Grace and Aliennation

volume20,no.16 may2020

Grace and Alienation

Vida YaoRice University

© 2020 VidaYaoThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons

Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License. <www.philosophersimprint.org/020016/>

I. Introduction

You have come to the troubling realization that a friend of yours,whomyouhavelovedwithaffectionformanyyears,isn’tthepersonheseemedtobe.1Youhadn’ttakenseriouslyenoughthegossipabouthisobnoxiousandcruelbehavior.Youneverdoubtedhisvalueswhenhemade“colorfulremarks”.Andinthelastfewyears,you’vebeensobusy anddistractedwithworkandfamily thatyouhaven’treallybeenpayingmuchattentiontohimatall.Butnowyourattentionisfocused,yourawarenessheightened,andyoureyesclear.Youseenowthathereallyisapig,thathiskindnessreallyisputon,andthathischarmsaremerelythatcharms. Heisnotrefreshinglyflakey,butunreliableandinsincere.Notcharismatic,butsloppyandarrogant.Whatyouoncebelievedtobehisgoodqualitiesyounowseeasveneeroveramixofviceandhollownessunderneath.

Given this revelation, it would be reasonable to conclude thatyou’dbejustifiedincuttingyourfriendoutofyourlife.2Butlet’ssup-posethatevenifyou’dbejustifiedindoingso,youfeelmaybebe-causeyou’veknownoneanothersolongandyour livesarenowsointerwoven,ormaybebecauseheissoisolatedanddisconnectedfromhisotherfriendsandfamily,ormaybebecauseyousimplydon’twant to,giventhatyoulovehimthatthisseemstoosimpleofananswer.Let’s suppose, too, that your friend isn’tobliviousor totallybeyondthe pale.He recognizes in himself theflaws you see, and sees that

1. ForclarityandconsistencywithanexampleIwilldiscussinmoredetailbe-low,Iwillusethemalepronounforthebelovedandthefemalepronounforthelover.

2. Onemightconcludethatyoumust, insomeway,stoplovingyourfriendbe-causeonemightthinkitsimplyimpossible,conceptuallyorpsychologically,toknowinglylovethevicious.Alternatively,onemightthinkthatthereisamoralobligationordutytonot lovethevicious.Thissecondclaimisoftenpresentedasanintuitionaboutwhatmoralitydemands,buthasalsobeendefendedby, forexample,JuliaDriver.Driver,“LoveandDuty”,Philosophic Exchange, 44:1(2014).BernardWilliamscriticizesasimilarviewadvancedbyDavidA.J.RichardsinWilliams,“Persons,Character,andMorality”inMoral Luck (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1981).Richards’viewispre-sentedinA Theory of Reasons for Action(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1971).Also,considerAristotle’sviewoffriendship,accordingtowhichthehighestformofphilia isstrictlyreservedforthevirtuous.

vidayao Grace and Alienation

philosophers’imprint –2– vol.20,no.16(may2020)

inlightoftheidealofattentivelove,youlookagain atyourfriend tomakesureyourjudgmentisn’tsimplymistaken.Maybeyou’vebeeninabadandunforgivingmoodgivenwhat’sbeenhappeningatworkoronthenews.Ormaybe,followingMurdochhere,afundamentallyegoistic concern of yours (perhaps, for example, you are really justworriedaboutyourownmoralreputation)ispreventingyoufromsee-ingyourfriendasthedecentpersonhereallyis.AsMurdochremindsus, you need not only strive to see your friend accurately, but also,justly.Butsuppose thatyournewviewofhimisnotbestexplainedbymoral-epistemologicalimperfectionsonyourpart.5Themoreyouobserveyour friendnowandthemoreyourmoralconsciousness israised,themorecertainyouarethatyouwerebadlymistakenbeforeseeinghiminthisnewlight.Andagain,complicatingmatters,thoughyou’veattendedtoyourfriendout of love forhim,yourfriend,awarethathismaskhasslippedandyourperceptionhashoned,shrinksfromyourgaze,exacerbatingtheestrangementyoumighthavehopedyourlovecouldovercome.

Atthispoint,onemightproposeawayoflovingyourfriendthatislessattentive.Asphilosophershavediscussed,thereareotherformsoflovethatdonotplacesomuchimportanceonattending toyourlovedones,butinstead,onsharingintheirendsorbeingcommittedtotheirwellbeing.6Consider,also,thatmanygoodfriendshipsareconstituted

Philosophy, Film and Fiction, SusanWolf andChristopherGrau (eds.) (NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2014).

5. Thus,thecaseIaminterestedinisaninverseofMurdoch’sfamouscaseofMwho(arguablybecauseofhersnobbishness,classism,andnot-disinterestedhopesforhowherson’slifeshouldgo)cannotinitiallyseeorappreciateherdaughter-in-law,D, forwhoshereally is.Murdoch’smeta-ethicalpositionsaremore complex than I can address here, but importantly,my argumentshouldnotnecessarilybeunderstoodasachallenge toMurdoch,butrather,asadevelopmentoftheconceptionofloveasattention.ThankyoutoBridgetClarkeforpressingmeonthispoint.

6. SeeKylaEbels-Duggan,“AgainstBeneficence:ANormativeAccountofLove”,Ethics 119:1 (2008).There, she considersHarryFrankfurt’s viewasparadig-maticallyrepresentativeofwhatshecalls the“benefactorview”,whichpro-posesthatloveisessentiallyaboutdesiringthebeloved’swellbeingforhisownsake.

theyareflaws.Butthoughthisgivesyousomereasontoresistwritinghimoffentirely,italsocomplicatesyourcontinuedrelationship.Younowrealizethathisself-awarenessisaccompaniedbyboutsofshame,whichinturn(younowrealize)explainhiscaginess,artificiality,andwithdrawalfromthosewhomhesuspectshaveseenhimtruly in-cluding,now,yourself.3

Iaminterestedincaseslikethis,whereonelovessomeoneofvi-ciouscharacterandflawedpersonality,wherethebelovedisasham-edlyawareofthequalitiesthatbothdriveothersawayanddrivehimawayfromothers,andwheretheremaybeverylittlehecouldrealisti-callydotochange thequalitiesthatmaybothchallengeone’sloveofhimand spurhis feelingsof shame.What is interestingabout suchcasesisthatthoughtheyseemtosimplyyieldahostileenvironmentfor human connection, love can stillmake communion or intimacybetween loverspossible.But it isn’tobvioushow this is so,givenacertainunderstandingofinterpersonalloveandgivenacertainunder-standingofshame.

Considertwoassumptionsaboutinterpersonallovethatdrivethepuzzle.Thefirst is that, ideally, loveencouragesand fosters connec-tion and communion rather than estrangement between its parties,andsecond,thatonecentrallyimportantanddesirableaspectoflove,discussedbyIrisMurdoch,isthatitisattentive,wheretheambitionofthisdirectedattentionistoseethebelovedas he truly is.4 Soimagine:

3. AsStanleyCavellwrites, Therearenolengthstowhichwemaynotgoinordertoavoidbeingre-

vealed,even to thosewe loveandare lovedby.Or rather,especially tothoseweloveandarelovedby:tootherpeopleitiseasynottobeknown.“TheAvoidanceofLove”inMust We Mean What We Say?: A Book of Essays (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1969),284.

4. IrisMurdoch,The Sovereignty of Good (NewYork:Routledge,2001).Murdoch’sidealhasbeendiscussedby,amongothers,MarthaNussbaum,DavidVelle-man,andSusanWolf.Nussbaum, “‘This story isn’t true’:Madness,Reason,andRecantationinthe Phaedrus”inThe Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2001).Velleman,“Loveasamoralemotion”,Ethics,109:2(1999).Wolf,“LovingAt-tention:Lessons inLove fromThe Philadelphia Story” inUnderstanding Love:



anaffectionatelovethatissensitiveandresponsivetoqualitiesofthebeloved,wherethequalitiesitrespondstoarenotexhaustedbygood ones,butincludethequalities of human nature.

II. Shame, Vision, and Alienation

Letmebeginbydescribingtheprobleminmoredetail,whichIwillrefertoasthe problem of alienation.Importantly,thisproblemisdistinctfromanotherthathasdrawnmost,ifnotall,contemporaryphilosophi-caldiscussionsoflove:thequestionofthejustifiability orrationality oflovinganotherhumanbeing,either in contrast toothers (imaginedtobejustaslovable)orgiventheimpartialdemandsofmorality.Thisnarrowingofourfocushasbeen,Ithink,aprofoundmistake.Mydis-cussionwillbe insteadontheabilityof interpersonal lovetosatisfywhatwemightthinkofasoneofitsinternalideals,orproperends:tofosterconnection,communion,orintimacybetweenitsparties.11

possibleforthisconcepttobeextricatedfromitstheologicalbackgroundandstillfoundtohavevalueinnon-theologicalethics?Iproposethatwetry.Con-sideramethodologicalobservation inAnnetteBaier’spivotalworkon thevalueoftrust:

Justas theonly trustHobbistmanshows is trust inpromises,providedthereisassuranceofpunishmentforpromisebreakers,soisthistheonlysortoftrustnontheologicalmodernmoralphilosophershavegivenmuchattentionatallto,asifoncewehaveweanedourselvesfromthedegener-ateformofabsoluteandunreciprocatedtrustinGod,allourcapacityfortrustistobechanneledintotheequallydegenerateformofformalvolun-taryandreciprocatedtrustrestrictedtoequals.Butwecollectivelycannotbringoffsuchalimitationoftrusttominimalandsecuredtrust,andwecandeceiveourselvesthatwedoonlyifweavertourphilosophicalgazefromtheordinaryformsoftrustIhavebeenpointingto.“TrustandAnti-Trust”,Ethics96:2(1986),252.

In this spirit, Iofferanontheological conceptionofgraceorgracious love,the need forwhich remains even ifGod is dead.Oncewe have “weanedourselves”fromHisgrace(forworseorforbetter),itwouldbeamistaketoavertourphilosophicalgazefromourneedforit,aswellasfromtheordinaryformsofgraceIwillpointtohere,thatsometimesmiraculously,albeitinanon-supernaturalsensehumanbeingsfeelandexpresstowardonean-otherinthoroughlyhumancircumstances.

11. While “intimacy” is ambiguous, I shall focus on connection and communion, rather thanon fusion andprocreation; thus, there is a respect inwhich the

bysimplypassingtimetogethergivenasharedhobby.7Andifyouareworriedthatgivenyourdiscovery,youwouldnolongerhaveareason toloveyourfriend,otherviewsoflovecouldeitherdispelyourwor-riesbypointingoutjusthowblindlovecanbe,8orjustifyyourcontin-uedloveinsomeotherway,perhapsbymakingreferencetothelonghistoryyou’veshared.9

But I shallargue thatattentive love, thoughseeming togive risetothepuzzle,isthewayoutofitaswell.Althoughitmayappearasthough less attentive forms could re-establish connection betweenlovers in such cases, Iwill argue that they cannot preciselybecause theyare insufficientlyattentive,andbecauseofwhat it is like tobeashamedofwhoyouare.Ratherthangiveupontheidealofattentiveloveinlightofthisproblem,Iargueinsteadthatweshouldreconsiderwhat it isthatweloveabout thepeopleweattendtoinalovingway.Weshouldnot,Ipropose,limitwhatweseeandloveinotherstoei-therjustthegood qualitiesoftheircharactersorpersonalities,ortoanisolatableorabstractvaluethattheypossesssimplyinvirtueofbe-ingfellowhumanbeingsorends-in-themselves.Ishallarticulateandargueforasecular,or interpersonal,conceptionofgrace:a lovethatisnotblind,butisalso,asRobertAdamshasputit,non-proportionaltotheexcellenceofitsobjects.10OntheproposalIwilloffer,graceis

7. Aristotle’s taxonomyof friendshipsmight allow for you to continue beingfriendsinthiscase,aslongasitwasnota“character”friendship,leavingonlythe possibility of either a relatively shallow friendship of pleasure or rela-tivelydepressingfriendshipofutility.

8. TheIrrationalistpositionthatwedonotloveforreasonsatallhasbeenmostrecentlyandprominentlydefendedbyHarryFrankfurt inNecessity, Volition, and Love(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1999)andThe Reasons of Love (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2004).

9. NikoKolodny,“LoveasValuingaRelationship”,The Philosophical Review,112:2(2003).

10. RobertMerrihewAdams,Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics(Ox-ford:OxfordUniversity Press, 1999). There is nearly nowork on grace incontemporaryanalyticmoralphilosophy,withAdamsandGlenPettigroveas rareexceptions.Pettigrove,Forgiveness and Love (Oxford:OxfordUniver-sityPress,2012).ThefactthatIproposeasecularorinterpersonal conceptionofgracegivesrisetoanimportantworry.Oneoughttowonder:isitreally



shame.Forexample, itexplainswhyonedoesnotfeelshamewhenviewednegativelybyotherswhoseviewsonedoesnotrecognizeasauthoritativeatall,aswellaswhyonecanbeashamedinlightofstan-dardsthatonedoesnotfullyshare,forexample,byone’sappearanceorbadmanners,evenifonedoesnotactuallyendorsethestandardsof appearance ormanners at play. The real social expectations em-bodiedbytheotherwhoseesyoumaynotbewhollyidenticaltoyourown,butyoumustidentifywiththemenoughtonotbefullyoutsidetheirauthority,asonemightfeelwhenatouristinforeignlands. Andbecauseshameispromptedbybeingseen orviewed bythisother(realor imagined), it gives rise to its characteristic feelings, expressions,andbehavior:forexample,ofnotbeingabletolookothersintheeye,coveringone’sface,wantingtohide,tosinkthroughthefloor,orasBernardWilliamsputsit,to simply disappear.Inawaveofshame,one’swholeselfcanfeeldiminished,becauseofthefeelingthat“theotherseesallofmeandallthroughme”.14Andbecausetheimaginedothercanbefully internalized,theseurgestohidetypicallyfail toresolvethemselves,sinceonewillbetryingtoescapefromone’sowngaze henceforthetendencyofshametoleadtoself-destructiveimpulses.Iwillfocushereprimarilyonthesignificanceofshameininterpersonalrelationshipswithactualothers:onhowitalienatesorestrangesonefromthosewhoseseeminglydiminishing,penetrating,andauthorita-tivegazeonestrivestoescape.

Guilt,too,canleadtointerpersonalalienationandestrangement.15 Throughone’saction,onehasviolatedthetermsofarelationshipwith

14. Shame and Necessity (BerkeleyandLosAngeles:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,2008),89.

15. AsT.M.Scanlonwrites, “…thepainofguilt involves,atbase,a feelingofestrangement,ofhavingviolatedtherequirementsofavaluablerelationwithothers”.What We Owe To Each Other (Cambridge,MA:Harvard UniversityPress,2000),162.WhileIagreewithScanlonaboutthefeelingofestrange-ment,it’snotclearthatImustbelieveI’vedamaged arelationshipinordertofeelguilty.Icanfeelguiltyforjustdirectlywrongingyou(evenifnorelation-shipisinplace),andIcanfeelguiltyevenifIdon’tsuspectI’vedamagedourexistingrelationship.ThankyoutoSamuelReis-Dennisfordiscussionofthispoint.

Theproblemofalienationisbest illustratedbyafamiliarkindofsituationonecanfindoneselfineitherastheloverorthebeloved.Asdescribedabove,themoreextremeversionsaresituationswhereonelovessomeoneofviciouscharacterandflawedpersonality,wherethebelovedisashamedlyawareofthesequalities,andwheretheremaybeverylittlehecouldrealisticallydotochange whoheis.Thus,thebelovedisalienatedfromothers,includinghisintimates,notjustbe-causehelacksthequalitiesthatmaymakelovinghimeasyandclearlywarranted,butbecauseofthecharacteristicfeelingsandmotivationsthatcomewiththeexperienceofshame.Whileitmaybemostvividandphilosophicallychallengingtothinkofcaseswherethebelovedisespeciallyorseeminglythoroughlyviciousorhisshameespeciallycut-ting,theproblemcanariseinlessextremecircumstances,simplybe-tweenanytwolovers,evenrelativelydecentonesandwell-disposedoneswhononethelesshaveflawsaboutwhichtheyareashamed.12

Above,Inotedtwoassumptionsaboutinterpersonallovethatmo-tivate the problem: ideally, that it is both attentive and fosters con-nectionorcommunion.Butthelogicofshameshapesanddrivestheproblemaswell.13Roughly,shameisthepainfulexperienceofbeingviewedin“thewrongway”byarealorimagined(internalized)other,wherethisother is(i)apersonwhoseviewtheagentrecognizesaspartly authoritative, (ii) anembodimentof a real social expectation,and(iii)apersonwithwhomtheashamedpersoncanpartlyidentify.This complex structuremirrors the complexity of the experience of

idealIamdiscussingisofphilia andnoteros.Iwillnotprimarilyuseexamplesoferoticlovers,orthelovethatparentshavefortheirchildrentoillustratemyarguments,butrather,onfriendsandsiblings.Ofcourse,wesometimesaspiretohavephiliawithoureroticlovers,ourparents,andourchildren,sothelinescannotbedrawnsharplyhere.ThankyoutoJohnF.Bowinfordis-cussionofthispoint.

12. ThankyoutoRyanPreston-Roedderforthisobservation.

13. ThisroughsketchisallIneedformypurposeshere;Iamrelyingonthede-tailedworkofSartre,GabrielleTaylor,BernardWilliams,JohnDeigh,HerbertMorris,JeffrieMurphy,andSandraLeeBartky,especiallyheressay,“ShameandGender”inFemininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Op-pression (NewYork:Routledge,1990).



orlookaway.This iswhywhenoneisashamed,onemightnotfeelpunished, butratherexiled.Andthird,theaspectofshamethatexplainsthese two features is that shame is felt in regards towho I am, andnotwhat I’ve done.AsJohnDeighwrites,“shameisfeltovershortcom-ings,guiltoverwrongdoings”.18WhileIcanofcoursebeashamedbe-causeofanactionI’veperformedgiventhat itrevealssomethingshamefulaboutmeorbecauseitispartofalargerpatternthatrevealssomething shameful aboutme often there isnoparticularwrongIcouldapologizeorcompensate for thatwouldalleviatemyshame,andmoreover,oftenwhatIamashamedabouthasnothingtodowithwhatIowetoothers.Thus,itiseithernotenough,orwouldinvolveacategorymistake,formetoapologizeorcompensateothersinordertoovercomemyshameandre-establishrelationswiththem.Rather,Ineedto change who I am.AsHerbertMorriswrites,whileguiltleadstorestoration,shameleadstocreativity.19

Butwhathappensinthenon-idealcase,whencreativityisnotare-alisticoptionfortheashamedperson?ReturnnowtothecaseIstartedwith, inwhich the beloved, though aware of his failings, cannot orwillnotchangeintherelevantway.Perhapshecannotbecausetheap-propriatetaskhemustaccomplishhereisthedifficultoneofsubstan-tive moral improvement,whichischallengingforallkindsofmundanereasons.Ifachangeofcharacternecessitatessomethinglikehabitua-tionandreflection,oneactuallyneedsthetime,energy,andresourcestodoboth.Badhabitsaredifficulttoquit,wearetoosusceptibletomixedmotivesandmanydifferentformsofakrasia, anditisacommonphenomenon, asMurdochwarns, thatmanywho actively strive tobecomebetterpeoplemayfindthemselvescaughtinaself-absorbedspiral.20

18. Deigh,“ShameandSelf-Esteem:ACritique”,Ethics,93:2(1983),225.

19. Morris,62.

20.“Theselfissuchadazzlingobjectthatifonelooksthere onemayseenoth-ingelse”,The Sovereignty of Good,30.Fordiscussionofthisobservation,seeSamanthaVice,“TheEthicsofSelf-Concern”inIris Murdoch: A Reassessment, AnneRowe(ed.)(NewYork:PalgraveMacmillan,2007).

another; guilt is thepained recognitionofwhat onehas done, andperhapsof thedamageonehasdone toone’s relationshipwith thewronged person. But asmany have noted, guilt has its advantageswhenitcomestoovercomingthisestrangement.16Whenonewrongsanotherandfeelsguiltinresponse,oneischaracteristicallymotivatedtomakeamendswhenIfeelguiltybecauseofsomethingI’vedonetoyou,Iwanttolookyouintheeye,apologize,compensate,andre-establishrelationswithyou.Ihopeforyourforgiveness,andifIamfortunate,youmaygiveittome.Imaywanttokneelbeforeyou,nothide fromyou.Andimportantly,yourresentmentorindignationinre-sponsetomywrongdoingmaymotivateyoutocometome,todemand somethingfrommeforwhatIhavedone,thusfacilitatingreconcilia-tioninawaythatsimplyavoidingmeorfeelingcontemptorpityformewouldnot.17

Shame, however, is more complicated, and the route from thecircumstances that prompt it to re-established relations with thoseitestrangesonefromislessclearforthreereasons.First,whenIamashamed,thepeoplewhomIwillfeelestrangedfromwillnotbelim-itedtothoseIhaveaffected.Ifoneisdisposedtobeashamedofone’sappearance,any stranger’sgazemightpromptanepisodeof shame;ifoneisdisposedtobeashamedofsomethinglessvisiblethanone’sappearance(one’ssocialclass,perhaps,orone’s lackofacumen, forexample),anystranger’simagined discernmentofthisfact coulddoso.Second,whileguiltisproductivelypairedwiththeresentmentorin-dignation of the peoplemywrongdoing estrangesme from, shameisnotobviouslypairedinthisway.Whenoneisashamedinfrontofanactualother,theothermaysimplyfeelcontempt,pity,orvicariousembarrassmentemotionsthatdonotcharacteristicallypromptherto engagewith the personwho is ashamed, but rather, towithdraw

16. HerbertMorris, “Shame andGuilt” inOn Guilt and Innocence:Essays in Le-gal Philosophy and Moral Psychology(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1976).

17. Fordiscussionofthispointaboutangryblame,seeSamuelReis-Dennis,“An-ger:ScaryGood”,Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 97:3(2019).



agoodheart-to-heart.Shouldacool-headedconversationfailtomovehim, you could relyonblame’sprolepsis, insisting, perhapsevenan-grily, thathegethimselfandhislifeinorder.22Butagain,supposethesituationisnotamenabletoyourhopes.Onbetterdays,yourfriendisconvincedheshouldreformhimself,butfindsthatthoughhetries,hekeepsreturningtohisusualhaunts;onworsedays,hebecomesembit-teredandresentfulthatyouaretreatinghiminthiswaybecauseheiscertainheeithercan’torwon’tchangeyoursanctimoniousharpingcannotnowmakethedifference.

Soyoumightconsideranotherresponse:compassion.Youcouldseehim,afterall,ashavinggottentowhereheisbecauseofeventsfromhispastthatheisnotresponsiblefor.Youcouldseehimnowpresentlysubject to forcesandmotives thatmakehimavictimofhis circum-stance,brainchemistry,orevenofhimself.Seeingapersoninthesewayscanoftenmitigate the reactiveattitudeof resentment,fillone’sheartwithpityandsorrowinstead,andmoveonetosincerelywanttosimplyhelpthepoorthing.Butnoticehowriskyanattitudelikecom-passionisinthiskindofsituation.Evensincerepityforthesufferingofawell-disposedpersoncanthreatenhisdignity;andinthecasesIhavefocusedon,theoperationsofshamewillmakesenseofwhythelesswell-disposedperson, in an effort of self-protection,might not takewellatalltoyourcompassionitmayonlybeaninsult.23

In contrast to tough love and compassion, the answer I shall ex-ploreisattentive love. AccordingtoMurdoch,thetaskofreallyseeing

22. BernardWilliams,“InternalReasonsandtheObscurityofBlame”inMaking Sense of Humanity: And Other Philosophical Papers (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress,1995).

23. Foranargumentthatwell-intentionedandeffectivebeneficencecanbedis-respectfulandoffensive,withafocusoncasesofthedisabled,seeAdamCu-reton,“OffensiveBeneficence”,Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 2:1 (2016).Part of the explanation is that to viewaperson compassionately involves,atleastonstandardconceptions,seeinghimasapatientratherthanan agent. Unmoderated compassion is commonly mistaken for completemoralvision,even(perhapsespecially)forthemostwell-intentioned.Forarecentfilmthatsucceedsincultivatingasincereformofcompassionatase-verecosttoseeingtheobjectofcompassionasafullhumanagent,seeRoma.

But another difficulty is that the ashamed personmay be partlyunwilling tochange in theappropriateway,even thoughhecanseethereasonsfordoingso.Oneproblemwithemergingfromashame-fulstateisnotjustthatitisdifficulttobecomeabetterpersongiventheassumptionthatoneiswholeheartedlyinvestedindoingso;itisalsothatinmanycases,becauseone’scharacterandoutlookis partlyconstitutedbyvices(theveryonesonemaybeashamedof),onemaybeinclinedtoresist theauthorityofthemoralviewfromwhichoneisbeingseen.Yes,itmaybetruethatIamriddledwithenvy,arroganceandmalice—butgiventhat I justam thisenvious,arrogantandma-liciousperson, Imay feelashamedwhilealso challenging themoralgazewhichissuesthisassessment,andwhichIamashamedinlightof.21 Inwantingtodisappearfromtheviewofothers, then, Iamnotsimplytryingtoavoidthepainofbeingseenbythem—Imayalso,inalast-ditcheffortatself-respectanddefiance,betryingtoprotect myself.

III. Love and Attentive Affection

LetmenowrestatethepuzzleIstartedwith,incorporatingthecom-plexitiesofshame.Howarewetorespondtotheashamedbeloved notjustsothathehas,forexample,hiswellbeingattendedto,orhisendsrespectedandsharedbutsothathefeelsaconnectionorcom-munionwiththosewhomhelovesandwholovehim,ratherthanthealienation and estrangement exacerbated by his shame?What reac-tionsareavailabletothosewhoseehimasheis?

Oneanswer is tough love.That is,youcouldrelyontheattitudesthataretypicallypairedwithwrongdoing,butwhichcanalsobeintel-ligibleresponsestosomeone(usuallyonlyourintimates)inanefforttogethimtobecomeabetterperson.Youcouldsithimdownandhave

21. ConsiderhowinThe Symposium, Alcibiades,wrackedwithshameanddesire,both lovesandhatesSocrates for revealing tohimthepossibilityofvirtue,andforremindinghimthathecannotachieveitwithoutbecomingsomeoneelseentirely.Thetensionarisesbecausemoralityandvirtuecivilizeandcon-strainourbasernatures,butalsobecausecertainmoralsystemscanthreatenthestatusof things thataregoodandwhichconstitute thegood aspectsofwhoweare.SusanWolf,“MoralSaints”,Journal of Philosophy,79:8(1982).



cheerup”.27Stockercharacterizesthisasaproblemofthe“indirection”ofSmith’smotives:hedoesn’tactuallycareaboutyou “directly”,butrather,caresaboutdoinghisdutygiventhatyouare a fellow x, ortheneediestx around.28

Butadifferentconcernarisesoncewetakeintoconsiderationthatthereare,afterall,dutiesthatcanobligateonedirectlytoaparticularperson.ConsideravariationofStocker’shospitalcase.Anoldfriendofyours,Zahra,isnotvisitingyoubecauseyouareafellowwhatever.Sheisvisitingyoubecauseit’s you, heroldfriend.Shewouldnot,out-sideofaphilanthropicventure,visitsomeotherxinthehospital.Sheishere toseeyou inparticular. But importantly, imagine thatshe isnonethelessmotivatedbyhersenseofduty.

ConsiderthatyouandZahrawereoncethickasthieves,butshehasbeenconsistentlyirritatedwithandboredbyyouformonths,orevenyearsnownotbecauseofanyparticularthingyou’vedone,butjustbecauseshehascometogrowtiredofyourneuroticfussinessoralternatively,yourfilthysloppiness,oryourelaborateloveofbespokecufflinksornerdymemorabilia,oryourendlessgripingabout“breed-ers”. Importantly,Zahradoesn’thate you.Shegenuinelywishesyou

27. Stocker,462,myemphasis.

28.More recentKantian projects attempt to resist this objection; for example,StevenDarwall’s“second-personstandpoint”isanattempttoconceptualizerespectasessentiallydirectedtowardandresponsivetoanindividual,partlyinresponsetoMurdoch’scomplaintthatthisiswhatKant,byhavinguscon-cernedwiththemorallawwithout,cannotcapture.However,Darwall’scon-ceptionofStrawson’s“participantstance”thatonetakesonwhenengagingfromthesecond-personstandpointwhollymoralizedismostfundamentallyaboutmakingandrespondingtocertainkindsofclaimsononeanother.Heonlybrieflymentionstheroleofloveinengagingwithanindividualfromtheparticipantstance.Morerecently,MelissaMerritthasarguedthatKanttakesourobligationstobegroundedinanddirectedtoparticularindividuals,andnotsimplyto“thehumanbeingassuch”.Nonetheless,IwillarguebelowthatevenifKantiansandKantcanrespondtoStocker’sobjectionasheoriginallypresentedit,myvariantoftheproblemofalienationstillhasteeth.Darwall,The Second-Person Standpoint:Morality, Respect, and Accountability(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,2006).Merritt,“Love,Respect,andIndividu-als:MurdochasaGuidetoKantianEthics”,European Journal of Philosophy,25:4(2017).

anotherpersonaccuratelyandjustlyisamoralachievementasittakesseeingpastour“fat,relentless”egosinordertorecognize anotherper-sonaspartofarealitythatexistsbeyondourselves.Itistoresistseeinghimtaintedandshapedbyour fears,needs,and(typicallynarcissis-tic)fantasies.IagreewithMurdoch.Butitisimportantnottoforgetthatattentiveloveisnotjustanidealbecauseitinvolvesamoralandepistemologicalimprovementinthelover,butbecauseitprovidesthebelovedwiththesensethathewhohereallyormostfullyordeeplyis istheobjectofanother’slovingattention.24Hecanletdownhisguard,andletanotherin.25

To illustrate thedifference that lovingattention toandof thebe-loved’sselforsoulcanmaketohim, let’srevisitMichaelStocker’sfa-mousexampleofSmith,dutifullyvisitingyouwhileyouare “boredandrestlessandatlooseends”inhospital.26InStocker’sexample,ourconcernaboutthequalityofSmith’sattitudestowardyouariseswhenwelearnthathehascometoseeyounotbecausehewasmotivatedtodoso“directly”,but“…becausehethoughtithisduty,perhapsasafellowChristianorCommunistorwhatever,orsimplybecauseheknowsofnoonemore inneedofcheeringupandnooneeasier to

24.AsNussbaumcharacterizesthisidealinherreadingofthePhaedrus,itisloveofthebeloved’scharacter“throughandthrough”(218).Thatone’swhole self istheobjectofloveiswhy,asSusanWolfwrites,lovecanboostone’sself-esteem.Foradiscussionofarelatedfeatureoflove,howitfunctionsasabe-stowalofstatus,seeSandraLeeBartky,“FeedingEgosandTendingWounds:DeferenceandDisaffectioninWomen’sEmotionalLabor”inFemininity and Domination.

25. “I don’twant to change you/ I don’twant to change you/ I don’twant tochangeyourmind/Ijustcameacrossamanger/Wherethereisnothedan-ger/Where lovehaseyesand isnotblind”.DamienRice, “Idon’twant tochangeyou”inMy Favourite Faded Fantasy (2014).

26.MichaelStocker,“TheSchizophreniaofModernEthicalTheories”,Journal of Philosophy73:14(1976),462.Stockerdidnotrefertotheproblemhedescribesasoneof“alienation”,thoughbothPeterRailtonandAdrianPiperdo.Railton,“Alienation,Consequentialism,andtheDemandsofMorality”,Philosophy and Public Affairs: 13:2(1984).Piper,“MoralTheoryandMoralAlienation”,Journal of Philosophy, 84:2(1987).



sake, can be done without affection, without enthusiasm some-timeswithout love at all.31

Whatisunfortunateforyouaboutadutifulfriend’svisitisnotthatherloveislacking inmoralquality,butjustthatyourfriendfindsyouburdensome becauseshenolongerhasaffectionforyourcharacterorpersonality.Thoughshesincerelyhopesforyourspeedyrecoveryforyoursake,sheisnotinterested inyou.Toputthisplainly:shedoesn’tlikeyou.Thisisglum,andyoumayjustifiablyfeelevenasshesitsbyyoursideandtellsyouastoryaboutherdaytokeepyourthoughtsoccupiedestrangedfromher,thoughyoumayalsohavenomoralcomplaintnordoubtsaboutthefactthatshelovesyou.32

Thus,itmattersthatwearenotjustloved,butappreciatedorlikedforwhoweare.However,itisstillnotclearthatattentivelove,nowunderstoodaspartlyamatterofhavingaffectionforthebeloved’schar-acter,willalleviatethebeloved’sfeelingsofalienationinthekindofcase I startedwith,wherewe can imagine that preciselywhat is at

31. “Tobe committed tomeeting children’sdemand forpreservationdoesnotrequireenthusiasmoreven love; it simplymeans to seevulnerability andtorespondto itwithcarethanabuse, indifference,orflight”.SaraRuddick,Maternal Thinking: Toward a Politics of Peace(Boston:BeaconPress,2002),19.Thispoint,Ithink,isexactlyrightandcanclearlybeextendedbeyondthevulnerabilitiesofchildren.

32. ThoughIhaveotherobjectionstohisaccountoflove,IagreewithFrankfurt’sobservationthat

…loversoftenenjoythecompanyoftheirbeloveds,cherishvarioustypesofintimateconnectionwiththem,andyearnforreciprocity.These enthusi-asms are not essential.Nor is it essential that a person like what he loves.Hemayevenfinditdistasteful.”The Reasons of Love, 43,myemphasis.

Nonetheless,thismayleadtosomejustifiedsaltinessonthepartofthebe-loved.ConsideranexamplefromtherecentfilmLady Bird.Inresponsetohermother’sretortthatapinkandfrillydresswhichLadyBirdtakestoexemplifyherpersonalityistoo pink,LadyBird(SaoirseRonan)laments,“Ijustwish…Iwishthatyoulikedme.”Hermother(LaurieMetcalf)replies,“OfcourseIloveyou.”“Butdoyoulikeme?”Hermotherreplies,“Iwantyoutobetheverybestversionofyourselfthatyoucanbe.”“What if this is the best version?”(Itisnoaccidentthatwriter-directorGretaGerwigwasinfluencedbySimoneWeil,whoseproposalthatlove is attentionisdevelopedbyMurdochandgivenvoicetobySisterSarahJoan(LoisSmith).)

well,wantstoalleviateyourboredomandloneliness,andhopesyouwillrecoverandgetbacktoyourlifesoon,allforyoursake.Shedoes,inarealsense,loveyou.Butshehasfoundthatshefindsyoutediousor impossibletospendtimewith;she isnotcuriousaboutyour life,haslittledesiretostayintouch,andabsolutelynodesiretospendalazydaychattingandloungingaroundthehouse,asonceyoulovedtodo.Butwhenshehearsthatyouareinhospital,sheunhesitatinglyrecognizes that, afterall, sheowes it toyou topayyouavisit.Andseeingyou lying thereall sickandpaleandat looseends,she feelsgenuinelysorryforyou.

Inthiscase,theobligationthatZahraisandfeelsboundby,isanobligationtoyou.Shedoesinsomesensecareaboutyouinparticular.Andby visiting you, she is fulfillingher obligation to you.ButwhymightyoustillfindZahra’sattitudesnotexactlywhatyouhadhopedfor,eventhoughyouhavenomoralgroundstoobject tothem?29Theworryinthiscasecannotbethatyou getintothepictureinonlyanin-directmanner.Rather,itisthateventhoughyoumaywantyourfriendtovisityoubecauseit’syou, youmightalsonotwantyourfriendtovisityoumainlyorsolelybecausesheisobligatedtodoso,orevenifshedesiresyourwellbeingforyoursakeevenwhenyouarethepar-ticularpersonsheisobligatedto,ortheparticularpersonwhosewell-beingshecaresabout.AsStockernoteselsewhere,thereisafamiliarandcrucial role thatdutyandobligationplay inclose interpersonalrelationships:asbeingrelieduponpreciselywhenourfeelingsofaf-fectionare“wornthin”.30Andweshouldnot forget,also, thatmuchofcaringaboutthewellbeingofanother,sincerelyandfortheirown

29.Angela Smith argues that included among the many things we owe ourfriendsarecertainattitudes;however,sheemphasizesattitudesofcareandconcern,respect,takingpleasureintheiraccomplishments,andfeelingsad-nessintheirlosses.WecanimaginethatZahrafeelsallthesethingstowardyou.She justdoesn’t like you.Smith, “GuiltyThoughts” inMorality and the Emotions,CarlaBagnoli(ed.)(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2011).

30.Stocker,465,fn.9.



OnewayofunderstandingthechallengeGloryfacesisthatitarisesgivencertainassumptionsaboutwhattraitsofcharacterorpersonalitylovecanbeanappropriateresponseto.Consider,forexample,KateAbramsonandAdamLeite’sconceptionoflove.33InelaboratingonPe-terStrawson’ssuggestionthatthereisaparticularkindofreactivelovethat,inhiswords,is“thesortoflovewhichtwoadultscansometimesbesaidtofeelreciprocally,foreachother”,34they proposealovethatis“anaffectionateattachmentappropriatelyfeltasanon-self-interestedresponsetoparticularkindsof…featuresofcharacterexpressedbythelovedone….”35Sofar,sogood.

Theproblememergesoncewesee that the featuresof characterthatAbramsonandLeitebelieveloveisanappropriateaffectionatere-sponsetomustbe“morallylaudableones”.Puttingasideamoregen-eralobjectiononecouldraisetothisidea,whenitcomestotheprob-lemofalienation,itisexactlythiskindoflovethatthebelovedwillbewaryof.Jackcannottrustit,asatthispointinhislife,he(reasonably)believesthathecannotsatisfytheconditionsthatitsets,norisitevencleartohimgivenwhoheactuallyandpresentlyisthathewouldwant tomeet itsconditionsifhecould.36Andso,Glory’sproblemiscomplicatedbythefactthatnotonlyisJacklackingingoodqualitiesthatmaymakehimeasierormoreappropriate to loveaccording tothisview,heisalsoalienated bycertainformsof love, includingthisone.Theyhavedrivenhimfromhishome.

33. “LoveasaReactiveEmotion”,The Philosophical Quarterly, 61:245(2010).

34. “FreedomandResentment”inFreedom and Resentment and Other Essays (Lon-don:Methuen&Co.Ltd.,1974),9.

35. AbramsonandLeite,677.

36.ConsiderthisconstructedtypeofconversationbetweenJackandhisfather,combiningmemoriesofdifferenttokenconversations:“Jack,canyoutellmewhyyouhavedonewhateveryoudid,actedhoweveryoudid?No,sir.Youcan’texplain it, Jack?No,sir.…Youdounderstandthatwhatyoudidwaswrong.Yes,sir,Iunderstandthat.Willyouprayforabetterconscience,betterjudgment,Jack?No,sir,IdoubtthatIwill.WellI’llprayfor youthen.Thankyou,sir.”

issue is thequestionofwhetherornot thebeloved,becauseofhischaracter,isworth thiskindofattentiveaffection,andwherethisques-tionisforhimliveenoughtoanimatehisshame.Havingspelledoutshame’s connectionwithvision, I cannowstatemoreexplicitly thechallengefacingtheidealofattentiveloveifitistofosterconnectionrather than threaten it.Whatattentive lovestrives todo(tosee thebelovedashereallyis)isexactlywhatpromptshisshame:heisbeingseenbytheotheraswho(hefears)hereallyis.

Nonetheless, Iwillargue thatalternativeviewsof love,preciselybecausetheyareless attentive,onlyexacerbatethisproblem,andthattheidealofattentivelove,whenmodifiedorsupplementedbygrace, canresolveit.InsectionV,Iwilldiscussthissupplementation.Beforedoingso,Iwillfirstconsiderthreeotherwisepromisingviewsofloveanddemonstratehow theyeachexacerbate rather thanalleviatees-trangementbetweenlovers.

IV. Love, Vision, and Connection

Toguideand illustrate thisdiscussion, Iwilluseasanextendedex-ampleMarilynneRobinson’snovel,Home.Init,Gloryfacesaproblemthat is similar to the one I startedwith. As an adult, she is now fi-nallygettingtoknowherolderbrother,Jack,whohasbeenawayfromhomefortwentyyears,andofwhomGloryhasonlychildhoodmemo-ries.Theirre-acquaintancebeginstenuouslyanddevelopsinfitsandstartsasJackrevealsandconfesseshisvices,alwayswiththewarinessandexpectationthatatsomepointhissisterwilleitherhavetodirectherattentionelsewhere,orattenuateheraffection forhim.Andhisapprehensionsarepartlyjustified:shecomestoseethathereallyis,amongotherthings,a“drunk”,a“thief”,anda“liar”.Shecomestolearnthathehasnoexcuseforfatheringandabandoningadaughter,whomGlorycomestocareforandeventually lovebeforethechilddiesofillness.Andimportantly,GlorycomestoseethetraitsofhischaracterandpersonalitythatunderlieandexplainJack’sdrunkenness,thievery,andlying:heis,amongotherthings,partlycowardlyandpartlypreda-tory,arrogant,andbelligerent.



Thismarksan importantmoment in thenovel:anaffirmationofGlory’s attitudes toward Jack.Earlier in their re-acquaintance,Gloryhadnoticedandremarkedthatshe,assheputsit,likes hissoul the way it is.GiventhesortofpersonJackis,andthepersonGlory is,shewaspuzzledbythis.38Now,explicitlywithinacontextinwhichJackhasagainfailedto liveuptovaluesandstandardsofconducttheybothrecognizetheauthorityof,andinresponsetoanotherbreakinganddarkeningofhissoul,Gloryre-affirmsandexpressesheraffection forhis soul the way it is.ThoughJacktriestodeflectthecommentbysug-gestingthatGlorydoesn’treallyknowwhathissoulislike,shepoint-edlydemonstratesthatheraffectiontowardhimispairedwithadis-cerningawarenessofhisvicesandthedistinctivewaysinwhichtheymanifestinhisbehavior.Ratherthanquarrelwithorrejecthisclaimthatshedoesn’tknowhimbycitingthegoodqualitiesonemightar-guehenonethelesspossesses,shealludestothosesheknowshefindsmostshameful.Butheneednotfearthatherloveassumestoomuch,norneedheshrinkfromhergaze.Shelikeshissoulthewayitis;herloveisgracious.

Beforeofferingoneproposalforhowtounderstandwhatgraceorgraciousloveis,andbeforeshowinghowitalleviatestheproblemofalienation, Iwill now consider three contemporary theories of lovethatcangroundtheappropriatenessandrationalityoflovingthepeo-plewedo,evenwhentheirsoulsareinabadstate.However,noneemphasizes the importance of attention to and affection for the be-loved’scharacterorpersonality.Thoughtheseformsmaymakeitlesspuzzlinghowitcouldbecoherent, rational,orappropriate forGlorytoloveJack,theywillnothelpwiththeproblemofalienation,preciselybecauseoftheirlackofattentiontowhothebelovedis,andbecauseoftheoperationsofshame.

277−278.

38.Glory isbothamorallygoodandpiousperson.Wealso learn thatGlory’sdreamsofasimplefamilylifehadbeenpainfullyshatteredbyamanwho,likeJack,tookadvantageofa“vulnerablewoman”.

Glory isable tomeet thischallengebetter thananyof theothermembers of their family or townsfolk of Gilead who become reac-quaintedwith Jackuponhis return.Consider this scene late in thenovel,inwhichGloryreflectsonthequalityofJack’ssoulwhilehelp-inghimwashupfromanightofheavy,self-destructivedrinking:

Glorysaid, “Youmightrubyourhandswithshortening.Thatwouldprobablydissolvethegrease.…”Shetookthecanfromthecupboard,scoopedoutaspoonful,andputitinhispalm.Shesaid,“Rememberwhenyoutalkedtomeaboutyoursoul,aboutsavingit?”

He shrugged. “I think youmaybemistakingme forsomeoneelse.”

“AndIsaidIlikeditthewayitis.”“Now Iknowyou’remistakingme for someoneelse.”

Hedidnotlookupfromthemassagingofhishands.“I’ve thought about what I should have said to you

then,andIhaven’tchangedmymindatall.…[Y]oursoulseemsfine tome. Idon’tknowwhat thatmeanseither.Anyway,it’strue.”

Hesaid,“Thanks,chum.Butyoudon’tknowme.Well,youknowI’madrunk.”

“Andathief.”He laughed. “Yes,adrunkanda thief. I’malsoa ter-

riblecoward.WhichisoneofthereasonsIliesomuch.”Shenodded.“I’venoticedthat.”“Nokidding.Whatelsehaveyounoticed?”“I’mnotgoingtomentionvulnerablewomen.”“Thanks,”hesaid.“Verygenerousinthecircumstances.”Shenodded.“Ithinkso.”Hesaid, “Iamunaccountablyvain,despiteall,and I

haveastreakofmalicethatdoesnotlimititselftofutileeffortsatself-defense.”“I’venoticedthat,too.”37

37.Marilynne Robinson, Home (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2008),



ofhisactions.41His father’s love,which,whenaffectionate, isbasedontheinterpretationofJackthatemphasizesthefactthatJackstarted off alonelierandmoreestrangedchild,onlyleavesJackfeelingmoreashamedanddefensive.Whensiblingsandwell-wishersexpresstheirfaithinJack,theseexpressionsonlypushhimfurtheraway.42

Whyisthis?Returntotheoperationsofshame.First,evenifothershavefaiththatJackwillbecomeabetterperson,orthatdeepdownheisabetterperson,Jack does not.43Thus,theirlovedoesnothingtoalleviatetheshamehewouldfeelinlightofamorediscerningotherwhoheimaginesseesallofhim,andallthroughhim,orwhowouldnottakehischildhoodasprovidingagenuineexcuseforwhohehasbecome.Hecannottrusthimselftobethekindofpersonthatthosewhohavefaithinhimbelievehecanbe,nordoeshefullyidentifyasthekindofpersonthatthecharitableseeinhim.Sotheirvisionofhim,in failing to seehimashe seeshimself, cannotpierce through anddispeltheshamepromptedbywhohefearsheisitinsteadchangesthetopic.44Second,hisshameisexacerbatedbytheirwillingnesstocontinuetogivehimthebenefitofthedoubt:thoughatemperamen-tallydifferentpersonmightreactmorepositivelytoanother’ssincere

41. Gloryoffers:“Thatwasallsolongago.Youwereyoung.”Jackresponds,“No,Iwasn’tyoung.Idon’tbelieveIeverwasyoung.…Excusesscareme,Glory.TheymakemefeellikeI’mlosinghold.Ican’texplainit.Butpleasedon’ttrytomakeexcusesforme.”Excusesoftenworkbydistinguishingwhatonedidfromwhoonereallyis;Jackfeelsdisorientedbyexcusesbecause,asheexpe-riencedhisactions,theyweretheproductofwhohereallyis,not,forexample,theresultofweaknessorimmaturityoralapseofthought.

42. Faith is expressedby another character (Lila), implicitly as away to thinkaboutJack:shesuggeststhatGod’sgraceistheunderstandingthateveryone can change for the better.Immediatelyfollowingthis,Jackgoesofftherailsonceagain,drinkinghimselfintooblivion.Itisafter thisepisodethatGloryrestateshersentiment.“I’mtrying,butI’vegone/Throughtheglassagain/Justcomeandfindme/Godloveseverybody,don’tremindme”.TheNational,“Grace-less”inTrouble Will Find Me(2013).

43. “Graceless/ I figuredouthow tobe faithless/But itwouldbe a shame towastethis/Youcan’timaginehowIhatethis/Graceless”.Ibid.

44. JackrespondstoGlory’sclaimthatshewouldn’tcareifhewereapettythief(implyingthatshetrustsorhasfaiththatheisnot, infact,apettythief),“That’sverysubjunctiveofyou”.

I’llconsiderthreeviewshere:(i) theproposalthat lovingpeopleoften involves being epistemically partial toward them, (ii) the pro-posalthatwelovepeoplejustbecauseoftherelationshipwestandinwiththemorbecauseofoursharedhistory,and(iii)theneo-Kantianproposalthatwhenweloveaperson,welovenotthequalitiesofhischaracterorpersonality(goodorbad),buthispersonhood orhumanity.

BeginwiththeproposalthatGloryshouldfocusherattentiononmore optimistic or charitable interpretations of Jack’s character. AsSarahStroudhasargued,therearemanywaysinwhichwecanseean-otherinamorepositivelight,someofwhichresultfromanepistemicpartialitythatgoodfriends(andgoodloversmoregenerally)exhibittoward one another.39 In a similar vein, according to Ryan Preston-Roedder, faith in another person involves believing of him that heisfundamentallygoodordecent,evenwhenonelackstheevidenceneededtofullyjustifythatbelief.40Whilethissortoffaithisthebasisofamoralvirtue,Preston-Roedderalsoarguesthatitisanimportantaspectofsustainingandnourishingalovingrelationshipwithanother,notinghowhavingfaithinapersoncanbolsterhisself-esteem.

Ihavenoobjection to theclaim that inmanyofour friendships,formsofepistemicpartialityareneededandvaluable; it isalsotruethat faith inothers can sustain loving relationships,maybe exactlythekindofresponsethatyourbelovedneedstobolsterhisconfidenceinhisabilities,andisthebasisofacentrallyimportantmoralvirtue.Thechallenge,again,isthatincertaincontexts,withpeopleofacer-taintemperament,somethingelsemaybeneededtofullyreachouttothebelovedwithoutalienatinghimfurtherakindoflovethatisn’tbasedonpartialorcharitableinterpretationsofwhoheis,onfaiththatheisbetterthanheis,orthathewilleventuallybecomethebetterper-sonyoubelievehimtobe.Toillustratethis,returntoJack.Heobjectsandresistswhenhisfamilymembersoffercharitableinterpretations

39.SarahStroud,“EpistemicPartialityinFriendship”,Ethics, 116:3(2006).

40.RyanPreston-Roedder,“FaithinHumanity”,Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,87:3(2013).



Whyis this? InthehospitalexampleIdescribedabove,youmayfeelabitglumorhurtthatyourfrienddoesn’tlikeorappreciateyourpersonalityorcharacteranymore.Butnowconsiderhowyoumightfeelif,likeJack,youarealsoashamed ofwhoyouare.Heknowsthatnotonlyhashis family’s affection forhimworn thin (and that theyoftenrelyonasenseofdutytomotivatetheirloveofhim),buthealsoknowsthatheisadisappointmenttothem.48Whenhisfamilynonethe-lesscontinuestolovehimandexpressthislovethroughasincerecon-cernforhiswellbeingsimplybecauseheistheir brotherorson,andnotbecauseofwhoheis,thisonlyconfirmsJack’sfearsthatiftheywere to lookmorecloselyatwhoheis,theiraffection,ifnottheirconcernforhiswellbeing,wouldbechallengedandattenuated as it in fact is.Moreover,thathisfamilymembersremaincommittedtohiswellbeingforthesimplereasonthatheistheirbrotherorsononlyfurthershisshameandexacerbateshis feelingsof vulnerability and lackof self-respect,andthisinturncauseshisself-protectivetouchiness.

Finally,whatabouttheideathatGlorylovesJackbecauseJack likeallhumanbeingshasthevalueofpersonhood orhumanity?Ac-cordingtoDavidVelleman,all persons,eventhosewiththekindofcharacterthatJackhas,areworthyofbothrespectandlovesimplyinvirtueof their existenceas rationalbeings.Othershaveobjected toVellemanbydenying that there is anessential andvaluable featurethatall rationalbeingsshare,orbyarguingthatVelleman’saccount,

48. Jack’sshameissurelycompoundedby the fact thatheknowsthathis fam-ilymembersarenotjustliabletobedisappointedbyhim,buttheyarealsoashamed ofhim.WardE.Jonesarguesthatthis ispartlybecauseone’swell-beingdependsuponthewellbeingof thosewhomoneloves(andsotheirshameisyourshame),andbecausetolovesomeoneistopersistentlybelieveinthebeloved’smoralgoodness.IagreeabouttheconnectionsWardpropos-es,butdisagreethatthispersistentbeliefisjustpart ofwhatlovinganotherpersonis.AsIamarguinghere,itmaybeidealtogiveupthepersistentbeliefinthebeloved’smoralgoodness,andlovethepersonasheisregardless.It’struethatone’swellbeingcandependuponthewellbeingofone’slovedones,buttheidealofattentivelovestrivestoeliminatetheextenttowhichthiswilldetermineandshapehowoneseesandwhatoneneedsfromthebeloved.SeeWardE. Jones, “ALover’sShame”,Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 15:5(2012).

faithinhim,Jack’sshamehasalreadymadehimtouchyandresentfulinresponseto theblindcharityofothers,andunable tohandle theunspokenburdenmadeonanyonewhoonehastrustorfaithin.

Similarproblemsarisewithformsoflovethatareinattentivetoaperson’scharacternotbecausetheyinvolveformsofepistemicpartial-ity,butbecausetheyaregroundedinfactsthatlieoutsideit.AsNikoKolodnyhasargued,aparadigmaticformof loveisthelovewefeeltoward thosewestand incertain relationshipswith.45Onecan loveapersoninthiswayevenifthereisnothingaboutthequalityofthatperson’scharacterthatonethinksofasgood:itissufficientthatonehassharedahistorywithhim,orthatonestandsinacertainimportantrelationshiptohim,suchasbeinghisgeneticparent.46Whoheisoth-erwiseisnotofmuchimportance.

Theproblemwith thiskindof love isnot that it isn’t intelligible,rational, appropriate,or valuable. It canbeall these things, and im-portantly,itcanmakesenseofwhy,inthekindofcaseIbeganwith,youmightcontinuetoloveyourfriendsimplyforhavingknownhimforalltheseyears;itisalsowhatseemstobeatworkintheexampleofyouandZahra.Thereisakindofloyaltyexemplifiedbythosewholoveinthisway.However,withincertaincontextssuchastheonesI’vefocusedon,thebelovedmightneedsomethingelsebeyondalovethatisstablebecauseitisbasedonjustone’srelationshiporhistorywithhim:akindoflovethatisattentiveandresponsivetowho he is.47

45. “LoveasValuingaRelationship”.

46.NikoKolodny, “WhichRelationships JustifyPartiality?TheCaseofParentsandChildren”,Philosophy & Public Affairs,38:1(2010).

47. Partof the tension toward theendof thenovel involves JackmakingsurethatheleavesthefamilyhouseholdbeforeTeddy,hisgoodandaccomplishedolderbrother,comestotendfortheirdyingfather.Jackrecollects:

[Teddy]cametoSt.Louisandhuntedmedown.Hewalkedaroundthe

backstreetswithacoupleofphotographsuntilhefoundsomeonewhorecognizedme.Ittookhimdays.Hewasjustoutofmedicalschool.AndIwasnotinverygoodshape.Thatmayhavebeenmynadir,infact.Wesatonabenchandatesandwichestogether.Heaskedmetocomehomewithhim,butIdeclined.HeofferedmesomemoneyandItookit.Amiser-ableexperienceforbothofus.



NoticehowVellemanhasdemarcatedtheterritoryoftheselfhere.It’struethatmanypeoplemightreasonablynotwanttobelovedsolely becauseof,forexample,theyellowoftheirhair(anexamplethatVel-lemanuses), theirflesh andblood (literally), or theirmerebehavior.Evenif theseareintrinsicallyvaluablequalities, they(ontheirown)serveasrelativelyshallowreasonsforsomebodytoloveyou,andtheyareshallowbecause thequalitiesofone’sappearanceorpatternsofbehaviorarenotontheirownaspectsofone’scharacterorpersonali-ty.52Thesearequalitiesaccessibletoone’s“empirical”senseofvision.But importantly, these shallow qualities are altogether and impor-tantlydifferentfromone’ssenseofhumor,tasteinmusic,boisteroustemperament,orcuttingtemper.It isimportantthatwenotconflatethefirstsetofqualities(ofone’sappearanceandbehavior)withthesecond (ofone’s characterorpersonality), even though itwouldbestrangetothinkofeitheras“accessibletopurelyintellectual”experi-ence.Moreover,onemightwanttobelovedforthesecondsetofqual-ities(ofthecharacterorpersonality)notbecausetheyareexpressiveofa“deeper”valueor“innerself”thatliesunderneath orbeyondthem,orbecausetheyarethenecessarymeanstolovingthatdeepervalue,butbecausetheyconstitutewho he is.Indeed,thesequalitiesareoftheverykindthatareatissuewhenitcomestoJack’sshame.53

But Velleman’s proposal is Kantian.What aboutKant? ConsiderKant’sproposalwhenheconsiders thequestionofwhetherwecan

52. Tobeclear,Iamnotclaimingthattheseshallowformsoflovearenot“reallyformsoflove”,orthattheyareobviouslyworse thanotherformsoflovethatground themselves incharacterorpersonality,or thatanyonewho isafterashallowformofloveisdoingsoundertheguiseofadeeperformoflove.Theystrikemeasjustdifferentwaysforhumanbeingstobeattachedandat-tractedtooneanother,andthatwehavesomereasonphilosophically,andinourpersonallives,tonotconfusethemforoneanother.ThankyoutoUlrikaCarlssonfordiscussionofthispoint.

53. Thoughofcourse,wecanalsobeashamedofourmoreempiricallyaccessiblequalities(e.g.ourbodilyappearance) inwhichcase,one’sshamemightverywellbealleviatedbyaloveofthosequalities.Imighthaveaffectionforyourpaunch,yourscar,oryoursnaggletooth;shouldyoucareatallabouthowIseeyouandwhetherIloveyou,thismightverywellgosomewayinalleviatingsomeofyourshameaboutthesethings.

ingroundingloveinwhatalsogroundsrespect,cannotaccommodatefortheselectivityofpersonallove.Iwilldiscussadifferentworryfromthese,raisedbytheproblemofalienation.

I’vealreadynotedthatotherviewsoflovedonottakeseriouslytheideathatJackistobeappreciatedforwhoheis.WhileVelleman’sac-countseemsbetterabletoaccommodatethebeloved’sself(andwhileVellemanhimselfpresentshisviewasanarticulationof theMurdo-chian ideal of attentive love), it is important to seewhat Vellemanconsidersthatselftobe,andthewayinwhichwearetoappreciateit.Vellemanwrites:

Theimmediateobjectoflove,Iwouldsay,isthemanifestperson,embodiedinfleshandbloodandaccessibletothesenses.Themanifestpersonistheoneagainstwhomwehaveemotionaldefenses,andhemustdisarmthem,ifhecan,withhismanifestqualities.Graspingsomeone’sper-sonhoodintellectuallymaybeenoughtomakeusrespecthim,butunlessweactuallysee apersoninthehumanbe-ingconfrontingus,wewon’tbemovedtolove;andwecanseethepersononlybyseeinghiminorthroughhisempiricalpersona.49

In other words, Velleman’s Kantian view relies on a distinction be-tweenaselfthatisaccessibletothesenses(“themanifestperson”or“theempiricalpersona”),andaself(his“personhood”)thatisgrasped“intellectually”.Whenwe love the “empiricalpersona”, our love is “aresponseto[hismanifestqualities]as a symbol or reminder ofhisvalueasaperson”.50AsVelleman thenputs thispoint, “Onedoesn’twantone’svalue as a persontobeeclipsedbytheintrinsicvalueofone’sap-pearanceorbehavior;onewantsthemtoelicitavaluationthatlooksthroughthem,tothevalueofone’sinnerself”.51

49. “LoveasaMoralEmotion”,371.

50.Ibid.

51. Ibid.,372,myemphasis.



V. Grace and Shame

Sofar, Ihavearguedthatviewsof lovewhicharelessattentivewillonlyexacerbatetheproblemthatGloryandJackface.Thisisbecause,Ihaveargued,giventhatwhatgivesrisetoJack’salienationishisshameandfearthat if one were to see him as he truly is, hecouldonlyinspirefeelingsofdisappointment,pity,orcontempt,lessattentiveformsoflovedonotalleviatehisfear,butrather,servetoconfirmit.

Returnnow to the ideal of attentive love,whichGlory’s love ex-emplifies in the passage above. Glory’s love does not skirt aroundthefactsofJack’spastandtheconclusionsthatonewouldjustifiablydrawabouthischaracter.Itisnot evasive.Andbecauseherresponseisnonethelessoneofattentive andaffectionate loveforhissoul,ratherthancontemptordisappointmentorresentment,itallowshertoseeandspeaktruthfullyabouthimwithoutthereactionsthathavemadethattruthsopainfultohim.Becauseherresponseisnonethelessoneofattentive andaffectionate loveforhissoulratherthancompassion orpity, itdoesn’triskbeinginsultingoroverbearing.Inlettingdownhisguard,givenGlory’saffectionforhim,Jackallowshimselftobeseenand lovedby her, thereby retaining some small but utterlypriceless connectionwithanotherhumanbeing.

However,thereisstillachallengeremainingevenifwearetoun-derstandGlory’sloveasprovidinguswithanimageoftheidealofat-tentivelove.Supposethatonegrantsthattheidealisvaluableifitcanbemadesenseof,butthatitishardtoseehowitcouldbe.56Onemight

character,butitisagainakindoflovethatJack,givenhisinabilitytobelievethathewill changeovertime,wouldfindalienating.Thosewhohaveamorefluidconceptionofthemselves,orwhoaspiretoaquasi-existentialistprocessofcontinuallycreatingwhotheyare,mayalsonotneedorwantfullyatten-tiveloveasI’vedescribedit.Jack,however,isatthepointatwhichhecannotbelievethathewilleverreallychangeatall.Foradynamicviewoflovethatcanaccommodateexistentialistlovers,seeBenjaminBagley,“LovingSome-oneinParticular”,Ethics, 125:2(2015).

56.Adifferentimportantworrythatonemighthaveiswhetherlovingsomeonegraciouslycancomeatthecostofotherimportantvaluesandideals.Couldbeinggracioustowardalovedonecomeatthecostofone’sowndignityorself-respect?Coulditcomeatthecostofbeinggivingothersperhapsthose

“well-like” and not just “well-wish” a villain. His answer, like Velle-man’s,treatsthequalitiesofthevillain’scharacterasofsecondaryornon-essential importance in comparison tohis abstracthumanity orpersonhood:

…nobody canhave sucha likingwhere there isnoob-jectofwhichtoapprove.Thereis,however,adistinctiontobedrawninamanbetweenthemanhimselfandhishumanity.I may thus have a liking for the humanity, though none for the man.Icanevenhavesuchlikingforthevillain…forevenintheworstofvillainsthereisstillakernelofgood-will.54

Sowehavetwoanswersthatwillbeunsatisfying.Ontheonehand,GlorycandrawadistinctionbetweenJackandhishumanity,haveaf-fectionforthelatterandnonefortheformer.Alternatively,Glorycanhaveaffection for Jack,as longasshebelieves that (orhas the faiththat)evenintheworstofvillains,thereremainsakernelofgoodwill.Theobjectionhere isnot that there isn’t this kernelof goodwill inJackarguably,thereis,evenifheandthepeopleofGileadcannotseeit.Theobjectionisthat,onthispicture,inordertohaveaffectionforJack,Glorymusteitherrelyonwhatcanonlyseemtohimtobeakindoffaith orcharitableinterpretation(thateveninhimthereisstillakernelofgoodwill);or,supposingthatthereisthere“noobjectofwhichtoapprove”(asJackfears),allhecanreceivefromherissincerewell-wishing,andnotwell-liking.Wehavealreadyseenthateitherop-tion faithandcharity,orgoodwillwithoutaffectionwillonlyexacerbateJack’sestrangement.55

54. ImmanuelKant,Lectures on Ethics, trans. J.B. Schneewind, ed. PeterHeath(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1997),27:418,myemphasis.

55. Thisdiscussion isnotmeant tobeanexhaustiveconsiderationof thevari-ousformsoflovethatonemighthaveinresponsetoJack.MichelleMasonhassuggestedtomethatthekindof lovethatGloryhas isa love“inpros-pect”:thatis,it’sakindoflovethatrecognizesthatJack,likeallhumanbeings,doesn’thaveastaticcharacterandisliabletogrowandchange.Thisproposalcapturestheimportanceoflovingapersonovertimeandthedynamismof



nature.57Thosequalitiesarenotalwaysqualitiesthatweshouldthinkofasgoodinanynon-trivialsense.Nonetheless,itisstillpossibletobecomeendeared toanobjectuponnoticing itspossessionof suchqualities,in virtue of recognizingitspossessionofthosequalities.

TherearemanyeverydayexamplesofthiskindofaffectionthatIcouldpoint to,but I’ll startwithan illustration fromwithinphiloso-phy.58 Inherdiscussionofwhat shedescribes as “arational” actions,RosalindHursthouseproposes thatwhile someaspects of our emo-tionallivesashumanbeingscanbe“rationalized”andmadevaluablethrough this process, other aspects are typically left untouched. Ex-amplesof“arational”actionsincludethoseexplainedbyanger,hatred,orjealousy,suchas

violentlydestroyingordamaginganythingremotelycon-nectedwiththe[hated]person…e.g.,herpicture,lettersorpresents fromher,awards fromher,booksorpoemsabouther;thechairshewaswonttosit in, locksofherhair,recordingsof‘our’song,etc.59

Here,too,Hursthousediscussesindetailtheexamplethathaspuz-zledactiontheorists:thatofJane,who,“inawaveofhatredforJoan,

57. Adams notes that certain undesirable qualities can also serve as qualitiesthat ground loveof aparticularperson,butgives alternative (and, I think,non-competing)explanationsofhowthisispossible.Oneisthatsomeofourqualitiesthosethatwecanseeinlightofaperson’ssufferingorneed“…canbeawindowintoherhumanity”(168).Suchqualitiescandrawusclosertothebelovedbecauseofthepossibilityofhelpingorcomfortingher.Iagree.ButgraceasI’vedescribeditisdifferentintworespects.Notallqualitiesofhumannaturearethoseweshouldseeasresultingfromsufferingorneed,atleastwithout seeing them ina fairlycondescendingor inattentivemanner,e.g.ifmyfriendweretoviewmyimpatienceorrudenessasarisingfrommysufferingorneed,andnotjustfromhowIconstruetheworldgivenwhoIam,I’dprobablyconcludethatmyfriendreallydidn’tknowmeafterall.Andagain,Iwanttoemphasizetheaffection wecanfeeltowardsuchqualities,notjustthemotivationswehavetocarefororcomfortthosewhosufferorareinneed(whichagain,canbecondescendingatleasttothoselikeJack).

58.RosalindHursthouse,“ArationalActions”,Journal of Philosophy,88:2(1991).

59. Ibid.,58.

thinkaperson’ssoulinthesecaseswouldrepel adiscerningeyeratherthanattractit.AsKantplainlyputsthisclaiminthepassageIquotedabove: “Nobody canhave sucha likingwhere there isnoobjectofwhichtoapprove”.

The idealofattentive lovecanrespond to thischallenge,butwemustmodify or supplement the ideal of attentionwith the ideal ofgrace.ConsiderfirstRobertAdams’discussionofgrace,bywhichhemeanslove’snon-proportionality withthegoodnessofitsobjectcap-turingtheideathatgraceisameritlessgift.Adamsarguesthatthisisanessentialaspectofall genuineorgoodformsoflove.Iaminclinedtoagreewiththis,atleastwhenitcomestointerpersonallove.ButIshallusetheterm‘grace’tofocusonamorespecificattitude,wherethislove’slackofproportionalityisexplainedbythefactthatthoughit is responsive to qualities of the beloved, it is not fundamentallyresponsive tohisgoodqualities.Theproposal Ioffer is thatgrace islovethatisnon-proportionaltothegoodnessofitsobjectbecauseitisanaffectionatelovefeltinresponsetoperceivedqualitiesofhuman

whohavesufferedatthehandsofthebeloved,orperhapsjustotherswhoareevenmoreneedytheirdue?(Mightitevenconstituteawrongtothem?)Perhaps.Isthereawayforthepracticallywisepersontobalanceorharmo-nizeone’sgraciousnesswithherothervirtuesandfulfillherdutiestoothers?Ihopeso.Afewpointsabouttheemotionsmayhelpalleviatesomeworrieshere.Thefirstisthattoexperienceanemotionisnotipso facto toactinsomedeterminatewayratherthananother(e.g.savingone’sbelovedwiferatherthanadrowningstranger),eventhoughemotionstypicallycomewithchar-acteristicbehaviorandactions. It isdogmaticbehaviorismtodenythis.ToborrowaquotefromMurdoch,slightlyoutofitscontext,“Wearesuchinwardsecretcreatures,thatinwardnessisthemostamazingthingaboutus,evenmore amazing thanour reason”.The Sea, The Sea (London: PenguinBooks,2001), 173.Thesecond is that itwouldbeamistake to think thatonecanonlyfeeloneemotionatatimetowardthesameobject,andthatseeminglyantitheticalemotionscannotbeheldconsistentlywithoneanother.Graciousloveneednotbeinconsistentwith,forexample,feelingresentfultowardthebelovedwhenhedoessomethingwrong,justastoforgivesomeone,neednotinvolvecompletelyforegoing resentment,asarguedbyAndreaWestlundin“Anger,Faith,andForgiveness”,The Monist,92:4(2009).Howexactlygracewould interactwithother emotions, andhowgraciousnesswould interactwithothervirtues,isbeyondthescopeofthispaper.



This is not a complete explanation of why we are affectionatetoward these aspects of ourselves andothers, nor is it a systematicpresentationoftheseaspects,butitisthebeginningofone.Wehavesomesensealreadyofwhatwemeanby“humannature”.AsPhilippaFootemphasizes,virtuesarebestunderstoodascorrectivestothe emo-tionalandmotivationaltendencies thatonefindsinhumanbeings.63 Thus, in investigatingvirtuesandvicesatall,wemustalreadyhaveinmindsomeconceptionofwhathumannature is likeone thatis understood in terms of thick psychological qualities and disposi-tions.Andwhatweknowaboutthosequalitiesanddispositionswillinformthecontent ofthevirtues.Forexample,weknowthatcourageisavirtue that corrects theemotions,motives,pains,andpleasuresthatpartlyconstitutebothcowardiceandfoolhardiness;weknowthattemperanceisavirtuethatcorrectsfortheemotions,motives,pains,andpleasuresthatconstitutegluttonyand(asAristotleobserves,morerarelyfoundinhumanbeingsgivenournature)abstemiousness.Onthispicture,gracewouldthenbealoveforhumannature, wherehu-mannatureis understoodtoincludethoseemotionalandmotivation-altendenciesandqualitiesthatthevirtuesareneededtocorrectfor:theintemperate,theimmoderate,thecowardlyandthefoolhardy,thestingyand theostentatious, theboastfuland theundignified.Tobegraciouswouldbetohavethedispositiontolovethosequalitieswithaffection,attherighttime,totherightextent,andintherightways,notbecausetheyaregood,butbecausetheyarehuman.

Whywouldthesequalitiesbringusclosertoaclear-eyedviewoftheperson who is theobjectofour love?Typically (perhaps ideally),theseaspectsofaperson’spsychologywillnotbefullytamedbyvir-tueorbroughtinlinewithmoralobligationandduty,andmayevenbuck up against its constraints. But importantly, they nonethelessrenderhimandhisactionswhatPeterGoldiehascalled“primitivelyintelligible”.64AsGoldieargues,thiskindofintelligibilityallowsusto

63. “VirtuesandVices” inVirtues and Vices: and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2002).

64. The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

tearsat Joan’sphotowithhernails,andgougesholes in theeyes”.60 Myinteresthere isnot inHursthouse’sargumentsabout thenatureof intentional action,but rather inanobservation shemakesaboutthekindsofbeingsweare.Whilesuggesting towardtheendof thepaperthatwewouldnotwanttoridourselvesofortotallysuppresstheseactionsandtheunrulyemotionsandmotivesthatpromptthem,Hursthousewrites:

Wemightwellfindsomethingrathertouchingorendear-ingaboutpeople’sperformingmanyof thearationalac-tions;eventhedisturbinglyviolentonesseemtoevokesome sort of bondof sympathy.When Ihave read thispapertodiscussiongroups,Ihavefoundthatthelistofthe examples at thebeginning alwaysprovokes instantdelightedrecognition….61

Hursthouse’s remarkhighlights thedistinctiveaffectof theemotionI’m interested in: it is “delighted” recognition, a feeling of “endear-ment”renderingit,again,aloveofaffection, ratherthanaresponseofcompassion orrespect.Alongwithherobservation,wecanreflectonthecommonideathatpeoplearemore likeabletotheextentthattheyare“humanized”inlightoftheirflaws;itisajournalisticclichétowriteaboutthelikeabilityofathletes,artists,oractorsgivenhowhu-man (i.e.imperfect)theyseemtobeareminderthatsuchpeopleare,afterall,merehumanmortals.Hursthousealsooffersanalternativeexplanation for thosewhowouldsuggest that this feeling isalwaystheresultof“theweakandfalliblefindingimproperpleasureinhavingcompany”.62Whatcanalsoexplainthisaffectionisthatwhatwevalue,oratleastlikeaboutourselves(thatis,ushumanbeings),isthatwearepartlyplainlyemotionalcreaturesandnotalwaysrational-emotionalones.

60.Ibid.,59.

61. Ibid.,68.

62. Ibid.



Again,thequalitiesthatrenderapersonprimitivelyintelligibletousandwhichcanalsobethebasisofaffectionarenotinanynon-triv-ialsense,good.Aclear-eyedviewofyourfriendwillrespectthis.Buttoloveinthiswayistorefusetolookawayfromtheseaspectsofwhoheis,excusethem,orseethemaswhatoneabstractsfromwhenlovinghim,leavingacoreofwhohemoretrulyordeeplyis(ifonlyhewerebetterthanheinfactis).Combined,graciouslove’stwoattributes itsaccuracyanditsaffectionrenderitabletoalleviatetheproblemofalienation.Likeshame,itisacomplexemotion.Itincorporatesbothhowtheshamefulagentseeshimselfinthediscerningandpenetrat-ingeyesofanother,andsoacknowledgesthatthisis whoheis,ratherthanevadingtheissue.Ratherthanexcusinghisbadbehaviorasnotreallypartofwhoheis(andtherebyundermininghissenseofhimselfasanagent),itgrantstohimandhisshamethathereallyisthatkindofpersonwhoseestheworldthiswayandactsashedoes.Butatthesame time, it allows for a reactionunlikedisappointment,pity, con-tempt,orcompassionforwhoheisitistofeelaffectionforwhoheis,throughandthrough.

Becauseaffectionisnotbasedonmerit(andisthusa“freegift”tothebeloved), itavoidsencumberinghimwiththepresuppositionthatheiswhatheisn’t,orthefaithortrustthathecanbecomewhathecannotorwillnot.Andbecausetheattitudeofaffectionisnotagiftthatistypicallymerited,butgiveninthisparticularcasewithoutcon-siderationofmerit,itdoesnot“lower”orpresupposethelowerstatusofthereceiverinthewaythatcharityormercycan.Thus,itislessofathreattothebeloved’sdignity.Importantly,however,weshouldnotconfusethefactthatgrace’saffectionismeritlesswithitbeingeitherblind orultimatelyfocusedonsomethingbeyondthepersonitisfelttoward.Itisaresponsetoqualitiestheloverseesinthebeloved.Andwhen felt for a particular human being, it is not love for the quali-tiesofhumannatureabstractlyunderstood,ortheabstractconceptof

andamplifiesthehorrorofhermurderatBabiYar.Murphy,“KantonTheoryandPractice” inTheory and Practice, IanShapiroand JudithWagnerDecew(eds.),(NewYork:NewYorkUniversityPress,1995).

getasenseofwhatisgoingonwiththepersonweareattendingtoinawaythatisdistinctively“personal” weareabletoseehimasanotherhumanbeingwithapointofview,thoughts,feelings,andemotionsofhisown,viciousthoughhemaybe. ItistoseehimfromwhatStrawsoncallsthe“participantstance”,andtolovehimgraciouslyistorespondtohiminlightofthesequalitiesasanotherperson,afellowadultwithaffection.65

2009).AsAristotlenotes,wecanunderstandhumanvice;wedonotreactwithblame(asecond-personal,orparticipatoryreaction)tothebestialvices,butrather,withfear(VII, NE).Forsomemorediscussionoftheseideasandtheirrelationshiptotheguiseofthegoodthesis,seeVidaYao,“TheUndesirableandtheAdesirable”,Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,99:1(2019).

65.Atthispoint,onemighthopeforamoregeneral,theoreticalapproachtoun-derstandingwhatthequalitiesofhumannatureare,andsoarriveatamoredeterminatepictureofwhatqualitiesgraceisresponsiveto,orharborsomeskepticismaboutthelegitimacyoftheclaimsthatthereare suchqualities.Ihavenotofferedsuchatheoreticalapproach,norhaveIfullydefendedthelegitimacyoftheideaofhumannature;myproposalcanthusbeseenasaframeworkforgrace.Note,however,theextenttowhichany moraltheoryop-eratesbyalreadyassumingthattherearesuchqualities,aswellasproposingconcretelywhattheyare.AsAllenWoodargues,Kant’sethicsisformulatedgivenaparticularconceptionofhumannature.ForKant,wearethespeciesthatsetsitsownends,butwearealsohighlycompetitiveandpossessdeepimpulsesofbothself-loveandself-conceit.Weneedthemorallawtostrikedownourself-conceit inparticular,preciselybecause(soKantclaims) it issuchapowerful,naturaltendencywithinus.Woodalsomakesamoregen-eralmethodologicalpointaboutethicaltheoryworthpausingon:

Basictoanypracticalscienceisaknowledgeofitsmaterials…itmustbe

basedonaknowledgeofhumannature,onhumanpsychologyinabroadsense(Kant’snameforitis‘anthropology’).Theintellectualpowerofanethical theory ismainly a function of its anthropology. “Unsociable So-ciability:TheAnthropologicalBasisofKantianEthics,”Philosophical Topics, 19:1(1999),326.

Wood’s remark remindsus that it isnot justAristotle andKantwhomust,

inofferinguspowerfulethicaltheories,strivetounderstandhumannaturein termsof thickqualitiesofpsychologicaldisposition, and sonot justAr-istoteliansandKantianscouldadopt the frameworkofgrace Iamoffering.ThinkofHobbes’conceptionofhumannature(fearful,curious,andnarrowlyself-interested);thinkofPlato’s(appetitive,spirited,alwaysatriskofillusion).Think of Freud’s.As pointedout by JeffrieMurphy, consider the love thatonemayfeelforFrauAnnaG,thecentralfigureofD.M.Thomas’snovel,The White Hotel,andhowtheintimacyofone’sknowledgeandloveforhercolors



discussionswithLauraGillespie,KylaEbels-Duggan,RyanDavis,andOdedNa’aman. Ihavebenefited fromdiscussionwithaudiencesatUNC-ChapelHill, theUniversityofToronto,NewYorkUniversity,andtheUniversityofChicago.SpecialthanksareowedtoKristinaGehrman,UlrikaCarlsson,An-dreaWestlund,andUriahKriegelfordetailedcommentsaswellasstylisticsuggestions.Finally,IamindebtedtoZahraHussainRizvi,MaryReneeLind-sey,andChristopherR.Hakkenberg.

“humannature”.Itisdistinctfromformsoflovejustifiedbyaperson’sbareorabstractpersonhood orhumanity,aswellastheexplicitlytheo-logicalviewthatallhumanbeingsareworthyoflovesimplybecauseweareGod’screatures.66Theseideasontheirownpickouttoothinorabstractaqualitytoserveastherightobjectoffullyattentivelove,giventherichnessofthequalitiesofourpsychologicallives,ourchar-acters,andourpersonalities,andgivenhowourfeelingsofshamearetypicallygeneratedbythoseconcrete,richerqualitiesthatcanbesoapparenttothosewhoseeus.67Tobelovedgraciouslyisforone’slovertogrant,andthenrelyon,thisrepertoireofqualitiestoinformandsus-tainheraffectionforhim.Asanidealoflove,graceasksonetonotice moreandfeelaffection for more ofone’sbeloved—thoughitistruethathemaybetoounruly,toofearful,ortoowild,tobegood.68

66.KieranSetiyahasrecentlyarguedforanagapicformoflovethatissufficientlyjustifiedsimplyonthebasisthattheobjectofone’sloveisafellowhuman, andnotonthebasisofanyqualitiesofthebeloved.WhileIagreewithSetiyathatthefactthatsomeoneisahumanbeingcansometimesbesufficientforlove,Ithinkthatwithoutfurtherqualifications,thiskindofloveistooinat-tentivetoavoidtheproblemofalienation,anddependingonthequalityoftheloveSetiyahasinmind,itmight,toputitalittletoobluntly,giverisetojustified feelings that the lover isbeing creepy.Afterall, itpresupposesnoknowledgeofwhothebelovedactuallyis.Ialsobelievethatmyproposalal-leviatesatleastsomeofSetiya’sworrythataquality-basedviewoflovewouldrendersomepeopleunlovable.KieranSetiya,“LoveandtheValueofaLife”,Philosophical Review, 123:3 (2014).

67. Forthemetaphysicalthesisoforiginalsin,whichofcoursecanbethebasisofshameforsome,atheologicalconceptionofgracemightbeneeded.Again,Ihavenoambitionorinterestindefendingatheologicalconceptionofgrace.

68.“Iamnotmyrosyself/Leftmyrosesonmyshelf/Takethewildones,they’remyfavorites/It’sthesideeffectsthatsaveus/Grace/”,“Graceless”.”Fortheircomments, discussion, and encouragement throughout several develop-ments of this paper, I amgrateful to SusanWolf, ThomasE.Hill Jr., RyanPreston-Roedder,SamuelReis-Dennis,RobertSmithson,DouglasMacLean,BenjaminBagley,GeorgeSher,JohnLawless,andFranceyRussell.Especiallyhelpfulwith early versionsof this paperwas the conferenceonneglectedvirtuesheldinhonorofRosalindHursthouseattheUniversityofAucklandin2015;my thanks,especially, toGlenPettigrove,NoellBirondo,andNimKirkham.EspeciallyhelpfulwithlaterversionsofthispaperwerecommentsfromMichelleMasonBizriandBridgetClarkeat the2018EasternAPA inSavannah,andthe12thAnnualNorthwesternSocietyfortheTheoryofEth-ics andPoliticsConference in 2018. I amgrateful for comments fromand

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Grace and Aliennation