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High-Power Electromagnetic (HPEM) Threats and the Electric Power System 1 Dr. William Radasky, Ph.D., P.E. Metatech Corporation Goleta, CA [email protected] 27 May 2010 ConnectivityWeek 2010

High-Power Electromagnetic (HPEM) Threats and the …€¦ · High-Power Electromagnetic (HPEM) Threats and the Electric Power ... *Information from the EMP Commission ConnectivityWeek

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High-Power Electromagnetic (HPEM)Threats and the Electric Power

System

1

Dr. William Radasky, Ph.D., P.E.Metatech Corporation

Goleta, [email protected]

27 May 2010

ConnectivityWeek 2010

Outline of Talk

•• Introduction• Overview of High-altitude Electromagnetic Pulse

(HEMP)• Overview of Intentional Electromagnetic Interference

(IEMI)• Overview of Severe Geomagnetic Storms

2

• Overview of Severe Geomagnetic Storms• Protection Issues and Standards• What’s New?• Conclusions

ConnectivityWeek 2010

Introduction to EM Threats

•• In this presentation we will discuss three high power electromagnetic (HPEM) threats to the current and future commercial power system

— HEMP (high altitude electromagnetic pulse) from a nuclear detonation

— Intentional electromagnetic interference (IEMI) caused by the use of electromagnetic weapons by criminals and terrorists

3

electromagnetic weapons by criminals and terrorists— Severe geomagnetic storms from solar activity

ConnectivityWeek 2010

Overview of HEMPOverview of HEMP

4

Overview of HEMPOverview of HEMP

ConnectivityWeek 2010

HEMP Environment Terminology

102

104

NEUTRON GAMMA SIGNAL

SCATTERED GAMMA SIGNAL

PROMPT-GAMMA SIGNAL

EARLY-TIMEINTERMEDIATE-

TIME LATE-TIMEE1

E2E3

E(t

) (V

/m)

5

NOTE: E1 AND E2-GAMMA ARE INCIDENT FIELDS, E2-NEUTRON ANDE3 CONSIDER THE PRESENCE OF THE GROUND

10-4

10-2

100

10-10

10-8

10-6

10-4

10-2

100

102

104

Time (s)

MHD SIGNAL

E(t

) (V

/m)

ConnectivityWeek 2010

HEMP Threat: Historical Evidence (US)

•• STARFISH event, July 9, 1962— 1.4 MT, 400 km HOB— 1400 km from Honolulu

• HEMP effects felt in Hawaii— Coupling to Hawaiian electric light

grid turns off some nighttime lights in Honolulu

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lights in Honolulu— Kauai telecom microwave outage— Other nuisance effects (alarms)

• Collateral effect: Sky swept clean of all commercial satellites within six months

*Information from the EMP Commission

ConnectivityWeek 2010

Overhead Transmission Line and Telecommunications –Disconnection and Damage

Diesels founddamaged, “later”

Long line problems dueto EMP “long tail”

After Tests – Invested in

(Kazakhstan - October 1962)

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After Tests – Invested inprotection devices.Distinguished work byKurchatov, Khariton, Sakharov

Note: Ranges were given as kilometers

Note: Red text based on Loborev’s spoken words in June 1994 as documented by Radasky ConnectivityWeek 2010

HEMP Burst Over Ohio - Line of Sight Circle

The image cannot be displayed. Your computer may not have enough memory to open the image, or the image may have been corrupted. Restart your computer, and then open the file again. If the red x still appears, you may have to delete the image and then insert it again.The image cannot be displayed. Your computer may not have enough memory to open the image, or the image may have been corrupted. Restart your computer, and then open the file again. If the red x still appears, you may have to delete the image and then insert it again.

8 ConnectivityWeek 2010

Major HV and EHV Substations Exposed (1765 - 83%)

The image cannot be displayed. Your computer may not have enough memory to open the image, or the image may have been corrupted. Restart your computer, and then open the file again. If the red x still appears, you may have to delete the image and then insert it again.The image cannot be displayed. Your computer may not have enough memory to open the image, or the image may have been corrupted. Restart your computer, and then open the file again. If the red x still appears, you may have to delete the image and then insert it again.

9 ConnectivityWeek 2010

Example of Horizontal

Substation Control Cable Issues

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Example of Horizontal exposure of control cables in EHV Substation - Trenway

ConnectivityWeek 2010

Control Cables routed via cable tray inside Substation Control house to

various relay/control panels

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Example of Relay and Control Panel

ConnectivityWeek 2010

E1 HEMP Conclusions

•• One or a few high-altitude nuclear detonations can produce HEMP, simultaneously, over wide geographical areas (arrival within one power cycle)

• Unprecedented cascading failure of our electronics-dependent infrastructures could result

—Power, energy transport, telecom, and financial systems are particularly vulnerable and interdependent

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particularly vulnerable and interdependent—HEMP disruption of these sectors could cause large scale

infrastructure failures for all aspects of the Nation’s life• Both civilian and military capabilities depend on these

infrastructures

ConnectivityWeek 2010

Overview of Intentional Electromagnetic

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Overview of Intentional Electromagnetic Interference (IEMI)

ConnectivityWeek 2010

Comparison of Several EM Environments

14Ref: IEC Standard 61000-2-13Ref: IEC Standard 61000-2-13

ConnectivityWeek 2010

Definition:Intentional malicious generation of electromagnetic energy

introducing noise or signals into electric and electronic systems, thus disrupting, confusing or damaging these systems for terrorist or criminal purposes

(Zurich EMC Symposium, February 1999;

What Exactly is Intentional EMI (IEMI)?

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(Zurich EMC Symposium, February 1999;Also IEC 61000-2-13:2005)

ConnectivityWeek 2010

Coupling Paths for Radiated IEMI Fields

Window

Mobile EMTransmitter

Communication and Data lines

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Network

Commercial Power

ConnectivityWeek 2010

Diehl EM Emitter

•• Diehl Munitions Systeme has developed a small interference source (including antenna)

— 350 MHz damped sine field— 120 kV/m at 1 meter (omni-

directional antenna)— 30 minute continuous operation

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— 30 minute continuous operation (5 pulses per second) or 3 hours in bursts

— 20 x 16 x 8 inches and 62 pounds• Demonstration in Summer 2004

ConnectivityWeek 2010

JOLT IRA Hyperband Generator

•• AFRL has developed an extremely powerful IRA system that

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system that produces hyperband pulses

—E*r = 5.3 MV—pulse width

~100 ps

ConnectivityWeek 2010

IEMI Conclusions

•• The IEMI electromagnetic fields are in a similar frequency band as the E1 HEMP discussed earlier

• The impacts on the power grid will be similar to that from E1 HEMP

—Substation control electronics can be affected by nearby EM weapons

—Control Center computer operations could be affected

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—Control Center computer operations could be affected—Power generation controls are also at risk

• Major difference is that the IEMI is a local threat and does not approach the same impact level as E1 HEMP, unless a coordinated attack is performed

• Protection methods for the electronics will be similar for IEMI and E1 HEMP

— In addition security measures such as physical separation of attack locations and EM monitors can be used for IEMI

ConnectivityWeek 2010

Overview of Geomagnetic Storm Impacts

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Overview of Geomagnetic Storm Impacts on the Power Grid

ConnectivityWeek 2010

Sunspot and Associated Solar Activity and Resulting Geomagnetic Storms

21SOHO Image June 9, 2002 ConnectivityWeek 2010

Storms have Continent-Wide Footprints

Geomagnetic Storms and Large Power Grids

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FieldDisturbances

from ElectrojetCurrent Couple

toPower

Systems ConnectivityWeek 2010

Geomagnetic Storms Can Cause Permanent Transformer Damage due to Overcurrent and Stray Flux Heating

These Key Assets may take a Year or More to Replace

Damage due

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Salem Nuclear Plant GSU Transformer Failure, March ‘89

Damage due to one storm

ConnectivityWeek 2010

Impact of a Large (4800 nT/min) Geomagnetic Storm over the US

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Geomagnetic Storm and E3 HEMP Conclusions

•• Both a severe geomagnetic storm and E3 HEMP can induce high levels of quasi-dc current into the high voltage power grid

— Transformer saturation occurs— Reactive power demand creates voltage instability leading to

blackouts— Hot spot heating can damage large transformers beyond repair

• Without adequate protection, recovery could be prolonged -- months

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• Without adequate protection, recovery could be prolonged -- months to years

— Costs to the economy range from 1-3 trillion dollars per year• Protection concepts for these threats do exist• Smart Grid impacts

— It is known that the higher the operating voltage of portions of the transmission network, the more vulnerable the connected transformers are to damage

— This should be considered in any upgrades for the network to accommodate wind power in the Midwest

ConnectivityWeek 2010

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Protection!

ConnectivityWeek 2010

EM Protection -- Not New!

•• Protection from electromagnetic fields is not a new discipline

• Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) engineers have been assessing new threats and developing protection and test methods for > 50 years

—Radar can affect aircraft and nearby commercial facilities—Radio station impacts on new construction nearby

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—Radio station impacts on new construction nearby—Hospitals need protection from MRI machines—Protection against cellular phones (major initiative that

continues today)

• These threats are recognized and dealt with as they occur—Not as easy for low probability events to determine and then

to fix the problem—For the power grid, the impact would be very high

ConnectivityWeek 2010

IEC HPEM Standardization Program

•• The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) develops electrical standards for the world -- founded in 1906 (www.iec.ch)

• The IEC has been developing HEMP and IEMI standards and reports since 1989

— IEC SC 77C was formed in 1991• Initial emphasis was to provide the means to protect civil

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• Initial emphasis was to provide the means to protect civil electronics equipment from the effects of HEMP generated by high-altitude nuclear bursts

• Scope of work in SC 77C expanded in June 1999 to include man-made EM transient threats with emphasis on IEMI

ConnectivityWeek 2010

20 Publications Produced by IEC SC 77C

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IEC Standards Conclusions

•• IEC SC 77C has been very active for more than 20 years in producing standards and other publications to deal with the protection of civil systems from HEMP and IEMI

• SC 77C publications are basic standards that form “building blocks” to be applied to electronic equipment

• SC 77C is working with the ITU-T to coordinate the HEMP and IEMI protection of telecommunications centers

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protection of telecommunications centers

• SC 77C is coordinating with CIGRE on the protection of HV substation controls from IEMI

• IEEE EMC Society is using the publications of SC 77C to develop protection practices for public accessible computers

• These IEC standards are the best place to start to understand the EM threats and to develop protection methods for commercial electronic equipment and systems

ConnectivityWeek 2010

What’s New?

•• Over the past 12 months the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has been examining these EM threats to the U.S. power grid and possible protection methods

• On 21 July 2009 the U.S. House held a hearing to examine the need to protect the U.S. power grid against these EM threats

• In November 2009 and March 2010 the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) held workshops to inform industry about high impact, low frequency (HILF) threats to the power grid

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high impact, low frequency (HILF) threats to the power grid• The House Energy and Commerce Committee passed the “Grid

Reliability and Infrastructure Defense Act” (HR 5026) by a vote of 47-0 on 15 April 2010

— Gives FERC the authority to address imminent threats to the electric grid with emergency orders

— FERC is directed to address longer-term grid vulnerabilities with standards written or approved by FERC

— The defense department has agreed that this bill is critical to our national security

ConnectivityWeek 2010

Conclusions

•• HEMP, IEMI and severe geomagnetic storms are serious threats to the existing power system

— Efforts are being made to protect the existing U.S. grid from these threats

• The introduction of new electronics to make the grid smarter will introduce more potential points of failure to high power EM threats

• Activities in the IEC, ITU, CIGRE, and the IEEE EMC Society are aimed at providing protection for commercial electronics for these severe threats

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providing protection for commercial electronics for these severe threats— First step is to have a robust EMC program for all electronics used

to control the smart grid— Second step is to consider the specific severe geomagnetic threats

one by one and to determine the most cost effective manner for protection

• It is important that the U.S. Smart Grid program consider EMC and severe EM threats at the design level as opposed to a retrofit approach

ConnectivityWeek 2010