequencesheseriouslyconsidersinhisdeliberation.

Thesignificanceof thiswhole-packageviewof theconclusionofpractical deliberation is that the evidential basis of the agent’s non-observational belief is actually his entire practical commitment, andnotmerely theparthe intends.Hewill bedisposed tobelieve thatheisbringingabouttheentirescenarioheplumpedfor,andnotonlythatpartatwhichheisactuallyaiming(thoughhemayconsidersomepartsoftheenvisionedscenariomorelikelythanotherparts).There-fore,incaseswheretheagenthasconsideredasideeffectinhisdelib-eration,andmadeapracticalcommitmentinfavorofthescenarioasawhole,thesameinferentialprocessIhavebeendescribingshouldalsoleadhimtobelieveheisbringingaboutthesideeffects.TheStrategicBomberwill inferfromhispracticalcommitmentnotonlythatheisonhiswaytobombthefactory,butalsothatheisonhiswaytobringaboutthedeathsofsomechildren.

In fact, I thinkthiscloser lookat theagent’sdeliberativeprocessreveals why some are inclined to consider knowledge concerningside effects different from knowledge of intended actions.Delibera-tionaboutwhattoaimat ispredominantlyamatterofpracticalrea-soning—weighingreasonsforandagainstcoursesofaction—whilefiguringoutthelikelysideeffectsofthosecoursesofactionwillbeamatteroftheoreticalreasoning.Thisisanimportantdifference,butitisadifferencerelevanttothedeliberativeconstructionofascenario,nottoone’sknowledgeofbringingthatscenarioabout.Onceacourseofactionischosen,one’sknowledgeofbringingaboutthatscenarioisuniformlyagential, inthesenseIarticulatedabove:it isbasedonone’schoicetomakeittruethatthesearethethingsoneisdoing,andnotonantecedentevidenceforthetruthorprobabilityoftheseevents.

The InferentialTheorycan thusbeextended inanaturalway to

whatone’sownagencyisamountingto.Toreasontothelatterbelief,theStrategicBomber’s groundsmust includehis intention tobombthe factory, forotherwisehewouldnothavesufficientreasontobe-lievethatheisactinginawaythatwillcausethedeaths.Thisproposalwouldthusendupclaimingthatnon-observationalknowledgeofin-tended actions is spontaneous,while any non-observational knowl-edgeofbringingaboutunintendedconsequencesisinferential.Thiswouldbeadivided,two-parttheoryofnon-observationalknowledgeofagency.

TheInferentialTheory,ontheotherhand,hastheresourcestopro-videaunifiedaccountofagentialknowledgeofintentionalbutunin-tendedsideeffects.Todothiswemustextendthebasictheorysome-what. InSection4, I suggested thatweoftenknowwhatwe intendtodobecausewehavedeliberated, reflectedonreasons forvariousactions,andresolvedinfavorofagivencourseofaction.Inparticu-lar,thiskindofdeliberationandself-ascriptionoftheresolved-uponactionasone’s intentionoftenoccurs inthecorecasesof full-blood-edagency inwhichweexpect theagent tohavenon-observationalknowledge.Butnormally,iftheagentisaresponsibledeliberator,hewillnotconsiderhisaiminisolation;hewillalsoreflectonwhathetakestobethelikelysideeffectsofthecoursesofactionheiscontem-plating.Beforedecidingtobombthefactory,iftheStrategicBomberisnotarashandheedlessagent,hewillweighinhisdeliberationthefact that insoacting,he isalso likely tobringaboutdamageto theschoolandkillsomechildren.73Intheprocessofdeliberatingandre-flectingonvariouscoursesofaction,theagentwillthereforebeledtoformasetofbeliefsaboutthelikelysideeffectsofeachoftheplansheconsiders.

Following Bratman (1987), we can think of the combination ofthe potential action and the anticipated side-effects as a “scenario,”andnotethattheagent’schoiceofacertainactionis insomesenseachoice in favorof thewholescenariohe foresees.74Thisdoesnot

73. AsdiscussedbyBratman(1987),§10.

74.Op.�cit.,151–155.



complete theoryofnon-observational knowledgeofwhatwedo in-tentionallyoughttoaccountforit.

Thispointhighlightsasignificantdifferencebetweenmyviewandthose of Anscombe, Velleman, and Setiya, however. Not only am Iproposingthatnon-observationalknowledgeofintentionalactionisinferential rather than spontaneousor immediate,but I amalsode-nyingthatitisthecauseofwhatitrepresentsinanystraightforwardsense.ThismightbeadivergencefromAnscombe’soriginalcharacter-izationofthephenomenon,buttheadvantageisthattheInferentialTheory is therebyabletoavoidmakinganexception intherationalrequirements on belief formation for beliefs about your own inten-tionalactions.TheInferentialTheoryisademystificationoftheepis-temicstructureofnon-observationalknowledge;itmaintainsthatthisknowledgeisbasedonsufficientpriorevidenceinthewayordinarilyrequiredbytheoreticalrationality.

Finally, theInferentialTheorycanstillacknowledgeandincorpo-rateoneof the fundamental insightsof itsStrongCognitivist rivals:thatwearecreatureswhoaredeeplymotivatedtoknowwhatwearedoing. This is, of course, the guidinghypothesis behindVelleman’swell-known theory of action. I do notmean here to endorse Velle-man’s claim that thedesire for self-understanding “plays the roleoftheagent,”75butIdothinkthatthatitishighlyplausiblethatwehaveastrongdispositiontomaintainawarenessofwhatwearedoing,inawaythatanticipatesthe laggingdeliveriesofsenseevidence.ThisinsighthelpstheInferentialTheoryexplainwhywewouldsoconsis-tently and automatically formbeliefs about our actions, even in ad-vanceofobservationalconfirmation.Wedesiretoknowwhatweareabout,andIhopetohavemotivatedtheideathatweachievethisinpartbyinferringfromourintentions.76

75. (2000b),138.

76.VersionsofthisarticlewerepresentedandinsightfullydiscussedatStanfordUniversity, UC Berkeley, and the University of Southern California. I amespecially indebtedtoMichaelBratmanformanyinvaluableconversationsandcommentsonearlierdrafts.My thanksalso toKristaLawlor,NadeemHussain,JohnPerry,LanierAnderson,KieranSetiya,LucaFerrero,andtwoanonymousrefereesatPhilosophers’�Imprintforextremelyhelpfulcomments.

provide a unified account of this special knowledge of our actions,whetherintendedormerelyforeseen.Themostplausibleoptionavail-abletotheStrongCognitivist,ontheotherhand, isthetwo-partac-count onwhich knowledgeof unintended side effects is inferential,whileknowledgeofintendedactionsisspontaneous.Itismyviewthatonceitisadmittedthatonekindofnon-observationalknowledgeisevidence-based,thereistheoreticalpressuretomovetowardtheuni-fiedstructureproposedbytheInferentialTheory,onwhichitisallofthiskind.

7. Conclusion

Manymoredetailscouldbeaddedtothisinferentialstoryofnon-ob-servationalknowledgeof intentionalaction,but I thinkenoughhasbeensaidheretoindicatesomeoftheadvantagesofthetheory.Mostsignificantly,itneutralizesoneofthemajormotivationsforhavingaStrongCognitivisttheoryofintention.ThepurportedabilityofStrongCognitivismtoexplainnon-observationalknowledgehasbeentoutedasanadvantageof thiskindofview,while theDPA camphas saidverylittleaboutit(perhapsoutofDavidsonianskepticism).TheInfer-entialTheoryprovidesDPA-typeviewswithastorytotellaboutnon-observational knowledgeof action, showinghow they can take theconnectionbetweenintentionalactionandnon-observationalknowl-edgeseriouslywhileretainingtheflexibilitytoallowforbreakdownsinbeliefatthemarginsofintentionalaction.

Second, more than merely leveling the playing field betweenStrong Cognitivism andDPA theorieswith respect to non-observa-tionalknowledge,IhavearguedthattheInferentialTheoryisbetterequipped to account for non-observational knowledge of the bring-ingaboutofunintendedsideeffects.UnliketheoptionsIcanseeforStrongCognitivism,thereisanaturalandstraightforwardwaytoex-tend the InferentialTheory toaccount fornon-observationalknowl-edgeofbringingabouteffectsyouforeseebutarenotaimingat.Sinceourknowledgeofbringingabouttheseeffectsisagential—groundedinourchoice tomake it true thatwearebringing themabout, rath-er thanapost�hoc apprehensionof the facts—it seems tome thata



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