Sheet1Subsystem:1. Unloading operation

Hazards/ KeywordsDescription/ CausesConsequencesSafeguardsFatallityFrequencyCategoryRecommendations1. Loss of containment1. Unloading arms - leakage from swivel joints1. Leakage from swivel joints would be minor leakages1. N2 purge and leak detection systemN/A0.019Negligibleequipment failure2. Unloading arms - leakage from mechanical flange joints2. Liquid spill or vapour release; potential fire; impact on structure due to cold liquid spill2. Operator monitoring16.50E-04Alarpfire + equipment failure0.00353. Unloading arms - disconnection under extreme weather condition3. Impact of cold liquid spill leaking from the connection flange on the ship manifold area3. Emergency shutdown of unloading operation12.50E-04Alarpfire + heave weater4. Leak from piping and equipment at the jetty - drain vessel and/or knock-out drum4. One of the liquid unloading arms can be used as vapour return arm during maintenance of vapour arm; periodic maintenance of arms/ swivel joints1.00E+002.40E-04fire + equipment failure5. Gas detection and low temp. detection; fire detection; fire water monitors at the jetty at different elevation (remote operated)6. Loading arm platform designed to withstand cold liquid spill7. Arm position limit detection and activation of shutdown valves at jetty end10.048. Powered Emergency Release Coupler with valves at either end of coupling results in isolation of both ship end and jetty end1000.00049. Spill containment system at the jetty platform with high expansion foam10.000410. Continuous water curtain during unloading localised at the ship manifold area1000.0000042. Spill/ Fire on the carrier while berthed1. Spill from connections on the ship deck1. Radiation effects on the jetty structure and facilities and personnel1. Spill containment system & emergency shutdown system on the ship83.40E-03ALARPfire + equipment failure2. Fire protection system on the ship3. Fire protection system at the jetty4. Tugs with fire fighting capability3. Manual Operations1. Arm movement and coupling connection between the arm and ship manifold (done on the ship) thru hydraulic controls operated manually.1. Impact of arm on the ship manifold due to operator error or due to ship movement. Possible damage to the arm connection coupler1. Operator training14.04E-04Negligiblefire + equipment failure

2. Gangway positioning from the platform to the ship2. Impact with the ship causing damage to the gangway2. Hydraulic control is slow and controlledN/A4.04E-04NegligibleContact3. Weather condition check0.114. Cabling assisted connection to enable loading arm operation under adverse conditions if required0.01104. Personnel Hazard1. Fall from gangway, jetty platform1. Possible injury1. Guard rails on platform and gangwayN/AN/ANegligibleaccident0.0011002. Contact with cold surfaces - coupling connection on the ship (platform piping is insulated)2. PPE (flotation devices)0.00013. Controlled access to the platform/ gangway0.000014. Controlled access to the arm coupling connection0.0000013. Ice falling off from the arm after disconnection5. PPE (hard hats) and controlled access6. Operating Procedures5. Impact while berthing1. Impact of LNG carrier on the jetty while berthing due to higher than operational approach speed limit1. Damage to jetty structure; possible damage to piping1. Tug assisted berthing with approach speed limits and indicators83.27E-04ALARPContact2. Fenders designed for specified impact load3. Mooring masters on the shore side to supervise the berthing4. Local HK Pilots onboard LNG carriers during berthing6. Maintenance1. Maintenance of arm - replacement of seals (about once every 5 years) - undertaken between unloading operations and will require scaffolding1. General personnel hazards associated with maintenance activities, such as fall1. Operating and safety proceduresN/AN/ANegligibleaccident2. Replacement of arm (expected about once every 20 years) - this will require barge/ crane operation. Operation undertaken between unloading operations7. Emergency Egress1. Emergency on the ship or the jetty1. Potential injury if unable to escape1. Normal access to the jetty and secondary egress to the mooring dolphin87.80E-03ALARPaccident8. Others - jetty operator shelter1. Weather shelter for operator presence during unloading operations1. No significant issueN/A3.20E-03Negligiblewheater

fire caseLoading un loading FTA0.00780.000649740.0000000401page 42In the two first cases, the probability of such a fire to spread to the cargo area and lead to ignition of LNGvapour is regarded as negligible. Thus, such fires are not unique to LNG carriers, and statistics from othertankers can be used in order to estimate its consequences. Referring to the study presented in [54], a totalof 44 fatalities were found for the 118 fire and explosion incidents that were investigated, indicating afatality rate of 0.37 fatalities per fire or explosion. This fatality rate will be assumed for fires in machineryspaces and accommodation area, and for the purpose of the current study, one fatality is assumed with aprobability of 0.37.In order for crew members to be injured by any spillage taking place, the crew members need to be nearthe point of spillage. The crew members are only close to any valves transferring the LNG liquid whenstarting up and closing down the transfer operation. In the meantime, the transfer is remotely controlledand the presence of crew members to valves is limited. In this respect, it is not considered that hoses andpipes will cause LNG spillage as these are designed to cater for any situation that may arise within suchan operation. Provided a ship spends 24 hrs in average to load the tanks, it is estimated that the crew maybe exposed to any LNG spillages taking place for an app. of 2 hrs (1 hrs hook-up and 1 hrs decoupling).Thus the spillage extent model provides a risk contribution of no exposure of 22/24 and for exposureof 2/24.Spillages occurring when crew is present are conservatively assumed to harm the crew member in termsof frost injuries in all incidents, i.e. 100% of the incidents. Provided the crew member is harmed it isassumed that this injury is fatal for 1 person, whilst other persons are escaping with burn wounds.Based on the above assumptions and data available for the LNG vessels, the risk contribution from thisscenario is calculated to 2.64 x 10-4 fatalities per shipyear.page 43As the final component in the fire and explosion risk model, the evacuation model will determine theexpected number of fatalities in various circumstances of compressor room fires. These cases can brieflybe divided into the following three categories: a) where there is a fire or explosion, but no leakage ofLNG, b) where there are LNG leakage and a pool fire at port and c) where there are LNG leakage and apool fire at sea. Previous estimates can be adopted for these cases under the following assumptions. Incase a), it is assumed that compressor room fires without LNG spillage will resemble engine room fires,and an average probability of 0.37 for 1 fatality will be used. For case b) and c), the estimates extractedfrom the Delphi session held in conjunction with the collision and grounding scenarios will be utilized,and it is assumed that the probability of fatalities will be 0.989 in both these cases. For case c), theaverage number of fatalities will be the same as for the collision scenario, i.e. 16, but for incidentshappening while at port a somewhat lower estimate will be assumed. For the purpose of this study, it isassumed that the number of fatalities will be reduced to half for accidents happening at port compared tothe ones occurring at sea, resulting in an average number of expected fatalities of 8. These estimates areused in the event tree.0.970.00350.00339500010.00040404

hal 20 Note0.00350.0032Safe dore sorurce hal 20

Sheet20.0000286680.0000915730.00005286680.000122820.000015350.0000155060.000326783800.10.01