Harker Neg Disclosure---Novice Policy---Damien

Coaches: this file contains all of the 1AC cards for our Saudi Arabia aff case, as well as the 1NCs to all of our CPs, DAs and case turns that we plan on reading this weekend vs Saudi Arabia and Taiwan. We will not be reading any Ks.

Please send any questions to jjk@staff.harker.org

AFF – Saudi Arabia

1AC

1AC – PlanThe United States federal government should end Direct Commercial Sales and Foreign Military Sales of arms from the United States to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

1AC – Yemen AdvantageAdvantage 1 – YemenScenario 1 – Middle EastYemen conflict causes direct Saudi-Iran war and spills over to the entire Middle East – independently hikes oil price volatilityMoussalli 15 [Marc Moussalli is an independent political risk consultant. Previously, he worked for major financial institutions in London and Frankfurt. As Managing Director, he advised some of Europe’s largest institutional investors. He holds an MA in International Relations from the University of Leicester and a BA in Business Administration from DHBW Mannheim. Not just a proxy war: Yemen’s strategic importance. April 23, 2015. https://globalriskinsights.com/2015/04/not-just-a-proxy-war-yemens-strategic-importance/]

The situation in Yemen is not only dangerous for domestic reasons . A number of factors make the increasingly volatile situa tion in Yemen G especially complex .

There is a real risk of contagion throughout the Gulf region . Further regional escalation could cause major instability at best and armed conflict at worst. In any case, the consequences would be felt across the world.

It draws in other great powersOstovar 18 [Afshon Ostovar is the author of Vanguard of the Imam: Religion, Politics, and Iran’s Revolutionary Guards and an assistant professor of national security affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School. The First Saudi-Iranian War Will Be an Even Fight. May 7, 2018. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/05/07/the-first-saudi-iranian-war-will-be-an-even-fight/]

If a Saudi-Iran conflict were to occur in a vacuum , the war would not be about territory or regime change by force. Neither side can take the fight across the Persian Gulf, much less seize and hold strategic areas in adversarial territory. The conflict would be about inflicting damage to both punish the other side and compel it to cease hostile behavior. While the Saudis — with their superior air power, access to foreign military technology, and far greater wealth — might be better situated to endure such a conflict, if not impose greater costs on the Iranians, the Islamic Republic has less to lose and has shown an ability to withstand years of warfare against greater powers.

However, it is unlikely that such a conflict would involve only those two parties and not grow to involve other states. Iran lacks state allies (except for Syria, of course, which is hardly a state now), but it does have a robust, transnational alliance with nonstate clients

Saudi Arabia, however, has a strong alliance with Arab states (especially the U nited A rab E mirates and Jordan ) and with the U nited S tates . Were such a conflict to occur, it is difficult to imagine that the U nited S tates would not become involved in one way or another in support of the Saudis. Although Iran could certainly raise the costs of American involvement by targeting U.S. naval vessels in the Persian Gulf directly or by targeting U.S. forces and nationals in other countries by proxy, Iran would have to balance such actions with the risk of drawing the United States into a more extensive war.

And, Saudi Arabia and Iran will proliferate – that magnifies the conflictKinzer 3/9/19 [Stephen Kinzer is a former New York Times reporter and the author of Overthrow: America's Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq (2006) and Reset Middle East: Old Friends and New Alliances: Saudi Arabia, Israel, Turkey, Iran (2011). We’re Edging Closer to Nuclear War. Mach 9, 2019. https://www.commondreams.org/views/2019/03/09/were-edging-closer-nuclear-war]

It’s easy to imagine even more dangerous faceoffs elsewhere in the world. The most terrifying new nuclear powers would be Iran and Saudi Arabia . Iran has enough scientific talent to develop a bomb , and Saudi Arabia could buy what it needs . Hearing the leaders of those countries snarl at each other is scary enough today . If both had nuclear weapons — not a far-fetched scenario if present trends continue — war between them could be devastating . So could a war over Taiwan, if Taiwan were to build a nuclear arsenal to compete with China’s. Serbia and Kosovo are in bitter conflict over disputed territory. So are Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Middle East war escalates and causes extinctionSaab 18 [Bilal Y. Saab is senior fellow and director of the Defense and Program at the Middle East Institute, and an adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University, The coming Middle East missile arms race, https://thebulletin.org/2018/09/the-coming-middle-east-missile-arms-race/]

The main reason Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have yet to pursue ballistic missiles is that Washington has managed for years to convince them not to.

The last thing the United States needs in the Middle East is an offensive missile race , which could quickly lead the antagonists into a deadly military confrontation that drags Washington and Moscow into war . Missiles are inherently destabilizing weapons because of their potential to quickly escalate conflicts. Their flight times can be very short , and new tech nologies are dramatically improving their

accuracy and lethality.

As if that were not scary enough, the nuclear future of the Mid dle East is also increasingly uncertain , now that the United States has withdrawn from the J oint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the deal that limited Iran’s nuclear development in exchange for sanctions relief. At the same time , at least half a dozen regional powers including Saudi

Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, and Qatar see peaceful nuclear energy as a long-term solution to their fossil-fuel dependence. The growth of nuclear power generation in the region could exacerbate the

risk of nuclear prolif eration, as the same tech nologies and materials are required to develop both nuclear energy and nuclear weapons. Should Middle East civilian nuclear development become militarized , possession of fleets of offensive missiles —arguably the most effective delivery vehicle for nuclear warheads —could magnify the potential danger .

The Yemen war uniquely primes the Middle East for nuclear war – extinctionWojcik 5/10/19 [John Wojcik is Editor-in-Chief of People's World. He joined the staff as Labor Editor in May 2007 after working as a union meat cutter in northern New Jersey. There, he served as a shop steward, as a member of a UFCW contract negotiating committee, and as an activist in the union's campaign to win public support for Wal-Mart workers. In the 1970s and '80s he was a political action reporter for the Daily World, this newspaper's predecessor, and was active in electoral politics in Brooklyn, New York. Trump’s worst legacy may be a nuclear World War III. May 10, 2019. https://www.peoplesworld.org/article/trumps-worst-legacy-may-be-a-nuclear-world-war-iii/]

That proved to be a false hope, and now, largely because of Donald Trump, the clock is racing again to midnight. The atomic scientists say the

cause is Trump’s pushing us closer to nuclear war . He quickly moved to cancel the nuclear arms reduction accord with Iran despite overwhelming evidence that Iran was sticking to the deal. Against a backdrop of an unstable Middle East, including a genocidal war against the people of Yemen being waged by Saudi Arabia with U.S. backing, the region provides an excellent opportunity for the outbreak of nuclear war .

Cutting off arms sales would end the war in Yemen – only America can provide logistical support, and provides diplomatic cover for Saudi operationsHarb 3/1/19 [Ali Harb is a writer based in Washington, DC. He reports on US foreign policy, Arab-American issues, civil rights and politics. Saudi Arabia would end Yemen war without US support, experts say. March 1, 2019. https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/saudi-arabia-would-end-yemen-war-without-us-support-experts-say]

Ending American assistance to the Saudi -led coalition fighting in Yemen would curtail Riyadh's war efforts and hasten the end of what the United Nations describes as the world's worst humanitarian crisis, experts say. A push by US lawmakers to halt US assistance to Saudi-led forces in Yemen.

That would have a critical impact , said Robert Jordan, former US ambassador to Saudi Arabia in the early 2000s,

who described US support as crucial to Riyadh's military capabilities .

"If we suspend providing spare parts for their F-15s , their air force would be grounded in two weeks ,"

Jordan told Middle East Eye last week. "So I think there is every prospect that, if that occurs, they will find it more appealing to go to the peace table and negotiate than they currently do ."

Khalil Jahshan, executive director of the Arab Center Washington DC, said both Washington and Riyadh would like to downplay the impact of American involvement in Yemen , but the US role in the war remains " extremely important " logistically and politically .

Beyond helping with military assistance, Washington provides " psychological and strategic cover " to Saudi war efforts, he said.

"If it weren't for American support, if that were to be withdrawn in the future ... I think Saudi Arabia would feel compelled to end that war faster than they would like," Jahshan said.

The plan sends a signal to Saudi Arabia and other allies – overrides alt causesSpindel 5/14/19 [Jennifer Spindel is an assistant professor of international security at the University of Oklahoma, and the Associate Director of the Cyber Governance and Policy Center. THE CASE FOR SUSPENDING AMERICAN ARMS SALES TO SAUDI ARABIA. May 14, 2019. https://warontherocks.com/2019/05/the-case-for-suspending-american-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia/]

Arms embargos are often dismissed as symbolic, and therefore ineffective. But just because something is symbolic, doesn’t mean that it won’t

have an effect. A U.S. arms embargo against Saudi Arabia would be a clear signal of American disproval of Saudi actions in Yemen , and would be an equally important signal to Washington’s allies , who are left

wondering if the U nited S tates is ambivalent or uninterested in the growing Yemeni humanitarian catastrophe.

By continuing to provide weapons, President Donald Trump tacitly endorses Saudi policies. This signal is strengthened by Trump’s recent veto of the resolution that called for an end to U.S. support for the war in Yemen. While Trump justified the veto by saying that the resolution was a “dangerous attempt to weaken my constitutional authorities,” statements from Congressional representatives show they are aware of the powerful signals sent by arms sales. Sen. Tim Kaine said that the veto “shows the world [Trump] is determined to keep aiding a Saudi-backed war that has killed thousands of civilians and pushed millions more to the brink of starvation.” An arms embargo against Saudi Arabia would be a signal both to leaders of that country, and other states, that the United States does not endorse Saudi actions. Those arguing against a ban are correct on one point: Embargos as blunt force instruments of coercion are rarely effective. But

arms embargos are effective as signals of political dissatisfaction , and serve an important communication role in international politics .

Arms Embargos Are Signals and Can Build Coalitions

Policymakers and scholars agree that arms embargoes are not effective “sticks” in international politics. Rarely do states cave when faced with punishment in the form of an embargo. But even if an arms embargo isn’t a direct tool of coercion, an embargo would be an important political signal. There are at least two reasons for the United States to seriously consider an arms embargo against Saudi Arabia.

First, arms sales are signals that cut through the noise of the international system . Cutting off arms transfers is a common way that states express their dissatisfaction with others and try to influence behavior. As Lawrence

Freedman observed in 1978, “refusing to sell arms is a major political act . It appears as a calculated insult, reflecting on the stability, trust, and credit-worthiness, or technical competence of the would-be recipient.” Yet this crucial point seems to have been lost in the

current policy debate about whether or not the United States should continue selling arms to Saudi Arabia. My research shows that

stopping arms transfers or denying requests is an effective way to signal dissatisfaction and causes the would-be recipient to re-think their behavior.

Take, for example, the U.S. relationship with Israel in the 1960s. The United States sold Israel Hawk surface-to-surface missiles in 1962, M-48 Patton tanks in 1964 and 1965, and A-4E Skyhawk bombers in 1966. Israeli leaders understood that these transfers signaled a close U.S.-Israeli relationship. As diplomat Abba Eban wrote, the arms transfers were “a development of tremendous political value.” Even against this backdrop of close ties and significant arms sales, Israeli leaders were extremely sensitive to arms transfer denials. In April and May 1967, the United States denied Israeli requests for armored personnel carriers and fighter jets. Approving the transfers would have signaled support, and likely emboldened Israel, as tensions were growing in the region. Israeli leaders believed these transfer denials overruled prior signals and demonstrated that the United States was not willing to be a close political ally for Israel. Eban described Israel as “isolated,” and the head of Israel’s intelligence service said that the arms transfer denials made it clear that “in Israel, there existed certain misperceptions [about the United States].” If arms transfer denials could have such a significant effect on Israeli thinking — keeping in mind that there was a close and significant political relationship between the US and Israel — imagine what a transfer denial would mean for U.S.-Saudi relations. Like Israel, Saudi Arabia would have to re-think its impression that it has political support and approval from the United States. We can, and should, ask whether or not withdrawal of U.S. support would affect Saudi behavior, but it’s important that this question not get overlooked in the current debate.

Because arms transfers (and denials) are powerful signals, they can have an effect even before a transfer is actually completed. This suggests

that even the announcement of an embargo against Saudi Arabia could have an effect . Take, for example, Taiwan’s recent request for a fleet of new fighter jets. As reports mounted that Trump had given “tacit approval” to a deal for F-16 jets, China’s protests increased. The United States has not sold advanced fighter jets to Taiwan since 1992, partially out of fear of angering China, which views Taiwan as a renegade province. Even if the deal for F-16s is formally approved, Taiwan is unlikely to see the jets until at least 2021, and the balance of power between China and Taiwan would not change. As one researcher observed, the sale would be a “huge shock” for Beijing, “But it would be more of a political shock than a military shock. It would be, ‘Oh, the U.S. doesn’t care how we feel.’ It would be more of a symbolic or emotional issue.” Yet China’s immediate, negative reaction to even the announcement of a potential deal shows how powerful arms transfer signals can be.

If this same logic is applied to an arms embargo against Saudi Arabia, an arms embargo would signal that Saudi Arabia does not have the

support of the United States. This signal would be an important first step in changing Saudi behavior because it would override other statements and actions the U nited S tates has sent that indicate support . And

Trump has given Saudi Arabia a number of positive signals: He called Saudi Arabia a “great ally” and dismissed reports that that the Saudi government was involved in the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi. He has expressed interested in selling nuclear power plants and technology to Saudi Arabia. And he has repeatedly claimed that he has made a $110 billion arms deal with Saudi Arabia (he hasn’t). With these clear signals of support, why should Saudi Arabia alter its behavior based on resolutions that come out of the House or Senate,

which are likely to be vetoed by Trump, anyway? An arms embargo would be a clear and unambiguous signal that the U nited S tates disproves of Saudi actions in Yemen .

The second reason for supporting an embargo concerns U.S. allies and the logistical difficulties of making an embargo have an effect. One of the reasons embargoes have little material impact is because they require cooperation among weapons exporting states. A ban on sales from one country will have little effect if the target of the embargo can seek arms elsewhere. Germany, instituted an arms ban against Riyadh in November 2018, and German leaders have pressured other European states to stop selling arms to the Saudis. Germany understands the importance of the embargo as a political signal: as a representative of the German Green Party explained, “The re-start of arms exports to Saudi Arabia would be a fatal foreign policy signal and would contribute to the continued destabilization of the Middle East.” But the German embargo has had minimal effect because Saudi Arabia can get arms elsewhere.

According to the 2019 Military Balance, most of Saudi Arabia’s equipment is American or French in origin, such as the M1A2 Abrams and AMX-30 tanks, Apache and Dauphin helicopters, and F-15C/D fighter jets. Saudi Arabia has some equipment manufactured wholly or in part in

Germany, such as the Eurofighter Typhoon and the Tornado ground attack craft, but these weapons are a small portion of its complete arsenal. A U.S. embargo would send an important signal to the allies who also supply Saudi Arabia , allowing them to explain participation in the embargo to their own domestic constituencies . This is especially important for countries like France , Germany , and the U nited K ingdom , that need to export arms to keep their own production lines running. While the research shows that sustaining an arms embargo is often the most difficult step, embargoes can restrain

sending states’ arms exports. Even if a U.S. embargo won’t have a direct effect on Saudi Arabia on its own , an embargo is important for building coalitions for a more expansive embargo that could affect Saudi behavior.

The plan forces Saudi Arabia and Iran to the negotiating table without causing an oil crisisLang 19 [Johannes Lang, Harvard Political Review. Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Failure of America’s Middle East Policy. March 6, 2019. https://harvardpolitics.com/columns-old/iran-saudi-arabia-and-the-failure-of-americas-middle-east-policy/]

There is no good reason , idealistic or realistic, for the divergence in U.S. foreign policy towards Saudi Arabia and Iran . The shale revolution has significantly reduced U.S. dependence on oil imports . With in only eight months in 2014, Saudi oil exports to the U nited S tates halved . Today, Washington has no reason to continue its commitment to an alliance that destroys America’s international credibility as a supporter of human rights.

Without an American blank check , the Saudis will likely think twice before invading and bullying their neighboring countries and arming radical terrorists . At the same time, assuaging Iran’s fears about drastic American intervention might allow Iran to shift away from its continued reliance up on Hezbollah , Assad, and Shia militias in Iraq. By forcing Iran and Saudi Arabia to the negotiation table , Trump could bring an end to conflicts in Yemen and Syria and the Qatar blockade.

Scenario 2 – RussiaRussia will use indefinite Yemen conflict to expand Middle East influence – causes Russian basingFenton-Harvey 18 [Jonathan Fenton-Harvey is a journalist and researcher who focuses on conflict, geopolitics and humanitarian issues in the Middle East and North Africa. Russia's deadly game in Yemen. March 6, 2018. https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/indepth/2018/3/6/Russias-deadly-game-in-Yemen]

Yemen's war has raged for three years and shows no immediate sign of ending . Warring factions have done little to gain ground over the other and, after more than 10,000 deaths and an astronomical humanitarian crisis, the conflicting parties are fighting a protracted stalemate within an increasingly destroyed country.

As the war drags on, it is increasingly clear that no military solution can end the conflict . Only diplomacy can achieve this. Yet no single power has yet acted to facilitate this .

Will Picard, executive director of the Yemen Peace Project, claims that outside powers responsible for stoking the conflict - including the UK and the US - have neglected their responsibilities for making peace.

"That none of these actors are doing any of these things tells us everything we need to know about how serious they are about peace, and how little they care about the Yemeni people," said Picard.

With Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman's travels to Britain and the United States this month, the Washington Institute claimed that it will be a priority of Western leaders to address the coalition's actions in Yemen, and push the kingdom to change course.

Yet given the impunity given to the coalition by both nations, with Britain reportedly increasing weapons sales and blocking UN investigations into Yemen, there is little reason to believe either will make peacemaking in Yemen a priority.

That no global power has tried to restore peace has left a void , which Russia appears to be looking to fill. Early on in the conflict, Moscow kept a close eye on Yemen, and positioned itself as a potential leading mediator in the crisis.

In January, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov stated the need to bring a diplomatic end to Yemen's war.

"It is essential that the participants in the conflict give up their attempts to solve the existing problems by force," he insisted.

Moscow would engage with all sides to help the situation "move from a military scenario to a political dialogue", added Lavrov.

Lavrov last week called for the international community to encourage more dialogue with all sides, in an interview with The Reporter.

More significantly, its vetoing of a British-led UN Security Council resolution over Yemen last week - which critics say was too harsh on Iran and the Houthis, and too favourable towards the Saudi-led coalition - shows that Russia is taking a more direct stance on Yemen.

It also shows that the West's policies in the Middle East - which in this case have echoed the Saudi line of needing to curtail Iran's influence in Yemen - have once again been foiled by Russia.

Russia's stronger position in Yemen is indicative of a shifting power balance in the Middle East . Russia has

overwhelmingly outmanoeuvred the United States in Syria. Overall, Moscow 's presence is expanding .

Russian President Vladimir Putin has shown himself to be an opportunist in the past and would conceivably use Yemen to expand his own influence .

Oleg Ozerov, deputy director of the Africa department at Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, believes that Russia looks to take a stronger stance in Yemen and could therefore take responsibility in leading negotiations to end Yemen's crisis - while involving the West in negotiations too.

It would be easy for Putin; Russia has increasing leverage with Saudi Arabia. Last month, both countries strengthened ties after signing a significant energy deal. This follows the significant rapprochement between Moscow and Riyadh last year, highlighting strengthening bilateral relations.

Meanwhile, Russia has played a balancing act by supporting the Houthis, having in the past abstained from UN resolutions to block weapons transfers to the rebels, while also claiming Houthi rocket fire into Saudi Arabia is a matter of "self-defence". Moscow has also sent aid into Houthi areas, which were neglected by the Saudi-coalition and its backers.

All this takes place while Russia ostensibly supports the UN-recognised Hadi government, which is backed by Saudi Arabia. Across the Middle East, Moscow is asserting its dominance, supporting Iran and Syria, while maintaining good relations with Israel.

Moscow is therefore in a better position than several other global powers to bring an end to the crisis.

There seems to be a degree of support for a greater Russian presence from some Yemeni factions too - notably among Houthi figures and others including Yahya Mohammed Abdullah Saleh, nephew of deceased Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh. The younger Saleh, head of Yemen's Alliance for Progress and Development Organisation, said he was hopeful that Russia could break Yemen's deadlock and bring peace to the area.

Tracing back the footsteps of history of being a power-broker in the region, analysts remember that the Soviet Union supported South Yemen in the 1960s civil war, while retaining good ties with the North.

"Russian leadership has met previously with both Houthi representatives and the Hadi government, so Moscow could conceivably help to facilitate talks," said Picard.

"However, it's hard to imagine that Russia is concerned with making peace , and much more likely that Putin wants to find a way to use the chaos in Yemen to his own advantage ," he added.

There has been talk of Russia looking to open military bases in Yemen , while Yemeni bases have been opened to Russia n access . Having strong ties with factions on the ground would allow for Russian expansion.

Russia could strengthen itself in the region in other ways. Bloomberg recently reported that Saudi Arabia may invest in the Russian S-400 air-defence system, while shifting away from Western suppliers, showing signs of Russia already benefitting from increased influence.

Yemen's crises present Russia with an opportunity to further expand its influence and once again outmanoeuvre the West. But, as ever, it is the people of Yemen who are being used as playing pieces in the game of geopolitical power.

Russian Red Sea basing causes Mediterranean power projection and counters US naval presence through shipping inspections and cut-offsBrookes 3/11/19 [Peter Brookes, Senior Research Fellow at Heritage. Russia’s Africa Ambitions. March 11, 2019. https://www.heritage.org/europe/commentary/russias-africa-ambitions]

Well, picture this: Through diplomatic agreements , Russian puts a limited number of bases —even civilian and/or military facilities that are just lightly manned and equipped but capable of being quickly augmented—in Sudan, Eritrea and Libya.

Bases in Sudan and Eritrea would potentially allow Moscow to collect intelligence on , interfere with , shipping through the Red Sea between the Mediterranean and the Arabian Seas. This would include U.S. warships sailing to, or from, the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean .

In Libya, this would potentially allow Russia to project air and naval power into the Mediterranean Sea across NATO’s southern flank, adding to its eastern Mediterranean presence at its air and naval bases in Syria.

Of course, not all of the deals that politicians propose are concluded or brought to fruition due to a variety of reasons—from the financial to the cultural; indeed, there may never be a Russian military bases in Sudan and Eritrea—or Libya.

But just the possibility of these developments —even if nascent—is unnerving, considering the strategic importance of the Mediterranean and the Red Seas to American national interests and those of our allies and partners .

That causes NATO-Russia warKasapoğlu 3/15/19 [Dr. Can Kasapoğlu, Defense Analyst, Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies and Europe Fellow at the German Institue for International and Security Affairs. Why and How NATO Should Adapt to a New Mediterranean Security Environment. March 15, 2019. https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2019C15/]

NATO faces a problematic threat landscape in the Mediterranean . The Alliance has to deal with hot topics

that range from Russia’s robust military posture and involvement in the Syrian Civil War to ISIS terrorism and the migrant crisis. To address all of these challenges, NATO should boost its engagement with partner nations, produce a new maritime security approach, and counterbalance Moscow’s strategic foothold in the eastern Mediterranean.

Against the backdrop of Russia’s interventions in Georgia and Ukraine, the Alliance’s eastern flank has been the geopolitical epicenter of

contention between NATO and Russia while the southern flank has taken a back seat . The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation enjoy clear superiority in their Western Military District over the Baltic NATO members (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) and Poland. Moreover, this correlation of forces is augmented by the strong combined-arms and mobilization capabilities of the Russian military. Notably, RAND’s Arroyo Center conducted a series of war games in 2014 and 2015 simulating a Russian incursion into the Baltics. The findings, published in a special report in 2016, highlighted that Russian forces could reach the outskirts of Tallinn and Riga within 60 hours. These considerations

put the eastern flank affairs at the forefront for NATO while the southern flank – and the Medi ter ranean in particular –

remains an over shadowed flashpoint . Indeed, these war game reports concluded nightmare scenarios for capitals in the eastern

flank, but key metropoles of NATO nations have already witnessed devastating terrorist attacks stemming from the south . The migrant crisis has plagued the Euro-Medi terranean area . In addition, as underlined by the 2018 Brussels Summit Declaration, Turkey has been hit three times in the last four years by missiles launched from Syria. Finally, the Mediterranean witnessed the most dangerous chemical weapons use of the 21st century, which triggered US-led punitive strikes against the Syrian Baath regime. In brief, NATO’s southern flank has gone through fire and water.

The Alliance faces two risk categories in the south. First, there is the rise of violent non-state actors, state failures, and human security issues.

Second, NATO has to deal with state-led challenges emanating from Russia’s rising military posture in the eastern Mediterranean . However, unlike the broadly accepted eastern flank narrative, the allies have yet to reach a consensus in the south.

Terrorist Threats and Spillovers

On November 13, 2015, a series of coordinated terrorist attacks shook Paris. Within five days, France’s flagship Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier had left its home port in Toulon and sailed to the eastern Mediterranean to conduct airstrikes on ISIS. The carrier then passed through the Suez Canal to assume the command of the US task force in the Gulf (CTF-50) in counter-terrorism operations. Around the same time, then-French Prime Minister Manuel Valls told parliament that France could be at risk of a chemical or biological terrorism attack. In fact, only one year earlier, a laptop captured from a Tunisian ISIS operative in Syria revealed the terrorist group’s plans for using weapons of mass destruction, including efforts to weaponize bubonic plague.

Similar patterns – namely ISIS connections or time spent with ISIS fighters in the Middle East and North Africa – were present in the 2016 Brussels bombings, the 2016 Berlin Christmas market truck attack (the Tunisian perpetrator was linked to an ISIS cell in Libya), the 2016 Ataturk Airport attack in Istanbul, and the 2017 Istanbul nightclub shooting, among many others.

The one and only time that the Alliance invoked Article V – the collective defense clause of the North Atlantic Treaty – was in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, less than 24 hours after al-Qaeda targeted NATO territory. Thus, NATO had acknowledged that the fight against terrorism was one of its duties. In October 2001, NATO’s Standing Naval Forces kicked off Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean, a counter-terrorism effort conducted in compliance with Article V.

There is little room for optimism regarding the terrorism challenge in the south. Al-Qaeda was largely the product of the Afghan jihad in the 1980s, which attracted 5,000 to 20,000 foreign fighters according to various estimates. The Syrian jihad, on the other hand, mobilized up to 40,000 foreign fighters, with some 7,000 of those being from NATO countries. In other words, the real fallout from the Syrian jihad remains to be seen in the coming decades.

Failed and fragile states have become vectors for terrorism in the Euro-Mediterranean region. Syria and Libya may never function as “states” in a Weberian sense again, as militancy could turn into “institutionalized warlordism” in these countries.

NATO should grasp this trend in a geopolitically holistic way. Due to global demographic trends, intrastate conflicts increasingly tend to take place in urbanized areas. Coupled with the growing lethality of modern firepower, overwhelming migrant influxes will accompany each urban warfare case from now on.

Terrorist activity across the southern Mediterranean is complex in nature. Tunisia has a problematic home-grown militancy issue, and this jihadist potential has found a safe haven in Libya amidst the collapse of the Libyan state. Open-source intelligence suggests that training camps established in Libya were used to dispatch Tunisian foreign fighters to Syria. The militancy issue in Libya also threatens Egypt’s Western Desert area and overstretches Egyptian security forces between the Libyan frontier and Sinai. In many cases, one cannot separate smuggling, terrorism, and violent extremism from each other in the southern Mediterranean. The Algerian national Mokhtar Belmokhtar, for example, is a key figure in al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb as well as an infamous champion of organized crime. He is known as “Mr Marlboro” or “the King of Marlboros” due to his cigarette smuggling activities.

Overall, NATO does not have an easy way out. Much like its close cooperation with eastern flank partners, for example Finland and Sweden, the Alliance needs to boost its engagement in the southern flank with its Mediterranean Dialogue partners. In fact, the Mediterranean Dialogue is a product of NATO’s post-Cold War efforts. Since its establishment in 1994, the regional security environment has gained completely different characteristics. At present, the Alliance needs to initiate tailor-made assistance programs for border security, security sector reform, intelligence cooperation with NATO structures, humanitarian challenges, and counter-terrorism.

Furthermore, although the establishment of the NATO Strategic Direction South Hub (2017) is a milestone for the Alliance, the hub can only make a meaningful difference if it can ensure the Mediterranean Dialogue partners’ permanent engagements. Otherwise, this important effort might not be embraced by its target audience.

State-led Challenge: Russia as NATO’s Southern Neighbor

As these risks from non-state actors persist, NATO has a new and ambitious neighbor in the Mediterranean.

The intervention in Syria has fostered the Russian military’s combat readiness . According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, more than 63,000 military personnel – including 434 generals and more than 26,000 officers – served in Syria. This includes about 90 percent of the combat pilots who have flown missions over the Syrian skies and 60 percent of the strategic and long-range aviation crews

who have taken part in operations. Furthermore, Russia has tested more than 200 weapon systems through its campaign. The Syrian expedition has led to fundamental improvements in the concept of operations. Long-range precision-strike capabilities provided by Kalibr land-attack cruise missiles remain the most notable achievement in this respect. In October 2015, the Russian Navy first used these high-end missiles from warships in the Caspian Sea. The missiles reportedly traveled some 1,800 km before hitting their targets in Syria.

The strikes marked a significant success for Moscow. In December 2015 and March 2017, Russian Navy submarines also launched Kalibr mis siles from the Mediterranean . Thus, NATO should be worried about the strategic ramifications of this trend . The Russian Navy can now use its relatively small vessels for long-range conventional strikes and commission its submarines to attack strategic targets deep in enemy territory without passing the nuclear threshold.

NATO-Russia war causes extinction – miscalc compounds risk and it outweighs every other conflictMajumdar 4/23/19 [Dave Majumdar is the defense editor for the National Interest. Hell: How Many Millions Would Die In a NATO-Russia War? April 23, 2019. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/hell-how-many-millions-would-die-nato-russia-war-53857]

If the Russians do not the intent to invade the Baltics or have the forces in place to start a war, what might start a conflict in Latvia, Lithuania

and Estonia? Oliker posits a plausible scenario where a misunderstanding could spark a war .

“It is plausible that the saber rattling , perhaps combined with exercises , could lead NATO countries to be concerned that some sort of Russian action in the Baltics is planned,” Oliker said. “If that then results in NATO military actions geared to neutralize Russian capabilities in Kaliningrad, Moscow could, in turn, perceive that as a threat (recall that most of Russia’s scenarios start with some sort of NATO aggression) and take steps to ameliorate that threat. Particularly in the absence of sound communication channels , and if tensions are otherwise high, it is possible that these competing actions could lead to an escalation spiral including , with everyone on edge

and predicting aggression from the potential adversary, to conflict .”

If a war were to breakout in the Baltics between Russian and NATO, it might ultimately be irrelevant what the conventional balance is on the ground . “The other problem with the fixation on conventional deterrence in the Baltic fight is that

just as in the old standoff between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, this battle is fraught with opportunities for nuclear escalation,” Kofman wrote. “Most Russian experts I know in the military analysis community, including those in Russia,

don’t see much of a chance for conventional battle with NATO to stay conventional .”

If NATO forces cross into Russian territory, that might provoke a nuclear response from Moscow . “There is

a possibility that if Russian forces are sufficiently degraded or defeated in Kaliningrad that Moscow may resort to or threaten nuclear first use,” Kofman wrote. “Nuclear escalation is not assured, but given the impact of such an outcome, perhaps the best strategy is to make decisions that afford the most opportunities for managing escalation dynamics. That means a force posture oriented toward

strategic flexibility, not entrenchment.” Such a war will almost certainly escalate into a full -up nuclear war between the planet’s only two nuclear superpowers —which means everyone loses.

That causes several nuclear warsBurrows 17 [Mathew J. Burrows, Director, Foresight, Strategy, and Risks Initiative at the Atlantic Council. Western Options in a Multipolar World. November 2017. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/Western_Options_in_a_Multipolar_World_web_1127.pdf]

Multipolarity has historically been less stable than when there has been a strong hegemon or even a bipolar distribution of power. Today's world is not just characterized by a growing number of state actors in the world—symbolized by displacement of the Group of Seven (G7) with the Group of Twenty (G20) leading industrialized and emerging economies—but also by a diffusion of power to non-state actors, some of whom have the means for inflicting violence on a level that used to be the monopoly of states. With robotics and biotechnology, the trend of growing non-state lethality will only grow. Terrorists and insurgents have already gained access to precision-strike capabilities and cyber instruments. The Middle East is where the better-armed, non-state actors are concentrated, but terrorism has a long arm and many groups are routinely hitting European and US targets.

Major state conflict—which has not occurred on a large scale since the Korean War—has historically occurred more often in less-stable multipolar worlds . Recent work by Harvard University’s Graham Allison points to the likelihood of challengers to any global system ending up in a fight with the declining hegemon .9 There are only a couple instances of a peaceful transition-such as happened after the Second World War—when the declining hegemon—Britain—

handed off its global role to the rising star—the United States. In cases where there is not a peaceful arrangement, mounting tensions between challenger and hegemon easily tip over into open conflict .

Nuclear weapons acted to limit the scope of US-Soviet Union conflicts but the worry today is that certain nuclear -capable states —India , Pakistan , and No rth Ko rea —do not have the same built-in inhibitions that developed during the early phase of the Cold War . If the North Korean regime faced a threat to its

survival, it would most likely use nuclear weapons. While the Soviet Union had a “ n o f irst u se ” policy, Russia has recently developed a new military doctrine that justifies a limited nuclear strike if faced with a large-scale conventional attack that exceeded its ability to reverse. To Russian thinking, the limited nuclear strike would de-escalate a conflict, but it could do the opposite.

Competing visions of how the international order should be run are a feature of the current multipolarity. Rising powers, led by Russia and China, in particular dispute Western norms and policies that undercut national sovereignty. They decry Western democracy-promotion efforts, citing the instability that has resulted from regime changes in Iraq and Libya and comparing Western unseating of rulers to the colonialism of the nineteenth century. Hence, there has been no agreement by the five permanent members (P5'°) of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on ending the Syrian civil war—one of the largest humanitarian disasters in modern history—because of Russian and Chinese worries that it would set another precedent for deposing an authoritarian leader.

SCS conflict goes nuclear – threat’s underratedTalmadge 18 [Caitlin Talmadge is Associate Professor of Security Studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. This essay is adapted from “Would China Go Nuclear? Assessing the Risk of Chinese Nuclear Escalation in a Conventional War With the United States,” International Security, Spring 2017. Beijing’s Nuclear Option: Why a U.S.-Chinese War Could Spiral Out of Control. 2018. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-15/beijings-nuclear-option]

As China’s power has grown in recent years, so, too, has the risk of war with the U nited S tates . Under President Xi

Jinping, China has increased its political and economic pressure on Taiwan and built military installations on coral reefs in the S outh C hina S ea , fueling Washington’s fears that Chinese expansionism will threaten U.S. allies and influence in the region . U.S. destroyers have transited the Taiwan Strait, to loud protests from Beijing. American

policymakers have wondered aloud whether they should send an aircraft carrier through the strait as well. Chinese fighter jets have intercepted U.S. aircraft in the skies above the S outh C hina S ea . Meanwhile, U.S. President Donald Trump has brought long- simmering economic disputes to a rolling boil .

A war between the two countries remains unlikely, but the prospect of a military confrontation —resulting, for example, from a

Chinese campaign against Taiwan—no longer seems as implausible as it once did. And the odds of such a confrontation going nuclear are higher than most policymakers and analysts think .

Members of China’s strategic community tend to dismiss such concerns. Likewise, U.S. studies of a potential war with China often exclude nuclear weapons from the analysis entirely , treating them as basically irrelevant to the course of a conflict. Asked about the issue in 2015, Dennis Blair, the former commander of U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific, estimated the likelihood of a U.S.-Chinese nuclear crisis as “somewhere between nil and zero.”

This assurance is misguided . If deployed against China, the Pentagon’s preferred style of conventional warfare would be a potential recipe for nuclear escalation . Since the end of the Cold War, the United States’ signature approach to war has been simple: punch deep into enemy territory in order to rapidly knock out the opponent’s key military assets at minimal cost. But the Pentagon developed this formula in wars against Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Serbia, none of which was a nuclear power .

NEG vs Saudi Arabia

End-Use CPThe United States federal government should

- create a new Single Export Control Agency tasked with oversight and control of US arms sales.

- ensure the agency has broad enforcement and end-use and end-user monitoring authority.

- substantially increase funding for the Blue Lantern and Golden Sentry programs.

That’ll solve the case – it streamlines existing programs and ensures broad compliance with end-use restrictions.Eddy ’14 (Jessica, J.D. from George Mason, “Re-focusing Export Control: A Review of the Obama Administration’s Export Control Reform Initiative and Suggestions for the Future,” CITBA Policy Paper, May 13. 2014, http://citba.org/documents/2013-JessicaEddy.pdf)

VI. Legal Solutions to Strengthen Export Control Reform While the Obama Administration’s is implementation of some of the goals of the ECRI, more actions are required to ensure the total permanency of the export control reform efforts and the protection of U.S. interests. First, as part of the export control overhaul, new Congressional legislation is needed to establish a single export agency, a single export control list, and more authority to ensure end-use and end-user monitoring. Second, the United States must seek ways to enhance international arms trade controls worldwide. Defense Trade Treaties and ratification of the United Nation Arms Trade Treaty are two avenues to increase export controls globally

in areas that are beyond U.S. jurisdiction. a. New Congressional Legislation New legislation is needed to ensure the Obama Administration’s ECRI is carried through into the future in order to overcome the archaic export control framework now in place. While the President has the Constitutional mandate as Commander and Chief that gives him or her authority over issues affecting national security, this position is not entrusted with authorities specifically enumerated to Congress.135 Congress is specifically granted the authority to “regulate commerce with foreign nations.”136 Therefore, because the purpose of export controls is to regulate sensitive technologies within commerce, Congress has the ultimate authority to legislate in this area.137 While the current ECRI efforts to overhaul the USML and CCL are authorized,

Congress should act to con solidate the existing export control framework into a comprehensive regulatory scheme that ensures efficiency, transparency, and accountabili ty. In order to accomplish these goals, new legislation should encompass a single export agency, a single export control list, and more robust end-use and end-user requirements . i. Single Export Control Agency (SECA) The Obama Administration identified the need for a single export control agency (SECA) to administer and oversee the export control regime, but has yet to detail what this agency’s functions should be and under what authority it should operate. Under Executive Order 13558, President Obama created the Export Coordination Enforcement Center (ECEC) is housed under the Department of Homeland Security.138 The ECEC is an interagency group that takes a whole-of-government approach to “strengthened and coordinated enforcement of United States export control laws and enhanced intelligence exchange in support of such enforcement efforts.”139 The group coordinates efforts of the Departments of State, Treasury, Defense, Justice, Commerce, Energy, Homeland Security, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, other executive branch departments, agencies, or offices as the President, from time to time, may designate.140 While this Executive Order takes a step in the right direction of creating a single agency, it falls short of creating the type of agency with the weight and authority to oversee all export control issues. The ECEC is a coordination body only. It specifically does not “provide exclusive or primary investigative authority to any agency.”141 It lacks any true independence because its function and administration are subject to the Department of Homeland Security and its budget.142 The ECEC has no authority to resolve jurisdiction conflicts between agencies, and the Executive Order is silent both on concurrence of certain agencies when making export control determination, as well as how conflict resolution should occur.143 Furthermore, because the ECEC is the creation of Executive Order, it is subject to the whims of political tides. The ability of each successive administration to shape the ECEC based on the current political climate leaves one of the most critical national security functions open to an unchecked political or public caprice. The ECEC does not go far enough to resolve the over-complexity that exists under today’s export control regime. A legislatively-created SECA is required

to ensure successful export control overhaul. A SECA is essential to create transparency and consistency in U.S. export control regulations. However, an agency that lacks authority to resolve the issues noted above is insufficient from overhauling export control. Conversely, a complete divorce from the current export control authorities would have unintended consequences. Each of the

agencies currently involved in the export control regime bring a unique perceptive on questions of technology control and a new SECA must

ensure a hostile approach to account for the military, political, and economic impacts of approving or denying a license request. To that end, Congress should enact legislation creating a new SECA independent of, but informed by, the Department of State, Commerce and Defense that currently oversee this regime. However, such legislation must be carefully crafted to ensure no usurpation or duplication of effort for the critical missions these agencies otherwise fulfill as part of their mandate. In other words, the new SECA must thrive and be successful because of the inputs of the existing export agencies versus trying to re-

create or self-inform on military, political, and economic factors relevant to export control license approvals. At a basic level, the SECA should act as an administrative coordinating venue but with strong enforcement oversight . It should be overseen by a Secretary responsible for coordinating the positions of each existing agency and ensuring consensus and concurrence is reached on controlled. Input from the existing agencies would be mandatory and consultation required when consensus is not reached. For unresolved issues of high importance (such as national security, foreign policy, or economic impact, etc.) the SECA should be responsible for presenting

export control decisions to the President for final determinations. The SECA must be required to report to Congress when proposed exports of major defense equipment, articles, and services meeting specific dollar thresholds are triggered under a license or treaty, regardless of their military or dual-use status. 144 The SECA must also have enforcement and end-use and end-user monitoring authority.145 It must have the right to bring civil and criminal actions against exporters or purchasers that knowingly and willingly violate export control regulations . Finally, it should be required to report to Congress on administrative and criminal violations of export laws. ii. Single Export Control List (SECL) The Obama Administration’s efforts to review and delist technologies on the USML are a positive step in moving the ECRI forward. However, the USML and CCL must be collapsed into one list to form a single accumulative list of export controlled items. Congress should ensure this consolidation through legislation that requires the single export control list (SECL) to take primacy and detailing what items are controlled on what level. The SECL should be a culmination of both military and dual-use technologies. It should offer varying levels of control to account for the range of least sensitive to most critical technologies. When possible, controlled items should specify what technical parameters of a particular technology are controlled. The SECL must harmonize existing licensing requirements and policies and ensure the license application process is clear and transparent to industry. The list should be subject to annual review to determine appropriate removal of items which have little or no military or intelligence significance. Such a review must include a foreign availability assessment to determine whether sensitive technologies are already available globally and evaluate if U.S. controls are warranted if a positive determination is found. A SECL overseen by a SECA eliminates the jurisdictional issues that exist under the current export control framework. Additionally, a SECL benefits U.S. manufactures by reducing the compliance costs to both large firms and SMEs who would have a one-stop-shop when determining if technology is controlled or not. A SECL administered by a SECA would also ensure consistency in licensing applications reviews, as well as a consolidated record of decisions and actions associated with controlled technologies. This would

create the much need transparency, consistency, and accountability that is lacking in the current export control regime. iii. Enhancing End-Use and End-User Monitoring and Enforcement New legislation must also ensure the SECA has strong oversight and enforcement authority . From an administrative standpoint, a SECA allows a streamlined opportunity to

track exported items and technologies. The SECA would be responsible for tracking the life cycle of a technology export from licensing application through end-use and end-user monitori ng . This would create records from a

technology transfer to be housed in one place in one system. This consolidation will make end-use and end-user monitoring easier to track and enforce . To that end, Congress must ensure strong enforcement provisions for the SECA. The new

SECA must have investigative authority to query end users about the whereabouts and use of controlled technologies. End-users who fail to comply with the SECA’s follow-up inquires must be subject to various levels of legislatively-approved sanctions, including but not limited to warning letters, watch lists, exclusions from end-use of certain technologies, ineligibility for military sale, and suspension or cancellation of contracts, and possibly sanctions. The SECA must have the responsibility for monitoring and reporting to Congress on multiple export control offenders. It should also make recommendations to Congress for further legislative sanctions if it is found that an allied or partner nation are not abiding by the terms of end-use and end-user restrictions against third-party transfers. The SECA recommendations should include country monitoring to identifying systemic issues, removing STA exemption eligibly, or sanctions for repeat

end-use and end-user violations. Congressional action to overhaul the current export control regime by legislatively creating a SECA, SECL, and enhanced end-use and end-monitoring controls will ensure export control accomplishes the objectives of protect ing national security and technological superiority.

Oil DA – Econ Oil prices have stabilized at $65 – fundamentals prevent any large price spikes in the status quoTDBFG 19 (TD Bank Financial Group, citing data from the Energy Intelligence Group and the International Energy Agency, May 2, 2019.

“Oil Price Outlook: Hitting the Sweet Spot.” https://www.actionforex.com/contributors/fundamental-analysis/194929-oil-price-outlook-hitting-the-sweet-spot/)

Global oil prices have been on a wild ride over the past year. After peaking at a four-year high of US$76 last October, the price of West Texas Intermediate (WTI) tumbled more than 40% at the end of 2018 (Chart 1). Since then, prices have staged an impressive comeback, with WTI returning back to the US$66 level. The rally coincided with improving risk sentiment as well as reduced recession risks and expectations of stabilizing demand. Still, a more important influence has been on the supply side, where cuts by OPEC+ have effectively eliminated a sizeable production surplus in the global oil market. Indeed, total world crude oil supply is now estimated to be around 2.5 to 3.1 million bpd below its

peak in November 1. With prices now running generally in line with fundamentals , we expect that WTI and other global benchmarks are likely to trade side-ways over the next few quarters. In our view, any move above the top end of the

US$60 to US$65 range is likely to prove short-lived . In such a scenario, we would expect supply to enter the market rather quickly. The outlook for Canadian oil benchmarks is slightly less favourable, with the

discount on the WCS benchmark expected to widen going forward (see Box 1). This forecast reflects longstanding transportation issues, the fading impact of the curtailment plan, and the recent drop in crude-by-rail shipments Box 1: Update on Canadian Oil Benchmarks Canadian oil spreads have narrowed remarkably since the Alberta government announced a plan to curtail production last December. Since then, prices have comfortably followed the rally in global benchmarks, with the WTI-WCS spread stable and averaging an unusually narrow US$10 since the start of the year. The curtailment plan is intended as a temporary solution to a supply glut problem that sent discounts to record levels last fall, including on lighter oil variations and synthetic crude. Starting in February, production limits have been gradually eased as a response by the government to improving prices and inventory reductions at the time. Still, we doubt that this low discount can be sustained in the near and medium term amid still-high inventories and a recent collapse in crude-by-rail shipments. Media reports and announcements by some producers have suggested that the recent spread levels (around US$10) are too low to justify the marginal cost of crude-by-rail shipments (at around US$15-US$20 range). This recent drop in energy export volumes2 and crude-by-rail shipments will likely slow down the inventory draws in the near term, thus adding further uncertainty (Chart 2). Indeed, the discount has widened (albeit only slightly) in the past two weeks, now sitting closer to US$12.5. Longer term, demand side drivers for Canadian heavy oil remain relatively strong, with a large proportion of U.S. refineries configured for heavy oil as feedstock. Given that U.S. production is primarily of a lighter variant (WTI) and that alternative heavy oil sources are lacking and/or declining, this should maintain stable demand for Canadian heavy oil in the foreseeable future. A lack of pipeline capacity remains a key longer-term barrier to Canadian heavy oil prices. A recent delay to Line 3, initially relied on to start operations by the end of 2019, has added to the uncertainty – with the pipeline now expected to be completed in the second half of 2020. At the same time, there has been minimal progress on the TransMountain (TMX) and Keystone XL pipelines from a regulatory perspective. A Federal decision on TMX is expected (albeit not guaranteed) in June. Other factors contributing to forthcoming uncertainty include the potential cancellation of additional rail capacity planned by the previous Alberta government, which would erase around 120K of planned transportation capacity, and the International Maritime Organization regulations on sulphur caps coming into effect next year (IMO 2020). On the whole, we believe that the current discount on Canadian heavy oil is likely too low, and continue to expect that it will widen again to levels near US$15-US$20 range by year-end. This forecast reflects the fading impact of the Alberta curtailment plan (and the easing in production limits), the potential impact of the recent drop in crude-by-rail shipments and export volumes on inventories, and the lack of progress on transportation and pipeline capacity. With pipeline delays still on the horizon and with the production curtailment plan winding down, crude-by-rail continues to be the marginal option for transportation, justifying a discount in the aforementioned range. Risk sentiment has improved since late 2018 Heading into last summer, market participants were feeling quite optimistic about oil prices. By October, the price for a barrel of WTI and Brent oil had risen around US$16 and US$20 dollars from the outset of the year, respectively. But with the start of autumn came an abrupt change of scenery. In a matter of 12 weeks, WTI fell from a high of US$76 to a trough of US$42, catching market participants and producers by surprise. Much of this change coincided

with sudden souring in the global economic outlook and risk appetite. Since December, risk sentiment has notably improved , and was matched by a similar movement in oil markets . For instance, net non-commercial positions in oil futures (used as a proxy for speculative

positions) have bounced back sharply, though not reaching the peak levels posted during last year’s price run-up (Chart 3). While the timing of WTI’s drop and consequent rebound has been identical to that of other major risk assets (including the S&P 500 Index as shown in Chart 1) the magnitude of the swing has been relatively pronounced. Underlying the broad tailwind to prices from the ‘risk-on’ behavior so far this year has been a steady tightening in the crude supply-demand balance. In the second half of 2018, daily world production was exceeding

consumption by as much as 2.5 million barrels per day, pushing up global inventories sharply. The excess daily output has been swiftly addressed since the start of the year. Demand expectations are mixed, but stabilizing With the increased global uncertainty last year

came both a significant lowering in near-term global GDP growth and oil consumption projections. The IMF’s recent World Economic Outlook placed world growth at 3.3% in 2019 (Chart 4). This is a further downgrade from October (3.7%), and equates to over US$300 billion removed from global GDP. Our sensitivity analysis suggests that a 0.3 ppt shock to global GDP growth results in around a 200K bpd drop in global oil demand (Chart 5). On the plus side, recent data, such as that for global business sentiment surveys, have started to turn the corner. A pause in rate hikes and a dovish tilt by major central banks has been supportive for growth expectations going forward. In addition, renewed Chinese stimulus and infrastructure spending is expected to support improved sentiment in 2019. At the same time, worries around an escalating China-US trade war have dissipated and so too have fears of a looming

recession. This bodes well for a firming in oil consumption later this year. Drilling down on demand by country reveals that China, India, and the U.S., are driving a significant chunk of the growth in demand

in the last few years (Chart 6). For these countries, consumer and manufacturing-related growth is still holding relatively strong. It is demand from advanced economies (ex-U.S.) that is at risk, including Japan, South Korea, and European countries. This coincides with IMF’s forecast, which cut growth expectations the most in advanced economies. Putting the demand picture together, growth forecasts (y/y) are

ranging from 1.2 to 1.4 million bpd in 2019 as a whole3. We expect that growth in 2019 will be at the lower end of this range, given

our relatively conservative 3.2% global growth forecast. Stabilizing global GDP growth should be enough to at least keep demand stable over the near-term forecast horizon and prevent it from slipping significantly below this range.

Supply-side factors are doing the heavy lifting The more prominent factor behind oil’s fundamental turnaround is the supply

side. Total world supply has fallen by more than 2.5 million bpd since its peak in November – mostly due to

planned and unplanned OPEC+ cuts. OPEC+, led by Saudi Arabia , has reduced output even more than its 1.2 million bpd commitment at its December meeting in Vienna. Compliance

for most producers in OPEC+ has been running well above 100%4. Saudi Arabia’s output alone has dropped more than 1 million bpd, with further drops in most OPEC+ countries. Unplanned and involuntary drops also brought some supply off the market due to the ongoing crisis in Venezuela (more than 400K bpd). In Canada, the mandated government curtailment plan in Alberta, which is home to the oilsands, has seen raw crude oil and bitumen production drop on average of -275K bpd in Q15 (see Box 1 for a detailed analysis on this). The return to deficit territory (Chart 7) of the daily global supply-demand position has removed a key roadblock depressing oil prices. Inventories have been slow to respond, given their elevated starting point6 and the glut formed by the end of 2018. However, signs of tightening and stabilization are starting to emerge. For instance, OECD inventories have reduced (albeit slowly), and are are now narrowing in on their five-year average. A recent development, whereby the U.S. fully eliminated all waivers on sanctioned Iranian oil is expected to further deepen the deficit in the near-

term. Still, any such upward impact on prices and balances should not linger for long , especially with OPEC’s spare capacity now at upwards of 3 million barrels per day7 and with U.S. shale production being relatively elastic. Historically, OPEC has offset unexpected reductions in global oil supply (Chart 8). With the recent elimination of Iranian waivers, we expect that OPEC+ will gradually reverse some of the recent cuts over the second half of the year, following its June meeting. On the

flip side, U.S. shale production is likely to continue to grow. Average annual production was more than 500K bpd higher than initial estimates in 2018. The EIA forecasts production will increase by around 1.4 million bpd in 2019 and another 0.7 million bpd in 20208. The comparable rate posted in 2018 was 1.6 million bpd. This would result in a significant supply build, though a lesser one than that which occurred in 2018. This slowdown in production growth is consistent with the number of oil rigs in operation. Here we have seen a modest decline since the autumn 2018 price slump (Chart 9). Rig counts remain well below their elevated pre-2014 investment surge levels. It is important to note that the elasticity of shale output to price changes is relatively high, and rig counts will likely be quick to respond to any expectation of sustained price increases.

Results from the quarterly Dallas Federal Reserve Bank Energy Survey suggest that the breakeven price to profitably drill a new well sits in the US$48-US$54 range (Chart 10), with an average of US$50. Indeed, rig counts declined in the fall of 2018 as prices dropped below that range. Of course, U.S. shale is not the sole determinant of prices, but with relatively low breakeven levels, it is now assumed to be a significant force in keeping prices range-bound. This marginal cost to drill a new well in U.S. shale provides an anchor to our price forecast. Price outlook In sum, the

crude oil market appears to be in a sweet spot with oil prices improving closer to their longer-term fundamental level, output growing in line with consumption, and stockpiles on track to be worked off towards historical norms. As such, our base case assumes that WTI prices will trend in the US$60-US$65 (Chart 11) range within the next two years . This range also implies that oil prices will continue to trade at a premium to the marginal cost of new U.S. shale production. Our base case relies on near-term global growth expectations holding firm at around 3.2% and that OPEC+ maintains some of the cuts put in place last December in

the coming months in order to keep the supply-demand fundamentals in balance. Upside risks to the forecast are mostly centered on wildcards , namely supply disruptions and geopolitical factors. This includes further drops in Venezuelan output, disruptions in Libya and Nigeria, or a larger than expected impact of Iranian sanctions on the crude market, which could force the risk premium implied in the price of oil higher. On the downside, the most notable risk is a deeper than projected slowdown in global growth as well as a renewed wave of pessimism in global financial markets.

Saudi will retaliate to the plan by hiking global oil prices – that crushes the global economy Bomey 18 [Deirdre Shesgreen, Chief Congressional Correspondent at USA Today. Nathan Bomey, business reporter at USA Today. Also Hasan Dudar. Will oil prices rise in the wake of the missing Saudi journalist case? October 16, 2018. https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2018/10/16/oil-prices-rise-wake-missing-saudi-journalist-case-khashoggi/1663369002/]

Bain warned, however, that a substantial cut in output like what the Kingdom imposed in the 1970s could lead to the price of oil escalating to $150 per barrel. While that scenario remains unlikely, “there is little doubt that Saudi Arabia has the ability to single-handedly engineer an other ‘ oil shock ,’” Bain wrote. Warren Patterson, commodities analyst at ING, told CNBC's Squawk Box Europe on Tuesday, said any move to cut production by the Saudis "would only quicken the pace of energy transition." "If this is something the Saudis were allowed to do, they'd be really shooting themselves in the foot," he said. "In the short to

medium term we'll definitely see an incremental amount of demand destruction, but the bigger issue is in the longer term." Energy analyst Phil Flynn told The Associated Press that Saudi Arabia would only hurt itself if they caused a surge in gas prices because they would “ put the world into a recession and that would lower the demand for oil.” The price of a barrel of West Texas Intermediate oil, the U.S. benchmark crude, was trading around $72 per barrel Tuesday afternoon. The price of Brent crude, the global benchmark, was trading around $82. The difference in prices between the two commodities is primarily due to U.S. energy pipeline constraints

and international geopolitical factors. Saudi Arabia makes about 12 percent of global petroleum and remains the world’s largest exporter of the commodity. In terms of U.S. dependence on Saudi oil, as of last month, Saudi Arabia ranked second only to Canada as the source of U.S. crude oil imports , with an average of 948,000 barrels per day in gross U.S. imports, according to the Congressional Research Service. Saudi Arabia produced 7.6 million barrels of crude per day. Danielle Pletka, senior

vice president for foreign and defense policy at the American Enterprise Institute, a center-right think tank, said Saudi Arabia has the ability to keep oil on or off the market, thereby influencing the world price and putting the country “ at the pinnacle of the global energy market .” She said other major oil- producing countries , such as Russia and Venezuela, are not in an economic position to hold back their production . “The bottom line is there’s no such thing as energy independence ,” Pletka said, noting that, depending on the price of oil, it can be cheaper for the U.S. to purchase oil from Saudi Arabia and other countries than to produce it domestically. The tensions only increased over the weekend when President

Donald Trump threatened “severe punishment” against Saudi Arabia and alluded to leveraging a multi-billion dollars in

arms sales between the two allies as a punitive measure , in an interview on CBS’ “60 Minutes” that aired Sunday. For its part, the Saudi government is attacking its critics and not backing down following condemnation from many world leaders over its alleged role in Khashoggi’s death. The U.S. resident and Washington Post writer living in self-imposed exile, disappeared after entering the Saudi consulate in Istanbul on Oct. 2. On Tuesday, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visited Riyadh, where he met with Saudi officials including King Salman and his son, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Over the weekend, as various media outlets reported some evidence linking Khashoggi’s

disappearance and presumed death to Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom government threatened to go after any punishment such as economic sanctions, outside political pressure or even “repeated false accusations.” Turki Aldakhil, general manager of the Saudi-

controlled Al Arabiya News Channel, angrily wrote on the outlet’s English-language website Sunday that U.S.- imposed sanctions on the Kingdom would affect oil production and that prices could jump from $80 a barrel to as much as $400 a barrel. “If US sanctions are imposed on Saudi Arabia, we will be facing an economic disaster that would

rock the entire world ,” he wrote. “Riyadh is the capital of its oil, and touching this would affect oil production before any other vital commodity. It would lead to Saudi Arabia’s failure to commit to producing 7.5 million barrels.”

Economic decline causes nuke warMann 14 (Eric Mann is a special agent with a United States federal agency, with significant domestic and international counterintelligence and counter-terrorism experience. Worked as a special assistant for a U.S. Senator and served as a presidential appointee for the U.S. Congress. He is currently responsible for an internal security and vulnerability assessment program. Bachelors @ University of South Carolina, Graduate degree in Homeland Security @ Georgetown. “AUSTERITY, ECONOMIC DECLINE, AND FINANCIAL WEAPONS OF WAR: A NEW PARADIGM FOR GLOBAL SECURITY,” May 2014, https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/bitstream/handle/1774.2/37262/MANN-THESIS-2014.pdf)

The conclusions reached in this thesis demonstrate how economic considerations within states can figure prominently into the calculus for future conflicts . The findings also suggest that security issues with economic or financial

underpinnings will transcend classical determinants of war and conflict, and change the manner by which rival states engage in hostile acts toward one another . The research shows that security concerns emanating from economic uncertainty and the inherent vulnerabilities within global financial markets will present new challenges for national security, and provide developing states new asymmetric options for balancing against stronger states. The security areas, identified in the proceeding chapters, are likely to mature into global security threats in the immediate future. As the case study on South Korea suggest, the overlapping security issues associated with econ omic decline and reduced military spending by the U nited S tates will affect allied confidence in America’s security guarantees . The study shows that this outcome could cause regional instability or realignments of strategic partnerships in the Asia -pacific region with ramifications for U.S. national security. Rival states and non-state groups may also become emboldened to challenge America ’s status in the

unipolar international system. The potential risks associated with stolen or loose WMD , resulting from poor security, can

also pose a threat to U.S. national security . The case study on Pakistan, Syria and North Korea show how financial constraints affect weapons security making weapons vulnerable to theft, and how financial factors can

influence WMD proliferation by contributing to the motivating factors behind a trusted insider’s decision to sell weapons technology. The inherent vulnerabilities within the global financial markets will provide terrorists’ organizations and other non-state groups, who object to the current international system or distribution of power, with opportunities to disrupt global finance and perhaps weaken America’s status. A more ominous threat originates from states intent on increasing diversification of foreign currency holdings, establishing alternatives to the dollar for international trade, or engaging financial warfare against the United States.

Oil DA – IranSaudi will retaliate to the plan by hiking global oil prices – that crushes the global economy Bomey 18 [Deirdre Shesgreen, Chief Congressional Correspondent at USA Today. Nathan Bomey, business reporter at USA Today. Also Hasan Dudar. Will oil prices rise in the wake of the missing Saudi journalist case? October 16, 2018. https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2018/10/16/oil-prices-rise-wake-missing-saudi-journalist-case-khashoggi/1663369002/]

Bain warned, however, that a substantial cut in output like what the Kingdom imposed in the 1970s could lead to the price of oil escalating to $150 per barrel. While that scenario remains unlikely, “there is little doubt that Saudi Arabia has the ability to single-handedly engineer an other ‘ oil shock ,’” Bain wrote. Warren Patterson, commodities analyst at ING, told CNBC's Squawk Box Europe on Tuesday, said any move to cut production by the Saudis "would only quicken the pace of energy transition." "If this is something the Saudis were allowed to do, they'd be really shooting themselves in the foot," he said. "In the short to

medium term we'll definitely see an incremental amount of demand destruction, but the bigger issue is in the longer term." Energy analyst Phil Flynn told The Associated Press that Saudi Arabia would only hurt itself if they caused a surge in gas prices because they would “ put the world into a recession and that would lower the demand for oil.” The price of a barrel of West Texas Intermediate oil, the U.S. benchmark crude, was trading around $72 per barrel Tuesday afternoon. The price of Brent crude, the global benchmark, was trading around $82. The difference in prices between the two commodities is primarily due to U.S. energy pipeline constraints

and international geopolitical factors. Saudi Arabia makes about 12 percent of global petroleum and remains the world’s largest exporter of the commodity. In terms of U.S. dependence on Saudi oil, as of last month, Saudi Arabia ranked second only to Canada as the source of U.S. crude oil imports , with an average of 948,000 barrels per day in gross U.S. imports, according to the Congressional Research Service. Saudi Arabia produced 7.6 million barrels of crude per day. Danielle Pletka, senior

vice president for foreign and defense policy at the American Enterprise Institute, a center-right think tank, said Saudi Arabia has the ability to keep oil on or off the market, thereby influencing the world price and putting the country “ at the pinnacle of the global energy market .” She said other major oil- producing countries , such as Russia and Venezuela, are not in an economic position to hold back their production . “The bottom line is there’s no such thing as energy independence ,” Pletka said, noting that, depending on the price of oil, it can be cheaper for the U.S. to purchase oil from Saudi Arabia and other countries than to produce it domestically. The tensions only increased over the weekend when President

Donald Trump threatened “severe punishment” against Saudi Arabia and alluded to leveraging a multi-billion dollars in

arms sales between the two allies as a punitive measure , in an interview on CBS’ “60 Minutes” that aired Sunday. For its part, the Saudi government is attacking its critics and not backing down following condemnation from many world leaders over its alleged role in Khashoggi’s death. The U.S. resident and Washington Post writer living in self-imposed exile, disappeared after entering the Saudi consulate in Istanbul on Oct. 2. On Tuesday, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visited Riyadh, where he met with Saudi officials including King Salman and his son, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Over the weekend, as various media outlets reported some evidence linking Khashoggi’s

disappearance and presumed death to Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom government threatened to go after any punishment such as economic sanctions, outside political pressure or even “repeated false accusations.” Turki Aldakhil, general manager of the Saudi-

controlled Al Arabiya News Channel, angrily wrote on the outlet’s English-language website Sunday that U.S.- imposed sanctions on the Kingdom would affect oil production and that prices could jump from $80 a barrel to as much as $400 a barrel. “If US sanctions are imposed on Saudi Arabia, we will be facing an economic disaster that would rock the entire world ,” he wrote. “Riyadh is the capital of its oil, and touching this would affect oil production before any other vital commodity. It would lead to Saudi Arabia’s failure to commit to producing 7.5 million barrels.”

That pressures Iran to renegotiate a better nuclear deal — Saudi supply is keyAl Jazeera 18 [Al Jazeera News. US aims to reduce Iran's oil revenue to zero. July 2, 2018. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/07/aims-reduce-irans-oil-revenue-180702171030835.html]

The US State Department has spelled out a campaign of "maximum economic and diplomatic pressure " to drive Iran towards negotiating a "better" deal to replace the Iran nuclear deal . State Department Director of Policy Planning Brian Hook told reporters on Monday that Iran is not a "normal" country and must meet 12 demands in order to be relieved of

US sanctions. "Normal countries don't terrorize other nations, proliferate missiles and impoverish their own people," Hook said. "This new strategy is not about changing the regime, it is about changing the behaviour of the leadership in Iran to comport with what the Iranian people really want them to do," he said. The State Department said new sanctions, which it described as "snap back" sanctions, will begin on August 4, targeting Iran's automotive sector and its trade in gold and other key metals. A second set of sanctions will snap back on November 6. This set will target Iran's energy sector, focusing on petroleum-related transactions, plus transactions with the central bank of Iran. The move comes two months after US President Donald Trump announced US withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal. International pressure US officials called on countries to cut all imports of Iranian oil when it re-imposes sanctions on Tehran. It called on allies in Europe, Asia and the Middle East to adhere to the sanctions with the aim of pressuring Iran into negotiating a new agreement. Hook said he planned to meet with European allies Britain, France and Germany at the end of the week to discuss Iran. He also said he and senior Treasury Department officials would visit Gulf states "in the coming days." Hook told reporters that the goal of the United States was to get as many

countries as possible down to zero Iranian oil imports. "Our goal is to increase pressure on the Iranian regime by reducing to zero its revenue on crude oil sales ," Hook said. "We are working to minimize disruptions to the global market but

we are confident there is sufficient global spare oil capacity ." Hook said more than 50 international firms have already announced their intention to leave the Iranian market, especially in the energy and financial sectors. "We have been clear with countries and companies around the world that we are bringing severe economic pressure on Iran until the regime changes its destabilizing policies," Hook

said. S audi A rabia's King Salman promised Trump at the weekend that he would raise oil production if needed and that the country has 2 million barrels per day of spare capacity to boost output , the White House

said. In a tweet on Saturday, Trump said the extra Saudi oil would help offset a decline in supply from Iran .

Cutting Iran’s revenue stops nuclearization — they’ll still comply with the deal even without the US, but maintaining economic pressure is keyLockie 18 [Alex is a news editor and a military and foreign-policy blogger at Business Insider. He is from Atlanta. He attended Georgia State University. Trump is beating up on Iran — and it's making Obama look weak. September 21, 2018. https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-strategy-on-iran-is-working-and-makes-obama-look-weak-2018-9]

President Donald Trump has, at almost every turn, defied experts on Iran policy to take a very aggressive track against Tehran. Despite this, Trump has yet to suffer a single tangible consequence or any of the nightmare scenarios that

President Barack Obama warned against. Under Trump, the US has withdrawn from the Iran nuclear deal, a move

Obama officials warned could send the country sprinting toward a nuclear weapon. Iran remains in compliance with the deal today. Trump's White House plans to sanction Iran's oil exports in November, and despite warnings of oil prices spiking or European firms picking

Tehran over Washington, oil prices are steady and even India, a longtime client of Iran's, has cut ties. Despite the pain Iran took from Trump's sanctions, experts contacted by Business Insider expect it to remain in the deal . They say the country has few remaining economic lifelines , and publicly breaching the deal to go nuclear could snuff out the remaining embers. The US military in Syria has repeatedly and stiffly beaten back Iranian and Iranian-linked forces when challenged. Under Obama, the US sought to give Iran a wide berth in Syria as it worked behind the scenes to reach the Iran nuclear deal. In the Strait of Hormuz, a key waterway outside Iran, Iranian ships would frequently harass and threaten US Navy ships. Under Trump, Iran has stopped these provocations. "The president is doing the opposite of what the experts said, and it seems to be working out," Michael Lynch, the president of

Strategic Energy and Economic Research, told The New York Times. Iran is struggling, and the US is fine Since Trump took office, Iran has weathered a series of withering economic and military setbacks.

Iran nuclear weapons would erode global nonprolif and cause nuke warKahl 13 [Colin Kahl, Senior Fellow at Center for a New American Security and an associate professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown. If All Else Fails The Challenges of Containing a Nuclear-Armed Iran. www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_IfAllElseFails.pdf]

Numerous commentators and officials have warned that if Iran defies the international community and develops nuclear weapons, it could fatally undermine the NPT . First, as the National Intelligence Council noted in December of 2012, Iranian nuclear acquisition “could trigger an arms race in the Mid dle East , undermining the nonproliferation regime .”79

Many fear that Saudi Arabia, which views Iran as its principal threat and rival for regional influence, would quickly follow Iran into the nuclear

club (perhaps by acquiring nuclear weapons from Pakistan) and that Turkey, Egypt and possibly other Middle Eastern states would not be far behind. Second, the failure to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons could undermine international respect for the NPT and gut the credibility of U.S. counterproliferation efforts. The United Nations (U.N.) Security Council has passed six resolutions since 2006 demanding that Iran comply with its NPT obligations. Three successive American administrations have also described Iranian nuclear weapons acquisition as “unacceptable,” pledging to do

whatever it takes to stop Iran before it gets the bomb. If Iran nevertheless succeeds in developing nuclear weapons, other states may conclude that the NPT is toothless and that Washington, in particular, lacks the capability and the will to enforce member states’ nonproliferation obligations. Finally, a nuclear-armed Tehran could itself become a supplier of proliferation materials. Even if Iran does not give operational nuclear weapons to allied states or

non-state actors, it might consider providing others with sensitive nuclear assistance, such as centrifuge components or warhead designs. In this way, Tehran could pass sensitive technology to Hezbollah or help jumpstart nuclear programs in allied countries such as Sudan or Venezuela , much as Pakistan’s AQ Khan

network allegedly facilitated proliferation efforts in Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea. Any of these scenarios could spark a wave of additional proliferation , leading to the emergence of multiple nuclear rivals in the Middle East or other volatile regions . Such multipolar nuclear competitions, in turn, could greatly complicate stable deterrence by making attribution for nuclear attacks trickier, creating difficulties for calculating the sufficiency and vulnerability of nuclear arsenals and multiplying the scenarios for crisis miscalc ulation. Even if all the relevant parties were rational , the prospects for inadvertent, unauthorized or accidental use leading to nuclear war would increase .

Alliance DASaudi arms sales and relations are high now – Trump just approved a massive deal.Lee & George 5/24 (Matthew Lee is an AP Diplomatic Writer, Susannah George is an intelligence reporter for AP, “ Trump cites Iran to bypass Congress on Saudi arms sales”, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/congress/senator-trump-says-will-use-loophole-to-sell-arms-to-saudis/2019/05/24/84ebfe7c-7e46-11e9-b1f3-b233fe5811ef_story.html?utm_term=.30a5378f6aca)

WASHINGTON — The Trump administration on Friday invoked a rarely used provision in federal law to bypass congressional review of arms sales to Saudi Arabia, citing threats the kingdom faces from Iran. Secretary of State

Mike Pompeo notified Congress of the decision to use an emergency loophole in the Arms Export Control Act to move ahead with sales of $ 7 billion in precision guided munitions, other bombs and ammunition and aircraft maintenance support to Saudi Arabia , along with the United Arab Emirates and Jordan, without lawmakers’ approval. In his notification, Pompeo said he had made the determination “that an emergency exists which requires the immediate sale” of the weapons “in order to deter further the malign influence of the government of Iran throughout the Middle East region.” He said the transfers “must occur as quickly as possible in order to deter further Iranian adventurism in the Gulf and throughout the Middle East.” Pompeo’s move follows President Donald Trump’s announcement that the U.S. plans to send 1,500 additional troops to the Middle East as part of a build-up in

response to an unspecified threat from Iran. It also comes as the administration has actively courted close ties with Saudi Arabia over congressional objections, notably following the killing of Jamal Khashoggi , a U.S.- based columnist for The Washington Post, by Saudi agents in October. Khashoggi’s slaying, coupled with increasing concerns about civilian casualties resulting from a Saudi-led coalition’s military operation against Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen, prompted lawmakers to block about $2 billion in arms sales to the kingdom for more than a year. Last month, Trump vetoed legislation that would have ended U.S. military assistance for the Saudi-led war in Yemen.

Arms sales are key to US-Saudi relations.Omar & Juneau 17 (Omar Mohamed, Program Officer at Public Service, graduated from the University of Ottawa, Thomas Juneau is an assistant professor at the University of Ottawa’s Graduate School of Public and International Affairs. From 2003 to 2014, he was an analyst with Canada’s Department of National Defence. “The Special Partnership: Considering U.S.-Saudi Relations Through the Alliance”, https://ruor.uottawa.ca/bitstream/10393/36607/1/OMAR%2C%20Mohammed%2020175.pdf, p. 41-43)

Arms transfers between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia represent a major component of the security partnership . U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia touch on both the economic and security dimensions of the bilateral partnership . Alliance politics literature highlights that partners whose strategic interest revolve around the areas of defence and security are more likely to have enduring relationships . To help secure U.S.

defence assurances, Saudi Arabia has pursued complex and lucrative arms deals , which have cemented long- term commitment to the security partnership. For the United States, arms transfers to Saudi Arabia help shore up Saudi Arabia’s defensive capabilities, while providing a reliable market for defence exports.

The Joint Security Cooperation Commission signed between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia in 1972, helped set a long-term framework for arms transfers between the two partners. As early as 1975, the value of U.S. arms sale had risen to an annual $5 billion, as contracts with Saudi

operated as an economic stimulus for the domestic U.S. arms industry. The growing security ties between the two partners allowed the U.S. arms industry to provide new jobs, increase production and reduce per-unit costs for domestic arms supply deals for the U.S.

military.109 As Bronson notes this trend made the Saudi market indispensable for the U.S. arms industry, further raising the cost associated with alliance abandonment .

The U.S. has been Saudi Arabia’s number 1 arms supplier for the duration of their diplomatic relationship . Between 1950 and 2004 the U.S. delivered over $67.1 billion worth of arms to Saudi Arabia under various agreements. 110 This figure has continued to grow , as a growing Iranian threat to U.S. and Saudi

strategic interests has prompted an expansion of defence capability in the region. From 2011 up till 2016, Saudi Arabia was the top destination for U.S. arms exports overall , acquiring 9.7% of total U.S. arms exports worldwide.111 This figure includes the biggest military sale in U.S. history reached with Saudi Arabia in December 2011, for over $60 billion worth of airpower technology to modernize the Saudi Arabian Royal Air Force. 112 This deal included 84 new F-15 U.S. jet fighters, 70 refurbished F-15 jets, 70 Apache and 36 AH-6M helicopters.113 The U.S. and Saudi Arabia have also reached a successive number of deals intended to strengthen Saudi Arabia’s missile and maritime capabilities. In September 2014, the Obama Administration submitted for a $22 billion dollar sale for Congressional approval that would equip Saudi Arabia with Mission Surface Combatant Ships and M1A2 tanks.114 Although Saudi Arabia also purchases a substantial amount of weapons from U.S. allies such as France, the U.K., and

Canada, the U.S. remains its leading arms supplier (see Figure 4).

Saudi abandonment causes them to get nukes- multiple scenarios for extinctionBowman ‘8 (Bradley, at time of writing, Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff member for the Middle East under Senator Lugar, major and strategic plans and policy officer in the U.S. Army. As an assistant professor of American Politics, Policy, and Strategy and an academic counselor in the department of social sciences at the United States Military Academy at West Point, Major Bowman taught courses in American foreign policy and American politics, as well as designed and taught a new course entitled "Studies in Grand Strategy" that was featured on NPR. Major Bowman served brief details on the Secretary of State's Policy Planning Staff and in the Office of Secretary of Defense for Policy during the summer of 2006. He earned an MA in international relations from Yale (2004) and a BS in American politics from the United States Military Academy at West Point (1995), CHAIN REACTION: AVOIDING A NUCLEAR ARMS RACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA479213&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

One can envision three scenarios that could prompt such a ‘‘roll forward’’ decision by U.S. allies and friends.

In the first scenario, a state relying on a U.S. or U.S.-led security umbrella can begin to question the reliability of that guarantee due to an escalating perceived threat not matched by a proportional increase in the reliability or capability of the U.S. security guarantee. This relationship between threat perception and the perception of the U.S. security guarantee is more subjective and psychological than objective and quantifiable. Nonetheless, in a growing threat environment, a static U.S. security guarantee can lead to a reassessment of a state’s

nuclear decision. In the second scenario, states could also begin to question the reliability of the U.S. security guarantee in a static threat environment if the protected state perceives a decline in the capability or will of the U.S. to serve as a security guarantor . In the third and most problematic scenario, a mounting threat perception accompanied by a simultaneous perceived deterioration in the reliability of the U.S. security guarantee, creates the most intense incentive for a state to reassess its nuclear decision . In any of these three scenarios—an increase in the perceived threat, a decrease in the perceived reliability of U.S. security guarantee, or both—the result can be the same; the state looks elsewhere to defend itself. If another security guarantor can be found, the state may seek a new security relationship to replace the U.S. If a partner with both the capability and will to perform as a security guarantor does not exist, the state will seek to improve and expand its internal defense capabilities—likely via nuclear

weapons. These broad historical observations and potential scenarios suggest U.S. policymakers should be concerned about recent developments in the Middle East. In the eyes of countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey in particular, Iran’s nuclear program has heightened threat perceptions , while the U.S. intervention in Iraq has damaged Arab and Turkish perceptions regarding the reliability of the U.S. security guarantee. As a result of this dangerous synergy,

these three states in particular appear to be moving deliberately in the direction of a nuclear hedging strategy that would position them to obtain a nuclear weapons breakout capability in the next two decades. A Middle East populated by a Saudi , Egyptian, and/or Turkish nuclear weapons capability could dramatically reduce regional security and could significantly endanger U.S. interests . The U.S. must take in the next 2 to 3 years to reduce Arab and Turkish threat perceptions and to restore their confidence in the U.S. or U.S.-led security guarantee. Absent deliberate U.S. action in

the next few years, the future Middle Eastern landscape may include a number of nuclear armed or nuclear weapons capable states vying for influence in a notoriously unstable region.

Case Turns

Yemen – Russia Fill-InEnding sales to Saudi Arabia means they shift to Russian weapons – those weapons are more dangerous and solidify their influence in the region – that turns the case. Rogan ‘19 (Tom, Middle Eastern Politics @ School Of Oriental And African Studies, “Blocking Saudi arms sales, the Senate endangers civilians and a critical alliance ,” 6-21, https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/blocking-saudi-arms-sales-the-senate-endangers-civilians-and-a-critical-alliance)

A bipartisan group of senators on Thursday responded to Saudi Arabia's war in Yemen and its assassination of Jamal Khashoggi by moving to block the Trump administration's arms sales to Saudi Arabia. But this is bad news both for civilians in Yemen and for American interests. It is fortunate that Trump is likely to veto the legislation. Why is it bad news? Well, ask yourself another question: what is more accurate, an advanced American guided bomb or a Russian bomb? That will matter when the Saudis turn around and start buy ing bombs like the BETAB-500 and FAB-500 that the Russia ns have been using to smash Syria apart . It will mean Yemeni civilians will face greater vulnerability . We should be pushing the Saudis to be more judicious over Yemen. But the irony here of politicians saying they want to save civilian lives but

achieving the opposite effect is inescapable. Now ask yourself another question: who se interests would be served by Saudi alienation from America? Answer: Russia , along with various Islamist terrorists. This is no small concern . Russia's strategi c gambit in Syria has never ultimately been about saving Bashar Assad, but rather about making regional actors see Moscow as a better partner than America . Senate actions like Thursdays thus play perfectly into Russia's hands . And while that explains Sen. Rand Paul's, R-Ky., support for this legislation, it doesn't

account for Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C. Regardless, we should fear Russia's consolidated leadership in the Middle East. Because Russia will be for the region both arsonist and and fireman, and it will sell a nice chunk of weapons in between. It will mean more disorder and more sectarian hatred. And it will mean a Saudi crown prince freed of U.S. pressure to reform his archaic society so that it doesn't end up becoming ISIS 2.0. Moreover, there is no question that overt rebukes to the Saudis are certain to spark Saudi reprisals : the centrality of honor and respect in Arab culture ensures it. Senators are deluding themselves if they think any good will come of this. The opposite is true.

Yemen – Saudi Pressure Turn Withdrawing regional support makes war inevitable by removing the incentive to negotiate and undermining American credibility Alasrar 18 (Fatima Alasrar is the Senior Yemen Analyst at The Arabia Foundation. "Yemen Is Bad but It Would Be Worse Without U.S. Involvement" https://nationalinterest.org/blog/middle-east-watch/yemen-bad-it-would-be-worse-without-us-involvement-26801?page=0%2C1)

Furthermore, vital U.S. interests are at stake. The Houthis have repeatedly threatened to disrupt international shipping. Earlier this year, they made good on this promise by firing on a Saudi oil tanker and a Turkish freighter carrying wheat. The Houthi militias are a sworn enemy of the United States and a tool for expanding Tehran’s destabilizing influence throughout the Middle East. The

Iranians have supplied ballistic missiles to the Houthis that have been launched against America’s Saudi, Emirati, and Yemeni allies. For the

United States to withdraw its support now would be tantamount to conceding Yemen to Iran , which would deal a serious blow to Washington’s regional credibility.

The war against Iran and the Houthis is also linked with the United States’ war on terror, which is supported by Congress, specifically the fight against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), an organization that is based in Yemen and is widely considered to be the most dangerous of al-Qaeda’s remaining regional affiliates. For example, the Saudi-led coalition helped to build the elite anti-Houthi Southern Security Belt forces. These United Arab Emirates–trained Yemeni units have, alongside Emirati special forces, fought AQAP. Last year, they pushed them out of the Shabwah Governorate, where, six years ago, a U.S. drone successfully targeted one of the al-Qaeda terrorists responsible for the 2000 attack on the USS Cole.

In addition, the U.S. military plays a critical role in safeguarding Yemeni civilians by identifying nonmilitary and civilian facilities for the coalition so that these are not accidentally targeted by air strikes. This intelligence support has not prevented civilian casualties altogether, but it has almost certainly reduced their number. Also, American-produced Patriot missile defense systems have allowed the coalition to intercept dozens

of Houthi ballistic missiles fired against Saudi, Emirati, and Yemeni civilian population centers. American involvement also bolster s ties between the U.S. military and the militaries of its Arab allies and these relationships are a key tool of U.S. power and influence if America is to remain globally relevant.

America should continue to support United Nations Special Envoy Martin Griffiths’ in his attempt to broker a lasting political resolution. But

the Houthis will have little incentive to negotiate in good faith absent continuing military pressure . Withdrawing U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition and for Yemen’s internationally recognized government will ease this pressure without doing anything to end Yemen’s war . It also will not help—and may even

exacerbate—the country’s humanitarian crisis while dealing a blow to America’s regional prestige and its short and long-term strategic interests. Lawmakers would do well to consider these costs as they seek to reclaim war-making powers from the executive branch.

NEG vs Taiwan

China Relations CPText: The United Stated federal government should

Substantially reduce tariffs placed on the People’s Republic of China consent to be bound by the Paris Climate Accord offer to work cooperatively with China on disease management, infrastructure development, and peacekeeping in Africa increase cooperation with China over counter-narcotics law enforcement end freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea

Plan solves, improves Chinese relations across the board Carter 19 (Jimmy Carter, former President of the United States, January 1, 2019. “Jimmy Carter: How to repair the U.S.-China relationship and prevent a modern Cold War.” https://www.denverpost.com/2019/01/01/jimmy-carter-how-to-repair-the-u-s-china-relationship-and-prevent-a-modern-cold-war/)

Forty years ago, Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping and I normalized diplomatic relations between the People’s Republic of China and the United States, putting an end to three decades of hostility. This led to an era distinguished by peace in East Asia and the Pacific region. China’s spectacular economic growth, in conjunction with its continuing integration with the much larger U.S. economy, has enabled the two countries to become engines of global prosperity. Scientific and cultural exchanges have blossomed, and the United States has since become the top foreign destination for Chinese scholars and tourists. The 40th anniversary of this relationship is a testament to the ability of countries with

different histories, cultures and political systems to work together for the greater good. Yet, today, this critical relationship is in jeopardy. I hear Chinese elites claiming that Americans are conducting an “evil conspiracy” to destabilize China. I hear prominent Americans, disappointed that China has not become a democracy, claiming that China poses a threat to the American way of life. U.S. government reports declare that China is dedicated to challenging U.S. supremacy, and that it is planning to drive the United States out of Asia and reduce its influence in other countries around the world. If top government officials embrace these dangerous notions, a modern Cold War between our two nations is not inconceivable. At this sensitive moment, misperceptions, miscalculations and failure to follow carefully defined rules of engagement in areas

such as the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea could escalate into military conflict, creating a worldwide catastrophe. The U.S. imposition of tariffs on $200 billion worth of Chinese goods, and China’s retaliatory tariffs, contribute to the deteriorating relationship, hurting both countries. The 90-day pause in further escalation of tariffs, agreed to at the Group of 20 summit in Argentina, offers the possibility of reaching a permanent agreement on U.S.-China trade. What can we do to build on this progress, and to repair the U.S.-China relationship? First, the United States’ long-standing complaints — about trade imbalances, intellectual property theft, forced technology transfers, and unfair barriers to U.S. investments and business operations in China — must be addressed

quickly and effectively. Neither country should use “national security” as an excuse to obstruct the other’s legitimate commercial activities. China needs competition for its economy to innovate and grow ; pursuing a

fair and reciprocal relationship is the only way for both countries to remain economically strong. Second, Americans must acknowledge that, just as China has no right to interfere in U.S. affairs, we have no inherent right to dictate to China how to govern its people or choose its leaders. Though even countries with the closest of relationships may critique each other at times, such engagements should never become directives or edicts; they should rather serve as a two-way street of open dialogue. China’s achievements in sustaining economic growth, alleviating abject poverty and providing developmental assistance to other countries need to be celebrated. At the same time, we cannot ignore its deficiencies in internet censorship, policies toward minorities and religious restrictions — which should be recorded and criticized. This balanced approach is key to ensuring that the United States and China continue to work together toward solving some of the most intractable global problems. Despite current tensions on other issues, Chinese support has been essential in our ongoing efforts to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. Beijing also could offer crucial help in post-conflict

reconstruction in the Middle East and Africa, countering terrorism and extremism, and mediating other international disputes. The United States should return to the Paris climate accord and work with China on environmental and climate- change issues, as the epic struggle against global warming requires active participation from both nations. But I believe the easiest route to bilateral cooperation lies in Africa . Both countries are already heavily involved there in fighting disease , building infrastructure and keeping peace — sometimes cooperatively. Yet each nation has accused the other of economic exploitation or political manipulation. Africans — like billions of other people around the world — do not want to be forced to choose a side. Instead, they welcome the synergy that comes from pooling resources, sharing expertise and designing

complementary aid programs. By working together with Africans, the United States and China would also be

helping themselves overcome distrust and rebuild this vital relationship . In 1979, Deng Xiaoping and I knew we were advancing the cause of peace. While today’s leaders face a different world, the cause of peace remains just as important. Leaders must bring new vision, courage and ingenuity to new challenges and opportunities, but I believe they also must accept our conviction that the United States and China need to build their futures together, for themselves and for humanity at large.

 

Allied Prolif DAUS-Taiwan relations are strong Kim and Miller 3/5/19 [Anthony Kim and Ambassador Terry Miller. Anthony Kim has a master’s degree in international trade and investment policy from George Washington University. Terry Miller is the director at the Center for International Trade and Economics and the Mark A. Kolokotrones Fellow in Economic Freedom. “The Taiwan Relations Act at 40: New Opportunities Ahead”, March 5, 2019. https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/the-taiwan-relations-act-40-new-opportunities-ahead] This year commemorates the 40th anniversary of   the TRA, on which   America’s unique and secure relationship with Taiwan has been grounded. The preamble of the TRA stipulates that the act   is  to help   maintain peace, security,   and   stability   in the   Western   Pacific   and  to promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing   the continuation of commercial, cultural, and   other   relations between   the people of   the U nited   S tates   and   the people on   Taiwan,   and for other purposes.1 The TRA is exceptional in purpose and form. It is the only law to govern nearly every aspect of U.S. relations with a foreign government in the absence of formal diplomatic relations. It sets forth clear policy goals and establishes an institutional framework to meet those objectives. The fact that the TRA has been in force without amendment over the past 40 years is remarkable.   Signed into law on April 10, 1979, the TRA came into existence out of the need for the United States to find a way to protect its significant security and commercial interests in Taiwan in the wake of President Jimmy Carter’s termination of diplomatic relations with Taiwan as well as a mutual defense treaty dating from the 1949 Communist takeover of mainland China. Members of the House of Representatives and Senate from both parties worked together to craft a bill, passing the TRA with a near unanimous vote to set the framework and course for America’s ongoing engagement with Taiwan. Over the ensuing decades, subsequent Congresses, whether controlled by Democrats or Republicans, repeatedly have sought to bolster the TRA by expressing strong moral and political support for Taiwan and urging successive Administrations to back up America’s commitment to Taiwan with tangible support. Providing policy continuity, the TRA has survived the test of time in the face of constant and growing criticism from Beijing. Not surprisingly, Taiwan’s support   in Washington has been strong and is getting stronger. Over the past year, Congress has reinforced the TRA by enacting two new laws: the Taiwan Travel Act that encourages official visits between Washington and Taipei “at all levels of government,” and the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act that reiterates American support for Taiwan’s key role in its Indo–Pacific strategy. The TRA has played an indispensable role in shaping American policy toward Taiwan and U.S. strategy in Asia. The United States has clearly recognized that supporting a Taiwan that is free to make its own decisions, and free from coercion by the People’s Republic of China, is in America’s vital national security interest. As specified in the preamble of the legislation, the TRA ,   in fact,   is   explicit about   the connection between Taiwan and the maintenance of “peace, security and stability in the Western Pacific. ”   In a testament to that unambiguous geopolitical and economic link, Taiwan and the United States have become strong allies sharing powerful commitments to the values of democracy, the rule of law, and free markets. The relationship today is a fruitful partnership that delivers measurable and   concrete benefits for Americans and Taiwanese alike.   In his June 2018 speech at the dedication ceremony of the new American Institute in Taiwan office complex, board Chairman James Moriarty summed up succinctly: “As Taiwan has transformed itself into a vibrant democracy and a model for the Indo–Pacific region and beyond, our relationship has grown into a close partnership based on the unshakable foundation of shared values and interests.”2 As a country with an impressive record as a constructive member of the world community,   despite efforts by mainland China to isolate and marginalize it, Taiwan is providing a positive example   for others of a pathway to development and prosperity based on high degrees of both political and economic freedom.   In its latest edition of Freedom in the World, an annual report that assesses political rights and civil liberties around the globe, Freedom House classifies Taiwan as a “free” nation.3 On the economic front, The Heritage Foundation’s 25th4 edition of the Index of Economic Freedom now ranks Taiwan as the 10th-freest economy in the world.5   Abandoning Taiwan decimates American assurances and causes regional proliferation Rehman 14 (Iskander; fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) in Washington, DC; 2/28/14, “Why Taiwan Matters,” http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/why-taiwan-matters-9971?page=4) 

Abandoning Taiwan would erode American credibility in the Indo-Pacific and   add   fuel   to   an ongoing   regional   arms race .  Taiwan policy cannot be compartmentalized, and viewed in isolation from the pivot and U.S. policy

towards Asia. Decision-makers in   Seoul, Tokyo, and Manila would   naturally   question U.S.   resolve   and Washington’s   commitment to their security in the event of an abandonment of Taiwan .   Japan ,  in

particular, would   feel threatened by the stationing of Chinese forces on Taiwan —in essence losing a valuable geopolitical buffer — in such close proximity to its southwestern approaches. Heightened threat perceptions   in Tokyo ,  if combined with a lack of faith in the credibility of U.S. conventional and nuclear deterrence, could lead Japan to acquire a nuclear-weapons   capability.   The corrosive effect   of forfeiting Taiwan   would also extend to   other key allies such as   South Korea, which might question   Washington’s determination to defend it from   North Korean aggression .  Indeed, recent public-opinion polls have indicated that a growing proportion of the   South   Korean public now favor s the development of   a South Korean nuclear arsenal. Revealingly, the reasons invoked for such a shift were growing concerns over North Korea’s increasingly unpredictable and

belligerent behavior, as well as over the continued viability of the United States’ security guarantee. Meanwhile, smaller regional states might find themselves both disinclined to place their faith in the United   States , and cowed into

submission by a more self-assured and advantageously positioned China. An abandonment of Taiwan could   thus   a lead to creeping Finlandization—or rapid nuclearization —of large tracts   of the Indo-Pacific , and, in time, to the sunset of American primacy in Asia. Taiwan, therefore, most certainly matters. 

East Asian prolif causes nuclear war Kleiner 16 - Postdoctral fellow at Yale Law School (Sam, "With His Finger on the Trigger", The Atlantic, 6/3/16, www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/06/donald-trump-nuclear-weapons/485504/) A new nuclear-arms race, moreover, could be even riskier than the one Reagan and others worked so hard to end. In retrospect, the Cold War standoff between two massive, nuclear-armed superpowers offered some stability; among other things, the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union could destroy each other, or any other challenger, in a nuclear confrontation ended up preventing either side from using nuclear weapons. Global alliances were structured in a bipolar system, with smaller powers picking one side or the other, which meant fewer possible avenues for conflict. But that world came to an end when the Cold War finished. We now live in a multipolar world that is, in many ways, a more dangerous one. Former Secretaries of State Kissinger and George Shultz, former Secretary of Defense William Perry, and Senator Sam Nunn warned in 2011 that “the growing   number of nations with nuclear arms and differing motives , aims and ambitions   pose s very   high   and unpredictable   risks and   increased   instability .” One particularly risky and region right now is East Asia, where   competing territorial claims and an unpredictable No rth   Ko rea   threaten to flare into conflict .   If Japan , which is revising its pacifist post-World War II foreign policy toward a more assertive one,   or South Korea , where there is broad popular support for weaponization,   go nuclear ,   the chances grow for a   regional   arms race — and for nuclear war .  Trump has begun to style himself as a foreign-policy realist. But he’s not a realist—he’s a radical. One possibility, as Mark Fitzpatrick of the International Institute for Strategic Studies noted: “No rth   Ko rea   might   be tempted to   launch a preemptive attack   at a time when the U.S. defense commitment [to South Korea] might no longer apply.” But even “short of this worst-case scenario, rather than negotiate disarmament, North Korea more likely   would claim the South’s actions as a justification for stepping up its own nuclear program.” These are by no means the only risks. There is, for example, the risk of an accidental firing   or a rogue officer deciding that he or she wants to launch a nuclear weapon. There is the   risk of “loose nukes” falling into the wrong hands, and the risk that individual scientists will be willing to transfer   nuclear   tech nology   to the highest bidder , as Pakistan’s A.Q. Khan did in selling nuclear technology to Iran, Libya, and North Korea.   When the nuclear bomb was first being developed, Secretary of War Henry Stimson offered a poignant warning about how devastating the weapon would be. He told President Henry Truman that “such a weapon may be constructed in secret and used suddenly and effectively with devastating power by a willful nation or group against an unsuspecting nation or group of much greater size and material power.” Today, America’s “greater size and material power” can’t necessarily stop a nuclear strike, particularly if the materials fall into the hands of terrorists.