H006 McPherson and Berlin Readings.pdf

8/11/2019 H006 McPherson and Berlin Readings.pdf

1/10

:=-

-:;5i3l:;*A=;:ff--.

=

l:..fi:,:i-+j*'jEl5#:,:\'j

-.

-:J:

.

1

.

-

Il

-'l

*'-

-:

j-.

Jarues

M.

McPbenon

TF}VE WERE TO C,O

OUT

I

any

town in

Americe

and

as

I

the dde

of this arcicle,

prob

spondents

would

unhesiutingly

answer,

"Abraham

Lin-

coln."

Most

of

them

*'ould cite

the

Emanciparion

Procl'.r-

mation

as

thc key documenL Some of the more

reflecdve

and

becer

informed

respondens would

add

the

Thirteenth

Amendment

and

point

to

Lincoln's important

role

in

is

adoption.

fuid a few might

qualifi

their

.Eswer

by noting that

without

military

victory

the Emancipadon

Proclamadon

rrould never

have

been

adopted,

or

at

least

would not

have

applied to

rhe

sates

where most

of

the

slaves

were

held. But,

of

course, Lincoln

lvas

commander-in-

chief

of

Union arnries,

so the

credit

for

their

victories

rvould

belong

mainly

to

him-

The answer

would

still

be the

same:

Lincoln freed

rhe

slaves.

In

recenr

vears,

drough,

this

answer

has

been

challenged

as

another example

of

elitist

history, of

focusing only

on

the

acrions of

great

rvhite

males

and

ignor-

ing the

accions of the overwhelming

majority of the

people, who also

make

history.

If

rve were

to ask our

quesrion

of professionrl

historians,

rve

would re-

ceive

a

reply quite

differenr

from

thar

described

above.

For

one

thing, it

would

not

be

simple-br

clear cr.rt

Many

The

uaditional

answer

to

the

question

"Who

freed

the slaves?"

is

the

right

answer.

By prbnouncing

slavery

a

moral

evil

that

must

come

to

an end,

by

rvinning

che

Presidency

in

1860, by refusing

to

compromise on

the

issue

of

slavery's

e,Ypansioil,

by

knining together

a

[Inionist

coalition. by

prosecuting

the

Civil

lVar to

unconditional

victory

as

Commander-in-Chief

of

an

army of

liberrtion,

Abraham

Lincoln

freed

rhe shves.

of

them would answer along the lines of

'On

the bne

hand...but

on the other."

They

would

speak

of

ambiva-

lence,

ambiguiry,

nuances,

paradox, irony. They would

point

to

Lincoln's gradualism, his slow

and apparendy re-

white

supremary.

They

would say

that rhe

rvhole

issue

is

more complex than

it

ap-

pears-in

other

words,

many

hisrorians,

as

is

their

wont,

would

not

give

a srraight ans\ver

ro

the

question.

But

of

rhose

who

did" a growing number

would

reply,

as

did

en

historian

spcaking to rhe

Civil

War

lrsrinrte

at

Ger-

Who

Freed

The

Slaves?

itary

canrps

in the South

thev

forced

the

issue

of emancip

tion on

r}re

Lincoln

adrninistration..By creating

a

simati

in_:uh

ich_ng.4hgrn

o tficials

rvou

ld e i

thG-Ei?E-I6JEEF

them

to

resolutely

place

rheir

freerlom-:rnd that of

their

posterity-


2/10

ing

the

Civil

lVar

era,

lhe

Freedmen :rnd

Southern

Sociew

Project

at

the

Universir.v

of Marvland,

has

startrped irs im-

primaEur

on

rhis

interpretation. The

slaves,

rvrite

the edi-

rors

of this

project,

r,r'ere

"the

prime movers

in securing

rheir

orvn

liberc.v."

The Columbia

Universiry historian Bar-

b.,rraJ.

Fields

gave

rvide

publiciry

to

this

thesis.

On

canrerr

in the PBS

television documentary

"The

Civil

War"

and in

an

essay

in the

larishl.r'illtrstrated

volume accomp:rnying the

series, she

insisted

that'freedom did not conle

to

rhe slaves

from

rvords

on

paper,

either the

*'ords

of Congress or those

of the

Presideng

but from the initiadve o[

the slaves' them-

selves.

"It

rvas

they

who

aught the nation that

it

must place

rhe abolition of slzvery

at

the

head

of its agenda.-.- The

slaves

themselves

had

to

make

their

freedom real.'

Two

important

corollaries of

the

self-emancipadon

the-

role in

a

situation

rvhich...needed

to be pushed torvanl

its

most profound revoludonary

implicrtions."

Lincoln repeat-

edly

"placed

the

presenrtion of

the

rvhite

Union

above

the

death ofblack slavery"; even

as

lare

as August 1852,

when

he

wrote

his

famous letter to

Fforace

Greeley sradng

thar

. 1\v

"if

I could

save

t]re Union

rvithout

freeing any slave,

I

{0"'ro}

would do it,"

he

was,

Harding

rvrites,

"still

trapped

in his

',

-.*'

\

'{

Own

ODSesSlOn

wlUl

sxllng

tne

rvnlte

Unlon at all

cOStS,

vt

even t}re

cost

of

continued

black slavery.' By

exempting

obsession

with

salins

the

rvhite

Union at all

N- lr."

I-1,

^:rr

\*

one-rhird o[ the Sourh from rhe Emanciparion Proclama-

+,{.$,t..,;;;" Fields

observes,'Lincoln

rvrs

more deter-

t\,

\

rt'

mined

ro retain the

goodwill of

the

slave

orvners than to

se-

cure

the

liberw

of the slaves."

Despite

Lincoln,

though,

"no

human being alive

could

have

held

back the ride thar s*'ept

toward

freedom"

by 1863.

Nevertheless,

Harding

laments,

"while

the concrete

historical realities

o[ the time testified

to the

cosdy,

daring,

courageous

activities

of

hundreds

of

thousands ofbleck people

breaking loose from

slavery

and

setting

rhemseh'es

free, the myth gave rhe credir for

rhis

freedom

to a

rvhite

republican

presidenc"

By this myth,

'the

independeng

radicel action

of

the

black

movemenr

ro-

rvard

freedom...was diminished,

and

the

coerced, ambigu-

ous role o[a

rvhire

deliverer...gained preeminence.'

Uni-

versiry

of

Pennsylvania

historian

Robert

Engs goes

even

farther;

he

thinls

the'6ction"

that

''Massa

Lincoln'

freed

the

slaves"

was

a

sort

of tacit conspirary among whites to

convince blacks

that'white

America, personi6ed by Abra-

ham Lincoln,had

giaea

them

their

freedom

[rather]

than

allow them

ro

realize

dre

empowerment

rhat their taking of

it

implied.

The

poor,

uneducated freedman

fel[

for

that

masterful propaganda

stroke. But

so have

most

of

the

rest

of us,

black and

*'hire,

for over

a

cenrury "

How

valid

are

these

statemens? Firsg

we

must

recog-

nize the

considerable

degree

of mrth

in rhe main

rhesis.

By

16l Rcmsmraion

coming

into [Jnion lines,

bv

rvithdrawing

their

labor

from

Contederate

orvners,

bv

rvorking

tbr

the

Union

army

and

5enl

so-callcd'non-elites,'

the

slaves

were

neither

passive

vicrims

nor palvns

of por*'erful

rvhite

males

who

loom

so

l:rrge

in

our

traditional

image

o[American

history. They,

too,

played

a part

in

determining their'os'n

destiny;

theS

roo,

made

a history

that

hisrorians have finally discovered.

That

is dl

to the

good.

But

by

challenging

rhe

"myth"

that

Lincoln

freed

the

slaves,

propbnens of the

self-emancipa-

don rhesis

ere in danger of

creadng another

myth-that

he

had lirde

to do

with

the destruction of

slavery.

-[t

may

rurn

out,

upon

close

e-ramination,

that the aaditional

answer

to

the

question

" Vho

Freed the

Slaves?'

is

closer

to being

the

right

ans*'er

than is the

new

rnd currently more

fashion-

able answer-

Firsg

one

must

ask

what s'as

rhe

sini qtn

noz

of

emanci-

pation

in the

1860s-the essenrial

condition, the absolute

pggg 1ire,

the one

thing rvithout rvhich

it

rvould

not

have

hcppened.

The cleer

:rnsruer

is: the

rvar.

\\'lthout

the

Civil

\\hi

rhere

rvould

have

been no cifrGG-rion

act, no Eman-

cipadon

Proclamation,

no

Thirteenth Amendment

(not

to

menrion

the Founeenrh

and Fifteenth),

certainlv no self-

emancipation,

and almost cenainly

no

end

of

slavery

for

several

more

decades

at least.

Slavery

had existed in North

America

for more

than trvo

centuries

before

1861, bur

ex-

cepr for

a

riny fracrion

of

slaves

who fought in the Revolu-

rion,

or

escaped,

or bought their

freedom, there had

been

no self-emanciparion

during that dme.

Every

slave

insur-

rection

or insurrecrion

conspir.rw

failed in rhe end. On

the

eve

of the

Civil

lVar,

planmcion

agriculrure

\t'as

more

pro[-

itable,

slavery

more entrenched, slu'e

o\r'ners nrore

pros-

perous,

and the

"slave

porver'

more dominant

rvithin the

South

if not

in the

nation ar lrrrge than it

had

ever

been.

Without the

war,

the

door

to

freedom

would

have

remained

closed for

an indeterminate

length of time.

What brought

rvar

and opened

that

door?

The

answer,

is that

secession

on the lvar. [n both

Abraham

Lincoln

moves to center

stagie.

Seven

stares

se-

ceded

and flormed the

Confederary

bec"@"n

elecrion

to the presidency

on

an

antislavery

pl"tf".n

;

f";**?-

freedom

was

the

decision

makins of Abraham

Lincoln

act-

ing

as antislavew

political

leader,

president-clect,

president,

and

commander-in-chief.

The

statement

quoted above,

that Lincoln

"placed

the

preservacion

of

the

rvhite

Union

above thc

death

of

black

a

of credit

for achievins their own

nt ally of black

free-

,

"played an actively

conserv'ative

States

ceded

after

escalated

to full-scale

rrar

llion.

The

com-

*on d.r--mnator

in a[

thG[3


3/10

s6very,'while

true

in

a

narrow

sense,

is

highly

misletding

when

shorn

of

is conte.xt.

From

185.t,

*'hen

he rerurned

to

policics,

until

nominaced

for

president

in

1860,

the

dominant,

unifring

rheme

o[ Lincoln's

career

rvas

opposi-

don

to

the

expansion

of slavery as

the vital first

srep ro-

ward

placing

it on

the course

o[ ultimate

extincrion. A

sru-

issue"

min-rhe

issue being

slavery.

RepeatedlS

Lincoln

denounced

slavery

as a'monstrous

injuscice,"'an

unqual-

ified

cvil

to the

ne8To,

to the

rvhite

man,

ro the

soil,

and

to

the

Stetq'He

attzcked

his

main political

rival, Stephen.L

Douglas,

for his

"declarcd

indifference"

to the

moral

wrong

of

slavery Douglas

ulooks

to ao

end

of tbc

institution

of

slcacry,"

said

Lincoln.

"That

is

the real

issue. That is

the

issue

rhat

will

continue in

this country when

these poor

tongues

ofJudge

Douglas and myself

shall

be silent. ft is

the

cternal

and

niry

and the other the

divine

right o[

kingp....

No marter in

rvhat

shape it comes, rvherher from

the

mouth

of a king who

seeks

ro

bestride the

people of

his

own

nation

and live by rhe

fruit

of

their labor,

or from

one

race

of men

as an apology

for

enslar.ing

anorher

race,

practices,

and polic.v,

which

h'rrrmonize rvith

it.... If rve

do

this,

we

shall nor

only have

s:rved

rhe

(Jnion;

but

rre

shall

have

so

saved

ir,

as

to nrake, :rnd

to

keep

it,

forever

ruorthv

of

the

saving.'

rhe

ideas

and ageno'of

Abrlh:rm

Lincoln

rhan

from

,;rher

single

cruse.

But,

u'e

must

ask,

not

the

elecrion

of

Iican

in

t860

h

ate hrd been_$rvard-B3tes,

rvho

might

conc

,rbly

have

rvon

the eleJtion

but

had

,rot

.rr.ri

an

ouB

given

him a more

radical

repurarion

rh:rn

Lincoln.

But

rvard

might

not

have

rvgn

tle

election.

More

ro

the

poin

he

had

ryon,

seven smres

would

undoubtedly

have

seced

ttlose seven

back in. Most

important of all, he would

h

c"il?f6TT-on

unrter and

thereby

exringuished

the

sp

rhat

threatened to

fla1ne

into

rvar.

As

it

was,

Seward

did

best to compel

Lincoln

into

concessions

and

evacuar

But Lincoln stood

firm. \\hen

Servard

flirred rvith

the

tion

of supporting

the

Critrenden Compromise,

wh

rvould

have

repudiated the Republican

plrrtflorm

by

per

dng rhe

espansion of

slavery',

Lincoln sriffened

the

ba

bones

of

Ser+ard

and

orher key Republican

leaders.

"En

tain no proposition

for a compromise in

regard to

the

tension of

slavery"

he

lerote

to them.

'The

nrg

has

ro co

& beacr

now, than anv time hereafter."

Crirtenden's

co

promise'would

lose

everything rve gained

by

the

electio

The

proposal

for

concessions,

Lincoln

poinred

our,

knowledges that

slavery

has equal righs with

liberw,

surrenders all

rve

have contended

for.... We

have

just

ried an election

on

principles

fairlv

sr:rted

to rhe peo

Now

s'e

rre told

in rdvance,

the

governnrent sh:rll be

b

ken

up, unless

rve

surrender to those

s'e

hirve berrren-.

s'e

surrender, it

is

the end o[us. Thcv

rrill

rcpear

rhe

ex

iment upon

us td

libituu.

A

year

rvill

nor

pass, rill

rve

s

have

to take Cuba

as a

condicion

upon

rvhich

thev

will

in

the

Union."

'

[t is

worth emphasizing here that

fi. .on]g3 gg

nlgr-in these

leners from Lincoln

to Ripublican lead

w1;

sla"ery.

T

b be sure, on the mafters of slavery wher

already existed

and enforcement

of the fugitive

slave

pr

sion of the

Conscitution, Lincoln

was

willing

to reassure

South.

But

on the

cnrcial issue

of

1860,

slavery

in rhe te

tories,

he

refused

to

compromise, and this refusal

kept

assertion

that Lincoln

"placed

the preservation

of

the

rv

Union

above the death

of

black slavery." The

Crinend

Compromise

did indeed

place

presewarion

of

the

Un

above

the death of

slavery. So

did

Seward; so did

most

w

Americans during

dre

secession

crisis.

But

that

asser

does

zor describe Lincoln.

the cor

to

i-a

private

letter

to

his old

fri

denr

of

Lincoln's

oratory has esrimared

that.he

gave

175

chance of

rvinning the nominacion-]Es_r-qlmgfSSaainly

political

ipeeches

during'those

six

y.".r.

ih.-"cenual Uh

H.

S@had

been

,h.

nil*inffiil-d',

...

message'

of these

speeches

showed

Lincoln

to be

a

"one-

talk of

a

'higher

larv" and

an

"irrepressible

conflict"

Southerners

read

Lincoln's

speeches;

cheyknerv bv hean

his words

about

rhe house

divided and rhe

ultimate e.rtinc-

tion

of

slavery.

Lincoln's

election

in 1860

was

a

sign rhar

they

had

losr

conrol

of

rhe

national

governmenq

if

they

re-

mained

in

the

lJnion,

they

feared

that uldmate

extincdon

of

their

way

of life would

be their

destiny. That

is rvhy

they se-

ceded.

It

was

not

merely

Lincoln's election,

but his

election

es

a

priacipkd

opporcnt

ttl*q

on

norul

grouzlr

that pre-

cipitated

secession-

Militant abolitionists

critical of Lincoln

for

falling

shon

of

their

orvn stand:rrd

nevertheiess recog-

nized

this

ruth.

States.'

Without

Lincoln's

elecdon,

southern states

would

it is the

same

tyrannical

principle."

fs 9 p -ofrh.

Declaretion oflndependence

and

the

principle

ofslarery

said

Lincoln,

"cannot

srand to

re

other man

rvho

mieht

conc

:rblv have been elected

i,1. I

\b.

, 199


4/10

.\le.xander

Stephens,

"You

think slavery is

rigbt

and

ousht

to

be

errended;

rvhile rve

think

it isunng and

ought to be re-

srricted.

That

I suppose

is the

rub." It

was

indeed

the

rub.

Even

more than

in

his

election

to the

presidenry,

Lincoln's

refusal

to

cornpromise

on the expansion of slavery or on

Fon

Sumrer

proved

decisive. If

any

other.

man

had been

in

his

position,

the

course

of

history-ind

of

emancipition-

rvould

have

been

different.

Flere

again

rve

have

rvithout

question

rsiniqtunon.

[t is quite

mre,

of

course,

that

once

the

war

stnrted,

Lin-

coln

moved

more

slor,r'ly

and

reluctandy

torvard making it

a

sar

for

cmancipation than

bleck

leaders, abolidoniss, rad-

ical Republicrns,

and

thc

slaves

themselves

wanted

him

to

mov'e.

He

did reassure

southern

whites

that

he had no

in-

tention

and no constirurional power

to

inrcrfere with

slav-

cr1

in

the

states. [n

September 186l and Mly 1862, he re-

voked

orders by Generals Fr6mont

and

Hunter freeing thc

slaves of Confederates

in

their mititary

districts.

In

Decem-

ber

l86l

he forced

Secretary

of

War Cameron

to

delete

a

paragraph

from

his annual

report

recommending the free-

ing

and

arnring

o[slaves.

.{nd

though

Lincoln

signed

rhe

confscation

'rrcs

o[

Augusc l86l

and

Juty

1862 rhat provid-

ed

for

freeing

some slaves

owned by

Confederates, this leg-

isladon did

not

come from his initiative. The initiative

was

taken

out in the field

by

slaves

rvho

escaped

to Union lines

and officers

like

General

Beniamin

Buder who

accepted

them

as'concraband

of

r,lar."

All

of this

appears

to

support

the

thesis

rhar

slaves

eman-

ciprted

themselves and

that Lincoln's image

as

emancipator

is

a myth. But

let

us

take a

closei

look It

seems

clear todaS

;.s it did to people

in

1861,

that no

won,

slavery

if not de-

sroved; if

the Confederacy

won,

slavery

would

survive and

perhaps

grow stronger

from the poswar

territorial erpan-

sion of

an independent

and confident

slave power. Thus

Lincolqh-Ephrsis on the

prioriqf

of Union had

positive

implicarions

for emancipation, while

precipitrrte

or

prema-

rure actions

agahSrsffiry

might

jeopardize

the

cause

of

Union

and therefore

boomerang

in

favor

of

slavery-

Lincoln's

chief concern

in

l86t

\vas

to maintain

a

united

coalition

of War

Democrats

and

border-state

Ljnioniss as

rvell

as

Republicans

in

support

of the

rvar

effort

To do this

he

considered

it

essential

to

de6ne the

war

as

being waged

solely

for

Union, which

united

this

coalirion,

and nor

a

war

against

slaverv.

rvhich rvould

fragment

it.

When

General

Frmont

issued

his

emancipacion

edict in

Missouri, on Au-

gust

J0,

1861,

thc political

and

militery efforts

to

preyenr

Kennrcky,

Maryland,

and

Missouri

from

seceding and to

cultivate Unioniss

in

rvestern

Virginia

and eastern

Ten-

nessee

were

at

a

crucial

suge,

balancing on e krifc edge.

If

he

had

let Fr6mont's

order

stand, explained

Lincoln to his

old friend Senator

Orville

Browning

of

Illinois,

it

would

i3l

Rcorctnutin

have been

"popular

in some

quarrers,

and would

have

been

more

so

if ir

had been a general declar:rtion

o[

emancipa-

rion."

But

this

would

have

lost

t]re

war

by driving

Kenrucky

inro secession.

"I think ro

lose Kentuclcy is

nearly

the

same

as to

lose the

*'hole

game.

Kennrcky gone.

we

can

not

hold

Missouri,

nor,.

as I thin(

Maryland.

These

all

against

us,

and

dre

job

on

our

hands

is'too

large. for us. We'woul,l

as

rvell

consent

t6 separation'it

once,

including

the

surrender.

of this

capitol."

There

is

no reeson

to

doubt the sincerity and sagaciry

of

rhis

statement.

Lincoln's

greatest skills

as

a

polidcal leader

were

his sensitiviry

ro

public opinion

and

his sense of dm-

ing.

He

understood

that

while a

majority of Republicars

by

the spring

of

1862

favored

a

war

against

slavery

a

decided

majoriry

of

his Union coalirion

did not. During those

spring

monrhs

he alrernately

coaxed

and prodded

border-

sate

Unioniss

rorvard

recognition of the inevitable

escala-

don ofthe

conflict

into

a rvar against

slavery

and

toward

ac-

ceprance

of

his plan tbr compensated

emanciparion

in their

stetes.

He

rvarned

southern Unionists

and

northern

Democrars

that

he

could

not fight this

rvar'rvith

elder-stalk

squirs,

charged

n'irh rose

rvater....

This governmenE can-

not

much

longer play

a

game

in which

it

stakes

all, and

its

enemies

suke

nothing.

Those

enemies

must

understand

rhat rhey

cannot

experiment

for ten years trying to destroy

the

governmeng

and if

they fail sdll

come

back

into

the

Union

unhurt."

Lincoln's

meaning, though

veiled, was

clear;

h.e

was

about

to

add

the

weapon of emancipation to his arsenal.

lVhen

he

penned

these

warningp,

inJuly

1862, he

had

made

up

his mind

to

issue

an

emancipation proclamarion.

l\trereas

a

year

rtarlier,

even three months cirrlier, Lincoln

had

betieved

that

avoidance

of

the emancipation

issue

rves

necessary

to maintain

that

knife-edge

balance

in the

Union

coalition, things

had now

changed.

The

war

had

escalated

in

scope

and 6:ry, mobilizing

all

the

resources

of both

sides,

including

the slave

labor force of

rhe

Confederacy. The

im-

minent prospect of

Union

victory

in the spring had been

shredded

by Robert E. Lee's

successful

counteroffensive

in

preservation

of

the

Union."

"The

slaves,'

he

told

his cabi-

neg rvere

"undeniably

an element of strength to those

who

had their

sen'ice,

and

we

must

decide

whether

that element

should

be

with

us or

against

us."

Lincoln

had

earlier

hesi-

tated

to rct

agairst

slavery

in thc

sutes

because

thc

Consti-

nrdon

protected

it

there.

But most

s[aves

were

the

proper-

ty of

enemics

waging

war against

the United

States,

and

"the

rebels,' said Lincoln,

"could

not at the

same

dme

duow

off

the

Constitution

and

invoke is

aid....

Decisive

and

extensive

measures

must be

adopted....

We

[want]

the

the

oon

the

Seven

Days.

The risk of

alienating

dre border

states

and

nonhern

Democrats

wglow

.

Lincoln

was

now

convt


5/10

arrny

to

strike

more vigorous

blows.

The

Adminisuation

must

set

an example,

and

srike

at

the heart

of the

rebel-

lion"-slavery.

IVlonrgomery

Blair,

speaking

flor the

forces

of

conservatism

in the North and border

srares,

warned

o[

the

corsequences

among'these groups

of an emancipadon

proclamation.

But Lincoln

was

done

conciliadng

these ele-

ments.

He

had

uied

to make

the

border

states see

reason;

.

'

4ciw'we,

must

make

the

fonvard

movement' without

them.

.

'

'

"'fh.y

*ill

acquiesce,

if

not

imrhediately,

soon."

fu

for

drd

nofthern

Democras,

"their

club3 would

be

used agzirst

us

take

whar

course

we

might

"

In

1864,

speaking

to

a

visiting

deleg"arion

of

abolition-

iss,

Lincoln

explained

why

he

had moved

more

slowly

rgairut

slavery than they had urged.

Having taken

en

oath

to

preserve and

defend the

Constitution,

which

protected

slavery

"I

did not

'Sate'

institution of

'Slavery'

for

when

rt

would

not have

try

had not

been

ready for

the Emanciparion Proclamation

in September

[862, cven

in

January

186J.

Democraric

gains

in the northern congressional

elecrions in rhc fall

of

1869 resulted in part

from

a vorer

backlash

ag"ainsr

the

pre-

liminary Emancipation Proclamation.

The

crisis

in morale

in the

Union

armies

and swelling

Copperhead sEength

during

the

winter

of

1863

grew in part from a resentfrrl

conviction

thar Lincoln

had

unconstitutionally uans-

formed

the purpose of

the

rvar

from resroring

the

Union

to

freeing

the

slaves.

\\,irhout

quesdon, this

issue

biaerly

di-

vided

the

North

and threatened

fatally ro erode suppon

for

the

war

effort-the

very

consequence Lincoln had

feared

in

1861 and that

Montgomery

Blair

feared

in

1862.

Not

until

after

the

twin

miliriry

victories ar

Gemysburg

ind

Viclsburg

did

this

divisiveness

diminish

and emancipation

gaia

a dear

mandate

in the off-year elections

of

1863.

In

his

annual

message

of December

1863,

Lincoln

acknorvl-

edged

that

his Emancipation

Proctamation a year earlier

had

been

"followed

by

dark and doubtful

days." But

now,

he

added,

"the

crisis which

threatened

to

divide

the friends

of

the

Union is past."

Even

that

statement

nrrned

out

to

be premature

and

optimistic.

In the

summer

of 1864,

northern morale

again

plummeted

and

the emanciparion

issue

once

more

threat-

ened

to

undermine

the

war

effort. By Augusr,

Granrt

cam-

paign

in

Virginia

had boggcd

down

in

the trenches after

cnorrnous

casualties, while

Sherman

seemed

similarly

stymied.

War

weariness

and defeatism

corroded

the

will

of

nonherners

as

they

contemplated

the staggering

cost

of

this

conflict

in the lives

of their

young

men.

Lincoln

came

under enormous

pressure

to

open

peace

negotiatio

end

rhe slaughter. Even

though

Jefferson

Davis

in

that Confederate

independence

r,r-as

his

essendal

con

for

peace,

northern democras

managed

to

conv

grear

many

northern people

rhat

only

Lincoln's

insis

on

emancipation

blocked

peace.

A rypical

Demo

newspaper

edirorial

declared ther

'rens

of

thousan

white men must

yet bite

rhe

dust to

qllay

the

negro

of

the

President."

":'

'

like

Horace

Greeley, who

had

cized

to

em

al

convention

ations

to

this

election.

The

rVco

York

Timcs

editor and

Repu

national

chairman Henry Raymond told

Lincoln

tha

special

czluses

are

assigned

[for]

this

great reaction

in

lic sentiment-the

rvant

ofmilitary

success,

and

the im

sion...that

we

can have

peace

rvith Union

if

we rvo

[but

rhat

you are] 6ghdng

not for

Union

but

for rhe

don of

slavery."

The

pressure

on

Lincoln

ro

back down on emanci

caused him

to

waver

temporarily,

but not to buckle. lr

he

told

weak-kreed

Republicans

that

"no

human

po*'

subdue

this

rebellion

withouq using

the

Emancipation

as

I

have done." Some

130,000 soldiers

and

sailors

fighting for

rhe

lfnion,

Lincoln noted. They

would

so if

they thought

the

North

intended to'betray them

they stake

their

lives

for us

thev must be prompted

sEongest

motive...the promise

of freedom.

An

promise

beine made, must

be

kep r. .

..}erctrrc-bga

the black

rva

wil

ro

lo

presidential election. In effecg

he was

saying

that

k

t

r

;

rs

d

n.

.1

s

r@.

In

manyways thisw

6nest hour.

As matters

nrrned

out, of course,

he

wa

right

and

president. Sherman's

capture of

Atlana,

dan's

victories

in the Shenandoah

Valley, and militar

cess

elsewhere transformed

the northern

mood

from

est

despair in August 1864

to determined

confden

November, and

Lincoln

was

triumphandy

reelecte

won

without compromising one

inch on the

emanc

question.

It

is

instnrctive to

consider rwo

possible

alternati

this outcome. If the

td

with

slavery.

Every

political observer, including

Li

Tiffived

in August

that the

Republicans

wou

live ..-rlIa

six monrhs earlier

lt.

enemtes, come

w

at best

the

L-

menq at

Vol.2 No.

I


6/10

I

the

stcadfast

purpose

of Abraham

Lincoln

than

to any

orh-

er

single factor.

The

proponens

of the self-emanciparion

thesis, horver'-

er,

rvould

avow

rhat all of this is irrelevanr.

I[

it

is

true,

as

Barbara

Fields

maintains, that by

the

time

of the Emanci-

padon

Proclemarion

"no

humln

being alive could have held

birck

the

tide

that

swepr

roward

freedom,"

that tide must

.h"r.

t*.I

even

more powerfrrl

by the fall

of

1864.

,".,

t:

.

u'ere

compelled

to retreat from

areas of the

Confed.:t;

where

their

presence

had

attracted

and

liberated conra-

bands,

the

dde

of

slaveqy

closed

in

behind

rhem.

Lee's

army

capnrred

dozens

of black pcople

in

Pennsylvania inJune

186l

and

sent

them

back

South

into slavcry. Hundre& of

black

Union

soldiers

caprured

by

Confederate

forces

were

reenslaved.

Lincoln

himself

took

note of rhis phenomenon

whcn

he

warned

that if

"the

pressure

of the

war

should

call

off

our forces

from

New

Orleans to defend

some other

-

point,

what

is to prevent

the masters

from

reducing

rhe

black

to

slavery

again; for

I

am told that whenever rhe

rebels

take

any

black

prisoners,

Free

or

slave,

thev immedi-

arely

auction

them

ofl" The edirors

oi

rhe

Freed-

men's

and

Sourhern

Sociery

Project,

rhe

most

scholarly

advocares

of

the

self-emanciparion

the-

sis,

concede

rhat

'southern armies

could recap-

nrre

black

people

who

had

already

reached Union

lines....

lndeed,

any

Union

rerreaE

could reverse

the

process

o[ liberation

and

throw

men and

women

r*'ho

tasred

freedom

backinro bondage....

Their

ravail

testified

to the

link

berween rhe mi[-

itary

success

of

rhe

Northern armies

and rhe lib-

erty

of

Southern

staves.'

Precisely.

Thar

is

the

crucial

point.

Slaves

did

mander-in


7/10

Emancipation

and

Its

Meaning

in

American

Life

-\,N

JANUARY

l,

t86J,,\lrrah:rrrr

[,incgln

prornul-

Lincoln's

edict

as

thgoccasion

to

call for

rapprochem

I I

-gared

his

Em:rncip:rdon

Proctirnuti11n.

A

docu-

betwccn

black

and

white

in

a racially

dirided ciry,

\U7

i,"nt

*hore grrn.l

ti,l.

Prorrrisctl

so

nruch but

raciatly

divided

nation-

Dismissing

the

notion

that Lin

whose

bland

,rords

deli=rercd

so tiide,

the

Ernancipation

embodied-rather

than

uanscended-American

ra

Proclamation

was :rn enigrnl

frorrr

thc ti.st.

C.rrrrempo-

('Thc

greatest

honky

of

them

all,"

Julius

Lester once

raries

were unsure.rvhether

to conrlcurn

clared),

the

men

and

women

who

pa

it

as

a

faiturg

of

itlealisrn or

rrpplrrrrrl it :rs

ed beforc

the

Proclamarion

saw

the

a triumph

of

rutpotitik,:lnrl

the

,\ureri-

ument

as

a

balm'

[t

was as if

Linc

cln

or

his

words

Documents

H006 McPherson and Berlin Readings.pdf