Hendrickson (2004) NATO's Secretary General and the Use of Force - Willy Claes and the Air Strikes in Bosnia

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Armed Forces & Society

DOI: 10.1177/0095327X0403100105 2004; 31; 95 Armed Forces & Society

Ryan C. Hendrickson Strikes in Bosnia

NATO’s Secretary General and the Use of Force: Willy Claes and the Air

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95Hendrickson

Ryan C. Hendrickson is an associate professor of political science at Eastern IllinoisUniversity. Among his publications on NATO and US military action, he is the author ofThe Clinton Wars: The Constitution, Congress and War Powers (Nashville, TN: VanderbiltUniversity Press, 2002). Address for correspondence: Ryan C. Hendrickson, Departmentof Political Science, Eastern Illinois University, Charleston, IL 61920. E-mail: [email protected]

Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 31, No. 1, Fall 2004, pp. 95-117.

NATO’s Secretary Generaland the Use of Force:

Willy Claes and the AirStrikes in Bosnia

RYAN C. HENDRICKSON

Since the Soviet Union’s collapse, the North Atlantic TreatyOrganisation (NATO) has undergone tremendous change. The

alliance has enlarged, has adopted new roles in crisis management andpeacekeeping, and has forged new relationships with its former enemiesin the Warsaw Pact. This evolution continues as it struggles to adapt tothe new challenge of terrorism after September 11. Of all the changesat NATO, however, perhaps the most significant in its initial post-ColdWar transformation was its decision to conduct sustained military strikesin Bosnia—also known as Operation Deliberate Force—in 1995. For thefirst time since NATO’s creation in 1949, Operation Deliberate Forcedemonstrated that the alliance was willing and able to engage in afundamentally different military role in transatlantic security. Almosta decade after these strikes, it is clear that Operation Deliberate Forcewas a critical step in NATO’s transformation.

Much research has been devoted to NATO’s post-Cold War transfor-mation. On NATO’s activities in Bosnia, most of the existing literaturefocuses on the operational and military aspects of Operation DeliberateForce. Others have focused primarily on the failed diplomatic effortsthat preceded the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995, which resulted ina peaceful resolution of the four-year humanitarian catastrophe. In thebroader literature on NATO’s evolution, as well as on specific analysesof NATO’s activities in Bosnia, however, little research has been



96 Armed Forces & Society/Fall 2004

devoted to the role played by NATO’s senior political leader at itsheadquarters in Brussels—the secretary general. In 1995, when NATOwaged its two-week bombing campaign on the Bosnian Serbs, BelgianWilly Claes served as secretary general. Yet most research and historicalsurveys of this crucial time in NATO’s life barely mention Claes. Thisarticle offers the first appraisal of his leadership during this crucial timefor the alliance, which laid a foundation for additional uses of force inKosovo in 1999 and reaffirmed NATO’s role in transatlantic securityafter the Soviet Union’s demise.

Using an analytical framework of international organizational lead-ership based on Michael Schechter’s previous research, this articleassesses Claes’ leadership from three perspectives: his leadership effortsunder the international systemic constraints prior to the use of force in1995; his organizational leadership at NATO, focusing primarily on hischairmanship of the North Atlantic Council (NATO’s principal deci-sion-making body); and his relationship with NATO’s Supreme AlliedCommander, which speaks directly to the interplay between civilian andmilitary leaders at NATO. The findings demonstrate that Claes’ influ-ence and role were substantial, and represent an unrecognized aspect ofOperation Deliberate Force’s success, and more generally, on thesecretary general’s role in assisting NATO to be a meaningful player inEuropean security. The findings also suggest an overlooked aspect ofNATO’s post-Cold War transformation: the key leadership role playedby NATO’s highest political leader in shaping the direction of thismilitary alliance. Before assessing Claes, however, the article presents anoverview of previous research and methodologies employed to studyNATO’s secretaries general. This discussion is followed by the develop-ment of a new analytical framework, through the use of a case study, toexamine Claes’ leadership during this critical era in NATO’s evolution.

NATO’s Secretary General: Literature Review andResearch Methodology

During the Cold War, most analysts concur that the office ofNATO’s secretary general was filled with talented diplomats, whosepowers and abilities to shape NATO’s agenda were often severelyconstrained by its member states.1 Most historical studies of NATOmake hardly any mention of the secretary general, which in part reflectsthe wide consensus of the relative weakness of this position during theCold War.2 Rather, many analysts point to the importance of NATO’smilitary leader, the Supreme Allied Commander, in shaping NATO’s



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critical policy choices during the Cold War.3 This inattention to thesecretaries general continued in the post-Cold War era. Despite the vastamount of literature on NATO’s evolution in the 1990s—whether itconcerns NATO’s expansion, its program to assist newly democratizedstates in their transitional processes, its institutional and organizationalstrength, or its peace-enforcement and peacekeeping activities in theBalkans—very little analysis or even mention of the role of thesecretaries general in contributing to these changes exists.4

The dearth of analysis on NATO’s secretaries general correspondsclosely with the broader literature on leaders of multinational, intergov-ernmental organizations. Despite the ostensibly growing importance ofsuch organizations after the Cold War, relatively little research has beendevoted to these leaders.5 Among the research that exists, nearly allscholarship has been historical and descriptive case studies, without thedevelopment of a widely accepted analytical model for studying suchleaders.6 Similarly, the only major work on NATO’s secretaries generalwas essentially a historical chronology of its first four civilian leaders,all of whom led the alliance during the Cold War.7 Thus, no acceptedanalytical framework beside the historical and descriptive case studyexists for assessing NATO’s secretary general.

Given that the leadership provided by the secretary general is oftenexercised in closed-door sessions of North Atlantic Council (NAC)meetings or in informal meetings in NATO’s hallways, the case-studyapproach—with reliance upon interviews with senior political andmilitary leaders at NATO—remains the most useful method for exam-ining a secretary general.8 In the case of Willy Claes, enough time haspassed that many key decision-makers are no longer in office or haveretired from political life, and are able to now speak more candidlyabout Claes’ role.

At the same time, the development of a new analytical model forassessing NATO’s secretaries general may help analysts conduct broadertests of its political leadership, and potentially, to make wider generali-zations about other NATO secretaries general. As noted by methodolo-gist Robert Yin, an analytical model can provide direction to a casestudy, and if employed well, perhaps can be useful in theory develop-ment and replication in future studies.9 Michael Schechter’s frameworkfor assessing Cold War-era intergovernmental, organizational (IGO)leaders offers a useful starting point in the development of such amodel.10

When studying the leaders of the World Bank, United NationsDevelopment Program, and the United Nations Educational, Scientific,




and Cultural Organization, Schechter argues that three aspects of IGOleadership demand close scrutiny: the leader’s ability to operate withinthe systemic political conditions, that is, how does the leader respond tothe wider political environment in which he or she operates; the leader’sorganization itself, asking what leadership opportunities exist for anindividual leader within the organization; finally, Schechter examinesthe leader’s individual personality, asking how personal and idiosyn-cratic qualities effect the leadership role. In general, much of thisframework can be useful for assessing NATO’s secretary general,although some adaptation will help improve Schechter’s framework forresearch on NATO’s leadership.

In this article, three leadership forums are examined. At the systemiclevel, the primary factor for analysis is Claes’ role in influencing theinternational political conditions prior to the use of force in August1995. A secretary general has wide discretion in how he chooses toaddress the international political conditions he faces. A secretarygeneral is, by definition, a representative of all the allies, and has littleindependent authority apart from his organizational powers at NATO.At the same time, the secretary general may or may not attempt to steerNATO’s public political agenda in certain political directions as hedesires. The secretary general can do little without support from theNATO allies, but can still choose to be active, passive, or a combinationof both strategies when facing political constraints or opportunities.Thus, this initial framework attempts to capture Claes’ leadership rolewithin the broader political context in 1995.

At the organizational level, Claes’ leadership of the NAC, NATO’sprincipal decision-making body, provides another useful avenue forassessing his leadership. The secretary general is charged with oversee-ing the NAC through his power to call meetings and set the Council’sagenda. The secretary general has no vote within the NAC, but at NATO,the Council provides a forum for him to exercise some formal (albeitlimited) leadership of the alliance.

Schechter’s third variable, personality, is less useful as an indepen-dent category of analysis for the secretary general. At NATO, thesecretary general’s personality is often difficult to separate from hissystemic and organizational leadership.11 As will be demonstrated, thisdivision of variables is especially difficult in Willy Claes’ case, givenhis own personal political troubles and his occasionally assertivediplomatic style used in Council sessions. Rather, another factor foranalysis that potentially includes personality, but is crafted to morespecifically fit the secretary general’s leadership role at NATO, is an



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assessment of Claes’ civilian-military relationship, which focuses onClaes’ relationship with the Supreme Allied Commander-Europe(SACEUR), who is always a general in the US Armed Forces. The firstSACEUR was Gen. Dwight Eisenhower. By examining this relation-ship, some insight will also be gained on the secretary general’s role inmilitary planning for NATO during the bombing campaign. Given theSACEUR’s previously recognized, historical importance at NATO, thismodification of Schecter’s framework seems justified. This assessmentmodel is summarized in table 1.

This revised model offers a guide for assessing Claes, but also mayhelp establish an analytical framework that has broader utility for futureresearch on political leadership at NATO or other military alliances andorganizations.

Systemic Leadership: Claes’ International Political Constraints

Willy Claes was appointed NATO’s secretary general on September29, 1994, soon after the death of his revered predecessor, ManfredWoerner. Woerner was seen by many as a forceful, articulate, andpassionate proponent of NATO’s expanded role after the Cold War.12

Given the wide international and personal respect for Woerner, follow-ing in his footsteps would have been a difficult task for any newsecretary general.

Another systemic constraint that potentially worked against Claeswas that he entered office as a compromise candidate after otherprospects were openly rejected by the allies, and other candidatesdeclined nomination for the position. Claes was the second Belgian

Table 1

Leadership assessment model for NATO’s secretarygeneral

Potential Leadership Forums Factor(s) for Analysis

Systemic Contribution in shaping the internationalpolitical agenda on a given issue.

Organizational Leadership role exercised as chairman ofNATO’s North Atlantic Council.

Civil-military relations Relationship to the SACEUR, includingthe role exercised in military planning.




candidate to be considered seriously; this likely helped his candidacysince the United Kingdom had already vetoed the first Belgian prospect,Jean-Luc Dehaene.13

Perhaps most important, however, Claes inherited NATO’s leader-ship role at a time when the alliance, the Clinton administration, and theEuropean Union (EU) were all struggling to define their post-Cold Warforeign policies, especially as they related to the Bosnia crisis. Much hasbeen written about the policy differences between the United States,Europe’s great powers, and the European Union, as well as thedifferences in views on the UN Security Council: all major states heldcontrasting positions on the Balkan crisis.14 More specifically, until July1995, the United States refrained from exercising assertive leadership inNATO, mostly due to the Clinton administration’s unwillingness toparticipate in any sort of serious or sustained troop engagement in theBalkans.15 Without US leadership, the political reality is that NATOcannot be a forceful actor on the world stage.

Claes was also limited by the considerable influence exercised by theUnited Nations in Bosnia. In Bosnia, the UN Protection Force(UNPROFOR) was attempting to provide humanitarian assistance andshelter to thousands of civilians in need. Claes, and NATO moregenerally, were constrained by the “dual-key” arrangement that hadbeen negotiated between the UN and NATO. Before NATO could useforce to enforce myriad UN Security Council resolutions, joint approvalfrom UN and NATO officials was necessary. In the case of the UnitedNations’ key, consent was needed from the UN Secretary GeneralSpecial Representative, Yasushi Akashi, who often received advice andoversight from UN Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali.16 In thisrespect, the UN essentially held veto power over NATO groundcommanders, which translated into additional limits on Claes’ ability toinfluence the broader international environment.

Finally, it is important to recognize Claes’ personal politicalscandal, which overshadowed nearly all of his term as secretary generaland eventually forced his resignation. Early in Claes’ tenure as secretarygeneral (in February 1995), he was accused of having knowledge ofbribes received on behalf of his former Belgian Socialist Party from theItalian defense firm Agusta in 1988, during his earlier days in Belgianpolitics. When these accusations became public, he initially indicatedthat he had no knowledge of them, with specific statements made to allNATO ambassadors that he knew nothing of these events. Yet soon aftermaking those comments, Claes was forced to admit that he knew of theseevents—although he noted that he did not approve of the bribes at the



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time. His association with bribes damaged his international reputationand ended his tenure as secretary general after only thirteen months.17

Although Claes’ problems were personal in nature, the bribery issuebecame international news, and thus became part of the systemicconditions in which he operated. In sum, Claes faced a host ofinternational systemic constraints on his leadership maneuverability.The previously omnipresent role played by his predecessor, the mannerin which he was chosen, NATO’s absence of consensus for much of1995, the UN’s large presence in Bosnia, and his own personal politicaltroubles made for unfavorable systemic conditions to lead NATO.

Under these systemic circumstances, most of the evidence suggeststhat Claes did not attempt to aggressively challenge the politicallimitations that he faced as NATO’s leader, at least in the first monthsof his leadership tenure. Individuals who worked at NATO note thatClaes was reserved initially, both personally and substantively,upon becoming secretary general, hesitant to show policy prefer-ences openly.18 Claes’ initially reserved leadership style was likelya reflection of the political realities within the alliance, where noconsensus existed for policy change, despite the escalating humanitariancrisis in Bosnia.

In 1995, however, some evidence indicates that Claes recognizedthat use-of-force options would be needed in order to address the crisis.As the problems deepened in the Balkans, Claes’ independent assertivenessincreased. An advocate for military options, Claes began to morepublicly support such policy proposals. Those proposals correspondedwith the policy preferences of the Clinton administration, especially asthe United States moved toward military options in the summer of1995.19 To some extent, Claes was ahead of the Clinton administration,in that he recognized the need for military options in Bosnia muchearlier.20 In this regard, Claes was preparing the alliance for a muchbroader use of force than the allies—including the United States—wereeven contemplating.

At the same time, Claes’ actions were never openly out of synch withthe US position. Former US National Security Advisor Tony Lake notesthat Claes was never seen as an obstacle by the United States in movingthe alliance toward aggressive military action in 1995, and was a helpfuladvocate for the US position.21 Another key participant noted that fromthe US perspective, Claes was always on “the right side of the issue, asfar as we were concerned.”22 Unlike his predecessor Manfred Woerner,who actively encouraged NATO intervention into the Balkans innumerous public appearances, Claes remained far more reserved in




openly calling for NATO strikes. Some at NATO considered this strategya wise diplomatic move, given the systemic constraints at the time.23

To some degree, Claes was helpful in moving NATO’s agendatoward more aggressive military options in 1995. Claes was not a strongsupporter of the UN’s role under the dual-key framework, and wouldrefer derogatorily to “the UN” at times.24 As noted by a senior NATOofficial, Claes was a “virulent critic of the United Nations, both publiclyand privately.”25 This position squared with the US’s position asdissatisfaction grew with the United Nations. One important changeimplemented in early August 1995 was the removal of the UN’s key,which was taken from Akashi and given to UN Field Commander Gen.Bernard Janvier. Claes did not produce these results alone, but he wascertainly instrumental. The United States was helpful in removingAkashi’s key because Akashi was viewed as tentative and too closely tiedto UN Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali. In this respect, Claeshelped to empower NATO vis-a-vis the United Nations; critics of theUN knew that Claes was an ally in the cause.

Claes’ association with the bribery charge certainly damaged hisinternational reputation and eventually forced his resignation, althoughreaction to this scandal was mixed in Brussels. While Claes was still inoffice, at nearly all US senior policy-making levels (including the JointChiefs of Staff and the National Security Council) and among the alliesas well, key participants were very concerned that his problems woulddamage his ability to lead the alliance.26 Yet even though senior policy-makers were concerned about Claes’ ability to lead, the accusations did notpolitically destroy Claes in the short term. Some evidence actually suggests thatClaes’ power increased in NATO, especially from the US perspective, sincemany viewed the accusations as part and parcel of Belgian politics. SinceClaes was no longer involved directly in Belgian domestic politics, it wasfelt by many at NATO that Claes was being made the political scapegoat forhis previous political party affiliation, the Belgian Socialist Party.27 Forexample, in his memoirs about the Dayton Peace Accords, Richard Holbrookeopenly expressed considerable doubt over the validity of these charges.28

Former Norwegian Ambassador to NATO Leif Metik writes similarly:

We who were close to him the year he was NATO’s SecretaryGeneral, avoided forming definite opinions about his possibleguilt or innocence. That question was up to the Courts todecide. This said, I believe we felt at the bottom of our heartsthat Claes was not “criminal” who willingly and consciouslyhad “enriched himself” in the Agusta affair.29



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Claes’ domestic political problems evoked sympathy from someallies, especially the United States, who felt that Claes was treatedunfairly but weathered the political storm admirably. These kinderviews toward Claes, however, should not imply that he went unscathedby the accusations. Some ambassadors note that the scandal proved verydamaging to Claes’ ability to lead the alliance, and simultaneouslytarnished NATO’s credibility at a time when it badly needed legiti-macy.30 Although the European allies considered the accusations moreserious than the United States did, it appears that few doubted Claes’commitment in seeing the alliance succeed in Bosnia. The consensusview is that Claes was still able to lead the alliance prior to and duringOperation Deliberate Force, although the allies simultaneously recog-nized that the external political doubts about Claes and NATO’sweakened credibility (resulting from his association with bribery)would eventually force his removal from office.31 At a minimum, theconcerns expressed by many at NATO over Claes’ political problemssuggest the inherent importance of the secretary general. If Claes werean irrelevant actor in the alliance, his political problems would not havegenerated concern. The evidence suggests otherwise.

In sum, Claes operated under difficult systemic conditions, whichhampered his efforts to have an independent impact on the alliance. Mostof the evidence suggests that he recognized these systemic constraints,and thus chose to lead the alliance cautiously. He chose not to stand alonein calling for NATO action, and was careful in criticizing the UnitedNations. Under such profound systemic political conditions (bothpersonal and political), Claes could have likely done little to impact theinternational political views on Bosnia. In this respect, Claes clearlychose to proceed carefully, at least in the public domain. Thus Claesshould not be viewed as a leader who was able to overcome systemicconstraints through independent political leadership. In contrast, how-ever, his organizational influence within the NAC was considerablydifferent, and his leadership was far more substantial and meaningful inNATO’s policies toward Bosnia.

Organizational Leadership: Leading the NAC

As noted earlier, the allies continued to struggle over how to handleBosnia for much of 1995. Major steps in changing policy toward Bosniaoccurred at a July 1995 summit meeting in London, where the majorallies in NATO and the UN adopted more aggressive use-of-force policyoptions. However, many of the operational details that emerged from




the London summit needed additional refinement and explanation. Thenecessary policy articulation fell to the NAC, which consists of allNATO member states’ ambassadors and is overseen by the secretarygeneral. As previously noted, the secretary general calls the meetings,sets the agenda, and adjourns the Council. He has no vote in the Council,but is charged with promoting consensus in the alliance.

At a series of Council meetings in late July and early August, NATOagreed to use force to protect the Bosnian city Goradze if it came underattack from the Bosnian Serbs. The UN key for using force was givento the UNPROFOR ground commander, French Gen. Bernard Janvier.Three sets of targets, known as options, were agreed to, allowing NATOto strike option 1 and 2 targets upon the next provocation from theBosnian Serbs. These targets included Serbian air defense systemslocated in southeastern Bosnia and other Bosnian-Serb military sites. Ina Council meeting on August 1, additional safe enclaves joined Goradzeas NATO protection zones.32

From interviews conducted with key participants, the evidenceindicates that Claes played a critical role in moving the alliance towarduse-of-force options at these Council sessions, especially at one mara-thon session held on July 25, 1995. Claes did a number of things thathelped shape the agenda while fostering consensus within the alliance.First, Claes was infamous for keeping NAC meetings in session regard-less of time; he exercised a great deal of discretionary power over timeand the meeting’s atmosphere. The Council’s crucial meeting on July25, 1995 went thirteen hours while working for policy consensus withinthe alliance. Claes’ determination and use of time assisted the alliancein adopting more aggressive military options.33 During such longsessions, Claes was known for bringing all issues into the open so thatthere was little confusion on what states were agreeing to, and hedemanded that states take policy positions. Under Claes’ leadership, theCouncil meetings were also very orderly, as Claes kept the allies focusedon the issue at hand. Claes’ style was unambiguous, with great attentionto detail.34

Former US Ambassador to NATO Robert Hunter maintains thatClaes’ diplomatic style at these NAC meetings, and his support for theUS position, were especially helpful in terms of agenda-setting andmoving the alliance toward military options for some of NATO’sEuropean allies, especially the Netherlands and Norway.35 Claes alsoworked closely with the Greek and Turkish delegations in efforts tobuild and maintain their support of Operation Deliberate Force.36 NATOworks by consensus, so gaining the support of all member states—



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regardless of a state’s military contribution to the alliance—is essentialfor making policy. Claes’ open and vocal support of military options,which at times was even more aggressive than the US position in August1995, was likely important in persuading some of the European allies tothe US’s preferred policies.37

Another aspect of Claes’ influence in the Council that has not beennoted in any previous research was the diplomatic style he exercised inCouncil meetings, which occasionally included theatrics. Despite hisinitial reserved and tentative leadership style, Claes later became knownat NATO headquarters for his temperamental outbursts, which would beinvoked when necessary to promote consensus. Such outbursts were notcommon, but did occur when an ally would begin to balk from pastcommitments. Key participants felt that Claes’ diplomatic theatrics andstrong temper were effective in promoting consensus because states didnot want to be the recipient of Claes’ occasional venting.38

Besides these examples of Claes’ leadership of the Council, threespecific cases of his organizational leadership stand out in terms of hissignificance at NATO. Recall that prior to Claes’ entry as secretarygeneral, many of the legal parameters involving military decisions forNATO were already set. The UN Security Council, and most impor-tantly Resolution 836, authorized NATO to use force to protect UNpeacekeepers. The UN Security Council had also authorized NATO touse force for violations of the no-fly zones over certain areas of Bosnia.39

With Claes in office, important evolutionary changes in policy weremade at the Council meetings following the London summit. It wasagreed that Gen. Janvier and the Commander of NATO Allied ForcesSouthern Europe, Adm. Leighton Smith, would hold the keys to useforce if any party violated UN international agreements. In this situa-tion, Claes was not intended to be a central decision-maker on initiatingforce; such decisions were delegated to Janvier and Smith.

On August 28, 1995, when a mortar fired on Sarajevo killed thirty-eight civilians, the dual-key decision-making process went into motion.After a brief investigation, it was determined that the Bosnian Serbs wereresponsible. Gen. Janvier, who was away at his son’s wedding, hadtemporarily relinquished his key to British Lt. Gen. Rupert Smith. Uponlearning that the Bosnian Serbs were responsible, he and Adm. Smith bothturned their keys without debate. Janvier returned immediately and supportedRupert Smith’s decision.40 These decisions put into motion the strikes thatcame only hours later, in the early morning hours of August 30.

Primae facie, little input could be expected from Claes, given thatthe dual-key decision-making procedures had already been defined.41 In




his memoirs, Richard Holbrooke gives Willy Claes considerable creditfor not initiating a Council meeting in the few hours before OperationDeliberate Force. Holbrooke notes that Claes’ decision not to convenethe Council was crucial, because it prevented additional policy debateand allowed the bombing campaign to ensue.42 With sixteen members inNATO at the time, additional policy differences certainly could havebeen raised if a meeting had been called. While it appears that most ofthe alliance was already committed to using force, Claes preventeddiscussion at the political level in Brussels by not calling for anotherCouncil meeting.43 While Claes’ role was ancillary to the decisions madeby the dual-key decision-makers, he did exercise his discretionaryauthority not to call a meeting, and thus played an important role inassisting the alliance toward military strikes.

Another important example of his leadership occurred on Septem-ber 1, when Gen. Janvier, with support from Adm. Smith and RichardHolbrooke, requested a cease-fire in order to negotiate with the BosnianSerbs. Claes was not involved in these decisions. Where Claes becomemore important, however, was in the effort to restart the bombings assoon as possible. When the cease-fire lasted longer than Claes, Holbrooke,SACEUR Joulwan, and others wanted, Claes personally phoned Gen.Bernard Janvier, who was responsible for granting the extended cease-fire. In what has been characterized as Claes’ “rage” at Janvier’sdecision, the secretary general expressed profound disagreement withthe cease-fire agreement that Ratko Mladic, the Bosnian Serb militarycommander, had negotiated with Janvier.44 US Ambassador to NATORobert Hunter maintains that Claes’ role was critical here because heplaced additional responsibility for the cease-fire on UNPROFORleaders, who would now be blamed by the international community fora failure in Bosnia.45 Although this example, arguably, applies equallyto his efforts to influence the systemic political conditions, his actionscertainly set the stage for his organizational leadership the followingday.

On September 2, when the Council reconvened to discuss theextended cease-fire, Claes announced that the ambassadors were notthere to debate whether to use force, but rather how long a cease-fire topermit. Again, Claes is credited with making an important decision atthe organizational level: he defined the military option for the allianceby arguing that the Council had already authorized military action, andtherefore that question was not open to debate.46 Debate at this timecertainly was possible given the rapidly changing events and theunknown political territory that NATO had entered as an alliance.47



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Claes exercised considerable authority through this interpretation of hisown powers as secretary general. As a result, the bombings resumed onSeptember 4 and continued until September 14, when the initial peacenegotiations began prior to the eventual Dayton Peace Accords.

In sum, when examining Claes’ leadership of the Council (incontrast to his much less influential role at the systemic level), theevidence suggests that Claes was very important in promoting consensusin the alliance. Through his own leadership style as exercised in Councilmeetings, and the exercise of his discretionary powers as secretarygeneral, Claes may be given some credit for moving the alliance towarduse-of-force options at a time when NATO’s credibility was at stake andthe humanitarian conditions in Bosnia worsened by the day. Clearly, ageneral consensus had already been achieved among the allies thatmilitary action needed to occur in the Balkans in order to resolve thesituation, yet this consensus was actively promoted by Claes at NATO.Similarly, Claes’ relationship with NATO’s Supreme Allied Com-mander suggests important and unrecognized leadership roles during histenure as secretary general.

Civil-Military Relations: Claes and the SACEUR

During Claes’ tenure as secretary general, Gen. George Joulwanserved as NATO’s SACEUR. NATO’s office of the secretary generalwas created in order to foster political consensus in the alliance, whilethe SACEUR—a general from the US Armed Forces—is NATO’s defacto military leader. These key leadership positions in the alliancerepresent an especially fruitful area of research for examining civil-military relations at NATO, especially given that Operation DeliberateForce was the alliance’s first sustained military campaign. An examina-tion of the development of NATO’s strategic bombing plan and targetselection process provides some insight on this element of Claes’leadership at NATO.

It is first worth recalling that no research has linked Claes to anyelement of NATO’s strategic military campaign against the BosnianSerbs. To some extent, this might be expected, given that NATO’smilitary planning is the SACEUR’s responsibility and that the UNplayed an extensive role in Bosnia in 1995. In fact, much of the historicalevidence generally supports the idea that Claes’s voice was limited interms of developing NATO’s military plans. The military strategy andbombing plans were developed in the months preceding OperationDeliberate Force by a joint NATO-UN planning board.48 After the




Bosnian Serb attacks on Sarajevo in August 1995, when the keys wereturned by both the UN and NATO field commanders, it was the UN’sJanvier and NATO’s Leighton Smith who debated the first set of targetsto hit.49 When the bombing campaign proceeded, Adm. Smith delegatedall tactical decisions to US Gen. Michael Ryan, Commander of AlliedAir Forces Southern Europe. The aircrafts used, as well as the targets,sequence, and timing, were determined by Gen. Ryan, who closelyprotected his own authority and prevented extensive political access tohim.50 Thus the evidence suggests that Claes was removed from much ofNATO’s military planning, as Gen. Ryan made many of the tacticaldecisions for the alliance.

However, Gen. George Joulwan notes that Claes had detailedknowledge of the bombing strategy and was privy to the operationalplans well before Operation Deliberate Force ensued. On two occasionsbefore the operation began, Claes and Joulwan met and discussed atlength the proposed military operation.51 In these planning phases, Claesallowed Joulwan considerable leeway in determining the appropriatemilitary action within the constraints of the various options that theCouncil had authorized. Joulwan views Claes’ decision to grant theSACEUR some independence in exercising military judgments as veryhelpful in achieving NATO’s eventual success.52 Even during Councilsessions prior to the strikes, additional evidence suggests that Claesworked closely with the SACEUR, who pushed the alliance for “clar-ity”—that is, detailed and specific instructions should the use of forcebecome a reality.53

Once the bombings began, Claes’ cooperation with the SACEUR atCouncil meetings is another important yet overlooked aspect of civil-military leadership relations during the campaign. Due to the SACEUR’ssometimes forceful personality, the new type of mission that NATO wasabout to engage in, and some natural distaste for strong US leadershipat NATO, Joulwan was viewed with some suspicion by the Europeanallies.54 To quell these concerns, Joulwan consulted extensively with theCouncil on all aspects of the operation during the bombing campaign.55

When Joulwan attended Council sessions, Claes would occasionally askthe SACEUR tough and detailed operational questions. Such questionswere not necessarily raised because of Claes’ personal concerns, butrather they were voiced because Claes could serve as a proxy for allieswho may not have wanted to raise doubts in a Council session with theSACEUR, but could do so indirectly through Claes.56 Claes thereby gave“political cover” to any ambassador who wished to proceed in thismanner, without openly showing any opposition to the SACEUR or to



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any other allies who favored vigorous military action. In this regard,Claes worked to reduce political and military ambiguity between theCouncil and SACEUR, and fostered consensus by serving as a proxy forthose allies who had real concerns.

Claes’ most significant operational-military role in Operation De-liberate Force came through his decision not to consult with the Councilprior to NATO’s use of Tomahawk missiles in northern Bosnia, nearBanja Luka, on September 10. While these strikes officially fit withinthe previously agreed-upon option 2 targeting plans, considerableopposition was expressed later on the use of the Tomahawks, whichsome ambassadors viewed as escalatory and a violation of the SACEUR’sauthority. France expressed the greatest concern, followed by Canada,Greece, and Spain.57 Moreover, the strikes took place outside of the“southeast zone of action,” which some NATO allies viewed as theprincipal authorized area of military targeting.58

The request to use Tomahawks came from Gen. Ryan, and had notbeen formally discussed by the Council. However, it was clearlyunderstood by NATO military officials that the use of Tomahawks wasa possible overextension of the mandate given to the SACEUR.59

Recognizing the political problems that use of the Tomahawks couldcause, Gen. Joulwan did not immediately approve Gen. Ryan’s request.Instead, Joulwan waited thirty-six hours in order to gain politicalapproval from the secretary general.60

Claes’ relevance and importance here is, first, that he did haveknowledge of the forthcoming Tomahawk strikes. The evidence sug-gests that Claes was an integral part of the decision to use the Toma-hawks, which has been viewed by military analysts as a strategicallycritical military maneuver in demonstrating NATO’s advanced militarycapabilities to the Bosnian Serbs.61 Richard Holbrooke writes that “thepsychological effect of such sophisticated weapons, previously usedonly in the Gulf War, was enormous.”62 Second, Claes supported theSACEUR’s and Gen. Ryan’s military judgment without verbal consul-tations with the Council. The SACEUR’s discussions with Claes on theTomahawks occurred on a weekend, when many NATO ambassadorswere not readily available in Brussels.63 Yet in NATO’s first sustainedbombing campaign ever, Joulwan’s communication with Claes and thethirty-six hour notice given to the secretary general would havecertainly allowed Claes ample opportunity to call an emergency meet-ing, or at a minimum, to phone key allied ambassadors and notify themof the forthcoming missile strikes. Moreover, if the use of Tomahawkswas viewed in US military circles as potentially controversial, it seems




probable that Claes too understood their potential political significance.Claes did provide written notification to the ambassadors prior to theTomahawk strikes; yet these written messages were placed in the NATOambassadors’ mailboxes, and were not received until after the strike.64

After the strikes, Claes called an early Council meeting the follow-ing Monday morning. Some ambassadors noted that they first heardabout the attacks through an early Monday morning phone call fromClaes or by seeing the events on CNN. A number of ambassadorsexpressed serious concern, and demanded improved communicationmethods for NATO.65 Claes likely anticipated these reactions, and inchoosing to allow the Tomahawks’ use, played an important role insupporting Joulwan’s request for more vigorous military action fromNATO. In retrospect, the Tomahawk’s use is viewed by militaryanalysts as instrumental in encouraging the Bosnian Serbs to negotiate.Had the Council been notified in advance, a good chance exists thatserious objections would have been raised, and the use of those missilesmay have been prevented.

Thus, despite almost no mention in previous research of Claes’military leadership role during Operation Deliberate Force, the evi-dence indicates that he had some influence in NATO’s target selectionand a close relationship with the SACEUR. His decision to grant theSACEUR considerable leeway in military tactical decisions, his previ-ously unreported knowledge of the entire military strategy, and hisdecision not to consult with the Council prior to use of the Tomahawkmissiles all must be acknowledged when examining Claes’ leadership ofthe alliance. More broadly, regarding the civil-military relations be-tween NATO’s leaders, the evidence suggests that Claes deferred toJoulwan’s military judgment, but at the same time, had full knowledgeof the military plans for Operation Deliberate Force.

Conclusion

Much has been written about the tragic events in Bosnia as well asNATO’s transformation in the post-Cold War era. In NATO’s firstsustained bombing campaign, Operation Deliberate Force involved ahost of decision-makers, including military and political leaders fromthe UN and NATO, as well as the sixteen allied governments. SinceNATO had never engaged in a military operation of this nature, it wouldbe difficult to predict what sort of role the secretary general would playin this operation. Based on Cold War-era experience and research,coupled with the many leadership impediments that Willy Claes faced



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upon becoming secretary general, it seems reasonable to expect that hewould be a minor (if not tertiary) player in the alliance. Moreover, inrecognizing the general dearth of research devoted to the secretariesgeneral in NATO’s transformation, one might conclude that Claes wasan ancillary player at NATO during this critical time for the alliance.The present findings indicate otherwise, although Claes’ influencevaried according to the leadership framework examined in this study.

At the systemic level, the evidence demonstrates that a multitude ofinternational political obstacles prevented him from making an indepen-dent impact on the alliance. When Claes began to openly advocate formilitary action against the Bosnian Serbs, his position correspondedwith the direction of US foreign policy. Moreover, as the Bosniantragedy worsened, the political environment in which NATO operatedalso lent itself to leadership from the secretary general. NATO was ina political crisis, and needed an effective demonstration of force in orderto maintain its credibility in transatlantic security. As NATO entered anera filled with uncertainty and without precedent, such an ambiguouspolitical environment likely worked to Claes’ advantage. NATO facedits own political crisis of relevancy in European security affairs. If it wasgoing to play a new role in post-Cold War security, the conditions in theBalkans eventually demanded action. Inaction would have causedNATO’s international stature to sink deeper, and would have called intoquestion the need for NATO. In this respect, over time the systemicconditions worked to enhance the leadership opportunities for Claes;Claes responded with more assertive calls for NATO military interven-tion.

Given that much of Claes’ legacy at NATO is remembered in anegative light due to his association with the Agusta scandal, it shouldalso be recognized that Claes had personal political incentives tocooperate with the United States. This crisis had a systemic impact, andlimited what he could do to influence the international political debateon Bosnia. During the remainder of his tenure in office, it was the UnitedStates that proved to be his best supporter, although many at NATOviewed the accusations lodged against Claes as unfair. Had Claes beenopenly opposed to aggressive military options, it seems likely that theUnited States would have called for his removal. However, no evidencesuggests that Claes’ personal view of the situation in the Balkanschanged or adapted to the US view. In the SACEUR’s words, Claesviewed Slobodan Milosevic as an “old school communist” who wouldonly respond to military strikes.66 Claes’ support of NATO militaryaction should not be equated with subservience to the US position, yet




his public assertiveness did correspond with the changes in systemicenvironment as the United States and eventually the allies recognized theimminent need for military action in the Balkans.

At the organizational level, within the NAC, Claes’ leadership rolebecame much more visible and influential. As Council chairman, Claesseized on his own discretionary powers and skillfully employed diplo-matic techniques in managing the allies to enhance his powers assecretary general. His resistance to calling an NAC meeting after theSarajevo strike, and his determination that the Council only debate whento resume the bombing while the cease-fire was in effect, were importantin keeping consensus among the allies. Again, without the United States’backing and readiness to use force, Claes would have not been able toexercise the influence that he did in the Council. Yet Claes’ personaldiplomatic style, his occasional outbursts at Council sessions, and hismanagement of Council meetings all provide new insight on hisleadership. These traits are clearly specific to Claes and contributed tohis leadership role as secretary general at the organizational level.

In terms of his leadership within the context of civil-militaryrelations, and specifically with regard to his relationship with theSACEUR, the evidence demonstrates that Claes and Joulwan workedclosely together to move the alliance toward military action. Claes’detailed knowledge of the bombing plans, and most important, hisdecision to allow the use of the Tomahawk missiles, represent criticalaspects of his leadership legacy, and provide insight on his views ofappropriate civil-military relations at NATO. Claes never stood in theway of Joulwan’s military judgment, which likely resulted from Joulwan’sextensive consultations with Claes and the NAC as well as Claes’ ownbelief that tough military action was needed to defeat the Bosnian Serbs.Claes’ decision to accept Joulwan’s request to use the Tomahawks,without consulting the Council, was critical in helping to end thebombing campaign and bring peace to the region.

In sum, this research demonstrates that Willy Claes was a criticalplayer at NATO as it adapted to new missions and roles in transatlanticsecurity. Operation Deliberate Force was instrumental in helping NATOadapt to new security challenges after the Cold War, and has clear policyimplications for the United States and all NATO allies. The findingsdemonstrate the need for an effective secretary general as NATO’sevolution continues. While the current Bush administration seems lessinclined than Clinton was to use NATO as a political and military tool,the secretary general should not be underestimated in promotingconsensus among NATO’s twenty-six allies. As the United States works



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to build support for its global war on terrorism, an effective secretarygeneral may be essential in bridging the gap on policy differencesbetween the United States and Europe. Moreover, the Balkans remain aregion of only fragile peace. Additional conflict—whether it be inAlbania, Macedonia, Kosovo, or Bosnia again—is certainly possible.Should such a security crisis arise, an effective secretary general, withexcellent diplomatic skills and good political judgment, unquestionablyserves transatlantic interests.

In terms of theory development, the leadership framework devel-oped here may potentially help generate additional insight and researchon other secretaries general. These findings suggest that systemicpolitical constraints represent serious (and perhaps insurmountable)obstacles for independent leadership action by the secretary general,although leadership may be exercised in more meaningful and influen-tial ways at the organizational level or through a relationship with theSACEUR. While Claes’ personal political problems were certainlyspecific to his circumstances, and thus represent an important nuance inthe history of secretaries general, the model may serve as a starting pointfor broader studies of leadership at NATO.

Notes

Author’s Note: The author thanks Jon Clausen, Col. Robert Owen, Patricia Shields, andthe anonymous reviewers of this manuscript for their assistance and helpful critiques.

1. Robert S. Jordan with Michael W. Bloome, Political Leadership in NATO: A Study inMultinational Diplomacy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979); William T.R. Foxand Annette B. Fox, NATO and the Range of American Choice (New York: Colum-bia University Press, 1967). See also Robert S. Jordan, The NATO InternationalStaff/Secretariat 1952–1957: A Study in International Administration (London: Ox-ford University Press, 1967).

2. See especially the three-volume set, Gustav Schmidt (ed.), A History of NATO: TheFirst Fifty Years (New York: Palgrave, 2001). See also Ian Q. R. Thomas, ThePromise of an Alliance (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997).

3. Robert Hunter, who later became US Ambassador to NATO, writes that the SACEURexercised the greatest influence during the Cold War: “civilian institutions in NATOhave paled beside the continuing influence of the military structure of the Alliance.”Robert Hunter, Security in Europe (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press,1972), 61. See also Robert S. Jordan (ed.), Generals in International Politics (Lex-ington: University Press of Kentucky, 1987).

4. Excellent research has been conducted on Operation Deliberate Force, but Claes’role has gone untreated within this body of research. See Col. Robert Owen (ed.),




Deliberate Force: A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning (Maxwell Air ForceBase, AL: Air University Press, 2000) and Tim Ripley, Operation Deliberate Force:The UN and NATO Campaign in Bosnia, 1995 (Lancaster, UK: CDISS, 1999). Otherresearch that makes important contributions, but makes little mention of the secre-tary general, includes Benjamin S. Lambeth, NATO’s Air War for Kosovo: A Strate-gic and Operation Assessment (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001); Anthony S.Cordesman, Lessons and Non-lessons of the Air and Missile Campaign in Kosovo(Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001); Thomas S. Szayna, NATO Enlargement, 2000–2015(Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2000); Celeste A. Wallander, “Institutional Assets andAdaptability: NATO after the Cold War,” International Organization 54 (2000):705–735; Pierre Martin and Mark R. Brawley (eds.), Alliance Politics, Kosovo, andNATO’s War: Allied Force or Forced Allies (New York: Palgrave, 2000). Somerecent research, although limited in scope, discusses the secretary general. See RonaldD. Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).See also Michael Ruhle, “Preface: Manfred Worner’s Legacy and NATO,” in AntonA. Bebler (ed.), Civil-Military Relations in Post-Communist States (Westport, CT:Praeger, 1997); and Ryan C. Hendrickson, “NATO’s Secretary General Javier Solanaand the Kosovo Crisis,” Journal of International Relations and Development 5, 3(2002): 240–257.

5. See Kent J. Kille and Roger M. Scully, “Executive Heads and the Role of Intergov-ernmental Organizations: Expansionist Leadership in the United Nations and theEuropean Union,” Political Psychology 24, 1 (2003): 175–198.

6. For recent examples, see Helen Drake, Jacques Delors: Perspectives on a EuropeanLeader (New York: Routledge, 2000); Michelle Cini, The European Commission:Leadership, Organization and Culture in the EU Administration (Manchester, UK:Manchester University Press, 1996); James Barros, Trygve Lie and the Cold War:The UN Secretary General Pursues Peace, 1946–1953 (Dekalb: Northern IllinoisUniversity Press, 1995).

7. Robert S. Jordan with Michael W. Bloome, Political Leadership in NATO: A Study inMultinational Diplomacy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979).

8. For a short discussion of the evolution of the secretary general’s role, see Sean Kay,NATO and the Future of European Security (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield,1998), 36–39.

9. Robert Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks,CA: Sage Publications, 1994).

10. Michael G. Schechter, “Leadership in International Organizations: Systemic, Organi-zational and Personality factors,” Review of International Studies 13, 3 (1987): 197–220.

11. Although little has been published on Secretary General Manfred Woerner’s leader-ship at NATO, many of his colleagues maintain that Woerner’s personality impactedNATO across a number of spectrums. See Ruhle, “Preface: Manfred Worner’sLegacy.”

12. Ibid.



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13. “NATO’s Gloomy Choice,” The Economist, October 1, 1994, p. 65.

14. Among the many sources, see Sonia Lucarelli, Europe and the Breakup of Yugosla-via: A Political Failure in Search of a Scholarly Explanation (The Hague: KluwerLaw International, 2000); James Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will: InternationalDiplomacy and the Yugoslav War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997);and David Rohde, Endgame (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1997).

15. On the Clinton administration, see David Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace: Bush,Clinton and the Generals (New York: Scribner, 2001), 303–318. For more on theUnited States’ policy evolution, see Douglas C. Foyle, “Public Opinion and Bosnia:Anticipating Disaster,” in Ralph G. Carter (ed.), Contemporary Cases in U.S. ForeignPolicy (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 2002).

16. Lt. Col. Ronald Reed, “Chariots of Fire: Rules of Engagement in Operation Deliber-ate Force,” in Owen (ed.), Deliberate Force (see note 4), 402–403.

17. Craig R. Whitney, “Facing Charges, NATO Head Steps Down,” New York Times,October 21, 1995, sec. 1, p. 5; Paul Belien, “Meanwhile, In Europe’s Arkansas,”National Review (March 20, 1995), 30.

18. Former NATO Ambassador from Norway, Leif Metik, notes in his book, Det nyeNATO (1999) that Claes seemed “nervous” in his initial meeting with the ambassa-dors, and that his style remained “uncertain” when he first became secretary general.English translation provided to author by Metik, January 2003. Also, author’s inter-view with Christman (July 2002); background interview with senior US defenseofficial ‘A’ (July 2002).

19. Interview with former US Ambassador to NATO, Robert Hunter (July, 2002); back-ground interview with senior NATO official ‘A’ (October 2002).

20. Interview with former SACEUR, Gen. George Joulwan (January 2003).

21. Interview with former US National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake (July 2002).

22. Background interview, senior US defense official ‘A’ (June 2002)

23. Interview with former Ambassador from the Netherlands to NATO, Lambert WillemVeenendaal (July 2003).

24. Background interview with senior US defense official (June 2002).

25. Background interview with senior NATO official ‘A’ (October 2002).

26. Christman interview (July 2002); Lake interview (July 2002); Metik correspondencewith author (January 2003).

27. Interview with former US military representative to NATO, Lt. Gen. Thomas Mont-gomery (July 2002); Metik correspondence with author (January 2003).

28. See also Richard Holbrooke, To End A War (New York: Random House, 1998),120.

29. From Metik’s memoirs, Det nye NATO (1999), translation provided to author (Janu-ary 2003).




30. Author interviews with former Canadian Ambassador to NATO John Anderson (July2003) and Netherlands Ambassador Veenendaal (July 2003).

31. Background interview, senior NATO official ‘A’ (October 2002).

32. Ronald M. Reed, “Chariots of Fire,” in Owen (ed.), Deliberate Force (see note 4),406-407. See also Ivo H. Daalder, Getting to Dayton (Washington, DC: BrookingsInstitution Press, 2000), 77–79.

33. Background interview, senior US defense official ‘A’ (June 2002).

34. Author’s interview with Lt. Gen. Montgomery (July 2002); background interview,senior US defense official ‘A’ (June 2002).

35. Hunter interview (July 2002).

36. Joulwan interview (October 2002).

37. Joulwan interview (January 2003). It should also be noted that former US Ambassa-dor to NATO, Robert Hunter, was also at times ahead of his own administration inhis desire for NATO to exercise military options. Hunter’s view that use-of-forceoptions were needed was well known within the alliance before the Clinton adminis-tration eventually came to that conclusion. Claes and Hunter shared the belief thatserious military strikes were needed much earlier than Operation Deliberate Force.Background interview, senior US defense official ‘A’ (June 2002).

38. Montgomery interview (July 2002). Norwegian Ambassador to NATO Lief Metikalso notes that Claes was “short tempered.” Metik notes that he witnessed Claes onone occasion when he “exploded in rage” at a NATO defense ministers’ meeting.Metik correspondence with author (January 2003); background interview, senior USdefense official ‘A’ (June 2002).

39. For the full range of Security Council decisions, see Jane Boulden, Peace Enforce-ment: The United Nations Experience in Congo, Somalia, and Bosnia (Westport, CT:Praeger, 2001), 83–95.

40. Rick Atkinson, “Air Assault Set Stage for Broader Role,” Washington Post (Novem-ber 15, 1995), A1; David L. Dittmer and Stephen P. Dawkins, Deliberate Force:NATO’s First Extended Air Operation (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses,1998), 20–21. See also Ripley, Operation Deliberate Force, 242–244.

41. This understanding had been reached between Claes and SACEUR General GeorgeJoulwan before these events occurred. Joulwan interview (January 2003).

42. Holbrooke, To End A War, 99.

43. Background interview, senior US defense official ‘A’ (June 2002).

44. Rick Atkinson, “In Almost Losing its Resolve, NATO Alliance Found Itself,” Wash-ington Post (November 16, 1995), A1. Joulwan interview (January 2003).

45. Hunter interview (July 2002).

46. Richard Holbrooke, To End A War, 120; Robert Owen, “Summary,” in Owen (ed.)Deliberate Force (see note 4), 499.



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47. Hunter interview (July 2002); senior US defense official ‘A’ (June 2002).

48. Christopher M. Campbell, “The Deliberate Force Air Campaign Plan,” in Owen(ed.), Deliberate Force (see note 4), 99–110.

49. Mark A. Bucknam, “The Influence of UN and NATO Theater-Level Commanderson the Use of Airpower Over Bosnia During Deny Flight: 1993–1995” (doctoraldissertation, King’s College, University of London, 1999), 209–212.

50. John C. Orndorff, “Aspects of Leading and Following: The Human Factors ofDeliberate Force,” in Owen (ed.), Deliberate Force (see note 4), 355–357. See alsoMark J. Conversino, “Executing Deliberate Force: 30 August–14 September 1995,”ibid., 132–133.

51. One meeting between Claes and Joulwan took place at the NATO air base in VillaFranca, Italy, and another in Claes’ office at NATO headquarters soon before thebombings. Joulwan interview (October 2002).

52. Joulwan interview (January 2003).

53. Joulwan interview (October 2002); background interview, senior NATO official ‘B’(October 2002).

54. Background interview, senior US defense official ‘A’ (June 2002). See also Gen. SirMichael Rose, Fighting For Peace: Bosnia 1994 (London: Harville Press, 1998),122–123.

55. Hunter interview (July 2002); background interview, senior US defense official ‘A’(June 2002); background interview, NATO military official ‘A’ (October 2002).

56. Hunter interview (July 2002); background interview with senior US defense official‘A’ (June 2002).


58. Rick Atkinson and Daniel Williams, “NATO Rejects Demand to End Bombing;Russia Warns Alliance on Bosnia Campaign,” Washington Post (September 12, 1995),A1.

59. Ripley, Operation Deliberate Force, 281.


61. For an excellent discussion of the symbolic importance of the Tomahawk missiles,see Robert C. Owen, “Summary,” in Owen (ed.), Deliberate Force (see note 4),491–492; Conversino, “Executing Deliberate Force,” ibid., 153.


63. Joulwan interview (January 2003). See also Bucknam, “The Influence of UN andNATO Theatre-Level Commanders,” 228.


65. Ripley, 286; background interview, senior NATO official ‘B’ (October 2002).

66. Joulwan interview (October 2002).



Documents

Hendrickson (2004) NATO's Secretary General and the Use of Force - Willy Claes and the Air Strikes in Bosnia