HIGHLIGHTS The Middle East - Camden Conference

FEBRUARY 21-23, 2014

CAMDEN CONFERENCE

The Global Politics of Food and WaterGlobal food and water shortages are rapidly emerging as the most critical crisis of our time.

Rising food prices, shrinking water availability, climate change, and relentless populationgrowth are converging to force this issue onto the world agenda. Shortages of food and water are already destabilizing societies and governments, andcreating hundreds of refugees. Jim Yong Kim, president of the World Bank, recently gave asobering warning about the risk of conflicts over natural resources. If the forecast of a four-degree global increase above the historical average temperature proves to be accurate, he said,“There will be water and food fights everywhere.” Kim called for action to create a carbon market, eliminate fossil-fuel subsidies, and “green”the world’s largest cities. He noted that the 2012 droughts in the US, which pushed up theprice of wheat and maize, had led to the world’s poor eating less. For the first time, he said,extreme weather that affects food production had been connected to climate change broughton by human activity. Among the timely questions that may be addressed in the 2014 Camden Conference:

� What new game-plan and alternative policies do we need to overcome market failures?What new technologies may aid in the process?

� What are the impacts of global warming on food production, and how might they affectpolitical stability?

� What innovations in organic and commercial agriculture, respectively, hold promise toproduce enough food to feed the planet?

� Do we have the ability to provide enough water for homes and farms and avoid conflictover water resources in the coming decades?

� What particular challenges do climate change, world food prices, poverty, and land-grab-bing pose for food security in Africa?

� What can the US do to assure the multilateral cooperation needed to establish policiesto resolve these challenges?

Check the Camden Conference website for updates on speakers, programs,community events, and registration.

Camden, Maine

www.camdenconference.org

The Middle East

Robin Wright • Marwan Muasher • Marc LynchJoshua Landis • Gregory Gause • Shai FeldmanSeyed Hossein Mousavian • Barbara IbrahimLaurence Pope • Nicholas Burns

HIGHLIGHTSFrom the 26th Annual Camden Conference, February 22–24, 2013

2013 WHATNEXT?

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BOARD OF DIRECTORSDavid Babski, CamdenBland Banwell, BelfastKaren Cadbury, RockportBruce Cole, CamdenJohn W. Davidson, CamdenBrewster Grace, RocklandG. Paul Holman, CamdenJeff Howland, CamdenPeter Imber, CamdenRendle Jones, CamdenEmily Lusher, RockportSarah Miller, CamdenJane Monhart, UnionRalph Moore, RocklandC. Patrick Mundy, Spruce HeadMaureen O’Keefe, NorthportSeth Singleton, Mount DesertRobert H. Tracy, HampdenMichael Wygant, Scarborough

ADVISORY COUNCILJames Algrant, CamdenRichard Anderson, RockportJohn Bird, Spruce HeadDan Bookham, RocklandFrederic Coulon, RockportJudith Daniels, UnionThomas M. Deford, Spruce HeadJohn Enright, Camden (in memoriam)H. Allen Fernald, RockportDesmond Fitzgerald, CamdenWill Galloway, HopeCharles Graham, CamdenPeter T. Gross, CamdenKathleen Hirsch, Owls HeadRobert Hirsch, Owls HeadDavid P. Jackson, RockportRonald Jarvella, NorthportAdm. Gregory Johnson, HarpswellJean B. Lenderking, BelfastJames Matlack, RockportThomas C. Putnam, RocklandRobert Rackmales, NorthportFrederick P. Rector III, CamdenJeffrey St. John, BangorLouis Sell, WhitefieldAmb. Anne M. Sigmund, Deer IsleJudy Stein, BelfastElizabeth A. Wilson, Bremen

CONFERENCE MANAGERKimberly A. Scott

About The Camden Conference

The Camden Conference—established in 1987—provides the opportunity forrenowned experts and interested individuals to share knowledge and con-cerns on issues of global importance. Each year, a topic is selected and a

series of related events are held in Maine communities from Damariscotta to BarHarbor—culminating in the weekend Conference in February in Camden. TheConference is simultaneously streamed to audiences in Belfast, Rockland, andEllsworth. Community Events include lectures, short courses, and symposia; group dis-cussions of selected books, articles, and news reports; and films, art exhibits, andother cultural occasions. All events are open to the public and most are free ofcharge. They are led by scholars and other well-informed area residents. Speakers at the three-day Conference come from government, business, themedia, academia, and international organizations. Each speaker addresses a facetof the year’s topic, answers questions from the audience, and participates in anexchange of ideas. The speakers generally spend the entire weekend in Camden,challenging each other both publicly and informally. In previous years, The Camden Conference has examined such topics as “TheUS in a 21st Century World, “The Environment and Foreign Policy,” and “Religionas a Force in World Affairs.” In some years, the focus has been on specific geopo-litical areas such as China; Europe; and Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan. Nextyear’s Conference will consider “The Global Politics of Food and Water.” The Camden Conference is a nonpartisan, federally tax-exempt, not-for-profit501(c)(3) corporation. The Board of Directors includes residents of 10 midcoasttowns, all of whom volunteer their time and talent to organize the Conference andrelated programs. Financial support for The Camden Conference comes from attendance fees;memberships; individual gifts; and grants from institutions, foundations, and cor-porations.

EDITING: Dorothea Graham, CamdenDESIGN: Carol Gillette, Communication Graphics, BelfastPHOTOGRAPHY: Sarah Szwjkos, Damn Rabbit Studios, RocklandPRINTING: Camden Printing, Camden

P.O. Box 882, Camden ME 04843-0882Telephone: 207-236-1034Email: [email protected]: www.camdenconference.org

2013

CAMDEN CONFERENCE

the 2013 camden conference HIGHLIGHTS

The Middle East:What Next?

Keynote Address:Rock the Casbah: What Next in the Middle East? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1Robin Wright

Two Years After the Arab Awakening—Emerging Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3Marwan Muasher

Egypt and the New Islamic Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5Marc Lynch

Syria: What Next? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7Joshua Landis

The New Middle East Cold War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9Gregory Gause

Israel and Iran: An Evolving Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10Shai Feldman

Nuclear Issues and US/Iran Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12Seyed Hossein Mousavian

Women and Public Space in the Arab Spring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14Barbara Ibrahim

US Policies and Prospects in the Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16Laurence Pope

Final Panel: Q & A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18

Moderated by Nicholas Burns

The successive uprisings of popu-lar discontent known as the ArabAwakening, or the Arab Spring,

have dominated the headlines since2010. Longtime rulers have been top-pled, and the battle rages on in Syria.The transition toward more democratic,progressive, stable governments hasbegun, but the process is proving to bemessy and slow. The 2013 CamdenConference wrestled with the issuesraised by these challenges, such as theongoing role of social media in publicdebate and protest; the emerging statusof women; the impact of the rise ofelected Islamic factions in governingroles; the growing tension betweenIsrael and Iran; and the prospects forIran/US relations, especially regardingthe Iran nuclear program.

This year’s Camden Conference was dedicated to Jim Matlack, ProgramCommittee Chairman for the last seven years, in gratitude for his thought-ful leadership and hard work in developing topics and recruiting speakers

for seven engaging Conferences.

P.O. Box 882, Camden ME 04843-0882Telephone: 207-236-1034Email: [email protected]: www.camdenconference.org© 2013 The Camden Conference

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Robin Wright opened the 26th Camden Conferencewith “both the good news and the bad news,” as shelaid out first the fundamentals that led to the current

upheavals in the Middle East, then the factors that she seesas positive in this upheaval, and last the trends that will in-fluence how it ends. “The epic convulsion in the Middle East is the most im-portant story of the early twenty-first century,” according toWright. “It is part and parcel of the extraordinary transitionwe have seen worldwide over the last quarter-century withthe demise of Communism in Eastern Europe and the SovietUnion, with the end of apartheid and minority rule in Africa,and the collapse of military rule in Latin America… It istough now, but let’s remember why [the transition] hap-pened. Those fundamentals have notchanged, and they will shape whathappens next.” “Proportionately we have the largestbaby boom in the world in the MiddleEast—two-thirds of the population of thearea is under the age of 30 and overone-half of those young people are liter-ate. They can read and write. They canget beyond their neighborhood, their city, their country. Life isno longer just about subsistence, it is about having a life.” Addto this growing literacy the tools of technology. “Not only dothey have Twitter and Facebook and YouTube—today thereare over 500 independent satellite television stations bringingthem different programs and different views. They have asense of diversity. ‘Islam’ literally means submission. But todaythere is enormous diversity in interpreting Islamic beliefs anda sense of what rights are for women as well as men. In thetwo most repressive countries in the area—Saudi Arabia andIran—over 60 percent of the university student body is female.That has to change things,” Wright emphasized.

But change is “going to take a lot of time over a lot ofspace in a lot of different ways.” Positive change will come“when Muslims turn against the odious ideologies of binLaden and other surrogate or allied factions.” Wright sees the culture of change as critical to positivepolitical change, and she sees it happening—the good news.“The ideas of folk music, poetry, plays provided the voice forsomething different in the Vietnam era. When we see pic-tures of Tahrir Square and the protests in Tunisia, we haveto understand that the culture of change is still there and itis the glue that defines what comes next.” Wright went on to lay out five aspects of that culture ofchange that “define and excite the people of the region.”Music is one—“rap has become the rhythm of resistance

across the region.” In Tunisia a youngrapper challenged the governmentwith a Facebook video. As people tookto the streets to support the fruit ven-dor who set himself afire, they sangthis rapper’s song.

The creation of new role models isthe second aspect. A father in Kuwaitwrote comic books containing 99 su-

perheroes for his children. Each character represents one ofthe positive attributes of God in Islam, each is from one ofthe 99 countries with Muslim populations, and half are menand half are women. The comic books he created have beentranslated into 12 languages. New Muslim comedians created the third trend. Muslims

ROBIN WRIGHT is a journalist, author, and foreign policy ex-pert. She has been a foreign correspondent in the Middle East,Europe, and Africa. She most recently covered US foreign policyfor the Washington Post. She is a Joint Fellow at the US Instituteof Peace and the Woodrow Wilson International Center.

Rock the Casbah:What Next in theMiddle East?The new order is yet to take shape.

Robin Wright

CAMDEN CONFERENCE HIGHLIGHTS | 1

2013 Keynote Address

“Today there isenormous diversity

in interpretingIslamic beliefs.”

Q&AQ: What should the US government do inresponse to the continuing changes?

Wright: There is not one answer for thewhole region. We can’t direct any more. Wewill constantly be responding to events onthe ground. We are often putting out firesand we don’t have enough time to figure outhow to keep the fires from igniting. But we can do small pieces. For example,we can train the media on what is a free press.We can train the courts and the police on howto have a free trial, on what is fair evidence.

Q: How can students today be engaged? Wright: We tend to think about what wecan do for Muslims over there when weshould be thinking about what we can doover here. One of the big challenges in theUnited States is recognizing our new Muslimidentity, as Islam becomes the second largest

religion here. We think of Islam in terms ofextremism instead of the positive things thatare happening, and we need not to automat-ically respond negatively. More students canlearn Arabic, study about Islam, and learnabout the region.

Q: What are the opportunities for educa-tion in North Africa? Are the peopleequipped for a democracy?Wright: In Libya there is 88 percent literacy.The problem is what they know. A lot of ed-ucation is rote learning. They haven’t beentaught to criticize. The real issue is re-educa-tion. That said, the younger generation is farbetter prepared for transition than their par-ents were. The idea of participation is in-stinctive.

introduced to stand-up comedy in the US have taken the formback to their home countries to challenge extremism and dic-tators. Theater has a role in changing culture as well. “Newplays take the idea of Jihad back to its roots, emphasizinghow to be a good Muslim, not to wage war but to teach thebasic lessons.” Wright’s last positive trend is what is happening to women,who are in the forefront of the battle for change. She told thestory of a young Egyptian woman who became an activistagainst female genital mutilation at age eight, after her owncircumcision. Then she went on to work on wider humanrights issues; start the first Arab human rights film festival;and, most recently, run for Parliament. The fundamentals and the culture of change feed the 10trends or conditions that Wright believes will shape the nextdecade:

� The old order is gone but the new order has yet to takeshape. We have focused on who is elected, but the consti-tutions will define what comes next.

� In every country in transition, people are worse off eco-nomically. The flashpoint for the initial uprisings was eco-nomic, not political. The unrest down the road may relatemore to that first (economic) flashpoint than to democracy.

� Too many parties and individuals run for office; few areorganized or have the resources or knowledge to govern.Most important, “there is not enough sense of the com-mon good. It is all about entitlement in democracy ratherthan responsibility.”

� There is a huge divergence of ideas in the Islamic worldthat is both healthy and dangerous. “Salafi is the most im-portant word I can send you home with tonight. They arethe ultra-conservatives. Their ideologies are often veryrigid. [They are] what worries me most ”

� Armed factions that will not give up their guns are re-sponsible for much of the violence in the region. In Libya,some are cooperating with the government, but others

are not willing to give up their guns and militia until theyknow what the new order will be, and until they knowthey have a big enough piece of the pie. The pie will notbe big enough.

� Tribes are re-emerging as a defining force in the region.People are voting along tribal lines. Tribes will be very im-portant in Syria.

� Demographic realities—of young, too often unemployedpopulations with older elected officials or dictators—mixwith the economic and political realities and the militiasto create a combustible situation.

� Corruption is rampant. “The dirty little secret of the dem-ocratic revolution is how it has been corrupted.” For ex-ample, only a fraction of the humanitarian aid intendedfor Aleppo actually arrives there.

� Women are faring poorly even though they are on thefront lines. At issue are economic opportunities, basic se-curity, and the Salafi threat of taking away from them theopportunities they are fighting for.

“The map of the Middle East may well change, whetherthrough massive decentralization or secession. It is possiblethat, depending on how this transition plays out—howvolatile it is, how deep tribalization goes, and how deep eth-nic and sectarian lines are drawn inside borders—that wemay see that map fundamentally change.” Returning to a more positive note, Wright concluded withthis thought: “We have to remember, when we talk aboutwhat is next, that we can’t think only about those awful pic-tures on television. We have to remember that a broadertrend is under way… The next decade is going to be turbu-lent; it is going to be a wild ride; we will long for the days ofthe simplicity of dictators. This is a global phenomenon notlimited to the Middle East, it has bigger context, but at theend of the day it also has a good bit of hope.”� Reported by Judy Stein

2 | CAMDEN CONFERENCE HIGHLIGHTS

Robin Wright


Right from the outset, Marwan Muasher made it clearthat neither the euphoria in the heady days after thefall of Hosni Mubarak, nor the pessimism that has re-

placed it, are accurate or useful ways to begin to evaluate theevents transforming the countries swept up in the still-risingtide of change in the Middle East. “The world seems to have gone in a span of two shortyears from calling it an Arab Spring, and having these roman-tic dreams that the toppling of leaders is going to somehowinstantaneously result in democratic transitions, to now prob-ably calling it an Arab Inferno, an Arab Winter,” he said. Muasher cautioned that the belief that democracy can becreated overnight is as unrealistic as the fear that the regionhas been lost to liberal democracies for-ever is shortsighted. Both characteriza-tions are equally simplistic. The roadbeing traveled is obstacle-ridden, andthe journey along it will be tough andlong. “This is a process that is going tobe measured in decades, not in monthsand not in years,” Muasher explained. The Arab Awakening has not sur-prised the Jordanian diplomat, who ob-served that until two years ago the Arab countries were in astate of what he called “artificially induced stability”— a sta-bility that was much more fragile than we may have per-ceived. “[The old regimes] told their people that bread mustcome before freedom and stomachs must be filled before bal-lot boxes can be… This was what all Arab regimes preachedto their people.”

By not allowing what Muasher calls “political space,”these regimes ruled without real opposition and suppressedany that attempted to fill that role. But without real reforms,such a status quo was ultimately not sustainable, and inTunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and still ongoing in Syria, peo-ple finally took matters into their own hands. Muasher believes time may be running out for the remain-ing monarchies in the region as well, both the oil-rich ones inthe Gulf States, as well as those in Jordan and Morocco. Tostop or delay the process of change in their countries, rulershave used their wealth to buy off dissent, and it has workedfor now. In Jordan and Morocco the monarchies are attempting to

get out in front of their people and showthem that reform from above can work.But Muasher says that without a seriousand sustained reform process that willlead to the sharing of power, these twocountries may be next to see popularuprisings.

Even where dictators have been de-posed, Muasher contends it has been

Two Years After theArab Awakening—Emerging TrendsThis must be a battle forpluralism.

Marwan Muasher

“[Arab countries]were in a state of

artificiallyinduced stability.”

MARWAN MUASHER is a Jordanian diplomat who currentlyserves as Vice President for Studies at the Carnegie Endowmentfor International Peace in Washington, DC. He is a former Am-bassador of Jordan to Israel and to the United States, and aformer Foreign Minister of Jordan. He was also the Senior VicePresident for External Affairs at the World Bank. He is currentlywriting a book on the Arab Awakening.

Marwan Muasher


very difficult for the new leaders who have replaced them toaccept the message of the Awakening—that power will haveto be shared from now on. Still, Muasher sees hopeful trendsas well as some vital promises that must be kept. A battle of ideas is being waged in the new politicalspace that has been opened, and for the first time in a cen-tury in the Arab world, diversity and pluralism are part of thediscussion. The outcome of this battle of ideas is crucial tothe process and progress of the Awakening, says Muasher,for if it becomes just a winner-take-all competition betweensecularism and Islamism, he fears the victors will merely bethe new dictators of the Arab world. “This must be a battlefor pluralism, where both secular elements and the religiouselements as well fight for the right of everybody to be in-cluded and no one to be excluded.” So far the battle has been between secular and religiouselements jousting to dominate the political scene. Muasherhopes the younger generation will grasp the stakes and par-ticipate in the pursuit of real change that can create the net-works and organizations necessary to grow and sustain

openness and diversity, and tofind the viable alternatives thatare neither elitist nor theocratic.

Muasher points out that theinitial proliferation of manydozens of parties running forelection in Egypt, for example, isconsistent with a pattern thathas historically occurred inemerging democracies. Many ofthe parties will disappear fromthe scene quickly, but for nowthey serve a necessary function.

He notes, “The secular andreligious holiness of parties is over… Criticism of their leaderswas tantamount to being sacrilegious… That halo aroundsecular parties as well as Islamist is over… It is now fair gameto criticize them—right, left, and center.” From now on accountability will need to be in play, hesays—a government’s success or failure will have to bejudged by the average citizen. In the past, economic reformwas not tethered to political reform, but Muasher hopes thatapproach won’t work anymore. An imperative expectation ofthe Awakening is that a new system of checks and balanceswill be forged to combat the rampant corruption that has his-torically siphoned off economic gains to the few. Muasher envisions a quid pro quo between governments’desires to act in economic matters and corresponding movestoward political reform in order for people to accept their gov-ernment's legitimacy from now on. For such checks and bal-ances to become authentic and effective, Muasher againclearly thinks it will take a new generation to shoulder the re-sponsibility for making it happen. “So far in the Arab world, in my view, commitment to truedemocracy from both the Islamist and secular forces is atbest lip service. People talk about democratic norms but theydon’t practice it… The old generation does not seem able orready to embrace true democratic norms, whether from theIslamist or secular forces.”

Suppression is no longer going to be an acceptable tool,and rhetoric will no longer work as a camouflage for inaction.Promises without genuine reform will not fool anyone any-more, according to Muasher. Muasher was particularly emphatic about the role of Islamand its possible undesirable ascendancy as the endgame ofthe Awakening. He says, “Islam as the solution does not de-liver jobs, does not deliver investment, as people in Egypt arewitnessing today… Support for Islamists has gone up anddown based on performance…and in my view, we have seenthe peak of support of Islamists around the Arab world.” Inthe short term, this idea may not appear to be true, he adds,but within a few election cycles in Egypt he believes it willbegin to be the case. Egypt is a society with a long and greathistory and a homogenous population; the nation will endureand survive this process of transition, and be the better for it. Muasher also sees a new reality for the role of the UnitedStates in the Middle East, one that is more limited and the re-sult of both new and old realities. He pointed out thatAmerica’s military power has been weakened as a result ofthe Iraq War, its economic clout has been damaged by theglobal financial crisis, and its inability or unwillingness tofind a solution to the Arab/Israeli conflict has made it lessrelevant to the region moving forward. America should now stay out of the way, is Muasher’scandid advice. He adds that the US has not done well whenit has attempted to pick winners and losers, so it should letthe Arab world pick its own. He cautions that change in theregion will not be monolithic. For countries such as Syria andLibya, it will take much longer and may not succeed. Hand-in-hand with increasing the likelihood of good out-comes is the need to establish or rebuild the institutions thatfoster democracy. Muasher sees education as a major com-ponent of this effort and essential to creating a citizenry ca-pable of critical thinking, inquiry, and tolerance. He addedthat liberal education is the key to the development of plural-istic societies and must begin immediately in the Arab world,but to his disappointment, so far it has not. As an example ofwhere the acceptance of ideas and diversity has succeededin the region, Muasher pointed to Lebanon, a weak and frac-tured state politically that flourishes nevertheless because ithas a society with more personal freedoms than any otherArab state. Time and patience also are required now. The events thathave taken place so far on the streets and their aftermath areonly opening acts in a drama that will play out in the yearsahead. Muasher issued a final warning about what could de-rail the promise of a real transformation, while expressing hisown determination to stay the course. “We cannot afford to lose another 100 years by makingthis a battle between Islamic and secular elements. ThisAwakening must not be just about toppling dictators butabout pluralism… I’m very excited about what is going on.I’m very excited that a process of change has started, and I,as an Arab individual, am willing to see all the turmoil thatgoes along with this process. Because I realize this is a nec-essary phase that we have to go through.”� Reported by Peter Imber and Jo Dondis


“It is easy to forget after the last two years of the exhaust-ing, dizzying roller coaster that Egyptian politics has be-come,” Professor Marc Lynch told his audience, “what

it felt like on January 25, 2011.” The 18 days between January25 and February 11, when Hosni Mubarak finally steppeddown, Lynch described as one of the most riveting periodsin his long experience working in the region—one of thosetimes “that turned the experience of …a generation of schol-ars, activists, policy makers, journalists, and others, com-pletely on its head.” As we consider Egypt’s “litany of problems and issues,”Lynch said, it is important for us not to lose sight of January25. After a decade of images of extremism and violence,what Americans saw in Tahrir Square that day might havebeen the first time that young Arabs, Egyptians, and Muslimswere portrayed so positively. Americans saw attractiveyoung Arabs, Egyptians, and Muslims yearning for the samethings that we yearn for, acting in ways that we act, fightingfor their freedom in ways that we could identify with and un-derstand. These images enabled us to identify with the peo-ple we saw, and we must preserve that sense ofidentification as we think through what the changes over thepast two years in Egypt mean, not only for Egyptians but forourselves. January 25, Lynch asserted, did not happen out ofnowhere. Rather, it was the culmination of at least 10 yearsof rising mobilization and social transformation. At varioustimes, many small protests were held, targeting foreign is-sues like Israel’s war with the Palestinians, and later the USoccupation of Iraq. Because these early actions were directedoutward, the government tolerated them. However, in 2003 to 2004, a group of perhaps a few thou-sand activists—writers, bloggers, journalists, and others—co-alesced, saying, “This isn’t enough for us.” They turned theirenergies into what became known as the Kefaya Movement(kefaya means “enough”). This group self-consciously used

new media technologies and small, temporary political open-ings to get their message out to their fellow citizens. They seized on the succession of Hosni Mubarak’s son tothe presidency as a symbol of what was wrong withEgyptian politics, and they went out into the streets anddemonstrated. Five years prior, these activists would havebeen viewed as nuts holding up signs. They would havebeen arrested and hauled off to dungeons. But these activistshad learned from their predecessors’ mistakes. They madesure that Al Jazeera photographers were there to film; theytook pictures and immediately uploaded them to their blogs.Western journalists were reading these blogs and watchingAl Jazeera, and suddenly the activists were punching wayabove their weight. Kefaya was a relatively small, cross-sectional coalition.They were not a mass movement in any way. But they laidthe foundations for a spirit of activism, for a culture of ac-tivism, for a cascading wave of protests involving almostevery sector of society during the first decade of the twenty-first century. This history demonstrates, Lynch said, that January 25was not a sudden awakening. But on January 25, for the firsttime, different groups of activists came together and wereable to convince the common people to join them in hugenumbers. Had there been only 10,000 protesters, Mubarak’ssecurity forces would have defeated them easily. But insteadof tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands of people tookto the streets. Over the space of three days, they defeated thepolice in hand-to-hand combat, and seized and held TahrirSquare.

Egypt and the NewIslamic PoliticsEgypt is going through apoorly managed transition.

Marc Lynch

MARC LYNCH is Associate Professor of Political Science and In-ternational Affairs at the Elliot School of International Affairs atGeorgetown University in Washington, DC. He directs the Insti-tute for Middle East Studies and the Middle East Studies Program.He also edits the Middle East Channel for ForeignPolicy.com.


Marc Lynch

Why were the protestors suddenly able to connect withthe masses? Because they had been watching the events inTunisia (the ouster of President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali). Theysuddenly believed victory was possible, and they came outin that moment of enthusiasm. Before the Tunisian revolu-tion, winning against the Mubarak government had been al-most unimaginable. But when President Ben Ali fell, peoplesuddenly thought that they might actually succeed.Protesting was worth the risk of torture and imprisonmentbecause it might work. That sense of possibility created a moment of profoundinspiration, but that moment that has long since passed,Lynch said. It has given way to a long process of polarization,fragmentation, institutional collapse, and an extraordinarilypoorly managed period of transition. Lynch told his audience to maintain whathe called “analytical humility” as we observethe rise of Islamic politics. “These events tookthe best of us by surprise,” he said. Then heset forth a number of points to consider as heanalyzed Egypt’s past two years and madesome predictions about the future.

� The mobilization in the streets of Egypt is not going to goaway, Lynch predicted. It has become a structural realityin Egyptian politics. Social media and modern technologyallow for the organization of street protests. Additionally,Egypt’s political structures continue to leave mobilizationas the people’s only option for effecting change. In otherwords, people have both the means and the reasons toprotest. Mobilization cuts two ways, Lynch warned. It isa powerful positive: it puts a check on untrammeled ex-ecutive power; it spotlights human rights abuses such asrape, torture, and the complete absence of accountabilityfor security forces. But it also contributes to Egypt beingungovernable, because the political machinery is con-stantly overwhelmed by crowds taking to the streets.Mobilization contributes to institutional breakdown andparalysis in the Egyptian government. Furthermore,street protests have become a substitute for competitionin elections that protesters believe they can’t win. Peoplearen’t doing the work to organize, fund, and run cam-paigns to get candidates elected to office—they areprotesting instead. These realities are not going to goaway, even when Egypt becomes a fully institutionalizeddemocracy.

� The rise of the Islamists, electorally, politically, and so-cially, is worrisome. There are elements of truth and un-truth to the narrative that Hosni Mubarak’s removalsimply paved the way for a radical Islamist takeover.Few should have been surprised to see the MuslimBrotherhood do well in post-January 25 elections. TheBrotherhood has worked hard to win elections and hasbecome a force in Egyptian politics. They had an organi-zational advantage going into the post-January 25 pe-riod, and they worked that advantage. Some evidencesuggests that the Brotherhood is an unstoppable, evilforce—but some evidence also suggests that they are in-competent. In this respect, democracy has done what it

is supposed to do. In power, the Brotherhood has beenexposed as unable to do the things we were afraid theywere going to do.

� It is difficult to clearly name the opposition to the MuslimBrotherhood and the Salafis. Many Egyptians are deeplyfrustrated with the inability of the Islamists’ opponents toform a coherent political alternative. Had members of theold political elite and the new activists been able to cometogether and support a single candidate, they could havegained some political traction against the MuslimBrotherhood. But they have failed to organize their politi-cal voices, which come from a wide range of factions, andso the fundamentalists continue to win elections.

� Egypt’s political environment has been served poorly bythe recent flux and uncertainty. Lynchlikened current Egyptian politics to Calvinball(the game in the comic strip Calvin andHobbes), where there are no rules. He re-minded us that without rules, without a con-stitution, without established electoraldistricts and design, nothing can be accom-plished. Until recently, nothing defined the

powers of the president or the legislature. This institu-tional uncertainty has led to deep, unprecedented polar-ization in every aspect of Egyptian society.

� The consequences of polarization are truly disturbing.People are attacking each other on the street; what Lynchdescribed as a “naked, brutal, cultural war” is taking placeat every level. It is fed by what was celebrated at the timeof the revolution—the media, especially social media, thatsend every rumor into hyperspace, regardless of whetherthe rumor is true or not.

� The disruption caused by this polarization is made worseby the mind-boggling collapse of the Egyptian economy,Lynch concluded. Add to this the ongoing violenceagainst women, including the gang rapes of women inTahrir Square, and we have a sense of the raw state ofEgypt today. Right now the Muslim Brotherhood is win-ning elections, which is evidence that they’re being dem-ocratic. But just as importantly, they’re not acting in whatwe would consider a maturely democratic, pluralisticway. That failure has created a sense of deep politicalmalaise since the glory days immediately followingJanuary 25.

In summary, it is entirely rational, Professor Lynch said, tobe both profoundly depressed and optimistic about Egypt’sfuture. Egypt’s transition has been “one of the stupidest inhistory.” At every possible moment when a political actor inEgypt could make a decision, it was the wrong one. TheMuslim Brotherhood is destroying itself. That is temporarilybad for Egypt. But in the long run, their destruction is for thegood, and Egypt will stabilize. The country has muddledthrough the past two years, but the years since the revolutionare a blink of an eye compared to Egypt’s 5,000-year past. � Reported by Kathryn King

“Mobilizationcuts

two ways.”

Professor Joshua Landis divided his talk into a discus-sion of three broad questions: why has the Syrian civilwar lasted so long and become so bloody, what might

the endgame look like, and what is the likely US role? He reminded the audience that Syria is what he termeda "minoritarian" state, one that includes a broad mixture ofvarious ethnic and religious groups. While its population isapproximately 70 percent Sunni Muslim, about 12 percentare a cohesive group of Alawites, an off-shoot of Shia Islam;another 10 percent are a similarly cohesive tribe of ethnicKurds; the rest are a mixture of Christians and Druze, with asmall scattering of other sects. Quoting a colleague, Landissaid Syria is similar to the other Arab states in the Levant,Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq: “…they are like Noah's Ark, withtwo of everything.”

Syria’s borders, also like those of its Arab neighbors, areconstructs reflecting its colonial heritage. The fact that theminority Alawites have ruled for over 40 years is similarly aresult of Syria's colonial past. The Alawites' original domainincluded the sliver of land along the Mediterranean and thevast mountain redoubts above it; their arable land was small,


Marc Lynch

Q&AQ: What effect has President Obama’sJune, 2009 speech at Cairo University hadon Egypt’s youth?Lynch: It has not been particularly success-ful. It was a very good speech, but everybodyfocused on the Israel/Palestine issue. ThePresident raised hopes and expectationsthat he would deliver on that issue througha two-state solution, and he failed. His cred-ibility crashed and has never recovered. Ireally don’t think the speech played a part ininspiring the revolution of January 25.

Q: Has the United States contradicteditself by wanting revolutions in places likeTunisia and Libya, while at the same timecontinuing to support a monarchy like the

government of Saudi Arabia, in order tokeep oil secure? Are we being hypocritical?Lynch: Absolutely. But our reactions to theevents in Bahrain were even more importantthan our approach to Saudi Arabia. In SaudiArabia, the Saudis were able to either crushor buy off the opposition before it really gotrolling. But at the height of Bahrain’s protests,when over half the country’s population werein the streets demonstrating, this active rev-olution was brutally crushed in full sight ofeveryone, and the US. did nothing. That madeus look extremely hypocritical, and we paidserious reputational costs for that. But theUS has not been in favor of real revolutionsanywhere, in the promotion of democracy.Rather, we have preferred meaningful politicalreforms—resulting in stable, legitimate soci-

eties—that wouldn’t change the governments’fundamental strategic orientations. We wantedto see democracy in Egypt because theMubarak regime was driving it into a ditch. Itwas no longer a useful or effective ally, anddemocracy was the way to make Egypt better.We did not want to see a revolution there,like an Iranian revolution for example, thatwould turn Egypt into an enemy or a funda-mentalist state. Meaningful reform is a wayof pre-empting that kind of change. You cansupport reform, in other words, in SaudiArabia, in Bahrain, without threatening yourstrategic interests. But people understandnow what we’re doing when we support rev-olution in one place but only “meaningful re-form” in another, and they’re more willingto call us on that kind of hypocrisy.

JOSHUA M. LANDIS is Director of the Center for Middle EastStudies and Associate Professor of Middle Eastern Studies atthe University of Oklahoma. He also writes Syria Comment, adaily newsletter on Syrian politics that is read widely in Wash-ington, DC; Europe; and Syria. He travels to Washington regu-larly to consult with the State Department and other govern-ment agencies. He also is a frequent analyst on TV and radio.He lived for more than 14 years in the Middle East.

Syria: What Next?There are severalendgame models.

Joshua Landis


Joshua Landis

and because they lived far from the major cities of Damascusand Aleppo, they were the poorest and most isolated ofSyria's Arab minorities. When the French took over after theOttoman collapse on the heels of World War I, the Sunnis andChristians predominated in the cities and controlled the bestland, so in order to support themselves, their poorer Alawitecousins signed up for the French-controlled colonial army. As a result, by the mid-1950s, less than a decade after theFrench had decamped, two-thirds of the noncommissionedofficers in the Syrian military were Alawite—more than fivetimes their representation in the population. In 1966, aftersome 20 years of endless military coups, an Alawite generalcame out on top. Four years later, Hafez al-Assad, the fatherof the current president, took power, then consolidated hiscontrol by assuring that all key security positions in the mil-itary and intelligence agencies were held by his relatives andothers from the Alawite community. In Egypt, it was possible to overthrowthe government by ousting PresidentMubarak (only a relatively small number oftop government officials were so entan-gled with him that their destiny was tiedto his). But in Syria, Landis pointed out,“It's a zero-sum game for the Alawites.” IfAssad goes, the power, wealth, and influence that the two-and-a-half million members of the Alawite community haveaccumulated over the last four decades would go with him.Further, as the war has grown bloodier, the likelihood thatAlawites would be the object of targeted revenge has grown.Finally, since virtually all key generals and a considerableportion of the military are Alawite, the government is com-mitted to fighting to the end. So where is the civil war heading? How will it ever end?There are several possible “endgame models,” Landis sug-gested. The first is the Turkish model, a reference to the eth-nic cleansing of Armenians and other Christians fromAnatolia as the Ottoman Empire collapsed, resulting in anethnically solidified Turkey. Ethnic cleansing, at least of theAlawites, is indeed a possibility for Syria. The Iraq modelLandis outlined presupposes an invasion by a foreign coun-try. But neither the US nor Turkey, the two likely candidates,has any interest in pursuing such an outcome, so that modelis an unlikely one. The Lebanese model, which involves acoalition government of its three principal minorities, is nota particularly viable model even in Lebanon, whereChristians, Sunnis, and Shiites each make up approximatelyone-third of the population. In Syria, such a sharing arrange-ment would be a nonstarter for the victorious Sunnis, whomake up more than two-thirds of the population. Assad's strategy so far has been to initiate ever more aggressive military action against the insurgents. With500,000 Alawites of military age, even with an increasing de-fection by Sunni government soldiers, Assad has consider-able forces at his disposal for the foreseeable future. At thesame time, the rebel forces opposing his rule are composedof literally hundreds of different militias operating independ-ently. Since the beginning of the uprising two years ago,Assad has constantly warned that his overthrow would lead

to a Sunni-controlled government enforcing Shariah law.Initially he was able to maintain the support, or at least theneutrality, of the more secular middle- and upper-class Sunniswho had no interest in a strict Muslim government. But in thelast year, as the fight for Aleppo and now Damascus has in-tensified, large segments of the middle class have been di-rectly affected by the government's military response andhave increasingly started siding with the rebels. Two events could lead to Assad's defeat: Iran's with-drawal of its significant military support, or the consolidationof the myriad rebel militias into a unified force. Regardless ofwhat happens, Assad is unlikely to negotiate until the bal-ance of power has shifted against him more than it has sofar—and by that time, it could be too late. Many oppositionmembers do not want to see any elements of Syria’s hatedsecurity apparatus survive into a post-Assad Syria. As the

rebels gain strength, Assad can be ex-pected to adopt a scorched-earth policy,eventually retreating with his remainingforces to the Alawite homeland in themountains above the Mediterraneancoast. Like Hezbollah in Lebanon, hewould try to remain a major force in Syria,with continuing support from Iran and its

protegé Hezbollah. Under this scenario, Syria conceivably could split into sev-eral autonomous regions, with the Alawites establishingtheir own zone of influence in Syria's west, prompting theKurds to formalize their territorial control along Syria's north-east border with Turkey and Iran. Such a result would ofcourse be a recipe for continuing instability, both in a post-Assad Syria as well as in southeastern Turkey, where theKurds have long sought autonomy. In the event that Assadand his forces are overwhelmed militarily, and Islamist mili-tias advance into the Alawite Mountains, Landis suggested,the Alawite population might retreat en masse across theLebanese border, which would have an even more destabi-lizing effect on that already fragile country. The Obama administration has made it clear it has no in-tention of putting boots on the ground in Syria. But withoutan eventual US role, Landis believes one or the other of theabove two scenarios is likely. During the Q&A period, a listener asked if the US couldinfluence the outcome of the war in a way that would ad-vance its own interests by destroying Assad's air force.Landis responded that as the rebel military forces are in-creasingly Islamic, short of the US embracing the MuslimBrotherhood, it's impossible for the US “to pick a winner.”Knowledge of this factor has led some in the Obama admin-istration to conclude that the best outcome the US can hopefor is that the war is “cauterized,” or kept from overflowingbeyond Syria's borders. Landis re-emphasized in his conclusion that Obama willnot intervene militarily in Syria. The US focus in the Arabworld is increasingly on Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, whichmeans that from a US perspective, Syria, like Iraq, is largelyon its own. � Reported by Mac Deford

“It’s a zero-sumgame for theAlawites.”


Professor Gregory Gause posited that the best way tounderstand the geopolitical situation in the MiddleEast is to understand the cold war being fought be-

tween Saudi Arabia and Iran. Gause identified what hetermed the “crescent of weakness,” a collection of weak gov-ernments (specifically, Syria, the Palestinian territories,Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq) that won’t or can’t check the moredisparate factions within their own borders. In the end, thesedisparate factions not only allow foreign intervention, “theyinvite foreign powers to intervene in order to get an advan-tage over their local government.” Because Iran shares ide-ologies with Shia groups in these weakcountries, Gause explained, “the Iranians,when we get to 2010, have bested SaudiArabia, their main rival in the region, innearly every one of the arenas whichthey’ve contested.”

There have always been weak states inthe Arab world, but the current story be-gins with the US invasion of Iraq in 2003,which created a playing field where otherpeople could intervene. The Iranians,being in the best position to do so, took im-mediate advantage of it. In the 2009 Iraqielections, Gause felt that Maliki had little choice in acceptinghelp from Iran. “I don’t think any national leader wants to bea puppet of a foreign power…but he needed Iranian supportto win re-election.” As evidence of Iran’s successes, Gausecited not only the 2009 election of Iraqi Prime Minister Nourial-Maliki, but also Hezbollah’s continued success in Lebanon,and growing Shia and Islamist influence in Bahrain, Yemen,and Palestine. As Iran’s influence grew in Iraq, “the Saudis saw it as amajor threat and began to get worried.” However, all their ef-

forts to block Iran—in Iraq, Lebanon, and the Palestinian ter-ritories—were not successful. Continuing the trend, HosniMubarak’s loss of power in Egypt and his replacement byIslamist-dominated elected government gave further evi-dence of Saudi defeat, in that the movement was now re-garded more as an Islamist Spring than an Arab Spring.These developments were not surprising to the Iranians,who proclaimed the uprisings to be “a continuation of anIslamic revolution that [they] began.” But Saudi Arabia pushed back where it could. Taking usto the Pearl Roundabout in Bahrain, Gause illustrated the

Saudi over-reaction to what were peacefulprotests against Bahrain’s monarchicalrule in the face of overwhelming popularsupport for a Shia candidate. “The Saudiswere…not going to allow a monarchy tofall and…were certainly not going to allowa Shia majority to take control.”

Then “Syria blew, [and] it is now thetest of Saudi Arabia’s ability to roll backIranian influence in the region.” Turkeyhad a strong interest in allying itself withSaudia Arabia, largely because of the bor-der it shares with Syria, and the costs it

would incur if a massive exodus of refugees entered their ter-ritory. However, the Turks are not completely on board with

The New MiddleEast Cold War State weaknesses inviteforeign intervention.

Gregory Gause

GREGORY GAUSE is a professor and chair of the polical sciencedepartment at the University of Vermont. In 2009-10, he wasthe Kuwait Foundation Visiting Professor of International Af-fairs at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government.He was on the faculty of Columbia University from 1987 to1995, and was also the fellow for Arab and Islamic studies atthe Council on Foreign Relations from 1993 to 1994.

“[Syria] is nowthe test of

Saudi Arabia’sability to rollback Iranian

influence in theregion.”

Israel and Iran: An Evolving DebateDoes Iran threaten the existence of Israel?

Shai Feldman

what they see as Saudi Arabia’s interest in preventing anIslamist uprising in Syria. The potential exists for the coldwar to become hot, “and the Turks don’t want to get suckedin.” However, as Gause said, “The shared border is an ele-ment that can’t be ignored.” As an aside, Professor Gause offered a brief history of theAlawite sect. They are a heretical and sectarian off-shoot ofShia with pagan and Christian beliefs, operating inside Syria.Their ideas were fomented in isolation and their beliefs havegrown “…inbred and weird,” but they represent 12 percent ofthe population. In summation, Gause stated that “the new Middle Eastcold war is history repeating itself..” He reminded us of theold Middle East cold war, presided over chiefly by EgyptianPresident Gamal Abdel Nasser during the 1950s and 1960s,when the US and the Soviet Union tried to manipulate thegovernments in the area. “State weaknesses invited foreignpowers to intervene,” Gause said. The influence wielded by

Nasser reached the disparate factions in neighboring coun-tries through the then-nascent technology of transistor ra-dios, demonstrating that past is prologue when it comes tounderstanding and appreciating the role of technology andsocial media. For better understanding of this cold-war cycle, Gause rec-ommended two books, neither published recently. The firstbook, The Arab Cold War, by Malcolm Kerr, “tells the story ofthe first regional cold war, which is very similar to this one,”and Patrick Seal’s The Struggle for Syria, “talks about Syrianpolitics from 1948 to1958, when Syria was the main arena inwhich the first cold war was fought out.” “The names have changed, but the dynamics are very sim-ilar. And…because the dynamics are so similar, we can learnnot only about what’s happening now, but we can learnmaybe not to be so afraid of it. Because if Gamal Abdel Nasser,the most popular man in the Arab world, could not dominatethis region, I’m not sure the Iranians could dominate it today.”� Reported by Dwight Blue

Gregory Gause


Professor Shai Feldman opened by stating that his re-marks would center on an ominous subject, and hewould start by walking through four preambles to

frame the discussion. He warned the audience, “Beware and be very, very sus-picious of anyone who offers simple prescriptions [to the sub-ject of Israel versus Iran]…the most difficult subject that Ihave had to grapple with in 35 years of my professional life.” He stated that he would share his understanding of whatthe Israeli thinking is on the topic. However, he said, “It is im-portant to understand that there is no such thing as an Israelinarrative…there is no single Israeli position.” He said that the debate is not partisan. “It is, first of all,the most extensive debate that we’ve had in Israel since theother very, very emotional debate…whether to establish rela-tions with Germany after the War.” In the final preamble to his presentation, Feldman high-lighted what the debate is not about. “There is no debatearound the proposition that Iran going nuclear is a bad idea,

that it may lead to the kind of cascade that was referred tohere earlier—Saudi Arabia, Turkey… Secondly, the debate isnot about whether a military option should be on the table…Almost everyone agrees that somehow it should remain onthe table… The third thing that is not debated is whether amilitary action against Iran’s nuclear installations will…solvethe problem…this option will only gain a few years of delay.” After looking at what the debate is not about, Feldmanmoved on to discuss what it is about. “The mother of all de-bates regarding the prospect of Iran and nuclear weapons is,is this an existential threat? If Iran acquires nuclear weapons,would they actually contemplate dropping a bomb onIsrael?” Feldman went on to explain that there are twoschools of thought about these questions. The first side believes that yes, Iran having a nuclearweapon poses an existential threat to Israel and the Israeli pop-ulation. He noted that Israel’s prime minister, BenjaminNetanyahu, believes that Ahmadinejad is a Hitler, committedto destroying Israel. From this perspective, “Fanatics cannot be

Shai Feldman


deterred. Any notion that a nuclear Iran can be deterred—in thesame way that the Soviet Union was deterred over six decadesof the Cold War—is based on a dangerously irrelevant analogy.” Feldman then explained the opposing view, that while anuclear Iran is a very serious threat, it is not an existentialthreat. This side believes that Israel is very powerful and hasa response to every contingency. This view, taken by Israel’sdefense minister, Ehud Barak, believes that Israel’s nuclearoption will deter Iran, and that Iran is not suicidal and willnot risk its own annihilation just to destroy Israel. After exploring the Iran nuclear debate and the differentIsraeli viewpoints, Feldman moved into a discussion ofwhere Iran stands in the progress toward producing a nu-clear weapon. He noted that there are three primary ques-tions about Iran’s nuclear program: How close are they? He points out that proponents of astrike say Iran’s enrichment program is moving very fastand also becoming more immune to a military strike.However, opponents of a strike believe Iran’s problemshave consistently been underestimated. Will we know that a decision has beenmade to weaponize (convert nuclear capabili-ties to actual weapons)? Feldman againnoted here that there are two schools ofthought. He stated that some in theAmerican and Israeli defense commu-nities believe that we will know if theSupreme Leader makes the decision toweaponize. Other people are moreskeptical, and believe that intelligencewill be the key, because the conversionof nuclear material to weapons can bemore easily concealed. Is there time? The combination of theprevious two questions leads to this operational question. Isthere time for exercising other measures, such as sanctions,which take time to have effect? After reviewing the key questions in the nuclear debate,Feldman went on to describe three questions in consideringa military strike to prevent a nuclear Iran. What would be the regional consequences of a militarystrike? Opponents are concerned that a strike would ignitea regional war and incite Iran’s allies. “Proponents argue thatfears of regional repercussions are overrated and unwar-ranted,” Feldman said. “Most Arab states would be happy tosee Iran’s nuclear program arrested, no matter what theirpublic position and rhetoric is.” What needs to be done on other fronts to reduce the costof a military strike? There is a strong school of thought in Israelthat if Israel has no alternative but to strike Iran’s nuclear fa-cilities, then “certainly you have to take some measures…tomove the peace process with the Palestinians forward.” How important are the objections of the Obama adminis-tration to an Israeli military strike? This topic has been thefocus of the debate in the last year. Feldman said,“Opponents of a strike argue that US/Israel defense cooper-ation has reached an unprecedented level…and it would beinsane for Israel to jeopardize this relationship for the sake ofbuying time.” Proponents of a strike reply that there are

“…some occasions when a nation’s survival is at stake, andthe call for action needs to be taken, even at the risk [to] re-lations with its closest ally.” So where are we now? Feldman said that in the next sixto nine months, Iran’s nuclear project will reach anothercrescendo. Iran will have made further progress, reducingtime it takes to convert nuclear capability to actual weapons.Israel’s defense communities, which have previously beenflexible in order to reduce risks to relations with the US, aregoing to be increasingly nervous. Also, he said that it is likelythat the Obama administration will make a last effort to finda diplomatic solution. “If Iran engages, this would raise otherissues which will require close coordination between the USand Israel.” For example, what levels of enrichment would betolerated and what verification and monitoring would haveto be put in place? Professor Feldman summed up his presentation by re-peating that this topic is “…the toughest issue I’ve had to dealwith in my first 35 years of professional life.” He also re-minded us that we should be very skeptical if anyone says

they have the solution. Looking at whatmakes Iran unique as far as Israel is con-cerned, he reflected that on May 15,1948, when Israel was established, Arabstates invaded Palestine in an effort toprevent Israel from coming about. “TheArab world has come around to accept-ing Israel as maybe an unfortunate[fact], but as a fact of life in the MiddleEast…Iran remains the odd man out. It’sthe only country in the region that stillaspires for Israel’s destruction. So thereis a material, qualitative difference be-

tween Iran and all Israel’s other neighbors.” Looking to the next speaker, Feldman said, “HosseinMousavian is a real Iranian patriot…immensely professionaland immensely reasonable… He and I could negotiate out ofthis problem…but unfortunately we’re not dealing with HosseinMousavian. We are dealing with Ahmadinejad and theSupreme Leader, who speak of Israel as the Satan and as some-thing that needs to be destroyed.” His final point, “not a happystory,” was that “we have to remember that all of this in Israelis seen through the prism of people who experienced only 67years ago—not hundreds of years ago, only 67 years ago—theworst genocide in [our] history. They don’t have the luxury ofnot taking the kind of rhetoric that we hear from Iranian lead-ers—not from Hossein Mousavian—seriously. And the idea thatthe people who talk about Israel’s destruction will one day pos-sess nuclear weapons is terrifying. So if you think this is com-plicated, the answer is no. It’s very, very, very complicated.”� Reported by Jeff Howland

SHAI FELDMAN directs the Crown Center for Middle EastStudies and is Professor of Politics at Brandeis University. He isalso a Senior Fellow and member of the Board of Directors ofHarvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and InternationalAffairs, where he is cochair of the Crown-Belfer Middle EastProject. He is also an Associate Fellow of the Royal UnitedServices Institute in London.

“ Most Arabstates would behappy to seeIran’s nuclear

program arrested,no matter what…their rhetoric is.”

Former Ambassador Seyed Hossein Mousavian pre-sented a historical narrative on nuclear issues betweenthe United States and Iran. His remarks focused on the

Iranian understanding of history and reality, leading to mis-trust of the US and its intentions on nuclear programs in Iran.Stating that “nobody claims that Iran has a nuclear bomb,”he said it is a fact that US intelligence itself could not confirmIran had a nuclear bomb in 2011. In ad-dition, Iranian leaders have made no de-cision on making a nuclear bomb. Yetthe United States, even knowing thatIran does not have a bomb, continues tomake Iran’s nuclear program its number-one issue in dealing with the country. Iranians do not understand whytheir nuclear power program becamethe number-one issue. What Iranians see is that the five pow-ers that are negotiating with Iran on nuclear programs havemore than 20,000 bombs among them, and yet it is Iran thatis viewed as the threat to international peace and security.Iranians don’t understand the logic, because they see thatthe US has relationships with Pakistan and other countriesthat have nuclear capacity, and yet the five powers have amistrustful relationship with Iran, which has no bomb and

has committed to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation ofNuclear Weapons (NPT). He acknowledged that the agendais stuck on Iran’s intentions, and the fear by the West of thoseintentions. According to Ambassador Mousavian, this tremen-dous doubt permeates all efforts to find a respectful resolu-tion with Iran’s nuclear program. Mousavian shared his own experience by telling the his-

tory of Iran’s nuclear program. He statedthat the foundation of Iran’s nuclear pro-gram was laid during the period from1957 to1979. He said it was the US thatlaid this foundation, and it was the USthat supported the building of the firstIranian nuclear plant. In addition, the USarranged for Iran to develop 23 nuclearpower plants by 1994. During the period

from 1957 to 1979, Germany signed an $8-billion contract tobuild Iranian plants, and France signed a contract for $1.2 bil-lion to produce fuel in France through a consortium withIran. Mousavian stressed that the blame should not beplaced on the Islamic government for having a nuclear pro-gram, but on the efforts prior to the revolution, includingtechnology shared by the US. He stated that if the Shah werealive today, he feels Iran would have multiple nuclear sitesand enrichment sites. He explained that only one plant wasnear completion at that time, and it needed to be completedto provide isotopes for patients with cancer. After the revolution, the US and the West decided to ceasecommercial relations with Iran. Germany terminated theircontract with Iran, and the reason was the objection of theUS. France immediately cancelled the enrichment programthat was to produce fuel in France for Iran, even though Iranhad already paid $1.2 billion to France. All efforts stopped be-cause France would not let them have the fuel needed for

SEYED HOSSEIN MOUSAVIAN is a Research Scholar at theProgram on Science and Global Security at Princeton University.His research focuses on options for resolving the crisis over Iran’snuclear program through diplomacy and improved relations withthe US. He is a former diplomat who served as Iran’s Ambassadorto Germany, head of the Foreign Relations Committee of Iran’sNational Security Council, and spokesman for Iran in nuclear ne-gotiations with the European Union. He recently authored abook called The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A Memoir (2012).

“The US laid thefoundation for anuclear Iran [from1958 to 1979].”

Nuclear Issues andUS/Iran RelationsIran wants its rights under theNPT respected.

Seyed Hossein Mousavian


their only civilian reactor. He emphasized that Iran had no op-tion other than to make the fuel itself. They went for self-suf-ficiency, because no one was prepared to give them fuel. Another issue that widened mistrust was the invasion ofIran by Iraq. All Western powers supported Iraq and sanc-tioned Iran. At least 1 million Iranians were killed or injuredin that war, including members of Mousavian’s own family.Iranians view themselves as victims of Iraq. The war, an at-tack by another Arab country, came at great cost to Iran.Such an aggression was seen as a clear message to bringregime change to Iran. Iraq had the support of other Arabcountries and clearly the war was an effort to disintegrateIran. Weapons of mass destruction, including chemicalweapons, were used against Iran. Mousavian said that theUS provided the materials for Iraq’s chemical weapons. Heasked the audience, “Why is Iran being accused of usingchemical weapons when they are the victims of mass de-struction?” Iranian religious leaders forbade the use ofweapons of mass destruction to counter Iraq. Mousavian said he was involved in numerous discussionswith Germany in efforts to complete their one power plant.Iran at that time would have accepted supervision andwould have been ready to pay for supervisors. He informedthe audience that Article 4 of the NPT, which requires allmembers to cooperate and share information with other na-tions on technology, is closed to Iran . He reiterated that Iranwent to the black market for fuel only because they had nochoice if they were to supply their facility in Bushehr. He saidtheir only intention after the revolution was to finish the plantand get fuel from France, but they were forced to a positionof self-sufficiency. They felt secrecy was reasonable becauseof Western sanctions. The US has continued to oppose anyenrichment efforts by Iran. Today, the former Ambassador stated, Iranians continue

to want Iran’s rights under the NPT to be recognized and re-spected, and for all nuclear-related sanctions against Iran toend. If the US and the West would accept those two require-ments, overall issues could be resolved in two to three years.He encouraged the US not to miss the opportunity, becauseIran will develop further nuclear capabilities through theirown efforts, when given no other choice. Mousavian empha-sized that the West is applying 95 percent of their efforts tosanctions and only 5 percent to diplomacy. It was Iran thatproposed enrichment at 5 percent, not the West. Although after President Obama took office, he promisedengagement with Iran, the United States has since ratifiedstrenuous international sanctions against the country.Mousavian stated that Iran would agree to implement addi-tional protocols, including intrusive inspections; to stop en-richment at 20 percent and even at the lower 5 percent levelIran had earlier recommended; to cooperate with theInternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) requiring accessbeyond the protocols; to implement the NPT SafeguardsAgreement and specified Subsidiary Arrangments; and tolimit the stock pile. But he feels Obama is pursuing a coverteconomic and intelligence war against Iran. Iran wants a normal relationship based on mutual re-spect. Iran considers the US to be using threats as a tactic.Iran is open to having negotiations without threats and coer-cion. Mousavian acknowledged that Iran has taken hostileactions against the US. He hopes for a period of time in ne-gotiations in which the US stops threatening and humiliatinga nation with a long and respected history. He pleads for theUS to include issues in the negotiations other than nuclearweapons, starting with common-ground issues and workingwith a comprehensive package. He mentioned Afghanistanas a common issue the two nations could discuss. � Reported by Linda Crawford

Q&AThe Q&A session began with a spirited andsometimes highly adversarial exchange be-tween moderator Nick Burns and HosseinMousavian, each of whom has worked onthe Iran nuclear issue for their respectivegovernments. Broadly, Mousavian said thatIran is prepared to negotiate as long as theirrights as a member of the NPT are respected.Burns countered that the UN Security Coun-cil resolution issuing sanctions against Iranis supported by most nations because theIranian government continues to lie abouttheir nuclear program. Their confrontationbecame the talk of the Conference andstimulated discussion for weeks to follow. Tohear the full content of their remarks, go towww.camdenconference.org/2013-conference/2013-conference-camcasts/and begin listening at 31 minutes and 40 sec-onds. Some questions from the audience, andMousavian’s responses, appear below. Burns

often took issue with the responses; for hiscounterpoints, go the web site .

Q: President Ahmadinejad consistentlyrefers to the Jewish state as the Little Satanor the Zionist Entity, but you call it Israel. Isthis a change in Iran’s policy toward Israel?Mousavian: I have no sympathy withAhmadinejad’s statements denying theHolocaust or wiping Israel off the map. I amagainst such rhetoric.

Q: Are there underlying geopolitical issues,such as commerce or energy, that causethe US to be so adversarial toward Iran?Mousavian: The US and Iran need to respecteach other’s interests in the region. InAfghanistan, both the US and Iran are sup-porting Karzai, and in Iraq, we are both sup-porting Maliki. There is room for us to coop-erate to fight terrorism, if we respect eachother’s interests in Iraq. Regarding energy,

we could also agree on a regional cooperationsystem in the Persian Gulf, like the Gulf Co-operation Council, that would have good re-lations with the West, and that would providesecurity and stability.





Barbara Ibrahim began by explaining that through herwork at the American University in Cairo, focused onthe activity of young Arab activist and non-activist stu-

dents across the Arab world, she began to sense somethingdifferent going on with this generation of young Egyptians.“They were not waiting for adults to invite them to join gray-haired people, NGOs, or activist groups.” They were startingtheir own communities, service organizations, and activistorganizations, and they were much less fearful politicallythan the older generation. Ibrahim said that these young peo-ple were suggesting to us that there was going to be a rup-ture or break with the past, and “…we didn’t realize the

significance of this until the Arab Spring revolution beganacross North Africa.” Ibrahim said she watched YouTube and the mobilizationeffort taking place around the January 25 demonstration inCairo, and she saw an invitation on Facebook to attend theevent, with 70,000 responses from people who said theywould be there. She said she thought to herself, “I’d betterget on my flak jacket and get down there and see what isgoing to happen.” She subsequently chose to “hedge my bet” the morningof January 25 and instead attend a meeting in a hotel thatfaced Tahrir Square. Ibrahim said the meeting attendees—

Women andPublic Space in the Arab SpringWomen are brave, butpatriarchal habits die hard.

Barbara Ibrahim

Q: Will the June elections in Iran changeIran’s stance in the nuclear negotiations?

Mousavian: Yes and no. It depends on theUS. For example, after 9/11, Iran stood bythe US in Afghanistan. But immediately afterthe victory there, Bush called Iran part of the“axis of evil.” After the June elections, if Iranshows good will toward the US and the USreciprocates, we could have an opportunity.

Q (from Burns): When Obama, in his firstinaugural speech, referred to opening the“clenched fist,” he was trying to meet Iranhalf way, but was rebuffed by the SupremeLeader. Why?Mousavian: Obama used nice words, likeengagement, and he wrote to Khamenei.Khamenei responded positively. But then, atjust about the same time, the Green Revolu-tion against the government came about

and Obama sided with the people in thestreets. While he talked engagement, in hisfirst month in office, he signed a directivefor a covert war. Iran looks for actions, notwords.

Q: The real victims of the sanctions arethe Iranian people. Can you describe someof the effects of the sanctions on ordinaryIranians?Mousavian: What are the objectives of thesanctions? If the objective is to reduce nuclearactivity, then they have failed. Sanctionspushed Iran toward more enrichment, justto prove that we won’t give up our rightsjust because of the sanctions. Of course thesanctions harm the people. Iranians are notanti-American, and yet the US punishes them.

Barbara Ibraham

donors, local experts, university professors—were disdainfulof her effort to encourage them to look for points of entry tothis activism, leverage points within the universities. Whenshe said, “It is only a matter of time before there is going tobe real change,” they responded, “Yeah, right, not in our life-time. Look out the window; there was supposed to be ademonstration today. Nobody has showed up yet.” But then, Ibrahim said, around 3:00 pm, through double-plated glass, they could hear the sound of marchers comingacross Qasr al-Nil Bridge. They could not see the beginningor the end of the crowd. With this account as background, Ibrahim explained thatthe focus of her talk was to explore and question some of theobservations that “…women participated fully in the demon-stration, in the civil disobedience that brought the revolution,but that they have lost ground subsequently and that themain reason for that has been the rise of Islamic discoursesand trends of power in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and elsewhere.”To consider whether these observations are true or not,Ibrahim suggested that we need to explore what was hap-pening with the women’s movement before the revolution,what happened during those 18 days, and what has tran-spired afterward. Ibrahim showed a video clip of a college-age woman whohad filmed a video of herself, calling upon her fellow Egyptiansto come down with her, to join her inmaking a change. Ibrahim said thisvideo went wildly viral. But a year later,the young woman and some of her ac-tivist cohorts came to Ibrahim sayingthat “…they had lost out—that they didnot know how to run for parliament, totalk with ambassadors, to walk into theoffices of governors.” Ibrahim said theywanted the University’s GerhartCenter for Philanthropy and CivicEngagement to help them. Ibrahim then pointed out that the young woman in thevideo was not just a citizen calling out to fellow citizens, buta young woman using highly gendered language to call outand motivate her listeners—urging to men to be men. “If youare a man, come with me. I’m a girl, but I’m going to be there.Come and protect me.” Ibrahim said that although this youngwoman is hip, a part of the Internet generation, she under-stands the gendered nature of her society and knows whatlevers to push. Ibrahim told of another example three years earlier whereworking-class, poorly educated women successfully con-ducted a sleep-in at a factory, bringing their children alongwith blankets and stoves. They taunted the men to be men,to defend their rights to be paid overtime and to collectbonuses that had been unpaid for over 10 years. She also cited two other campaigns led by women, “NoMilitary Trials” and “Military Are Liars”, that have producedpositive results. But since the revolution, there also have beensome abortive and ineffective organizing efforts. Ibrahim said that while this past and current activityshows that women are brave and women are active, there isa problem. “Those patriarchal ideals, habits of mind, gen-

dered understandings of what my role and your role are, arevery deeply embedded in Egyptian and other Arab societies.And they will not be overthrown because of 18 days in asquare.” Ibrahim recalled that during those 18 days, the squareshad a utopian character to them. Men stood by women, andveiled women and unveiled women stood by each other. Itwas a time when being Christian or Muslim could be forgot-ten, a time free of the military pitting of sect against sect. But as soon as Mubarak stepped down, the public spacesbegan filling with pleasure-seekers. The problem of sexual vi-olence began. She cited an incident within the first monthwhere a small women’s protest group entered the square.Within an hour, young Egyptian men, mostly with beards,took the women’s placards and threw them to the ground.They taunted them to return to their kitchens, shouting, “Youhave no place in the new Egypt.” Ibrahim said that it wasclear to everyone that this incident was not men againstwomen, but rather a conflict between the Islamic and moresecular factions. Ibrahim discussed how citizen participation in the elec-toral process has been very strong. She observed that theprevious organizing activity of the Muslim Brotherhood andSalafist Nour Party has given them a distinct advantage inthe democratic process, and that it will take time for those

without such a long history of organi-zation to gain representation.

Ibrahim said that citizen journal-ism and social media have made his-toric abuse of citizens much moretransparent and will continue to driveleaders to change their ways. She saidthe young men committing mass gangrapes have probably been paid byunidentified groups to engage in thisactivity, and it is not an indication of

the breakdown of Egyptian society. Recent protests in 20 dif-ferent cities around the world are pressuring the Egyptiangovernment to step forward and put a stop to such violence. Looking to the future, Ibrahim cited an example inMorocco called the February 20 movement, “…where youngmen and women have set a goal of parity of men and womenin the fight for social justice, economic justice, and the fightfor the kind of society they want to see in Morocco.” Ibrahim concluded by reflecting, “After all, if I take youback to the 18 days and what made it a success, it was ex-actly that blurring of the lines of diversity in Egyptian society,where everyone stood side by side, everyone made commoncause, and they began that first step toward that dream ofthe Egyptian society they want to see.” � Reported by Kathrin Seitz and Richard Anderson

“[Savvy activistwomen] use highly

genderedlanguage, callingon men to be men.”

BARBARA IBRAHIM is Founding Director of the John D.Gerhart Center for Philanthropy and Civic Engagement at theAmerican University in Cairo. Before that, she served for 14years as the regional director for West Asia and North Africa forthe Population Council. Her publications are in the fields ofwomen’s employment, youth transitions to adulthood, genderand health, and Arab philanthropy.


Ambassador Pope began with a brief summary of hisunderstanding of the main points of the speakerswho had preceded him. He praised Robin Wright and

Barbara Ibrahim for their emphasis on the Arabs as peopleand individuals and not as stereotypes. He creditedAmbassador Muasher for providing a “clear, distinct Arabvoice” in his summation of the present state of mind of theArab world. Pope agreed with Joshua Landis’ pessimisticoutlook for Syria and for American policy there. He alsolauded Gregory Gause’s appraisal of the ongoing “cold war”between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and Shai Feldman’s state-ment that the “fates of the US and Israel are inextricably en-twined,” both now and in the future. Pope praised the presentation of Hossein Mousavian,pointing out that the Iranian Ambassador had well per-formed his job of giving us the other side of the US/Iran dis-pute. His subsequent debate with Nick Burns had shownclearly the “degree to which it’s often impossible to agree onthe same facts, let alone on the course ahead.” Pope thenmentioned that in a recent book, Mousavian had complainedthat he and his fellow Iranian diplo-mats often had had to work overseaswithout clear understandings of whattheir home government wanted themto do. “Such a thing,” Pope said, tonguewell in cheek, “could never happen inthe United States.” (The audienceerupted in rueful laughter.) Pope went on to the two main issues

he wished to discuss, the first being the “disturbing transfor-mation of our national security bureaucracy” and, second, anexamination of the meaning of the “vexing word, diplomacy”and the goals behind its practice. He said he planned to ad-dress these points in the context of his recent experience inLibya. He then turned to the Conference’s graphic on the bigscreen behind him and commented on its portrayal of faceless,ominous menace. He lamented that this depiction of theMiddle East as an “exotic and violent other,” where “they hateus,” was a perception that now seems to permeate the charac-ter of America’s presence in the Middle East and North Africa. Pope contrasted the stereotype of these images to RobinWright’s urging us to understand the Middle East through theneeds and aspirations of its peoples. It seemed to Pope thatour views on these matters stem from a decade of US nation-building wars in the region, the resulting expenditure of “bloodand treasure,” and other costs that will afflict America for atleast another generation. “We fought with borrowed money;our economy was undermined; and our future freedom of ac-tion was compromised, including in the Middle East. We will

be paying the opportunity cost of theseadventures for generations to come.”

This failed nation-building has also“transformed and militarized our na-tional security apparatus,” Pope said.Citing the freedom of movement and ac-cess to local people that US diplomatsonce enjoyed in their foreign postings,he described the new reality of ourdiplomats hunkered down in fortress

embassies “from Istanbul to Cairo and from Rabat toBaghdad.” When he arrived in Libya to replace the slain USambassador there, Pope said he found the situation to be“even worse than I thought.” Of a contingent of 150 people,one-third were Marines; the staff had become accustomed tofortress living in their prior postings; and “we had anti-tankweapons stored in our empty swimming pool.” During the recent second anniversary of the revolt against

US Policies andProspects in theMiddle EastThe Arab Spring cries out foractive American diplomacy.

Laurence Pope

LAURENCE POPE served most recently as US Chargé d’Affairesin Libya, assuming the duties of the late J. Christopher Stevens,the former US Ambassador to Libya. Pope is a retired diplomatwho held a number of senior posts in the Department of State,including Director for Northern Gulf Affairs; Associate Directorfor Counter-Terrorism; US Ambassador to Chad; and PoliticalAdvisor to General Zinni, USMC, Commander- in- Chief of USCentral Command.


“[In the embassy inBenghazi,] we hadanti-tank weapons

in our emptyswimming pool.”

Laurence Pope

Gadaffi, Pope lamented that, while the British ambassadorwas mixing in with the joyous throngs in the streets of Tripoli,the US diplomatic contingent was “hunkered down” in abunker 15 miles away. Pope cited this paranoia as part of the justification for agrowing militarization of US foreign policy, a transformationvisible in many recent developments, such as:

� The breakdown of the buffers between the activities ofthe CIA and the FBI, a change fraught with dangers.

� The increasing closeness of the “alliance between the CIAand the military” ( as a part of which ‘covert action’ is nolonger a dirty word) and “four-fold expansion in the lastdecade of the Special Operations Command.” (Also knownas USSOCOM, this is a combined armed forces unit head-quartered in Tampa, Florida, tasked with carrying outcovert and clandestine operations. It is the fastest-growingpart of the armed forces, with a budget of around $10 bil-lion and with units in over 100 foreign countries.)

� The likelihood that, in the wake of the Benghazi incident,AFRICOM, the USSOCOM in Africa, will acquire its ownforce of intervention.

� The initial comments of the new Secretary of State, JohnKerry, who has talked more about supporting commercethan practicing diplomacy.

Having described this militarization of US foreign rela-tions and the devaluing (and defunding) of US diplomacy,Pope turned his attention to the current meaning in Americaof that “hoary word, diplomacy.” After describing briefly theorigin of diplomats and embassies in the seventeenth andeighteenth centuries as means for ongoing dialogue, or “per-manent negotiation,” he praised the institutions as an “extra-ordinary development” and crucial vehicles for the“management of relations between sovereign states.” In this increasingly globalized world, Pope said, the man-agement of the relationships between states “will be moreimportant than ever,” and the US, like all nations, will “needskilled and trained people to do it well.” However, he warnedthat the number of trained and experienced US Foreign Serv-ice officers is insufficient for our nation’s needs. As result,

many of the most crucial US diplomatic tasks today are beingdone by retired officers who, like Pope himself, are asked tocome back to help out. What would we think, he asked, if theSecretary of Defense turned to retired generals and admiralsto fight the nation’s wars because he didn’t trust the colonelsand captains to do so? It’s a small wonder that officials fromother agencies are constantly choosing to ignore the StateDepartment to deal with foreign governments. For Pope, “the Arab Awakening cries out for an activeAmerican diplomatic role.” It will require a new relationship,where we treat the “Arab states and populations as equalsand partners, not clients or targets.” In Libya, he said, therewas a hunger for such a relationship with us. Pope doubtedthe ability of US military institutions to provide that new re-lationship. He believes that President Obama’s decision topush aggressively on Iran regarding their nuclear ambitionshas left him with “reduced margin for maneuver in his sec-ond term.” Furthermore, he felt that too many of Obama’shopeful plans for a new day in the Middle East had been un-dermined by the unexpected events that torpedo so manyoptimistic proposals, such as those of the neocons. The US,Pope said, now has limited means for influencing events inplaces like Bahrain, Morocco, the Persian Gulf, and Arabia,not to mention Palestine. Most troubling to Pope was the recent reform effort at theState Department, in the form of a 242-page document calledthe Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR).This document advanced two disquieting concepts: first, that“sovereign states are of declining importance [and] diplomacy. . . is increasingly irrelevant;” and the second, that “the properbusiness of our diplomats is to be handmaidens to the militaryin nation-building, rather than the conduct of foreign policy.” In a final story to illustrate the misguided nature of ourparanoia and our perception that everyone hates us, Popecited his meeting with a visiting delegation of young, 20-something Libyans at the US Embassy in Tripoli not longafter the murder of Chris Stevens. He told them he was sorryfor all the security they had had to go through to come intothe “fortress.” But he was touched when a girl in the group,“wearing a hijab, the conservative head covering, looked mein the eye and said very directly, ‘No. We are sorry.’”� Reported by Charlie Graham

Q&AQ: How do we reverse the downgrading ofthe diplomatic service as an instrument offoreign policy?Pope: It’s interesting that we are hearingmore and more Defense officials, such as Sec-retary Gates, advocate more use of diplo-macy. I’m encouraged that most senior mili-tary officers now realize the importance ofpolitical solutions for the problems they arebeing asked to resolve. But the weakness ofmany civilian institutions has led to a some-what reluctant military takeover. The StateDepartment itself is somewhat at fault in

this, emphasizing response to events ratherthan the development of long-range strate-gies. I’m afraid our national attitude aboutdiplomacy is somewhat muddled.

Q: Is there a role for American students inimproving this situation?Pope: The State Department is recruitingmore candidates for the Foreign Service Of-ficer career track, but giving them fewer op-portunities at the top level of policy-making.The big problem is the challenges to such acareer posed by all the issues I’ve discussedhere today. It’s an honorable profession, but

if I had a daughter who was interested injoining the Foreign Service, I would warn herto go in with her eyes open.

Q (asked by a woman of Iranian origin):Wouldn’t it help if Americans heard morefrom foreign people about their challengesand about the good will that they actuallyfeel toward America?Pope: It would, but there you have the prob-lem cited by Barbara Ibrahim of our govern-ment’s unwillingness to give visas to citizensfrom many of the countries we have beendiscussing.


Q : What is the position, policy, and rele-vance of Russia in the Middle East?Landis: Both Russia and China drew a lineat Syria. They thought Assad might survive.US policy really is about Iran. They wantSyria to fall in order to hurt Iran. Russia hasother interests. They are propping up Assadin order to prevent regime change. ThroughSyria they have a front line on the Israel/Pales-tine conflict, and they can maneuver onthat. They have a big port in Syria. If Syriafalls, they will have nothing left. Even ifAssad retreats to an enclave on the coast,they still will have influence. If they abandonhim, they will not be a player.Mousavian: Russia feels a sense of humiliationafter the fall of the Soviet Union. Now isthe time to regain status. The US has failedin Iraq and Afghanistan and is diverting itsattention to East Asia. The US will becomeenergy-independent. Russia and China havea grand strategy to fill the vacuum.Gause: Russia is an energy-exporting state.Right now there is no real competition. Ifnew sources of energy develop and demandfalls or prices fall, it will place Russia in conflictwith energy exporters and will increase com-

petition for market share. That will be the dy-namic we will be talking about down the line.

Q: Can we or should we utilize the diverseAmerican Muslim society in helping withthe difficult transition to democracy?Ibrahim: The Muslims in the US might be abridge. We have work to do here in reachingout to that community. Maybe this is a goodtime to start a dialogue.Lynch: I have been frustrated about the waythe war of ideas has been waged in the last

decade. Implicitin it is the juxta-position of theUS as secular andliberal and theMuslim world asconsumed by re-ligion. My expe-rience is that theUS is deeply reli-

gious. The genius of the US is that we havereconciled strong religion with a constitutionthat allows the separation of church andstate. That doesn’t mean there is no church.The church is strong, and that is a wonderfulthing. The message that we craft should rec-ognize that and not pretend we are somethingthat we are not. I think it was a missed op-portunity in the early days when we couldonly think about combating radicalism andwe saw Islam as a source of radicalism.Muasher: In this country Islam is seen asmonolithic. Most people lump Al Qaeda,Hamas, Hezbollah, the Muslim Brotherhood,and Salafism all together. The Muslim Broth-erhood might have views we disagree with,but they have been peaceful for decades,and they represent the overwhelming ma-jority of political Islam in many countries.

Q: How are the sanctions affecting thepeople of Iran, in terms of food, medicine,construction, and trade?

Mousavian: One word—greatly. The bankscannot transfer any money. The governmentcannot import basic commodities. I hope thiswill be something the P5+1 (the group ofcountries that joined in the diplomatic effortswith Iran regarding nuclear issues) wouldconsider—not to harm the ordinary people.Burns: A student asked me, don’t we havean ethical responsibility not to hurt people?I negotiated three of the UN Security CouncilSanctions Resolutions for the US on Iranfor the Bush administration. Our first prioritywas to negotiate with Iran. In the absenceof negotiations, what are our options? Thereis no question that sanctions hurt innocentpeople, but our objective is to convince thegovernment that they are better off negoti-ating. That has been a calculation in thepast two administrations.Pope: Sanctions are a blunt instrument. Theyare an action short of war, but they do dam-

age the people.When you aretrying to influ-ence the actionsof a foreign stateyou have a limit-ed toolbox, andsanctions are partof that toolbox.

The Conference traditionally concludes with a discussion panel that takes questions from the audience and engages the speakers with one another. Sunday’s panel, moderated by NickBurns, included Greg Gause, Marc Lynch, Barbara Ibrahim, Marwan Muasher, JoshLandis, Larry Pope, and Hossein Mousavian.


Final Panel: Q&A

Final Panel: Q&A

Lynch: I spent a lot of time working on thesanctions issue during the long struggle withthe war in Iraq, and the ethical issues wereprofound. The sanctions seemed to be divorced from any strategic outcome. Thequestion is, do they work? The overwhelmingevidence is that the answer is no. Theyalmost never achieve the desired effect.

Q: The elephant in the room is the issue ofoil, not only for the oil-rich countries, butalso for the poor countries that receive aidfrom them. How are their economies goingto deal with the depletion of oil reserves? Muasher : Oil has been both a blessing anda curse in Arab society, in both oil-rich andoil-poor countries. In oil-producing countries,oil has basically killed productivity. Peopledon’t have to work if they can find moneyon the ground. Oil has created a sort ofwelfare state, but it has also produced re-pressive states politically. People don’t haveto pay taxes; no taxation, no representation.In oil-consuming countries it has been creatingpatronage systems. Oil is traded in returnfor favors and loyalty. It allows these statesto spend money beyond their means. In acountry like Jordon, 40 percent of the workforce works for the government. Unlesscountries have the will to increase produc-tivity, this situation is unsustainable. Thesame is true in the rich countries. Even inSaudi Arabia unemployment is very high.This can’t go on. Gause: It can’t go on forever, but it can goon for a while. The issue is not depletion.There is plenty of oil in the region, and withtechnological changes they are finding more.

The question ispopulation. Low-population stateslike Kuwait orQatar have noreason to change.In high-popula-tion countrieslike Iran and Al-geria, these are

serious and immediate issues. Saudi Arabiais somewhere in between. The problem isdomestic consumption. The Saudis are burningall their oil to run their air conditioners. Theyhave among the lowest prices in the world.Consumption is encouraged, not managed.In 30 years, they will have no oil to export. Itis a real challenge for exporting nations. Mousavian: Before the revolution Iran im-ported almost everything from the West.

After the revolution, due to sanctions, Iranbecame an independent nation producingits own industrial products and conventionalarms. There is one remaining problem: theIranian budget is too dependent on oil. Oneschool of thought says this is a golden op-portunity for Iran. Let them sanction oil;then we will build a new economic systemnot dependent on oil. Then Iran would becompletely secure. This effort might becounterproductive for the West.

Q: What will be the economic impact ofthe turbulence in the Middle East onEurope?Landis: Migration is one of the greatestimpacts. Several years ago during the Bushadministration, when Bush was squeezingSyria, the German ambassador in Damascussaid to me that Germany’s greatest fear wasthat he would succeed. We already are inun-dated with Muslim immigrants, he said. IfSyria explodes, hundreds and thousands ofMuslims will want to get to Europe. They willfind a way through Turkey. This phenomenon

is driven by sanc-tions. America iscontributing tothe impoverish-ment of manycountries throughsanctions. Insome ways it is anun -Amer i c anthing to do. Our

basic philosophy has been to support themiddle class; through getting wealthier theywill become more democratic, and they willchange regimes. If sanctions don’t accomplishtheir goals immediately, people are impover-ished and locked into poverty for years. Ittakes the whole region backward and puts alot of pressure on Europe. In Iraq, a third of amillion people died because of the sanctions.Muasher: Europe is in no position today topour money into the Middle East to try topush economic and political reform, in orderto stem immigration, as it did with theBarcelona Process in the mid-1990s. Thateffort didn’t work because the countries didnot cooperate and conditions for aid weretoo mild.Lynch: Tunisian economists say yes, we needforeign aid, but what we really want is moreopen markets and investment and the op-portunity for our labor to migrate morefreely. In Europe the emphasis has been onaid, which is easier, but it is a mismatch.

Q (to Nick Burns): Yesterday you referredto Hamas and Hezbollah as terrorist groups.Give me your definition of terrorism.

Burns: The indiscriminant use of violence toachieve a political purpose is one definition.As I look at the history of our governmentinvolvement in the Middle East over the past25 years, what I see particularly from Hezbollahis repeated attacks; assassination of our cit-izens; and repeated attacks on our military,including our Marine barracks in Beirut andour embassy in Beirut in January of 1984. Ilook at this as terrorism; yeah, I do.Mousavian: It is true that the US considersHamas and Hezbollah as terrorists groups,but the majority of countries worldwide donot. Iran does not. Even US allies like SaudiArabia do not.Everybody knows90 percent ofHezbollah’s sup-port comes fromUS allies in theregion, the Arabcountries. Onehundred twentycountries of theallied movement do not consider them ter-rorists. Even the Europeans do not. Hezbollahare in the parliament of Lebanon. Do youconsider Lebanon a terrorist country? Theperspective in the Middle East is completelydifferent. The people love Hezbollah becausethey are fighting for the integrity of Lebanon.They love Hamas because they are fightingfor the Palestinians. Ibrahim: An Egyptian student once askedme, “Do you think if the United States ofAmerica had just two square miles of itsterritory occupied for more than 40 years,with no recourse from the internationalcommunity, that a resistance movementwould not form and that they would notsomeday resort to violence?”


Q: The heart of the Middle East is Palestine,but we haven’t talked about it. Is Palestinenot included because Palestine is irrelevant,or because it is such a tough nut to crackthat we might as well put it aside and dealwith the other subjects first?Burns: You are right. This is a tough confer-ence to put together. There are so manydifferent issues. I think what happened inthe Israeli elections on January 22 was asurprise—a second-place vote for a moderateparty dedicated to negotiations with thePalestinians. It will force Netanyahu to thinkagain. If Tzipi Livni comes back as the nego-tiator there is at least a glimmer of hope.And Secretary Kerry has been speaking abouthis hopes to reignite the negotiations.

Muasher: I spentmost of my pro-fessional careertrying to bringabout peace be-tween the Arabsand Israelis. I wasthe first ambas-sador from mycountry (Jordon)

to Israel. I think the United States is goingto face an awfully difficult time in the MiddleEast to regain even part of the credibilitythat was lost before the Arab Awakening. Ifit argues to the Arab public today that ifyou are an Egyptian or Tunisian or Libyan orMoroccan or Yemeni or Syrian yearning forfreedom, we are with you, but if you arePalestinian and yearning for freedom, it’scomplicated. That is not an argument thatwill resonate anywhere in the Arab world,let alone with the Palestinians. On the conflictitself I am actually rather pessimistic. I thinkthe two sides have come to a point wherethey are not able to sit together. The US isthe only catalyst that can bring the twosides together, and they seem to have decided

that the chances for success are too smallto make it worthwhile. I am not optimisticthat the second Obama administration isgoing to make a serious effort. I hope toGod I am wrong. In my view a serous effortis not to launch another process. That haslost all credibility in the Middle East. Wecan’t have two people arguing over a pizzawhile one of them is eating it. The processdoesn’t work when the status quo is changingevery day. Arabs look at the Oslo peaceprocess and the Madrid process as a 20-year-old process which has not produced aresult. During that time the number ofsettlers has increased from 250,000 to over500,000 since 1993. About 200,000 of themare in East Jerusalem and 80,000 in theheartland of the West Bank. Even if an agree-ment were signed today it would be nearlyimpossible to implement it in a way thatwould separate the two peoples. If theywere to be kept together, the security wouldbe a nightmare. If there is no two-state so-lution within two months—not two years—then I think the window has closed for avery long time, a decade or two. Even withthe new coalition, I am not convinced thatNetanyahu is ready ideologically to makethe necessary concessions to create a viablePalestinian state. In the meantime the number

of Arabs and Jews under Israeli control isnearly equal at six million. It can’t be post-poned much longer.

Q: As I listened to the exchange betweenBurns and Mousavian yesterday, I wantedto believe you both. But I couldn’t figureout the facts, and so I couldn’t trust. Howdo we create a sense of trust among usagain?Mousavian: It is a very bad situation today,with many miscalculations, misunderstand-ings, misperceptions. We should look forward,and confidence-building is the only way. I’mskeptical that our two governments can recognize their past mistakes and open anew door. For the moment, realistically, thebest way forward may be for both govern-ments to open relations people-to-people.Iranians and Americans are not hostile toeach other. Perhaps after a decade of tourism,humanitarian and academic relations, facili-tating visas, the people can change thecourse of the hostilities.Burns: That’s the first time Hossein and Ihave agreed this weekend. Neither govern-ment has committed to full citizen exchange;there are barriersto visas on bothsides. What youheard last nightbetween us isreal life. I thinkwe have to getinto direct nego-tiations, not mul-tilateral ones,and the initial conversations will be like theone we had last night. There is a huge chasmbetween our two historical narratives. Butwe have to keep bringing people togetherto talk to prevent war. The kind of exchangewe had yesterday is far preferable to war. � Reported by Dave Jackson

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Final Panel: Q&A

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FOUNDATION

BOARD OF DIRECTORSDavid Babski, CamdenBland Banwell, BelfastKaren Cadbury, RockportBruce Cole, CamdenJohn W. Davidson, CamdenBrewster Grace, RocklandG. Paul Holman, CamdenJeff Howland, CamdenPeter Imber, CamdenRendle Jones, CamdenEmily Lusher, RockportSarah Miller, CamdenJane Monhart, UnionRalph Moore, RocklandC. Patrick Mundy, Spruce HeadMaureen O’Keefe, NorthportSeth Singleton, Mount DesertRobert H. Tracy, HampdenMichael Wygant, Scarborough

ADVISORY COUNCILJames Algrant, CamdenRichard Anderson, RockportJohn Bird, Spruce HeadDan Bookham, RocklandFrederic Coulon, RockportJudith Daniels, UnionThomas M. Deford, Spruce HeadJohn Enright, Camden (in memoriam)H. Allen Fernald, RockportDesmond Fitzgerald, CamdenWill Galloway, HopeCharles Graham, CamdenPeter T. Gross, CamdenKathleen Hirsch, Owls HeadRobert Hirsch, Owls HeadDavid P. Jackson, RockportRonald Jarvella, NorthportAdm. Gregory Johnson, HarpswellJean B. Lenderking, BelfastJames Matlack, RockportThomas C. Putnam, RocklandRobert Rackmales, NorthportFrederick P. Rector III, CamdenJeffrey St. John, BangorLouis Sell, WhitefieldAmb. Anne M. Sigmund, Deer IsleJudy Stein, BelfastElizabeth A. Wilson, Bremen

CONFERENCE MANAGERKimberly A. Scott

About The Camden Conference

The Camden Conference—established in 1987—provides the opportunity forrenowned experts and interested individuals to share knowledge and con-cerns on issues of global importance. Each year, a topic is selected and a

series of related events are held in Maine communities from Damariscotta to BarHarbor—culminating in the weekend Conference in February in Camden. TheConference is simultaneously streamed to audiences in Belfast, Rockland, andEllsworth. Community Events include lectures, short courses, and symposia; group dis-cussions of selected books, articles, and news reports; and films, art exhibits, andother cultural occasions. All events are open to the public and most are free ofcharge. They are led by scholars and other well-informed area residents. Speakers at the three-day Conference come from government, business, themedia, academia, and international organizations. Each speaker addresses a facetof the year’s topic, answers questions from the audience, and participates in anexchange of ideas. The speakers generally spend the entire weekend in Camden,challenging each other both publicly and informally. In previous years, The Camden Conference has examined such topics as “TheUS in a 21st Century World, “The Environment and Foreign Policy,” and “Religionas a Force in World Affairs.” In some years, the focus has been on specific geopo-litical areas such as China; Europe; and Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan. Nextyear’s Conference will consider “The Global Politics of Food and Water.” The Camden Conference is a nonpartisan, federally tax-exempt, not-for-profit501(c)(3) corporation. The Board of Directors includes residents of 10 midcoasttowns, all of whom volunteer their time and talent to organize the Conference andrelated programs. Financial support for The Camden Conference comes from attendance fees;memberships; individual gifts; and grants from institutions, foundations, and cor-porations.

EDITING: Dorothea Graham, CamdenDESIGN: Carol Gillette, Communication Graphics, BelfastPHOTOGRAPHY: Sarah Szwjkos, Damn Rabbit Studios, RocklandPRINTING: Camden Printing, Camden

P.O. Box 882, Camden ME 04843-0882Telephone: 207-236-1034Email: [email protected]: www.camdenconference.org

2013

CAMDEN CONFERENCE

the 2013 camden conference HIGHLIGHTS

The Middle East:What Next?

Keynote Address:Rock the Casbah: What Next in the Middle East? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1Robin Wright

Two Years After the Arab Awakening—Emerging Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3Marwan Muasher

Egypt and the New Islamic Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5Marc Lynch

Syria: What Next? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7Joshua Landis

The New Middle East Cold War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9Gregory Gause

Israel and Iran: An Evolving Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10Shai Feldman

Nuclear Issues and US/Iran Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12Seyed Hossein Mousavian

Women and Public Space in the Arab Spring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14Barbara Ibrahim

US Policies and Prospects in the Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16Laurence Pope

Final Panel: Q & A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18

Moderated by Nicholas Burns

The successive uprisings of popu-lar discontent known as the ArabAwakening, or the Arab Spring,

have dominated the headlines since2010. Longtime rulers have been top-pled, and the battle rages on in Syria.The transition toward more democratic,progressive, stable governments hasbegun, but the process is proving to bemessy and slow. The 2013 CamdenConference wrestled with the issuesraised by these challenges, such as theongoing role of social media in publicdebate and protest; the emerging statusof women; the impact of the rise ofelected Islamic factions in governingroles; the growing tension betweenIsrael and Iran; and the prospects forIran/US relations, especially regardingthe Iran nuclear program.

This year’s Camden Conference was dedicated to Jim Matlack, ProgramCommittee Chairman for the last seven years, in gratitude for his thought-ful leadership and hard work in developing topics and recruiting speakers

for seven engaging Conferences.

P.O. Box 882, Camden ME 04843-0882Telephone: 207-236-1034Email: [email protected]: www.camdenconference.org© 2013 The Camden Conference

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FEBRUARY 21-23, 2014

CAMDEN CONFERENCE

The Global Politics of Food and WaterGlobal food and water shortages are rapidly emerging as the most critical crisis of our time.

Rising food prices, shrinking water availability, climate change, and relentless populationgrowth are converging to force this issue onto the world agenda. Shortages of food and water are already destabilizing societies and governments, andcreating hundreds of refugees. Jim Yong Kim, president of the World Bank, recently gave asobering warning about the risk of conflicts over natural resources. If the forecast of a four-degree global increase above the historical average temperature proves to be accurate, he said,“There will be water and food fights everywhere.” Kim called for action to create a carbon market, eliminate fossil-fuel subsidies, and “green”the world’s largest cities. He noted that the 2012 droughts in the US, which pushed up theprice of wheat and maize, had led to the world’s poor eating less. For the first time, he said,extreme weather that affects food production had been connected to climate change broughton by human activity. Among the timely questions that may be addressed in the 2014 Camden Conference:

� What new game-plan and alternative policies do we need to overcome market failures?What new technologies may aid in the process?

� What are the impacts of global warming on food production, and how might they affectpolitical stability?

� What innovations in organic and commercial agriculture, respectively, hold promise toproduce enough food to feed the planet?

� Do we have the ability to provide enough water for homes and farms and avoid conflictover water resources in the coming decades?

� What particular challenges do climate change, world food prices, poverty, and land-grab-bing pose for food security in Africa?

� What can the US do to assure the multilateral cooperation needed to establish policiesto resolve these challenges?

Check the Camden Conference website for updates on speakers, programs,community events, and registration.

Camden, Maine

www.camdenconference.org

The Middle East

Robin Wright • Marwan Muasher • Marc LynchJoshua Landis • Gregory Gause • Shai FeldmanSeyed Hossein Mousavian • Barbara IbrahimLaurence Pope • Nicholas Burns

HIGHLIGHTSFrom the 26th Annual Camden Conference, February 22–24, 2013

2013 WHATNEXT?

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Documents

HIGHLIGHTS The Middle East - Camden Conference