Habermas's Reconstruction of Reason by Keith Pisani - Introduction

7/31/2019 Habermas's Reconstruction of Reason by Keith Pisani - Introduction

1/38

1

Introduction

Modern Philosophy:

from Descartes to Marx


2/38

2

0.1 Introduction

Whatever the definition given to philosophy, it is assumed that this activity wouldnt exist

unless rationality exists. Rationality is possible only in as far as it is embodied in an action,

whether linguistic or non-linguistic, and in thought, whether expressed or simply potentially

expressible. There are other types of rational objects, such as a rational law, or a rational

policy; however, these objects are simply actions and thoughts of a higher kind. Thus it

seems that a proper examination of what is rational is intimately related to an analysis of

action and thought insofar as they embody reason.

The history of philosophy can be described as the history of humankind dealing with

rationality. The philosopher relates to rationality in two ways. First, he attempts to act and

think in accordance with what is rational.1

Second, he makes rationality the subject-matter of

philosophy. In this sense, recalling Hegels critique of Kant, rationality can be the instrument

or medium of philosophical activity, but also the object investigated by that very instrument

or medium. In the first type rationality is present, it may be said, only in the background of

the philosophical activity; in the second type, it is brought to the foreground.

It is commonly accepted that with the beginning of modernity, the issue of rationality

acquired a new dimension. It was brought to the foreground of the philosophical activity.

Descartes, who is usually accredited with beginning modernity, attempted to show the

independence of reason from dogma. The position of self-sufficient rationality dominated

1A particular example would be logic; to think rationally, in this case, would mean to think logically or in

accordance with logic.


3/38

3

the thoughts that followed the Cartesian revolution.2 As such, it can be said that modern

rationality is at the same time emancipatory rationality. But Modernity is also characterised

by the formalisation or instrumentalisation of reason; reason was reduced to mere effective

application of means to given ends.

The focus of this work is Habermass reconstruction of reason; that is to say his response to

the rationality issue that culminated in the modern period, and also to matters that surround

this same issue. A proper investigation of his response necessitates a prior review of the

contributions put forward by his predecessors. This chapter deals with the issues that

stemmed in the modern period, from Descartes to Marx. This will be followed, in Chapter 1,

by a discussion of the thoughts of Habermass more proximal predecessors, i.e. the Frankfurt

School theorists. But before dealing with the particular contributions of modern

philosophers, some remarks will be made on modernity itself and on the rationality issue that

took over the philosophical scene of modernity.

Modernity and Rationality

The word modern is derived from a Latin word meaning in this time. In the English

language, the term has two meanings. First, it denotes contemporary, present time.

Second, it refers to a particular epoch in history that followed the medieval and post-

medieval eras. (Kolb, 1986, pp. 1-2) These two senses of modern are sometimes used

interchangeably, implying that the period that followed medieval and post-medieval period

2This idea is highlighted in the work of both Spinoza and Leibniz (usually associated with Leibniz), who

employ the principle of sufficient reason. This principle states that nothing can be so without there being a

reason why it is so. (Blackburn, 1996, p. 367)


4/38

4

is still on. Other times, the period that we are living in today is termed postmodern, implying

that there is something in our present era that is radically different from the modern period.

In this work, the first categorisation will be used, however without refuting the thesis that in

our contemporary, present time something radically different is taking place.

Modernity is said to have begun with Ren Descartes (1596 1650) in France and Francis

Bacon (15611626) in England. (Copleston, 1960a, p. 1) The former, usually referred to as

the father of modern philosophy, sought to free certainty or truth from dogma. He aimed to

attain truth by the use of reason alone. The latter, promoted instrumental efficacy as the

criterion that ought to guide science. (Taylor, 1991, p. 104) He was highly critical of the

Aristotelian science as it has contributed nothing to relieve the condition of mankind.

(Taylor, p. 104) While these two thinkers can be said to stand in opposition with regard to

the theory-practice dialectic as Descartes made theoretical reflection the primary

characteristic of the human being, and Bacon outlined the principles of the new empirical-

practical scientific method (the novum organum, new instrument), thus making the empirical

and the practical as fundamental both, in their own different way, paved the way for the

instrumentalisation of reason.

This last theme, the instrumentalisation or formalisation of reason3, highlights the principal

distinctive feature that sets modernity apart from earlier eras. In modern social theory, the

discussion of the formalisation of reason was made famous by Max Weber. Weber argued

3The two terms, instrumental reason and formal reason, have similar meanings, albeit different ones.

Instrumental reason refers to the usage of reason in a means-end situation. In this context, reason is conceived

as a tool or instrument necessary to attain a particular goal. Formal reason refers to a kind of rationality that

follows from the application of formal rules. Formal rules are the type of rules that govern artificial systems,

from the functioning of a simple electronic device to the functioning of capitalist systems and modern law. In

the modern period, rationality can be said to have become instrumental through formalisation.


5/38

5

that modern life is characterised by the prominence given to formal rationality over

substantive rationality. (Kolb p. 11) Substantive rationality establishes the values and goals

that ought to guide our actions. On the other hand, formal rationality, deals with the

maximum efficient application of a set of means to given ends, which makes efficiency and

consistency the final tribunal of legitimation. In the case of the latter, the ends are not

established by reason itself, but are self-chosen. (Kolb p. 11)

While it may be argued that the prominence given to formal rationality over substantive

rationality is modernitys principal distinctive feature, it should also be noted that it is not

the sole one. It is in fact, related to other major characteristics that helped to modernise the

western world. The prominence of instrumental or formal rationality over substantive

rationality gave the individual greater power in three principal spheres of life: the individual

sphere, the social-political sphere and the technical-scientific sphere.

In the individual sphere, the individual became master of his own life. If no world-view can

be inferred using reason, then it follows that it is up to the individual to decide on how to

shape his or her own life. In other words, with modernity, the individual acquired more

individual freedom. This individual freedom, is related to, and cannot exist without, a

freedom that is granted and protected by a liberal state. Thus if the individual has more

freedom, it is because society in general has been emancipated from the fetters of dogma

(Habermas would later refer to this phenomenon as the rationalisation of the lifeworld, see

Chapter 3). Finally, with the disenchantment of the world, that is to say with the sterilisation

of substantive rationality, things are in sense up for grabs. (Taylor p. 5) They become

mere raw materials or instruments for our projects. (Taylor p. 5)


6/38

6

A proper review of the themes just mentioned requires much more space than it was

dedicated above. This introduction should suffice only to direct the reader to the themes that

will be discussed in this work. More will be said in the chapters that follow. For now

attention shall be turned to the major thinkers that dominated the early part of the modern

period, i.e. from Descartes to Marx.

0.2 The subject as foundation: Descartes and the rise of the modern

subject

Ren Descartes is considered the founder of a new kind of philosophy, a philosophy that

posits the thinking subject at the basis of any rational and scientific inquiry. Inspired by the

exactness and success of mathematics, Descartes attempts to develop a philosophical system

using the deductive method employed in mathematics, where certain propositions are to be

derived from a single, self-evident proposition. The system developed by Descartes was to

have a profound impact on subsequent thought.

In the Meditations on First Philosophy Descartes sets himself the task of revising all his

formerly held opinions. In the First Meditation he develops a number of arguments through

which he casts everything he believes he knows, including his own existence, into doubt. He

however argues in the Second Meditation, that while every proposition he had previously

accepted could in theory be doubted, the very fact that he exists could not. There must be

someone or something that performs the act of thinking for there to be doubt at all. Thus he

concludes that the I exists, and that this I exists insofar as it thinks.


7/38

7

The importance of the Cartesian project lies in the fact that with Descartes the meaning of

old concepts are given a new formulation. In this way, Descartes sets the philosophy of

modernity into a particular direction. In his lectures on Nietzsche4, Heidegger argues that

four central philosophical concepts, that is to say the concepts of man, thinking, other

beings and rationality, are given a new formulation in the Cartesian system.

With Descartes, man becomes essentially a disengaged subject, i.e. an entity whose nature is

characterised by its subjective experiences. This subjectivist approach is evidenced by the

style employed in The Meditations on First Philosophy. This work is characterised by usage

of the subjective pronoun I, and by a particular self-reflective approach.

The subject is according to Descartes essentially a thinking subject. In the Second

Meditation ofThe Meditations, after casting everything into doubt, Descartes claims:

So that, after having thought carefully about it, and having scrupulously examined

everything, one must then, in conclusion, take as assured that the proposition: I am, I exist, is

necessarily true, every time I express it or conceive it in my mind. (p. 103)

Thinking thus becomes the experience which confirms the existence of the subject. The

verification of the existence of the subject is only possible because the subject is able to

think. However, thinking is not simply a means to verify the subjects existence, but also that

which characterises the subject. Later on, in the same meditation, he makes this point clearly,

when he says: I am, I exist: this is certain; but for how long? For as long as I thinkI am

therefore, precisely speaking, only a thing which thinks. (Descartes, p. 105)

4Heidegger argues that with the Cartesian method, the following were given a new formulation: i. beings

become objects; ii. truth becomes certainty; iii. man becomes subject; iv. relation between faith and reason

becomes emancipation; v. understanding of the world becomes representation as picture. For a detailed

discussion see Messinese, L. Heidegger e la Filosofia dellEpoca Moderna, pp. 159 -176.


8/38

8

The reduction of man to a disengaged subject requires that other beings become the objects

with which the subject is opposed and contrasted. A subject can only be postulated if and

only if objects are also postulated. There is no subject unless there are objects, or at least,

one object.5

Moreover, a subject is always related to, or relates with, its objects. Thinking,

which as said above is the fundamental characteristic of the Cartesian subject, is that act

which relates the subject with its objects. But the thinking that Descartes seems to have in

mind, as Heidegger points out, is representational thinking. (Messinese, 2000, p. 167) In any

thinking act, there is always an object that is being represented, whether the object exists in

reality or not.

If man becomes a disengaged subject, and other beings its objects, and thinking is reduced to

mere representation, then rationality is also given a new formulation. It becomes nothing

other than the correct representation of objects by the subject. Rationality is reduced by

Descartes to perceiving something in a clear and distinct manner. To perceive something in a

clear and distinct manner means to have a proposition whose certainty is beyond doubt.

Heidegger points out that Descartes model prepares the groundwork for a rationality that

would go instrumental. He argues that the subject in representing (thinking) secures the

certainty of the object represented. (Messinese, p. 170) In this way, the thinking subject also

becomes the subject that controls objects through representation. Consequently, according to

Heidegger, rationality becomes defined as the disengaged application of thinking,

5One may object that in the Second Meditation, where the meditator is only certain of his existence and of the

fact that he thinks, no objects are postulated, thus rendering the above thesis incorrect. On the contrary it should

be argued that the meditator, in establishing the existence of the subject that thinks, also objectifies the subject

that is performing the thinking. In an act of self-reflection, the subject objectifies himself through thinking.

Therefore, in so far as the subject is the object of thought and not just that which performs the thinking, it is

also an object.


9/38

9

understood as representation, with the aim of theoretically controlling objects. (Messinese, p.

164)

Although recent thinkers have criticised the Cartesian conception of the subject and

rationality, it must be acknowledged that Descartes was one of the earliest thinkers who

recognised the Enlightenment principle that the subject has sufficient rational ability to

decide on what is rationally acceptable. While de facto, he was probably influenced by the

dominating powers of the time, namely the Church6, he nonetheless, at least on a theoretical

level, sought to show the independence of rationality from dogma. Of this opinion is Charles

Taylor, who in his Ethics of Authenticity says that Descartes disengaged subject is

grounded in a moral ideal, that of a self-responsible, self-controlling reasoning. He goes on

to say that this ideal of rationality is at the same time an ideal of freedom, of autonomous,

self-generating thought. (pp. 103 4) Thus, in a sense, Descartes can be said to be a

precursor of the Enlightenment thinking.

0.3The Enlightenment

The Enlightenment, sometimes referred to as the Age of Reason, was a historical period that

brought remarkable social, cultural and intellectual changes in the western world. It was a

period where man, as Kant puts it, started to emerge from his self-imposed immaturity,

where immaturity is understood as the inability to use one's understanding without guidance

from another. (Kant, par. 1) The period can be characterised and defined by reference to

6Evidence of this is the fact that he withheld the publication of the Treatise on the Universe in 1633, after he

came to know of Galileos condemnation. (Scruton, 1995, p. 29)


10/38

10

two distinct, yet related philosophical 'facts': the acceptance of reason as the final arbiter of

all issues i.e. religious, scientific and political matters, and the belief that reason and

knowledge lead to enlightenment, which in turn leads to emancipation.

Probably, one of the most incisive expressions of free thinking in the Enlightenment period

was the publishing of the Encyclopaedia, edited by Denis Diderot (1713 - 84) and Jean le

Rond D'Alembert (1717 - 83). (Copleston, 1960b, p. 43) The contributors of this work, such

as Diderot and D'Alembert themselves, Voltaire, Montesquieu and d'Holbach, differed

considerably in the views held. For example Voltaire, at the time of the Encyclopaedia

subscribed to Deism; on the other hand, d'Holbach, was an outspoken materialist. But the

importance of the Encyclopaedia, which as its editors admitted, left much to be desired

(Copleston, p. 39), lies not in its contribution to knowledge, but rather in its ideological

statement: it is reason, and the liberty to use ones own reason freely, and not the Church or

the State, which should be the final judge of religious, scientific and moral issues.

The idea that reason can lead to enlightenment, and then to emancipation, was of great

importance to the philosophers of the period. The connection between enlightenment and

emancipation, however, was not a new idea to western philosophy. The first philosopher to

articulate this idea was Plato, who in theRepublic had argued that enlightenment was a state

that only philosophers could attain, and consequently he concluded that the best rule is rule

performed by philosophers. The intellectuals of the Enlightenment were however, much

more confident in the average mans ability to be enlightened. (Ingram, 1990, p.3)

The Enlightenment was also characterised by two important intellectual controversies, which


11/38


12/38

12

On the proper source of Knowledge

Kant's Critique of Pure Reason was written as a response to the rationalist-empiricist debate.

The rationalists, as explained above, had claimed that proper knowledge is acquired through

deductive methods. Descartes, one of the major exponents of rationalism, in his Meditations,

provides the wax argument to make his rationalist case. He says that no one would doubt that

the same wax remains when it is brought close to fire and melts even though the wax

changes all its observable properties. Thus, he contends, the conclusion that the melted wax

is the same one that was previously solid cannot be based on empirical observation but on

the inspection of the mind alone. (Descartes, pp. 108 - 9)

The empiricists, on the other hand, had claimed that scientific knowledge can only be

attained through empirical observations. David Hume (1711-1776), the most radical

exponent of the school, maintained that truths of reason, such as '3 + 3 = 6' and 'He will

either pass the exam or not' are mere tautologies, that although certain, are not informative.

Informative propositions are what Hume called 'matters of facts' i.e. beliefs regarding the

existence of things and their properties. These, Hume contended, by contrast to tautologies,

have their origin in sense-experience. However, Hume agreed with Descartes in that sense-

perception does not provide solid knowledge. (Ingram, 1990, p. 7) Starting from an

empirical standpoint, Hume ends up accepting sceptical conclusions.

Hume argued that certain notions we take for granted are in actual fact highly doubtful and

cannot be ascertained. He denied that there is a necessary link between what we see as a

cause and its perceived effect. The link, he maintained, is constructed by the mind out of


13/38

13

habit, and cannot be rationally inferred that future events will conform to past events.

(Ingram p. 7) Apart from casual necessity, Hume also deconstructed the Cartesian Ego, and

maintained that the postulation of a permanent ego is unfounded. He pointed out that

whenever it is asked the question 'what am I?', the only rational answer that can be given is

that 'I am all the ideas I have together'. In other words, there is no observable object which

corresponds to the 'I'. (Scruton, 1995, p. 130) Finally, Hume also denied moral freedom, and

argued that reason was handmaiden to passions (Ingram, 1990, p. 8)

Kant agrees with Hume in that causal necessity is not something inherent in reality, but he

was not ready to accept his sceptical conclusion. He argues that the problem with the

rationalists and empiricists was that both assumed a passive mind whose sense-impressions

are imposed on it from the outside. In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant proposes a

revolution similar to the one put forward by Copernicus. (Scruton, 1995, p. 142) He argues

that the mind organises experience by imposing its own innate structure on sense-perception.

Thus, for example, the mind is a priori equipped, or knows a priori, that for every cause

there must be an effect; when perceiving two distinct events, say a melting ice-cream and the

heat of the sun, the mind structures the two events in such a way that the melting is

conceived as an effect of the heat. In this way, the mind is envisaged as actively organising

experience according to its own, innate, logical knowledge. However, innate knowledge on

its own, or what Kant terms the categories, are empty; on the other hand, unstructured

experience is blind. This productive notion of reason that Kant develops, as will be

explained below, must also assume a unity of consciousness, without which no active

organisation of experience would ever be possible.


14/38

14

The Unity of Apperception, Freedom, Morality

In The Critique of Pure Reason Kant deals with a number of antinomies of reason. An

antinomy is a paradox that arises when two contradictory positions can be shown to be

reasonably acceptable. (Copleston, 1960b, p. 286) In resolving the rationalist-empiricist

debate Kant argues that the mind makes sense of the information captured through the senses

by organising it according to an a priori structure. Thus, it was said above, that every event

is conceived as having a cause, and as causing a further event (its effect). In contrast, actions,

as opposed to events, seem to be caused by a spontaneous ego. These two contradictory

positions, however, create a contradiction, an antinomy - how can an action, which is always

also an event, be caused spontaneously by the ego, and at the same time be determined by an

antecedent cause?

Kant argues that experience is only possible if there is a permanent ego that provides a

ground for uniting experience (a unity of apperception). The ego is a necessary condition for

any experience whatsoever. Since experience is real, Kant argues, its necessary condition

must mutatis mutandis be real as well. However, he also agrees with Hume in that the

permanent ego is never given in experience. Therefore, on the one hand a permanent ego

seems to be a necessity for experience, while on the other hand, a permanent ego is never

empirically observed. To resolve this contradiction, Kant distinguishes between an empirical

ego, an ego given in experience but which is not permanent, and a transcendental ego, a

necessary permanent ego for experience. By postulating a transcendental ego as the

guarantor of the unity of apperception, Kant was able to free the ego from the rigid

determinism that the understanding seems to impose. The ego, says Kant, as an empirical


15/38

15

ego, is subject to the deterministic law of cause and effect. As a transcendental ego (whose

existence cannot nonetheless be verified), however, it is not. (Copleston, 1960b, pp. 2846)

To show that the two egos can exist even if they seem to be mutually exclusive, Kant also

distinguishes between the phenomena and the nuomena.7

The distinction between the

empirical and the transcendental ego holds only if a distinction between phenomena and

nuomena is also made. The phenomena refer to sense-experience as organised according to

the categories. Phenomena are observable events and objects. The nuomena, on the other

hand, refer to the things in themselves. So, the empirical ego, Kant argues, is the ego as

perceived by the senses and organised according to the categories, while the transcendental

ego is the ego in itself. In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant argues that the human being can

never access the nuomena, since he are confronted only with already structured sense-

perception. In fact, in The Critique of Practical Reason, he acknowledges that we can never

prove that we are free (i.e. that a transcendental ego exists); but on other hand, he argued, we

can show that freedom is not logically impossible. As such, since practical reason demands

that we are free, for unless we are free we can never act morally, we ought to think of

ourselves as free.

In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant develops the necessary structure of possible experience,

in other words, the categories through which sense is made of the world. Similarly, in the

Critique of Practical Reason, he attempts to develop the a priori principles that are

7There are various interpretations of what Kant actually meant when he distinguished between the nuomena

and phenomena. In this work, we will stick to the widely accepted interpretation that by nuomena and

phenomena, Kant meant that there is one object but two different standpoints. This is usually called the Two

Standpoint/Aspect Theory, as opposed to the Two World/Object Theory. For a discussion of the issue, one cansee Robert Hannas work, where the author develops a third view, which he calls the Two Concept/Property

Theory see. Hanna, R. (2006). Kant, Science and Human Nature. Oxford: Clarendon. Press.


16/38

16

applicable to morality. Such a principle is called by Kant the categorical imperative. To

explain what the categorical imperative is, it is useful to first distinguish it from the

hypothetical imperative. An imperative is hypothetical if it is dependent on an antecedent

condition that needs to be satisfied. For example, If you want to live a happy life, then you

ought to act morally is a hypothetical imperative. Thus, a hypothetical imperative h as the

logical form of If a then b. For Kant, such an imperative cannot be adequately

universalised; a truly a priori imperative, that is applicable to all actions, must be categorical

i.e. not depending on any antecedents. (Copleston, 1960b, p. 322)

Kant said that there is only one categorical imperative. However, he also said that there are

three formulations of the categorical imperative, and he then gives five formulations.

Copleston interprets this apparent contradiction as meaning that Kant gave various

formulations of the same, categorical imperative in order to explicate further the categorical

imperative. (1960b, p. 326) The important point to bring out here is that according to Kant

reason can offer a rational guide to morality.

0.5 Philosophy of History: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel

Hegels philosophy represents a departure from Kant's transcendentalism towards a more

worldly definition of reason. Unlike Kant, Hegel conceives reason as developing in

interaction and labour. It can be said, that the most important notions that Hegel introduces

in relation to Critical Theory are his ideas that reason is shaped and influenced by the

historical conditions it is faced with, and that it is dialectical, or dynamic. With regard to the


17/38

17

first, Engels, Marx's colleague, had said:

What distinguishes Hegel's mode of thinking from that of all other philosophers was theexceptional historical sense underlying it. However abstract and idealist employed, the

development of his ideas run always parallel to the development of world history, and the

latter is indeed supposed to be only the proofof the former. (Singer, 1983, p. 123)

Both ideas, the dynamism of reason and the historicity of reason, are related to yet another

important Hegelian notion: freedom. For Hegel, as it will be argued below, the development

ofreason in history is also the development offreedom.

Criticism of Kant

In the Introduction to the Phenomenology of Mind Hegel deals with the philosophical

problem of finding a valid starting-point for philosophy. He says that philosophers have

attempted to find rational criteria that would demarcate proper knowledge from mere

apparent knowledge. (Norman, 1991, p. 9) Such an approach has been undertaken by both

rationalists and empiricists alike. Descartes, for example, in the Discourse on Method, had

developed a number of rules that have to be followed if one is to make correct use of the

intellect. However, while what Hegel says in the Introduction applies to any philosophical

endeavour which seeks to establish a set of criteria before engaging in any philosophical

activity, it is clear that he has Kant in mind. (Norman, p. 11)

Hegel argues that the sceptical8

approach that seeks to delimit the use of reason has to

presuppose three particular assumptions. First, that knowledge is itself fundamentally a sort

8The sceptical approach is the approach that attempts to establish the limits of reason and the understanding

before making any constative proposition.


18/38

18

of instrument or medium, and consequently, one must first examine its appropriateness

before making use of it. Second, that there exists a real distinction between knowledge, or

what Kant called knowledge of the phenomena, and real knowledge, or what Kant called

knowledge of things-in-themselves (and what Hegel calls Absolute knowledge). Third, it

must also assume that knowledge of the phenomena can properly be called knowledge.

(Norman p. 11) Presuppositions, however, are themselves claims to knowledge, and any

genuine sceptical approach requires that such suppositions are critically examined. Thus, any

attempt to delimit the use of reason, is bound to lead either to an infinite regress or to

circularity. (Norman p. 12)

In theLesser Logic, Hegel presents a very clear criticism of the above mentioned approach,

this time with an explicit reference to Kant:

We ought, says Kant, to be acquainted with the instrument, before we undertake the work

for which it is to be employed; for if the instrument be insufficient, all our trouble will be

spent in vain Unless we wish to be deceived by words, it is easy to see what this amounts

to. In the case of other instruments, we can try and criticise them in other ways than bysetting about the special work for which we are destined. But the examination of knowledge

can only be carried out by an act of knowledge. To examine this so called instrument is the

same thing as to know it. But to seek to know before we know is as absurd as the wise

resolution of Scholasticus, not to venture into the water until he had learned to swim. (The

Logic of Hegel in Norman, p. 11)

Since philosophy cannot proceed by first establishing the limits of the knowing subject, as

this would lead either to an infinite regress or circular reasoning, Hegel proposes instead to

begin philosophy by immediately examining phenomena. In this way, he avoids the dilemma

of epistemology that haunts the Kantian approach.

The phenomenology of Hegel differs from the Kantian approach in two main respects. First,


19/38

19

it recognises the historical nature of reason. For Hegel, reason is an objective historical

force that must be conceived dynamically or developmentally (Ingram, 1990, p. 11)

Second, Hegel conceives the dialectic tension in thought as being productive, unlike Kant

who regarded contradictions as resulting out of a mis-usage of the cognitive faculties.

(Ingram, p. 12) To appreciate these two characteristics of Hegels philosophy, it is necessary

to make some remarks on Hegels Phenomenology.

The Odyssey of the Mind

In the Phenomenology of MindHegel writes the detailed history of the process of training

and educating consciousness itself up to the level of science. (Singer, 1983 p. 169) While

for Kant science was the starting point of any valid philosophy, for Hegel it was the end of

the philosophical process. He envisages the Mind as passing through a number of stages in a

struggle to understand itself, to attain knowledge of the whole (the Absolute Idea). (Ingram,

1990, p. 13)

For Hegel, contradictions or dialectic tensions are conceived as an opportunity for the Mind

to attain positive knowledge. (Ingram, 1990, p. 13) They are part and parcel of the minds

progression towards absolute knowledge. The Mind first accepts an idea that it thinks

explains reality. However, it soon realises that the accepted idea, the thesis, is countered by

another idea, the antithesis, and which thus invalidates the content of the former. The Mind

thus rejects the thesis and instead upholds the antithesis. Then again, a moment comes when

the Mind understands that the antithesis is also faulty. It thus unites the two opposing ideas,

into a higher more correct idea: the synthesis. This process of thesis, antithesis and synthesis


20/38

20

is repeated until the Mind appropriates the absolute idea.

The dialectical process is related to another very important Hegelian notion: the idea that

reason manifests itself in society. Hegel argues that the progress achieved by the Mind in the

logical sphere, is manifested in society as institutional and political change. For Hegel the

logical and the historical are two sides of the same coin. (Ingram, 1990, p. 13) He views

history as being powered by the contrast between the real (say a thesis), that is society

organised according to a particular idea, and the ideal (say the antithesis). When

philosophers or religious leaders make explicit or articulate the contradiction that exists

between the cultural sphere (the social sphere) and the ideal (the logical sphere), a rationality

crisis occurs. This leads to a revolution that attempts to adjust the real in accordance with the

ideal. The process goes on until Absolute knowledge is achieved and society is made to

correspond in accordance to the absolute idea. (Ingram, p. 14)

Hegel's odyssey of Mind is thus rooted in his philosophy of history. In the Philosophy of

History, Hegel states that The history of the world is none other than the progress of the

consciousness of freedom. (Singer, p. 125) Hegel conceives history as having a purpose,

and consequently he engages into a philosophy of history, or reflection about the

significance and purpose of history. His basic idea is that the development of Mind shouldnt

be understood only logically, as in his Phenomenology of Mind, but should also be traced

historically through different historical periods, as has been hinted above. Thus, for example,

from the Persian period to the Greek period, he sees a development of consciousness, where

in the Persian Empire only one consciousness has freedom, that being the emperor, in

Ancient Greece the development of individual freedom takes place, even though this


21/38

21

freedom is limited to male citizens. For Hegel, the history of consciousness is thus also the

history of freedom.

0.6 Marxs Historical Materialism

Karl Marx (18181883) was influenced by Hegel's philosophy of history. He, like Hegel,

accepts the thesis that history can be understood and consequently explained with reference

to particular historical and social realities. Moreover, he accepts the dialectical approach.

Evidence of this is the way his monumental workCapital is structured. However, contrary to

Hegel, he does not think that ideas stand at the basis of development; on the contrary, he

argues that ideas are mere expressions of existing material conditions. This section deals

with three main Marxist themes, these being his concept of alienation, historical materialism

and his ideas on ideology and exploitation. In Chapter 2, the issue of whether Marx was a

determinist or not, linking this debate with the schism that occurred in the first half of the

twentieth century between orthodox Marxists and Western Marxists will be dealt with.

Alienation

One Marxian commentator9argues that Marxs system of alienation stands at the core of the

Marxian system. (Wood, 2004, p. 5) The concept of alienation occurs throughout Marxs

work; however, it is clear that in Marxs later writings, the concept of alienation loses the

9The commentator in question is Istvan Meszaros. See Wood p. 4.


22/38

22

centrality Marx had assigned to it in his early works. In his fragment Estranged Labour'10,

Marx seems to be arguing that all types of alienation are but different aspects of a single

system, where each type is based on one paradigm form of alienation: alienated laboring

activity. (Wood, p. 4) In this text, alienation is assigned a basic explanatory role. Wood

argues that although the concept of alienation occurs in many of Marxs later writings, such

as in the Grundrisse and in Capital, in the later writings it takes a more peripheral role. If in

Marxs early writings alienation is explanatory, in his later writings, it becomes descriptive

or diagnostic. (Wood, p. 7)

Marx owes the concept of alienation to both Hegel and Feuerbach. Hegel, as explained in the

previous section, conceives the history of humanity as a process of de-alienating Mind. On

the other hand, Feuerbach argues that man is alienated when he projects an imaginary God,

and directs his affirmation and love to this imaginary deity. The postulation of a God

requires, Feuerbach contends, the degradation of human beings. To enrich God, he says,

the human being must become poor; that God may be all, the human being must be

nothing. (Wood, p. 12) While Feuerbach is critical of Hegels quasi-mystical philosophy,

he however agrees with the latter in equating alienation with false consciousness i.e. an

erroneous conception of mans relation to ultimate reality. (Wood, p. 10) Both thinkers thus,

consider alienation as being essentially a theoretical mistake. Consequently, both argue that

the remedy to alienation resides in a correction of such false consciousness.

From his early writings, Marx makes it clear that his understanding of alienation has to do

10The fragment in question makes part of The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, which are sometimes

referred to as The Paris Manuscripts.


23/38

23

with the practical productive life of the workers. In his famous fragment Estranged Labour,

Marx says that the medium through which estrangement takes place is itselfpractical.

(Marx, XXV) For Marx, alienation results from the kind of labouring activity that takes

place within the capitalist society.

The early Marx, in the Estranged Labour fragment, develops a four-fold typology of

alienation: alienation from ones product, from the labouring activity, from ones humanity

or species being, and finally from other men. In capitalism, man, Marx argues, confronts the

product as something alien, as apower independent of him. (Marx, XXII) The product that

man produces in a capitalist society is never owned by the producer who makes it.

Alienation in this sense shows the unnatural separation that takes place in capitalist

production. The product thus appears as loss of realizationfor the workers. (Marx, XXII)

The product is estranged from the worker only because the production act itself is alienating.

The alienated product is just the summation of the alienating labouring activity. (Marx,

XXIII) Thus the first form of alienation, alienation from the produced product, is in reality a

result of the second type, that is, alienating labour activity. Thirdly, man is also alienated

from his own nature, his own species being. What is supposed to be an expression of mans

essential being, in capitalism becomes merely and exclusively a means for subsistence.

Marx says that different from animals, man can produce in freedom and in accordance with

the laws of beauty. (Wood p. 7) In capitalistic production, this distinctive characteristic of

man, which sets him apart from other animals, is lost. Thus in this kind of production, Marx

says, what is animal becomes human and what is human becomes animal. (Marx, XXIV)

Finally, man is also alienated from other man. The product that the workers produce is at the

end of the day owned by other men. (Marx, XXIV)


24/38

24

Wood points out that Marxs conception of alienation rests on a particular unde rstanding of

human nature. This, however, does not mean that Marx thinks that man has an objective

nature independent of any social formation. On the contrary, he asserts that the human

condition cannot be grasped apart from the social structure within which it exists, especially

the economic structure. Nevertheless, Marx argues that there is something distinctive about

human beings that set them apart from the rest of nature. (Wood, p. 17) This distinctive

feature is production. Wood interprets Marx as saying that human beings are essentially

productive beings. (p. 28) What is distinctive in human production is that man produces

consciously and purposively. (p. 32)

If human beings are fundamentally productive beings, Wood argues, it follows that human

self-fulfilment is achieved in production. (p. 28) However, not any kind of production is self-

fulfilling. According to Marx, as he writes in Estranged Labour, man fulfils his nature

when he produces freely. It is production free from physical need. In this fragment, Marx

argues that in capitalist societies, the workers most humane characteristic, their ability to

duplicate themselves in reality through the product produced, is reduced to a mere means for

subsistence. (Marx, XXIV) This creative element in human nature is frustrated. Thus, argues

Wood, alienation results when human essential powers are frustrated, stopped from

developing. (Wood, p. 24) In this way, the workers experience a life that lacks meaning and

self-worth. (Wood, p. 8)


25/38

25

Historical Materialism

Marx disagrees with Hegels claim that social progress is an effect of progress in the realm

of ideas. Hegel had argued that when the Mind ascents to a more accurate conception of

reality, social organisation adjusts itself to the newly acquired understanding. On the

contrary, Marx maintains that social life in general is determined by material production.

Accordingly, economic reality stands at the base, of which social formation is just an effect.

(Wood, pp. 63 - 4) He claims that his materialist conception of history turns Hegels

dialectic rightside up. (Ingram, 1990, p. 19)

Marx maintains that material production is determined by what he calls forces of

production. In the narrowest sense, forces of production include the labour power of the

workers and the tools and instruments used to perform the work. In a wider sense, forces of

production also include the organisation of the work done, or the division of labour. Marx

asserts that the forces of production, understood as instruments, determine a particular

division of labour. (Wood p. 67) Productive forces in the wider sense, i.e. workers labour

power, instruments, as well as a particular division of labour, determine a particular set of

relations of production, i.e. a certain set of social and economic institutions, relationships of

power, authority and ownership within which labor is carried on. (Wood, p. 68) Thus for

Marx, within the economic structure (which is itself more fundamental when compared to

the superstructure), productive forces are the most fundamental element.

In the Marxian materialist conception of history, relations of production always adjust to

changes in the forces of production. Marx conceives material progress as being dominated


26/38

26

by a dialectical tension between developing forces of production and relations of production.

When the former expand to the extent that their unfulfilled potential is constrained by the

kind of production relations that exist in a given society at a particular point in time, a

revolution occurs. The revolution changes the relations of production that hinder the

fulfilling of the potential of the forces of production. Thus, for example, according to Marx,

capitalist relations of production prevailed over feudal relations of production because the

latter got in the way of the developing forces of production. Similarly, socialism would

emerge out of capitalism once the latters relations of production begin to hinder the

expression of the developing forces of production. (Wood, p. 81) Relations of production are

thus conceived by Marx as changing in accordance with the necessities of the ever

developing forces of production. However, he does not claim that change is automatic.

Counter-forces, such as ideologies and social institutions (which pertain to the

superstructure), tend to back the current relations of production and delay the above

mentioned adjustment.

While Marx definitely claims that at the basis of the economic base stand the developing

forces of production, he does not explain change as occurring with an absence of mind. At

the end of the day, it is people that bring change; more specifically classes. In fact Marx

regards history as a history of struggles between social classes. In this respect, individual

motives and actions become secondary to a general understanding of a dynamic history of

classes. (Wood, p. 89)

Marx never completed the section on classes in Capital. However, by class, he seems to

have understood a group of individuals with a common situation and common interests that


27/38

27

arise out of definite relations of production. (Wood, p. 90) Conflicts between classes, rather

than conflicts within classes are considered by Marx to be historically determining. (Wood,

p. 91) History, as he sees it, can be explained as a struggle between two major classes: that

which owns the means of production, and that which has labour to offer in exchange for

money. It must be said though, that for Marx a true class is a class in itself; a class that is

conscious of its own interests. (Wood, p. 92) This does not mean that for a class to be for

itself it must develop a sophisticated theoretical analysis, but it does imply some kind of

political organisation. (Wood, p. 94) Each class has a particular goal in history, this being the

establishment of a particular set of production relations that favour the interests of that

particular class. (Wood, p. 95) A class in-itself is a class that manages to recognise its

interests together with the kind of production relations that would actualise these same

interests.

Ideology and Exploitation

Wood discerns three basic uses of ideology in the Marxian corpus. (p. 118) The first use of

the concept of ideology is found in The German Ideology, a work co-authored with Engels.

In this work, ideology refers to the idea that the principal determining factor of historical

change is the idea. (p. 119) As has been explained above when discussing alienation, both

Hegel and Feuerbach argued that alienation is merely a false consciousness, and the

overcoming of alienation requires the correction of such a mistake. Marx and Engels

consider such views as those upheld by Hegel and Feuerbach ideological.

The second usage of ideology is called by Wood functional ideology. As the term implies,


28/38

28

functional ideology is an ideology that serves a specific purpose. In this sense, ideology

refers to the materialist thesis that socially prevalent or influential ideas can be explained by

showing how they either sanction the social relations determined by the existing stage of

productive powers or express and promote class interests. (p. 120) It is in this sense that

Marx says that jurisprudence, religion, art and morality in general are ideological. (p. 120)

The third usage of ideology is called by Wood ideological illusion. Here ideology means

consciousness which is ignorant of its own real social and historical significance. (p. 120)

In other words, ideology in this sense refers to ignorance with regards the materialist basis of

reality.

These three uses of ideology are intimately related. For example, historical idealism can be

both functional ideology, serving the interests of particular class, and also ideological

illusion, as it negates the materialist basis of reality. (Wood, p. 121) Moreover, it must be

said that ideological illusion is always functional ideology, but functional ideology need not

be ideological illusion. (Wood, p. 121) In fact, Wood claims that in principle the materialist

conception of history can be functional ideology as it serves the interests of a particular

class, the proletariat. (p. 121)

In capitalism, ideological illusions serve to justify the exploitative nature of capitalistic

relations of productions. The concepts of ideology and alienation are closely related to the

concept of exploitation in the Marxian corpus. In a capitalist society, the capitalist owns the

means of production, while the worker owns nothing except his labour power. Exploitation,

according to Wood, results from the fact that labour power is vulnerable to capital and not


29/38

29

simply from an unfair exchange.11 The workers have no option but to yield to the current

system of exchangeif they dont they would starve to death. Thus, according to Marx, as

interpreted by Wood, exploitation results from the fact that the worker is always in weak

bargaining position. (p. 251).

0.7 Conclusion: Habermas, Critical Theory and the Philosophical

Problems of Modernity

The outline of the thought of the philosophers of early modernity (from Descartes to Marx)

provides a panoramic view of the problems raised in philosophical modernity. It was argued

that the main problem that modern thinkers dealt with was that of reason; however, the

addressing of such an important concept requires the tackling of the web of issues to which

rationality relates. The school of thought that is usually referred to as the Frankfurt School,

the school of thought to which Habermas belongs, developed in part12

as a reaction to the

philosophical heritage of modern European philosophy. In this brief conclusion of the

Introduction, a preliminary discussionof the problems of philosophical modernity and the

way critical theorists responded, in particular Habermas, will be presented.

The problem of rationality is thus the fundamental problem of modernity itself. An

understanding of modernity requires an understanding of modern reason, that is to say, the

11Wood criticises the idea that exploitation refers to the fact that the workers spend only a part of their working

day for their own subsistence. On the other hand, Ingram seems to argue exactly the contrary. For a comparison

see Ingram p. 22 and Wood p. 250.12

Critical Theory is normative, in the sense that it seeks to change the cultural, social and political formation in

which it is begotten. If this were not the case, then at most it would be critical philosophy. As such, any kind of

critical theory reacts to both the philosophical andpolitical heritage in which it develops.


30/38

30

way modern philosophers conceived and understood reason. This does not mean however

that early modern philosophers (from Descartes to Marx), had a univocal understanding of

what it means to be rational. On the contrary, it may be argued that in philosophical

modernity there are various conceptions of reason. In fact, it will be argued that in the early

modern period, there are at least three different conceptions of reason: a subjectivist

conception, which was roughly embraced by Descartes and Kant, a developmental

conception of reason which however gives priority to the realm of ideas over the material

realm, which was developed by Hegel, and another developmental conception of reason

which gives priority to the material condition over the realm of ideas, which was developed

by Marx.

Apart from the theoretical problem of rationality, the early modern period also presents the

practical problem of rationality. Modern philosophers were not simply interested in

developing a consistent conception of rationality, but also sought to provide ways in which

reason can be consistently applied to moral and social-political issues. These two types of

practical rationality can be separated conceptually, but are in reality intimately related. A

conception of practical rationality is usually developed to be applied to interactions between

human beings, understood as being normatively regulated and as belonging, directly or

indirectly, to the social-political sphere of human life. Central to the problem of practical

rationality is the issue of how to bridge theory with practice, that is to say, how to ground or

justify normative claims. In fact, the issue of justification is central to any critical theory.

Finally, the philosophical issues that stem from early modernity can make the project of

modernity itself an issue: is modernity, as expressed in the tradition that makes the human


31/38

31

being and his rational capabilities at the centre of any moral, social and political endeavour,

misconceived, and thus ought to be abandoned? This third issue has been raised by various

contemporary philosophers who saw an anti-human element in the tradition of modernity.

The three philosophical problems just outlined - the problem of a theoretical definition of

reason, the problem of how to bridge theory and practice, and the issue of the project of

modernity itself have been tackled by Habermas and other critical theorists. In what

follows in this introduction, these three problems will be discussed in order to introduce the

early critical theorists and Habermas.

The Theoretical Conception of Rationality

Before delving into the critical theory of the Frankfurt School, it is imperative to clarify what

is meant by the theoretical conception of rationality. When the question what is

rationality? is posed, the expected answer would be a theoretical elaboration of what

rationality is. To be sure, one may seek to define rationality by giving examples of what it

means to be rational (ostension), but the ultimate answer would be a conception, in strictly

theoretical terms, of the idea of rationality.

Early critical theorists refuted both the conception of rationality offered by the subjectivists

(Descartes and Kant), and by Idealism (Hegel). First generation critical theorists offered two

different criticisms to the subjectivist conception of reason: one such criticism is found in

Marcuses Philosophy and Critical Theory, whereas the other is found, amongst other

works, in Horkheimers and AdornosDialectic of Enlightenment.


32/38

32

In Philosophy and Critical Theory, Marcuse argues that the subjectivist13 and idealist

conception of rationality is complacent to the status-quo; this is because as a conception it is

limited to the realm of ideas. In his criticism of Rationalism and Idealism, Marcuse contends

that real freedom is freedom from material oppression. Basically here Marcuse is rehashing

the Marxist critique of Hegel. The criticism offered by Marcuse and other early critical

theorists will be discussed in detail in Chapter 1.3. In the Dialectic of Enlightenment,

Horkheimer and Adorno equate the subjectivist conception of rationality with the

instrumental conception of rationality.14The authors argue that the barbarism experienced

in the twentieth century is nothing other than a consequence of an instrumentalist-

subjectivist conception of reason that goes back to the ancient world. The arguments

presented in the Dialectic of Enlightenment(and Habermass critique) will be discussed in

Chapter 1.7and 1.8.

Habermas refutes all the three conceptions of rationality discussed above, that is to say, the

subjectivist, the idealist and the materialist. He argues that his predecessors, most notably

Horkheimer and Adorno, while understanding that the subjectivist conception of reason is

faulty and limited, fail to make the necessary paradigm shift towards a fuller conception of

reason. In his Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, Habermas is particularly critical of

Horkheimer and Adorno. He argues that the criticism levelled by Horkheimer and Adorno

against the subjectivist conception of reason (as will be argued below, against the project of

13Marcuse uses the term rationalist to refer to the subjectivist conception discussed here.

14In this they agree with Martin Heidegger who sees the philosophy of Descartes as preparing the groundwork

for a conception of reason that would go instrumental. This theme is tackled by Heidegger in various works,

most notably in his lectures on Nietzsche and in Being and Time. The critique of instrumental reason is then

radicalized by Heidegger in his famous paper The Essence of Technology. In this paper, Heidegger calls for a

different attitude of the human being towards Being from that found in the technological-instrumental

disclosure of Being.


33/38

33

modernity itself), commits them to a performative contradiction. Following Nietzsche,

Horkheimer and Adorno provide a radical critique of reason with the result being that they

leave no rational criterion which can justify their critique.

Habermas argues for a paradigm shift from the philosophy of the subject to the philosophy

of language. In The Theory of Communicative Action Vol. I & II Habermas distinguishes

between communicative action and strategic action. This distinction is necessary to

understand Habermass reconstruction of reason. Communicative action refers to action that

aims at reaching understanding and agreement. On the other hand, strategic action is action

that is goal oriented, and thus subjects understanding and agreement to the attaining of ones

goals. The following is a reconstruction of Habermass argument:

i. Speech has a rational basis.ii. There are at least two types of social action involving speech: communicative

action and strategic action.

iii. Communicative action is fundamental, whereas strategic action is parasitic oncommunicative action.

iv. Therefore communicative rationality, which is the kind of rationality that governsspeech, is fundamental.

i. Speech has a rational basis.Habermas argues that whenever a speaker engages in communicative action through the

uttering of a speech act, he is simultaneously raising four different validity claims: a truth

claim, a normative claim, a truthfulness claim and comprehensibility claim. In essence, this


34/38

34

means that the speaker must if the need arises, justify or ground what he says. This

expectation is inherent in speech, meaning that it is immanent, and effective communication

cannot by-pass such expectation of grounding.

ii. There are at least two types of social action involving speech: communicative actionand strategic action.

Communicative action is not the only possible social action. There are other forms, amongst

them strategic action. Strategic action is when a speaker utters a speech act knowingly that

he is being insincere. So whereas communicative action, that is, action oriented towards

mutual understanding, requires that all four validity claims are raised, the actor who engages

in strategic action suspends (without revealing what his real intention is) the truthfulness

claim.

iii. Communicative action is fundamental, whereas strategic action is parasitic oncommunicative action

The fact that strategic action requires the suspension of one of the four validity claims that

are on in communicative action, shows that communicative action is fundamental.15

iv. Therefore communicative rationality, which is the kind of rationality that governsspeech, is fundamental.

If communicative action is fundamental, and strategic action is derivative, it follows that the

kind of rationality that governs communicative action is fundamental and that which governs

15Habermas offers other arguments to support this claim, which will be discussed in full in Chapter 2. For the

time being it is enough to note that strategic action is parasitic on communicative action.


35/38

35

strategic action is derivative as well. The rationality that governs communicative action is

termed by Habermas communicative rationality. On the other hand, the rationality that

governs strategic action is instrumental. So this means that instrumental rationality that is

equated by Horkheimer and Adorno with subjectivist rationality, is not the only conception

of rationality, and more than that, is not even fundamental as they assume in the Dialectic of

Enlightenment. So through his conception of communicative rationality Habermas is able to

transcend previous conceptions - the subjectivist-instrumental, the idealist and the

materialist.

Theory and Practice

The issue of grounding is an important theme in critical theory. Any critical theory must

ground the critique it makes, in order to avoid infinite regress or circular reasoning. First

generation critical theorists have made used of a technique immanent critique, which they

borrow from Hegel and Marx. Basically this means comparing the real material situation to

the ideals that were used to justify the current system of production. For example, capitalism

is usually justified because it enhances justice and equality. A critical theorist who makes

use of immanent critique would compare the real situation with the promised ideal.

Habermas refutes such an approach, as he argues that in late capitalism such ideals are no

longer used to legitimate current relations. Thus, if Habermas is correct here, immanent

critique loses the critical thrust it relied on before. This will be discussed in Chapter 1.5.

Marcuse, attempts to develop a different argument to ground his critique in Eros and

Civilization. In this work he attempts to unite Freudianism with Marxism. His main


36/38

36

argument, which will be discussed in Chapter 1.6, is that whereas some needs are real, other

needs are constructed by the system. Critical theory thus can use the tension between real

needs and false needs to critique the system. Habermas, again, refutes this argument; one of

the main objections that he levels against Marcuse is that needs are always linguistically

mediated, and so it is practically impossible to distinguish between the two. Language,

which is fundamental for human identity, cannot be removed in a sort of epoch as

envisaged by Husserl. In other words, needs are mediated linguistically, meaning that they

can only be articulated and thus comprehended linguistically.

Instead of immanent critique and biological grounding, Habermas makes use of his

theoretical conception of reason in order to ground his critique. Through the theoretical

conception of communicative rationality, Habermas is able to provide a theory that can guide

practice. Habermass contribution in this regard is twofold. On the one hand, the theory of

communicative action can serve as a conceptual scheme from where to diagnose and offer

cures for the pathologies of modernity. In fact the theory of communicative action is used by

Habermas to offer a critical analysis of the domination by what he calls systems of power

and money (state and economy) in late modernity. This will be the subject-matter ofChapter

3. On the other hand, the theory of communicative action can serve as the basis of discourse

ethics. Habermas argues for a cognitivst morality that is rooted in communication and

dialogue, contrary to moral scepticism. This will be the subject-matter ofChapter 4.


37/38

37

The Project of Modernity

Habermass reconstruction of reason, which he develops in The Theory of Communicative

Action Vol. I & II, cannot be understood in isolation from his theory of modernity.

Horkheimer and Adorno in the Dialectic of Enlightenment provide a radical critique of

reason but also a radical critique of the possibility of enlightenment and emancipation.

Habermas argues that the rejection of the project modernity is based on a misconception of

reason. Modernity should not be understood as being dominated by instrumental reason.

Horkheimer and Adorno of the Dialectic of Enlightenmentmis-conceptualise modernity as

they follow the one-sided analysis of Max Weber. Weber considers modernity to be

characterised by a rise of formal or instrumental rationality, which he concludes led the

moderns in an iron cage. Habermas argues that the problem with Webers

conceptualisation lies in the fact that he fails to see that there were two rationalisation

processes, and not one. For Weber, modern rationalisation is simply the rise of instrumental

reason, which resulted from the disenchantment of religious and metaphysical narratives.

Habermas contends, contrary to Weber (and Horkheimer and Adorno), that such a view is

one-sided. Modernity for Habermas, is characterised by a rationalisation of the lifeworld,

which refers to the unleashing of the potential inherent in communicative action, and by a

rationalisation of systems of power and money, which function on a principle of rationality

that is strictly instrumental (or functional). Thus, Habermas sees modernity and modern

western society as being guided by two different rational principles, communicative

rationality in the lifeworld, and instrumental rationality in administrative and economic

systems, both of which are necessary for the effective functioning of modern society.


38/38

Problems arise, Habermas argues, when the instrumental principle encroaches upon areas

that ought to function in accordance with communicative rationality. A practical example of

such an encroachment would be when areas like school and family disputes, are subjected to

instrumental rationality. This will be discussed in Chapter 3.

For Habermas modernity is thus an unfinished project, which can, through communicative

rationality, be completed or improved. However, such progress requires first and foremost a

proper conceptualisation of the development that occurred in modernity with the aid of

proper concepts that are lacking in theorists like Weber, Horkheimer and Adorno.

Documents

Habermas's Reconstruction of Reason by Keith Pisani - Introduction