Herodotus's Account of the Battle of Salamis

8/10/2019 Herodotus's Account of the Battle of Salamis

1/13

Herodotus's Account of the Battle of Salamis

Author(s): Benj. Ide WheelerSource: Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association, Vol. 33 (1902),pp. 127-138Published by: The Johns Hopkins University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/282591.

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2/13

Vol.

xxxiii.]

Herodotus's

Account of

Battle

of

Salamis.

I27

VIII. - Herodotus's

Account

of the Battle

of Salamis.

BY PRESIDENT

BENJ. IDE

WHEELER,

UNIVERSITY OF

CALIFORNIA.

OUR chief

sources of

knowledlge

oncerning

the battle

of

Salamis are

Aeschylus,

Persians, 345

ff.,

nd Herodotus

VIII,

70-95. Of only secondaryvalue-possibly, as some have

thought,

f

no

independent

value-are

Diodorus

(Ephorus)

VIII,

17, 2-19, 2,

and

Plutarch

in the

Thcmistocles.1

The

vulgate

account,

basing

upon

Herodotus,

and

placing

the

battle

inside the

straits,

was first

eriously

alled

in

question

by

Loeschke, Ja/rb.

f:

P/il.

1877,

pp.

25

ff.

Finding

Aes-

chylus

and

Herodotus

in

discord,

he

prefers

to follow

the

former,who

was

an

eye-witness,

nd

prepares

an

account of

the battle

which

he

believes to be

supported

by

the

state-

ments of

Aeschyius

and in

harmony

with

those of

Diodorus.

He

makes no

attempt

o

lharmonize

he

statements f

Herod-

otus,except

to

suggest

a

correction

f

the

text

at

the

point

of

most

serious

discrepancy. The

battle

he

believes

to

have

occurred

outside the

narrowsmade

by

the

point of

Cynosura

and the

opposite headland

of

Attica.

His

main

points are

thefollowing:

(i)

It

is not

credible hat the Persian

ships

the

night

before

the

battle

could

have entered the

straits

000

metres

distant

from he

Greeks

without

being

observed

by them.

(2)

Psyttaleia was

evidently

xpected

by Xerxes to

be

in

the

midst

of

the

impendingbattle,

E'V

yadp

&)

rpdp

Tr)q

Pav-

AaXt,qai,

/ ,?EXXovO-s?

6'aEa-Oat

E''O

'E70

vI?

os

(Herod.VIII,

76);

hence the disembarkation ftroops here. If thebattlewere

fought

inside the sound,

it

would

be too far

away to

be

sought

as

a refuge

by

the

Greeks

cf. Aesch.

450 ff.).

(3)

Aeschylus confirms iodorus when he

indicates

Pers.

366-68) that

one detachment

of

ships

was sent

around the

southof

Salamis

to

block the

northwest

assage,

and

the

rest

l

Cf.

Perrin, B., Plutarch's Themis/ocles

zn.] Ar4is/ides;

note

pp.

206

ff.

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3/13

I28

Benj.

Ide Wheeler. [I902

in three ranks were

set to guard the strait t Psyttaleia.

If

the Greeks

were surrounded by a movement of Persian

ships inside the straits,there were no need of this outside

manoeuvre.

(4)

The Persians

are

represented

by Aeschylus as having

heard

the

Greeks,theirpaean,

the trumpetblast, the stroke

of

the

oars,

before they saw them.

This

can only be

ex-

plained on supposition

hat Cynosura ntervened. The

Per-

sians

in

question

were therefore

t

the southwest

passage

betweenPsyttaleiaand Cynosura. The Greeks became visi-

ble

as

they

bent around the

point

of

Psyttaleia. Hence the

rightwing was seen

first.

(5)

The

Ezv

-revw'(Aesch.

4I3)

refers

o the narrows etween

Cynosura

and Attica. The

turning

point of the battle was

the

confusion

nto

which the Persians

fellwhen forcing heir

way

into this strait.

(6) The statement f Hlerod.VIII, 85 that the Phoenicians

occupied

in

the Persian line the

wing

towardEleusis and the

west, and the Ion ans that toward

the east and Peiraieus

is from Loeschke's point

of view

unintelligible.

It

yields

meaning

for

him, however,

f

only

EaXap4zvos,

e

substituted

for

EXEuo-'YoW,

so that

the Phoenicians

be

assigned

the

wing

toward Salamis

and the west.

Loeschke, therefore, rrangesboth lines across the straits

from hore

to

shore,

from ast

to

west.

A

somewhat

different

olution s

attempted y

W.

W.

Good-

win

in Vol.

I,

Papers

Amer.

Schloo, pp. 239

ff.

Starting

with an

acceptance

of Loeschke's

criticism

of

the vulgate

theory,

he

joins

with

him in

thinking

t incredible that the

Persians

should

have taken

up

their

position,

on

the night

before

the

battle,

within

he

straits.

He

does

not,

however,

follow Loeschke in amending the text of Herodotus, but

rather

seeks

to harmonize Herodotus's account

with

the

others

by

a different

nterpretation

f

the

vexed

passage

Herod.

VIII, 85.

He

seeks, namely,

o locate

the

struggle

within

he

straits,

ut makes the Persians

enter

n

the

morn-

ing,

and ascribes

their defeat

to the

fact

that

they

were

attacked

before

they

had formedtheir

ine,

and

before

they



4/13

Vol. xxxiii.]

Herodotus's

Account of

Battle

of

Salamis.

129

had recovered

from

the

confusion

incident to

passing

the

narrows.

His mainpoints, dditionalto those ofLoeschke, are:

(i)

A.eschylus beyond

doubt

represents

the

Persians

as

enterin1ghe straits fter aybreak. So

Diodorusand

Plutarch.

(2)

Their

line

(called by Aeschylus

pE'/,ua)

ell into

some

confusion

n

entering he

narrows;

and

they

never

ucceeded

in

regaining

their

orderof

battle,being immedliately

met by

the Greeks

as

they passed

the

long

point

of

Salamis.

(3) SThere is nothing inconsistentwith this view of the

battle

except

the common

nterpretation

f

two

passages

of

Herodotus :

the

first

of

these, VIII,

76,

which

represents

the Persians as bringing

up

their

west

wing to

Salamis

KCVKXOv,uLevoturing the

nighit

before tfe battle, he explains as

referring

o the

sending of

ships

around the south of

the

island to close the northwest

assage (cf. Diod. XI, I 7; Plut.,

Themnist.

2);

and the second passage, VIII, 85, he explains

by applying

the

points

of

the

compass

to

the order

of

the

Persian line as

it

entered

the straits, .e.

it

entered

end on

with

the

right

wing

leading,

so that

the

right

wing

thus lay

to

the west or

northwest.

The

Greeks are

made

to take a

position

at

first

cross

the

sound,

between Magoula

and the

Perama

(corresponding

o Diodorus's

statement), i.e.

south

to north,and then, by advancing their right wing first, o

assume

a

position

southeast

to

northwest

ufficient o

bring

them

near to the desired

ine,

.e.

with

their

eft

wing slightly

west

of

north.

Professor Goodwin's

statement gives a clear, consistent

story

of

the

battle,

and has

the merit of

establishing

an

apparentlycomplete reconciliationbetween the

accounts

of

Herodotus and

Aeschylus.

It

is, however,

ather n

attempt

at reconcilingwith the Aeschylean account two conflict-

ing passages

in

Herodotus

than any attempt

at

reconciling

the two

accounts taken as a

whole.

To

Aeschylus,

as

an

eye-witness,

must be

given

undoubtedly

the

preference

in

case

of

ultimate conflict.

We submit,however,

hat

the

account of

Herodotus must

be interpreted s

a whole.

It

can

scarcely

be

doubted

that

Herodotus,

who

certainly



5/13

130

Bcnj.

Ide Wleeler. [I902

visited

the scene of

the battle within thirty-five

ears

after

its occurrence,

must have

had

when he wrote a

self-

consistent plan of the battle in nmind, hetherthat plan

was rightor

wrong.

We believe

that a reviewof

Herodotus's

account as

a

whole

will show

that the two passacges

cited

above are not

the only

ones which

appear to be

inconsistent

with the plan suggested

by Professor

Goodwin; we believe

that

t

will

also

appear that he

misunderstands

eschylus.

The essential

featuresof

Herodotus's

account may be

dis-

cussed in the chronological rderas he gives them.

(i)

In the forenoon

fthedaybefore

the battle

the Persian

ships

were beached

at

Phaleron, and

the leaders

were in

council. So

soon

as it

was decided

to give battle,the

ships

were

pushed

off and headed

for

Salamis,

'rVb

v

laXapva

(? 70),

just as the land

troops

were at

niohtfallbeaded

c'rb

i7V

HfEXO7rOlVJJ7cTvO.

Contrast7rpoS

Tr7V

YaXaaitva,

?

75.

In

the open sea off Peiraieus the ships were sorted out and

arranged

KaT'

?'o-vXtyv.

s

nightwas,

however, pproaching,

it

was found

necessary

to

postpone

battleuntil

the next

day.

At

night

the

Persian

army

broke

camp

and started

long

the

shore toward

the

Peloponnesus.

Hence

it was

in

the

midst

of

his

army, lready

on its

slow

march,

hatXerxes had

his

seat the next

morning

v

T7ro\

QV

pe

(Lo

apzrt'ov

aXa/.t,Voq

(?

90).

The wholeAttic shorewas Persian.

(2)

The Greeks,especially

the

Peloponnesians,

eeing

how

completely

hey

would

be

isolated

in case of a naval

defeat,

were

in

great

perturbation,

nd

the

withdrawal

f

the

Pelo-

ponnesian

contingent,

r

perhaps

even

of the whole

fleet,

o

the

Isthmus

was all but determined

pon.

Themistocles sent

Sikinnos

to

warnXerxes

of

the

proposed

movement.

Xerxes

believed.

The

story

was

probable

nough,

for t seemed

surely

thewise course forthe Greeks to pursue. Why should they

at

great

risk

of

complete

solation

of the

army tay

to defend

a

country lready

ost

?

Xerxes

acted

promptly.

His

purpose

was

to

prevent

he withdrawal f

the

Greek

fleet.

First,

lhe

immediately

disembarked

7roXXo)t0v

-cv

llpp-e'av

upon

the

island

of

Psyttaleia,

hus

securing

with

troops

this

slhore,

s he

had

already

the Attic

shore.

This

marks the



6/13

Vol. xxxiii.] Herodotus's Accountof

Ba/tle

of Salamis. I3I

proposed line of his battle.

Ancient naval

battles

were

by

preference, s Duncker (Gesch.

d.

Altert.)

has

shown,

fought

from shore to shore, i.e. fromfriendly hores respectively,

and

not with the

wings

reposing,

he one

upon

a

friendly,

he

otheruponan unfriendly,hore.

The Greeks

were

at Salamis

and held the

island,

and

if,

as seems a

priori natural, the

Persians were proposing

n

general

to

make the

Attic

shore

theirbackground,Psyttaleiawould be

at

the end of their

eft

and,

as

lying

n

the face of the

strait,

ould well be viewed

as

CE 77oppo

TI'

vavuaX7,9q

/LeXXovT7)9

eOco-Oat

?

76), and as

affording

fine

vantage point

fromwhich to succor friends

or hew down foes

according

as

the

refugees

from

ither ide

might eek it.

The

second part of

Xerxes's movement

ook

place

at night

and concerned

the

fleet.

It consisted

of

two

distinct ma-

noeuvres

(

-ie

Be

Firstly,

z'vq2yov ezy ro&' -pr'Epuv

idKpaq

cvKov/LEvO1

w7rpoq

r

\v

aXaFitva; secondly, '4yov &e

ot

a,uO\

\v

Ke'ovre

c

r

Kvvo'o-ovpav TeTay/LJevot,aTer%ov

Te

/1%pI MouvVX611

adzrza

ToZ 7Vop9f,loP

'fl?

VXVCr.

Concerning

the

first

of these

manoeuvres,

wo

difficulties

face the

interpreter: a) Which

is

the

west wing? (b) Was

the movement one around

the

south

of

the island

or

inside

the sound ?

Professor

Goodwin's interpretationmakes Herodotus use

west

wing

in

? 85

of

the rig-ht ing and in ? 76 of the left

wing,and this in a connected account of the samc battle.

Regarding

the wings

as

named

by

their

tenporary

position,

he

naturally s forced by the specification hat the other or

eastern

wing

was

at,a,u

T7L

Ke'o0

TE

Kxa

T

7P

Kvvo'o-ovpav o

locate

the

west

wing

out

along

the

shore of the

sland,though

no possible ratio for eading the fleet over there can be dis-

covered.

Dr.

Lolling

(Meerenge zvon alamis, Aufsdtze

an

Curtizus

ewidinet) attempts

o

solve

the

diifficultyy reading

Leros for

Keos. This is impossible,not only forgrammatical

reasons

viz.

the use of

-re

ca\,

nd the necessity

of making e

balance

LeLP, hile

8e

introduces a parentheticalclause),

but

forthe

plain reason that if the Persian ships were already at



7/13

132

Benj.

Ide Wheeler.

[I902

Leros, the

Greeks were already

surrounded, nd there was

no need of

doing anything further cf. Hauvette, Herod.,

p.

4I2).

The

whole

difficultyinds a ready

solution when we take

into account

that we are dealing here

with a continuous,

consistent, nd

well-considered ccount in

which the Persian

fleet

s always spoken of in terms of the

Attic shore against

which it was

located on the day before the battle, before

which it was drawn up on the day of the

battle,and which

was regarded as its permanent point of departure. Pre-

cisely the same thing

s done in ? 85, where,

f I may antici-

pate somewhat, t will be shown that the

wings are again

named in terms of

the trend of the Attic

shore. The 7pos

&'7repDscdpa9s throughout he rig/twing.

The

movement

escribed by Herodotus

as

KvKXoVF,EJVot

rpo

T\)v

2aXa/uva

is

by some understood as within the sound

towarda positionby the Perama, by others as a circumnavi-

gation

of the

island. No one gives a propervalue

to

KVKXOV-

,/evot.

If, now,

this movement consisted in

sending- part

of the righlit

ing

around the island,

KVKXOv,)ueVoL

s the per-

fectly

natural

description

f

the

movementwhich

sends this

detachment of the

right

wing- round

behind

the left wing.

It

seems

to

me

probable

that

such

a detachment

was

sent

aroundthe island,and forthefollowinigeasons

(a) Aesch.

Pers. v.

368,

aXXa9

8\ Ac6KXa v-ooV

A1tavroq

7rwpt

rTdat)

seems

to

refer o

such

a

movement;

if

not,

it

refers

o something therwiseunmentioned

n

our

sources.

(b)

DiodoruLs

I, 17 says:

He

sent out the naval force of

the

Egyptians

with

orders

to close

the straitbetween

Salamis

and the

land of Megara. The same is

impliedby

Plutarch.

Two

hundcred

s

just

the number

of

ships

assigned

by

HerodotLuso the Egyptians. For this see Goodwin,p. 248.

The

Egyptians

would

naturally

elong

in the

right

wing

with

the

Phoenicians.

(c)

The

enemy's ships,

which

Herodotus

reports

Aristeides

as

having

seen in

his

passage

from

Aegina,

may well

have

belonged

to this

detachment.

See

Goodwin,

p.

251.

(d)

The

objections which have

been raised

on the

score



8/13

Vol.

xxxiii.]

Herodotus's

Accountof

Batle

of

Salamis.

I33

of the distance and the

darkness

of the

night

are not

of

weight.

The

weather,

s usual in

September,

was

probably

calm; thetriremeswere moved byoars and were

swift; the

distance

was not

such as to

require

over

fouror five

hours;

i.e.

the

triremeswould

reach the straitsbefore

daybreak.

(e) The movement

was

an

exact

parallel

to that of

sending

two

hundred

hips

around Euboea

with

the

design

of

shutting

up

the

Greeks

in

the

Euripus.

(f)

The flight f

the

Corinthian

Adeimantus through

the

sound to thewestmaybe a base libel,but the very ntroduc-

tion

of

the

story

hows

that

Herodotus did not

think of

a

Persian

fleet s

postedoff

t. George. The

second

manoeuvre

of the

fleetconsisted in

bringing

he left wing-

ver to

enter

and

occupy

the

strait.

In

consonance

with his

general

way

of viewing

the

plan

of

battle,

Herodotus

here

also

expresses

this

occu'pation n

terms

of

the

Attic

coast,-

occupied

clear

down to Munychia all the strait with the ships. The

temptation o

justify n

oracle

cited later

undoubtedly ided

in

dictating

the

choice

of

word.

If

these

ships

had been

already

ying

off

the

straits,

s

is shown

by

a',u4l

Tr7)v

6ov TE

ecat

TrRv

vvo'oovpav,

something,

ew

must have

happened,-

something

radicallynew. The

theory

f

Professor

Goodwin

really eaves

nothing

to be

done. That

Herodotus

believed

the ships occupied the straitsinside and were posted along

the

shore

facing

the

bay of

Ambelaki,

we

think

certainly

proven

by

what

follows.

If

he did

not

think

hey

did some-

thing

of

this

sort,

why

should

he

specifically

dd,

They did

this in

silence,

that

those on

the

other

side

might

not

know

of

it ?

(?

76).

It

is,

indeed,

only

bywhat

I

must

thinka

misinterpretation

f

Aeschylus

(Pers.

382) that

Professor

Goodwin

refuses to think

that

the

Persians

began

entering

the straits

before

daylight.

Aeschylus

says (1.

38X):

they

sail

off

ach to

his

appointed

station, nd

(11.

382-3) all

the

night

keep

sailing

throughi

ntil 11.

384-5),

whenthe

night

s

passed,

no

place

is

left

for

the

Greeks to

sail

out.

The

antithesis f

&tdw7Xoov

ca9io-raoav

nd 'cX7rXovv

tcac9to-raro

is too

apparent;

the

word-play

tcaOt(o-aro)points

t

out; note

also

7rXe'ov-t

ad7rXoov

e'c7rXovv.

Professor

Goodwin's



9/13

I34

Beej.

Ide Wheeler.

[1902

interpretation

f 1.382

is given

on

p. 246, the Persian

ships

are

kept rowingabout

all night.

Aside fromthe

common

meaningof the anguage and the implication f theantithesis,

therearises

the

consideration:

howwere they

ailing

to their

appointed

stationsby

rowingabout

all night ?

The inter-

pretation

f

this passage

is not, however,

f

prime mportance

to us,-to

Professor

Goodwin and

his theory

t is

of fatal

importance.

Loeschke and

Goodwin

lay

great stress upon

the

impossibility

f effecting

uch a

movement

n the face

of

theenemywithout ttractingrheir ttention. Goodwin n the

first lace

is

surely

mistaken

n assertinc,

hat t was

a moonlit

night. The

statementof Aesch.

v.

365 is

against this,and

Busolt, Gr. Gesc.2

(II,

702,

note

2),

shows that

at the time

of

the

battle

the moonmust

have been

well

advanced in its

last

quarter

nd probably

id not rise

before

bout two

o'clock.

The

Greeks were deep

back

in

the bay

of

Ambelaki some

fourmiles fromthe opposite Attic coast. That there was

doubtless

danger

of

attracting

he attention

f

the

Greeksis

shown

by

the fact

that

the

Persians

moved

in

silence,

but

that

it

was

possible

to

do

it

under cover

of

the darkness must

be

undoubted.

That the south

passage,

i.e.

that between

Cynosura

nd

Psyttaleia,

was not

entirely

locked

s

suggested

by

the arrival

of the

Aeginetan

trireme

he next

morning.

Herodotus's account turns now in ? 78 to the Greeks.

They

were

busy

in

discussion.

They

did

not

know

yet

that

the barbarians

were surrounding

hem with

their

ships,

but

supposed

them

to

be in

the same

positions

as

they

saw

them

by daylight.

According

o Professor

Goodwin's

theory,

they

would

be,

except

for the

ships

sent around

the island.

Then

follows

the arrival of

Aristeides,l

from whom as

an

eye-witness

Themistocles

first earns that

the Persians

have moved as he desired.

Not until

Aristeides's

report

s confirmed y

the

Tenian

deserters

do

the

Greek

leaders

really

believe

they

are sur-

rounded.

Once

convinced,

hey

directlyprepare

for battle.

1

Aristeides

may

have

anded

on

the south horeof

Cynosura,

hence

five

r

ten minutes'walk

over

the

ridge

would have taken

him

to

the Greek

camp,

or

he

may

have

rounded

he

point.



10/13

Vol.

xxxiii.]

Herodotus's

Account

of

Battle

of

Salzamis.

I35

The

dawn

is

breaking,. The men are assembled to hear

some

words

of

exhortation.

They

hurry

to

their

places

on

the

ships. The triremewiththe blessingof theAeacidae arrives.

They push off.

Hardly

are

they

off

when

the barbarians

are

upon

them.

At

first

he

Greeks

recoil,

and some

were

just

beaching

their boats

again,

but

Ameinias on

the left

pushes

ahead, joins

fight,

nd

the rest

follow.

The

fight

begins

off

the mouth of the

bay

of

Ambelaki.

Mr.

Goodwin's

plan

makes

it

begin

at the

other

side or

the

middle

of

the

sound,

beforethe Persians have reached theirposition and formed

their

line.

The

Greeks,

according

to

his

plan,

would

have

been

obliged

to

back water

at at least

i

miles before

beach-

ing.

In

? 89 Herodotus

says

Greeks

whose

ships

were

lost

swam

ashore. If the

Greek line had

been

across

the

sound,

this

were

unlikely.

Near

those of the

leftwing

would

have

been a

hostile

shore.

Most

of

the others

could

have

reached

shore

only

by swimming y and aroundmanyfriendlyhips.

Passing

to

the

details

of

the

battle,

H-erodotus,

85,

makes

the

statement:

Opposite the

Athenians had

been

arranged

the

Phoenicians,

for

they

held

the

wing

toward

Eleusis and

the

west;

opposite

the

Spartans

the

Ionians;

they had

the

wing

toward

the

east

and

Peiraieus.

As we

have

already

seen, this

statement

has

given

rise to

abundant

controversy,

but yet it is just the statementthat it was mostnaturalfor

Herodotus

in

accordance

with

his

entire

conception of

the

plan

of

battle

to

make.

He

viewed

the

Persian

ine

as

arrayed

before the

Attic

coast.

This coast

opposite the

mouth of

the

bay

of

Ambelaki

lies

exactly

east

and

west.

Herodotus

had

not

studied

out

the

battle

on a

map, but

on

the

spot.

It

was

of

slight

matter

that

the

map

shows

Eleusis

to

be

to

the

northwest.

The

plain

fact

is

that the

shore

runs

east

and west, and the west end of the sound opens toward

Eleusis,

the

east

end

toward

Peiraieus.

A

fleet

arrayed

along

this

shore

has

therefore

ts

right

wing

toward

the

west

and

Eleusis, its

left

toward

the

east

and

Peiraieus.

The

story

of

the

battle,

aside

from

the

personal

incidents,

is

brief.

The

Greeks

preserved

heir

order,

but

the

Persians,

as

they

crowded

down

to fall

upon

the

Greeks

in

their

nar-



11/13

I36

Beny.

Ide

Whecler.

[1902

rower

position, nterfered ith ach other,

aking ne another's

oars,

and making

themselvesan easy prey.

The position of

the Greeks forced the Persians into narrowerquarters,cz'

crTsC,

so

Aeschylus

puts

it. The resultcould not have been

different,s Herodotus

says. The ancient

naval battle was

a

ramming match. A

fully equipped triremecarried only

eighteenfightingmen to

I70

oarsmen. The

great considera-

tion

was speed, and theability o drive the ioo

feet ong barge

against

the enemy's ship and disable it.

Once the Persians

were crowded upon each other, he battle was settled. This

was

the reason why the Greeks kept the

shelter of their

narrow

bay.

It

is

inconceivable that they should, as Mr.

Goodwin

would

have

them,

leave the shelter

of

a

friendly

shore, nd

lean

their

eft

wing upon

a

hostile

shore.

The confusion f the

Persians was increased

by the ambi-

tion of those in

the rear lines

(Aesch. says

they

were

drawn

up threedeep) to make a good showingunder the eye of the

king

wlho at on the

shore behind them.

The

Phoenicians

were

driven

back by the Athenians

e

7'v

rypv

lutarch ays),

and Herodotus tells

of

their

coming

up

to

rnake

a certain

complaint

o the

king.

The flight

ecame

general.

All

the

ships

pushed

for

the north

passage.

Here

the

Aeginetans,

who had

moved

forward

from their

position

on

the

right

Greekwingr t the tip of Cynosura,were waitingfortlhem,

and

taking

them

in

the

flank made havoc

of the

fug-itives,

earning

themselves

he

chief

glory

of the

day.

This is

Herodotus's

perfectlyntelligible

nd

self-consistent

account.

From it

it

seems to us

clear

that he thought f the

Persians as

already

drawn

up

at

daybreak

along

the Attic

shore

and

closing the north

passage of

the

strait,

o as to

extend from

Psyttaleia

on the

Attic

shore

opposite

it

to

a

pointwestwardtherefromppositethe northern ape bound-

ing

Ambelaki

bay.

This

makes

a

line

of

21

miles,

or

if

extended

to the

Perama,

of

4 miles.

The Persian

fleet,

fter

the

withdrawalof

the 200

Egyptian ships,

could

not have

exceeded

6oo

ships. Aeschylus says these

were drawn

up

three

deep.

This

allows,

on

the basis

of a

21-mile

extent

of

line,

65

feet

waterwayfor each ship,

considerably

more



12/13


13/13

138

Bcnj.

Ide

Wlieeler.

[1902

paean was not

the song of men

who meditated

flight,but

rather of men

hastening in inspired

courage

to the

battle.

Then the blare of the trumpetset all the air afire, and

straightway ame

the dash

and

the swish of

the

oar

as it

smote the brine to the

boatswain's call.

And with

a

rush

they were

all

beforetheir

eyes.

This fits Herodotus's

account.

The

Greeks tarried

in

council

till

day

was

dawning. Then came late the

decision

to

fight.

The sailors were addressed

just

as the

sun

was

rising. With an enthusiasm heyare off o theirboats. The

trumpetgives

the

signal

for

launching.

Suddenly they

are

off, nd way down

in

the recesses

of the

bay

four

miles

away,

where

just

before all

had been

quiet

in

the

gray

of

twilight,

the Persians ee

the

water overed

with

he

advancing

riremes.

(b)

The

expression

p'evi4a

s

believed

by

Goodwin

to

refer

to the

columnar

order of the Persians

in

passing

the

straits.

The cause of their confusionwhich resulted n theirdefeat

was, according o

his

view,

that

n

passing

the straits

ev

Trev5)

they

were

obliged

to

narrow

his

column.

They

were

then

attacked

before

they

recovered

from

their

confusion.

This

is not what

Aeschylus says.

He

says

the

reverse.

For

the

first

he stream

of the

Persian

host held on its

way,

but

when the mass

of the

ships

had

been

crowded

together

nto

close quarters, heywere no help to each other,but rather

hindrance

and

destruction, tc.,

and

then the

Greeks

smote

them

hip

and

thigh.

This

crowding

ezv

7evjOi

omes

at

the

end,

not

at

the

beginning. Compressed

nto

a narrower

ed,

what

had

been

a

steady

stream

now

becomes

a

confusion

f

waters.

It

is the

same thing

which

Herodotus

describes. As

they

came down

upon

the

Greeks

in

their

narrower

osition

off he mouth

f

the

bay, they

crowded

ogether,

ouched

oars,

and weredisabled.

Herodotus's

account

is not

only

self-consistent;

t

is in

entire

consistency

with

the

other

ccounts.

Documents

Herodotus's Account of the Battle of Salamis