Committee Guide

Disarmament and International Security

Christian Friedel, Kelli-Anne Tim and Marcus

Dörfel

Heidelberg

Model United

Nations

Conference

Beyond Globalisation

8th – 11th June 2017

2

Table of Contents

LETTER OF WELCOME ......................................................................................................... 3

THE COMMITTEE ................................................................................................................. 4

TOPIC A: COMPUTERIZED AND MODERNIZED WEAPONS, FOCUSSING ON DEWS ...... 5

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 5

HISTORY OF THE TOPIC ........................................................................................................ 6

DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEM ............................................................................................. 7

NON-LETHAL DEWS ........................................................................................................... 8

RISKS OF NON-LETHAL DEWS AND POSSIBLE DANGERS ........................................................ 10

CURRENT SITUATION AROUND THE WORLD AND POSSIBLE USE OF DEW ............................... 11

PREVIOUS UN AND DISEC INVOLVEMENT .......................................................................... 11

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS ........................................................................................................ 12

BLOC POSITIONS .............................................................................................................. 12

United States of America....................................................................................... 12

People’s Republic of China .................................................................................. 12

Russian Federation ................................................................................................. 13

State of Israel ........................................................................................................... 13

Other Nations .......................................................................................................... 13

RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS ............................................................................. 14

REFERENCES .................................................................................................................... 14

TOPIC B: ILLICIT USE AND DISTRIBUTION OF WEAPONS: REGULATING PRIVATE

MILITARY COMPANIES ............................................................................................................... 17

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................ 17

HISTORY OF THE TOPIC ...................................................................................................... 17

DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEM ........................................................................................... 19

Causes of PMCs Employment and Their Role ..................................................... 19

The International Arms Trade and PMSCs Involvement .................................... 20

International Standards and Regulation of PMCs ............................................. 21

PREVIOUS UN INVOLVEMENT ............................................................................................. 22

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS ........................................................................................................ 25

BLOC POSITIONS .............................................................................................................. 26

RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS ............................................................................. 28

REFERENCES .................................................................................................................... 29

3

Letter of Welcome

Dear Delegates,

Welcome to HDMUN 2017! We are pleased to welcome you to General

Assembly First Committee: Disarmament and International Security. We are

looking forward to this year's conference. The topics are:

1. The future of warfare: Computerized and modernized weapons, focussing

on DEWs

2. Illicit use and distribution of weapons: regulating private military companies

This study guide serves the purpose to give you background information on

the General Assembly as well as insight into the two topics. We encourage and

expect all delegates to do their own individual research regarding their assigned

countries and topics. We look forward to fruitful debate during the conference

and expect professionalism from all delegates.

Most importantly, we hope that all delegates enjoy the simulation.

Christian Friedel is a law student at the University of Heidelberg, originally

from Venezuela and has been doing MUN for almost five years.

Originally from Toronto, Kelli-Anne Tim is now completing her graduate

studies in Political Science, Sociology and History in Siegen and discovered her

passion for MUN in the last year.

Marcus Dörfel is a student from Chemnitz University of Technology, studying

European Studies and focussing on disarmament, security and defence. He has

been part of Model UN since 2012.

We look forward to seeing you at HDMUN 2016 and to being your Chairs.

Christian Friedel Kelli-Anne Tim Marcus Dörfel

Chairs of DISEC

disec.hdmun2017@gmail.com

4

The Committee

The United Nations was established on October 24th 1945 with 51 countries

signing the Charter of the United Nations drawn up during the United Nations

Conference on International Organization1. The General Assembly is one of the

six main bodies, as outlined in the Charter Article 72 with the responsibilities and

powers further explained in Chapter IV3. The General Assembly (GA) is comprised

of six committees who report to the General Plenary on their specific focal points.

The GA is the central organ within the UN that discusses issues relating to peace

and international security, making recommendations to promote global

collaboration, sustainable development in economy, society, humanity, culture

and education and review reports from other UN bodies4.

The GA First Committee focuses on disarmament and security threats that

affect the global community and looks for solutions to these challenges5. The First

Committee has representatives from all 193 Member States of the United Nations.

The First Committee strives to reach consensus on challenges and problems in an

effort to strengthen the resolve of the Assembly’s decisions6. The mandate of the

First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, as stated in Chapter

IV, Article 11 of the United Nations Charter, follows the rules and procedures of

the GA7. The GA has powers to discuss matters within the limits of the Charter, but

must refrain from making decisions that the Security Council is debating on. It has

the ability to discuss the powers and functions of any UN organ and subsidiary

body established in the Charter.

1 "History of the United Nations." United Nations. Accessed May 07, 2017.

https://www.un.org/en/sections/history/history-united-nations/.

2 "Chapter III." United Nations. Accessed May 07, 2017. https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-

charter/chapter-iii/index.html.

3 "Chapter IV." United Nations. Accessed May 07, 2017. https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-

charter/chapter-iv/index.html.

4 "United Nations, main body, main organs, General Assembly." United Nations. Accessed May

07, 2017. https://www.un.org/en/ga/about/background.shtml.

5 "United Nations, main body, main organs, General Assembly." United Nations. Accessed May

07, 2017. http://www.un.org/en/ga/first/.

6 Ibid,.

7 "Chapter IV — The General Assembly - Article 11." United Nations. Accessed May 07, 2017.

http://legal.un.org/repertory/art11.shtml.

5

Topic A: Computerized and modernized weapons,

focussing on DEWs

Introduction

Directed-Energy Weapons (DEW) are, following the definition of the Naval

Air Warfare Center of the United States of America, “all weapon systems, that

irradiate a target with electro-magnetic waves with the intention to damage or

destroy equipment, facilities or personnel”8. DEW can be divided into three major

categories:

- Light Amplification by Stimulated Emission of Radiation (LASER) weapons

- High-Power Microwave (HPM) weapons

- Particle beam (PB) weapons

Of those three different weapon systems, only the first two are considered

feasible for military use, due to the vast technological challenges connected to

the development of particle beam weapons9. The principle technology for DEW

has existed for more than 80 years10, but has yet to be discussed by the

international community. DEW warfare will not change the basics of armed

conflict, but it will change lethal and non-lethal conflict resolution

The potential for these weapons to violate the Convention for Certain

Conventional Weapons (CCW)11 can lead to dangerous consequences that the

international community must be made aware of. The United Nations has yet to

directly address DEWs, but with the danger that they pose to the peace and

security of the global community, it is important to begin to address this issue

concretely.

8 Deveci, Bayram Mert, Cpt. "Directed-Energy Weapons: Invisible and Invincible?" PhD diss.,

Naval Postgraduate School, 2007. 2007. Accessed May 6, 2017.

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a473993.pdf. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 United Nations. "The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons – UNODA." United Nations.

Accessed May 07, 2017. https://www.un.org/disarmament/geneva/ccw/.

6

History of the Topic

The first serious attempts towards the development of Radio Detection and

Ranging (RADAR) equipment began in the early 1930s12. By 1934, those

developments inspired the British Air Ministry to consider the possibility of a

weapon system, that could detonate bombs while still attached to enemy

aircraft13. Although this weapon system was never produced, the general idea

behind it led to the development HPM weapons.

A breakthrough in the development of DEW was the invention of the “ruby

solid-state laser” in the 1960s14. Not only was it the first laser that was ever

developed, it also caused renewed interest in DEWs by the US military. At the same

time, technological progress made high-power microwave technology more

expedient.

In 1979, Soviet engineers succeeded in building the first functional HPM

device, by manufacturing a microwave emission triode, also referred to as a

“magnetron”, that was capable of producing energy on a gigawatt level. This

was an important step forwards to the military use of this technology, as previous

devices lacked the strength and efficiency for a weapon system, meaning they

were just not powerful enough to do any damage.

DEWs started to gain more attention in the 1980s, as the US military was

searching for a technology that could counter intercontinental ballistic missiles

(ICBM), following Ronald Reagans “Star Wars” speech15, where the US President

outlined the idea of an anti-missile shield, later called Strategic Defense Initiative

(SDI). Other planned uses of laser-based DEWs would have been the destruction

of anti-ship cruise missiles, which were fielded in the arsenals of the Soviet Union

and other members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Soviet doctrine planned

to use those missiles in large numbers to overwhelm conventional missile defense

systems (surface-to-air missiles). The desired solution would have involved Free-

12 Skolnik, Merril I. "History of Radar." Encyclopedia Britannica. July 26, 1999. Accessed May 7,

2017. https://www.britannica.com/technology/radar/History-of-radar . 13 Tate, Jennifer Weaver. "Directed Energy Weapons: From War of the Worlds to the Modern

Battlefield."

DSIAC Journal 2, no. 2 (March 2015). March 2015. Accessed May 7, 2017.

https://www.dsiac.org/resources/journals/dsiac/spring-2015-volume-2-number-2/directed-

energy-weapons-war-worlds-modern. 14 Ibid., 15 Reagan, Ronald. "Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security." Speech, Address

to the Nation on Defense and National Security, Washington, DC, March 23, 1983. Accessed

May 7, 2017. https://reaganlibrary.archives.gov/archives/speeches/1983/32383d.htm.

7

Electron lasers (FEL), which were already developed in the 1970s, yet had not

been put into military service.16 The SDI program would have violated the Treaty

on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) of 197217 and the

Outer Space Treaty18, but due to the technological limitations of that time, was

never developed to technical readiness, stalling the development of DEW.

Discussion of the Problem

DEWs have been under development for the past 55 years, becoming more

and more complex. Due to technological limitations, DEWs initially had only very

limited capabilities, making any possible DEW system too large or too weak in

performance to be deployed into combat effectively. With the advance of

microelectronics, most of these limitations have been overcome. Automation of

electronic systems, an increased understanding and use of the electromagnetic

spectrum, new materials like polymers created the possibility of more advanced

DEW.19

By 2017 the United States, the Peoples Republic of China, the Russian

Federation, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, the State of

Israel, the Commonwealth of Australia and the French Republic are leading in the

development of DEW20. The DEWs that have been developed in the last 20 years

can vary from non-lethal weapons, which can be used to incapacitate

individuals for a limited time, to lethal weapons, which can destroy vehicles and

in the future, might even be capable of laying ruin to entire buildings.

DEWs share numerous similarities with conventional weapons, mostly that

they can destroy their targets by causing physical damage to the structure of the

targeted object.21 This is also referred to as “hard-kill”. It can include destruction

16 National Security Science Magazine. "Blasting Missiles Out of the Sky." Blasting Missiles

Out of the Sky | National Security Science Magazine | Los Alamos National Laboratory.

September 01, 2009. Accessed May 07, 2017.

https://www.lanl.gov/science/NSS/issue1_2012/story5full.shtml. 17 Freedman, Lawrence D. " Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty)." Encyclopedia

Britannica. September 07, 2007. Accessed May 7, 2017. https://www.britannica.com/event/Anti-

Ballistic-Missile-Treaty. 18 Encyclopedia Britannica. " Outer Space Treaty." Encyclopedia

Britannica. July 20, 1998. Accessed May 7, 2017. https://www.britannica.com/event/Outer-

Space-Treaty. 19 Deveci, Bayram Mert, Cpt. "Directed-Energy Weapons: Invisible and Invincible?" PhD

diss., Naval Postgraduate School, 2007. 2007. Accessed May 6, 2017.

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a473993.pdf. 20 Ibid., 21 Ibid.,

8

of the target by sheer structural damage due to heat, which melts inner

components and leads to short-circuiting electronics and fusing moving

components within the target together. The major advantages over

conventional, kinetic weapons (weapons that rely on penetrating the target and

causing damage by destroying inner components, like bullets or modern tank

grenades), is that the energy emitted by the DEW can be controlled, giving the

same DEW system not only a hard-kill capability, but also the possibility of non-

lethal soft kills.22

Non-lethal DEWs

Non-lethal DEWs offer a wide range of possible uses. Possible application

could include equipment to protect civilian ships from pirate attacks23, the

disruption of ignition systems of vehicles and Active Denial Systems24, which could

be used to disperse crowds.

Several nations currently are interested in the development of non-lethal

DEWs, most importantly the United States25. There are multiple reasons why there

is such an interest in this kind of military equipment. First and foremost, current

conflicts are largely asymmetric, meaning that state actors are fighting non-state

actors. Ideally, the state actors try to limit the amount of civilian losses to the

absolute minimum. Non-lethal DEW can deliver this exact kind of capability, by

incapacitating violent civilians without killing them. Looking at the possible use in

symmetric warfare, meaning state actors fighting amongst each other, the mere

paralysation of an enemy combatant is preferable to killing him, as an

incapacitated enemy soldier binds additional enemy personnel, such as medical

troops and blocking important slots in military hospitals.

Other uses and types of non-lethal DEW include:

- “Zappers” – HPM weapons that send a short, highly concentrated burst

of electromagnetic energy that short-circuits the vehicles ignition

22 Ibid., 23 Network, MI News. "A New Laser System to Defend Ships from Pirates." Marine Insight. July 20,

2016. Accessed May 07, 2017. http://www.marineinsight.com/marine-piracy-marine/a-new-

laser-system-to-defend-ships-from-pirates/. 24 LeVine, Susan. The Active Denial System A Revolutionary, Non-lethal Weapon for Today’s

Battlefield. Report. Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense

University. June 2009. Accessed May 7, 2017. www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ada501865. 25 Department of Defense Non-Lethal Weapons Program. "Non-Lethal Weapons Program." Non-

Lethal Weapons Program > About > Planning Guidance, Vision, Mission, & Definition. Accessed

May 07, 2017. http://jnlwp.defense.gov/About/Planning-Guidance-Vision-Mission-Definition/.

9

(sometimes referred to as “soft-kill) on distances of up to 50 meters26.

Possible use of this system would be on road checkpoints, preventing

Vehicle Born Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs) from attacking the

checkpoint. This weapon can be used against any kind of equipment

that uses microprocessors or any other kind of advanced electronics.

- Landmine Detonators – combined with Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

(UAV) lasers could be used to detonate landmines or Improvised

Explosive Devices (IED) from safe distances, preventing the loss of life

amongst mine-clearing personnel27. This technique would require a laser

that is strong enough to harm humans, but due to the way it is deployed,

it would rather save lives than kill people.

- Active Denial Systems – by emitting a millimeter wave beam, similar to

that of HPM beams, the top layer of the skin of the targeted person is

abruptly heated, causing painful stimulation of nerves and pain

receptors, disrupting them from their activities, and therefore providing

a possible crowd-dispersal system, which could be used to protect

military compounds from attacks by insurgents without killing them.

Current tests suggest that there is a danger of skin damage, yet on a

very limited scale28.

By developing DEWs as non-lethal weapons, many situations that currently

require lethal force, such as the defense against armed attacks on military bases

or vehicles ignoring security procedures at road checkpoints, suggesting an

possible VBIED attack, could be solved without firing a single shot. This would save

the lives of soldiers, but also protect civilians that might otherwise become

collateral damages.

26 Sample, Ian. "Police test hi-tech zapper that could end car chases." The Guardian. July 11,

2004.

Accessed May 07, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/science/2004/jul/12/sciencenews.crime. 27 Richard B. Miles, Arthur Dogariu and James B. Michael. "Using Lasers to Find Land Mines and

IEDs."

IEEE Spectrum: Technology, Engineering, and Science News. January 31, 2012. Accessed May

08, 2017. http://spectrum.ieee.org/semiconductors/optoelectronics/using-lasers-to-find-land-

mines-and-ieds. 28 LeVine, Susan. The Active Denial System A Revolutionary, Non-lethal Weapon for Today’s

Battlefield.

Report. Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University. June

2009. Accessed May 7, 2017. www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ada501865.

10

Risks of non-lethal DEWs and possible dangers

Despite several possible advantages, non-lethal DEWs can still cause

secondary damages to humans or infrastructure in the Area of Effect (AoE) of the

weapons. The range and AoE of HPM weapons cannot yet be completely and

reliably controlled, since this technology has not seen wide use. Damages to

infrastructure might include permanently destroying any kind of electrical circuits,

people might lose their eyesight, receive 2nd degree skin burns or even stand a

higher chance of getting cancer.29

Among the effects that non-lethal DEWs have, when used on test persons,

were pain, breathing problems, disorientation, nausea, vertigo, epileptic seizures

and temporary blindness.30

The biggest challenge for the international community are those side

effects, that have not been monitored yet and are therefore unknown. Future

developments in the field of non-lethal DEW might create new technologies,

whose advantages and disadvantages cannot be estimated with our current

knowledge. Laser technology alone has come from devices that require a full-

sized research laboratory to work towards machines that can be fitted on ships or

large airplanes and will one day be small enough to be fitted on vehicles, all the

while becoming increasingly powerful31. The Tactical High Energy Laser – owned

by the U.S. Space & Missile Defense Command – is strong enough to shoot down

rockets, artillery shells and can even hit objects as small as mortar grenades32.

29 Deveci, Bayram Mert, Cpt. "Directed-Energy Weapons: Invisible and Invincible?" PhD diss.,

Naval Postgraduate School, 2007. 2007. Accessed May 6, 2017.

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a473993.pdf. 30 Herbert, Dennis B., Col. "Non-Lethal Weaponry: From Tactical to Strategic Applications." Joint

Forces

Quarterly, April 1999. April 1999. Accessed May 7, 2017.

https://web.archive.org/web/20031223201043/http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1621.p

df. 31 Airforce Technology. "Airborne Laser System (ABL) YAL 1A." Airforce Technology. Accessed

May 07, 2017. http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/abl/. 32 Northrop Grumman. "Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL)." Northrop Grumman. Accessed May

07, 2017.

http://www.northropgrumman.com/Capabilities/ChemicalHighEnergyLaser/TacticalHighEnergyL

aser/Pages/default.aspx.

11

Some of the effects of DEW might violate the CCW33, by “causing

unnecessary suffering and superfluous injury34” to combatants and non-

combatants by causing neurophysiological disorder.

Current Situation around the World and Possible Use of DEW

• Use in Asymmetric Warfare: Some of the assets of terrorist groups, like VBIEDs

and hidden IEDs as well as missiles might be neutralized using DEW. This

could be of especial interest to countries such as the United States and

Israel.

• North Korea: With the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea continuing

to invest in heavy artillery35, laser DEW as a defense system against artillery

shells and the use of HPM to target North Korean command facilities might

be of interest to the Republic of Korea.

Previous UN and DISEC Involvement

The UN has not yet taken any decision specifically on DEWs. Nevertheless,

there have been numerous decisions on weapons and arms in general which can

be applied to the topic by this committee:

• The 1967 Outer Space Treaty

o The use of DEW as satellite based weapons could constitute a direct

breach of the treaty, as it limits the weapons that are deployed in

space to be conventional weapons – with the legal nature of DEW

being unclear, there might reason for debate.

• The 1980 United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons

o The CCW Protocol IV prohibits any laser weapon that has the sole

intent to cause blindness, yet it protects laser weapons, that only

cause this as a side effect.

33 Herbert, Dennis B., Col. "Non-Lethal Weaponry: From Tactical to Strategic Applications."

Joint Forces Quarterly, April 1999. April 1999. Accessed May 7, 2017.

https://web.archive.org/web/20031223201043/http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1621.p

df. 34 United Nations. "The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons – UNODA." United

Nations. Accessed May 07, 2017. https://www.un.org/disarmament/geneva/ccw/. 35 Stratfor Enterprises. "How North Korea Would Retaliate." Stratfor Worldview. May 2016.

Accessed May 07, 2017. https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/how-north-korea-would-retaliate.

12

• The 2013 Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)

o The ATT regulates the international trade in conventional weapons,

yet lacks any specific clauses on newly emerging weapon systems,

such as DEW

Possible Solutions

The main objective for this committee should be the creation of a mutually

agreed set of international guidelines regarding the development, deployment

and proliferation of Directed-Energy Weapons. International legislation should

include regulations about what kind of DEW can be developed, what kind of DEW

might be banned because of their side effects, possible limitations on the

circumstances under which DEWs can be used and what safeguards must be

created to prevent Non-State Actors from acquiring DEW.

Those guidelines could either be created as an additional protocol to the

CCW or constitute an entirely new treaty. The most difficult challenge will be

finding a proposal that all Member States of the UN can agree too.

Another possible solution could be an all-out ban of any type of DEW.

Bloc positions

United States of America

The United States of America have been leading in the development of

DEW since the 1960s. With their position in that field being challenged by the

Russian Federation and the PRC, the US intensified their research. Most notably

were the development of the YAL-1 Airborne Laser and demonstrators for laser

weapons that were small enough to be fitted on trucks36.

People’s Republic of China

Chinese development on DEW focusses on lasers and HPMs, focusing to

Anti-Satellite weapons (ASAT), in an attempt to build capacities to being able to

neutralize the US advantage in satellites for reconnaissance and communication.

36 Asher, Dani. "US Military Presents: The Return of the Laser." Israel Defense. March 9, 2017.

Accessed May 07, 2017. http://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/node/28793.

13

In the past China has been accused of using laser DEW to blind and temporarily

disable US satellites.37

Russian Federation

The Russian Federation has invested in the research of DEW, developing

laser, acoustic, holographic and high-energy kinetic systems. Russia has already

deployed the 1К17 Сжатие system, consisting of a tank chassis equipped with a

battery of lasers that is intended to blind optical-electronic equipment in the

1980s38.

State of Israel

The Israeli DEW program aims to enhance the capabilities of countries

already existing Iron Dome anti-missile system. Currently Israel uses Iron Dome to

protect its cities from missiles fired from the Gaza Strip, but has already discovered

the limitations of a kinetic hard-kill system39.

Other Nations

Other Member States, such as Germany, France, United Kingdom, Australia

and Ukraine, have been notably active in the research of DEW. Japan, South

Korea, Sweden, Taiwan, Pakistan and India are also emerging powers in the

creation of DEW, but have not yet caught up with the leading nations40. Most

likely smaller countries across the world will prefer strict regulations on DEWs,

mainly because to avoid dependency on larger nations with advanced

programs and to avoid an DEW arms race.

37 Gertz, Bill, Nicholas Lyall, Paul J. Saunders, and Ted Galen Carpenter. "Get Ready for China's

Laser-

Weapons Arsenal." The National Interest. April 12, 2017. Accessed May 07, 2017.

http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/get-ready-chinas-laser-weapons-arsenal-20138. 38 TACC Russian News Agency. "Russia develops directed-energy weapons." TASS. September 16,

2015.

Accessed May 07, 2017. http://tass.com/defense/821623. 39 Strategy Page "Air Defense: Laser Iron Beam For Israel." Strategy Page. November 4, 2015.

Accessed

May 07, 2017. https://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htada/articles/20151104.aspx. 40 Deveci, Bayram Mert, Cpt. "Directed-Energy Weapons: Invisible and Invincible?" PhD diss.,

Naval

Postgraduate School, 2007. 2007. Accessed May 6, 2017.

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a473993.pdf.

14

Relevant international documents

• The 1967 Outer Space Treaty

http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/outerspacet

reaty.html

• The 1980 United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons

https://web.archive.org/web/20100717100420/http://treaties.un.org/Page

s/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVI-2&chapter=26&lang=en

• The 2013 Arms Trade Treaty http://www.armstrade.info/

• Major documents on DEWs:

o Directed-Energy Weapons: Invisible and Invincible?

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a473993.pdf

o Blasting Missiles Out of the Sky

https://www.lanl.gov/science/NSS/issue1_2012/story5full.shtml

References

Strategy Page. "Air Defense: Laser Iron Beam For Israel." Strategy Page.

November 4, 2015. Accessed May 07, 2017.

https://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htada/articles/20151104.aspx.

Airforce Technology. "Airborne Laser System (ABL) YAL 1A." Airforce

Technology. Accessed May 09, 2017. http://www.airforce-

technology.com/projects/abl/.

Asher, Dani. "US Military Presents: The Return of the Laser." Israel Defense.

March 9, 2017. Accessed May 07, 2017.

http://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/node/28793.

National Security Science Magazine. "Blasting Missiles Out of the Sky."

Blasting Missiles Out of the Sky | National Security Science Magazine | Los Alamos

National Laboratory. September 01, 2009. Accessed May 07, 2017.

https://www.lanl.gov/science/NSS/issue1_2012/story5full.shtml.

United Nations. "Chapter III." United Nations. Accessed May 08, 2017.

https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-iii/index.html.

15

United Nations. "Chapter IV." United Nations. Accessed May 08, 2017.

https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-iv/index.html.

United Nations. "Chapter IV — The General Assembly - Article 11." United

Nations. Accessed May 08, 2017. http://legal.un.org/repertory/art11.shtml.

Deveci, Bayram Mert, Cpt. "Directed-Energy Weapons: Invisible and

Invincible?" PhD diss., Naval Postgraduate School, 2007. 2007. Accessed May 6,

2017. http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a473993.pdf.

Gertz, Bill, Nicholas Lyall, Paul J. Saunders, and Ted Galen Carpenter. "Get

Ready for China's Laser-Weapons Arsenal." The National Interest. April 12, 2017.

Accessed May 07, 2017. http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/get-ready-

chinas-laser-weapons-arsenal-20138.

Herbert, Dennis B., Col. "Non-Lethal Weaponry: From Tactical to Strategic

Applications." Joint Forces Quarterly, March 1999. April 1999. Accessed May 7,

2017.

https://web.archive.org/web/20031223201043/http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/j

fq_pubs/1621.pdf.

United Nations. "History of the United Nations." United Nations. Accessed

May 07, 2017. https://www.un.org/en/sections/history/history-united-nations/.

LeVine, Susan. The Active Denial System A Revolutionary, Non-lethal

Weapon for Today’s Battlefield. Report. Center for Technology and National

Security Policy, National Defense University. June 2009. Accessed May 7, 2017.

www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ada501865.

Network, MI News. "A New Laser System to Defend Ships from Pirates."

Marine Insight. July 20, 2016. Accessed May 07, 2017.

http://www.marineinsight.com/marine-piracy-marine/a-new-laser-system-to-

defend-ships-from-pirates/.

Department of Defense Non-Lethal Weapons Program. "Non-Lethal

Weapons Program." Non-Lethal Weapons Program > About > Planning Guidance,

Vision, Mission, & Definition. Accessed May 07, 2017.

http://jnlwp.defense.gov/About/Planning-Guidance-Vision-Mission-Definition/.

Reagan, Ronald. "Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security."

Speech, Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security, Washington,

DC, March 23, 1983. Accessed May 7, 2017.

https://reaganlibrary.archives.gov/archives/speeches/1983/32383d.htm.

16

Richard B. Miles, Arthur Dogariu and James B. Michael. "Using Lasers to Find

Land Mines and IEDs." IEEE Spectrum: Technology, Engineering, and Science

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land-mines-and-ieds.

TACC Russian News Agency. "Russia develops directed-energy weapons."

TASS. September 16, 2015. Accessed May 09, 2017.

http://tass.com/defense/821623.

Sample, Ian. "Police test hi-tech zapper that could end car chases." The

Guardian. July 11, 2004. Accessed May 07, 2017.

https://www.theguardian.com/science/2004/jul/12/sciencenews.crime.

Skolnik, Merril I. "History of Radar." Encyclopedia Britannica. July 26, 1999.

Accessed May 7, 2017. https://www.britannica.com/technology/radar/History-

of-radar.

Stratfor Enterprises. "How North Korea Would Retaliate." Stratfor Worldview.

May 2016. Accessed May 09´7, 2017. https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/how-

north-korea-would-retaliate.

Northrop Grumman. "Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL)." Northrop

Grumman. Accessed May 09, 2017.

http://www.northropgrumman.com/Capabilities/ChemicalHighEnergyLaser/Tac

ticalHighEnergyLaser/Pages/default.aspx.

Tate, Jennifer Weaver. "Directed Energy Weapons: From War of the Worlds

to the Modern Battlefield." DSIAC Journal 2, no. 2 (March 2015). March 2015.

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https://www.un.org/disarmament/geneva/ccw/.

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Assembly." United Nations. Accessed May 08, 2017.

http://www.un.org/en/ga/first/.

17

Topic B: Illicit use and distribution of weapons:

regulating private military companies

Introduction

The emerging presence of private military and security companies (PMSC)

has affected the nature of the international arms trade. The illicit use and

distribution of weapons has increased due to greater demand and more

channels of supply with the growing presence of PMSCs in armed conflict

situations. PMSCs occupy a wide range of positions and provide services to

countries who contract them. These services range from technical training,

logistical strategic support, procurement of arms and active intervention in violent

conflicts.

If the role of PMSCs is growing and their activities are impacting the illicit use

and distribution of weapons into conflict and crisis regions, then how does the

international community combat this? Not only does the role of PMSCs to provide

large amounts of arms to their clients violate the values stated in the UN Charter,

but their training and security services also increases the demand for weapons in

those regions. The increased arms distribution into conflict regions threatens to

impact the peace, security and development that the UN aims to achieve.

History of the topic

Article 47 in the 1997 Protocol I to the Geneva Convention contains the

widely-accepted definition of mercenaries41. It defines mercenaries by the role

that they are involved in. Mercenaries must be recruited to fight in an armed

conflict, play a direct role in the hostilities, be incentivised to be part of the

hostilities in exchange for material compensation. Furthermore, they cannot be a

national or a resident of the territory controlled by the Party to the conflict, they

41 "Commentary Of 1987 Mercenaries," Treaties, States parties, and Commentaries - Additional

Protocol (I) to the Geneva Conventions, 1977 - 47 - Mercenaries - Commentary of 1987, ,

accessed May 07, 2017, https://ihl-

databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/1a13044f3bbb5b8ec12563fb0066f226/ffc84b7639b26f93c12

563cd00434156.

18

cannot be a member of the armed forces of the Party, and they cannot be sent

by a State on official duty42.

The end of the Cold War saw a resurgence of Private Military employment

by States43 because there was a disengagement by the official State armed

forces in ethnic and nationalistic conflicts44, such as the Bosnian War and the

collapse of the Somalian State45. The UN peace mission attempt in Mogadishu,

Somalia was a crucial tipping point for many developed countries, such as the

United States of America, as Member States became unwilling to invest their own

armed forces into other UN peace missions. The United States of America,

specifically, lost 18 military personnel and 73 were wounded46. The lack of

guarantee for the safety of their armed forces created a demand for privatized

military. It was in 1967 that the first 20th century Private Military Company was

established in the United Kingdom, called WatchGuard International47, but the

end of the Cold War presented an opportunity for more PMSC’s to be established.

In the United States of America, the Brown and Roots Service was hired by the

Reagan Administration to help to integrate private companies into war48.

Private Military Companies have been an integral faction within the United

States in America. In 2005, 80 Private Military Companies were working in Iraq with

over 20 000 personnel49. A substantial increase was seen in the years after 2005 as

the number rose to 250 000 personnel members in Iraq and Afghanistan50. The

United States of America Congressional Research Service Report of September

42 "Commentary Of 1987 Mercenaries," Treaties, States parties, and Commentaries - Additional

Protocol (I) to the Geneva Conventions, 1977 - 47 - Mercenaries - Commentary of 1987, ,

accessed May 07, 2017, https://ihl-

databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/1a13044f3bbb5b8ec12563fb0066f226/ffc84b7639b26f93c12

563cd00434156. 43 Laura Peterson and Contributors to This Story: Samiya Edwards, "Privatizing combat, the new

world order," International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, October 28, 2002, , accessed

May 07, 2017, https://www.icij.org/project/making-killing/privatizing-combat-new-world-order. 44 S. Goddard, Major, "The Private Military Company: A Legitimate International Entity Within

Modern Conflict," Global Security , 2001, , accessed 2017,

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2001/pmc-legitimate-entity.pdf. 45 Emel Osmançavuşoğlu, "Challenges to United Nations Peace Keeping Operations in the Post

Cold War Era ," Journal Of International Affairs IV, no. 4 (2000): , http://www.sam.gov.tr/wp-

content/uploads/2012/02/EmelOsmanCavusoglu.pdf. 46 Ibid. 47 Stephen Lendman, "Outsourcing War: The Rise of Private Military Contractors (PMCs)," Dissident

Voice: a radical newsletter in the struggle for peace and social justice, 2010, , accessed 2017,

http://dissidentvoice.org/2010/01/outsourcing-war-the-rise-of-private-military-contractors-pmcs/. 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid. 50 Ibid.

19

2009 found that 53% of the Department of Defense’s workforce comprised of

PMSC’s51. Other States have also employed PMSC’s in various roles within armed

conflict situations. The United Kingdom contracted its aircraft support units, tank

transport units and aerial refueling fleet to Private Military Services, which played

important roles in the 1999 Kosovo conflict52. The methods of warfare have

changed with the resurgence of PMSC’s as armed conflict now has more

potential to be perpetuated for the sake of profits.

The United Nations and other International Non-Governmental

Organizations employ PMSC’s in areas of security to protect staff on missions. In

2009, the United Nations spent $44 million in contracted security services and $73

million in 201053. With the increase of PMSC’s in all areas of international security,

there is potential for illicit use and distribution of weapons. The privatization of

warfare also affected the international arms trade due to the increase in demand

and supply for weapons54. The various types of private military firms indicate that

there is a wide range of reasons for weapons to be purchased and sold without

proper regulations. The Private Military Companies and the Proliferation of Small

Arms: Regulating the Actors report by The British American Security Information

Council, the International Alert and Saferworld indicates that PMSC’s can be

involved in illicit use and distribution of weapons through arms brokering and

transportation, violations of UN arms embargoes, and driving demand for small

arms55.

Discussion of the Problem

Causes of PMCs Employment and Their Role

PMSCs are employed by governments and the United Nations with three

types of roles in mind. The first type are military provider firms who offer services to

51 Moshe Schwartz, "Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background

and Analysis," Congressional Research Service: , 2009,

http://www.voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/R40764_20091214-3.pdf. 52 P.w. Singer, "Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and Its Ramifications

for International Security," International Security 26, no. 3 (2002): ,

doi:10.1162/016228801753399763. 53 Lou Pingeot, "Dangerous Partnership Private Military & Security Companies and the UN," 2012, ,

https://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/GPF_Dangerous_Partnership_Full_report.pdf. 54 Sami Makki et al., "Private Military Companies and the Proliferation of Small Arms: Regulating

the Actors," The British American Security Information Council : ,

http://psm.du.edu/media/documents/reports_and_stats/ngo_reports/intlalert_biting-the-bullet-

10.pdf. 55 Ibid.,

20

engage in combat or direct control of field units. The second type are military

consulting firms who offer advisory, training and strategy services. The third type

are military support firms who provide logistical, technical and transportation

services. These positions are created for PMSCs to fill because there is a lack of

armed forces available; they are more cost effective; they provide a space for

countries and even the United Nations to avoid responsibility for PMSC actions;

and finally, they can intervene in conflicts that would be considered violating

another state’s sovereignty.

The International Arms Trade and PMSCs Involvement

The activities of private military and security companies (PMSC) relate to

the international arms trade because often these PMSCs require the purchasing

of weapons for their role in armed conflict. Their activities of engaging in armed

conflict, offering training and providing technical services contributes to the

purchase and distribution of weapons. The UN Special Rapporteur Report

Economic and Social Council 4//2001/19 indicates that illicit arms trafficking

occurs when mercenaries are “hired as pilots, co-pilots or flight engineers for the

transport of weapons, as arms salesmen in the field or as instructors in the use of

the weapons and military material that have been sold, and to train troops or

paramilitary groups, which in many cases comprise raw recruits, persons with little

training or knowledge or ad hoc combatants.” In Papua New Guinea, Sandline

International was hired by the government in 1997 to stop a rebellion in

Bougainville and import Russian weapons56.

In accordance with their contract, Sandline International obtained “four

attack (Mi-24) and transport (Mi8/17) helicopters (originating in Belarus),

armoured fighting vehicles, light weapons, heat-seeking missiles, electronic

warfare equipment, communications systems, 500 cases of ammunition and

explosives.”57 The Papua New Guinea government paid Sandline International

$36 million out of the aid and development funds from Australia58. There are

indicators that PMSC’s activities in armed conflict situations can result in weapons

being funnelled into conflict and crisis regions59. The UN Special Rapporteur Report

56 Sami Makki et al., "Private Military Companies and the Proliferation of Small Arms: Regulating

the Actors," The British American Security Information Council : ,

http://psm.du.edu/media/documents/reports_and_stats/ngo_reports/intlalert_biting-the-bullet-

10.pdf. 57 Ibid., 58 Ibid., 59 Sami Makki et al., "Private Military Companies and the Proliferation of Small Arms: Regulating

the Actors," The British American Security Information Council : ,

21

Economic and Social Council 4//2001/19 on The Right of Peoples to Self-

Determination and Its Application to Peoples Under Colonial or Alien Domination

or Foreign Occupation indicates that the international community is not prepared

for mercenaries’ or PMSC’s involvement in illegal arms trafficking because there

are not sufficient regulations to monitor PMSC’s activities.

International Standards and Regulation of PMCs

The lack of international standards to regulate PMSC’s actions relates to the

violation of UN or regional arms embargoes. In 1998 Sandline International was

contracted by the then-exiled President of Sierra Leone to provide a 35-tonne

shipment of arms from Bulgaria60. In 2000, the UN Security Council placed

sanctions on the sale and supply of arms in Eritrea and Ethiopia to stop the conflict

between these countries, but the lack of enforcement provides insufficient data

to determine whether these sanctions were adhered to61. The concern for the

International Community is that if there are no regulations or international

standards, then PMSC’s have the potential to illegally use and distribute weapons

to conflict regions. The 2012 Dangerous Partnership: Private Military and Security

Companies by the Global Policy Forum and the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation

stated that the media presented evidence that PMSC’s were insensitive and

violent prone while NGO’s and think tanks indicated that PMSC’s actions are not

held accountable even when they are blatantly inhumane62. Without

international standards and regulations, PMSC’s will continue to exist in an

ethnically grey area.

The main organs of the United Nations -- the GA, the Security Council, the

Economic and Social Council and the Commission on Human Rights -- have

condemned mercenaries as they undermine human rights. The UN Working

Group on Mercenaries for the past five years has indicated in their findings that

there are little to no common standards to regulate registration and licensing of

PMSCs. This lack of common standards gives PMSCs free reign over the vetting

and training of their staff, which often leads to discretions involving the

http://psm.du.edu/media/documents/reports_and_stats/ngo_reports/intlalert_biting-the-bullet-

10.pdf. 60 Sami Makki et al., "Private Military Companies and the Proliferation of Small Arms: Regulating

the Actors," The British American Security Information Council : ,

http://psm.du.edu/media/documents/reports_and_stats/ngo_reports/intlalert_biting-the-bullet-

10.pdf. 61 Ibid., 62 Lou Pingeot, "Dangerous Partnership Private Military & Security Companies and the UN," 2012, ,

https://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/GPF_Dangerous_Partnership_Full_report.pdf.

22

safekeeping of weapons as well as operations within conflict areas in foreign

nation63.

The UN Special Rapporteur has stated that mercenary activities and human

rights have a direct correlation where the criminal activities affect the value of

rights64. Furthermore, there is evidence that PMSC’s have been complicit and

implicated in human rights violations. The South Africa PMSC Executive Outcomes

was found to be responsible for presenting illicit weapons into Angola65. There is a

risk from PMSCs operating in countries as they can contribute to the militarisation

of society and escalate tensions within the region66. There is also evidence that

PMSCs leave extra weapons once their contracts are finished within the country,

which could perpetuate violent conflicts or tensions67. The surplus of weapons that

are unlicensed and left behind by PMSCs undermine the efforts for sustainable

development and peace.

Previous UN Involvement

There has been a variety of efforts by the international community to

regulate the activities of PMSC’s through national legislation or international

agreements, but these efforts fail to effectively regulate their activities68. The

PMSC’s operations in relation to the illicit use and distribution of weapons have a

negative effect on the political, societal and economic environment that these

activities occur in. The Swiss Government and the International Committee of the

Red Cross established the Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal

Obligations and Good Practices for States related to Operations of Private Military

and Security Companies during Armed Conflict in 2011 in an attempt to

63 Jose L. Gómez Del Prado, "Global Policy Forum," The Role of Private Military and Security

Companies in Modern Warfare – Impacts on Human Rights, August 11, 2012, , accessed May 07,

2017, https://www.globalpolicy.org/pmscs/51834-the-role-of-private-military-and-security-

companies-in-modern-warfare-impacts-on-human-rights.html. 64 Sami Makki et al., "Private Military Companies and the Proliferation of Small Arms: Regulating

the Actors," The British American Security Information Council : ,

http://psm.du.edu/media/documents/reports_and_stats/ngo_reports/intlalert_biting-the-bullet-

10.pdf. 65 Ibid. 9 66 Ibid. 10 67 Ibid. 68 Ibid.

23

encourage PMSCs to adopt “good practices” and adhere to a voluntary code

of conduct69.

The United Nations adopted the International Convention against the

Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries 1989, which addresses

the negative effects that mercenaries have on the order and integrity of the State

and the impact on peace and security. It remains limited to the definition of

mercenaries and does not include the activities of PMSCs. Furthermore, 35 States

have ratified the Convention, but majority of Member States have not70.

The Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2004/5 extends the mandate

of the UN Special Rapporteur and affirms the use of mercenaries to be in violation

of the values within the Charter. It also urges Member States to take legislative

steps towards protecting their territory against mercenary activities that could

threaten the national security of their State.

The Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2005/2 ends the mandate of

the UN Special Rapporteur and establishes a Working Group with the mandate to

present proposals on standards to encourage the protection of human rights; to

monitor mercenary-related activities; to draft international principles for private

companies to follow involved in military services; and to identify the impact of

mercenary activities on human rights.

The General Assembly Resolution 62/145 (2008) recognizes and

acknowledges the Report issued by the Working Group on the use of mercenaries

as a means of violating rights and impeding the exercise of rights of people to

self-determination A/62/301. It also affirms the dangers mercenary activities pose

to human rights while encouraging Member States to establish regulations for

private companies providing military assistant. Furthermore, the resolution calls

upon States to investigate the potential for the involvement of mercenaries in

terrorist-related activities.

69 "The Role Of Private Security Companies (Pscs) In CSDP Missions And Operations," Directorate-

general For External Policies Of The Union, 2011, ,

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2011/433829/EXPO-

SEDE_ET(2011)433829_EN.pdf. 70 "International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of

Mercenaries, 4 December 1989.," Treaties, States parties, and Commentaries - States Parties -

International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, 4

December 1989., accessed 2017, https://ihl-

databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp_viewStates=XPages_NORMStatesParties&xp_tr

eatySelected=530.

24

General Assembly Resolution 63/164 (2009) acknowledges the Report

issued by the Working Group A/63/325 and reaffirms the vigilance that Member

States should adopt when interacting with mercenary-related activities because

of the threat they pose to peace and security.

General Assembly Resolution 64/151 (2010) further acknowledges the

Report issued by Working Group A/64/438 and reiterates the dangers mercenary-

related activities pose to peace and security with extra emphasis on the

importance of Member States to ratify the International Convention against the

Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries 1989.

General Assembly Resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council 15/26

(2010) establishes an Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group with a

mandate to consider the possibility for international regulatory framework.

General Assembly Resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council 18/6

(2011) recognizes that armed conflicts, terrorism, arms trafficking etc. encourage

the demand for mercenaries. The resolution reiterates the importance for national

regulations for PMSCs and encourages Member States to work with the Open-

Ended Working Group to establish international regulatory framework for

overseeing activities of PMSCs.

General Assembly Resolution 66/147 (2012) echoes many of the resolutions

of the past sessions and appreciates the work from the Open-Ended Working

Group on establishing international regulations. It acknowledges the importance

of a legally binding international regulatory instrument to ensure PMSCs are

accountable.

General Assembly Resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council 21/8

(2012) requests Member States to continue to establish national legislation to

regulate the employment of PMSCs. It further requests the Open-Ended Working

Group to continue investigating mercenary activities and the use of them while

welcoming a new potential definition of mercenary.

General Assembly Resolution 66/147 (2013) reaffirms the previous

resolutions adopted in the GA and requests the Open-Ended Working Group to

consult with States and Non-Governmental Organizations in the implementation

of the report and resolution with specific recommendations.

General Assembly Resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council 33/4

(2016) welcomes the cooperation from Member States that the working group

visited and the adoption of national regulations to restrict the recruitment,

25

assembly, financing and transit of mercenaries. It renews the mandate of the

working group for another three years.

Possible Solutions

How does the United Nations (UN) regulate Private Military and Security

Companies (PMSCs) when States and the United Nations themselves use PMSC

services in armed conflicts in various positions? There has been no concrete

framework to regulate the activities of PMSCs on a national or international level.

PMSCs are not held accountable. When they violate the UN Charter by

participating in activities such as the illicit use and distribution of weapons, there

needs to be international standards to hold them accountable.

The Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating

human rights and impeding the exercise of rights of peoples to self-determination

is a step forward towards securing peace and security for the international

community. The Working Group’s Fifth Session 2017 discussed a range of issues

regarding PMSCs such as “access to justice and remedies for victims of violations

and abuses linked to the activities of private military and security companies; the

operation of those companies in maritime and other contexts; the initiatives taken

at the national and international levels; other measures taken concerning the

regulation and oversight of the activities of private military and security

companies; existing regulatory frameworks; and problems, challenges, and

suggestions from delegations to move forward”71. There has been an effort to

address the growing issue of PMSCs, especially focusing on regulations on these

companies. But there needs to a stronger focus on the role of PMSCs in arms

trafficking and an effort to find solutions to these challenges.

The Working Group should continue to examine the practices of existing

regulations and registrations for PMSCs and model an international regulation

framework based on best practice sharing. This international framework should

aim to prevent violations against the UN Charter and create transparency for the

state and non-state actors by making the PMSCs contract accessible. The

international framework for regulations should also require PMSCs to abide by the

71 General Assembly Resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council Working Group. 10/5/2

(20 February 2017) Summary of the fifth session of the open-ended intergovernmental working

group to consider the possibility of elaborating an international regulatory framework on the

regulation, monitoring and oversight of the activities of private military and security companies,

available from https://documents-dds-

ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G17/038/31/PDF/G1703831.pdf?OpenElement

26

Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) adopted by the GA in General Assembly Resolution 69/49

(2014).

The framework should include controls over arms brokering into the area of

arms export regulation to combat the role that PMSCs can have in the illicit use

and distribution of weapons. The UN should recognize the role that PMSCs play in

the illicit use and distribution of weapons and include these activities in any arms

export regulations. These regulations should be developed within the international

framework and international standards should include sharing information

between State and Non-State Actors on the contractual work that PMSCs are

used for.

The framework should also promote the introduction of safeguards within

PMSCs to prevent violations of the UN Charter. PMSCs should be encouraged to

have strict regulations when hiring employees. These employees should be

trained on the importance of adhering to the ATT to ensure that no weapons are

left in the region once their contract is finished.

Bloc positions

PMSCs continue to be a source of military assistances for States, especially

countries such as the United States of America and the United Kingdom. They

advocate mainly for reliance on national legislation and the International Code

of Conduct rather than for international regulations72. They lead a bloc that might

not be in full support of a wide reaching international framework to regulate

PMSCs activities.

United States of America supports international efforts for regulation and

oversight of PMSCs, especially the Montreux Document and the promotion of the

International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers. The United

States of America’s Department of Defense is involved in several initiatives to

ensure that the use of force by PMSCs are aligned with international law. The

United States’ policy on PMSCs states that these entities must be regularly

established, registered, well regulated, rigidly disciplined, properly staffed with

carefully selected operating personnel73.

72 "Updates on the discussions on the regulation of PMSCs at the United Nations Office at

Geneva," ControlPMSC, , accessed 2017, http://controlpmsc.org/updates-on-the-discussions-on-

the-regulation-of-pmscs-at-the-united-nations-office-at-geneva/. 73 "Private Security Companies:," Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics &

Materiel Readiness, , accessed 2017, http://www.acq.osd.mil/log/PS/psc.html.

27

The United Kingdom supports the efforts of the Montreux Document, which

expresses a preference for a licensing system and the International Code of

Conduct for Private Security Providers, which provides a non-binding framework

for states and an international system for self-regulation for PMSCs. The United

Kingdom supports the benefits of a licensing system to ensure PMSCs fulfil their

obligations to the UK and subject the companies to UK law74. Furthermore, the UK

supports the self-regulation system for PMSCs to follow.

The European Union supports the Montreux Document, which was signed

by 14 EU members including France and the UK. The EU emphasizes their regional

guidelines to regulating PMSCs in areas of arms brokering and technical

assistance75. The EU does acknowledge the lack of international regulations and

that the EU can take a leading role by improving its controls.

Russia Federation, Egypt, South Africa and Venezuela lead a bloc that

considers a binding international document necessary to regulate the activities

of the PMSC. It is a bloc that sees PMSCs activities to be cemented in the use of

force76 and the danger that it might be to national armed forces.

The Russian Federation supports the effort to implement international rules

to regulate PMSCs. According to Russian law, it is difficult to employ PMSCs, which

is the reason that the Russian Federation does not adhere to the Montreux

Document. A bill has been proposed to the Russian parliament to regulate PMSCs,

which incorporates elements of international law and a licensing system, which

would make PMSCs accountable under international law, Russian law and the

laws of the country that they are operating in77. The Russian Federation further

supports an international legal framework for PMSCs.

The African Union adopted the 1977 OAU Convention for the Elimination of

Mercenarism in Africa and has been ratified by 27 out of 53 African States. The AU

74 Nigel White, "The UK and the Regulation of PMSCs," , November 2015,

http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Mercenaries/WG/Event2015/NigelWhite.pdf.

75 "The Role Of Private Security Companies (Pscs) In CSDP Missions And Operations," Directorate-

general For External Policies Of The Union, 2011, ,

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2011/433829/EXPO-

SEDE_ET(2011)433829_EN.pdf. 76 Ibid., 77 "Russian Federation: Regulating private military and security companies," International

Committee of the Red Cross, June 27, 2016, , accessed May 07, 2017,

https://www.icrc.org/en/document/russian-federation-regulating-private-military-security-

companies.

28

has also adopted the African Union Non-Aggression and Common Defense Pact

in adherence to International Law78. The AU discourages the use of PMSCs in the

security sector reform activities in Africa. The AU also encourages the conformity

to international, regional and national frameworks to regulate the activities of

PMSCs79. The AU highlights the need to develop national frameworks to regulate

PMSCs activities.

Relevant international documents

International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of

Mercenaries 1989

The Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2004/5

The Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2005/2

General Assembly Resolution 62/145 (2008)

General Assembly Resolution 63/164 (2009)

General Assembly Resolution 64/151 (2010)

General Assembly Resolution adopted from the Human Rights Council 15/26

(2010)

General Assembly Resolution adopted from the Human Rights Council 18/6 (2011)

General Assembly Resolution 66/147 (2012)

General Assembly Resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council 21/8 (2012)

General Assembly Resolution 66/147 (2013)

Arms Trade Treaty

General Assembly Resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council 33/4 (2016)

78 Sabelo Gumedze, "Regulation of Private Security at the African Union Level ," Institute for

Security Studies : ,

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/droi_090209_312/DROI_09

0209_312en.pdf 79 Tarek A. Sharif, "Regional Conference On Private Military And Security Companies," 2015, ,

http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/pmscs-dr-sharif-statement-nov-2015.pdf.

29

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